Estrada v. Sandiganbayan GR 148560, 19 November 2001Bellosillo (J) :

Facts:

On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Criminal Case 26558, for violation of Republic Act (RA) 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Criminal Cases 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Sections 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Criminal Case 26563, for violation of Section 7, paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth Act 142, as amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Criminal Case 26558; and, for reconsideration / reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. The grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration / reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists tojustify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001, Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 9 July 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

Issue:

Whether the Plunder law, and the information, are clear to inform Estrada of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Held:

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Section 1, paragraph (d), of the Plunder Law. Herein, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which Estrada is alleged to have committed. There was nothing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in his defense. Factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, Estrada is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. There is no basis for Estrada's claim that the Supreme Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental

purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. "On its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.

ABAKADA vs. ErmitaG.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

Facts:Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits … these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted.  Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe.  The petitioners in these cases, however, question not only the wisdom of the law, but also perceived constitutional infirmities in its passage.

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005.  They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).  Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.  These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006.

Petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate to 12% contingent on any of the two conditions being satisfied violates the due process clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people.

Petitioners’ argument is premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.   According to petitioners, the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed.  Petitioners also argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law.  Petitioners further contend that like any other property or property right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed of, and

that by limiting the same, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-added.

 Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the limitation on the creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of input tax; or (2) invests in capital equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification.

Issue:

Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate due process of law

Held:

No. The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. Moreover, input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due process clause.  A VAT-registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege.

In addition, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established.  Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity.  As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

GSIS vs. Montescarlos

G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006

Facts:

The herein petitioner assails the validity of DPWH Administrative Order No.1 which ban motorcycles’ entry or access to the limited access facilities. The petitioner contends that this is inconsistent with RA 2000, entitled “Limited Access Highway Act.” Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

Issue: Whether or not AO 1 of DPWH deprive the petitioners of due process

Held: No, Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways.41 Several cheap, accessible and practical alternative modes of transport are open to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of one’s scooter, bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle upon using a toll way.The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the “most essential, insistent and illimitable” of all government powers. The tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness.

GSIS vs. Milagros MontesclarosG.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004

Facts:

The herein respondent is the wife of Nicholas Montesclaros, who is entitled for retirement benefits under PD 1146 or the Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977. Upon application to GSIS, Nicholas designated his wife, Milagros, as his sole beneficiary. When Nicholas died, Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 18 of PD 1146 is violative of due process and equal protection clause.

Held:Yes. The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouse’s claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.

It also do violate the equal protection clause because the proviso in question do not satisfy the following requirements in determining whether a statute is valid and reasonable (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent “deathbed marriages,” then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.

DELFIN ESPINOCILLA, JR., Et. Al. Vs. BAGONG TANYAG HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION Et. Al.

G.R. No. 151019, August 9, 2007

FACTS:

Espinocillo and other petitioners who were former members of the Bagong Tanyag Homeowners’ Inc (BAHATI), filed an appeal before the S.C and faults the appellate court in not declaring the acts of BAHATI as unconstitutional or contrary to Art. 13, (Social Justice and Human Rights) sec 9 and sec 10 (under Urban Land Reform Housing ) in relation to RA 7279-An act to provide a comprehensive and continuing urban dev’t and housing program, establish a mechanism for its implementation ad for other purpose.

Petitioners contended that the property or lots which was occupied by them, or adjacent to them where they planted crops or made improvements for some time were subdivided without their consent, reassigned without due process of law and that their names were omitted in the list as prospective beneficiaries. They filed a complaint before the HIGC and the HIGC declared that they were deprived of their property right without due process of law. However upon petition of the respondents with HIGC, the latter reversed the decision and declared that the acts of the BAHATI was valid.

ISSUE:

WON the Petioners were deprived of their property without due process of law

HELD:

No. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. Record shows that the petitioners were given more sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard before they were removed from the list of prospective beneficiaries and that even after they were delisted, they were given a new deadline for them to submit requirements and were sent notices informing them of the consequences of noncompliance.