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ELITE AND MASS SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID VERSUS GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM UGANDA
MichaelG.FindleyDepartmentofGovernmentUniversityofTexasatAustinmikefindley@austin.utexas.edu
AdamS.Harris
HelenV.Milner
DepartmentofPoliticsPrincetonUniversity
DanielNielsonDepartmentofPoliticalScienceBrighamYoungUniversitydan_nielson@byu.edu
March30,2015
Abstract Extantstudieshaveleftunresolvedwhetherforeignaidenablesorconstrainselitecapture,whichin turnhas effectson thepublic.Buildingonprominentdebates in the foreignaid literature,wetheorizethatforeigndonorswieldsubstantialcontrolovertheflowofaiddollars,makingelitecap‐turemoredifficultandbyextensionmassbenefitsmorelikely.Toassesstheargument,wecompareelite and mass support for foreign aid versus government spending on development projectsthroughanexperimentandsurveyonmembersoftheUgandannationalparliamentandaparallelstudyonarepresentativesampleofroughly3,600Ugandancitizens.Fortwoactualaidprojects,werandomlyassignedexposuretotheprojects’differentfunders.Significanttreatmenteffectsonatti‐tudesandbehaviorsrevealthatmembersofparliamentsupportgovernmentprogramsoverforeignaid, whereas citizens prefer aid over government. The argument also implies that respondentsshould favor foreign aidmore as their perceptions of government clientelism and corruption in‐crease.Usingsubgroupanalysis,weexplorethispatternandalsoreportonseveralpossiblecom‐peting mechanisms: partisanship, co‐ethnic bias, nationalism, incumbency, and a foreign mediaeffect.Effectsaremostapparent formembersofparliamentandcitizenswhoperceivesignificantgovernmentcorruption,suggestingthatcitizensseeforeignaidasanescapefromcorruption,butelitesperceivemoreavenuesforthecaptureofgovernmentresourcescomparedtoaid.
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Introduction
Academic disputes rage over what foreign aid allows politicians to do. For some
scholars,aidenablespoliticalelitestobuyvotes,buildmilitariesforrepression,andenrich
themselvesthroughcorruption(Svensson2000,AlesinaandWeder2002,Bräutigamand
Knack2004,Easterly2006,Morrison2009,Moyo2009,Morrison2012).Aidmaythusun‐
dermine citizens’ ability to hold political elites accountable for how public revenues are
spent(Ross2004,Knack2009,Morrison2009,Moyo2009).Inthisview,foreignassistance
is often capturedbypowerfulpolitical elites in recipient countries, thusbenefitingelites
andhurtingmasses.
Alternatively,othersarguethatforeignaidcanbypasscorruptpoliticiansandtarget
thedeliveryofneededpublicgoodsdirectlytorecipientsevenasitpromotescivilsociety
actors thatcandemandbettergovernance(Finkel,etal.2007,WrightandWinters2010,
McLean and Schneider 2014,Bermeo2015,Mosley forthcoming). Additionally,much aid
targetsgovernmentcapacitybuildingandmightcontributeto thedevelopmentofbetter‐
functioninginstitutionsandthusconstrainpoliticianstocleanupcorruptionandmisman‐
agement(Riddell2007,BaserandMorgan2008).Bythisaccounting,foreigndonorshave
considerableinfluenceoverthedistributionofforeignassistance,thusbypassingelitesand
benefitingthemasses.
Thedebateremainsunresolvedforanumberofreasons;weconsidertwoimportant
elements.First,greaterattentionneedstobefocusedontheperceptionsofandpreferences
foraidofbothpolitical elitesandcitizens in recipient countries.Manyscholarshavead‐
dressedthedebatebylookingatflowsofaidandcorrelatingthemwithvarious“objective”
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measures of economic or political development outcomes. This is an important exercise
andhasyieldedmany,althoughinconsistent,resultsabouttheimpactofaid.Weareinter‐
estedinadifferentelementoftheaidequation.Wethuswanttoknowwhatelitesandciti‐
zenswhohaveexperiencedforeignaidbelieveaboutit,andhowmuchtheysupportit.
Thesesubjectiveattitudesmaymatter justasmuchasobjectiveoutcomes. These
attitudesandbeliefsmayhaveastrongcorrelationwithhowaidprojectsareactuallyper‐
forming. After all, Ugandans are likely to experience aid projects continually since aid is
suchanimportantpartoftheireconomy,aswedetail later. Moreover,eveniftheseper‐
ceptionsdonotcorrelatewithobjectiveoutcomes,theymaybemoreimportantforpolitics,
policy,anddevelopment. Citizensandeliteshaveattitudesandbeliefsfirstandthentake
actionsornot;objectivemeasuresofoutcomesmaynotbeknowntothemandarefiltered
throughtheirbeliefsinanycase.1Evenifwecouldagreeonkeyobjectivedevelopmentin‐
dicators,2itisnotclearthattheyareasimportantasperceptionstocitizenandelitebehav‐
ior.Thisisespeciallytrueofpublicgoodsprovisionsinceobjectivemeasuresofthemare
even lessdeveloped.3Research shows that attitudes andbeliefsmatter a greatdeal and
1Asamajorrecentstudyconcluded,“thereoftenseemstobeamarkeddistancebetweenstandardmeasuresof importantsocioeconomicvariables likeeconomicgrowth, inflation,unemployment,etc.andwidespreadperceptions.Thestandardmeasuresmaysuggest,forinstancethatthereislessinflationormoregrowththanindividualsperceivetobethecase,andthegapissolargeandsouniversalthatitcannotbeexplainedbyref‐erencetomoneyillusionortohumanpsychology.Insomecountries,thisgaphasunderminedconfidenceinofficialstatistics(forexample, inFranceand in theUnitedKingdom.onlyonethirdofcitizenstrustofficialfigures, and these countriesarenot exceptions),witha clear impacton theway inwhichpublicdiscourseabouttheconditionsoftheeconomyandnecessarypoliciestakesplace.”(Stiglitz,etal.2009,p.7)2SeeforinstancethedebatesaboutusingGDPpercapitaversustheHumanDevelopmentIndex(Srinivasan1994).3“Governmentsplayanimportantpartintoday’seconomies.Theyprovideservicesofa“collective”nature,suchas security, andofamore “individual”nature, suchasmedical servicesandeducation.…Beyond thecontribution of collective services to citizens’ living standards, individual services, particularly education,medicalservices,publichousingorpublicsportsfacilities,arealmostcertainlyvaluedpositivelybycitizens.
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evenmorethanobjectiveindicators. Subjectivewell‐beingisnowamajorelementofde‐
velopment policy. Research on happiness—or life satisfaction, for instance, shows both
that it isnotcloselyrelatedtoobjective indicatorsandhas importanteffectsondevelop‐
ment (Easterlin1973,1995, Sen1999,FreyandStutzer2002,Layard2005,Kroll2011).
Researchontrustissimilar. Itisnothighlycorrelatedwithobjectiveindicatorsofdevel‐
opment,butitisessentialforfosteringdevelopment(ZakandKnack2001,Tabellini2010,
Bjørnskov2012).Finally,aswedetailbelow,differenttheoriesabouttheimpactofaidde‐
pend on andmake assumptions about citizens’ and elite attitudes, beliefs, and behavior.
Examiningthesevaryingassumptionsagainstevidencemightyieldaclearerpictureabout
theroleofaid.Itshouldhelpustounderstandunderwhatconditionsdifferenttheoriesof
aid and its effects aremore likely to be operative.Hence perceptions and preferences—
especiallyasrevealedbyourbehavioraloutcomes‐‐matter,notjustobjectiveindicators.
Second, aid does not occur in an institutional vacuum, so we need ameaningful
baselinetowhichtocompareit,andgovernmentprojectsprovidethemostrelevantalter‐
native.Mosttheoriesshareexpectationsaboutdomesticelites,arguingthattheyplayasig‐
nificant role in shaping how foreign aid affects their country. Yet, to our knowledge, no
directandsystematicevidencehasbeengatheredthatemployspoliticiansasrespondents
instudieswheretheyreflectonthedispositionofaid.Studiesofrecipientcitizens’support
for aid are likewise rare. And yet probing elite andmass perceptions about foreign and
Theseservices tend tobe large inscale,andhave increasedconsiderablysinceWorldWar II,but, inmanycases,theyremainbadlymeasured.Traditionally,measureshavebeenbasedontheinputsusedtoproducetheseservices(suchasthenumberofdoctors)ratherthanontheactualoutputsproduced…Forasatisfacto‐rymeasureofeconomicperformanceandlivingstandardsitisthusimportanttocometogripswithmeasur‐inggovernmentoutput.”(Stiglitz,etal.2009,pp.11‐12)
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governmentassistancemaybepreciselywhatisnecessarytounderstandaidallocationand
use.
Herewepresenttwotheoriesabouttheflowofaidwithinrecipientcountriesand
discussthe.Weexaminetheirassumptionsaboutmassandeliteperceptionsofandpref‐
erences for aid and government development projects.We point out several hypotheses
thatderivefromthesearguments.Thefirsttheory,whichwecalltheaidcapturetheoryas‐
sumes thataid ispurely fungibleandcanbeusedby recipientpoliticiansat theirwill. It
impliesthatelitesshouldbeatleastindifferentbetweenthetwosourcesoffundingforde‐
velopmentprojectsormorestronglypreferforeignassistancebecausetheycancaptureit
likeothernon‐taxrevenuesanduseitfortheirownpurposes.Citizens,ontheotherhand,
shouldnotsupporttheforeignassistancestronglybecauseelitesarecapturingtheaidand
societycontinuestosuffersimilartowiththeproblemwithsubstantialnon‐taxrevenues
suchasoil.Thesecondtheory,whichwecallthedonorcontroltheory,arguesthatdonors
havemuchmoreinfluenceoveraidandcanchannelandconditionit.Unabletocapturethe
aid easily, elitesdonot strongly support foreignaid and insteadprefer governmentpro‐
grams. Alternatively, benefitting more fully from the foreign assistance, citizens evince
strongerpreferencesfortheforeignaidrelativetoelite‐dominatedgovernmentprograms.
Inthispaper,wecontendthatdonorsdoindeedexercisesignificantcontrolovertheflow
ofaidfundsand,therefore,theexpectationsofthedonorcontroltheoryaremorelikelyto
findsupportinempiricalanalysis.
Wereporttwoparallelexperimentsperformedin2012inUgandathatcontrastelite
andcitizensupportfordevelopmentprojectsintreatmentconditionsattributedtoforeign
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donorscomparedtoidenticalprojectsinacontrolconditioninwhichnodonorwasexplic‐
itlymentioned and thatmost sampledUgandans took tobe thedomestic government.A
sizableminorityofsubjectsbelievedtheunnamedfunderinthecontrolconditionwasac‐
tuallyaforeigndonor,butthisworksinfavorofthenullhypothesisofnosignificantdiffer‐
ence between treatment conditions and control. The differences reported below thus
understateelites’andcitizens’contrastingpreferencesforaidversusgovernmentprojects
giventheinformationwehave,aresultweshowindetailintherobustnesssection.
In all, wewere able to conduct nearly hour‐long interviewswithmore than two
thirdsof the sittingNinthUgandanParliament (276outof375membersofparliament).
Wealsoconductedthestudywith78formerMPsfromtheEighthParliament.(Totalcur‐
rentandformerMPssurveyedis354.)Moreover,werandomlysampledanationallyrepre‐
sentative group of roughly 3,600 Ugandan citizens for comparisons. The parallel
experimentsprovidedanopportunity foreach setof subjects todemonstrate individual‐
levelsupportforforeignaidorgovernmentfundsthroughbehavioralactionsthatimposed
personalcostsaswellasthroughresponsestoattitudinalsurveyquestions.
Interestingly,elitesandmassesinUgandadistinguishbetweenthesetwosourcesof
developmentfunding.Membersofparliamentaresignificantlymorelikelytosupportpro‐
jects in thecontrolconditionthatmost tooktobethegovernmentratherthantreatment
projectsidentifyingforeigndonors.However,citizensaresignificantlymorelikelytosup‐
port foreigndonors,precisely theoppositeof theelites.Effectsizesaregenerallymodest
and approach a ceiling, but the differences are significant and robust across a variety of
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specifications.ThesedifferencesbetweenthepublicandeliteinUgandaformaninterest‐
ingandnovelpuzzleandoffersupporttothedonorcontroltheory.
Thesedistinctpreferencesregardingaidshouldberelatedtootherbeliefsandpref‐
erencesthatelitesandmasseshold, if thedonorcontroltheoryaboutaid isoperative. In
particular, if citizens perceive corruption and clientelism, then they should even more
stronglypreferforeignassistanceasdonorsmightbetheonlysourceofassistance.Ifelites
perceive corruptionandclientelism, then they shouldevenmore stronglyprefergovern‐
mentprogramsbecauseinfluentialforeigndonorswouldnotallowskimmingfromforeign
funds.Weevaluatepossiblesubgroupeffectsandtheresultsareconsistentwiththedonor
control theory.MPswhoperceivegreater government corruptionare especially likely to
prefergovernmentprojectsoverforeignaid,whereascitizensperceivinggovernmentcor‐
ruptionwere significantlymore likely to support the aid projects. Subjectswho did not
perceive government corruption appeared indifferent between aid and government pro‐
jects. Effect sizes for corruption subgroup analyseswere considerably larger than in the
mainanalysis.
Wealsoexplorealternativemechanismsthatmightunderliethesedifferences:par‐
tisanship, ethnicity, nationalism, incumbency, and a foreign reputation effect. In general,
theremainingsubgroupresultsprovidenullorweakevidenceforallofthepossiblemech‐
anisms.Taken together, our results tell an interesting storyaboutmass andelitebeliefs,
preferences,andbehavior. Inparticular theysuggest that–at least in themindsof those
withdirectexperience–aidmaybelesssusceptibletopoliticalcapturethangovernment
resources.
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Thisstudyaddresseskeygapsinourunderstandingofthepoliticaleconomyofde‐
velopment.First,webuildonrecentdebatesabouttheroleofforeignassistanceindevel‐
opingcountriesbyadvancing the theoreticalargumentthatdonorsexerciseconsiderable
controlovertheflowofaid.Thisincreasedcontrolresultsingreatersupportforforeignaid
fromcitizensandlesssupportfromelites.Second,itisthefirstdetailedstudyofforeignaid
versusdomesticgovernmentfundingtoemploymembersofparliamentinarecipientgov‐
ernment as respondents. This comparison of masses and elites provides a novel puzzle
aboutdivergentpreferencesfordevelopmentassistance.Third,itconsidersadditionalim‐
plicationsofthedonorcontroltheory,namely,thatcitizensperceivinggreatercorruption
and clientelism shouldprefer strongerdonorswho cannonethelessdeliver aid,whereas
elitesshouldprefertheopposite.Theresultsbearoutthisadditionalimplication.
The Debate
Indevelopingcountries, foreignaidhasanon‐trivial influenceonthepoliticaland
economic landscape,bothat the levelof leadersandcitizens. Politicalandhumanitarian
motives for aid allocation (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000) as well as aid effectiveness in
termsofobjectivemeasuressuchaseconomicgrowth(e.g.,BurnsideandDollar2000)are
wellrepresentedintheaidliterature.Sensingadiminishingutilityincontinuingthesede‐
bates, scholarshave turned tounpacking the specificpolitical economiesof aid indonor
andrecipientcountries.
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Avigorousdebateisunfoldingstakingouttwokeypositions.Oneapproachwecall
theaidcapturetheorypositsthatdonorsprovideforeignaidinexchangeforpolicyconces‐
sions from the recipient government;donors give aid thenwithoutmuch concern for its
usebytherecipient.Aid is thusassumedtobeasourceof fungiblegovernmentrevenue,
likeothernon‐taxrevenuesincludingoil–andwithpotentiallysimilarnegativeeffectson
theeconomyandpolityasinthewell‐knownresourcecurse(seeRoss1999,Humphreys,et
al.2007).Bythisaccounting,donorsprovideaidinminimally invasivewaysand, inturn,
benefit fromrecipientpolicy concessions (BuenodeMesquitaandSmith2007,2009). In
exchange,donorsprovidehighlyfungibleaidsuchthattherecipientpolitical leaderswho
mustapprovepolicyconcessionswillbenefit.Anapproachemphasizingdonorself‐interest
isnotwithoutfoundation;indeed,conventionalwisdomcontendsthatdonorsgiveaidfor
politicaloverhumanitarianreasonsandwouldthereforeprioritizeaiddeliveryaccording‐
ly.
Forrecipientleaders,fungibleaidisaboonbecausetheycancaptureaidandbenefit
directly;forrecipientcitizens,itisabanebecause,asaresultofelitecapture,theysuffer.
Thus,analystshavelikenedaidtonaturalresourcesinthewayresources“curse”develop‐
ingcountrieswithconflict,autocracy,andpoorgovernance(Morrison2009,Moyo2009,p.
59,Morrison2012).Prominentstudieshaveheldthatexternalsourcesofmoney,suchas
natural resources and aid, enablepoliticians to entrench themselves rather thanbeheld
accountableasisthecasefortaxrevenues(Bräutigam2000,Smith2008,Morrison2009,
Gervasoni2010).Citizens,itisclaimed,demandmoreaccountabilityandbetteroutcomes
when their tax dollars are at play (Schumpeter 1954, North and Weingast 1989, Ross
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2004),thusmakingaidandoilnetcostsforcitizens.Bythislogic,politicalelitesinthedo‐
norandrecipientcountriesarethemajorbeneficiariesofaid,asaidfunctionstoincrease
theirpoliticallongevity,whereascitizensinpoorrecipientcountriesarethebiggestlosers
fromaid,asmasspublicsare forced toacceptpolicyconcessions theyopposeand toen‐
duremorecorruptionfromtheirownleaders(BuenodeMesquitaandSmith2009,p.311).
Otherscholarshaverespondedwithadifferenttheoryaboutforeignaid.Inthisver‐
sionwecallthedonorcontroltheory,donors—especiallythoselessmotivatedbyforeign
policygoals—havedifferentmotivationsandaremoreinterestedinandcapableofmoni‐
toringhowaidisusedintherecipient.Bythisaccounting,donorsdomorethanseekpolicy
concessionsinminimallyinvasiveways.Instead,theyplan,commit,disburse,andmonitor
aidinwaysthatdonotsimplybenefitleaders,butratherprovidenovelmeansofpursuing
broader recipient‐level goals including reaching the citizenswho comprise the set of in‐
tended beneficiaries. Donors understandmany of the challenges they face in developing
countriesandtrytoactstrategicallytoadvancetheirgoals.Incontrasttoastoryemphasiz‐
ingdonorallocationofrelativelyunrestrictedfungibleaid,donorsattachconditionstoaid,
providebothnon‐fungibleand fungibleaid, alter the channelofdelivery, andevenwith‐
hold(orthreatentowithhold)aidinresponsetorecipientleaderdecisions.
Atabroadlevel,Bermeo(2010,2011)showsthatdonorsgoalshavechangedsince
theendoftheColdWarandthattheyarenowmorefocusedondevelopmentanddemocra‐
cypromotion.Shedemonstratesthatdonorspursue“strategicdevelopment,”instrategical‐
lyallocatingdifferenttypesofaidtodifferenttypesofcountries.Often,aidexplicitlytargets
improvements in government capacity rather than providing narrow benefits to specific
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leaders.Forexample,Bermeo(2015,p.4)showsthataiddoesnotinhibitdemocratization,
noting that “aid is not oil. Foreign aid comes fromdonors and donors havepreferences.
Theyalsohavetoolstoprovideaheterogeneousbasketofaidwhichcanlookverydifferent
fromtherevenuestreamattachedtoastate‐ownedenterprise.”
Evenifaidfailstostrengtheninstitutionsorbuildcapacitydirectly,thisalternative
literature claims that aid—especially for democracy and governance—can find ways
aroundincumbentpoliticians.Dietrich(2013)showsthatdonorsstrategicallydecidehow
muchaidtoprovidedirectlytogovernmentsandhowmuchtobypassthem.Inweakerand
more corrupt institutional environments, donors aremore likely todecide tobypass the
governmentandchannelaidtohelpingbuild targetedprojects in therecipient.This “cir‐
cumvention”aidcansupportoppositionparties,watchdogmedia,andcivilsocietyorgani‐
zations that might effectively demand more accountability. Indeed, some evidence
suggests that aid contributes significantly to democratization in recipient governments
(Finkel,etal.2007,ScottandSteele2011,Aronow,etal.2012).
In strategically targeting and delivering aid, donors provide less fungible aid. As
AltincekicandBearce(2014)argue,aidmayneverhavebeenasfungibleasmanyscholars
imply.Theyastutelypointoutthattheresearchonfungibilityrelieslargelyonasinglepa‐
per (Feyzioglu, et al. 1998),which found high fungibility only in one sector: agriculture.
Moreover,donorshavegrownlessinclinedovertimetogiveaidasdirectbudgetsupport,
whichislikelyeasierforelitestocapture.Thus,aidmaybehighlyrestrictedinwaysthat
stymierecipientpoliticians’rapaciousdesigns.
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Foreign aid – especially if it ismonitored, has conditions attached to it, or is less
fungible–maythusservemoreasapublicgoodthatpoliticiansstruggletodiverttothem‐
selvesandtheirallies(MavrotasandOuattara2006).Aidmaynotbe,infact,similartooth‐
er non‐tax revenues such as oil. If donors exercise substantial control over aid, thenwe
shouldexpectleadersandcitizenstoviewaiddifferently.Incontrasttocitizenswhomay
preferforeignaid,leaderswhodonotbenefitasmuchpersonallymaysupportaidlessen‐
thusiastically.
Thedebateremainsunresolved.Extantstudiesaddresstheproblemfrommultiple
methodologicalperspectives,butthusfarhavenottakenthestudydirectlytothepolitical
eliteswhomay use (or abuse) foreign aid nor to themasseswhomay benefit or suffer.
Whilenomethodologyisperfect,andourexperimentalapproachdoesnotresolvethedis‐
pute, focusedexperimentsusingelitesandcitizensassubjectsmaycontributeto thisde‐
bate by providing evidence about who supports foreign aid or government funding for
developmentprojects,andtheirreasonsfordoingso.Supportfordifferentsourcesofreve‐
nueamongmassesandelites–particularlytheirbehavioralsupport–oughttoshedsome
lightonthepoliticaleconomyofdonor‐recipientrelations.
If the aid control camp is correct in claiming that donors do not exercise control
overaidand that therecipientgovernmentcanuseaidas itpleasesunlike taxrevenues,
then like other non‐tax revenues politicians should prefer foreign aid over government‐
fundedprograms.Leaderswouldthusbefreertousetheaidfortheirownpurposescom‐
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paredtotaxrevenuesforwhichtheymustanswertothepublic.4If,ontheotherhand,the
donorcontroltheoryiscorrectandforeigndonorsexercisemorecontrolandaccountabil‐
ityoveraidfunds,anddonorshavethecapacitytoaudit,constrain,andpunishpoliticians
who try to use aid for their own political ends, thenwe expect a different result: elites
should prefer government programs to foreign aid projects. MPs should be keen to use
available resources tomaintain their privilegedposition and should thereforeprefer the
fundingsourcewithfewerconstraints(seevandeWalle2003,p.313).5
Preferencesofcitizensshouldmoveintheoppositedirection.Ifdonorsexercisesuf‐
ficientcontroloveraidsuchthatitreachesthecitizensingreatervolumeandefficacy,then
citizensshouldpreferforeignassistanceovergovernmentspending.Thisfindingshouldbe
especiallylikelyforthosewhoperceivethegovernmenttobeveryclientelistorcorrupt.If
donorscannotimposecontrolandaidisseenasreinforcingtheproblemscharacterizingall
non‐taxrevenues, thencitizensshouldmorestronglysupportgovernmentspendingover
aid.6
AlongnearlyeverymajorbywayinUganda,asinmanydevelopingcountries,signs
tyingprojectstoforeignordomesticdonorscrowdtheroadsideandthereforewouldmake
theconnectionofaidtooutcomespossible.Ofcourse,citizens’perceptionsmaybemistak‐
enabouttheeffectsofaid,andweareopentointerpretingourdatainthislight.However,
4Totheextentthattaxrevenuesarealsonotconstrainedbythepublicandaidisfungiblewiththem,thenelitesshouldbeindifferentbetweenthetwosources.5Similarly,whatRothchild(1986)called“hegemonialexchange”andBayart(1993)“reciprocalassimilationofelites,”clientelismpervadesAfricasincepoliticalstabilitytherehasoftenbeenconstructedbyusingstateresourcesto forgealliancesacrossdifferentsocialelites,often in the formofovertpower‐sharingarrange‐ments(vandeWalle2003).6Wealsoinvestigatedpreferencesoflocalgovernmentofficials(similartostateandcitylevelofficialsintheUS),butfoundnosignificantpreferenceforgovernmentoraid‐fundedprojects.Thisislikelythecasebecausetheseofficialsmostlyreceivefundsfromthecentralgovernmentthatareearmarkedalready.
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evenifcitizensaremisinformed,politicians,wewouldargue,haveabettergraspoftheef‐
fectsofdifferentsourcesofrevenueontheirpoliticalcareers. Membersofparliamentof‐
ten influencehowaid isdistributed inrecipientcountries.LearningMPs’dispositionand
behavior toward aid, especially as it compares with government funding, appears im‐
portanttounderstandinghowaidmightbechanneledthroughdomesticinstitutions.And
socombiningstudiesofthetwosubjectpoolsandcomparingtheirattitudesandbehaviors
towardthesameexperimentalconditionsisusefulandnovel.
The results of this study – especially for theMP experiment –may reflect on our
theoriesofaidandonkey links in thecausalchainconnecting thepoliticaleconomiesof
donorsand recipients. Ifwe find that citizensandelitesare indifferentbetween the two
sources,thissuggeststhattheaidcapturetheoryisrightandaidisveryfungibleandnei‐
thergroupcandistinguishthetwosources. Ifwefindthatonaveragecitizenspreferaid
andelitesprefergovernment,wemightconcludethatthedonorcontroltheoryaboutdo‐
norsbeingabletochannelaidhadmoresupport.Andifwefindelitespreferaidandciti‐
zens prefer government projects, itmight suggest that again the aid capture theory has
moresupportandthattaxrevenuescanbebettermonitoredthanaidfunds.
The Ugandan Context
Contextmatters for the theoriesweareexamining. Ingeo‐strategically important
developingcountriesandinonesthataredemocraticandwellgoverned,thetheoriessug‐
gestthatdonorsshouldbelessworriedabouttherecipient’suseoffunds.Channelingaid,
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monitoring and bypassing the government should be less necessary. Uganda likemany
Sub‐Saharan countries does not fit this description. Uganda currently has a semi‐
authoritarian regime inwhich thegovernmentofYoweriMuseveni’sNationalResistance
Movement (NRM) has retained power for nearly 30 years (van de Walle 2007, Greene
2010). In2006,Ugandabeganholdingmultiparty elections; yet theyhavenotbeen fully
freeandfair(Cheibub,etal.2010,HydeandMarinov2012).Scholarsdescribetheparty’s
rulingmethodsasrelyingheavilyonpatronageandclientelismtoretainitscontrol(vande
Walle2003,2007,Muhumuza2009,Green2010,Tripp2010).Asonerecentstudypoints
out,“InUganda,therulingNRMhasestablishedpatronagenetworksthroughoutthecoun‐
trythroughtheuseoflocalgovernment.Thecivilserviceisanothersuchnetworkofpat‐
ronage,andperhapsthemost important is themilitary.Theseclientelistnetworks,while
consolidatingkeysourcesofsupport,at thesametimeunderminegovernanceanderode
theviabilityofinstitutionsandleadership”(Tripp2010,p.25).Asof2010,Ugandaranks
onthehigherendofcorruptionscales,scoringinthe72ndpercentile(129thoutof178)on
TransparencyInternational’sCorruptionPerceptionsIndex.
Partisanshipandethnicattachmentshavealsoplayed important roles inUgandan
politics at both the citizen and elite levels, revolving around the NRM‐opposition split.
However,recently,theNRMhasfacedimportantoppositionnotjustfromoppositionpar‐
ties,whoarefracturedandcurrentlyonlyhold16%oftheseatsinparliament,butmainly
fromwithintheNRM’sownranks. Intherun‐uptothe2011parliamentaryelections, for
example,theNRMprimarieswerehotlycontested(inmanyinstancesmorecontestedthan
thegeneralelections).Ballotboxeswerestuffedandelectionsriggedtoensurethatparty‐
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leaderfavoriteswontheNRMpartynomination(Malinga2010).This ledtowidediscon‐
tentamongthelosersoftheprimaries.Manyoftheseindividualsthenranasindependents
in2011,andnowthecurrentparliamenthasmore independents thananysingleopposi‐
tionparty,whichmakestheroleofpartisanshipmorecomplicatedandlesspredictable.7
EthnicityisalsoimportantintheUgandanpoliticalcontext.Critically,sharedethnic‐
itywiththechiefexecutiveofthecountryhasimportantpoliticalanddevelopmentalcon‐
sequencesinthattheleader’sco‐ethnicsarelikelytobenefit(FranckandRainer2012).In
Uganda,itiscommonlyunderstoodthatwhenNorthernerssuchasPresidentMiltonObote
wereinpower,theNorthernregionofthecountryreceivedthemostbenefitsintermsof
development, government employment, and othermaterial goods.Now, under President
Museveni,manycitizensarguethattheWesternregion,especiallythoseareasinwhichhis
fellowMuyankolearedominant,receivethenewroads,schools,andclinics.Whetherornot
thisisinfacttrue,citizenstendtooperateundertheseassumptions(seePosner2005).
Ugandaprovidesausefulsettingfortheexperimentbecauseitreceivessubstantial
amounts of foreign development assistance. Since the 1990s, aid including off‐budget
sourcesequalsapproximately70percentofgovernmentexpenditures.Moreover, aiden‐
compassedabout15percentoftotalGDPformuchofthatperiod,thoughthesharehasde‐
clinedtosomeextentinthelastfewyearsaseconomicgrowthhasincreased.Somebasic
7ThecurrentUgandanparliamenthas375membersrepresenting7politicalparties:238ConstituencyMPs,112WomanMPs,10UgandanPeople’sDefenseForce(UPDF)representative,and5representativesforeachofthefollowingspecialinterestgroups:peoplewithdisabilities(PWD),workers,andyouth.ThevastmajorityofMPsareelectedunderpluralityrulesinsingle‐memberconstituencies.Eachdistrictelectsonefemalerep‐resentativeandeachconstituency(usually twoor threeconstituenciesarecontained inonedistrict)electsoneConstituencyMP.Elevenex‐officiomembersareappointedinaddition,andeachofthefivegeographicalregionselectsonePWD,Worker,andYouthrepresentativeandtwoUPDFrepresentatives.
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informationgarneredfromoursurveyconfirmedthatcitizenshadgeneralawarenessboth
of foreign aid and their parliamentary representatives.More than two thirds of subjects
knewthatmorethan30percentof theUgandanbudgetcomes fromforeignaid; thevast
majority(66percent)couldnameboththeirConstituencymemberofparliamentandDis‐
trictWomanmemberofparliament;andthemajorityofsubjectswereawareofforeignaid
flowingtotheirlocalareas.
UgandaisalsotypicalofAfricancountriesintermsofitsdemocratizationprocesses,
current level of democratization, and executive dominance (Bratton and van de Walle
1997,ResnickandvandeWalle2013).Likewise,much likemanyof thecountriesacross
the continent, the Ugandan parliament sees quite competitive elections and while it is
muchweakerthantheexecutiveitismuchmorethansimplyarubberstampandisavenue
forimportantandlivelydebates(HumphreysandWeinstein2012).Indeedthereadingof
thebudgeteachyearisoneofthemostcontroversialandimportantmattersforeveryMP.
IfweconsiderUganda’slevelofdemocracy(PolityIVscore)anddegreeofaiddependence
(World Bank’s World Development Indicator of net official development assistance per
capita),UgandaisverysimilartoEthiopia,Guinea‐Bissau,Togo,Chad,andtheCentralAfri‐
canRepublic.Whiletherearevariousotherconsiderationssuchasethnicdiversity,coloni‐
alhistory, levelsofeconomicdevelopment,etc.,similarityonthesetwokeymeasuresare
importantforunderstandingtowhichcasestheseresultsmostlikelygeneralize. Inthese
contextsthen,weexpectdonorstobeactiveandconcernedabouttheiraiddollars,andof‐
tenunwillingtoletrecipientgovernmentsdoastheypleasewiththefunds.
18
ResearchDesign
Toinvestigatecompetingexpectationsregardingeliteandmasspreferencesforfor‐
eign aid compared to governmentprograms,we conducted twodifferent experiments in
thefield,eachwithcompanionsurveys.First,wecarriedoutanexperimentonaconven‐
iencesampleof276ofthe375Membersofthe9thUgandanParliament(thesittinglegisla‐
ture)and78formerMPsfromthe8thParliament(totalcurrentandformerMPssurveyedis
354).AlthoughwesampledMPsbyconvenience,thedistributionisstrikinglysimilartothe
actualparliamentatthattime,whichwediscussbelow(SeeTable1).Second,weconduct‐
edanationallyrepresentativeexperimentonnearly3,600citizens in42ofUganda’s112
districts.Weusedaclusteredrandomsampleforthecitizensurveytoensureregionaland
political representativeness.Bothexperimentsweresimilar,butnot identical.Theywere
performedbetweenJuneandOctober2012bylocalUgandanenumerators.8
[TABLE1ABOUTHERE]
TomaximizethenumberofresponsesintheMPsurvey,weattemptedtoconducta
censusofallcurrentMPsandachieveda72percentresponserate.Inaddition,wealsocon‐
tactedasmanyformerMPsaspossible(fromthepreviousparliament)andobtaineda55
8ItispossiblethatsubjectsbelievedthelocalUgandanenumeratorsrepresentedaforeignaiddonororthegovernmentratherthanacademicresearchers. Indeed,datafromtheAfrobarometersuggeststhatmostre‐spondentsthinkthegovernmentistheonedoingsurveys.WeexaminedtheAfrobarometerquestionsaboutsubjects’perceptionsofwhosenttheenumerators. Inthe2012roundofUgandaAB(Round5),56%ofre‐spondentsthoughtthegovernmentsenttheinterviewer.Inthe2008roundfor20differentcountriespooledtogether,58%ofrespondentsthoughtthegovernmentsenttheinterviewer.Thisshouldbiasagainstthere‐sultswefind.
19
percentresponserate.9Whilekeyaspectsof theexperimental instrumentswere identical
foreachgrouptofacilitatecomparisons,thecitizensurveywaslengthier.
Thesamplesofrespondentsreflecttheunderlyingpopulationswell,andassignment
to treatment conditions is not predicted by available observables, providing evidence of
randomassignment.FortheMPsurvey,wedonothavedataonafewrelevantindividual
MPcharacteristicsincludingreligionandeducationlevels.10Table1,however,presentsde‐
scriptivestatisticsfromoursampleandfromParliamentasawholeforgender,party,re‐
gionandMPtype,whichgenerallymatchesthe9thParliamentasawhole.Thedistribution
ofMPsby region is largely representative, though it slightlyoversamples those from the
CentralregionandundersamplesthosefromtheNorthernregion.Andfinally,assignment
totreatmentconditionsamongMPsisnotsignificantlyrelatedtoparty,gender,MPtype,or
region,so there isgoodcovariatebalanceacrossexperimentalconditions.For thecitizen
survey,balancingandrandomizationproceduresalsoworkedwell.Keyvariables,suchas
education,gender,age,party,religion,andregion,werenotsignificantlyrelatedtowhether
citizenswereassignedtoagivenexperimentalcondition.
9TheformerMPresponserate is likely lowerbecausemanyformerMPsarescatteredthroughthecountryandnotaseasilyaccessible.10GiventimeconstraintsintheMPsurvey,wewereunabletoobtainmuchdemographicdataonMPstocom‐parewiththemasssample.Beyondthecomparisonsinoutcomedataexploredbelow,wecanidentifysomecomparisons.Forexample, theMPsamplehasmoremen,which isunderstandablegiven theparliament isdisproportionatelymaleandtheMPsamplealsohasahigherproportionofNRMthanthemasssample.
20
Interventions
The experimentalmanipulation presented each subjectwith a randomly assigned
projectdescriptionandarandomlyassignedfunderforthatproject.Thisbetween‐subjects
designisimportantforelicitingcomparisonsbetweengovernmentandforeigndonorpro‐
jectswheredirectcomparisonsmightbetoosensitive.Werandomlyassignedthemanipu‐
lationforactualpipelineprojects.Assuch,thestudyavoidedactivedeception.Theprojects
wereco‐financedbytheWorldBankandmultipleagencies,whichallowedustomanipu‐
latewhichofthemultipledonorswaspresentedtothesubjectsasfunderoftheproject.We
also randomly assigned the type of project: an infrastructureproject (electricity) and an
educationproject.Inordertogeneralizemore,weusedsixdifferentdonors,includingvari‐
ousmultilateral and bilateral ones, and two different project types.MPs, in order to in‐
crease the number of observations, were presented with and asked to express their
supportinvariouswaysforboththeelectricityandeducationprojectsindividually(andin
randomorder)butonlyonedonor.Citizensreceivedonlyoneofthetwopossibleprojects.
Wechosetheelectricityandeducationprojectsbecausetheyrepresentthetypesof
projects that can be given selectively to constituencies that support politicians. For the
masssurvey,werandomlyassignedthedonorandtheprojecttype.Neitherprojecttypein
themasssurveywassignificantlypreferredovertheotherinthebetween‐subjectsdesign,
whichmayreflectthefactthatbothtypesofprojectsaredesperatelysoughtafterinUgan‐
da.Becausetherewerenosignificantdifferencesbetweenprojecttypesandamongforeign
donors,wefocusourdiscussionsonthedifferencebetweenallaiddonorsandthegovern‐
ment.
21
Our framing question read, “The Electricity Sector Development Project will im‐
provethereliabilityofandincreaseaccesstoelectricity.Onemajoraspectoftheprojectis
toextendelectricitytothosewhodonotyethaveaccesstoit.Theprojectmayrequireyour
communitytoprovidefundingformaintenanceinthefuture.[Thisprojectwillbefunded
bythe{RANDOMLYASSIGNEDFUNDER}.]Howmuchwouldyousupportthisproject?”We
includethetextfortheeducationprojectintheappendix.
Weincludedthesentenceaboutfutureexpenses(“mayrequireyourcommunityto
providefunding…”)toincreasetherespondents’sensethatthisprojectmightcostthemin
themediumandlongtermtosupportit.Giventhataidmaybeperceivedas“freemoney”
whereasgovernmentprogramsmayimplyincreasedtaxes,wewereconcernedthatoffer‐
ingaprojectwithoutanynotedcostsmightleadallsubjectstosupportit.Askepticmight
worrythattheaddedcostconditionisnotsufficienttoovercomeabiastoward“free”re‐
sources among subjects. Aidmay feel like a windfall, but government programs appear
costly.This isa reasonableconcern,andwe tooksomemeasures toaddress it in the ro‐
bustnesssectionbelow.
The funding organizationswe randomly assigned in theMP experimentwere the
WorldBank,theGovernmentoftheUnitedStates,agenericmultilateralinstitution(“anin‐
ternationalorganizationfundedbymanycountries”),agenericbilateralagency(“asingle
foreigncountry”),andNoDonor,inwhichweomittedthesentenceindicatingwhichagency
was funding theprojectandservedas thecontrolcondition. In themassexperiment,we
22
also included the African Development Bank and the Government of China because the
largersubjectpoolenabledthepossibilityformoretreatmentconditions.11
Inthecaseofthecontrolcondition,weassumedthatrecipientswouldassociatethis
casewithdomesticgovernmentspending.Wementionednothingaboutforeignaidorfor‐
eigndonorsinthisversionofthesurvey.Weelectednottonamethegovernmentexplicitly
forthecitizensurveyoutoffearthatgeneralizedparanoiatowardgovernmentorassocia‐
tionswith therulingpartymightbiasresponses.12Wedid thesame for theMPstoavoid
socialdesirabilitybias(i.e.,governmentMPsmightfeeltheyshouldsupportprojectsbythe
government,andthuswhenthegovernmentisexplicitlynamed,wewouldreceiveinaccu‐
rateresponses).
Althoughwemadethisdesignchoiceingoodfaithatthetime,inretrospectthisde‐
signchoicemaynothavebeenoptimal:explicitidentificationoftheUgandangovernment
wouldhavepresenteda lessambiguouscontrolcondition.Butaswedescribebelow,this
design choice actually works in favor of the null hypothesis of no difference between
treatmentandcontrol;andthereforeourresults likelyunderstatethefullextentoftreat‐
menteffects.Moreover,giventheinformationwehave,ourresultsholdevenifsomesub‐
11Inadditiontotestingthetreatmenteffectofreceivinganaiddonorrelativetothegovernmentcontrol,wealsotestedtheeffectofindividualdonorsacrossgroups.BecauseelitesdidnotreceivetheAfricanDevelop‐mentBankandGovernmentofChinatreatments,weestimateddifferenceinmeansteststodetecttheeffectofthevarioustreatmentsrelativetothecontrolandtheothertreatmentconditions.Acrossallgroups,thereisneveraconsistentlysignificanteffectforanyoftheindividualdonors.12Concern for biased responses out of fear about the government seems fairly reasonable in a non‐democraticcontextlikeUganda.Inround5ofAfrobarometerdonein2012,thesameyearasourstudy,50%oftherespondentssaidtheydidnotfeelcompletelyfreetosaywhatevertheybelieve,and1/3saidtheyfeltsomekindofpressureaboutwhomtovotefor.Moreover,63%admittedfearofbeingintimidatedinelectioncampaigns.
23
jectsmisinterpreted the control condition; see the detailed discussion in the robustness
sectionbelow.
Further,our intervention focusesonone typeofaid:projectaid.Thus,ourresults
maynotapply togeneralbudget support.Project aid ismuchmore infungibleandchan‐
neled than budget support. However,we chose to focus on project aid because it is the
mostcommontype,itconstitutestheoverwhelmingmonetaryshare,anditisthemostvis‐
ibletocitizensandthuswouldmaximizeourabilitytoobtaininformedpreferencesregard‐
ingaid.According to theAidData informationbase,which is the largestrepositoryofaid
statistics,between2000and2012Ugandareceived157budgetsupportgrantsandloans
summingto$3.2billion.Overthesameperiod,thecountrywashostto16,019aidprojects
summingto$24.5billionintotalaid.Thissuggeststhatbudget‐supportaidinUgandacon‐
stitutes1percentofthecountbut13percentoftotalUgandanaid.Thisisroughlyonpar
withtherestofSub‐SaharanAfrica,whichreceived3,811budgetsupportgrantsandloans
for$57.5billioninrelationto352,839projectsthattotaled$615billion.Budgetsupportin
theregionthuscomprised1percentofthecountbut9percentofthemoney(Tierney,etal.
2011).
Weacknowledgethatprojectaidandbudget‐supportaidmighthavedifferentpolit‐
icaleffects.ThefindingsofTripp(2013)andGazibo(2013)inTanzaniaandBenin,respec‐
tively, suggest that budget support aid is more corruptible than project aid. In fact,
perceptionsofincreasedcorruptionhaveleddonorstoreducebudgetsupportinBeninand
Ugandainfavorofprojectaid.
24
Outcomes
Eachsurveyaskedavarietyofdemographic,political,andaid‐relatedquestions.To
avoidprimingeffects,weposedallaidquestionsaftertheexperimentalportionofthesur‐
vey.Tomeasuretheoutcomeofsupportoroppositionfortheforeignordomesticfunded
projects,weaskedallrespondentstofirstexpresstheirlevelofsupport,thentoreportto
ustheirwillingnesstotellahigherauthority(PartyleaderforMPs,andLocalCounciloffi‐
cialforcitizens)oftheirsupport(ornot)fortheproject,theirwillingnesstosignapetition
voicingtheirsupport,andtoactuallysignthepetition.13
MPswereaskedtoexpresstheirwillingnesstocoordinatewithpeersinsupportof
(orinoppositionto)theproject,tellconstituentsabouttheproject,rallylocalsinsupport
of(orinoppositionto)theproject,andsignalettertothePresidentinsupportoforoppo‐
sitiontotheprojects.Citizens,butnotelites,werealsoaskediftheywerewillingtosenda
textmessage(SMS)andtoactuallysendtheSMSinsupport(ornot)oftheproject.
BecausetheMPswerepresentedwithbothprojects,wehavetwoobservationsfor
eachonalloftheseoutcomes,exceptthepetitiontothepresident.EachMPwasaskedto
signasinglepetitionthatreportedtheirlevelofsupportforbothprojectstothePresident,
thuswehaveoneobservationforeachMPonthisoutcome.Thisdesignchoicewasmadeto
reducetheburdenontheMPsandtoreduceredundancyofsendingtwonearly identical
letterstothepresident.BecausetheMPsreceivedthesamedonoracrossthetwoprojects
13Full textof thepetition language is included in theAppendix.Note that the language in thepetitiononlyasksthemtosignwithoutspecifyingaforeigndonororgovernment.Ifadonorwouldhavebeennamedinthepetition language, then the treatmentcondition(withadonornamed)wouldnothavebeencomparable tothecontrolcondition(wherenoonewasnamed).Instead,weoptedtosimplyaskthemtosignapetitioninsupportoropposition.
25
thisshouldnotaffecttheresultswereportherebecausewearecomparingdifferencesin
donors and not sectors (given that therewas nomeaningful difference between project
types).Thesevariousmeasuresofsupportpresenttherespondentswithvaryinglevelsof
cost(attitudinalvs.behavioralresponses)andwillbeusedasthekeyoutcomevariablesto
gaugesupportforprojectsacrosstreatmentarms.
Results
Inthissection,first,weaskwhetherMPsaremoresupportiveofgovernmentpro‐
gramsorforeignaidprojects.Second,weaskwhetherthemasspublicismoresupportive
ofaidorgovernmentprogramsandthencomparethemtoUgandanMPs.Andfinally,we
considerpossiblemechanismsthatcouldexplaintheoveralltrendsinpreferences.
Differences across groups
Table2reportsresultsfromdifference‐in‐meanstestscomparinglevelsofsupport
underalloftheaidtreatmentconditionscomparedtothegovernmentcontrolconditionfor
MPsandmasses.PanelAreportsoutcomesthatweremeasuredforallrespondents(plus
theSMSandPresidentialLetteroutcomesforcitizensandMPs,respectively),andPanelB
reportsoutcomes for thoseonlymeasured forMPs.Theseoverall results showthatwith
onlyoneexception,MPsareconsistentlymoresupportiveofgovernmentprojectsthanfor‐
eignaid.Thisdifferenceinsupportissignificantin3ofthe9outcomes,andtreatmentef‐
26
fectsrangefromlessthan1to12percentagepoints.14SeeFigureA1intheAppendixfora
graphicrepresentationofthetreatmenteffectsandsignificancelevelsforasubsetofout‐
comes.
Theresults inTable2alsoshowthatcitizensconsistentlypreferaidovergovern‐
mentprojects;thisdifferenceinsupportissignificantin5ofthe6outcomes,includingthe
behavioraloutcomes.Thetreatmenteffectsrangefrom2to4percentagepoints,whichare
notlargebutnonethelesssignificantstatistically.Themodestsubstantivedifferencesmay
resultfromstrongceilingeffectsgiventhattheprojectsareextremelypopularandthere‐
foreclusteredneartheupperboundof100percentsupport.
[TABLE2ABOUTHERE]
Why do these differences appear?
These results present some interesting and counterintuitive findings. Since they
seem tobe consistentwith thedonor control theory about aid,weaskwhatmechanism
mightaccountforthesedifferences.Thelogicofthedonorcontroltheoryimpliesthatper‐
ceptionsofcorruptionandclientelismoughttomagnifytheeffectsobservedabove.Weal‐
so explore other possibilities—partisanship, ethnicity, nationalism, government
incumbencybias,andabiasduetoforeignmedia—andreportonthemintheappendix.To
14NotethatTable2reportsintent‐to‐treateffects.Forthemasses,weaskedamanipulationcheckthatallowsustodeterminethelevelofcompliance.Thoseresultsarequalitativelythesameastheintent‐to‐treateffects.Moreover,ifwerestricttheanalysistothosesubjectspassingthemanipulationcheck,theresultsshowstrongdifferences in favorofmasses supportingaid in everypossibleoutcomecategory.Becauseof the statusofmembersofparliament,weoptednottoaskmanipulationcheckquestions.Wethusmustrelyontheintent‐to‐treateffectsalone.
27
provideaplausible explanation, a subgroupmechanismneeds todiffer substantivelybe‐
tweenthemassesandMPs, toexplainthedifferencesbetweenthetreatmentandcontrol
withineachsubgroup,andmostofalltoaccountforthedifferencesbetweentreatmentand
control across the elites and masses. For the perceptions of clientelism and corruption
mechanism,whichwasbestsupportedbytheevidence,wereportresultsbelow;therestof
theresultsarereportedgraphicallyintheAppendix(FiguresA2‐A13).15
Beforeweproceed, it is important to first establish thatMPsdonot simply think
thatgovernmentprojectsaremoreeffectiveorsuperiorsimplybecausetheUgandangov‐
ernmentisinvolved.Ifthatwerethecase,thenourstorywouldbesimple:MPsprefergov‐
ernment projects because they view the government, of which they are a part, as a
preferablemanagerofaidfundsandprojects.
MPsonaveragedonot, infact,holdtheviewthatgovernment‐fundedprojectsare
superior.Only32percentofMPsbelievegovernmentfundsaremorelikelytogotothose
mostinneedcomparedtoforeignaidfunds,which59percentbelievegomoretotheneed‐
iest.Inaddition,only34percentofMPsbelievethatgovernmentfundsaremoreeffective
andlesswastefulcomparedtoforeignaidfunds.Only39percentofMPsbelievethatgov‐
ernment‐funded projects better meet the needs of their constituents than do foreign‐
fundedprojects.Andonly31percentbelievethatgovernment‐fundedprogramsaremore
transparent than foreign aid projects. Finally,when askedwho they thinkwould be the
15Wedonotdiscusstheforeignmediaeffectindetail,butnotethatmassrespondentscouldbemorelikelytovoicetheirsupportforaprojectwhenitisassociatedwithaforeigndonorratherthanwhenitisadomesticsource.Citizensandelitesthatpreferforeignmediaaremorelikelytobebiasedinfavorofforeignprojectsbecausethoseprojectsarereferencedfavorablyintheforeignmedia.WethusseparatedmassesandMPsbytheextenttowhichtheypreferforeignmediaoverUgandanmedia.SeeFiguresA2andA3inappendix.Theresultsgenerallyareinconsistentandweak.
28
mosteffective incarryingouttheelectricityoreducationproject,only23percentofMPs
namedtheUgandangovernment.Moreover,roughly80percentofMPsthoughtforeignaid
had a positive effect on the government and their constituents. Therefore,MPs actually
tendtohavelessconfidenceingovernment‐fundedprojectscomparedtoforeignaideven
thoughtheytendtomorereadilysupportgovernmentprograms.Onealternative implied
bythedonorcontrolargumentisthatperceptionsofclientelismandcorruptionmayshape
supportforforeignassistancevs.domesticprograms.
Evidenceinfavorofthecorruptionandclientelismmechanismwouldindicatethat
citizenswhobelievethatthegovernmentiscorruptandclientelisticwouldpreferforeign
aidprojects.MPsshouldhavetheoppositepreference.Whenpoliticiansseecorruptionin
governmentitmaybeaboontothempersonallyorelectorally,andhencetheymayprefer
government projects because theyprovide an easierway to accessmoney for their own
personalgains.
Inthesurvey,weaskedbothMPsandcitizenswhethergovernmentfundsaremost
likely“tobenefitgovernmentofficialsandtheirpoliticalallies”or“helpthosemostinneed”
to capture aspects of both clientelism and corruption (usingmoney to help friends and
themselves).BothareintimatelylinkedconceptsinAfricabecausecorruptionlargelysus‐
tainsclientelism(Szeftel2000).WeseeaverylargedifferencebetweenthepublicandMPs
in their perceptionsof corruption and clientelism:75percentof thepublic believes that
current government leaders take government money to benefit themselves and their
friendsratherthaneveryoneinthecountry,whileonly35percentoftheMPsagreewith
29
thisstatement.Wethereforeusethisquestiontodividethesampleintothosewhoseegov‐
ernmentfundsasmoresusceptibletocaptureandabuseandthosewhodonot.
Weacknowledgethefactthatthecorruptionquestionmaybesusceptibletosocial
desirability bias; however, further analysis mitigates the concern. We can leverage evi‐
dencefromoursurveytoseeifsocialdesirabilityisatplay.IfsomeMPsaremoresuscepti‐
ble to social desirability pressures, then we should expect a strong positive correlation
betweenlowresponsestothecorruptionquestionandavarietyofotherquestionsreflect‐
ing socially desirable responses, such as reportingmore visits to theMP’s constituency,
perceivingagoodeconomy,andclaimingbetterattendanceatplenarysessionsofparlia‐
ment.However, answers to thesequestionsareneverstronglypositivelycorrelatedwith
low corruption perceptions. There is aweak negative correlation (Pearson’s r) between
lowcorruptionreportsandclaimingmoredaysspentintheMP’sconstituencyeachmonth
(‐0.1189).Thereisaweakpositivecorrelationbetweenlowcorruptionreportsandmain‐
taining that the national economy is in at least a “good” condition (0.1017). And finally
thereisaweaknegativecorrelationsbetweenlowcorruptionreportsanddeclaringhigher
ratesofattendanceatplenarysessionsofparliament(‐0.0183).Thereseemstobenocon‐
sistent socialdesirabilitybias.Whilewecannot ruleout thepossibility, ourdata suggest
thatMPswhoarecorruptarenotnecessarilyunder‐reportingcorruption.
TheanalysisforMPs(reportedinTable3)showsthatMPswhobelievegovernment
fundsaremorelikelytobeusedforcorruptionandclientelismaresignificantlymorelikely
toprefergovernment‐fundedprojects.For5ofthe9outcomes,MPswhoseegovernment
funds asmore corrupt and clientelist are significantlymore likely to prefer government
30
funds.Importantly,theseeffectsarestronglysignificantforthebehavioraloutcomes.The
treatmenteffectsrangefrom4%to19%,thusindicatingmoremeaningfulsubstantiveef‐
fectsizes.
[TABLE3ABOUTHERE]
Conversely,thedifferenceinsupportforaidandgovernmentprojectsisnotstatisti‐
callysignificantforMPswhodonotperceivesignificantcorruptionandclientelism(thisis
trueforalloutcomemeasures;seeTable3).ThissuggeststhattheMPswhoseefewave‐
nuesforcorruptionandclientelismexpressnopreferenceforgovernment‐fundedprojects
overaid.Oneplausible interpretationoftheseresultssuggeststhat if theMPcannotcap‐
turesomeofthefunding,thens/hedoesnotmanifestaclearpreferencetowardsuchpro‐
jects.
The results inTable 4 report the difference‐in‐means tests and support the claim
thatcitizensupportforaidisalsoconditionalontheirperceptionsofcorruptionandclien‐
telism,but in theoppositedirection.Thecitizenswhobelievethatgovernment fundsare
used forcorruptionandclientelismaresignificantlymore likely tosupportaidovergov‐
ernmentprojectsfor3ofthe6outcomes(4ofthe6atthe0.1level).Amongsubjectswho
donotperceivethecorruptuseofgovernmentfunds,therearenosignificantdifferences,
butmostofthenegativesignssuggestaslightpreferenceforgovernmentprojectsoveraid.
(TheresultsforMPsandmassesarealsoplottedinFiguresA12andA13.)
[TABLE4ABOUTHERE]
Wealsoranadditionalteststodetermineiftheeffectofcorruptionandclientelism
ismediatedbyethnicity,partisanship,orregionalidentities.Eventhoughmanystudiesar‐
31
gue that clientelism operates along ethnic or regional channels or through partisan net‐
works(i.e.,Wantchekon2003,Stokes2005),wefindnoclearevidencethattheeffectofcli‐
entelismfoundhereismediatedbyanyofthesevariables,asreportedinAppendixFigures
A14andA15.
Thisanalysisprovidessupportfortheargumentthatcitizenssupportaidovergov‐
ernmentprogramsconditionalontheirperceptionsofcorruptionandclientelism.Further,
wefindthatcitizensdoinfactconsidercorruptiontobeabadthing:peoplewhoperceive
theretobemorecorruptionaresignificantlylesslikelytotrustparliament,theirMPs,and
thepresident(effectsaresignificantatthe0.01levels).Takentogether,thisanalysisoffers
someevidencethatpoliticalelitesmaybelievethatgovernmentfundsaremoresusceptible
toclientelismandcorruption. Inaddition,ordinarycitizenswhoperceivecorruptionand
clientelism ingovernmentbehave inways that suggest they seeaid‐fundedprojectsasa
morepreferredmechanism thangovernment action toobtain thepublic goods that they
expresstheysodesperatelyneed.
Discussion of Robustness
Aswithanyexperimentnumerousdesignchoiceswererequired,allofwhichpre‐
senteddifficult tradeoffs. In thissection,wediscuss two importantaspectsof theexperi‐
mental design. First,wediscuss the cost condition,which tries to address thedifference
between“tax‐based”governmentprojectsand“free”aidprojectseventhough,asweargue
below,thischaracterizationisnotaccurateinthecontextofthestudy.Second,wediscuss
32
thefactthatthecontrolconditiondoesnotexplicitlynamethegovernmentasthefunder
butisneverthelessinterpretedasthegovernment.
Taxed Government Projects versus Free Aid Projects: A False Dichotomy
Afirstdesignobjectionmightbethatthepublicmaypreferaidbecauseitisviewed
asfree,whereasgovernmentprojectsrequirecitizenstopaytaxes.Wedonotbelievethis
isthefactordrivingourresultsforseveralreasons.First,weaddedthecoststatementto
both the treatmentandcontrolconditions,so that individualsareawarethatanyproject
mayrequirelocalfunds.
Second,weundertookafollow‐upstudywherewerecruitedanadditional460sub‐
jectsandrandomlyassignedthemtoreceivethecoststatement(ornot)inassociationwith
oneofthetworandomlyassignedprojectdescriptions.Thecoststatementhadnosignifi‐
canteffectonsubjects’supportfortheproject.Thismaybeeitherbecausethecoststate‐
mentwas tooweak toproduce treatment effectsorbecause subjectswere indifferent to
costsforprojectstheyfeeltheydesperatelyneed.Whilethecoststatementmaybeweak,
multiplereasonsleadustobelievethatcitizensarerelativelyindifferenttocostsforpublic
goods.
First, subjects likely do not see government projects as costly to themselves any
morethanforeignaidiscostly.ThevastmajorityofUgandans–86percentinournational‐
ly representative subject pool – fall below the earnings threshold forpaying income tax,
whichisroughly600dollarsperyear.AndasMartin(2013)andFjeldstadandTherkildsen
(2008)note,Ugandantaxrateshavebeenreducedrecently.MostUgandansalsodonotpay
indirecttaxes.EightypercentofUgandansliveinruralareasandmorethanninetypercent
33
ofoursubjectsreportedearninglessthantwodollarsperdayinincome.Mostarenotpart
oftheformalmarketandhencedonotpayindirecttaxesliketheVAT.16Further,thegov‐
ernmentraiseslittlerevenuefromtaxesandwhatrevenuesexistareoftentransformedin‐
to private goods and/or directed to political allies for the purposes of corruption or
clientelism(seeCoxandMcCubbins2001,Martin2013).
The Government Control Condition
Aseconddesignobjectionmightbethatthegovernmentwasnotnamedinthecon‐
trolcondition.Wewereconcernedaboutsocialdesirabilityinresponsesifweactuallyla‐
beled the control as the government. This is not a trivial concern in this context as the
Afrobarometer data show (see footnote 9). For the citizens,weworried that theymight
feargovernmentreactionsandsoalwaysrankthegovernmentprojectsfirst.FortheMPs,
wefearedsocialdesirabilitybiasinwhichtheyalwayssaidtheypreferredthegovernment
projectssincetheywerepartofthegovernmentandwouldwanttoavoidbeingseenasnot
supportinggovernmentdevelopmentprojects.
Toassesswhatcitizensperceivedwhentheyviewedthecontrolcondition,aswell
aswhattheimplicationsofthisare,weconductedafollow‐upsurveytoensurethatsub‐
jectsinthemassexperimentdidinfactinterpretthecontrolconditionasthegovernment,
16AsKagambirwe(2014,p.62)notes,“ThemajorityofUgandansthatstayinruralareasofUgandahavenostableincomeamongstwhichthegovernmentcantaxthem.ThisthusleadstohavingaverylimiteddomestictaxbaseamongstwhichURAcan tax its citizens. Italso limits the informal taxes suchasValueAddedTax(VAT)incometaxandpayasyouearn(PAYEE)becausethelevelofconsumptionofthesecommoditiesislow.Alsothelevelofunemploymentissohighthuslimitingthecitizensinearningmoneyamongstwhichtheycanbetaxedinformofpayasyouearn(PAYEE).”
34
andwefoundthatthemajorityofsubjectsdidso(52%and51%fortheeducationandelec‐
tricityprojects, respectively) (Milner, etal.2014).More thanone thirdof subjects in the
follow‐upstudy,however,attributedthecontrolconditiontoaforeigndonor.Whileamore
directcomparisonmayhavebeenpreferable,attributionofthecontrolprojectstoforeign
donorsworksinfavorofthenullhypothesisofnotreatmenteffects.
Theconcernisthatthecontrolconditionrepresentedacombinationofpeoplewho
believeitimpliedeitherthegovernmentoraforeignaiddonor;thatis,supportforthecon‐
trolisequaltosomeaverageofsupportforforeignaidprojectscombinedwithsupportfor
government projects. Becausewe know two of these three values—the outcome in the
controlconditionoverallandtheoutcomeintheforeignaidcondition,wecancalculatethe
third:thelevelofsupportthatsubjectswouldprovidehadtheybeengiventhegovernment
controlconditionexplicitly.
First,weknowtheaveragevaluethatmassandMPrespondentsgaveinsupportof
theprojectsiftheywereassignedaforeigndonor.Inthetwosurveysweaskedaboutsup‐
portfortheprojectsusing6differentaiddonorsforthemassesand4fortheMPs,assign‐
ingeachsubjectadonoratrandom.17Ourdatashowthatacrossalltheseforeigndonors,
themassrespondentsdidnotdifferentiatesignificantlybetweenthem,butonaveragethey
supportedtheforeign‐fundedprojectsatahigherlevelthandidthecontrolgroup.Wehave
similarevidencefortheMPs,excepttheMPs,ontheotherhand,supportedalltheaidpro‐
17Respondentswererandomlyassignedoneof6donors:US,China,WorldBank,AfricanDevelopmentBank,genericbilateralandmultilateraldonor.MPsdidnotseeChinaortheAfDB.
35
jectsonaveragelessthanthecontrolcondition.Thisimpliesthatwecancalculateanaver‐
agevalueofsupportamongthemasspublicandMPsforprojectsledbyanyforeigndonor.
Second,onaveragethecontrolgroup's levelofsupport fortheprojectswas lower
thantheaverageforalltheforeign‐donortreatmentgroupsforthemassexperiment.For
theMPs,thecontrolgroups’supportwashigherthanforalltheforeignaidprojects.Third,
ourpost‐surveydatashowthat51or52%,dependingontherandomassignmentofelec‐
tricityoreducationproject,respectively,believethatthecontrolwasagovernmentproject
andmostoftheremainingbelieveditwasaforeigndonor.Sotheactualvalueofsupport
for thecontrolgroupfor thosewhothought itwasthegovernmentcanbededucedfrom
this information. In themass experiment itmust necessarily be lower than that for the
group thatwas given the foreign aid conditions,while in theMP experiment itmust be
higher.
Wecanusethesethreepiecesofinformationtocalculatethemeanandstandarder‐
rorsofthemassrespondentswhoattributedthecontrolconditiontothegovernment.We
canonlyobtainanestimatefortheMPssincewedidnotaskthemwhotheythoughtwas
funderinthecontrolcondition,butthisstillimplieswhatthecontrolgroupwhoattributed
ittothegovernmentwouldhavescored.Calculatingthemeanisstraightforward.Weknow
thatthemeanofthecontrolgroupismadeupoftherespondentswhothoughtthatthecon‐
trolwasaforeigndonorandthosewhothoughtthecontrolwasthegovernment:
∗ 1 ∗
where and aretheaveragelevelsofsupportforthedevelopmentprojects
underthecontrolandtreatmentconditions,respectively.Thesevaluesareknownfromthe
36
data and is the percentage identifying the control as the government. Rearranging to
solvefor wederive:
1 ∗
Calculatingthestandarderrortocreatetheconfidenceintervalsisalittlemoredifficultand
wedescribe theprocedure in the following footnote.18Using these calculatedmeans and
standarddeviations,wecanthencomparethosereceivingtheforeigntreatmenttothecon‐
trolconditionasreportedinthepapertotheportionofcontrolrespondentswhothought
theconditionwasthegovernment.Figure1demonstratestherelativedifferences for the
strongsupportconditionamongthemasses.Forallotheroutcomeconditions formasses
andMPs, this relative orderingholds and sowedonot display themhere.As the figure
shows, the difference between those receiving the explicit foreign condition and those
thinkingthecontrolrepresentedthegovernmentismuchlargerthanbetweentheexplicit‐
lyforeignconditionandtheundifferentiatedcontrol.Thedirectionoftheeffectisopposite
intheMPcase.Thus,theresultswereportinthepaperworkagainstourstatedhypotheses
andthereforeprovide themostconservative test; that is,hadwenamedthegovernment
18WeknowthatthestandarderroristhestandarddeviationdividedbythesquarerootofN.Thestandarderrorforthecontrolwillbecomprisedofthestandarderroroftherespondentswhobelievedthegovernmentwasthedonorandthosewhobelievedthatitwasaforeigndonor:
2
Againwecanrearrangetheformulatocalculatethestandarddeviationofthegovernmentrespondents:
2 ∗ ∗
SincethestandarderrorisjustthestandarddeviationdividedbythesquarerootofN,wecancalculate
togetthestandarderrorsofthegovernmentrespondents.
37
explicitly in thecontrolcondition,wewouldhaveobservedamuch largerdifferenceand
thereforetheresultsreportedwouldbeevenstronger.
[FIGURE1ABOUTHERE]
ForcostandlogisticalreasonswedidnotperformthesamefollowupstudyonMPs,
butweexpectthatMPsmighthavevoicedsimilarperceptionstootherUgandans.Thisof
coursemeansthatsomeMPs,likesomecitizens,probablyperceivedthecontrolcondition
assponsoredbyforeigndonors.Again,thiswouldhaveledtoanunderstatementofthedif‐
ferencebetweentreatmentandcontrolintheMPexperiment.
Ontheotherhand,itisalsopossiblethatMPsmaymerelyhaveapreferenceforun‐
specifiedoverspecifiedfunding.Theprojectdescriptionswereidenticalacrossconditions
savethestatementofthefundingsource,sothedetailsoftheeducationandelectricitypro‐
jectswereequallyspecifiedbetweentreatmentandcontrol,whichdiminishesourconcern
here.Moreover,twooftheforeigndonorconditionsweredeliberatelygenericinthatthey
attributedtheprojectstoeitheranunspecifiedmultilateralorbilateraldonor.MPsdidnot
significantlypreferthesegenericconditionstoconditionsinwhichtheWorldBankorthe
United Stateswere named,whichmoves us toward discounting the possibility thatMPs
simplypreferprojectswithunspecifieddonors.Rather,itappearsmorelikelythattheirat‐
tributionofthecontrolprojectstothegovernmentpromptedthetreatmenteffects.
38
Conclusion
Thispaperprovideswhatis,toourknowledge,thefirstexperimentalstudytocom‐
pareaidpreferencesandactionsformembersofparliamentandanationallyrepresenta‐
tive, random sample of ordinary citizens in a prominent developing country. We were
specifically concerned with preferences towards foreign vs. domestic development pro‐
jects. Citizens preferred aid over government programs consistently, andwithmost de‐
pendentvariablestostatisticallysignificantdegrees,especiallyinthebehavioraloutcomes.
Thiswasparticularlysoamongtherespondentswhoperceivedproblemswithgovernment
corruptionandclientelism,thusprovidingevidenceconsistentwiththeargumentthataid
can help overcome governance problems. Likewise,members of parliament consistently
preferredgovernmentprogramsoveraid.
Ourstudyprovidesevidenceconcerningtwodifferenttheoriesoftheeffectsofaid.
Wefindlittlesupportfortheideathataidishighlyfungibleandthatrecipientgovernments
candoastheypleasewithit.Neitherelitesnorthepublicareindifferentbetweenaidand
government–funded projects. Both perceive aid and government projects to be different
fromoneanotheronaverage.Butelitesandcitizenshavedistinctpreferences.Citizensare
morewilling to supportaidby takingbehavioralaction imposingpersonal costs through
signingapetitionandsendinganSMS.Theyviewaidas lesspoliticizedthangovernment
programs.Thisseemstobeconsistentwithaviewofaiddonorsasbeingstrategicintheir
control of aid and of channeling, monitoring, and bypassing governments. In a weakly
democraticcontextwithknowncorruptionproblems,weexpectdonorswhodonotseethe
government as a critical geo‐political ally to try tomaintain control over aid, to limit its
39
fungibilityandtargetittowardparticularprojects.Giventhatourdatashowthatthepublic
knowsaboutforeignaiddonorsandtruststhemmorethandomesticinstitutions,thisevi‐
dencesuggeststhepublicisperceivingaidprojectsdifferentlythangovernmentones.
Forthesesamereasons,itperhapsmakessensethatpoliticaleliteswerelessenthu‐
siasticaboutaidthantheywereaboutgovernment‐fundedprojects.MPs’likelyfacefewer
constraintsoverhowtheymightutilizethesedomesticgovernmentresources.Highlevels
ofcorruptionandclientelismexist indevelopingcountriesevenintheabsenceofforeign
aid.Anddomesticresourcesmaybeeveneasierforgovernmentstodiverttothesepurpos‐
essincethereareoftennostrongaccountabilitymechanismsatworkinpoordeveloping
countries.Theseperceptionsandpreferencesmaythentellusagreatdealaboutthecon‐
tendingtheoriesaboutaid’s impact.Ourevidencesuggeststhatelitesandmassesarenot
indifferentbetween the two typesofdevelopment funders, that they seeproject aid ina
differentlightfromgovernmentsponsoredprojects,andthatdonorsmaywellbeactingin
waysthatproducethesedistinctviews.
Our study brings together two complimentary literatures. The large literature on
clientelismandcorruptionindevelopingcountriesstronglyimpliesthatgovernmentshave
the desire andwill to use their funds to promote their own political purposes first and
foremost.Stayinginofficeiscriticalandusinggovernmentprojectstobuildsupportisone
way todo this.Uganda’sgovernment isnoexception.However,aid scholarsoftenassess
foreignassistancewithoutanydirectcomparisontothemostrealisticalternative,whichis
governmentfunding.Ourstudyexaminesthebeliefsandactionsofbothelitesandcitizens
bycomparingtheirsupportforthesetwodifferentdevelopmentmechanisms.Theseforms
40
ofevidenceshednewlightontwoveryprominentliteraturesbymakingmorecentralthe
preferencesofpoliticalelitesandcitizens.Weexpectthatmuchistobegainedbycomple‐
mentingexistingmacro‐levelstatisticalapproacheswithmicro‐levelexperimentaldataon
politiciansandbeneficiariesofaidindevelopingcountries.
41
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Table 1: Comparison of MP Sample to the Actual 9th Parliament
Sample 9thParliamentGender %Male 67 65%Female 33 35Party %NRM 74.6 73.5%Independents 10.2 11.2%FDC 8.5 8.8%DP 3.1 3.4%UPC 3.1 2.6%CP 0.25 0.25%JEEMA 0.25 0.25Region %fromCentral 28 25%fromEastern 28 27%fromNorthern 18 22%fromWestern 26 26MPType %ConstituencyMPs 59 62%DistrictWomenMPs 28 29%SpecialInterestMPs 6 7%Ex‐OfficioMPs 8 2
47
Table 2: Citizen and MP Preferences for Government versus Aid Projects
PanelA:MPandCitizenOutcomesMPs Strong
SupportTell Willing to
signSigned Willing to
SignPres.SignedPres.
Govt 0.84 0.97 .89 .78 .86 .75N 136 136 136 138 59 59Aid 0.83 0.99 .82 .75 .75 .68N 567 567 567 570 292 292Difference ‐0.01 0.02 ‐0.07** ‐0.04 ‐0.12** ‐0.06 Strong
SupportTell Willing to
signSigned Willing to
SMSSentSMS
Masses Govt 0.73 0.91 0.82 0.77 0.59 0.02N 528 520 528 538 538 202Aid 0.77 0.94 0.83 0.80 0.64 0.05N 3007 2967 3008 3017 3017 1143Difference 0.03* 0.03** 0.02 0.04* 0.04* 0.02*
PanelB:EliteOnlyOutcomes TellConstituents RallyLocalOfficials Coordinatewith
PeersMPs GovtNAidNDifference
0.991360.98567‐0.00
0.981230.97501‐0.01
0.991360.97567‐0.02**
Anegativedifferencemeansthattheproportionofsupportforprojectsinthecontrolcondition(government)islargerthantheproportionunderthetreatmentcondition(aid),implyingthegovernmentconditionispre‐ferredtotheaidone.Notethatifasubjectstateds/hedidnotwanttosignthepetition(thirdcolumn)westillpresentedthemthepossibilityofsigningthepetition(fourthcolumn).ThehigherNsforwillingnesstoSMSinthefifthcolumn(e.g.,538and3017)arearesultofsubjectrefusalstoanswerthepetitionquestions(wherecorrespondingNsarelower:528and3008).Thatis,ifasubjectrefusedtoanswerpetitionquestions,westillaskedaboutSMSand fewer subjectsdeclined toanswerSMSquestions.Also, theNsdecrease in the “SentSMS”condition(relativeto“WillingtoSMS”)becauseweonlycalculateSentSMSforsubjectswhoownedaphone.
48
Table 3: Testing the Corruption Mechanism (MPs)
MPSupportConditionalonPerceptionsofCorruption Strong
SupportTell Willing to
SignSigned Willing to
SignPres.SignedPres.Pet.
Yes,GovernmentFundsusedforCorruptionGovt 0.86 0.98 0.95 0.89 0.94 0.89N 44 44 44 45 18 18Aid 0.82 0.98 0.85 0.78 0.77 0.70N 195 195 195 197 103 103Difference ‐0.05 0.01 ‐0.10** ‐0.11** ‐0.18** ‐0.19**No,GovernmentFundsnotusedforCorruptionGovt 0.82 0.97 0.86 0.73 0.83 0.68N 90 90 90 91 41 41Aid 0.83 0.99 0.81 0.73 0.74 0.68N 366 366 366 367 188 188Difference 0.01 0.02 ‐0.05 0.00 ‐0.09 ‐0.01
MPSupportConditionalonPerceptionsofCorruption Tell
ConstituentsRallyLocals Coordinate
WithPeersYes,GovernmentFundsusedforClientelismGovt 0.98 0.97 1.00N 44 39 44Aid 0.98 0.96 0.96N 195 171 195Difference ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.04***No,GovernmentFundsnotusedforClientelismGovt 0.99 0.98 0.99N 90 82 90Aid 0.98 0.97 0.97N 366 324 366Difference ‐0.01 ‐0.00 ‐0.02Anegativedifferencemeansthattheproportionofsupportforprojectsinthecontrolcondition(government)islargerthantheproportionunderthetreatmentcondition(aid),implyingthegovernmentconditionispre‐ferredtotheaidone.Apositivedifferenceimpliesthattheaidconditionispreferredtothegovernmentcon‐dition.Notethat ifasubjectstateds/hedidnotwanttosignthepetition(thirdcolumn)westillpresentedthemthepossibilityofsigningthepetition(fourthcolumn).
49
Table 4: Testing the Corruption Mechanism (Masses)
MassSupportConditionalonPerceptionsofCorruption Strong
SupportTell Willing to
signSigned Willing to
SMSSentSMS
Yes,GovernmentFundsusedforCorruptionGovt 0.71 0.90 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.03N 393 386 393 402 157 157Aid 0.77 0.94 0.83 0.80 0.71 0.05N 2274 2241 2274 2279 894 894Difference 0.06** 0.04** 0.03 0.05** 0.02 0.03*No,GovernmentFundsnotusedforCorruptionGovt 0.82 0.93 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.00N 126 126 126 176 42 42Aid 0.76 0.94 0.84 0.82 0.78 0.03N 695 688 696 699 236 236Difference ‐0.06 0.01 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.08 0.03***Anegativedifferencemeansthattheproportionofsupportforprojectsinthecontrolcondition(government)islargerthantheproportionunderthetreatmentcondition(aid),implyingthegovernmentconditionispre‐ferredtotheaidone.Apositivedifferenceimpliesthattheaidconditionispreferredtothegovernmentcon‐dition.Notethat ifasubjectstateds/hedidnotwanttosignthepetition(thirdcolumn)westillpresentedthemthepossibilityofsigningthepetition(fourthcolumn).ThehigherNsforwillingnesstoSMSinthefifthcolumn(e.g.,538and3017)arearesultofsubjectrefusals toanswerthepetitionquestions(wherecorre‐spondingNsarelower:528and3008).Thatis,ifasubjectrefusedtoanswerpetitionquestions,westillaskedaboutSMSandfewersubjectsdeclinedtoanswerSMSquestions.Also,theNsdecreaseinthe“SentSMS”con‐dition(relativeto“WillingtoSMS”)becauseweonlycalculateSentSMSforsubjectswhoownedaphone.
50
Figure 1: The Value of the Control if Government was Named
Calculationofcontrolvalueifithadspecifiedgovernmentusinginformationfromsurveys.
.7.7
5.8
.85
.9.9
5%
Su
ppor
ting
Foreign Control Gov (calc.)
Mass MP
Foreign and control show actual values; gov (calc.) estimates the meanfor respondents believing control was government
% Strongly Supporting project by treatment