escra sep opinion and legis

8/20/2019 Escra Sep Opinion and Legis

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No. L-68635. May 14, 1987.*

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO

LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No.

68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."

Attorneys; Due Process; Contempt; Where an attorney and a part-litigant were given a "Show-

Cause" order and they replied thereto and their arguments were not believed by the Supreme

Court, their plea that the Supreme Court violated due process for not ordering a hearing before

resolving the disbarment and contempt charges contained in the "Show-Cause" Order is not

impressed with merit.—The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process; is not

impressed with merit. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera

vs. Lamaroza. et al. 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-

type" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta

was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected to

disciplinary action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the disciplinary action against him be

dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a

like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or theofficial actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the

contempt proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both

were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters

written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press

copies of the complaint filed before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his

profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that those letters and the charges levelled

against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and

contemptuous character, but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete

obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the

cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to havebeen said or proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentiary hearing was obviated (see

People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and

llustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.

Same; Same; Atty. Laureta's wife received the Tanodbayan resolution and his wife delivered it

to Mrs. Ilustre. Hence, Atty. Laureta cannot plausibly say his professional services for Mrs.

llustre had already been terminated.—Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a

process server of this Court, that after having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of

March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao,

Quezon City," having been informed that she is "not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the

residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision for her

husband and for Ms. Maravilla-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. II). That Ilustre subsequently received copy

of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as of March 27,

1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the Motion

for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987,

the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship

between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do

was to return to the Sherif f the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta

proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie-up between the corespondents is heightened bythe fact that three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam

Resolution on Ilustre personally.

Same; Same; If Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with the complaint in question (against some

members of the Supreme Court in the Tanodbayan), the DZRH reporter would not have called

him for an interview regarding it and he would not have given comments.—Noteworthy, as well,

is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment on

the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the complaint, he

would not have been pinpointed at all And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step for him to

have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out ofelementary courtesy and propriety. But he did "nothing of the sort." He gave his comment with alacrity.


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Same; Same; The lack of respect of Atty. Laureta to the Supreme Court is shown by his

assertion that he understands the cooperation of Bulletin Today in remarking about the SC

decision suspending him as a lawyer.— The impudence and lack of respect of Atty, Laureta for this

Court again surfaces when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the

cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam

Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper

"because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year." The

malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court and is an added reason

for denying reconsideration.

Same; Same; Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to uphold the Court's

dignity rings with insincerity.— Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and

uphold the dignity of this Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic

stance for the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned

before the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that verypurpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the full.

Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational

hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and

statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and

conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of

all justiciable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and the Justices

concerned, and in the orderly administration of j ustice.

Same; Same; Same; Mrs. Ilustre and her counsel have allowed suspicion to blind their actions

and in so doing degraded the administration of justice. Court personnel cannot know thevoting of Justices in a case.—Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She

has turned deaf ears to any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept the

untenability of their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to

blind their actions and in so doing degraded the administration of justice, "Investigation" was utterly

uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at

only after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held

on May 14,1986 showed that the members of the Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not

in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors

without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their

inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired. The personality of the Solicitor

General never came into the picture. It was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was

Chairman of the First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was

rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en

banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the unmeritoriousness of

Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities involved.

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P.,

HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F.

SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P.,

EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTORS. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA, M.P., petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity


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as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the

TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Constitutional Law; The Court may pass upon constitutionality of Presidential Decree No.

1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977".—Indeed, where the legislature or

the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to

interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its

constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the

government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the

Constitution "In one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII,

Section I of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted

as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power

this Court has exercised in many instances.

Same; Same; Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article

VIII of the 1973 Constitution declared null and void.— Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5], It empowers the President to

indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive

Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the

General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the

funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or

whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be

made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby

amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.

Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. [Demetria vs.

Alba, 148 SCRA 208(1987)]


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PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL

ROSARIO, DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P. BALLARES, JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M.

YASON, VICENTE A. CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA,

petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, ANA THERESIA

HONTIVEROS, and TEOFISTO L. GUINGONA III, Oppositors-Intervenors.

G.R. No. 178193.** September 17, 2009.*

DANILO B. URUSA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 180705.** September 17, 2009.*

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Corporation Law; A treasury share or stock, which may be common or preferred, may be used

for a variety of corporate purposes, such as for a stock bonus plan for management and

employees or for acquiring another company.— A treasury share or stock, which maybe common or

preferred, may be used for a variety of corporate purposes, such as for a stock bonus plan for

management and employees or for acquiring another company. It may be held indefinitely, resold orretired. While held in the company’s treasury, the stock earns no dividends and has no vote in

company affairs. Thus, the CIIF common shares that would become treasury shares are not entitled to

voting rights. And should conversion push through, SMC, not Cojuangco, Jr., becomes the owner of

the reacquired sequestered CIIF SMC common shares. Should SMC opt, however, to sell said shares

in the future, prospective buyers, including possibly Cojuangco, Jr., have to put up their own money to

acquire said common shares. Thus, it is erroneous for intervenors to say that Cojuangco, Jr., with the

use of SMC funds, will be acquiring the CIIF SMC common shares. It bears to stress that it was SMC

which amended its articles of incorporation, reclassifying the existing composition of the authorized

capital stock from PhP 4.5 billion common shares to PhP 3.39 billion common shares and PhP 1.11

billion Series 1 Preferred Shares. The conversion in question is a legitimate exercise of corporatepowers under the Corporation Code. The shares in question will not be acquired with SMC funds but

by reason of the reconfiguration of said shares to preferred shares.

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Under the principle of separation of powers, neither

Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other

branches of government.— The decision on whether to proceed with the conversion or defer action

thereon until final adjudication of the issue of ownership over the sequestered shares properly pertains

to the executive branch, represented by the PCGG. Just as it cannot look into the wisdom behind the

enactment of a law, the Court cannot question the wisdom and reasons behind the decision of the

executive branch to ask for the conversion of the common shares to preferred shares. Else, the Court

would be trenching on the well-settled doctrine of separation of powers. The cardinal postulate

explains that the three branches must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority

conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the

President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government.

The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws,

and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and contro-versies. Jurisprudence is

well-established that the courts cannot intervene or interfere with executive or legislative discretion

exercised within constitutional limits. In JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 450 SCRA 169

(2005), the Court explained: The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is vested inthe Government agencies entrusted with that function. The discretion given to the authorities on this

matter is of such wide latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is

used as a shield to a fraudulent award (Jalandoni v. NARRA, 108 Phil. 486 [1960]). x x x The exercise

of this discretion is a policy decision that necessitates prior inquiry, investigation, comparison,

evaluation, and deliberation. This task can best be discharged by the Government agencies x x x. The

role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has

transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative

discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decision-

making.


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Administrative Law; Administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of

administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of

discretion, fraud, or error of law.— Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine

of primary jurisdiction that the courts will DEFER to the decisions of the administrative offices and

agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in the matters assigned to them. Administrative

decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only

be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. The only instance when the

Courts ought to interfere is when a department or an agency has acted with grave abuse of discretion

or violated a law. A circumspect review of the pleadings and evidence extant on record shows that the

PCGG approved the conversion only after it conducted an in-depth inquiry, thorough study, and

judicious evaluation of the pros and cons of the proposed conversion.

Constitutional Law; Judgments; The approval by the Presidential Commission on GoodGovernment (PCGG), for respondent Republic, of the conversion is a policy decision which

cannot be interfered with in the absence of a showing or proof, as here, that PCGG committed

grave abuse of discretion.— The approval by the PCGG,for respondent Republic, of the conversion

is a policy decision which cannot be interfered with in the absence of a showing or proof, as here, that

PCGG committed grave abuse of discretion. In the similar Palm Avenue Realty Development

Corporation v. PCGG, 153 SCRA 579 (1987), the Court ruled that the approval by PCGG of the sale of

the sequestered shares of petitioner corporations allegedly owned and controlled by Kokoy Romualdez

was legal and could not be the subject of a writ of certiorari or prohibition, absent proof that PCGG

committed a grave abuse of discretion. The price of PhP 29 per share approved by the PCGG was

even below the prevailing price of PhP 43 per share.

Presidential Commission on Good Government; Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG) has ample powers to address alleged strategies to thwart recovery of ill-

gotten wealth.— The mere presence of four (4) PCGG nominated directors in the SMC Board does

not mean it can prevent board actions that are viewed to fritter away the company assets. Even under

the status quo, PCGG has no controlling sway in the SMC Board, let alone a veto power at 24% of the

stockholdings. In relinquishing the voting rights, the government, through PCGG, is not in reality

ceding control. Moreover, PCGG has ample powers to address alleged strategies to thwart recovery of

ill-gotten wealth. Thus, the loss of voting rights has no significant effect on PCGG’s function to recover

ill-gotten wealth or prevent dissipation of sequestered assets.

Corporation Law; It is also not correct to say that the holders of the preferred shares lose all

their voting rights.— It is also not correct to say that the holders of the preferred shares lose all their

voting rights. Sec. 6 of the Corporation Code provides for the situations where non-voting shares like

preferred shares are granted voting rights, viz.: Section

6. Classification of shares.—The shares of

stock in corporations may be divided into classes or series of shares, or both, any of which classes or

series of shares may have such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated in the articles of

incorporation: Provided, That no share may be deprived of voting rights except those classified and

issues as “preferred” or “redeemable” shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code: Provided,further, That there shall always be a class or series of shares which have complete voting rights.

Same; The loss of four (4) board seats would not in reality prejudice the rights and interests of

the holders of the preferred shares.— The preferred shares will be placed under sequestration and

management of PCGG. It has powers to protect and preserve the sequestered preferred shares even

if there are no government-nominated directors in the SMC Board. Thus, the loss of four (4) board

seats would not in reality prejudice the rights and interests of the holders of the preferred shares. And

such loss is compensated by the tremendous financial gains and benefits and enormous protection

from loss or deterioration of the value of the CIIF SMC shares. The advantages accorded to the

preferred shares are undeniable, namely: the significant premium in the price being offered; thepreference enjoyed in the dividends as well as in the liquidation of assets; and the voting rights still


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retained by preferred shares in major corporate actions. All things considered, conversion to preferred

shares would best serve the interests and rights of the government or the eventual owner of the CIIF

SMC shares.

Sequestration; The Court rules that the dividends shall be placed in escrow either at the Land

Bank of the Philippines or at the Development Bank of the Philippines in the name of

respondent Republic and not Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED).—On

the issue of the net dividends accruing to COCOFED, the Court rules that the dividends shall be

placed in escrow either at the Land Bank of the Philippines or at the Development Bank of the

Philippines in the name of respondent Republic and not COCOFED.

Same; The Court, to be sure, has not barred the conversion of any sequestered common

shares of a corporation into preferred shares.— The Court, to be sure, has not barred the

conversion of any sequestered common shares of a corporation into preferred shares. It may be

argued that the conversion scheme under consideration may later on be treated as an indirect sale of

the common shares from the registered owner to another person if and when SMC decides to redeemthe Series 1 preferred shares on the third anniversary from the issue date of the preferred shares. Still,

given the circumstances of the pending incident, the Court can validly allow the proposed conversion

in accordance with Rule 57, Sec. 11, in relation to Rule 59, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 11

reads: SEC. 11. When attached property may be sold after levy on attachment and before entry of

judgment.—Whenever it shall be made to appear to the court in which the action is pending, upon

hearing with notice to both parties, that the property attached is perishable, or that the interests of all

the parties to the action will be subserved by the sale thereof, the court may order such property to be

sold at public auction in such manner as it may direct, and the proceeds of such sale to be deposited

in court to abide the judgment in the action.

Same; While the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), as a sequestrator,

does not exercise acts of ownership over sequestered assets, the proper court, where the case

involving the sequestered asset is pending, may, nevertheless, issue a positive and definite

order authorizing the sale of said assets.— Even if the conversion-cum-redemption partakes of an

indirect sale, PCGG can be allowed to approve the conversion in line with our ruling in Palm Avenue

Realty Development Corporation, 153 SCRA 579 (1987), subject to the approval of the Court.

Evidently, as long as the interests of all the parties will be subserved by the sale of the sequestered

properties, the Court may allow the properties to be sold. More so, the Rules would allow the mere

conversion of the shares of stock given the evident benefit that all the parties would receive from such

conversion that far outweighs any perceived disadvantage. Thus, the Court is clearly empowered to

allow the conversion herein pressed by the PCGG. While the PCGG, as sequestrator, does not

exercise acts of ownership over sequestered assets, the proper court, where the case involving the

sequestered asset is pending, may, nevertheless, issue a positive and definite order authorizing the

sale of said assets. As we held in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 192 scra 743 (1990): Our temporary

restraining order lifting the Sandiganbayan restraining order did not, by any stretch of the imagination,

authorize PCGG to sell the Falcon aircraft. A definite and positive order of a court is needed before the

jet plane may be sold. The proper procedure after the lifting of the restraining order was for PCGG togo to Sandiganbayan and ask for formal authority to sell the aircraft. xx

x The ruling in Republic v.

Sandiganbayan voiding the sale by PCGG of a sequestered jet does not apply squarely to the incident

at bar, because PCGG did not, in that case, seek court approval before the sale. Moreover, PCGG was

not able to provide any justification for the seizure of the jet from the lessee. In the pending incident

before the Court, it has long been settled that the CIIF SMC common shares were bought by what

have been declared as prima facie public funds. Thus, the sequestration is justified. More

importantly,respondent Republic, as contained in the Supplemental Comment filed by the OSG dated

September 4, 2009, has adopted Resolution No. 2009-037-756 approving the conversion of the

shares, and has prayed for the approval by the Court of such conversion.


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HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, petitioner, LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION

and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners-in-intervention, vs.

PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG

HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA1 and his

SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA,

respondents.

Constitutional Law; Words and Phrases; “Operative Fact” Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine

does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful as it also

applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid.— Contrary to the stance of

respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared

unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. As

We have discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision: That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to

executive acts––in this case, the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distribution––is well-

settled in our jurisprudence. In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, We held: Petitioner postulates

that the “operative fact” doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because it is an equitable doctrinewhich could not be used to countenance an inequitable result that is contrary to its proper office. On

the other hand, the petitioner Solicitor General argues that the existence of the various agreements

implementing the SMDRP is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored, citing

Rieta v. People of the Philippines. The argument of the Solicitor General is meritorious. The “operative

fact” doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or

executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be

complied with.

Same; Same; The term “executive act” is broad enough to encompass decisions of

administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequentlyrevoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.— For one, neither the De Agbayani

case nor the Municipality of Malabang case elaborates what “executive act” mean. Moreover, while

orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have fixed definitions

and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the phrase “executive act” does not have

such specific definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by the minority,

nowhere can it be found that the term “executive act” is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term

“executive act” is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under

the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the

Court.

Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and

rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as

that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.— The operative fact doctrine is not

confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded

the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.

Same; Same; The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity; It is applied only in the absence of

statutory law and never in contravention of said law.— The operative fact doctrine is a rule of

equity. As a complement of legal jurisdiction, equity “seeks to reach and complete justice where courtsof law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special

circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent

and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different

courts.” Remarkably, it is applied only in the absence of statutory law and never in contravention of

said law.

Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; Absent any allegation or proof of fraud or other

public policy considerations,the existence of interlocking directors, officers and stockholders is

not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.—In the third place, by arguing that

the companies involved in the transfers of the 300-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita haveinterlocking directors and, thus, knowledge of one may already be imputed upon all the other


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companies, AMBALA and Rene Galang, in effect, want this Court to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.

However, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is warranted “only in cases when the separate legal

entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, such that in

the case of two corporations, the law will regard the corporations as merged into one.” Absent any

allegation or proof of fraud or other public policy considerations, the existence of interlocking directors,

officers and stockholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction as in the

instant case.

Agrarian Reform Law; Expropriation; Just Compensation; Department of Agrarian Reform’s

(DAR’s) land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon

the landowner; The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise

of what is admittedly a judicial function.—The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the

DAR’s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the

landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to

determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the

exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National

President (BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, petitioner, vs. HON.

MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON.

NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIANB. HEFTI, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, respondents.

Remedial Law; Actions; Parties; Bureau of Customs Employees Association’s (BOCEA’s) members

have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain,

direct injury as a result of the enforcement of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 and its Implementing Rules

and Regulations (IRR).—Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA

has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its

members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are actually covered by the law and its IRR.

BOCEA’s members have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have

sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.

Constitutional Law; Administrative Agencies; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of

powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and

is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere; The principle of non-

delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions.—The principle of separation of powers ordains

that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in

matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is

the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non

delegari potest, which means “what has been delegated, cannot be delegated.” This doctrine is based

on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be

performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the

intervening mind of another. However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous

exceptions, one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative

agencies like the Board in this case.

Same; Equal Protection Clause; Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly

situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities

imposed; Purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.— Equal protection simply provides that all persons

or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred andresponsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a


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state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express

terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other

words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may

not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate

governmental objective.

Same; Due Process; The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied

to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side.— The essence

of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair

and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side. BOCEA’s apprehension of

deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The concerned

BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left

without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant factors that

may affect the level of collection.

Same; Statutes; Bill of Attainder; Republic Act No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder; A bill of attainder is alegislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a

judicial trial.— On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a

legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a

judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of

individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.

Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of

a Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or Bureau of Customs (BOC) official or employee and provides for

the consequences thereof.— R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does

not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds forthe termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The

democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are

amply protected.

Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to

justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one

that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.—As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on

the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch.

Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the Legislative

branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaningdetached from the manifest intendment and language thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335

has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear

and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.

We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are

constitutional.


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BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, petitioner, vs. THE HON.

REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., (COMMISSIONERS OF THE

COMMISSION ON AUDIT), and DIR. KHEM M. INOK, respondents.

Magna Carta for Scientists, Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and Technology Personnel in

the Government (R.A. No. 8439); Science and Technology; The salary scale of science and

technology personnel is differentiated by R.A. No. 8439 from the salary scales of government

employees under the existing law.— R.A. No. 8439 was enacted as a manifestation of the State’s

recognition of science and technology as an essential component for the attainment of national

development and progress. The law offers a program of human resources development in science and

technology to help realize and maintain a sufficient pool of talent and manpower that will sustain the

initiative for total science and technology mastery. In furtherance of this objective, the law not only

ensures scholarship programs and improved science and engineering education, but also affords

incentives for those pursuing careers in science and technology. Moreover, the salary scale of science

and technology personnel is differentiated by R.A. No. 8439 from the salary scales of government

employees under the existing law.

Constitutional Law; Article VI, Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares that: “No money

shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”— Article VI,

Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares that: “No money shall be paid out of the

Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” This constitutional edict requires that

the GAA be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations. As such, the

requirement under Section 20 of R.A. No. 8439 that the amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta

benefits were to be appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must be purposefully,

deliberately, and precisely included in the GAA. The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not

materialize as a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439, but must initially be proposed by theofficials of the DOST as the concerned agency for submission to and consideration by Congress. That

process is what complies with the constitutional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment

of the benefits because the GAA did not mirror every provision of law that referred to it as the source of

funding. It is worthy to note that the DOST itself acknowledged the absolute need for the appropriation

in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte, Jr. would not have needed to request the OP for the express

authority to use the savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.

General Appropriations Act (GAA); The President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the

House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional

Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in the General

Appropriations Act (GAA) for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective

appropriations.— In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should

still be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will

determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is

found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the

Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the

heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in

the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

The plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture, which

we should now dispose of as untenable.

Same; Commission on Audit (COA); The Commission on Audit (COA) is endowed with sufficient

latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or

unconscionable expenditures of government funds.—The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to

determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable

expenditures of government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for

the purposes for which they had been intended by law. The “Constitution has made the COA the

guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government

revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive authorityto define the scope of its audit and examination, to establish the techniques and methods for such


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review, and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations”. Thus, the COA is generally

accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine

and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is

sanctioned by law. Verily, the Court has sustained the decisions of administrative authorities like the

COA as a matter of general policy, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but

also upon the recognition that such administrative authorities held the expertise as to the laws they are

entrusted to enforce. The Court has accorded not only respect but also finality to their findings

especially when their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to

grave abuse of discretion.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Commission on Audit (COA); Only when the

Commission on Audit (COA) has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a petition for

certiorari brought to assail its actions.— Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court

entertain and grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of Rule 65, Rules ofCourt, demands that the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial

or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the

proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,

which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the

petitioner should establish that the COA gravely abused its discretion. The abuse of discretion must be

grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or

despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or

board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act incontemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial

powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere

abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. [Nazareth vs. Villar, 689 SCRA

385(2013)]


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METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO,

petitioner, vs. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III, respondent.

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have

no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the

Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive

Branch.— Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide

matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the

Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this

case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the

executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of

grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an

evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in

contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by

reason of passion or hostility. For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth

Division, Cebu City, 562 SCRA 184 (2008), the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his

jurisdiction when he required “hard facts and solid evidence” in order to hold the defendant liable forcriminal prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a

trial.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; At a preliminary investigation, the

investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission

complained of constitutes the offense charged.—We stress that a preliminary investigation for the

purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary

investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act

or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Probable cause refers to facts and

circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that therespondent is probably guilty thereof. There is no definitive standard by which probable cause is

determined except to consider the attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause depends

upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the examination, who is called upon not to

disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear

dictates of reason.

Criminal Law; Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents; Elements of.—Tobias was charged

with estafa through falsification of public document the elements of which are: (a) the accused uses a

fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,

business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits; (b) such false pretense,fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the

commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act

or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false

pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered

damage. It is required that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause

or the only motive that induced the complainant to part with the thing.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; A presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the

criminal case where in the establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made should

adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and demolish the prima facie case.—A presumption affects

the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State. The effect is to create the need of presenting

evidence to overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary. As

such, a presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the criminal case where in the

establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut

the presumption and demolish the prima facie case. This is not so in a preliminary investigation, where

the investigating prosecutor only determines the existence of a prima facie case that warrants the

prosecution of a criminal case in court.

Same; Same; Same; The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is itsforger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.—The presumption that whoever


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possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory

explanation. Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the

information in the face of the controverting explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess

the spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of discretion,

least of all grave.

Banks and Banking; Negligence; Banks are expected to exercise greater care and prudence than

others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest.—We do not lose sight

of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty to observe due

diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of

the documents bearing on the realty. Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching its competent

and experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of

investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a

thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral.

As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care and

prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest. Theirfailure to do so constitutes negligence on its part. [Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank)vs.

Tobias III, 664 SCRA 165(2012)]


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MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of

Representatives, and (HON QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO, Secretary,

House of representatives, respondents.

Administrative Law; Election Law; Petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no

longer operative does not hold water.—Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned

statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut

short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such

officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office

and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they

cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public

officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have

received from their constituents.

Same; Same; Term of office distinguished from tenure.—In theorizing that the provision under

consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse

"term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General: "The term of officeprescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the

period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances

within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at

all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles,

76 Phil. 12)."

Same; Same; Same; Fact that the ground cited in Section 67, Article lX of BP Blg. 881 is not

mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of

Congress does not preclude its application to present members of Congress.—That the ground cited

in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode ofshortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present

members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the

Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the

Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of

the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All

other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by

impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in

Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not

exclusive.

Same; Same; Forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of

candidacy for another office.—In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No.

180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently

effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of

filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new

election or appointment can restore the ousted official.

Same; Same; Same; As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces

automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessaryas petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held.—As the mere act of filing the certificate of

candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position

being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held.

The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture

decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of

office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Constitutional Law; Statute; To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal

breach of the Constitution not a doubtful and argumentative implication.—The basic principle which

underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of

legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created. This Court has enunciated thepresumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law,


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there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative

implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. [Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr., 202 SCRA

779(1991)]


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G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003.*

RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A.

AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN

THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

G.R. No. 152161. December 10, 2003.*

CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Policy matters are not the concern of the Supreme Court—

government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.— The

legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or

discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause

with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, somesectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would

encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government

policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this

Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment

is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to

achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits

should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the

serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.

Same; Same; Same; Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 of Omnibus Election Codeby the ruling in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in

the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose.—Congress is not precluded from repealing

Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by

its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress

may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and

the paramount objective of election laws—the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving

members of Congress—is achieved.

Same; Same; The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be

embraced in its title page is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its

provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action

and study of the legislators and the public; It cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised

of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and

comprehensively deliberated upon by members of the House of Representatives.— Moreover, the

avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is

to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the

enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators

and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of

Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated

upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of

Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes.

Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the

Omnibus Election Code.

Equal Protection Clause; Public Officers; Administrative Law; Substantial distinctions clearly exist

between elective officials and appointive officials.— Substantial distinctions clearly exist between

elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the

electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon

stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of theirdesignation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a


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permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the

appointing authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under

Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative

Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil

service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any

election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding

political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

Statutes; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Words and Phrases; Under the “enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a

bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of

both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.—The petitioners,

thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the

“enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and

the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its

due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the rule. The Court

finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the

petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd BicameralConference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these

internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and

with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal

validity of Rep. Act No 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De

Venecia, viz.: But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the

courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to

comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional

provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: “At any rate, courts

have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or

waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules aremerely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or

disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will

not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have

agreed to a particular measure.’ ” [Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503(2003)]


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ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent. [Quinto vs. Commission on Elections, 613 SCRA 385(2010)]

Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is the Legislature that is given the authority,

under our constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices

responsive to the exigencies of the times.— The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr.

Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected officials (vis-à-vis appointive officials) have greater political

clout over the electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring—but not by this Court. Suffice it to say that

the remedy lies with the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our

constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices responsive to

the exigencies of the times. It is certainly within the Legislature’s power to make the deemed-resigned

provisions applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are

of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the class. This Court

cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people the best

state of affairs from a public policy standpoint.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The Court cannot blink away the fact that the United

States Supreme Court effectively overruled Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F. 2d 187 (1973), three months after

its promulgation by the United States Court of Appeals.— Our assailed Decision’s reliance on Mancuso

is completely misplaced. We cannot blink away the fact that the United States Supreme Court

effectively overruled Mancuso three months after its promulgation by the United States Court of

Appeals. In United States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers

AFL-CIO, et al. and Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al., the United States Supreme Court was

faced with the issue of whether statutory provisions prohibiting federal and state employees from

taking an active part in political management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional as to

warrant facial invalidation. Violation of these provisions results in dismissal from employment andpossible criminal sanctions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards of Review; The Court’s assailed Decision’s submission that the

right to run for public office is “inextricably linked” with two fundamental freedoms—those of expression

and association— lies on barren ground; American case law has never recognized a fundamental right

to express one’s political views through candidacy, as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.—Our

assailed Decision’s submission that the right to run for public office is “inextricably linked” with two

fundamental freedoms—those of expression and association—lies on barren ground. American case

law has in fact never recognized a fundamental right to express one’s political views through

candidacy, as to invoke a rigorous standard of review. Bart v. Telford pointedly stated that “[t]he FirstAmendment does not in terms confer a right to run for public office, and this court has held that it does

not do so by implication either.” Thus, one’s interest in seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to

constitutional protection. Moreover, one cannot bring one’s action under the rubric of freedom of

association, absent any allegation that, by running for an elective position, one is advancing the

political ideas of a particular set of voters.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not

violative of the equal protection clause—the deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve

governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather

than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of “political justice” as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the

danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on

their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity).—

It is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not violative of the equal

protection clause. The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i)

efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the

appearance of “political justice” as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful political

machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free

from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity). These are interests that are

important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seekelective office.


20/53

Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The myopic view that the evils sought to be prevented are

extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post

obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the

partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy— the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by

a “powerful political machine” that has amassed “the scattered powers of government workers” so as

to give itself and its incumbent workers an “unbreakable grasp on the reins of power.”—According to

the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they apply

indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position

being held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be

attendant thereto. Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are

extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post.

Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the

government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of

systematic abuse perpetuated by a “powerful political machine” that has amassed “the scattered

powers of government workers” so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an “unbreakable graspon the reins of power.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when

it comes to the application of the overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that purportedly

attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, for such approach is

manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as a last resort; The probable harm

to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue

elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by

the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.—This Court would do well to proceed

with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to the application of the overbreadth doctrine in theanalysis of statutes that purportedly attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of

speech, for such approach is manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as a

last resort. In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the

judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived

grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the

possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished. Facial

overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the

challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would cure, or at least

substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute. In the case at bar, the probable harm to

society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursueelective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by

the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute. [Quinto vs. Commission on Elections,

613 SCRA 385(2010)]


21/53

MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARSENIO DENSING

NOBLE, respondents. [Pundaodaya vs. Commission on Elections, 600 SCRA 178(2009)]

Election Law; Residence; Words and Phrases; It was held that the term “residence” is to be

understood not in its common acceptance as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation” but rather to

domicile or legal residence, that is “the place where a party actually or constructively has his

permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to

return and remain (animus manendi).— Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the

Local Government Code, requires that an elective local official must be a resident in the barangay,

municipality, city or province where he intends to serve for at least one year immediately preceding the

election. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 576 SCRA 331 (2009), it was held that the term

“residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,”

but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively

has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually

intends to return and remain (animus manendi).”

Same; Same; The Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,

whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.—In Domino v.

Commission on Elections, 310 SCRA 568 (1999), the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed

permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one

intends to return. It is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances,

three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile

somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have

but one residence or domicile at a time. If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he

must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of

abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts whichcorrespond with the purpose. Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three

requirements, the domicile of origin continues.

Same; Same; We held that a person’s registration as voter in one district is not proof that he is not

domiciled in another district.—The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail to convince

us that Noble successfully effected a change of domicile. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second

Division, private respondent’s claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in the past 3

elections in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected

residency in the said municipality. Indeed, while we have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a

strong presumption of residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. Thus, in Perez v. Commissionon Elections, 317 SCRA 641 (1999), we held that a person’s registration as voter in one district is not

proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The registration of a voter in a place other than his

residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.

Same; Same; To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled

with conduct indicative of that intention.— To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in

the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily

presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent

place of abode.

Same; Same; We held that the one-year residency requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders “from

taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.”— We find

that Noble’s alleged change of domicile was effected solely for the purpose of qualifying as a

candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, 337

SCRA 574 (2000), we held that the one-year residency requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders

“from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.”

Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the

purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to

the needs of the community. Thus, we find Noble disqualified from running as municipal mayor ofKinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.


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Same; Considering the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental

occasioned by Noble’s disqualification, the proclaimed Vice Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.—

Considering the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental

occasioned by Noble’s disqualification, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.

[Pundaodaya vs. Commission on Elections, 600 SCRA 178(2009)


23/53

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MALIK “BOBBY”

T. ALINGAN, respondents.

Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not

necessarily render the certificate void ab initio—once filed, the permanent legal effects produced

thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.— The withdrawal of a certificate

of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal

effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn. Section 73 of

the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, as amended) provides: Sec. 73.

Certificate of candidacy.—No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a

sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A person who has filed a certificate of

candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written

declaration under oath. No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same

election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for

any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, the

person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for

which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or

administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; The fact that a person’s certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate is given due

course by the COMELEC does not bar the COMELEC from deciding on her qualifications to run as a

candidate.—The fact that petitioner’s certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate was given due

course by the Comelec did not bar the Comelec from deciding on her qualifications to run as municipal

mayor. As correctly found by the Comelec: Said resolution (Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses

only the following: a) movant is given the green lights to be the substitute candidate for her husband

who was disqualified; b) her certificate of candidacy was duly accomplished in form and substanceand c) the certificate of candidacy will not cause confusion among the voters. Clearly, no issue of

disqualification was passed upon by the Commission in the said resolution. Movant may have been

given the impression that the Commission’s act of giving due course to her substitute certificate of

candidacy constitutes a pronouncement that she is not disqualified. It must be pointed out, however,

that the bases for giving due course to a certificate of candidacy are totally different from those for

enunciating that the candidate is not disqualified. x x x

Same; Same; Residence; Domicile; Words and Phrases; The term “residence” as used in the election

law is synonymous with “domicile,” which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also

personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention; For purposes of

election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention.—The Comelec correctly found that

petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. The term “residence” as used in the

election law is synonymous with “domicile,” which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place

but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The

manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,

unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an

elective office to serve that community. For purposes of election law, the question of residence is

mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually

resides. Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile

somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a

man can have but one domicile at a time.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Choice; Change of Domicile; Requisites.—In order to acquire

a domic