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Environment and Security in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region: Water and Air Issues Robert G. Varady, Ismael Aguilar Barajas, and Gerardo Mejía Velázquez

Paper prepared for the Puentes Consortium

Mexico-U.S. Higher Education Leadership Forum

December 15, 2009 General Introduction

In this essay, we address the broad issue of environmental security in the U.S.-Mexico border region. The heart of the paper is an examination of the two aspects of environment that are most closely related to human health and well-being: the region’s water resources and its air quality. In order to frame our discussion in a context that considers the area’s security, we begin by offering our perspective on how to interpret that term so that it can be applied meaningfully to the region’s environment. As the next section argues, our understanding of security is expansive, allowing us to speak directly to environmental concerns, thus leaving to others questions of militarization, immigration, drug trafficking, and enforcement. 1. Environment and security: A post-realist perspective

Environment and security in the U.S.-Mexico border region—and in any transboundary region—are closely intertwined. Each may and usually does affect the other. Environmental processes in one country, such as droughts, floods, sewage flows, and air pollution, may become serious enough to harm the neighboring country. Conversely, one nation’s security-protection actions such as militarization, drug interdiction, fencing, and patrolling for cross-border immigrants can adversely impact the other nation’s environment and natural resources. This interrelationship is further complicated by a deeper distinction between hard “traditionalist” or “realist” views of national security on the one hand—and softer, alternative, “non-traditionalist” or “post-realist” interpretations on the other hand. Adherents of the realist, or neo-Hobbesian school of thought see security as a critical part of a nation’s sovereignty and therefore as a fundamental, absolute right, with an obligation to preserve it at any cost. According to this interpretation, arising from age-old competition for territory and resources, the concept of “national security” is used to justify maintenance of armies, the development of new weapons systems, and the manufacture of armaments. Military strength—and in recent history, economic power, as well—is the trump card and the nation that possesses the greatest measure of it earns the right to protect itself and its interests absolutely. This perspective prevailed across the globe until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing end of the Cold War (Dalby, 1992; A. Dinar, 2000). Realists examining environment and security in the U.S.-Mexico case would undoubtedly be most interested in instances where conflicts threaten stability and well-being in one of the states. Salient illustrations include such events as Mexico’s delay during the drought of the mid-2000s in meeting treaty obligations to supply critical water to the Rio Grande/Río Bravo; the United States’ decision to line the All-American Canal, depriving Mexican farmers of cross-border seepage; and the border security wall’s flood causation in Nogales, Sonora, in 2008. Realists would view such instances as serious assaults on their nation’s security and would advocate forceful, unilateral measures to impose solutions.

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But by the late 1970s and early 1980s, although the Cold War still raged, a number of writers—Lester R. Brown was among the vanguard—challenged the realist view of international relations and began in effect “rethinking security” (Brown, 1997; Ullman, 1983; Dalby, 1992). In the early debates, the non-traditionalists argued for a radical expansion of the concept of security to include social, economic, demographic, agricultural, and natural-resources-related matters. Among those at the forefront of this movement to “securitize” environmental issues1 (Liverman, 2009) were scholars writing about environmental change. Norman Myers and Jessica Mathews, both writing in 1989, were among the early proponents of this view. They saw clearly that because security is contingent on stability and peace, environmental problems and population growth were critical aspects of national security (Myers, 1989; Mathews, 1989)2. Appreciating the nuances of the rapidly changing relationship between humanity and natural systems and resources, Brown, Myers, Mathews, and other non-traditionalists recognized tradeoffs between security and other values. One important result of this insight was a rise in the importance of environmental issues and the consequent attention to cooperative approaches to transboundary conflicts (A. Dinar, 2010, forthcoming). In this vein, Aaron Wolf, in a seminal 1998 essay (and in a decade of work since), effectively refuted the notion that international water conflicts will inescapably lead to water wars; he demonstrates that historically, cooperation on transboundary waterways disputes has been far and away the prevalent outcome for more than two millennia (Wolf, 1998; 2007; Campbell and Weitz, 2007a). These findings are relevant for the U.S.-Mexico border region. In the years since the initial redefinition of security, writers have continued broadening the term to encompass food security and poverty, climate variability and change, water security, and energy. This more holistic conception of security underlines environmental problems that threaten the health and wellbeing of individuals or economic security of countries (Falkenmark, 2000). The topic water and security has arisen as byproduct of the growing interest in environment and security. Expanding the definition security yet further, Karen O’Brien and Robin Leichenko (2000) proposed a linkage of globalization and climate change, terming the risk from those two combined forces, “double exposure.” Through the work of the Global Environmental Change and Human Security [GECHS] project and other efforts, this initial pairing has grown to be multidimensional. This line of reasoning links multiple forces such as globalization, energy demand, poverty, disease, and conflict, which acting in concert, could severely impact communities, society, environment, and stability—in other words, by definition, national security. This more comprehensive line of thinking has been growing.3 The environmental –human security dimensions are in fact the reason behind the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) in 2004, under the United Nations University umbrella. For UNU-EHS (2005, p. 3) safeguarding human security requires a new approach, and better knowledge of many interrelated variables –social, political, economic, technological and environmental—which determine the impact of extreme events—

1 That is, to consider the security aspects of these issues, with environment seen as either the cause of security

concerns or as the possible object of security-related actions. A complementary term might be “environmentalizing security.” 2 It’s noteworthy that the 1977 monograph by Lester Brown, the 1983 article by Richard Ullman, and the 1989 piece

by Mathews were titled, Redefining National Security, “Redefining Security,” and “Redefining Security.” The Ullman and Mathews essays both were published in the influential journal Foreign Affairs, assuring a wide audience for these new, more liberal interpretations of security.

3 Among the wide number of institutions and programs that have emerged, there are the following ones:

Environmental Change and Security Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center; Center for International Strategic Studies; Center for the New American Security.

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such as floods, landslides and droughts—when the occur.4 The appeal of such broad redefinitions has even drawn such neoliberal thinkers as Gary Becker, who has allowed that environmental protection and national security goals may well coincide (2007). In our approach to this paper, we have deliberately chosen to cast environment and security in the U.S.-Mexico border region in the non-traditionalist, post-realist light described above. This approach does not ignore raw political and economic power asymmetries, but concentrates instead on illustrating a tradition of peaceful, cooperative solutions to shared problems. In a complex binational agenda, water shows that cooperation is possible. Of course, as stated above, there have been periods of heightened tension, but overall the countries have so far managed to resolve them. As expressed elsewhere for the international setting (Falkenmark, 2000), water is in fact forcing us to rethink the notions of security, dependency and interdependency: “While increased interdependency is often viewed as increasing vulnerability and reducing security, there is an alternative way to look at interdependence. These notions can be seen as networks that increase our flexibility and capacities to respond to exigencies of nature and reduce our vulnerability to events such as droughts and floods and thereby increase security.” Further, “Since water security is needed for all those living in the basin, cooperation is essential” (p. 10-11). This is an important point to take into account in the U.S.-Mexico border region, in regard to the strengthening of joint efforts to address these events. In other words, rather than feel more unsecure, cooperation over such a precious and indispensable resource as water could lead to greater security. 2. The U.S.-Mexico border region

Environmental security and border institutions

The area abutting the international border separating Mexico and the United States extends some 3,100 kilometers from the Pacific to the Atlantic Oceans (see Fig. 1 [map]). The line itself is the tenth longest boundary in the world and it separates two countries with widely disparate histories, cultures, political systems, economic bases, legal traditions, and civil society. Perhaps most strikingly, the GDP per capita of the United States is five times that of Mexico, making it the clear hegemon, in realist terminology, and rendering the transboundary zone one of the world’s most distinctive. Since Mexico and the United gained independence, their relationship has experienced periods of high conflict (actual war in one instance5) interspersed with long periods of peaceful, if sometimes tense coexistence. Sources of binational conflict typically centered on territorial disputes in the early years of the relationship. In more recent times, major irritants have been large-scale northward immigration, narcotraffic, imbalanced economic and trade policies, and disagreements over global politics such as policies toward Cuba, El Salvador, and nonaligned nations.

4 The United Nations Development Program identified, since 1994, seven dimensions to human security:Economic;

food; health; environmental; personal; community; and political (UNDP, 1994). As expressed in the latest Stockholm International Water Symposium, orientated to transboundary waters, “water security is a key element of human security, together with food security, energy security, health security, economic security, and freedom from fear” (Grobicki, 2009, p. 14).

5 The Mexican-American War of 1846-48.

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Figure 1. Map of U.S.-Mexico border region (to be completed)

In the environmental realm, conflicts have existed and erupted periodically, principally over shared surface waters of the two great rivers, the Colorado in the western portion of the border region, and the Rio Grande/Río Bravo in the east. While these have sometimes seriously aggravated relations between the two countries, they have not risen to the level of outright violence. Partly, this relative calm is due to the existence of the first truly binational institution operating in the border region, the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) and its Mexican section, the Comisión Internacional de Límites y Aguas (CILA).6 One of the first observers of transboundary environmental issues in this region was Albert E. Utton, a distinguished international law scholar. Already in 1973, four years before the pioneering Lester Brown monograph, Utton expressed clearly anti-realist views. He advocated a policy of “good neighborliness,” that he thought would yield equitable solutions the then-growing cross-border water and pollution problems affecting the area. His approach was among the earliest expressions of the need to manage resources, especially transboundary resources, on the basis of natural basins or regions—rather than, as traditionalists maintained, as elements of larger national interests. Utton’s views were all the more remarkable because they emerged at a time when no binational environmental institutions other than IBWC/CILA existed. This lacunae was partially filled in 1983, when the presidents of the two nations met in La Paz, Baja California, and agreed to a comprehensive environmental accord.7 This instrument, while not officially a treaty, provided a framework for addressing a host of issues— water, air, hazardous and solid waste, pollution prevention, contingency planning and emergency response, and cooperative enforcement and compliance. This agreement spawned a series of joint environmental plans (the International Boundary Environmental Plan (first Bush administration and Salinas administration), Border 2012 (Clinton and Salinas/Zedillo administrations), and Border XXI (G.W. Bush/Obama and Fox/Calderon administrations). The 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement was heralded as the world’s first “green” or partially green trade accord, when its side accord yielded the trilateral (Canada, U.S., Mexico)

6 IBWC/CILA originated as the International Boundary Commission in 1889, becoming the present commission in

1944.

7 Known as the La Paz Agreement or the Reagan-de la Madrid Accord.

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Commission for Environmental Cooperation. Simultaneous, though separate, discussions between the United States and Mexico resulted in two more binational organizations, the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and its partner, the North American Development Bank (NADBank), charged with identifying and funding borderwide water-infrastructural needs (Varady, 2009; Córdova and de la Parra, 2009). In the mid 1980s, soon after the signing of the La Paz accord, Mexico’s economic problems—eventually resulting in the Peso crisis of 1994—rose to the surface and were perceived by some as that country’s chief security problem. Jorge Castañeda, later to be minister of external affairs, wrote in Foreign Policy, that “Mexico's most demanding medium-term challenge is clearly economic,” thus anticipating the redefinitions of security proposed by the early post-realists (Castañeda, 1986). The centrality of the economy as a driver of national insecurity in Mexico, provided a convenient receptacle for other such drivers. As this expanded notion of security caught on in Mexico, Norman Myers (1989), himself one of the advocates for an expansive understanding of security, echoed Castañeda in fearing economic upheaval along with forest loss, lack of water availability, and population growth as major threats to internal stability and thus security in Mexico. At least on paper, water has often been referred in government and political circles as a national security matter. However, this statement may not hold in practice. In the two decades since this sort of thinking emerged, environment and natural resources have featured in discussions of security on both sides of the border. In the vast, mostly arid-to-semiarid cross-border area, the two countries have confronted numerous environmental issues that link to national security concerns. The most newsworthy problems are ones that involve the threat of or the use of force. Because of widely disparate economic conditions in the two nations, Mexican immigration to the United States has long been the source of mutual recriminations. The U.S. position generally has been that persons coming across the border without proper authorization are considered “illegal” or “undocumented” immigrants. The various border security agencies have for decades attempted to stop such crossings by militarizing the area. The late 1990s saw the rise of much more extensive patrolling, electronic surveillance, and construction of physical barriers, most notably walls in several long stretches. In the last several years, officials and some researchers on the U.S. side have cited the cumulative impact of crossings and border enforcement activities as destructive of natural habitat and landscape, and as sources of pollution, wildfire (Sharp and Gimblett, 2009), and potential environmental disease. Some scientists have concentrated instead on the destructive impact of all-terrain vehicular patrols; the harmful effects of physical barriers on wildlife movement, streamflow, and urban flooding; and the added pressures on Mexican infrastructure induced by large masses of deportees in Mexican border towns and cities (Segee and Córdova 2009). A second major source of contention has been the flow of illegal drugs across the border, almost exclusively northward. The consequences of this undeclared “border war” have been similar to those engendered by immigration. The chief difference is the scale of human activity. Unlike the tens of thousands of migrants seeking to improve their lives, drugs are brought across by small bands of carriers—too small to impact the environment directly. But the counteractions by U.S. immigration and security officers are nearly identical to the measures employed to interdict human migration. As a result, the environmental consequences are the same, due to police and military activities. These mostly affect the northern side of the border (Nuñez-Neto and Garcia, 2007).

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In this paper, as post-realists, we address the “other” side of the environment-security issue: the effects of environmental problems on stability, society, and general well-being in the two countries. In other words, where are the hot spots that have needed attention, especially binational attention? Where these result in transboundary disagreement, how can such disagreements be addressed and defused cooperatively? In particular, we highlight some key water-related and air-quality-related problems in the border area. Environmental issues and drivers of change

Except for the easternmost quarter of the border region (from around Ciudad Acuña [Coahuila]-Del Rio [Texas], the border area is typified by low rainfall (less than 600 mm per year and periodic, sustained multiyear droughts. Precipitation decreases more or less continuously toward the west, reaching less than 80 mm per year in the hyperarid desert along the border, west of the Colorado River. In other words, water scarcity is highly associated with this semiarid climate. Recent studies have shown, meanwhile, that the area—already highly vulnerable—is likely to be particularly impacted by expected warming of climate and further decreases in annual rainfall (Seager, et al. 2007). The middle portion of the cross-border region—from around Organ Pipe National Monument in the west (Arizona-Sonora) to Big Bend National Park along the Rio Grande/Río Bravo (Texas-Chihuahua and Coahuila)—includes desert highlands, with long stretches of mountainous zones whose peaks, known as “sky islands” reach 3,000 meters. On either side of these highlands are low-lying lands extending to the two coasts. The water scarcity that characterizes the area has largely defined uses of the land since human occupation. Water resources have been so important to human and economic development that the development of scarce water resources can be said to have constituted the main driver of environmental change (Varady and Ward, 2009; Liverman, et al. 1999). Throughout this time—from the earliest settlements of American Indian groups, to the advent colonial settlements, to the establishment of the United States and Mexico as neighboring independent countries, to the modern period—water has been the limiting factor in all aspects of development. Early attempts at agriculture recognized this constraint and communities devised irrigation systems and water-harvesting techniques designed to maximize the use of scarce water. Spanish missionaries and colonists, acknowledging the value of water, adapted Iberian and, occasionally, indigenous water-management laws and practices to local conditions. Until the 20th century, farming remained at best a limited source of livelihood. But massive irrigation schemes such as the Salt River Project in central Arizona and the building of dams along the Colorado and Rio Grande/Río Bravo Rivers and their tributaries and elsewhere made commercial agriculture viable and lucrative. Then, in 1942, to meet wartime and postwar labor shortages, the U.S. government introduced the Bracero guest farmworker program. This effort distributed permits to more than four million agricultural Mexican workers and changed the human landscape of the region, while imposing new requirements for water and other resources for the enlarged population. Cattle-raising, introduced by the Spaniards, became an important occupation and a major source of revenue. Because of the low carrying capacity of the land, ranching required extensive tracts of land and careful use of water. Inevitably, through overgrazing and other practices, vast expanses were devegetated, while riparian areas and aquifers used to water cattle were degraded and depleted—many of these, irreversibly. Gold and silver were the chief lures of the conquistadors when they arrived in North America and the present border region was rumored to contain rich deposits of both. This expectation

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spurred large-scale mining enterprises that proceeded to extract nearly all available silver and the little gold that was found. The most prevalent metal, however, was copper. The largest deposits in North America lay in the vicinity of the west-central portion border, in what is now Arizona and Sonora. Large mines were established and some of these continue to operate. Mines, like ranches, require large quantities of water and because of the wealth they generate, governments in Mexico and the United States have granted inexpensive mining rights and water rights to large mining enterprises. And as with cattle growing, mining—especially the 20th century advent of surface mining—has taken an environmental toll on the region, depleting and polluting water stores while contributing to dust-borne air pollution. In addition, until the late 1980s, copper mining was accompanied by smelting. With the exception of a smelter in Nacozari, Sonora—which was built with a sulfur-dioxide-controlling acid plant in the mid-1980s—all the region’s smelters were old and highly polluting. They emitted not only sulfur dioxide, but nitrogen oxides, lead, arsenic, selenium and particulate matter—all of which have been suspected of causing respiratory problems, cancers, and other ailments, as well as damaging vegetation. The operation of these smelters engendered public opposition that eventually caused the closure of all but a few; other than in Nacozari, the only currently operating copper smelters in the border region are in Hayden and Winkelman, Arizona, and in El Paso, Texas (Wirth, 2000; Varady, 1988). A third driver of environmental change in the border region has been industrialization (and its effects on urbanization). Rapid population growth and increasing urbanization has meant considerable pressures on water supply. In this regard, it is important to recognize that urbanization and economic policy should also be part of, or at least to be considered in crafting, water policy. In other words, considerations about land use conversions should not be treated as merely urban matters. For centuries—because of its extremes of climate, water scarcity, and rugged landscapes—the area was sparsely populated. Most communities were small, isolated, and rural, clustered around ranches, missions, and military outposts. By the middle of the 20th century, this profile began to change. The growth of large cities such as Laredo-Nuevo Laredo, El Paso-Ciudad Juárez, and San Diego-Tijuana was driven by new migrations, themselves spurred by growing employment opportunities in the region. These culminated in the rise beginning in the 1970s of maquiladoras, or foreign-owned industrial manufacturing plants in Mexico, many of them located along the country’s northern border. Between their start and the late 1990s, hundreds of maquiladoras were created, drawing hundreds of thousands of workers northward to the border region. In the Mexican sites of the manufacturing plants—cities such as Nogales, in Sonora, and Nuevo Laredo and Matamoros, both in Tamaulipas—grew to many times their previous size. This sudden urban growth strained already overburdened infrastructure, prompting a need for large investments in new water delivery, treatment, and sanitation systems, especially on the Mexican side of the border. Some of the necessary expenditures for such improvement have been provided by NADBank and BECC. The rise in industrially-driven population has been accompanied by heavy vehicular traffic with its attendant toxic emissions. Further, because population growth has been concentrated in previously undeveloped parts of urbanized areas, much of the traffic circulates on dirt roads, thus leading to serious air pollution caused by dust. The proliferation of vehicles also created a serious problem with growing stocks of old tires, large volumes of which were burned, polluting surrounding airsheds (Rincon, et al., 2005); others were stored providing habitat for mosquitoes and other disease vectors.

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In the two sections that follow, we discuss the two substantive themes of this paper: water and environmental security, and air and environmental security. In the first instance, in reviewing key water-related issues, we limit our purview to the lower portion of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo (LRGC) Basin. The section on air quality treats the length of the border region: the LRGV Basin, the Paso del Norte strip, and the California/Baja California area. 3. Water and environmental security in the Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin

Introduction: The case of the Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin

In arid and semiarid regions throughout the world, population growth and economic development are exerting ever-greater demands on scarce water resources. For these regions, water security—dependable access to sufficient quantity and quality of water—is paramount to the very survival of the social, economic and ecological systems upon which society in these regions is based. Therefore, water security and economic development (understood from a comprehensive perspective) are interlinked. Worldwide, poor governance and mismanagement of natural resources contribute to a growing imbalance between water supply and water demand. This demand is being fueled by rising population, economic growth, and urbanization (CSIS and Sandia National Laboratories 2005). This applies as well to the U.S.-Mexico border region. Few resources are as vital to the U.S.-Mexico border´s future as water.8 As Mexico and the United States accelerate the pace of economic integration, the border region has become even more tightly linked. As also stressed in the above-mentioned report, water management is one of the most complicated issues in the U.S.-Mexico agenda. However, it does not seem that this complexity is fully recognized. The demand for water today outpaces the available water supply in many regions on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. Almost all renewable water resources in northern Mexico are already being used at maximum capacity. Water use in Mexico will double within the next 20 years. During the same period in El Paso, Texas, the municipal industrial use of water is projected to increase 30 percent, which is indicative of the rapid increase in consumption on the U.S. side o f the border. The current framework for allocating and planning is insufficient for dealing with the sustainable development of water resources in the years to come (Mumme and Aguilar, 2003). Water policy instruments are not comprehensive and often conflict with economic, fiscal, agricultural, and urban development policies, which add to public confusion over what national, sectoral, and regional priorities really are, as was evident in the heated binational debate over the Rio Grande water deficit. To a large extent, the selection of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo, below, to illustrate environmental security is due to the heightening of political tensions between the stakeholders in both sides of the river, and the lessons derived from them.9 More particularly, the conflicts associated with Mexico´s water debt illustrate the multilevel—spatial and sectoral—governance that is involved. This scarcity of management compromises the security of the environment and the border regional economy. In the case of Mexico, given the geostrategic role of this region, environmental and water security become in fact matters of national security.

8 This statement comes from Mumme and Aguilar (2003). The figures mentioned in the following paragraph also

come from this source.

9 This is also the view taken in the CSIS report (2003) advocating for a transboundary study focusing on the Rio

Grande/Rio Bravo.

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El Paso Ciudad Juárez

La Cuenca del Río Bravo

The Rio Grande Basin

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Hydrological Region

Perhaps nowhere else is the complexity of U.S.-Mexico border water security better revealed than in the lower part of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin. This is why our contribution focuses on this particular part of the binational basin. The Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin (or simply Lower Basin), is at the receiving end of a complex binational multi-tributary system. It is a drought-prone region characterized by limited water supplies, a rapidly growing urban population, intensive irrigation, significant and increasing industrial production, a dynamic binational economy driven by trade, high incidence of poverty, and significant ecological degradation. Water security is a chronic concern. Notwithstanding the shortcomings and the fact that under this context the possibility for conflict is high, cooperative, binational water management efforts have also been present and are fundamental to the region´s future. The region’s water regime comprises a complex interaction of binational, national, state and local actors and institutions. Decisions taken at a local scale can ultimately have implications for binational relations. For example, one can trace how local decisions in Chihuahua state (in which the Río Conchos sub-basin lies) can yield impacts that affect local water users downstream in Texas and Tamaulipas.

Main problematic

The Rio Grande/Río Bravo runs 1,000 km (600 miles) north-south from its source in the Colorado Rocky Mountains to El Paso, Texas. From there it turns southeast and for nearly 2,000 km marks the border between Mexico and the United States before emptying into the Gulf of Mexico (see Figure 2). The river is of crucial significance for Mexico and the U.S. in socioeconomic, societal, and environmental terms. While the border has long been a national security concern for the two nations, water is increasingly seen as a key issue in this regard.

Figure 2. The Rio Grande/Rio Bravo

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Due to intensive human development and water use in Colorado, New Mexico and West Texas, the Rio Grande/Río Bravo runs dry south of El Paso-Cd. Juárez during much of the year. As a result, below Fort Quitman, Texas, to the Gulf of Mexico, the river has effectively become a separate watershed. It is this portion of the watershed that we refer to as the Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin (LGRB).

Unlike the upper part of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin and the Colorado River Basin to the west, which also have binational concerns, the LGRB is at the receiving end of a multifaceted binational multi-tributary system. Two tributaries in the Lower Basin—the Río Conchos from Mexico, and the Pecos River from the United States—are the main sources of water feeding into the Rio Grande/Río Bravo, restoring its flow to the Gulf. The long-term river hydrograph of the LGRB is characterized by long periods of low flow punctuated by very high flow events on an interval of several years (Ward, 1998). This explains the occurrence of both droughts and floods that affect the region. Water management along the Mexico-U.S. border region is by nature binational. The IBWC/CILA was established by the Treaty of 1944 to manage water between Mexico and the United States. Concerning the Rio Grande/Río Bravo, the Treaty formalized provisions for the construction and operation of Falcón and Amistad reservoirs by IBWC/CILA, and provides for the division of stored waters from the binational watershed between the two countries. Reservoir operation is a complex process involving not only assessment of the hydrological state of the river’s various reservoirs and demands from downstream users, but also judgments weighing the risk of flood versus drought and the political positions of the two countries.10 Falcón and Amistad dams capture and store the runoff from the large, infrequent rainfall events, providing protection against floods a well as a more reliable water supply for users downstream. Such infrequent, high flow events play a major role in filling the reservoirs, which otherwise are in a general state of drawdown with storage levels well below maximum storage capacity (see Figures 3 and 4). Figure 3 shows that from 1993 onwards, the combined contents in these reservoirs were decreasing very seriously. In 1992 both reservoirs were simultaneously full. For the following ten years the region experienced one of the most prolonged and severe droughts on record, during which the annual average of the combined reservoir contents hovered around 30 percent of total storage capacity. However, treated individually, the contents of Falcón have dwindled to as low as eight percent of its storage capacity, while Amistad’s contents dropped to as low as 16 percent of capacity. Most of the Lower Basin’s population and economic activity is concentrated in the final 400 km stretch of the river between Falcón and the Gulf, the LRGB. It appears in Figure1 as the “Impact Region.” Since the 1950s, the LRGB has experienced tremendous population growth, a trend that will likely continue over the next several decades. From 1950 to 1995 population rose from around 1 million to more than 5.1 million—an increase of more than 200 percent.11 The population continues to grow at high rates.

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Falcon and Amistad Reservoirs have been in operation since 1952 and 1967, respectively, and since 1972 they have functioned as a single tandem system in which Falcon is generally drawn down first. This is hydrologically prudent since it maximizes the available storage downstream, so that rainfall events can be captured whether they occur on the Amistad or Falcón portion of the watershed. See Ward (1998) for details regarding the operation of the Falcon-Amistad reservoir system.

11 Much of the increase is the result of in-migration from the interior of Mexico and Central America.

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Source: Aguilar Barajas et al (2001) [Note: this should be Figure 3]

Figure 4. Amistad-Falcon International Dams: Conservation Capacity, 1996 -2007 (May)

Source: IBWC/CILA (www.ibwc.state.gov, November 9, 2009).

As the region entered a new century, industrial, manufacturing and service sectors, driven by international trade, began to dominate the economy, a trend that was strengthened by the 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For Mexico, the LRGB is of paramount national economic importance—it is the focal point for large amounts of foreign direct investment, trade, and employment, and is a center of relative economic opportunity and prosperity. For the United States, the region represents a major challenge since it is among the poorest in the nation, with high levels of unemployment and other social problems, yet it is also a major focal point for trade with Mexico. More than sixty percent of all trade between the U.S.

Figure 2. Combined Amistad-Falcon Reservoir Contents,

1990-2000

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Combined ReservoirContentsCombined Storage Capacity

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and Mexico passes through this part of the border. The LRGB thus represents a dynamic region of strategic social and economic importance for both countries.12 Although the vast majority of the Lower Basin’s population lives in urban areas, agriculture, which currently uses most of the region’s water supply, is socially and economically important. Thus, urban water security in the region is closely tied to agricultural water security. Water security in the LRGB border region is also inextricably linked to upstream portions of the watershed. The waters of Rio Grande/Río Bravo, stored in the Falcón-Amistad Reservoir system, are the LRGB’s only major source of water. The LRGB receives the vast bulk of its water, nearly 95 percent, from the much larger watershed upstream.13 The great majority of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo’s water—80 percent or more—is used by agriculture. As water is diverted from the river channel to various users, the flow remaining in the river is concomitantly reduced. As population, the regional economy, and associated waste-generation have rapidly grown, the quality of water has become a major concern in the region. In response to these threats, concerted Mexican and binational effort have being directed at increasing wastewater treatment capacity in the Mexico portion of the LRGB. Nonetheless, water quality will continue to be a serious issue as more water is used for municipal and industrial purposes, which generally require higher quality than agriculture. Over the last hundred years, human activities have seriously impacted the region’s ecology. Over 20 years ago, observers warned that less than five percent of the original Tamaulipan brushland ecosystem remained along the binational downstream corridor (Jahrsdoerfer and Leslie 1988). Almost 10 years ago, it was also recognized that dramatic changes to the flow regime of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo have had a major impact on the riverine biota (Edwards and Contreras-Balderas, 1998) The water-supply-related challenges for the future are daunting. Our estimates suggest that the region’s booming urban population will double yet again over the next 30 years. Indeed, since the completion of Falcón Reservoir in 1953, the population of the LRGB will have increased by 600 percent by the year 2030. This population, concentrated almost entirely in the region’s urban areas, will in turn drive municipal water demand to more than twice the current level and will tremendously strain existing water treatment, delivery, and sewerage infrastructure. At current rates of use, the river will not be able meet the combined demands of agriculture, industries, and municipalities, let alone the needs of the ecosystem. As elsewhere along the Mexico-U.S border, water management in the Lower Basin is fragmented, involving international, federal, regional, state and municipal institutions in both countries. Within the two countries, water management differs significantly. Because of the growing population and regional economy, the limited water resources available to the region, and the complex institutional context within which water management is currently carried out, there exists an array of potential conflicts in the basin: between agriculture and industry, between economic development and preservation of environmental quality, between rural and urban areas, between upstream and downstream users and between Texas and Mexico.

12

See the book Integration Económica Noreste de México-Texas.- Diagnóstico y Prospectiva, commissioned and published by the state of Nuevo León, Monterrey, 2007, Fondo Editorial Nuevo León.

13 Groundwater is generally of poor quality, with high levels of salinity, nitrates, and sediments, and is currently not

used widely.

13

Without improved water management, these tensions will only increase as the region’s population and economy continue to grow.

Drought as a threat to water security

Within the overall problematic described above, drought is an acute threat to water security in the Lower Basin. The region’s climate is semiarid, with recurring droughts a defining feature of the physiography. Vulnerability to these drought events can be aggravated by such factors as population and economic growth, land use changes, socioeconomic conditions, education, and cultural considerations. Yet despite regular occurrences of drought and the vulnerability of the region to these climatological events, the region lacks a comprehensive vision of or program for drought management. This fact and the reduced amount of water available during droughts combine to exacerbate tensions and conflicts among competing users, and together these represent a particular threat to water security in the region. The drought observed since the early 1990s- and which lasted almost a decade illustrates these matters very neatly. Mexico´s current water deficit—and the complex array of conflicts that emerged as a result—are set in this context. This is what this paper turns to next.

The Treaty of 1944

In 1944 Mexico and the United States signed a treaty to jointly manage the waters shared by the two countries. The treaty is occasionally updated through a system of minutes, which are approved by the federal senates of the two nations. The minutes, which are proposed and administered by the IBWC/CILA address different aspects of boundary water management, such as the construction of sanitary projects. By law, the IBWC and CILA commissioners must be engineers.

By the same treaty, Mexico is obligated to deliver to the U.S. one-third of the water from the Río Conchos watershed upstream from the Lower Basin, and no less than 350,000 acre-feet (431,721,000 m3) per year.14 These deliveries are measured as an average over five year cycles, to allow a degree of flexibility that accounts for the variability in rainfall. Any deficit in a given cycle is covered in the next one. According to the Treaty, Mexico could postpone her obligations if there is an extraordinary drought or when the two international dams Falcón and Amistad are at full capacity.

On the other hand, the U.S. provides Mexico 1,500,000 acre-feet (1,850,234,000 m3) from the Colorado River Basin, to address water demands in northwestern Mexico. The rights to these waters are considered in the Treaty. Conflicts between the U.S. and Mexico over the Rio Grande/Río Bravo deliveries, which are detailed below, have linked the two basins politically. There were radical voices in the U.S. who went as far as to claim that the country stop deliveries from the Colorado to Mexico until the conflicts over the Rio Grande /Río Bravo were solved.15

14

There are six tributaries explicitly mentioned in the Treaty whose waters reach the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo. These deliveries are measured as an average over five year cycles, to allow a degree of flexibility that accounts for the variability in rainfall. Any deficit of a given cycle is covered in the next one.

15 It has to be emphasized that these are two hydrographically distinct basins. In any case, there are also claims from

Mexico over the unilateral lining of the All American Canal (in the Colorado River Basin) by the U.S, which will stop infiltration to the Mexican side. This, in turn, will adversely affect agriculture and the regional economy of Mexicali (and also neighboring Calexico) as well as trans-border ecosystems.

14

The drought of the 1990s and conflicts over the Rio Grande/Río Bravo

A severe drought has affected the Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin since 1993. Increased development upstream and low levels of precipitation in the Conchos Basin prevented Mexico from fulfilling its water deliveries indicated in the 1944 Treaty, resulting not only in less water for U.S and Mexican users in downstream in the Lower Basin, but also political tensions between and within the two countries. On several occasions the river did not reach the Gulf of Mexico.16 Following discussions between presidents Fox and Bush, in Rancho San Cristobal, Guanajuato, Mexico, on February 16, 2001, the IBWC/CILA commissioners, along with high officials of the two governments, met in Washington, D.C. The agreements reached at these meetings found their way into Minute 307, dated March 16, 2001.17

In 2002 and 2003 the lingering conflict ranked high in the binational agenda. Mexico´s newspapers covered the differences between views in the nation and in the United States over the Rio Grande/Río Bravo waters. During several months this affair made the first page, often above more traditional and pressing issues like migration, drugs, and even border security. In the U.S. there were also several features and editorials in media such as The New York Times and Los Angeles Times. In fact, it was even suggested that the parties refrain from discussing the (then in the public arena) migration agenda unless and until the Rio Grande/Río Bravo conflict could be solved. Mexican society had learned that, among other things, the country maintained a water debt with the U.S. In 2002 Mexico owed the U.S. some 1,640 million cubic meters (or just above 1.2 million acre-feet). The high visibility in the media of this deficit also showed the lack of understanding about the binational water management framework and its complexity.18 Very often misinformation and biased views governed the discussions. Over the last few years there have been higher precipitation levels that eased the situation. Amistad and Falcón increased their volumes of water, well above the dramatic levels of the early 2000s when conservation capacity reached dramatic levels, especially in Mexico (Figure 3). The situation improved greatly during the rest of cycle 26 and in the first two years of cycle 27 (2002 to 2004). Average annual deliveries were in the order of 607 Mm3. In 2004, the deficit was estimated at 884 Mm3.

After hard negotiations with the U.S., it was agreed that Mexico should cover it with waters coming from Falcón, Amistad and Marte R. Gómez dams. These deliveries were concluded on 30 September, 2005.19 This scheme allowed, at least partially, a way out of a dispute that had reached its peak in the binational agenda. Relatively high precipitation levels continued in the subsequent years. In October 2008, the National Water Commission of Mexico and the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, announced the end of cycle 28.20 This was possible thanks to the rains of the previous months that enabled the U.S. to have 100 percent of conservation capacity in Falcón and Amistad.21

16

Annual average deliveries of cycle 25 (which ran from 1992 -1993 to 1996-1997) and those first three years of cycle 26 (1997 to 2000) were in the order of 233 Mm3, well below the volumes contemplated in the Treaty. Mm3 stands for million of cubic meters.

17 The purpose of this meeting was to study measures in order to reduce the deficit in deliveries which at the

beginning of the Fox administration was calculated at around 1,500 Mm3.

18 This remark applies to politicians, several officials, academics, the general public, and, of course, the media itself.

19 Of these, 416 corresponded to Amistad; 194 to the losses involved in the transfer, and 274 to Marte R. Gómez. It

has to be underlined that waters from Marte R. Gómez dam, near Tamaulipas, are not considered in the Treaty, a fact that caused a great deal of concern in Mexico.

20 Press bulletin, October 19, 2008 (Bulletin #222-08, published by Comisión Nacional del Agua).

21 According to the Treaty, when this happens, the current cycle is over and a new one begins.

15

Some lessons and experiences

Water management must recognize scarcity conditions. The crisis over the Rio Grande/Río Bravo beginning in the 1990s showed that neither Mexico nor the United States had a drought management plan. This was also true for the binational region. Rather, improvisation, misinformation, and lack of serious analysis took place in response to the extended drought. These shortcomings are threats to water security, and thus to border economic development (in its more comprehensive meaning which includes environmental security).

So far there is no integrated binational model to manage the basin. For instance, despite progress in understanding the complex interaction of hydrological, socioeconomic, institutional and ecological systems at the watershed level, a truly comprehensive binational database of the watershed has yet to be established. Thus, there is not an integrated model that could orient informed policy design. In the meantime, current and projected future water shortages are in fact inhibiting the region´s long-term development. Of course, there have been efforts in this direction on the part of several universities. Among these institutions are The University of Texas at Austin, The Houston Advanced Research Center, Texas A&M University, National Heritage Institute, Tecnológico de Monterrey, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, and the Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. In fact, there is collaboration among these institutions, and more knowledge today about the basin than before. It is likely that in the future a binational water center will be established, perhaps under the leadership of universities but with a strong commitment from government circles and civil society. At least in the short term, stakeholders could form a water studies transborder academic network. Science and academia have a major role to play. Obtaining more and better knowledge is essential. The list of issues to be addressed in a binational research agenda is wide: enhancing trust; information sharing; proper valuation of water; and the establishing real and potential possibilities for water markets at the national and binational level. A comprehensive analysis of drought impacts on the regional and national economies (especially important in the case of Mexico) is still needed—primarily an assessment of the social impacts, which are very often left aside in valuing water. And of course, there are issues of risks and vulnerability as a result of climate change. In fact, a matter of the 1944 Water Treaty that gained a great deal of relevance is the notion of ‘extraordinary’ drought. There seems to be a consensus that there is no precise reference in the Treaty about this notion. This point, which has been widely discussed in binational meetings, was at the very center of the dispute over the Rio Grande/Río Bravo waters. It is not a minor consideration of semantics.22 As a matter of fact, the Mexican interpretation of the Treaty of 1944 referred to these conditions of extraordinary drought to defer the deliveries of water to the cycle 2002-2007. Long term impacts due to climate change only complicate the understanding of this definition and, above all, how to proceed. In this crisis over international waters, IBWC/CILA was severely questioned in their respective countries. Those affected most by the drought—primarily agricultural producers in Mexico and Texas—rejected drought as the sole explanation for the current water crisis in the Lower Basin. Instead, they pointed to deficiencies in water management and related factors such as uncontrolled growth in upstream Mexican state of Chihuahua that had, in turn, affected the deliveries of the Río Conchos.23

22

There were debates as to wheter Mexico had a water debt or a water deficit.

23 See, for example, the headline story, Los Angeles Times, Tuesday, May 29, 2001, section A, pg. 1.

16

These criticisms should be viewed in perspective. The 1944 Treaty was the result of very hard work that involved high technical and diplomatic competences. It was conceived and signed in a historical context that must not be overlooked. In fact, within a wider historical perspective, the Treaty (and its Minutes mechanism) shows that in an agenda full of conflicts—from migration to drug trafficking, environmental and trade disputes—cooperation is possible. In any case, the conflicts with the U.S. over the Rio Grande/Río Bravo also show the insufficient policy responses of other actors with responsibility in the design of a domestic agenda—not only the binational one—which is not always understood and very often ill-addressed. In other words, it is ironic that the border makes these insufficiencies very visible. For many years the two branches of the IBWC/CILA commission maintained relative stability in its commissioners. This favored continuity and understanding of several and complex affairs. In the last few years, however, there was a high rate of turnover between commissioners in the U.S. side—due to governmental changes and illness. This situation has adversely affected the efficiency of the handling of the binational water agenda. It could not be more meaningful or symbolic that the two commissioners—Arturo Herrera and Carlos Marin—died together on September 15, 2008, in a plane accident as they were flying over the Ciudad Juárez/El Paso region to monitor the high precipitation that took place that year.

On the other hand, the work of IBWC/CILA is restricted to a geographical scale, basically given by the border area and to a sectoral mandate centered on water. However, the scale and complexity of water problems in the Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin far surpass the limited authority of the IBWC/CILA to develop appropriate policy responses. In this regard, water security implies talking across sectors.24 Thus, more comprehensive binational water governance is required in order to tackle current and future water affairs.

With care, the use of market mechanisms could provide powerful instruments to invest, price, and value water. The intraregional, inter- and intra-sectoral transfers of water that are likely to occur in the future will require the best economic, environmental and social science. This, in turn, requires a larger and better information base. This is one of the major conclusions of a recent study on the Río Bravo Basin, using a regional partial equilibrium model for the agricultural sector (Howitt and Medellín-Azuara, 2008), which is part of a larger study on the interventionist policies in the water sector in Mexico, conducted by the World Bank and Mexico´s Ministry of Natural Resources.25

This conclusion of the 2008 report stresses that in light of growing water demand in the big cities, and the continuing rural to urban migration, the research program for the water sector should include an aggressive campaign of data acquisition in order to improve the simulations of agricultural production. The study also concludes that more coordination is required among water users and authorities, and other institutions involved in providing valuable information, leading to the building of scenarios of water management. If this is done, then these simulations could fall more within the range of physical, political and ideological possibilities for affecting the complex system of managing water in Mexico. Furthermore, the study makes the case for differentiated and well focused local policies. This is due to variations in water availability for irrigation, as a result of climate change or due to government intervention, as well as macroeconomic policies (S. Dinar et al., 2008).

24

This is precisely the message of the 2009 Stockholm International Water Symposium, which was centred precisely on trans-boundary waters. See the contribution of Grobicki (2009).

25 This study was conducted between 2005 and 2006. Mexico Economic Sector Work (ESW): Assessment of Policy

Interventions in the Water Sector. It has been published by Guerrero García Rojas et al (2008).

17

The extension of these conclusions to the shared border region adds more complexity but at the same time greater urgency to the need for higher quality information and a better understanding of water affairs along the U.S.-Mexico border region. The conflicts derived from Mexico´s water debt illustrate how disinformation and partial views preclude the proper and fair handling of the issues at hand. There is a role for academia to address these challenges. And hence resides the relevance of the Puentes Consortium, a point that is worth underlying in the conclusions of this essay. Outlooks and prospects for the U.S.-Mexico border region

The rapid population and economic growth in the U.S.-Mexico border region is expected to continue, putting additional pressure on the environment in general and on water in particular. There are different estimates about this growth, but all of them clearly indicate significant increases in both people and economic activities. For instance, in 2002 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that the border´s population would growth from 11.8 to 19.4 million people by 2020.26

The industrialization of Mexican border cities means steadily rising per capita demand for water as the population multiplies at remarkable rates (Westerhoff, 2000). Having 1995 as a baseline, Mexican border water consumption will double between 1995 and 2020 (Peach and Williams, 2000). Expectations are that it will rise from 1.07 billion annual liters consumed per capita in 1995 to 2.35 billion by 2020—an increase of nearly 120 percent even if current rates of consumption hold constant, which is unlikely (Peach and Williams, 2000; Westerhoff, 2000).

The picture is similar on the U.S. side. Population-wise, U.S. border states are among the fastest growing in the country, with Arizona and New Mexico registering double-digit growth between 1995 and 2000 (Western Policy Review Advisory Commission 1999). Five of the 10 fastest growing U.S. cities are border cities. In El Paso, where fresh groundwater is rapidly depleting, city officials are shifting to greater dependence on limited Rio Grande/Río Bravo surface stocks while investing in a range of complex augmentation and conservation measures including desalinizing groundwater, remote imports, and a groundwater management agreement with Mexico.27

In particular, Mexico´s National Water Commission estimates that in 2030 the Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin population will grow from 10.56 to 13.25 million people, which will be one of the highest increases in all of Mexico’s water administrative regions. This will diminish, very seriously, the natural availability of water (CNA, 2003).

Whatever the real figures will prove to be, it is a fact that there will be tremendous pressure on water. In addition to this pressure, climate change will impose additional challenges on water management in the shared border region. Without appropriate responses, these driving forces could made physical resource scarcity an issue of higher politics than has been so far the case, both binationally and intra-nationally. Such demands are testing the institutional framework for binational water management as never before, at once implying the imperative of binational cooperation while highlighting the complexities of doing so.

A closer look at these trends needs to be established, in terms of what has been presented above about environmental security (in its more comprehensive or post-realist perspective). A failure to do this would compromise the very future of the quality of life this shared region. It is

26

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Border 2012: U.S.- Mexico Environmental Program”, EPA-160-0-02-001. Washington, D.C.: EPA; September 23, 2002, p. 5, cited by CSIS (2003, p. 2).

27 This discussion comes from Mumme and Aguilar (2003, p. 58-59).

18

clear in the case of water that further growth means additional pressure on supply. Even with the best management of demand—through pricing mechanisms, use of technology in industry, more efficient irrigation systems, treatment and recycling, and campaigns about culture in the use of water—it is possible that more water would be needed to sustain this accelerated growth. Of course, acknowledging the environment as a user, and not only as a source or provider, would complicate things further, but would also exhibit great wisdom. After all, the future of the region depends on the very existence of the river. Considering supply and demand together may be a more intelligent approach that seeing them in isolation.

While much of attention has been focused on implementing mechanisms to achieve repayment of Mexico’s water debt (an acute issue), long-term trends of increasing population, economic activity and water use in the basin quietly march forward. Together with the unique complexities embodied in the 1944 Treaty, these trends suggest progression toward a chronically unstable water regime that could fail even under “normal” fluctuations in precipitation.28

This, in turn, has important implications for the stability of the water regime. The historically large “surplus” flows from the Mexican portion of the Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo watershed have served a beneficial role as a buffer—slack in a complex system of water use that connects upstream with downstream, Mexico with Texas, at a variety of levels. In a scenario in which Mexico uses, to the greatest extent possible, all flows to which it is entitled under the treaty, the protective slack is all but eliminated, with potentially dramatic consequences for the stability of the water regime. The ability of the system to absorb large deficits in water delivery diminishes concomitantly. Likewise, as it has happened in the past, in a drought serious enough for Mexico not to comply with the Treaty, the economic fortunes of the Mexican population and economic activities will suffer. In the absence of joint programs to handle water scarcity in either case, water security is at risk.

Thus, water management becomes risk management. In its current form, the Treaty of 1944 is not designed to deal with this vulnerability. Without new mechanisms to address this complexity, Mexico will have to weigh the risk of maximizing current water use against the possibility of facing a future drought with little reserves upon which to draw, versus the possibly large opportunity costs of maintaining a reserve that would be used to meet the minimum treaty requirement in the event of a future drought. Furthermore, the high variability of precipitation and the regular occurrence of drought in this semiarid region require that the LRGB water regime retain a high degree of flexibility. This could be of utmost value during periods of acute water scarcity.

It seems that—unless there is a crisis—transboundary water management is not taken seriously. There is thus also a scarcity of well-crafted responses. It does not appear that the complexities associated with water along the U.S.-Mexico border are being recognized and addressed properly. Different examples support this statement. Even the Water Summit, conducted in 2005 as a mandatory initiative of IBWC/CILA´s Minute 308, left a lot to be desired. Following the spirit of the this minute, intended to at last have the input of all those involved in border water affairs, this meeting did not and could not possibly have had the foresight needed to design a binational drought program.29 The treatment of water of the XXVII Border Governors Conference, which took place in Monterrey, Mexico, on September 2-4, 2009, is

28

This paragraph and the following two are taken from Mathis and Aguilar-Barajas (2003).

29 The meeting gave more voice to government representatives and far less attention to other stakeholders like

farmers or local officials. In the end, it resulted in another water meeting. It was binational more on paper than in reality (so it seems). Business as usual has characterized binational water management since. There has not been another Minute following this issue.

19

another case in point. The recommendations of the Conference expressed in the Joint Declaration do not reflect the complicated issues at stake.30

4. Air and environmental security

Although it is not explicit, the ‘Border 2012’ U. S. Mexico Environmental Program signed by the U.S. and Mexican governments reflects intrinsically the new vision of environmental security as we have described above. The mission of the plan is to protect the environment and public health in the U.S.-Mexico border region, consistent with the principles of sustainable development (EPA-SEMARNAT, 2003). In the program, EPA and SEMARNAT recognize the importance of improving environmental conditions where necessary and preserving natural resources in a manner that is coordinated with the social and economic development of the border. The program then aims to ensure safe environmental conditions for all the communities living along the border.

The guiding principles of the program support the accomplishment of Border 2012’s mission. These principles include the reduction of health risks and preservation and restoration of the natural environment, and strengthening the capacity of local communities to manage their own environmentally-related health issues. The principles respond to the need to protect the residents of cities along the border that suffer of health problems related to air pollution, water quality, management of pesticides, and hazardous and solid-waste management.

Border 2012’s bottom-up approach anticipates that the best strategy to address environmental problems is via local decisionmaking. The program has also addressed recent issues related to mitigation of carbon emissions to respond to Climate Change Action Plans of different U.S and Mexican states along the border. In the case of air, Border 2012’s goals are focused on determining ambient concentrations of air pollutants, assessing the contribution on emissions and impacts of different sources, and developing cost-effective control strategies. The program’s objectives seek to attain and thus harmonize the national ambient air-quality standards of the two countries, reducing, as a consequence, human exposure and health costs. These objectives are linked to those of the program on health, which are focused on measuring air-quality effects on children’s health and the impacts of the use of pesticides and other chemicals on communities along the border. The intended results are to ensure a safe environment for the people living along the U.S.-Mexico border region.

Several problems associated with air quality have been identified along the border. Non-attainment areas have been detected where the 24-hour average air-quality standard for suspended particles and the hour-average for ozone are violated. These standards are set for acute exposure (SSA, 2009; EPA, 2009a) and when they are exceeded, people´s health is threatened by environmental conditions—with consequent increases in health costs, lost productivity, materials damage, and other costs. The effect of air pollution on health is mostly a result of chronic exposure and is exacerbated by daily peaks that increase morbidity and mortality rates, in particular in elderly people (Molina, 2002). Bad air quality is judged and usually communicated to the population by the government, based on acute exposure, while the effects of chronic exposure are usually not communicated to people. This exposure is determinant in evaluating the benefits of air-pollution control in the case of particles. Communicating the health risks of bad air quality is important in

30

They only refer concerns on: desalination projects (to be addressed in a binational workshop in 2010 in San Diego); the request that both the IBWC/CILA´s National Water Commission provide timely information to state and local governments when policies on reservoir management in the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo basin are changed, in order to ensure implementation of appropriate safety measures; and studying pollutant loading to water courses (via a binational conference). The discussion presented so far indicates that water problems are greater and more complex than this listing.

20

order to maintain public interest and consciousness of the problem. A community interested in the problem will support air-quality improvement policies that may be enforced to provide a safe environment. Air pollution is ranked among the problems with highest priority of the Mexico-United States border region because of its effects on human and environmental health. The capacity to take care of air-quality deterioration in this region is tied strongly to the knowledge that it is possible to obtain information about the impacts of the predominant pollutants and their emission sources (Van Schoik, 2003; Mukerjee, 1997). Several U.S. and Mexican government agencies and universities have developed projects to acquire data on emissions and its impacts on air quality and health. Support from the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), the Western Governors’ Association (WGA), and SEMARNAT to prepare Mexico’s first National Emission Inventory represents a first step to develop air-quality management plans in areas not covered by local management programs (Rojas, 2005). The emissions inventory is a powerful tool to validate or reformulate air-quality improvement policies. Due to a lack of studies in Mexico that relate air pollution to health effects, air-quality standards in Mexico—with the exception of CO (11ppm)—were based on U.S. standards in the inventory. Cooperation between the two countries to improve air quality in shared airsheds has led Mexico to develop air-quality management programs (PROAIRE) for the Mexican border areas of Ciudad Juárez, Tijuana-Rosarito, and Mexicali. These programs were developed with the support of the U.S. EPA, WGA, the Texas Commission for Environmental Quality (TCEQ), and CEC (Rojas, 2005). These programs have raised awareness among the Mexican population but follow-up to the programs has been inadequate due to lack of funds. An important issue evident in these programs is the shared responsibility to control emissions sources. In Mexico, local environmental agencies are responsible for all industrial, commercial, and mobile sources except for the point sources of federal jurisdiction. Then, besides binational agreements to improve air quality, local agreements are needed between local stakeholders to develop cost–effective strategies to improve air quality (Rojas 2005). The development and success of such agreements would reduce health risks and their associated costs, as well as other costs related to loss of productivity, material damage, and impacts in ecosystems. As a consequence, impacts on air quality become a real threat to the security of local communities along the border. Better environmental conditions are necessary to ensure the quality of life and the security of the population in twin cities and regions in the U.S.-Mexico border area. Twin cities along the border already experience air-pollution problems and, due to anticipated population increases and economic growth, the problems threaten to become worse in the future, increasing health and environmental risks. In the next sections we review the cases of three geographic zones. In each case, we comment on types of air-quality problems, the main sources of air pollutants, possible impacts on populations, and areas of opportunity to improve air quality and environmental security. The Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo Valley (LRGV)

The LRGV is part of the Four State Region (FSR) formed by the states of Texas, Tamaulipas, Nuevo León. and Coahuila. The LRGV air-quality management program includes the counties of Cameron, Hidalgo, and Starr in Texas, and the municipalities of Matamoros, Río Bravo, and Reynosa in Tamaulipas. Several studies of the LRGV emphasize a degradation of air quality due to unusual growth in border traffic volume as well as in the number and size of colonias (unplanned settlements) in the region (Mukerjee, 1997; Mejía and Rodriguez, 1997; Mukerjee, 2001).

21

In the U.S border area, ozone, CO, PM10, PM2.5, lead, and VOCs have been measured, while on the Mexican side, monitoring has been limited to PM10 (Mejía et al, 2006a). Although this region is considered an attainment area, the rapid urbanization, the extensive industrial and agricultural activities, population growth, and increase in traffic along the border and on crossing bridges are threatening air quality (Rincon, et al., 2005; Gilbreath, 1992). Few studies have been published explicitly related to emissions, air quality, and health risks in the region. PM2.5 represents 16 to 20 percent of PM10 in Matamoros, Brownsville and Hidalgo; while in Río Bravo and Reynosa, located downwind, those pollutants represent from 40 to 55 percent. Important sources of air pollutants are urban dust (unpaved roads), automotive emissions, biomass burning and waste burning (Mejía et al., 2003). The transport of air pollutants changes with predominant winds. In order to understand the dynamics of air pollutants in the area, a photochemical model was applied during a period in December 1995. The results show that the highest concentrations of ozone and sulfur dioxide occur west of the Reynosa/McAllen area. Sulfur dioxide and ozone precursors are transported from a power plant located in Río Bravo, after which they pass over the urban areas of Reynosa and McAllen and mix with other pollutants emitted in these cities, producing peak ozone and sulfur dioxide concentrations downwind, beyond the location of the air quality monitoring stations. An important outcome of this study is that the location of the monitoring stations may not be representative of the air quality in the region (Mejía et al., 2003).

In the LRGV some short-term local episodes of elevated or dangerous air pollution have occurred. These episodes were caused either by meteorological conditions combined with long-range transport of pollutants from outside the region, or by sporadic local air pollution events (Mejía et al., 2006a). These episodes united with the fast growing traffic and commercial activities and the intense agricultural activities have raised the interest in evaluating the impacts of transboundary pollution on air quality. The results of the application of a GIS/Source Modeling approach to evaluate the possible contributions of different U.S. and Mexican sources on PM10 concentrations in the LRGV, in the period March 4 to March 10, 2004, show that transboundary pollution is an important issue in the region (Mejía et al., 2006b). The results also show that a reliable emission inventory is necessary to estimate the appropriate contribution of the different sources in air quality as well as a good prediction of wind intensity and direction. Standardized methodologies are necessary to obtain better assessments of emission inventories, in particular for Mexico where emission factors typical of the country industrial, vehicle, and area sources are necessary. Also, meteorology stations are necessary to validate results of meteorology models that are used as input to state-of-the-science air quality models.

Despite the fact that the LRGV is an attainment area, air quality concerns exist due to irregular smoke events caused by landfill fires, burning of field trash at sugarcane plantations, exposure to emissions of traffic at border crossings, the use of pesticides for agricultural activities, as well episodes caused by long range transport of pollutants, like dust from the Saharan Desert (Mejía et al., 2006a). It is expected that air quality may deteriorate in the FSR due to the population and vehicle growth. In the FSR the population grew 36 percent from 1990 to 2000 in the Mexican states and 42 percent in Texas. The combined population was 2.74 million in 2000 and could reach 3.79 million in 2010 and 5.27 million in 2020. Most of the population of the FSR is located in the LRGV with 1.9 million in 2000, and it is expected to be 2.65 million in 2010 and 3.7 million in 2020. The vehicle fleet was 1.33 million in 2000 in the FSR and could reach 1.84 million in 2010, with 1.24 million in the LRGV (Mejía, et al., 2006a). The expected rapid growth will increase air pollution, increasing the health risks of the population.

Social conditions are also related to a higher incidence of respiratory diseases. Studies in the Mexican cities of Matamoros and Reynosa in the LRGV and Nuevo Laredo, north of the LRGV, show that children attending schools located in areas with lower socioeconomic status than other parts of the cities report higher respiratory disease problems like allergies, asthma, and

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rhinitis, as well as gastrointestinal, diarrhea, and intoxication cases (Guerrero et al., 2008; Gor et al., 2008). These observations may be related to more uncontrolled urban development and corresponding higher traffic and industrial emissions; water supply, sewage, pesticides and insecticides use, and food consumption in unhealthy conditions. Paso del Norte

The Paso del Norte region is a good example of collaborative efforts to improve environmental conditions along the U.S.—Mexico border. This region encompasses the communities of Doña Ana in New Mexico, El Paso in Texas, and Ciudad Juárez in Chihuahua. Air quality on both sides of the border has been exceeded for PM10, CO, and ozone in the Paso del Norte (Rincon et al., 2005). Under the U.S. Clean Air Act, a region may be penalized if it fails to meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), except in the case that the failure is caused by emissions that are generated outside the U.S. Monitoring of ozone and CO began in El Paso in 1970 and the data at that time showed violations in the one-hour average for ozone and the eight-hour average for CO. Monitoring of PM10 started in El Paso in 1980, when the data showed that both the 24-hour and the annual air quality standards for both pollutants were exceeded. The number of violations has been reduced since the mid 1990s despite the growth in population and number of vehicles in the region (Currey and Pumfrey, 2006).

A binational organization, the Paso del Norte Air Quality Task Force was established in 1993 with the objective of reducing air pollution in the region. The Mexican and U. S. authorities in 1996 created the Binational Consulting Committee for Air Quality Improvement of the Atmospheric Basin of Ciudad Juárez, El Paso, and Doña Ana. In 1997 the Southern California Ozone Study was developed and subsequently became the basis for monitoring and modeling activities in the region (Rojas, 2005).

Several additional studies have been performed in the region of Paso del Norte in order to develop emission inventories, to characterize the physical and chemical composition of particles, to study the contribution of sources and the dynamic of particles in the atmosphere, and to evaluate the impact of air pollution control strategies (Fields, 2005; Li et al., 2005; Meuzelaar et al., 2005a). According to a 1995 emission inventory of the Paso del Norte Region, Ciudad Juárez contributes 75 percent of the region’s PM10, mostly from road dust (49 percent) followed by wind erosion (24 percent) and vehicles and other combustion processes (two percent), although these last sources are important PM2.5 sources. The 25 percent share of PM10 in El Paso is composed of road dust (18 percent), mobile and natural sources (3 percent each), and fuel combustion (the remaining two percent) (Rincon et al., 2005). A 1996 emission inventory developed for the Paso del Norte Study shows that vehicles in Ciudad Juárez are the main source of CO, VOCs, and NOx emissions, followed by point, area and mobile sources along the U.S.-Mexico border (Fields, 2005). PM2.5 is estimated to represent from 15 to 32 percent of PM10 (Li et al., 2005). Another study using Chemical Mass Balance (CMB), Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and Principal Component Regression (PCR) shows that the main sources of particles in Paso del Norte are brick kilns and trash burning, diesel and gasoline, road dust, and cooking and biomass burns (Meuzelaar, et al., 2005a).

A good understanding of pollutant-source apportionment is the basis for identifying air pollution control strategies; even better decisions can be made if the impacts on population health are evaluated. A broad variety of respiratory problems like asthma, bronchitis, lung cancer and emphysema – all of them related to air pollution—have been detected in the Paso del Norte Region (Parks, 2003). Attention has been focused on the number of vehicles and their emissions, waiting time at international bridges, general air pollution, and health effects on people in and around the international bridges. High levels of CO led to the redesign of inspection booths so that they could be provided a clean air supply.

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A study by Romieu (2004) shows adverse effects on children from exposure to ozone even at levels below the air quality standard. The results of this study suggest increased mortality in children may be caused by exposure to PM10 concentrations. Since Ciudad Juárez has the largest percentage of people in the region, the social cost of exposure to air pollution is highest on the Mexican side of the border. Particular interest exists in determining the origin and effects on health of evening PM events in Paso del Norte (Mejia, et al., 2004; Meuzelaar, et al., 2005b). Data on air quality and population density can be combined using geographic information systems (GIS) to estimate health risks. Using PM10 air quality data from 1997 to 2001, the evaluation of health risks shows that the zones with higher individual risks are located south and southwest of the Paso del Norte region. This area has the highest PM average concentrations in Paso del Norte and is near the location of numerous brick kilns in Ciudad Juárez. Overall, the social risk (i.e., the individual risk multiplied by the number of people affected in a certain area) in Ciudad Juárez is higher than in El Paso due to its higher population, higher population density, and the city’s high PM concentration (Mejia, et al., 2004). As a consequence, the health benefits of air pollution control would also be higher in Ciudad Juárez than in El Paso based on the number of people affected. However, from an economic point of view, the benefits may be balanced by higher health costs in El Paso. In any case, both cities would receive both significant health and economic benefits from greater air pollution control. California/Baja California

Two airsheds are identified in the California/Baja California border region: San Diego-Tijuana and Imperial Valley-Mexicali. Both airsheds show rapid population growth, industrialization, and extreme congestion at border crossings by light cars and heavy-duty trucks. Due to air pollution in San Diego and Imperial Valley, these counties were designated non attainment areas beginning in 1999 for ozone and PM10; while in Mexico, Tijuana and Mexicali do not meet the air quality standard for PM10, ozone and CO (Sweedler, et al. 2003). Increased traffic activities in general and transboundary traffic in particular have increased the air pollution problem in the region.

Air quality monitoring stations exist on both sides of the border. In the U.S. the monitoring network measures(although not at all stations) PM10, lead, SOx (as SO2), NOx (as NO2), ozone, CO and other noncriteria pollutants including air toxics. In Mexico, stations measure ozone, CO, and PM10, and only one station in Mexicali measures toxics (Quintero et al., 2006). The data from the monitoring stations show that the number of days that exceed air quality standards is decreasing for ozone, CO and PM10 concentrations, except in the region of Mexicali, where the days exceeding PM10 have not changed and remain around 35 to 50 per year. San Diego and Tijuana are close to attainment.

Major air pollution sources in the region are fast food operations, power generation, vehicle emissions, unpaved roads, and wind erosion. These activities contribute CO, NOx, and particulate emissions. Important sources include a geothermal and two thermoelectric power plants in Mexicali, the large number of used vehicles in Mexico in poor maintenance condition, idling of vehicles at binational ports of entry, unpaved streets in Baja California, agricultural and trash burning, fuels distribution, and the use of solvents, among others. Asthma, respiratory and heart illnesses are serious health issues in the California—Baja California Region that can be related to air pollution. (Quintero et al., 2006).

Several studies and projects have been developed or are being conducted to improve air quality in the region (Quintero et al., 2006). These studies address health issues related to air pollution, particle and VOCs characterization, air quality monitoring and modeling, options for sustainable and renewable energy sources, agricultural burns, and quality of life. Important projects to mitigate emissions include street paving, agricultural burning reduction, retrofit of

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diesel engines and vehicles, NOx reduction in power plants, and energy efficiency and renewable energy programs. Strong recommendations are given related to data management, clean and efficient transport, energy generation, and policy-making. Regarding policymaking in particular, the studies emphasize the reduction of air pollution based on health risk and recommend adopting a single airshed approach for sister cities.

Emission inventories are the first step in developing air pollution control strategies and for policy-making (Sweedler, et al., 2003; INE, 2005). San Diego has detailed and updated emission inventories, while Tijuana has recently developed its emissions inventory and air quality management program (PROAIRE). Sources include fine clay soil and sand dunes, desert vegetation, cleared fields, unpaved roads, pesticides, geothermal facilities, mining, and pollen from crops. Mobile sources are also an important source of PM10 as well as food processing, burning of crop residuals, and brick-making (Sweedler, et al., 2003). The Imperial Valley-Mexicali emission inventory shows that particulate matter is the most important pollutant, the most important sources of which are soils and vegetation in the Imperial Valley and transportation, point and area sources in Mexicali (ERG, 2009).

From the discussion above, we observe that the California/Baja California airsheds exhibit different problems caused by different sources. As a consequence, specific air pollution control strategies need to be developed for each U.S. and Mexican region. Since the airshed is shared by the communities on both sides of the border, binational efforts are necessary to reduce air pollution, like the Imperial—Mexicali Environmental Alliance formed in 1996 with the aim of obtaining local, state, and federal assistance for environmental issues in both countries (Sweedler, et al., 2003). 5. General conclusions and recommendations

Our post-realist, expansive view of the concept of security—especially as it applies to environment—is consistent with the recommendations of recent reports to the U.S. President. These reports urge the government to consider and coordinate a broad, comprehensive, and sustainable set of policies on border security (e.g., GNEB 2007). The basic premise of this perspective is that a narrow focus on security, concentrating principally on interdiction of illegal immigration, terrorism, and contraband does not reflect the complexity of interactions across Mexican (or Canadian) borders.31 This view also recognizes that human welfare—especially including access to sufficient quantities of safe water, unpolluted air, and a protected environment—is a key element of security. Populations that do not enjoy these universal attributes are far more likely to be unstable and restive, thus threatening national and transborder security. Below, we discuss key findings from the foregoing reviews of major water-resources and air-quality issues in the U.S.-Mexico border region. Water resources

The binational Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin is one of North America’s fastest growing regions. As the LRGB enters a new century, explosive population and economic growth in its

31

Another example is given by North America Next—A Report to President Obama on Building Sustainable Security and Competitiveness, North American Center for Transborder Studies, Arizona State University, 2009. The report contains eight recommendations. Recommendation #3 addresses the designation of a North America / Borders authority to coordinate sustainable security. The report stresses that there are “competing, complementary, and overlapping border management, national security, law enforcement, commerce, transportation, environment, water, regional development, and other infrastructure and political issues that comprise today´s border area realities (p. 3).

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border cities are creating unprecedented demands on the river. Competition between agricultural, domestic, industrial and ecological use has greatly intensified. Securing access to water is a matter of socioeconomic and environmental survival. Indeed, water shortage on both sides of the border can be viewed as an early, urgent test for 21st century U.S.-Mexican diplomacy.32 Sustainable water strategies require comprehensive perspectives that take into account the diversity of views and institutions with responsibilities in the U.S.-Mexico border region. No individual government agency could be in the position to craft and implement integrated responses to the acute problems facing the region. The handling of the mid-1990s drought reflected this very neatly. As found in the conclusions of the CSIS (2003) report on the Rio Grande/Río Bravo, “. . . Any progress on a binational level will require an interdisciplinary approach that is comprehensive and inclusive” (p. 19).

As expressed elsewhere for the international arena, “. . . With properly conceived frameworks, management and use of international water bodies should result in ‘win-win’ situations for all the parties concerned. Contrary to popular belief, these are not zero-sum games for a vast majority of the cases, especially when negotiations could encompass a broader framework of water and other related resources development” (Biswas, 2000, p. 31). The binational management of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo banks on and supports this statement.33 As argued by Mumme and Aguilar-Barajas (2003), for the U.S.-Mexico border water agenda, binational cooperation is not an option. It is essential to health, well-being, and even national security over the very long haul.

Therefore, to a large extent, whether the Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin moves toward a more sustainable future concerning its water resources is largely a question of management. The role of water and non-water institutions is crucial. Solutions that combine more water-efficient infrastructure and technology with less wasteful water-management practices and more comprehensive planning are possible. Based upon past experiences, agricultural use of water will have to be reduced. Market mechanisms and mutually beneficial arrangements between cities and irrigation districts can bring about more efficient water use, making the rural-urban reallocation one of cooperation rather than confrontation. As new wastewater treatment plants continue to come on line, water quality in the river may improve, although these improvements could be offset by increased concentration of pollutants due to decreased stream flow caused by increased use and droughts. In other words, the discussion of environment and water security implies a sustainable reallocation of water. For example, the overexploitation of the Rio Grande /Río Bravo Basin—surface water and groundwater—coupled with accelerated urban growth makes difficult to sustain current patterns of water allocation for agriculture. In this sense, small reductions of agricultural water could mean large volumes for the cities. As found for the Mexican part of the basin, this option could be a viable one (S. Dinar, et al., 2008). Border water management must be linked to drought management (Mumme and Aguilar, 2003). This is a critical lesson of the past Rio Grande/Río Bravo water crisis and one that is exceedingly relevant for the entire border region. An adequate drought-management regime requires a radical policy departure, one that moves beyond the reactive mode of crisis-response

32

See Los Angeles Times, Tuesday, May 29, 2001, section A, pg. 1.

33 Biswas (2000, p. 31) began his conclusions by saying that “The root for the English word rival is from the Latin term

rivalis, which originally meant using the same river (rivus).” But as the world becomes increasingly more and more interconnected sharing the same river should no longer consider each other as rivals.

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to embrace a permanent, long-term drought mitigation effort (Aguilar et al. 2001). Absent such a proactive program—one that unites the various agencies of the two governments in a coherent action plan—efforts to achieve regional water security will be severely limited (Aguilar, et al., 2001; Utton, 1999). This point cannot be overemphasized. Despite the border region´s known vulnerability to periodic drought, no formal mechanism for drought management currently exists in the border area. The role of IBWC/CILA should be reassessed in a more comprehensive way. As mentioned above, the agency should be given the credit it deserves. In spite of its shortcomings and limitations, CILA/IBWC has been referred to internationally as an example of binational cooperation. The 1944 Treaty is a landmark of international water law. Of course, there is a need to update the role of IBWC/CILA so that it can operate more in line with current times. Although the five-year cycle and allowance of water debt was originally an innovative solution to dealing with highly variable precipitation and drought in the Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo watershed, existing pressures and trends create vulnerabilities to the stability of the existing water regime in a number of areas. Among these are water quality, integrated watershed management, ecosystems, groundwater, and drought planning (e.g., Mumme, 1999; Schmandt, et al., 2000; Aguilar-Barajas, et al., 2001; Schmandt, 2002). It seems obvious that a great deal could and should be done, within the current Treaty framework. The mechanism given by the Minutes provides flexibility. Properly crafted, such a modified system could address many of the 1944 Treaty´s weaknesses. An issue worth stressing is that without changes in allocative mechanisms to reflect minimum ecological water needs, not enough water will be left instream to maintain riverine ecosystems. Therefore, water management must address ecosystem as essential water users. To do this implies further stress on water supply and, therefore, heightened competition between and among users. Nonetheless, ignoring natural-habitat and ecological needs could threaten the very existence of the river. From an integrated perspective, the links between water security, ecological security with economic development are self-evident.

There is an urgent need to educate wide audiences about the international diplomatic aspects of water management along the U.S.-Mexico border. This includes top officials with responsibility in water affairs. The crisis over Mexico´s water debt to the U.S. made this need very clear. Rather than informed discussions, suspicious, ill-oriented debates and disinformation dominated the scene. As expressed by Collado (2007), there exists a grave lack of knowledge about the 1944 Treaty and its water-allocating mechanisms. He is right in asserting that this is understandable in the case of common citizens, but not regarding top officials with responsibility.

Given the geostrategic relevance of the U.S.-Mexico border, water should be recognized in practice, and not only in the political discourse, as a matter of national security (i.e., in the sense of the comprehensive meaning used in this contribution). It does not appear that the complexities associated with water along the U.S.-Mexico border are well-recognized or properly addressed. Most responses to chronic problems lack forethought and are not well crafted. As noted, water management is not taken seriously—unless there is a crisis. The continuation of the commonly-employed ‘hurricane policy’—that is, relying on high precipitations that fill Amistad and Falcón and thus solve (temporary) scarcity problems—is not a wise one. This ‘policy’ could well lead to a repetition of previous instances of business-as-usual complacency and indulgence.

Nonetheless, security concerns about the environment in general and water in particular highlight that in business-as-usual scenarios, the U.S.-Mexico border region might face a more

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worrisome future. Paraphrasing the conclusions of Campbell and Weitz (2007b) on the international and national security implications of global climate change, a new path must be charted, “for we already live in an age of consequences.” Water illustrates this concern very clearly. Unless it is considered that shock therapy renders better results because it generates political momentum and actions that would not happen without a crisis.

It is about time that policy be designed in a non-crisis context. Of course, the complex array of local, state, regional, federal, and international institutions involved in border water management presents a formidable challenge. And yet it is in the best interest of the two nations that the river, on whose existence life in the basin ultimately rests, is managed effectively. What is a stake the region’s long-term security, ecological integrity, and economic development. The case of the Lower Rio Grande/Río Bravo Basin demonstrates that harmonized water management between the two countries is not only possible, but in the light of circumstances, indispensable. Securing this new management of the area’s water resources is perhaps the greatest challenge the U.S.-Mexico border faces in the years to come. Air quality

Air pollution is a condition that becomes a health risk for exposed populations. Under the vision of environmental security that underlies this paper, deteriorated health and its associated costs threatens human security, and thus national security. To improve air quality it is necessary to identify the sources, amount of pollutants emitted, and impacts on air quality. Different projects to study air-quality problems have been developed along the region. However, much work remains in order to achieve a full understanding of the contribution of the different sources and their impacts on air quality. In the last years NADBank has been investing significantly in street-paving and in renewable-energy projects. Both of these investments relate directly to air-pollution control while simultaneously yielding other social benefits. The amounts invested in recent years are even greater than for improvement of water and waste management. However, the health and environmental benefits of these air-pollution and energy projects have yet to be evaluated. It is important to continue supporting projects to mitigate air pollution, but it is also important to assess their benefits. Such analyses would provide valuable information for cost-benefit evaluation of the Bank’s projects. Toward binational, integrated development planning

Across the globe, but especially in the U.S.-Mexico border region, natural resources are limited and the resilience and assimilative capacity of the environment must be considered in development plans. The border area’s fast-growing population, increased traffic, and economic growth—accompanied by water shortages, likely exacerbated by climate change—demands binational, integrated development planning. Economic, urban, and industrial development plans must be linked to environmental plans if they are to improve overall environmental and human-health conditions as well as avoiding air-quality deterioration. As with the water sector, such an approach will lead to a balance in resource use while promoting the economic and social development of border communities. Preserving and eventually enhancing environmental quality to improve health and living conditions is in the joint interest of both countries. In this regard, close cooperation among the two neighboring nations on environmental issues is essential. In recent decades, universities on the two sides of the border have contributed to this binationalism by collaborating on technically-oriented environmental topics such as hydrological modeling, water treatment and reuse, particulate and gas characterization, air-quality monitoring activities, emission-factors determination, software development, and development and use of decision-support systems.

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University scholars from Mexico and the United States also have worked together on such subjects as regional demographics and economics, legal and institutional systems, water-management strategies, and policy analysis. This research needs to be accompanied by remedial and monitoring actions in the coming years. All this will require strong, well-educated, local-level technical and management capacity and a bottom-up willingness to accomplish the joint goals of the border environmental plans. This premise of binational collaboration underlies the Border 2012 Program and its predecessor plans. To the extent that the current bilateral plan can accomplish its aims, the border region’s residents will enjoy better environmental conditions, and healthful and safe—and thereby secure—living conditions. The border-based academic sector—as exemplified by the Mexican and U.S. institutions that comprise the Puentes Consortium—can be expected to play a key role alongside the region’s diverse stakeholders to develop knowledge and information to inform enlightened binational, integrated environmental policies. References

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