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1Environment & Urbanization Copyright © 2014 International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).Vol 0(0): 1–20. DOI: 10.1177/0956247814552233 www.sagepublications.com

From shared learning to shared actionin building resilience in the city ofBandar Lampung, Indonesia

JONATAN A LASSA AND ERWIN NUGRAHA

ABSTRACT This paper describes how the city of Bandar Lampung began toincorporate climate change adaptation goals into its budget and some of its plans.A series of Shared Learning Dialogues supported by the Asian Cities Climate

Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN) involved staff from city government,NGOs and universities. This led to the formation of a multi-stakeholder City Team

that was charged by the mayor with assessing climate risks and vulnerability,prioritizing problems and programmes, supporting small-scale adaptation projects

and functioning as climate change adaptation advocates within the city. The paper

describes some of these projects and how a range of factors underpinned bettersolid waste management and flood risk reduction, including fiscal reform that

brought a large increase in the city’s budget, strong leadership and better planning.Challenges and barriers are also discussed, including what is needed to ensure that

local government continues to incorporate climate change adaptation into its

work and investments.

KEYWORDS Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN) / BandarLampung / climate change adaptation / local risk reduction / transformation /

urban development planning / urban resilience

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the emerging institutional transformation andpolicy change in the city of Bandar Lampung as a result of supportfrom the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN).

This is funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, managed by Mercy Corpsand implemented by the City Team (a multi-stakeholder platform thatincludes city government). This initiative started in 2009 and it runs until2016.

For Bandar Lampung and the other cities with ACCCRN support,three specific outcomes are sought: improved capacity within theirgovernments to plan, finance, coordinate and implement climatechange resilience strategies; the creation of a network of people withpractical knowledge of building urban resilience to deepen the qualityof awareness, engagement, demands and applications by ACCCRN cities;and expansion or scaling up of the urban resilience-building models in

other cities, drawing on diverse resources.(1)In this paper, we ask how the city government can sustain adaptation to

climate change and what mechanisms are required to ensure incremental

Jonatan A Lassa is aResearch Fellow at the

Centre for Non-TraditionalSecurity (NTS) Studies,S. Rajaratnam School ofInternational Studies (RSIS),Nanyang TechnologicalUniversity, Singapore. Hereceived his PhD fromthe University of Bonn,Germany. His researchfocus is climate adaptationin urban and rural contextsand human and policydimensions of disaster riskreduction.

Address: RSIS Singapore,Blk S4, Level B3a, NanyangAvenue, Singapore 639798;e-mail: [email protected]

Erwin Nugraha recentlybecame associated withthe Institute of ResourceGovernance and SocialChange, Indonesia. Hepreviously worked at MercyCorps, Indonesia, on theACCCRN initiative in BandarLampung, and is currentlya postgraduate student at

Durham University in UK.

Address: e-mail: [email protected]

Acknowledgement: Theauthors would like to thanktwo anonymous reviewers,Diane Archer, DavidSatterthwaite and ChristineRo, who gave very valuableinputs to improve theprevious drafts. Personalthanks to Ratri Sutarto, PakSutri, Paul Jeffery, Ninik

Mulyawati, Omar Sarachoand Jim Jarvie (MercyCorps), who have beensupporting all the logistics

EAU0010.1177/0956247814552233Environment andUrbanizationLassaandNugraharticle2014

by guest on April 23, 2015eau.sagepub.comDownloaded from

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of this research. We wouldalso like to thank all theCity Team members inBandar Lampung, especiallyDesti Mega Putri (BappedaBandar Lampung), Wahyudi(BPPLH), Aryanto (Pusbik),Herza (Mitra Bentala),Maulana Muklish (LampungUniversity) and otherswho have been kindlyproviding support for thisresearch. We also thank theRockefeller Foundation forthe research grants withoutwhich this piece would nothave materialized.

1. Brown, Anna, Ashvin Dayaland Christina R Del Rio (2012),“From practice to theory:emerging lessons from Asia for

building urban climate changeresilience”, Environment andUrbanization Vol 24, No 2,pages 531–556.

2. Satbintrans (1983), Pola pelaksanaan transmigrasiumum, resettlement dantransmigrasi lokal (Patternof Implementation: GeneralTransmigration, Resettlementand Local Transmigration in

Lampung Region), PemprovI Lampung; also BPS BandarLampung (2011), Kota BandarLampung in Figures 2010.

change toward long-term adaptation. The paper draws on the authors’engagement as researcher (Lassa) and facilitator (Nugraha) with ACCCRNand on fieldwork in Bandar Lampung from June to October 2012. Thisincluded participant observation, unstructured interviews with citystakeholders and project managers, semi-structured interviews with localcommunities and literature reviews (including a review of official minutes

of meetings, project reports and other official documents).The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides background

information on the city and Section III considers how climate changeadaptation is being considered for cities. Section IV discusses theimplementation of ACCCRN’s activities in Bandar Lampung, including theShared Learning Dialogues (SLDs), Vulnerability Assessment (VA), formationof the City Team, pilot projects and City Resilience Strategy (CRS). SectionV presents a case study of urban waste management. Section VI reviewsexpenditures on environmental issues, Section VII outlines the city’ssustainability scenarios and Section VIII presents some final reflections.

II. BANDAR LAMPUNG: PAST AND PRESENT

Home to nearly 900,000 inhabitants, the city of Bandar Lampung spreadsalong 27 kilometres on the east coast of Sumatra Island. The city wasseverely damaged by the 1883 Krakatoa volcano eruption that triggereddeadly tsunamis. The impact of these modified the city, which came tobe divided into two parts. The safer part was situated in the upper part ofthe city (formerly known as Tanjung Karang district) where the wealthiergroups live (and was once used by the Dutch colonial rulers). The secondpart (formerly known as Teluk Betung District) has high concentrations

of low-income groups. This was among the areas hit by the tsunamis in1883 that killed thousands of people in Lampung and also on the Bantencoast (northwest of Java Island). Tanjung Karang and Teluk Betung werebrought together to form a united district called Bandar Lampung in 1983.

As Sumatra’s island gateway to Jakarta (Indonesia’s capital and itslargest city) and as a major destination for transmigration (inter-islandmigration), Bandar Lampung continues to experience high rates ofpopulation growth – on average 8.6 per cent per year for the period 1971to 2010. As of 2011, exports through Bandar Lampung port were going tomore than 87 countries (24 countries in Asia, 14 in Africa, three in AsiaPacific, 15 in the Americas, and 31 in Europe). As of 2008, at least 27 per

cent were living under the poverty line. In 2030, its population is likely toreach around 1.2 million.

By 2005, Bandar Lampung no longer had rural areas. The status of100 per cent urban is defined by administrative status; desa (rural village)status no longer exists and all areas now have kelurahan (urban village)status. This is a result of rapid spatial change in the city as only 10 yearspreviously, there were still 146,000 people considered to be living in ruralareas of the city. Lampung received the first influx of transmigrants from Java Island in 1905 in a programme initiated by the Dutch colonial rulers.This was later supplanted by further transmigration under the Suhartogovernment during the period of Pelita (five-year development plans).(2)

The population of both the city of Bandar Lampung and the province ofLampung have been dominated by transmigrants (for the city, from about36 per cent in 1971 to more than 80 per cent in 2010).


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3. Gutman, G, I Csiszar and PRomanov (2000), “Using NOAA/AVHRR Products to Monitor

El Niño Impacts: Focus onIndonesia in 1997–98”, Bulletinof the American Meteorological Society Vol 81, No 6, pages1189–1205, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/1520-0477(2000)0812.3.CO;2.

4. Du, Yan, Tangdong Quand Gary Meyers (2008),“Interannual Variability ofSea Surface Temperature offJava and Sumatra in a GlobalGCM”, Journal of Climate Vol

21, No 11, pages 2451–2465,available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/2007JCLI1753.1.

5. Román, Mikael, Björn-OlaLinnér and Per Mickwitz(editors) (2012), “Developmentpolicies as a vehicle foraddressing climate change“,Climate and Development Vol 4,No 3, pages 251–260.

6. Eriksen, Siri and Katrina

Brown (2011), “Sustainableadaptation to climate change”,Climate and Development Vol 3,No 1, pages 3–6.

According to a recent climate Vulnerability Assessment carried out byACCCRN, Bandar Lampung is at high risk from extreme weather eventssuch as droughts and floods. In Sumatra, these are strongly related to large-scale climate phenomena such as El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO)(3) and the Indian Ocean Dipole (a.k.a. Indian Niño) that often regulates therainfall pattern in the western and eastern Indian Ocean of Indonesia.(4) A

recent drought affected its residents, especially those who work as urbanfarmers, causing a decline in crop yields and loss of income for traders ofagricultural products. Despite the city’s entirely urban status, however, atleast 55 per cent of the land is still used for dry and mixed dry agriculturalareas (down from 60 per cent in 1992). The total area under settlementincreased from 13 per cent in 1992 to 35 per cent in 2006. Since drylandagriculture is very sensitive to drought and there is competition betweenagriculture and the household/industrial consumption of fresh water, thecity often experiences a lack of fresh water.

The city’s vulnerability to extreme weather has persisted and hasbeen amplified by different forms of maladaptation to different urban

problems. There has been an increase in small flood events within thecity. Its coastal population often experiences coastal floods that are locallyknown as robs (high tides combined with inundation and abrasion). Inaddition, more incidents of flooding have been strongly associated withpoor drainage and solid waste management. 86 per cent of the city’s solidwastes never reach the final disposal site and waste has accumulatedover the last 30 years. Informal settlers do not see waste as a problembut as a resource that can be turned into raw materials for settlementexpansion. This can be seen in community-based coastal reclamation inBandar Lampung that has been in evidence over the last 25–30 years.Unfortunately, the inhabitants of these settlements on reclaimed land

have homes and livelihoods that are at high risk from floods, sea level riseand tsunamis, and these are difficult to reduce or reverse.

III. CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT

In Indonesia, national policies on climate change are still at an earlystage. In addition, the main focus is still on climate change mitigation.The establishment of the National Climate Change Council in 2008and the subsequent release of the Indonesia Climate Change SectoralRoadmap (ICCSR) by the National Development Planning Ministry

(BAPPENAS) have been the first steps toward integrating climate changeadaptation and development. The ICCSR targets 2015 as the year whenclimate change vulnerability mapping will lead to the establishment ofadaptation information systems at national level. At present, climatechange intervention is mainly limited to discussions of mitigation andadaptation in particular policy settings with stakeholders at nationallevel. At both province and district levels, adaptation policy remains atthe stage of some pilot initiatives driven and facilitated by internationalactors in a few selected cities and regions.

Researchers have been suggesting that the main vehicle for addressingclimate change is the development process.(5) Sustainable development

outcomes require sustainable adaptation to climate change.(6) However,in conventional city development, climate change is still a nascent policydomain and still unknown to many cities’ managers, especially in low- and


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7. Carmin, JoAnn, IsabelleAnguelovski and DebraRoberts (2012), “Urban ClimateAdaptation in the Global South:Planning in an Emerging PolicyDomain”, Journal of PlanningEducation and Research Vol 32,No 1, pages 18–32.

8. See reference 7; alsoPasquini, Lorena, GinaZiervogel, Richard M Cowlingand Clifford Shearing(2014), “What enables localgovernments to mainstreamclimate change adaptation?Lessons learned from twomunicipal case studies in theWestern Cape, South Africa”,Climate and Development ,available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2014.8869

94; and Roberts, Debra (2008),“Thinking globally, acting locally– institutionalizing climatechange at the local governmentlevel in Durban, South Africa”,Environment and Urbanization Vol 20, No 2, pages 521–537.

9. Anguelovski, Isabelleand JoAnn Carmin (2011),“Something borrowed,everything new: innovation andinstitutionalisation in urbanclimate governance”, CurrentOpinion in Environmental

Sustainability Vol 3, No 3, pages169–175.

middle-income countries.(7) Some case studies of adaptation initiativessuch as Durban and Hessequa (South Africa) and Quito (Ecuador) are oftenpresented as good practices.(8) Despite evidence of a significant degreeof endogenous influence toward the adoption of climate adaptation inDurban and Quito, exogenous influences are evident in much of thediscussion on climate change policies in the cities of the Global South and

these serve to motivate, facilitate and shape actions.(9) Some cities in high-income nations, especially global cities such as New York, Sydney andBarcelona, have endogenously addressed their need to adapt to climatechange drawing on their own financial resources, scientific knowledge,infrastructure and regulatory capacity.

In order to achieve sustainable development outcomes, cities haveto adapt to climatic change through building their resilience. But citiesin low- and middle-income nations have been struggling to adapt dueto the lack of knowledge and capacity in urban climate planning anddevelopment reform. Regardless of the model and origin of policy changeand the drivers (either endogenous or exogenous), the question is how

cities of the Global South can make use of incentives, ideas and capacitytoward the needed institutional change.

IV. THE ACCCRN FRAMEWORK IN PRACTICE IN INDONESIA

In recent years, the cities of Bandar Lampung and Semarang (Indonesia),together with eight other cities in India, Thailand and Vietnam, have beentaking the leadership role in developing an ex-ante adaptation strategyand climate resilience building. These are all part of ACCCRN. The twoIndonesian cities are among the most important coastal cities that have

been exposed to different types of coastal risks and catastrophes. In thecontext of increasing vulnerabilities and climate change, the cities arelikely to face diverse scales and magnitudes of climate extremes. Theselection of the cities in Indonesia was based on a desire to work insecondary cities (cities with populations of around 1 million) that arevulnerable to climate change. Also influencing the choice of cities waspolitical will (as city governments agreed to adopt the Urban ClimateResilience Planning Framework (UCRPF)), government capacity and thepresence of individual champions.

The ACCCRN project framework that is being implemented inBandar Lampung includes five phases (Figure 1). The first involves Shared

Learning Dialogues among practitioners and policy-makers. These beganin mid-2009. The second is the production of a Vulnerability Assessmentthat informs the need to both conduct further in-depth studies (thirdphase) and develop a City Resilience Strategy (fourth phase). The thirdphase is the initiation of pilot projects, sector studies, workshops andthe drafting of a CRS during 2010–2011. In the fourth phase, the VAis intended to help the actors to understand the present context andfuture scenarios as shaped by vulnerability and climate change. The VAidentifies vulnerable sectors and groups in the city. The final phase is theimplementation of the actions from 2012 to 2016. Starting in 2011, atthe programme management level (country level), the ACCCRN project

initiated support for replication and dissemination of knowledge andpractical know-how from the ACCCRN pilot cities to other cities inIndonesia.




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10. See http://www.acccrn.org/about-acccrn/acccrn-methodology/shared-learning-dialogues, accessed 11 August2014.

11. Moench, Marcus, StephenTyler and Jessica Lage (editors)(2011), “Catalyzing urbanclimate resilience: Applyingresilience concepts to planningpractice in the ACCCRNprogram (2009–2011)”, ISET,Boulder, Colorado; also Tyler,Stephen and Marcus Moench(2012), “A framework for urbanclimate resilience”, Climate and

Development Vol 4, No 4, pages311–326.

a. Shared Learning Dialogues

In Bandar Lampung, the ACCCRN project has been facilitating a new modeof urban climate governance where a collective decision-making process isundertaken by the City Team through multi-stakeholder platforms made

up of representatives of relevant departments, civil society organizationsand local universities.

Since mid-2009 the City Team has adopted SLDs, which are “iterative,transparent discussions with local community members, governmentagencies, civil society organizations, research centers and other technicalagencies designed to facilitate mutual learning and joint problem-solving”.(10)

During the SLDs, the UCRPF was introduced to the city stakeholders.This framework, developed within ACCCRN, helps urban agents(individuals and organizations) to think across sectors and scales; theUCRPF facilitates the contextualization of scientific knowledge of climate

change and drives action in a defined timeframe. Thus, it helps increaseunderstanding of urban systems, institutions and climate change alongwith the interactions among them.(11)

The first SLD focused on an introduction to scientific informationon climate change for the city departments and NGOs. The City Teamreferred to it as levelling the perceptions concerning climate change sothe actors could be on the same page.

SLDs help the actors to identify problems related to climate changeand its footprints in the local levels as well as vulnerability identification.In the second SLD, the stakeholders were informed of evidence from theVA co-produced by a local university with the Indonesian ACCCRN project

lead (Mercy Corps) and URDI, an Indonesia-based NGO. The VA identifiessectors that are potentially affected by climate change. Responses fromparticipants in the SLD helped the vulnerability assessors to improve the

FIGURE 1Typical ACCCRN process in Bandar Lampung and Semarang

SOURCE: Internal ACCCRN project report/presentation.




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draft. The second SLD identified the need for prioritization concerningsectors that needed to be studied in greater depth.

During the third SLD, the City Team discussed the findings fromthe pilot projects. The participants identified early actions required totackle climate change and highlighted some institutional issues such asthe trade-offs between intervention options and the need for capacity

building, basic services improvement and strengthening of the localinformal economy. A working group for the CRS was formed at thismeeting. The members of the working group were selected from the CityTeam, which includes representatives of the city development planningagency as well as the Environmental Department (BPPLH).

The fourth SLD in May 2010 became a discussion forum for actionplans. Assessment criteria for intervention proposals were discussed and allprocesses of decision-making were shared. In May 2010, ACCCRN createdopportunities for the city to submit concept notes for intervention. Of thesix concept notes, one was developed into a proposal entitled IntegratedSolid Waste Management Master Plan.

The city governments allocated funds for the city’s departments tosustain the coordination meetings among local government departments,NGOs and academics. The city government, especially the key departmentsthat host the initiative, also allocated an annual budget (averaging US$10,000) to incentivize their focal points to participate in the meetings.More than a hundred meetings were held during 2009–2013, which wereattended by designated city officials, NGOs and local universities.

b. Vulnerability Assessment and City Resilience Strategy

International and national experts were commissioned to conduct a VAof Bandar Lampung City. The study aimed (i) to assess current and futureclimate variability in Bandar Lampung, (ii) to assess vulnerability andadaptive capacity as well as current and future climate risk at urban village(kelurahan) level, (iii) to identify direct and indirect impacts of climatehazards now and in the future at kelurahan level, (iv) to identify the mostvulnerable areas and social groups, as well as dimensions of vulnerability,including adaptive capacity of communities in relation to climate changeimpacts, (v) to identify institutional and governance issues that mayaffect the resilience of the city to current and future climate risk, and (vi)to develop initial recommendations for increasing the city’s resilience to

current and future climate risk.The assessment document reveals the risks the city faces from natural

catastrophe and natural hazards such as floods, landslides, high tides(a.k.a. robs), tsunamis, earthquakes and droughts. The study also evaluatedthe socioeconomic impact of climate risk in six kelurahans. The assessorsdeveloped a vulnerability and adaptive capacity index for the kelurahan that included socioeconomic and biophysical indicators.

The risks from flooding are associated with the two large rivers(Way Kuala and Kuripan) and the other 23 small rivers or streams thatpass through the city. In addition, the kelurahans, where many of thehouseholds live in buildings on river banks, have little access to drinking

water from PDAM (the government-owned water companies), and havehigh population densities and large concentrations of low-incomegroups. A large proportion of the kelurahan area near the rivers and coast




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12. Personal interviews withDesti Mega Putri, the DailyCoordinator of the City Teamof the Local DevelopmentPlanning Board (Bappeda)and the Head of the PlanningSection of the DevelopmentPlanning Board of BandarLampung, on 19 June 2012 and11 October 2012.

13. See City Regulation (Perda)No 10/2011 Concerning Spatialand Regional Planning 2011–

2030. The word “climate” is notmentioned at all. However, thedocument has been sensitiveto disaster risk managementterminology because it appearsdozens of times in the planningdocuments.

14. See reference 12. Weparticipated in the last meetingof the Master Plan for GreenOpen Space. The meeting washosted and facilitated by MrsDesti Mega Putri.

with less green open area is likely to be more at risk (indicated by thehigh vulnerability index). The assessment baseline year is 2005 withfuture scenarios for 2025 and 2050. It is projected that by 2025 and 2050,six–seven kelurahans are likely to experience improvement in the copingcapacity index but for some other kelurahans, this is likely to decrease.

The results from the VA have been incorporated into key city policy

documents. These include the City Resilience Strategy 2011–2030 and theIntegrated Solid Waste Management Master Plan (funded by ACCCRN)drafted in 2011. The CRS 2011–2030 provides broad guidance for city-level stakeholders in particular to guide the city to create an informedclimate change adaptation strategy. The CRS collated results from the VAto inform the climate change adaptation scenarios. The CRS documentis expected to inform the Long-term Regional Development Plan 2005–2025 (RPJP) and Bandar Lampung Spatial Plan 2011–2030 (RTRW).

The actors believe that without the resilience strategy document, thecity would be unable to adapt in response to extreme weather events. TheCRS has provided valuable information to inform adaptation in the city’s

Mid-term Regional Development Plan 2010–2015.(12)

The City Team members claimed early successes of ACCCRN in thatboth the VA and CRS have been incorporated into the Mid-term RegionalDevelopment Plan 2010–2015, suggesting that one of the strategic effortsto reduce the risk of flooding is to improve the quality of management andprocessing of solid waste. However, the VA and the CRS are not cited inBandar Lampung’s Spatial Planning (RTRW) Document for 2011–2030.(13) One of the reasons is that the consultants selected for the RTRW 2011–2030. do not have adequate climate adaptation literacy. For the otherdocuments (e.g. the Mid-term Development Plan), all the key selectedconsultants have been part of the City Team. Nevertheless, the VA, CRS

and Integrated Solid Waste Management Master Plan have been treatedas informal (as they have not yet been endorsed as legal documents). Butthey have been used and cited in the White Paper for Sanitation in BandarLampung City (drafted in 2012) and in the Master Plan for Green OpenSpace drafted in 2012.(14)

c. Formation of City Team

The City Team plays an important role in ACCCRN cities because itbecomes a temporary climate governance mechanism or collective

decision-making body drawing in city departments, civil society,representatives from local universities and the private sector. The idea isto have a defined procedure for cities’ decision-making systems.

The legitimacy of the team in Bandar Lampung is based on two officialdecision letters (or mayor’s decrees) in 2010 and 2011. The mandates forthe City Team are to monitor, control, organize, conduct studies, manageprojects, and report on all activities, processes and methodologies appliedunder ACCCRN. It also leads and facilitates the development of the CRS,which is one of the key goals of the ACCCRN project. The City Teamprepares monitoring and evaluation plans for each pilot project. TheCity Team determines the terms of reference for the sector studies. The

initial ideas for the sector studies were generated during the second SLDwith participation of community members and then narrowed down andfinalized by Mercy Corps and the City Teams.




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15. Personal interview withAryanto, Director of Pusbik, on19 June 2012; also personalinterview with Herza, Directorof Mitra Bentala, on 10 October

2012.

16. CCROM, ISET, Mercy Corps,URDI and ISET (2010), FinalReport: Vulnerability and adaptation assessment toclimate change in SemarangCity , ACCCRN, Indonesia.

The City Team is to ensure that the VA is adopted into the developmentagendas. One early success was to adopt the VA as a basis for the BandarLampung Resilience Strategy document. Since then, the team was toguarantee the adoption of the CRS into the city development planningand agendas. The City Team has emerged as a temporary strategic groupthat functions as a lobby group to ensure politicians, the mayor, and

the head of city departments allocate adequate resources for climateadaptation.

ACCCRN also affects the day to day relationships between NGOsand their perception about local governments as indicated by the lackof collaboration prior to ACCCRN. There have been improvements inthe relationships between local governments and NGOs. Despite the riskof being compromised by this, the NGOs also noted that the networkgives them more chances to influence local government. (15) This suggeststhat the City Team functions as a networking and relationship-buildingagency where stakeholders’ interests are shared.

d. Pilot projects

As the VA document suggests, the inadequacies in solid waste managementand drinking water provision have became the most visible problemsfor the city over the last 10–20 years. (16) During 2009–2011, no projectwas earmarked related to urban climate adaptation. It was agreed by theCity Team that all the pilot projects should be implemented by NGOsbecause the local government’s budget system has no provision fortapping external resources. The first pilot project was implemented byan NGO (Lampung Ikhlas). It was a small-scale waste management and

clean water management project with the overall objective of improvingcommunity adaptation to reduce impacts of flood and water scarcity. Itsought to change the behaviour of coastal communities through solidwaste recycling (e.g recycling plastic and paper waste as well as turningorganic waste into fertilizer). The water management project helpedcommunities in Kangkung Village (Kota Karang) to filter brackish waterinto drinking water.

The second pilot was implemented by an NGO named Mitra Bentala.The NGO helped a community in Bandar Lampung (Panjang Village)through waste management training, organic farming, environmentaleducation and clean water support. It also facilitated vertical agriculturetraining – a way of growing herbs and vegetables that uses little spaceand that makes use of organic waste. Mitra Bentala provided some wastecontainers as well as forming a community-based organization to collecthousehold solid waste through temporary waste collection (tempat penumpukan sementara).

Our study suggests that the intervention was not sustained due tothe institutional barriers present in 2009 (such as the lack of space andlack of incentive for growers). What is left is a few champions who turnedorganic waste into inputs for organic farming and very small-scale verticalagriculture. While the clean water project was sustained, it remains anisolated success with no evidence of the potential for upscaling.

However, the overall policy landscape for waste managementsuddenly changed, especially after the new mayor took office in 2010.This is discussed in Section V below.




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17. Bappeda (2011), BandarLampung Integrated SolidWaste Management MasterPlan (2011), pages 108–109.

18. We interviewed 14grassroots communities inseven villages during 13–14October 2012 concerning

the behaviour of solid wastemanagement at the level ofhouseholds as well as the localinstitutions.

V. CASE STUDY OF URBAN WASTE MANAGEMENTSUSTAINABILITY

One of the impacts of the SLDs, the VA and the pilot projects was theincreasing attention to waste management in the city’s governmentoffices. The decision of the City Team to draft the Integrated Solid Waste

Management Master Plan(17) (to increase climate change resilience) hashelped the city to start investing in waste management. This recognizedthe importance of having a plan for waste management to increase cityresilience to both the direct and the indirect impacts of climate change.It recognized that solid waste has been contributing to vulnerabilityto climate change impacts as uncollected wastes in “drainage channelsand rivers have reduced the drainage capacity and increased the possibilityof flooding”. In addition, “due to high tide, wind storm and high rainfall incoastal areas there have been severe flood events. And along with piles of garbagein coastal areas and inland areas, the secondary impacts (of disease spreadingand water contamination) could trigger the occurrence of dengue fever and

diarrhoea.” Existing data suggests that only two-thirds of generated wastewas properly disposed of in a final disposal site, with the rest improperlydisposed of, including in drainage channels.

The new mayor’s commitment to environmental sustainabilitywithin the city fits well with the City Team’s initiatives, starting since theend of 2010. Most of the City Team members have had roles as “informal”advisors to the mayor. As a result, from 2010, the city government hasincreased its investment in its waste management policy and practice.

Along the 27 kilometres of the city’s coastline, we have observed howthe coastline has been expanded into the sea as communities use householdsolid wastes as a raw material for landfill. This form of community-based

coastal reclamation is also complemented by uncontrolled reclamationby the private sector and local government. The “new” settlements thatresult from this practice cannot be fully seen as informal because the localgovernment has legally expanded its electricity and water services to theseareas and collects land and housing tax from the areas too.

Photos 1 and 2 show waste management practices in Bandar Lampung.Photo 1 shows the result of the ongoing informal coastal reclamation

using solid waste that has meant that the coastlines have been movingfrom 10 to 100 metres into the sea. This coastal reclamation continuesdespite significant reforms made by the city government over the lastthree years. The informal settlers see the waste as valuable raw materialsfor settlement expansion – but this can also be seen as increasingvulnerability to high tide, wind storms and high rainfall, and even asmaladaptation in relation to climate change.

A range of different institutions with different jurisdictions make up apolycentric solid waste management system. The coastline and near-shoresolid wastes are the responsibility of the Marine and Fisheries Department.Solid waste at the urban markets is managed by the traditional marketmanagers. The City Parks and Cleaning Department deals with the wastesin the streets, road canals and selected public spaces. Photo 2 is an exampleof how the City Parks and Cleaning Department has been working to cleanthe city’s streets since the new mayor took office in late 2010.

There has been very considerable progress in solid waste managementas seen and felt by most of the interviewed stakeholders.(18) But what ispuzzling is that this was not reflected in the ranking given to the city in the




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19. When we suggested thatperhaps the Adipura assessordowngraded the cleanlinessindex of the city based onthe observation of the city’scoastal areas, one of the CityTeam members in the city’sEnvironmental Departmentargued that almost all of thecoasts in cities in Indonesia arein poor condition. So coastalconditions should not be usedto downgrade the rank ofthe city of Bandar Lampung.

Interview with A Wahyudi,key contact at BPPLH, City ofBandar Lampung, on 20 June2012.

Adipura Award. This award has been used to encourage Indonesian citiesand urban regions to be clean and green since 1986. The Adipura Awardwas stopped for a few years after the fall of Suharto in 1998 but was revivedduring Megawati’s presidency in 2002. Every year, there is an Adipuracontest among the metropolitan cities, big cities, medium cities and smallcities. Additional categories include cities with the best urban–forest ratio,best city markets and best city parks. In 2009 Bandar Lampung was awardedthe Adipura Award in the big city category. In 2012, when the city wascleaner and better managed as a result of significantly higher investmentin waste management, it received a new status as “the dirtiest city” inIndonesia. It came bottom in the Adipura ranking – as announced by the

central government’s Ministry of Environment.(19) There is good reason toquestion the 2012 Adipura assessment. Assessing the responses of a rangeof interviewees including taxi drivers, garbage collectors and officials at themayor’s office and city environmental agency suggests that the city wascleaner and had better managed solid wastes in 2012 compared to 2009.Indeed, the city could have been placed far lower in the 2009 assessment– but the 2012 assessment was unacceptable. Unfortunately, the assessmentprocess and ranking criteria are not entirely transparent.

There has been a sharp increase in the city budget since the presentmayor took office in 2010. For instance, in 2009, the City Parks andCleaning Department budget was only US$ 247,000. This increased by

700 per cent in 2010 (or US$ 1.8 million) and continued to increaseto US$ 3.2 million in 2011 and US$ 5.5 million in 2012. This rapidincrease in budget was made possible by the reform in the taxation

PHOTO 1Land filling practice on the coast by local communities

© Jonatan A Lassa (2012)




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and tax collection system set by the mayor. It is clear that solid wastemanagement has improved greatly although there is the question ofwhether this will be sustained – for instance, whether it will be supportedby the next mayor in 2015.

VI. CITY SPENDING ON ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

The mayor decides on which environmental agenda to fund although,as explained below, the city legislators also have some powers in this.Officials at the Environmental Department Office and the DevelopmentPlanning Office have the discretionary power to propose smaller-scalebudget lines. The city budget for the environment (including climatechange) is relatively low in international comparisons but it grew fromless than US$ 100,000 for 2004–2006 to about US$ 300,000 during 2007–2010 (Figure 2). It has been consistently increased since 2010, where itstarted from US$ 300,000, to about US$ 750,000 in 2013.

The total budget for fiscal year 2012 was about US$ 215 million. Sincethe new mayor took office, he has been pushing to double the budget for

PHOTO 2Recent solid waste management practice by the City Parks and

Cleaning Department

© Jonatan A Lassa (2012)




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20. Personal interview withMaulana Muklish, Lecturer andClimate Change AdaptationEducation Project Manager,Lampung University, on 11October 2012.

21. The LAKIP Report is thePerformance AccountabilityReport by city departments.

2011–2013. Compared to the total city budget, for both recurrent costsand development expenditure, the percentage of the budget allocatedfor climate change-related activities was below 2.5 per cent during 2004–2006, 4 per cent during 2011–2012 and 5 per cent in 2013. The datais based on the spending at the Environmental Department combinedwith some related spending such as public health and urban drainage.However, more detailed disaggregated data is not yet available.

After the exchange of ideas through the SLDs during 2009–2012, since2012, for the first time, the Environmental Department (a.k.a. BPPLH) hascreated a new budget code for climate change adaptation. This is brokendown into intervention for the groundwater recharging programme,namely biopores (water-absorbing pits or holes), climate change impactcontrol, and training/capacity building concerning biopores. The increasein 2012 and 2013 allocations shown in Figure 3 has been related to the

local government commitment to improve groundwater conditions bysupporting biopores. Before 2012, climate change adaptation was under abudget line for environmental protection and conservation. There havealso been recent efforts that include greatly increased spending on treeplanting, biopores and capacity building.(20)

Since 2010, BPPLH has shown a commitment to investing in climatechange adaptation. It allocated US$ 121,000 in 2010, 112,000 in 2011and 133,000 in 2012 to address climate change impact. In 2013, theplanning draft suggests an increase to US$ 144,000. Although data basedon final audits is not yet available, the increase in the allocation of theenvironmental sector (Figure 2) suggests that the allocation is likely to be

as committed. This budget does not include staff costs. In 2010 and 2011,the budget was spent mainly on buying seeds for urban trees as well asbuying instruments such as climate and weather monitoring and somelaboratory instruments (LAKIP BPPLH 2010 and 2011).(21)

FIGURE 2Bandar Lampung spending on the environment and climate

change

NOTE: Inflation is corrected based on the Bank of Indonesia rate, at constant

prices for 2004.

SOURCE: Regional Transfer Section, Ministry of Finance, 2004–2013. Data on

2013 is tentative based on the 2013 plan.




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22. Pelling, M (2011), “Urbangovernance and disaster riskreduction in the Caribbean:the experiences of Oxfam GB”,Environment and Urbanization Vol 23, No 2, pages 383–400.

Some of the city’s annual budget is from funds transferred by thecentral government through DAK (special budget allocation), often madeby ministers at central government level. This includes the funds of theEnvironmental Department. Some of the shifts in the budget allocationsto include climate change intervention during 2010–2011 were at theexpense of other environmental programmes. For instance, the waterand environmental quality monitoring and improvement programme in2009 was US$ 145,000 but cut to zero in 2010, while in 2011 only US$1,980 was allocated to it. Even though it was raised to US$ 40,000 and30,000 in 2012 and 2013 respectively, this is still far below the 2009 level.

Comparable cuts were made in the budget for environmental impactassessment including no funds during 2010–2012. So there is considerablevolatility in the budget allocation. The reason for the volatility is thatinterest from the city government changes every year despite the fact thatthere is a need for stable allocation of vital programmes such as waterand environmental quality monitoring. 2013 shows some indication ofa more balanced budget allocation within the office but this is helped bythe increase in the budget from US$ 194,000 in 2009 to 463,000 in 2013.

VII. SUSTAINABILITY SCENARIOS

In international development interventions, sustainability is ofteninterpreted as lengthening the social and physical outputs andoutcomes.(22) The ACCCRN project seeks to imprint adaptation pathways

FIGURE 3Trend of regional original income in Bandar Lampung

SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration.




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in the cities that can be sustained. The expectation is that after thephasing out of the intervention in 2016, city governments will be able toadopt, replicate and sustain the overall process using their own resourcesto reduce their climate change risks.

There is the issue of how what began as an exogenous influencebecomes locally owned. The idea of a city government having a climate

change adaptation policy was introduced by ACCCRN. Whether or notit will continue depends on whether the city government takes theopportunity to sustain the policy and practice of climate adaptation.Our work suggests that five factors have importance for assessing this –beyond the SLDs and exchange of ideas. The first is fiscal sustainability,which allows a city government to increase sharply the investment inwaste management using the city’s own funds, while at the same timeshifting some small grants from the central government to supportclimate change adaptation. The second is the planning process. The thirdis sustaining the continual flagging of the idea of adaptation in the offices(e.g. BPPLH and Bappeda). The fourth is the issue of leadership. The fifth

is the issue of staff turnover in the context of Indonesian decentralization.Finally, the drive from the mayor to enforce local regulations that arepertinent to adaptation is also key to sustaining the results.

a. Fiscal sustainability

Over the last five years, the government of Bandar Lampung has increasedits capacity to act by expanding its revenue base. It has enjoyed a greatdeal of income growth since 2010. In 2006, its income was US$ 57 millionand in 2010, around US$ 86 million. During 2011 and 2012, the city

recorded an increase to US$ 101 million and then to US$ 135 million. Thetotal budget allocated for 2013 was US$ 149 million.

The data (Figure 3) suggests that Bandar Lampung City also increasedits tax income; in 2006, the city was only able to collect US$ 4.7 million.This increased to US$ 7.6 million in 2010 and $11.8 million in 2011.In 2012, after serious commitment from the city government, includingefforts to curb corruption within the local tax office and the extensionof tax targets, the PAD (regional original income) increased to US$ 29million in 2012 and US$ 35 million in 2013. This included local tax(regulated by national tax law), recompense (or Retribusi – special taxcollected for special services such as parking services, regulated under

city tax law), and the local government’s asset management. Local taxesare collected from entertainment businesses, hotels and C type mining(e.g. sands and other substances for construction materials); there arealso taxes on street lighting and advertisements. In addition there aretransfers of funds from central government (a.k.a. dana perimbangan).These consist of general allocation funds (DAU) – usually 60–70 per centof which are allocated to the salaries of civil servants while the rest goesto physical infrastructure, facilities and other regular spending. Thereare also special allocation funds or DAK allocated by central governmentthrough technical ministries that go directly to specific departmentsin cities and districts, and sharing funds from tax and non-tax sources.

Then there are “Other Sources” such as grants, (disaster) emergencyfunds, tax sharing with the province, other adjustment funds and otherfunds outside the categories above.




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23. See the remarks fromthe city website, accessed11 August 2014 at http://bandarlampungkota.go.id/?p=2376.

24. See Radar Lampung (2012),

“Herman fights floods”, 10October; also see the mayor’ssimilar comment in theLampung Post , 21 August 2013.

b. Better planning and better city politics

Weak capacity in annual development planning has been the bottleneckfor both urban and regional development in Indonesia. After thepolitical reform that led to decentralization in Indonesia in 1999, localgovernments have been going through a long transition in building their

capacity to plan. Local governments have been encouraged to plan fortheir own development agenda. New political dynamics emerge as theexecutive governments often require political approval from the multi-party legislators at province, city and district levels. This often createslong delays in fiscal planning for the new fiscal year. In some places,executive–legislative conflict can mean delays of more than nine months.A delay of nine months means that the cities/regions have only 90 daysto finish development projects. As a result, development outputs oftensuffer from poor-quality implementation and construction.

To avoid delays in fiscal planning, the central government issuedregulations that create sanctions and rewards for the cities and regions. One

of the regulations is Ministry of Finance Regulation 04/2011 concerningthe time limit for regional fiscal information such as the annual fiscalplan (a.k.a. APBD). It encourages local governments to submit a new fiscalplan for each fiscal year on 31 January. If they fail to submit on time,they receive warnings within 15 days after the time limit. If these areignored, within 30 days, new warnings will be issued and the Ministry ofFinance will also delay the transfers of DAU (general allocation funds).The government will cut the transfers by 25 per cent each month duringthe fiscal year. Other sanctions will also be applied.

On the other hand, rewards are given to local governments thataccomplish their fiscal planning earlier. Figure 4 shows how the city of

Bandar Lampung has demonstrated a new culture of fiscal planning. Forwhat is probably the first time during the last 50 years, the city has beenable to obtain approval of its fiscal year planning ahead of time. For 2012,the mayor was able to get approval from the legislators 16 days before thebeginning of the new fiscal year. For the fiscal years 2013 and 2014, theapproval was signed 92 and 120 days in advance. For fiscal year 2014, itwas reported that the city of Bandar Lampung was the first to finish its2014 fiscal planning.(23)

One incentive is that city/district governments are entitled to US$1 million grants if they are able to plan ahead. Another benefit of earlyapproval is that it allows the city bureaucrats adequate time and some

degree of quality to plan and implement their programmes and projects.In the past, such as in 2006, approval was delayed by 82 days becauseof long negotiation between the executive and the legislative. This canalso lead to corruption risk. In the city of Semarang, also supported byACCCRN, the previous mayor took the risk of using bribes to speed upapproval of the 2012 budget allocation and as a result he ended up beingpunished by the National Corruption Eradication Commission in 2012.

c. Leadership

The mayor noted that “ Floods often come to this city, but I ask all the villageand districts’ head to take care of their local environment by direct visits tothe field and not only sitting in the office as I do.”(24) In the management




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25. Diskominfo (2012), “Kota

Bandar Lampung YangPertama Bahas APBD TepatWaktu” (“Bandar LampungCity is the First to Have theAPBD Reviewed on Time”), 27September.

of solid wastes, the mayor promotes high-performing staff and dismissesthose with poor performance. Local media portray him as having a gooddeal of crisis management leadership, exemplified by his consistent citysurveillance during heavy rain, especially in the inundation hotspots. Itis not clear whether he will run for a second term in 2015. However, herecently ran for governor of the entire Lampung Province in April 2014.Despite ranking second out of four candidates, he received the majority ofvotes for the city of Bandar Lampung, with 56 per cent. This indicates thatthe people of the city are in favour of his leadership.

On 11 September 2012, the mayor received an award from the vicepresident of the Republic of Indonesia.(25) The award was a recognition of

the financial accountability of the city government. He combined supportfor innovative programmes (including environmental programmes) withtransparent financial management. As for the 2013 and 2014 annualfiscal plans, the city legislators were to review and approve them first.In addition, the provincial government as the representative of nationalgovernment also was to review and approve the draft earlier so that workcould start subsequently on the first of January 2013 and January 2014.

Administrative will and political will are the conditions for creatingsustainable climate governance practice. Leadership and accountabilitycreate conditions for healthy fiscal capacity. The increase in the fiscalcapacity of the city means more funding available for the issues and

sectors that concern the present leadership.However, there should be fixed connectors and lobby groups created

at different levels in order to facilitate the different actors, such as

FIGURE 4Trend in time for approval of annual fiscal planning for Bandar

Lampung (in days)

NOTE: Negative figures show delays (in days) for the local government

to come to an agreement on budget allocation. Positive figures (in days)

suggest agreement reached before the start of the new fiscal year in January.

SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration.




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26. Lassa, Jonatan and SetiyonoJawoto (forthcoming), “RecentProgress of Climate IntegrationInto Local Development Policy

in Indonesia: Lessons FromAgenda 21 to ACCCRN inSemarang City”, Climate andDevelopment (under review).

politicians, bureaucrats, civil society, the private sector and academia,coming together to solve urban problems under a changing climate; thisis a role that is in part played by the City Team.

d. Staff turnover

Rapid staff turnover causes discontinuity in the City Team and this wasespecially so during 2009–2010. In Indonesia, it is common for middle- orhigh-level government staff to be moved without prior notice. Therefore,policy innovation and practices being exercised by key officials are oftendiscontinued when these officials are moved. Our interviews in BandarLampung suggest that among high-level officials involved in the CityTeam, only one or two key persons have stayed in the same offices formore than 10 years while the rest only stayed from six months to three–four years.

Our recent findings suggest that the key person, Desti Mega Putri,

the daily coordinator of Bappeda’s City Team, moved from her postin Bappeda in early 2014. Since she has been a champion as well as aconnector of stakeholders within and outside city government in regardto all of the climate change resilience initiatives since 2009, her departurecan be seen as a collapse of a hub of the City Team network. The internalreporting and documentation system in local governments elsewherein Indonesia remains weak. Most often the successor has to start fromscratch as the accumulated information, knowledge and network over theyears are not properly documented. This might lead to transition in thecurrent progress of adaptation and resilience.

Despite the fact that the City Team conducted a workshop (in early

2014) on how to institutionalize the adaptation and resilience initiative,the members were divided when we (Nugraha) asked about their views onthe future without ACCCRN. Half of the City Team were of the view thatthe initiative can be sustained while the rest pessimistically maintainedthat things may not be sustained given the uncertainty in the futureleadership.

e. Sustainability of adaptation discourse

The success in increasing city government income from local tax andrecompense allowed the government to increase the annual budget for

urban waste management from US$ 0.25 million in 2009 to US$ 5.5million in 2012. But having more money does not automatically increaseinvestment in sustainable development including climate change. InBandar Lampung, sustaining the adaptation planning needs more thanthe meetings, pilot projects and interventions reported in this paper. Itis clear that the city government has been performing better in wastemanagement (suggested by both the spending and the fact that the city iscleaner), but there is still a need for smarter spending (e.g. more spendingon adaptation and wider environmental concerns).

Findings from ACCCRN in Semarang suggest that having a localchampion matters. The absence of a local champion can delay progress

in adaptation.(26) The sustained success of adaptation in Durban (e.g.with a prominent champion such as Debra Roberts) indicates that alocal champion should have stable engagement to ensure a long-term




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27. See reference 8, Roberts(2008).

28. See reference 25.

29. See reference 8, Roberts(2008).

endogenous climate adaptation initiative.(27) In the context of Indonesiandecentralization, this requires an inter-generational leadershipcommitment that ensures not only financial supports but also theexistence of the local champions.

f. Creative enforcement of regulation

The VA acknowledges that over-exploitation of ground water is oneof the root causes of the city’s vulnerability in regard to fresh watersupplies, along with regular droughts. The mayor has demonstrated howlocal regulations (or Perda) and incentives can be created to shape thebehaviour of the community and private businesses. Under Perda No2/2010 (regarding Ground Water Management) and Perda No 9/2011(Guide for Ground Water Tax), the present city government has been ableto create disincentives for ground water exploitation.

As of 2012, the mayor was able to collect US$ 40,000 of the water

tax (compared to the target of US$ 25,000). The amount may seem trivialin relation to the local government budget but it is significant from theperspective of the local government’s history. The arrangement wasunder the leadership of the Environmental Department.(28) Property andhousing developers have been encouraged to pay the ground water tax.This is seen as a way to increase local income tax and recompense at thesame time.

VIII. REFLECTIONS

Lessons from Durban suggest that the city government’s much-heraldedadaptation strategy was unsuccessful in encouraging any new adaptation-focused action, while the development of sectorally focused action planshas been far more successful in building champions and encouragingaction. In addition, lessons from Durban’s adaptation response suggestthat the learning by doing strategy has been key to the city’s success; itallowed the city to explore new methods and concepts through structuredand programmatic action.(29)

In Bandar Lampung, the “learning by doing strategy” has been usedin part by the City Team with support and leadership from the city’smayor. However, there has been no clear, measurable success in the degree

to which the level of vulnerability and risk has been reduced within thecity because the intervention has been focusing on the activities such asdeveloping new ideas, studies and knowledge sharing, policy drafting andbudgeting. But the success in local tax reform that is an important partof the increase in fiscal capacity allowed the city government to invest inwaste management.

One of the lessons learnt in Bandar Lampung is that progress towardadaptation can be reached when external support such as that fromACCCRN is met by an endogenous drive, as exemplified by the presentcity government, including the leadership from the mayor as well as thestill-functioning City Team.

Bandar Lampung has evolved from a city with no knowledge or policyon climate change adaptation to a more climate change-sensitive city asindicated by the shifts in planning, policy and city budget. However,




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30. See reference 21.

31. Carmin, JoAnn, DebraRoberts and IsabelleAnguelovski (2009), PlanningClimate Resilient Cities: EarlyLessons from Early Adapters,Paper prepared for the WorldBank 5th Urban ResearchSymposium on Cities andClimate Change, Marseille,France, June, page 4.

spending explicitly earmarked for climate adaptation within the city’sEnvironmental Department has been very modest in comparison to wastemanagement.

This paper has documented progress to date but there is uncertaintyabout how attention to climate adaptation will unfold in the future.Present “temporary” success is associated with the multi-stakeholder

platform, the City Team. Its members have been able to act as climatepolicy entrepreneurs in their own departments and agencies. The CityTeam also managed to convince the mayor to combine external support(from ACCCRN) with the city budget to address water matters such asbiopores. The question is: After 2016, what kind of incentive can be locallycreated to support the roles of the City Team?

Incentives for climate adaptation need to be substantial andsustained(30) because “incentives create imperatives” for coordination,shared learning and shared action.(31) However, incentives for climateadaptation can only work if there is a sustained effort to keep the issuealive at city level. This justifies the use of small external interventions to

catalyze action within the city.

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climate governance”, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability Vol 3, No 3, pages169–175.

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resilience”, Environment and Urbanization Vol 24,

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