IR452 Empire and Conflict in World Politics (2015/16)

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“The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualization and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world’”1(Weber, 1948)

1Gerth H. H, C. Wright Mills; From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (International Library of Sociology), (Routledge, 2007), p155.

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A question that places the act of violence alongside a framework of rationality is certainly a complex structure to work within. To remove ‘imperialism’ from the title leaves another difficult question to answer, where the mention of irrational infers the opposite - Can the act of violence, be it physical, social or psychological, ever be rational? It is a question that relies upon perception, predictable motive and unpredictable emotion. The texts that I will reference to throughout this paper – Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (1961); Lisa Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror (2013) and, to a lesser extent, Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (2005) – certainly support both ‘sides’ of this question, where violence against imperialism is both conceivably rational and irrational. This paper will indeed argue for this middle-ground, where the attainment of a simple consensus, in this case, would require only exploring one side, be it state or subject, of the argument. Following the exploration of the terms mentioned in the question, I will turn to the character and purpose of violence, primarily when linked to themes of identity and with reference to the distinction between ‘insurgent’ and ‘terrorist’. I will then explore the application of violence and its legitimacy in relation to rationality, exploring its escalating and reciprocal nature. Through close examination of the texts, I hope to emphasise the dichotomy that is present, a political context that renders any violence against the state irrational yet, under the same conditions, can be deemed wholly rational by those subjects who wage violence against it.

To help in understanding the internal mechanisms of this ‘black box’, it is first important to unpack the definitions aforementioned in the question. To begin, regarding Imperialism, I am following the Oxford Dictionary definition of “a policy of extending a country’s power and influence through colonization and use of military force”2. In addition, when discussing the ‘state’, I am using Weber’s definition of “The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”3. Consequently, politics is defined as the “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power”4. As such, imperialism is the policy selected to extend this distribution of power, enabled by its monopoly over violence; to modify a Clausewitzian formulation, within this framework, ‘violence is the continuation of politics by any means’. The imperial state relies on its power from domination and violence, the authoritative notion of the ‘carrot and the stick’. This is where a fundamental distinction to be made first arises - imperialism relies on violence to uphold its power while those that attack imperialism rely on violence to erode its power. Finally, in regards to rationality, I will be primarily following the Weberian concept of instrumental rationality with reference to value rationality. Firstly, instrumental rationality is similar to a cost-benefit analysis, where both the performing of the action involved and the ends achieved are weighed up, where one is using the best means to achieve a certain end and the factors within the situations are seen as ‘variables’ to be controlled. Secondly, value rationality is a social action that places emphasis upon the intrinsic nature of the action undertaken, where the moral value of the means used is as important as achieving the end. Despite this, there could be scenarios where instrumental rationality is also value rationality, a key criticism of Weber’s distinction. I will be exploring modes of violence within this sociological framework, where “rational action is action based on the most efficient means to achieve a given end”5.

Firstly, I wish to discuss the character of violence, where I intend to demonstrate that its use in the pursuit of attaining individual goals can be both rational and irrational. Violence, I believe, is inherently instrumental, where it can serve as an effective means. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon described colonialism as “violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence”6. It is clear that Fanon perceived colonialism and, by default, imperialism as the very manifestation of violence, described as “not a thinking machine nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties”7. Through removing the faculty of thought and reason from this system of rule, it is apparent that Fanon perceived it to be incapable of rationality. The violence that this system enacts is one of technological superiority and total power, the ‘stick’ rather than the ‘carrot’ with “bombs raining down on them, armoured cars coming at them on every path, 2http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/imperialism?q=Imperialism 3Weber, Max; Owen, David (ed.); The Vocation Lectures: ‘Science as a Vocation’; ‘Politics as a Vocation’, (Hackett Publishing, 2004), p78.4Ibid. 5Allan, Kenneth; Explorations in Classical Sociological Theory: Seeing the Social World, (Pine Forge Press, 2009), p152. 6Fanon, Frantz; The Wretched of the Earth, (Grove Press, 2005), p60.7The Wretched of the Earth, p61.

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machine-gunning and police action”8. The colonial site, the imperial “town, all made of stone and steel”9, is where the power lies, where the native is perceived as the absolute embodiment of evil, representing “not only the absence of values but the negation of values”10. Similar to Fanon’s criticism of the colonial state, it is clear that the imperial state deployed a similar decrying rhetoric, where the native is far removed from any faculty of thought or reason. Such state mechanisms, where the native is dehumanized and portrayed as ‘evil’, are instrumental in justifying the imperial ‘monopoly on violence’. Where state violence is justified, so is its power and authority. Fanon fundamentally saw the use of violence against imperialism as the only truly rational action to take, where the “exploited man sees that his liberation implies the use of all means, and that of force first and foremost”11. This idea was aptly demonstrated in the film, ‘Burn!’ (1969), which detailed the protagonist, Jose, rising from slave to rebel leader. When Jose first strikes at his colonial oppressor, the Portuguese in this case, his English ‘handler’ Walker retorts “See? Even the Portuguese can die”12. In this sense, the act of violence served to remove the boundaries of ‘slave/master’, to render the oppressor and the oppressed both inherently human.

It is a fundamental argument in The Wretched of the Earth that violence is the most instrumentally rational option for the re-acquisition of an individual social identity. Satre’s preface to Fanon’s text describes how colonial violence “seeks to dehumanize them”13, where only the “rebel’s weapon is the proof of his humanity”14. This dehumanization process is necessarily one that contains violence, an example given by Du Bois (in, Avengers of the New World) demonstrating that this process saw the Spanish be “so extraordinary cruel so that harsh and bitter treatment would prevent Indians from daring to think of themselves as human beings”15. In another parallel to ‘Burn!’, Satre noted that violence against imperialism holds two outcomes, where killing a ‘European’ dualistically “destroys an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time”16, leaving “a dead man and a free man”17. This dualism extends into the wider cultural imperial society, described by Fanon as “a world divided into compartments”18. These settlers are described as living in a “brightly lit town”19, with “streets covered with asphalt”20 and “feet protected by strong shoes”21. In direct contrast, the native population live in a place of “ill fame”22, with “huts built one on top of another”23, symbolically a “town on its knees”24. Fundamentally, Fanon saw the only rational response for the upheaval of this system was for the native to claim this ‘violence’, to “surge into the forbidden quarters”25. Violence was to hold both a cathartic and unifying effect, a ‘cleansing force’, where “the practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link to the great chain”26. It is an evocative example to describe the different standards of living, to use the modernity and privilege of colonialism, that of ‘strong shoes’ and roads covered in asphalt, as maintained by this violence. Violence, in this sense, was to be the ultimate qualifier, that of returning humanity to the native, where “it is precisely at the moment he realizes his humanity that he begins to sharpen his weapons with which to secure its victory”27.

8The Wretched of the Earth, p64.9The Wretched of the Earth, p39. 10The Wretched of the Earth, p40. 11The Wretched of the Earth, p61. 12Pontecorvo, Gillo (Dir.); Burn! (1969). 13The Wretched of the Earth, p22.14Ibid.15Dubois, Laurent; Avengers of the New World (The Belknap Press, 2005), p39. 16Ibid. 17Ibid. 18The Wretched of the Earth, p38. 19The Wretched of the Earth, p39. 20Ibid. 21Ibid.22Ibid. 23Ibid. 24Ibid. 25The Wretched of the Earth, p40. 26The Wretched of the Earth, p94. 27The Wretched of the Earth, p43.

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It seems important to briefly refer to the Hegelian Dialectic, ‘The Master and the Slave’. This placed one human being directly against another, where each shared the “desire of each individual to be accepted as a free being”28.The victor will accept the role of the master while the individual that lost accepts the role of the slave. Through the slave recognizing his subservience, the master is established in his power. They are dependent upon one another for their freedom or lack of. This process is different under imperialism, where mutual recognition is not possible. Yet, it still fundamentally applies, with violence perceived as the very essence of these ‘Wretched’ people, where their willingness to self-sacrifice in the pursuit of freedom is surely the epitome of rationalism, described aptly by Messay where, it is “pure freedom because it values freedom more than life"29. Du Bois saw those slaves within Haiti as in a “permanent state of war with their masters”30, where “they have the right to demand liberty by any means, even violence”31. This ‘right’ for liberty would likely justify any means utilised as rational in its pursuit. Fanon also saw violence as a necessary and intrinsic good, described by Satre where “in him, the Third World finds itself and speaks to itself through his voice”32.

It is important to recognize the different elements at work within this ‘call to arms’, where I would suggest the existence of two stages. The initial strike against the oppressor could be described by another Weberian formulation, ‘affectual action’, a movement solely driven by emotion. I am sure, at this point, some critics would argue that this violence, driven purely by emotions such as anger, cannot be a rational act. However, I would argue that one cannot remove the factor of emotion and indeed, humanity, from the act of violence. It is important to note that this ‘affectual’ action, I believe, still contains an element of rationality. Fanon then advocated a second ‘wave’, where violence becomes politicized and education becomes the ends. The initial outburst of violence has to be given closer direction, or “the intense emotion of the first few hours falls to pieces if it is left to feed on its own substance”33. Consequently, following the initial ‘cleansing’ rage, the next form of violence must “uplift the people; we must develop their brains, fill them with ideas, change them and make them into human beings”34. The emphasis upon education and politicization, I believe, renders the process instrumentally rational.

Next, still in relation to identity, I wish to turn to Stampnitzky’ Disciplining of Terror, a text which offers an interesting narrative in how knowledge is created around the definition of ‘terrorism’ and its relation to rationality. The problem of defining ‘terrorism’ is a wicked one, “cursed by an ongoing inability to settle upon a stable meaning”35 but is generally regarded to describe illegitimate political violence. This problem of definition centres around three axes, all of which are similar to the process of understanding violence within Fanon and Du Bois, that of “politicization, rationality and morality”36. However, I wish to primarily focus on the definitions of ‘insurgency’ and ‘terrorism’, where a distinction lies that would perceive violence against imperialism as both rational and irrational. However, it is important to note that this text is primarily composed of academic sources, from those within the government to state policy-makers that created state-sponsored ideas and discussions. Thus, it is from a radically different perspective than that of Fanon, where any violence against imperialism was necessarily perceived as irrational. This is not a total negative though as it will allow for a more balanced argument.

The attack on the Munich Olympics in 1972, broadcast to television sets around the world, was the first turning point in the debate around ‘terrorism’. It was described, in 1976, as a “new barbarism, fought primarily not to win territory but to command attention”, “in the hope of forcing the world to listen and to right an alleged wrong”37. At the first US Conference, it was described as a “product of frustration induced by unresolved

28Kebede, Messay; The Rehabilitation of Violence and the Violence of Rehabilitation: Fanon and Colonialism, Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 31:5, (May, 2001), p546.29The Rehabilitation of Violence, p550. 30Avengers of the New World, p110. 31Ibid. 32The Wretched of the Earth, p10. 33The Wretched of the Earth, p139. 34Ibid. 35Stampnitzky, Liza; Disciplining Terror, How Experts Invented Terrorism, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p5. 36Ibid. 37Disciplining Terror, p49.

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grievances”38. Through the language of ‘attention’, ‘frustration’ and ‘grievances’, it suggests that a certain degree of rationality was afforded to those acting against the state. It is clear that over the course of the 1970s, the term ‘insurgency’ was transformed into one of ‘terrorism. The counterinsurgency discourse had placed insurgents and counter-insurgents in parallel roles, much like the Hegelian dialectic, where political goals were recognized and sought through the application of violence, as rational actions. Stampnitzky wrote how “insurgents were generally assumed to be rational actors”39 with no moral evaluation necessary attached to the term. In contrast, the identity of the ‘terrorist’ would become intricately linked to morality, or a lack of. While it is clear that both insurgency and counterinsurgency are inherently violent forms, this presence of rationale is what renders it fundamentally distinct from the terrorism framework.

While ‘terror’ was present within the insurgency framework, it was used as a tactic, by both counterinsurgents and insurgents, “a stage through which groups could pass without permanently tainting their reputations”40. One counter-insurgency expert, Thompson, wrote that “We shall treat terror as a tool to be used rationally”41. It is clear that the application of rationale, within the framework of violence, depended on how that actor is defined, usually under state-accepted definitions. If the imperial state defined Fanon’s ‘call to arms’ as an insurgency, where there were real grievances to be addressed, certain acts of violence could be deemed instrumentally rational. A successful insurgency requires a cause to fight for and counterinsurgency literature emphasised understanding the minds and motives of these actors. Brian Jenkins aptly described this distinction, commenting that during his time in the army, they were encouraged to read revolutionary literature such as Mao as “this was the only way to understand the guerrilla warfare we confronted”. The often-quoted dictum, where one man’s ‘terrorist’ is another man’s ‘freedom fighter’ is indicative of a vital turning point in the definition of political violence, from the 1970s. It is clear that the process of perceiving violence against imperialism as rational or irrational depends on the definitions that are deployed.

However, even if Fanon’s subjects are defined as ‘terrorists’, described as ‘absolute evil’ by the state, I would still argue the presence of rationale. They still act within a political context and I would disagree that one should simply refer to terrorism as irrational and ‘mindless’ violence’ when it is in fact “a means to an end, not an end in itself, terrorism has objectives”42, as described by Jenkins, a sentiment I would agree with. The use of poison, as described by Du Bois is an interesting example. It was a tool used by slaves “aimed to dominate their masters” and through humiliation, “by making them feel a power that was hidden but very close”43. It was instrumentally rational for the slaves as it would accelerate their process of freedom by killing their masters – would we define these slaves as terrorists or insurgents? In addition, the label of ‘terrorism’ is not exclusive to sub-state actors. Indeed, one would not have to travel far within certain areas of the Middle East, for example, to find a commonly held view of the West as ‘imperialist terrorists’. As Jenkins and Johnson wrote, “some governments apply the word terrorism to all violent acts committed by their political opponents, and by the same token, anti-government extremists frequently claim to be victims of terror committed by government security agencies”44. Attributing rationalism to an act of violence is a matter of perception.

Finally, I wish to discuss the act of violence itself, to explore the rationality process around its means. For this, it is necessary to examine Fanon’s, often disturbing, psychiatric reports in addition to the ‘evil’ discourse that followed the ‘terrorism’ framework after 9/11. Despite Fanon’s text dating back to 1961, there are parallels to our contemporary government policy, primarily in the use of surveillance and post Patriot Act/ post 9/11, where “the incoherent mass of the people… must be held in check by mystification or by the fear inspired by the police force”45. Violence against the state often provokes such fearful responses for protection. As described by Du Bois, the violence utilised by the rebels in Haiti served to send reverberating shocks back to

38Ibid. 39Disciplining Terror, p50. 40Disciplining Terror, p52. 41Thompson, Robert; Defeating Communist Insurgency, (Chatto & Windus, 1964). p71, in, Disciplining Terror, p52.42Disciplining Terror, p73. 43Avengers of the New World, p56.44Jenkins, Brian and Johnson, Janera; International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974, (Diane Pub), in, Disciplining Terror, p102.45The Wretched of the Earth, p182.

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Paris, where De Gouges, stated that the rebels had “justified their tyrants by intimating them”46, where “men were not born in irons but now you prove them necessary”47. From the side of the imperial state, the rebels had emphasised a requirement for slavery through their violence, not their liberation.

Chapter 5, titled ‘Colonial War and Mental Disorders’, within The Wretched of the Earth, examines the psychiatric effect of violence, when placed within a damaging socio-political context. Those dominated are forced to ask themselves “In reality, who am I?”48, where imperialism is described as “fighting against a true liberation of mankind”49. This chapter emphasises the inherent humanity of those parties involved, where subjugation under colonialism is different from subjugation under conquer, where “under the German occupation, the French remained men; under the French occupation, the Germans remained men”50. As such, Fanon would suggest different measures are required. Consequently, Fanon disregarded the moral value of the means used as irrelevant, writing that for a ‘colonized man’, “living does not mean embodying moral values” as “to live means to keep on existing”51. Under this framework, value rationality - the moral action of the means - would be disregarded, only the ends would be considered for its rationality. It is certainly an area with which I disagree with Fanon, where even with asserted political ends, the means can still render an act irrational, demonstrated in this next example.

Case Study 2 describes a 37 year old survivor (named ‘S’) of a massacre in Algeria. After a particular brutal ambush against the French nearby, their troops arrived with one officer stating “There’s been too much talk about this village. Destroy it”52. Those who were unable to escape were rounded up and executed, twenty-nine in total, certainly an act of ‘terror’ by the soldiers defending imperialism. ‘S’ was wounded by two bullets and evacuated by the Health Service. ‘S’ previously described himself as being apolitical yet following the massacre, “he demanded a gun”53 and one night, he grabbed one of the soldier’s guns and tried to fire on those soldiers sleeping. He declared that he wished to kill everybody and “attacked about eight patients with make-shift weapons”54. Interviews displayed his true intentions, “all these so-called Algerians are really Frenchmen…give me a machine gun… I’ll kill them all, every single one of them… And afterwards I’ll be able to sleep in peace”55. It is clear that following his experience, he had become ‘radicalised’ from his previously apathetic position. Now, as an actor, could we describe his violence against imperialism as rational? Would we define ‘S’ as an insurgent or a terrorist? Perhaps, if defined under the framework of ‘insurgency’, it would be legitimate action within a war. However, with his declarations of “I’ll kill them all’, despite asserting a certain goal, that of violence against ‘imperialism’, I believe this case-study is a good example that defining rationality does also depend on the ‘values’ of the means, where I would suggest a combination of Weberian principles, the efficiency and moral values of the means are to be involved in a question of rationality.

The second case-study is from Series B, where a European child was murdered by his two Algerian classmates (aged 13 and 14). This is a more difficult example, alluding to the ethno-psychiatric damage that is emphasized in an imperial setting. Du Bois also referred to such damage, alluding to the merging of dialects and creole, where a way of life was created that “can neither resemble that which they had in their place of origin or differ from it absolutely”56. The younger of the two killers indicated that “he was a good friend of ours” yet, disturbingly, “one day we decided to kill him because the Europeans want to kill all the Arabs, we can’t kill big people”57. When the 13 year old was asked “What does being dead mean?” he replied “When it’s all finished,

46Avengers of the New World, p129. 47Ibid. 48The Wretched of the Earth, p200.49Ibid.50The Wretched of the Earth, p201. 51The Wretched of the Earth, p249. 52The Wretched of the Earth, p208.53The Wretched of the Earth, p209. 54Ibid. 55Ibid. 56Avengers of the New World, p43. 57The Wretched of the Earth, p216.

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you go to heaven”58. This boy’s rationale for striking against this ‘European’, a symbol of his occupation, is clearly ethically centred, a reciprocal strike of vengeance due to the generalisation within his social paradigm that all Europeans want to kill Arabs. Even within Fanon’s logic of ‘striking’ for ‘identity’, it would be difficult to class this act of violence against imperialism as instrumentally rational. The boy appears too naïve to hold clear political aims to follow from this murder, with his innocent allusions to ‘big people’ and ‘heaven’. The second boy, who is 14 years old, offers an interesting alternative in his explanation. Like his colleague, the murder was not denied and when asked why he had killed the European, he responded with a question of his own – “Had there ever been a European arrested and sent to prison after the murder of an Algerian?”59 Fanon responded that he had never seen a European in jail, yet, the boy replied, Algerians were killed every-day. In addition, the boy had had two of his family members killed in a massacre at Rivet Village with no arrests made. Crucially, the boy stated “I wanted to take to the mountains, but I was too young”, the ‘mountains’ representing the more legitimate ‘insurgency’ campaign. The boy ended his interview with “Well, kill him I did. Now, you can do what you would like”60. This case-study aptly demonstrates both the irrationality and rationality of fighting violence with violence, against imperialism. The older boy had rationale and self-justification for his action, mainly in acting in vengeance and showed awareness of the insurgency campaign ‘in the mountains’. As awful an act it is, the boy perhaps acted instrumentally rationally within his means while the younger boy, who displayed a general naivety, could be perceived as acting irrationally. This case-study aptly describes the paradox at play in terms of rationality and violence against imperialism.

As described in Disciplining Terror, by the 1980s, terrorism was defined within the ‘logic of war’, away from the 1970s classification of insurgency and rationality. The first war on terror, during the 1990s, was pursued through retaliation, to strike back ‘in defence’, where this retaliation was portrayed as punishment for a crime, delegitimizing its opposition. However, the second war on terror, post 9/11, would become driven by pre-emptive violence, where those engaging in warfare against imperialism were not only criminals but inhuman. The insurgency doctrine of the 1970s was now regarded with hostility, described by Netanyahu, as containing those “disguised as freedom fighters, presented by perverted publicity as glamorous guerrillas”61. All actors that waged violence against imperialism were deemed irrational and immoral, any argument against this thesis now held the potential for academics to be branded a sympathizer, a process of ‘anti-knowledge’. The development of suicide bombers under Hamas in the 1980s helped to develop this image of their irrationality – after all, what is more irrational than committing suicide to gain political freedoms that you will never be alive to see? The Hegelian Dialectic would disagree, seeing self-sacrifice as ‘true freedom’. These ‘new terrorists’, much like the natives within Fanon, were described to be “characterized by blind aggression, rage and impulses”62. The Western World sought to discredit, fearful of its own security being undermined. Weary of the dangers of ‘anti-knowledge’, I would consider Sprinzak’s definition of terrorists - “cold, rational killers who employ violence to achieve specific political objectives” – as more useful. Indeed, often these acts of terror will produce the political ends on their own, as demonstrated following the bombing of Madrid where Spain withdraw from Iraq.

After 9/11, the rhetoric of ‘evil’ took over, with the term being included in Bush’s speeches over 1,000 times between his inauguration and June 200363. These ‘animals’ were said to have attacked America as “They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote”64. In this speech, Imperialist America sought to defend its own freedom, to place its action within a discourse of liberation. As mentioned previously, by citing such a discourse, Bush sought to legitimise the violent actions that would follow in revenge and reciprocal violence. It is a luxury that the state enjoys through its ‘monopoly on violence’. If the Algerian Government had proclaimed the same in a speech against the French, the more powerful imperial state, they would have been instantly discredited. Credibility on the international stage

58The Wretched of the Earth, p218. 59Ibid.60Ibid.61Netanyahu, Benjamin; International Terrorism: Challenge and Response, (Transactions Publishers, 1980), p111, in, Disciplining Terror, p117. 62Laquer, Walter; The New Terrorism (W & N, 2001), p82, in, Disciplining Terror, p155. 63Disciplining Terror, p166. 64President Bush, Address to the Nation, (September 11, 2001).

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relies on power. In a meeting at the White House, when Bush was asked if Bin Laden possessed political goals, Bush could only reply “he has got evil goals”65, describing this second war on terror, as “civilization’s fight. You are either with us or against us”66. Under the President’s language, these men were to be regarded as sub-human, not in possession of political goals but to be targeted and destroyed. Consequently, identity is removed, in parallel with Fanon’s ‘wretched’ people, where “terrorists commit terrorism because they are terrorists”67. We can see the same occurring now in response to ISIS, where they are branded ‘lunatics’ rather than possessing real goals. Indeed, I believe that Weber, for example, would regard ISIS and their utilisation of social media in this ‘information age’ as instrumentally rational – they wished to draw attention to their cause and their beliefs, and these violent actions, deemed necessarily irrational by the West, still allowed them to achieve maximum publicity, contributing positively to their overall force, a goal achieved.

To conclude, in 1771, Louis-Sebastien Mercer imagined a fable where, 672 years in the future, he awoke to a new age. In front of him laid a statue, addressed “To the Avenger of the New World”, an oppressed man who, through violence and rebellion, had liberated the world “from the most atrocious, longest and most insulting tyranny of all”68, ‘tyranny’ being imperialism. A dichotomy is present, where any violence against imperialism can be deemed inherently irrational by the state yet deemed inherently rational by those fighting for political goals. The question of rationality inevitably comes down to perception and definitions, the moral codes involved and the cause being fought for, as I demonstrated with the ‘Insurgency’ v ‘Terrorism’ argument. It might be objected, within this paper, that I could have explored the Weberian rationality frameworks in more detail but I wished to focus upon the texts themselves. To explore more deeply the question of ‘rationality’, with other scholarly intervention, and the criticisms of such concepts, would have been interesting. In addition, some may disagree with my middle-ground conclusion but following my analysis of the texts’, it is, for me, the correct one. To take this paper further, it would be interesting to explore more deeply the psychiatric effects of warfare and violence, primarily within a dysfunctional colonial situation. Within this paper, it is my contention that violence against imperialism can be both rational and irrational, where the judgement of individual cases relies on perception, definitions, means and motivations.

Bibliography

Books

65Disciplining Terror, p189. 66Ibid. 67Disciplining Terror, p180. 68Avengers of the New World, p57.

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Allan, Kenneth; Explorations in Classical Sociological Theory: Seeing the Social World, (Pine Forge Press, 2009).

Bush, George; Address to the Nation, (September 11, 2001).

Dubois, Laurent; Avengers of the New World (The Belknap Press, 2005).

Fanon, Frantz; The Wretched of the Earth, (Grove Press, 2005).

Gerth H. H, Mills Wright C; From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (International Library of Sociology), (Routledge, 2007).

Jenkins, Brian and Johnson, Janera; International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974, (Diane Pub), in, Disciplining Terror.

Laquer, Walter; The New Terrorism (W & N, 2001), p82, in, Disciplining Terror.

Stampnitzky, Liza; Disciplining Terror, How Experts Invented Terrorism, (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Thompson, Robert; Defeating Communist Insurgency, (Chatto & Windus, 1964). p71, in, Disciplining Terror.

Weber Max, Owen David (ed.); The Vocation Lectures: ‘Science as a Vocation’; ‘Politics as a Vocation’, (Hackett Publishing, 2004).

Journals

Kebede, Messay; The Rehabilitation of Violence and the Violence of Rehabilitation: Fanon and Colonialism, Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 31:5, (May, 2001).

Website

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/imperialism?q=Imperialism

Film

Pontecorvo, Gillo (Dir.); Burn! (1969).

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