elections in chile: a loss for the left?

8/9/2019 Elections in Chile: A Loss for the Left?

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Two weeks ago, in a relatively close

run-off election, the center-right

Alianza por Chile coalition edged the

incumbent center-left Concertacin

which has ruled Chile since the returnto democracy in 1990. Progressives who fol-

low Latin American politics are lamenting Chris-

tian Democrat Eduardo Freis loss, fearing it portends

a swing in favor of the regions conservative neoliberal

forces. Some have taken this setback as an indication

that the tide of reformist governments and rising popular

movements across the region has exhausted itself. This

interpretation is awed on many counts.

The Concertacin, led by the Socialist Party and Chris-

tian Democracy, elded Frei, a former president and a

dull candidate who failed to mobilize the needed votes

to stem the right-wing oppositions rst presidential vic-

tory in the post-Pinochet era. The winning candidate,

Sebastin Piera, belonged to the Alianza, which was

formed by Renovacin National (RN), representing themodern and democratic entrepreneurial right, and

Union Democrtic In-

dependiente (UDI), with

origins in the ultra-con-

servative, old oligarchic

and pro-Pinochet elite.

Piera is a member of

Chiles new billionaire

class who beneted

handsomely from the

1980s privatizations

and the pro-business

policies that have fol-

lowed uninterrupted.

Though Piera supported

Elections in chile:

a loss for the left? -- by Rene Rojas, February 3, 2010

Page 14:

massive earth-

quake shatters

myth of chileanexceptionalism:

deep class fault-lines ExposeD


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Solidarity: a socialist, feminist, anti-racist organization

the return to democracy in the countrys 1988 plebiscite, the lead-

ing role of UDI in his coalition, along with his familys ties to the

military regime, have contributed to fears of a democratic reversal

and the beginnings of a new phase of unbridled capitalism gov-erned directly by businessmen.

In the end, Piera, who led all candidates in the rst round with

36% of the vote, beat Frei quite handily in the run-off, reaching

almost 52%. Frei, who disappointed throughout, failed to capi-

talize on the unfading popularity of president Bachelet (SP) and

managed to scramble together 48% in the run-off, compared to

the lowly 29% he received in the rst round. The candidacy of

independent Socialist, Marco Enrquez Ominami or MEO, made

these elections more interesting than past ones. MEO broke from

the Concertacin ranks and obtained just over 20% in the rst

round, having successfully tapped into the current frustration with

Chiles neoliberal model and the Concertacin governments that

have managed it. And, Jorge Arrate, an old-school Socialist (albeit

with strong ties to the Concertacin) ran on the Communist-led

ticket, getting a respectable 6.2% of votes cast. As Arrates votes

were already committed to Frei, the second round largely becamea contest over MEOs followers.

But what do these results really mean? A number of incorrect (or

at best incomplete) conclusions, often stemming from question-

able assumptions about the current regime, have been reached.

Treating Pieras win as simply a win for the right and a defeat

of the center-left fails to clarify what has actually happened in

Chile since 1990 and what direction the country may now movein. What follows is a short analysis of the elections and Chilean

politics in general which might help correct some of the errone-

ous views that have been offered in the aftermath of the January

18 run-off.

1. The loss of the Concertacin should not be viewed in

terms a right wing backlash or reassertion against the re-

gions Pink Tide. The Concertacin has very little to do withthe Pink Tide phenomenon, both in terms of its social bases,

its domestic policies, and its position on hemispheric affairs. It is

with good reason that the US foreign policy establishment views

the Concertacin as the prime exemplar of the good left in Latin

America.


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elections in chile:a loss for the left?

While the Concertacin governments have enjoyed majority elec-

toral support since 1990, business has been a key pillar of the gov-

ernments and their stability. In fact, maintaining business con-

dence is the Concertacins paramount concern. Moreover, it hasruled in an openly exclusionary way. This is best illustrated by its

approach to demands of the Mapuche indigenous minority and

their actions in the south of the country. The coalition govern-

ments of the SP-PPD (party for Democracy, a Socialist Party cre-

ation) CD (Christian Democrat) governments have severely re-

pressed Mapuche communities in their ghts to reclaim land from

forestry and energy companies, many of them multinationals. In

fact, the government has deployed its repressive apparatuses un-

der the guise of a Pinochet era anti-terrorist law. And it has done

so quite effectively, imprisoning scores of activists and killing not

a few.

The regime also excludes large chunks of the working class from

even formal incorporation. Recent estimates show that well over

half of Chilean workers are under-employed, informally employed

or generally employed in jobs considered precarious. The per-

centage of workers in unions and those covered by collectivelybargained contracts have actually shrunk since 1990, from 10%

and 12.5%, to 8.5% and 11%, respectively. This should come as

no surprise as under the current regime, Pinochets regressive la-

bor law remains in effect. To this day, industrial unionism is not

allowed (workers can only bargain at the rm level) and the broad

layers of informal and subcontracted workers enjoy no legal pro-

tections. Similarly, the peasants have not only failed to recover the

land which the 1967-1973 land reform process granted them andwhich the coercion of the market or the military took away, small-

holders continue to lose their lands to highly capitalized export

farmers and transnational food conglomerates. The recent worries

expressed by Concertacionista Viera-Gallo that Piera might opt

for repression when dealing with Mapuche grievances is nothing

short of absurd. When adjudicating between claims on natural re-

sources disputed between indigenous communities and large capi-

tal, the Concertacin consistently responded with brutal coercionagainst the Mapuche!

The Concertacin has pursued unadulterated Pinochet era neo-

liberal policies. Privatizations advanced dramatically under Alwyn

and Frei (rst two Concertacin administrations), services contin-

ue to by decentralized or municipalized (and thus severely un-


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derfunded), prior privatizations and municipalizations (eg Social

Security and education) were not revised, despite their huge social

costs and wide disapproval, and large multinationals continue toenjoy the most favorable conditions, often at the expense of lo-

cal communities. Besides the situation in Mapuche territory, this

is best exemplied by the Pascua Lama mining project. Annual

growth rates in Chile, which are higher than the regional average,

remain predicated on the export of agricultural and extractive

commodities, namely fruit and copper. There has been a signi-

cant improvement in terms of poverty reduction and alleviation,

as the Concertacin has implemented World Bank-style targeted,

means-tested welfare programs.

While poverty has been reduced, the social problems that afict

Chilean society are not too far beneath the surface. They are in-

creasingly exposed and everyday move closer to the point of erup-

tion. Chile has become one of the most unequal societies in the

world and large sectors are losing their patience. The explosion

of the students movement in 2005-2006 shows this as do other

smaller and more local struggles. Along with the persistent Mapu-che movement, the huge 2007 wildcat strikes by sub-contracted

miners, and the persistent shanty debtors protests, are clear indi-

cators of the potential for large-scale social unrest.

Some, not least of all the formerly ruling politicians themselves,

argue that the Concertacins hands have been tied by the rules

Workers at Chiles Chuquicamata copper mine wait during a gen-

eral assembly at the start of a strike in Calama, on January 4.


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left in place by Pinochet and the constraining effects of interna-

tional competition. But there is little truth to the notion that top

Concertacin policy makers reluctantly pursued a strict neoliberal

agenda. The fact is that they have championed free-market poli-cies, even to the point of glorifying Pinochet. Asked about the dic-

tators contribution to Chilean development, Alejandro Foxley, a

leading Concertacionista economic manager, and more recently

Bachelets Foreign Minister, stated without inching:

Pinochet carried out a transformation, particularly of the

Chilean economy, which is the most important change

of the century. He deserves credit for anticipating the

globalization process... We have to acknowledge his vi-

sionary capacity for opening our economy to the world,

decentralizing, deregulating, etc. this is a historic contri-

bution that which will endure for many decades in Chile...

Moreover, he passes the test for what it means to make

history, for he ended up changing the lives of all Chileans,

for good, not for bad. This is my opinion and it situates

Pinochet in a high place in Chilean history.

This is not the position of a renegade member of the Concertacin.

Foxley, a former critic of neoliberalism, is a leading voice in the

coalition. Such praise of and commitment to Pinochets counter-

reforms are dening feature of its program, one which all leading

members share, Christian Democrats and Socialists alike.

The Concertacin is one of Washingtons most trusted allies in

South America. Along with Mexico, Columbia, Peru, and (now) thecoup regime in Honduras, Chile is a stalwart friend of the US in

its moves against the countries and regional alliances that seek

continental integration and more independence vis-a-vis Wash-

ington. This unabashed move into the USs sphere of domination

was deepened under CD-SP leadership. Lets not forget that former

president and SP member Michelle Bachelet was Defense Minister

under Lagos and helped cement this close relationship from that

position. In fact, Chile has replaced Argentina as the USs carnalally in the Southern Cone. This all happened under the Concert-

acin.

While publically Chile projects an image of neutrality in disputes

between the regions radical populist regimes and governments

advancing US interests, Chiles role under the Concertacin has


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been far from impartial. In the 2005 Mar de Plata Summit, where

Washingtons proposed FTAA was denitively defeated, the head of

state that most fervently promoted this neocolonization scheme,

after Mexicos ultra-conservative Vicente Fox, was Ricardo Lagos,the SP president who preceded Bachelet. Further, Chiles national

security forces are highly integrated into US projects, both in terms

of military strategy and weapons systems, a development, to re-

peat, that Bachelet facilitated. While foreign policy under Piera

might be more openly aligned with US strategic interests, it will be

marked by basic continuity.

2. Politically and socially, Chile has changed dramatically

since the end of the military regime. The transition and return

to (low-intensity) democracy shifted the content of class politics,

political fault-lines and terms of debates. It is wrong to view these

elections through pre-1990 lenses that pit right v. (center) left,

dictatorship v. democracy, unbridled exploitation v. social justice.

These old lines of demarcation are today almost irrelevant. A facile

conclusion is to state that Pieras election is a defeat of democ-

racy and a return to power by THE right. In fact, in Chiles elections

since the end of the dictatorship, two right wings have competed,both promoting a limited form of democracy and neoliberal poli-

cies. Surprisingly, many historic left gures, such as Manuel Ca-

bieses, founder of Punto Final, a newspaper that used to be very

close to the MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement), asked leftists to

hold their noses and vote for Frei, the lesser evil, in the run-off, in

a desperate effort to prevent the pro-Pinochet, anti-human rights

monstrous RIGHT from regaining power. While the RN-UDI Alian-

za is right-wing, and is composed largely of Pinochet-era mon-sters, it is impossible to characterize the Concertacin alternative

as anything but right-wing. This framing of the contest, its rhetoric

and the fear it appeals to have been used to get popular sectors to

vote for and defend the neoliberal policies of the Concertacin, the

other Right.

3. The Concertacin lost not because the right has enjoyed

any kind of surge in popular support. In fact, the vote to-tal of the RN-UDI Alianza did not surpass their totals in the 1999

and 2005 run-offs. Indeed, the votes for the right have remained

fairly stable since the Yes vote (for prolonging Pinochets regime)

in the 1988 plebiscite obtained 44%. This does mean that non-

Concertacin right has real, substantial, and enduring electoral

support. But is also suggests that the Concertacin lost mainly for


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internal reasons, because it has exhausted itself as a political op-

tion (for now). People have not moved increasingly to the right;

they have abandoned the Concertacin for failing to deliver on

the expectations of change; they are simply fed-up with its anti-popular policies, its epidemic corruption, the grotesque bickering

over resources and positions by its unsavory and elitist political

class, and its growing clientelistic practices. Analysts are correct

to point out that the Concertacin has squandered the political

capital it began its rule with in 1990. They had managed to eke

out victories by exploiting the specter of a restoration of military

rule, fear of which was not unreasonable coming out of a 16 year

brutal dictatorship. Today, however, they are a shaken and weak-

ened, if not spent, force, and this appeal to peoples basic desire

for democracy and human rights has lost its efcacy.

The Concertacin just barely squeezed by in the last two elec-

tions. It was only a matter of time before its marketing would

prove ineffective in the content-less popularity contests that elec-

tions have become. Since there has been basic agreement be-

tween both rights in Chilean politics, the elections have been gov-

erned primarily by personalities. In fact, Chile can be said to haveanticipated the US ruling elites Obama ploy in 2005 by offering

Michelle Bachelet to a disillusioned public. The Concertacin had

nothing to offer programmatically so it came up with a seemingly

down-to-earth single mother (albeit one that hobnobbed with top

US and Chilean brass) that the female electorate could identify

with, and a former political prisoner who might appeal to the

sentiments of the left and democrats in general, to boot. At the

time, the Chilean electorate found her to be more simptica thanher opponent and she won in a close race. In fact, her popularity

has only grown since then, despite her disastrous handling of two

key crisesthe student movement and the restructuring of San-

tiagos transit system. Yet her high approval ratings (80%) did not

help the Concertacins fortunes this time around. Between a grey

Frei whom people associate with the worst of the current po-

litical class and the internal bickering of a Concertacin which is

increasingly removed from the everyday lives of Chileans andPiera someone who seems to have a more dynamic personal-

ity this time around they found the latter more simpatico. Frei

obtained 200,000 fewer votes than previous Concertacin candi-

dates summoned in past run-offs. A fraction of a third candidate

Marco Enrquez Ominamis votes were enough to get Piera over

the hump.


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4. The institutions of the current Chilean regime are de-signed to be as exclusive as possible. And the Concertacin

has hardly tried to correct this in spite of its claims. When discuss-

ing this point, most observers emphasize the most blatant arrange-ments left in place by Pinochet, like the designated senators which

have historically stacked the Senate in favor of the pro-Pinochet

right. This is certainly a residue that must be eliminated. But far

more effective in reducing real democracy are the binomial elec-

toral rules. This system has allowed a powerful party elite (from

both camps) essentially to decide the makeup of Congress even

before elections or primaries take place. It has given party boss-

es huge amounts of power and has removed popular sectors as

far as possible from real decision-making. It has also effectively

excluded small, third parties from having a voice on the nation-

al scene. To date, this institutional conguration has served both

political blocs quite well. They have been able to govern through

this regime with impressive stability, despite its exclusionary char-

acter. Nevertheless, there are rumblings from down below which

the elites from both sides will take note of. It remains to be seen

whether the disenchantment among workers, students, shanty-

dwellers, the Mapuche, etc. will be able to breakthrough this insti-tutional stranglehold that both rights currently have on the Chil-

ean political system or whether, following these elections, elites

will nd ways to x the institutions and keep them working in

their exclusive favor.

In short, the post-Pinochet regime stands atop an institutional ar-

rangement that is designed to exclude. In fact, the Concertacin

has quite comfortably co-existed and even co-ruled with the Alian-za opposition. And there will be many Concertacin forces now

calling for a more formalized power-sharing deal with the Alianza,

a pact resembling the Social Democratic-Christian Democratic

Punto Fijo pact that reigned in Venezuela from 1958 until the rise

of Chavez. One of the effects of such exclusionary political prac-

tices and institutions has been an increasingly alienated electorate,

a development that could only hurt the incumbents and help the

Alianza. Only two thirds of eligible voters registered to vote in therst round and over one sixth of those didnt even bother to show

up. Uncharacteristically, abstention actually increased slightly in

the run-off. In the end, Piera, similar to victorious candidates be-

fore him, won with less than 30% of the eligible voters. Most alien-

ated from the electoral politics are young people, representing

more than half of unregistered voters. And among working class


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youth, things are even worse. The apparent apathy and resignation

that the exclusionary character of the post-1990 regime has bred

is a problem that the radical left will have to address.

5. A critical question: What opportunities, if any, does this

outcome present for the radical left and organized popular

sectors? If the Concertacin is not to be counted among the new

Pink governments in Latin America, does its loss signify an open-

ing for the social forces that back Evo Morales in Bolivia and Hugo

Chavez in Venezuela? Better yet, does its failure create opportu-

nities for a truly independent left and the emergence of vibrant,

autonomous struggles from below? Many have suggested just the

opposite, arguing that a return to power by the Right will mean a

closing of spaces for political participation and a further clamping

down on the struggles that are just beginning to gather steam. This

is a pretty dominant view among sections of the left linked to the

Communist Party of Chile. In fact, the 6-7% of the electorate that

voted for the Commu-

nist candidate in the

A student during the

protests known asthe Penguin Revolu-

tion of 2006. The sign

mocks Bachelets slo- gan, I am with you

on the left -- it says

You can sell your kid-ney to pay for your ed-

ucation on the right.


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page 10


rst round wholeheartedly supported Frei in the run off for this

very reason. In exchange for this support, the Communists and its

allies were ceded three congressional seats by the Concertacin.

The logic behind such a deal with Christian Democrat and Social-ist Party neoliberals is that it keeps the Right at bay while simul-

taneously giving the Left a parliamentary foothold. However, for

the reasons listed above, this position is unconvincing. Having the

Concertacin in ofce does no more to level the political playing

eld for the anti-capitalist left. And tying the success of the left to

the fortunes of the neoliberal Concertacin seems doomed to fail.

Others saw in the rst round candidacy of Marco Enrquez Omin-

ami (MEO) a promising development that can be built upon. MEO,

the biological (but certainly not ideological) son of legendary MIR

founder Miguel Enrquez, broke off from the Concertacin and

launched his campaign promising a new and more democratic

way of doing politics. His demagogic campaign was indeed more

dynamic and his new face and style won him an unprecedented

20% of the vote. Yet, while many saw in him a left gure, who not

only was stirring things up in a stagnant and decomposing Con-

certacin but was also offering a real left alternative, the fact is thatprogrammatically MEO offered nothing of substance. If anything,

despite his attacks on business as usual represented by both com-

peting camps, he represented certain continuity with the neolib-

eral model, as his irting with further privatization of the copper

industry indicates. More realistically, his vote tally is a sign of the

general and directionless frustration with the Concertacin rather

than the beginning of a new movement. His campaign should be

seen as a maneuver by a disaffected yet nonetheless establish-ment Concertacionista intended to improve his bargaining power.

In the end, a third of his supporters voted for Piera, supplying

the numerical margin which the Alianza right needed to win this

time around. That his campaign mobilized a motley collection of

opportunists and malcontents, and the eclectic nature of his plat-

form belies the notion that MEO might somehow head a new left

alternative in Chile.

In my opinion, the Concertacins defeat does represent an op-

portunity for the anti-capitalist left, even if signicant dangersexist. This is not because a Piera victory will make things that

much worse for the masses, awakening them and channeling

them into militant action. Not only is such a view morally repug-

nant, it is, in the Chilean case, unrealistic. Material conditions will


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not change signicantly as the Alianza will in all likelihood con-

tinue the social-liberal policies of its predecessor. The moment

may be favorable for the radical left because the shifts and re-po-

sitioning that take place within the Concertacin may weaken theconstraining links that the Socialist Party (and even the Christian

Democrats) has with labor and popular sectors. The Concertacin

will do everything in its power to prevent this, yet given the in-

ghting and cannibalism among its leaders, it may not be able to.

Still, it will make every effort to pull MEO and his followers back

in and to re-distribute power quotas in order to please the entire

coalition, keep it as intact as possible, and minimize disruption

to the overall political order. If this is achieved, the Concertacin

will present itself as a loyal and constructive opposition and en-

ter into a alternating power-sharing arrangement with the Alianza,

further entrenching the elite and undemocratic nature of the post-

Pinochet regime. If this outcome does in fact materialize, Chilean

politics will bear resemblance to Mexicos following the defeat of

the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party, which ruled for 70 years

until the new century). Since 2000, the PRI has refashioned itself

and now is poised to recover power from the other dominant and

neoliberal party, the PAN (National Action Party), in 2012. In Chile,the Concertacin, if it rebuilds successfully, will try to come back

in four years, possibly with simptica Bachelet as its candidate. If

this occurs as party bosses envision, prospects for the radical left

will remain very difcult.

However, the disruptions that the electoral defeat will inevitably

produce inside the formerly ruling coalition should allow its la-

tent loss of legitimacy to translate into real action and oppositionby workers and popular movements that escape the binding and

demobilizing effects of the Concertacin. Many sectors of the So-

cialist Party Allendes party for instance, will nally realize

that substantive change will never come from within the coalition.

We can expect them to return to their roots and replant them-

selves in the workers and popular struggles that have until now

been (mostly) effectively ignored by ruling institutions. Having

been convinced of the bankruptcy and futility of the Concertacin,the departure of these groups can have a positive effect on the

reconguration of a real left in Chile. This tendency will be more

pronounced to the extent that the CD continues to fragment, pull-

ing factions to the right.

Naturally, such prospects depend primarily on the reemergence

of stronger and larger struggles by independent movements. With


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the Concertacin monkey of their backs the threat of a return of

the Right having nally materialized rank and lers, Mapuche

activists, and community organizers have little reason to temper

their demands and actions. In this context, and with the control-ling nature of the post-Pinochet regime in question, we should see

a multiplication and intensication of struggles from below. These

struggles will be the building blocks that will reconstruct a real

anti-capitalist left in Chile, one that will ght both Rights, the Con-

certacin and the Alianza. They will redraw the lines of demarca-

tion of a new class politics and they will rely on their own efforts,

rather than the hollow promises of the center-left, to restore real

justice and democracy in Chile.

Fortunately, there are political formations in Chile that have this

outlook. The Movimiento de los Pueblos y los Trabajadores (MPT

the Workers and Peoples Movement) is an effort to regroup and

rebuild revolutionary socialism from below and through the cre-

ation of independent working class power. Facing the alternating

power of elites, it is necessary to build up an alternative from be-

low and in all disputed terrains of the class struggle, states activ-

ist/writer Andres Figueroa, a member of the MPT. Cor- r e c t l y


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viewing the Concertacin and Alianza as two sides of the same

neoliberal coin, he adds:

Its true that after a long retreat, organic and politicaldecomposition, despair and depression, anti-capitalist

socialism just now is beginning to write the prologue to

the reconstruction of its leadership among workers and

popular sectors. This will be done slowly, with audac-

ity, and, at the same time, giving condence, clarity, and

strength to the future agents of the deep, independent,

and popular change that the vast majority of Chileans

demand. For this reason, its main tasks are participating

in the genuine struggles and movements of the working

class, and dynamically and comprehensively broadening

the anti-capitalist struggles of indigenous communities,

women, environmentalists and the queer community.

To the extent that the post-1990 regime has been shaken and

openings will present themselves for increasing active popular

struggles, and to the extent that the a new generation of anti-capi-

talist activists and movements follow the advice of groups like theMPT, the prospects for a genuine radical left in Chile may improve.


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massive earthquake shattersmyth of chilean exceptionalism:

deep Class Faultlines ExposedBy Rene Rojas -- March 3, 2010

Only a month and a half after a powerful earthquake laid waste

to Haiti, the most oppressed country in the western hemisphere,

Chile, supposedly Latin Americas most advanced, was hit by a

even stronger tremor.

In the early hours of Saturday morning, when the country was

still deep in sleep, a quake measuring 8.8 on the Richter scale, 500

times more potent that the one that ravaged Port-au-Prince, rocked

the central regions of Chile. The seismic movement occurred miles

off the Chiles coastline and its impact was forcefully felt in an arc

reaching the capital Santiago and beyond to the north, Valdivia,

where the piers were destroyed, to the South, and as far as BuenosAires to the east. The seventh (Talca) and eighth (Concepcin) re-

gions were particularly hard hit.

After initial reports that seriously underestimated the quakes dev-

astation, gradually it has become apparent that the country has

suffered an enormous social and infrastructural toll. Moreover, the

quake has starkly revealed the exclusionary side of Chiles much

touted neoliberal experiment.

Inevitably, as the extent of the destruction is gauged and states

response is evaluated, comparisons with Haiti have surfaced. In

most instances, Chile is pointed to as a model in earthquake pre-

paredness and subsequent relief efforts. Even progressive seis-

mologist Roger Bilham, appearing on Democracy Now, referred to

Chiles handling of the disaster as a tremendous success story. He

added that earthquake-resistant construction prevails throughout

Chile and that they have an intelligent government that enforces

these regulations.

Many of the points being made, such as Chiles more effective

regulation around construction, its stronger and more functional

state, and its overall higher level of development, are certainly val-

id. Yet there are at least three differences we should not lose sight


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Massive Earthquake Shatters Myth of Chilean Exceptionalism:Deep Class Faultlines Exposed

of: 1) the epicenter of Haitis quake was immediately next to its

most populated areas, 2) Chiles epicenter, besides being further

out, was 22 miles beneath the earths surface, whereas as Haitis

was only 5 miles below, and 3) though the earthquake hit Chile inthe middle of the night and Haitis hit in the late afternoon, Chil-

eans, being accustomed to the drill, ran outside, whereas Haitians,

having never experienced an earthquake and their response being

conditioned by hurricanes, had the unfortunate urge to run inside

their deathtrap homes.


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One has to wonder at the outcome if the quake in Chile had been

centered right next to and right beneath Santiagos or Concep-

cins poor neighborhoods. Still, as the disparate death tolls sug-gest (thus far 3000 deaths and missing persons have been reported

in the wake of the Chilean quake), Chile undoubtedly fared much

better. But beneath the more positive assessment lies a grim real-

ity produced by Chiles neoliberal model. The extreme free market

policies inherited from and pursued vigorously since the end of

Pinochets dictatorship have generated catastrophic vulnerabilities

among Chiles working class and have needlessly aggravated the

suffering caused by the earthquake.

Erosion of State Capacity

If the country is no doubt in better shape than Haiti, what the Chil-

ean quake also reveals is that amidst Chiles gloried economic

miracle, there are deep and wide pockets of Haiti-like conditions.

It is estimated that out of a total population of 17 million people,

at least one million families have lost their homes. Half a million

homes have been completely destroyed. Another one to two mil-lion have been seriously damaged. By comparison, it is estimated

that the Haitian quake left one million people homeless out of a

total population of ten million. To this day in Chile, there is no

plan in place to provide these people with proper housing. The

government simply has no contingency plans in place to respond.

While the state is functional, it has been stripped of its capacity

to act in such circumstances after decades of religiously pursuing

neoliberal policies.

In fact, president Bachelets rst appeal to the Chilean people was

to be positive. More recently, president-elect Piera has pulled a

wholly inadequate plan out of his ass. According to reports, his

Levantemos Chile or Lets Pick Chile Up plan relies on the soli-

darity of the business world. Since then, relief plans have focused

on private donations by way of Sabado Gigante host Don Fran-

ciscos well known telethons and the charity of Chiles new crop ofmillionaires. So much for the Chilean states much touted seismic

preparedness. That the state was caught off guard and in a state of

paralysis was demonstrated by the initial almost laughable discus-

sions about whether to declare the affected zones as disaster ar-

eas eligible for state resources. Further, the top brass of the armed

forces is claiming that it took days to receive orders to mobilize for


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page 17


relief.

The stripping of the social functions of the state is apparent in the

failures of the Tsunami detection and alert systems. Though thenavy is now claiming that it did indeed activate its alarm system,

the fact is that residents of coastal towns received no ofcial warn-

ing, much less help evacuating. When the Tsanamis hit a few hours

after the quake, they washed away entire shing and beach com-

munities like Constitucin, Curanipe, Pelluhue, and Dichato, and

even partially obliterated industrial ports like Talcahuano, where

the wharfs have been destroyed and 80% of the 180,000 residents

have been left homeless. The people of these towns managed to

save themselves only by following their instincts to head for the

nearby hills. Even then, thousands remain unaccounted for. In

small town of Constitucin alone, at least 350 were swallowed by

the sea. Thousands of artisanal shermen have lost their means of

subsistence with no safety net to fall back on.

The loss of the states regulatory capacity is evident in the dam-

age to newly built middle class high-rise condominiums. Over the

past ten years, Chile experienced its own housing boom. Many ofthe newly constructed buildings were 15-25 story condominiums

aimed at young professionals. A walk across Nuoa (a trendy mid-

dle class neighborhood in central Santiago), for instance, makes

you feel like youre in the middle of an inverted Tetris game. They

have sprouted like mushrooms. These building are allegedly built

to withstand powerful quakes, even exceeding strict construction

codes.

So far, reports are that they fared well. In his NYT op-ed, Santiago

Stands Firm, architecture professor Sebastin Gray gave the coun-

try the highest marks suggesting that our height of civilization ex-

plains why of the thousands of contemporary mid- to high-rises in

Santiago and Concepcin, most were able to withstand the quake

with only cosmetic damage, if any. Thank the stringent building

codes and responsible building practices that have existed heresince the devastating earthquakes of 1939 and 1960, which lev-

eled many older structures. In his view, the few modern structures

[and highway overpasses] that crumbled were spectacular excep-

tions, that is, the few bad yet unrepresentative rotten apples.

I suspect, however, that this is not quite accurate. One of these


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page 18


brand new buildings toppled over completely in Concepcin, kill-

ing dozens of residents. The bodies of sixty to 100 people are said

to be buried in the rubble; the gure would have been higher, but

it had only recently opened and had not reached full occupancy.This building was billed as the height of structural quality and

safety; on February 27 it snapped in two like a matchstick.

A similar two year old building in the Maipu district of the capital

collapsed. Another, built by the same company responsible for the

Concepcin deathtrap, has been quietly vacated by ofcials in the

Nuoa district. Reports are emerging of other hushed evacuations.

The cosmetic damage reported by Gray seems to be widespread

and irreparable structural disrepair. In Nuoa, at least one resident

reported that the foundational underground beams had been com-

pressed into Ss like putty.

Im willing to bet this is the case with a number of these new build-

ings. Its unconceivable that the construction companies did not

cut corners in this unbridled race to erect these buildings. And one

can only speculate the degree to which the endemic corruption

that characterizes the ruling Concertacin political coalition in-cluded inspectors and regulators who took bribes to look the other

way. It is a well known fact that infrastructure concessions were

granted in ways that beneted state brokers who cut protable

deals with contractors. These arrangements favor the pockets of

ofcials over the safety of consumers.

The day after the earthquake, a progressive bishop from Rancagua,

a city just south of Santiago, was the lone voice denouncing thesecorrupt practices: for a few pesos, men have evaded the law and

have built buildings in a seismic zone that are not made to with-

stand earthquakes. So far, this phenomenon has received little

media attention, though, as if anticipating what might come, the

housing minister warned that the government would not hesitate

to prosecute companies that violated building codes. I wont at all

be surprised if in the coming weeks scandals start to emerge. It

seems the degree of relaxation of the proud building standardsof this country lamented by Gray, far from being exceptional, is

widespread indeed.

In addition, entire sections of hospitals have collapsed.

Talcas public hospital is illustrative. In of the neediest cities, the


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page 19


hospital has been forced to operate outdoors. Already suffering

a systemic crisis, hospitals such as thesethe very ones that the

poor depend onhave been put out of commission in spite of

having been built in theory to withstand severe quakes. The dev-astation of hospitals explains why, after days of denial and then

ambivalence, the Chilean government is nally pleading for inter-

national aid in the form of eld hospitals.

Of course, the most vulnerable of the population will probably re-

ceive the least assistance from the state. Peruvian immigrants in

Santiago, for instance, have been particularly hard hit. In recent

years, tens of thousands of Peruvians have migrated to Chile to

work as construction workers, restaurant workers, domestic work-

ers, and in the informal market. They basically live in the shadows.

Many had settled in the old quarters of Santiago center. These con-

tain the buildings most affected in the capital. Ive gotten sporadic

reports of old brick and adobe buildings collapsing on families. As

these people live semi-clandestine lives in Chile, getting an accu-

rate account of the damage theyve suffered will be difcult. Worse

still, they do not have the inuence to get the help they need at a

time like this.

Proto-Class War?

There are interesting reports of looting coming out of Chile fol-

lowing the quake [see video: http://cnn.com/video/?/video/

world/2010/02/28/st.claire.chile.aftermath.cnn]. Like a small tsu-

nami, these people, Chiles working class, are doing what is nec-

essary to obtain the milk, food, diapers, water, medicine, and gas-- the fuel everyone relies on for cooking and heating -- they need

to survive.

And of course, they are being

met with repression. Reports

of people taking these basic

necessities have been ac-

companied by the obligatoryaccounts of looters taking

advantage of the situation to

pillage TVs and appliances.

The right-wing (UDI) mayor

of Concepcin made hys-

terical declarations about in-


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page 20


dependent shop keepers defending their modest patrimony with

shotguns from tumultuous bands of thugs. Another mayor of the

region has exhorted cops to shoot to kill. Reminiscent of Katrina,

there seems to be a campaign to create a certain political climate.(The underlying message seems to be that poor mothers may, per-

haps, have the right to feed their children, but when the rabble

tries to enjoy the comforts of modern technology, they are cross-

ing the line.)

Its not clear how much if any popular organization there is in

these attempts to obtain food and confront the police. Though

some reported that the looters were more organized (than what?),

most of it appears pretty spontaneous.


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What is clear is that the state is responding with a heavy hand.

Even before the troops were deployed, the police, programmed

from years of putting down street demonstrations, responded to

the crowds by ring tear gas canisters and aiming their high pow-ered water tanks at the looters. Further, and most interesting, it

seems that the state decided on this response after meeting with

the top supermarket and retail executives. These industry heads

demanded and got a meeting with Bachelet and her interior minis-

ter, Perez Yoma, a powerful Concertacion cacique, when they saw

that people were taking matters into their own hands.

Besides Carabineros, Chiles national police force, Bachelet decid-

ed to send in the armed forces. Troops have been deployed to Con-

cepcion, Temuco and other affected cities and towns as I write this.

Another outcome of the meeting was a curfew that rst imposed in

Concepcin from 9pm to 6am, and later extended to other towns

and longer hours. Naturally, these measures will be presented as

an effort to guarantee the delivery of goods in an orderly fashion.

The government has already announced distribution of a basket

of basic goods for those that behave.


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What the episode makes clear is who calls the shots in Chile. At-

tention to this issue did not emerge until business forcefully raised

its concerns. The state will now take minor steps to distributesome goods to the affected poor. But the main message of its ac-

tions was that it immediately stepped up to make sure that the pri-

vate property of the huge retailers, and their fundamental power

to shape the distribution of commodities, would not be threatened

even when the goods will probably go bad or be thrown away.

Bringing in the Military

Apparently, the story is more complicated than cops being over-

whelmed and then the army being sent at the behest of business

leaders, though this is certainly part of it.

Sunday morning, as people woke up in Concepcin only one day

after the quake, they immediately headed to the new mega-mar-

kets (WalMart types) to take advantage of this opportunity to ac-

quire the goods they usually have trouble acquiring. At that time,

the Carabineros, the national police force, ALLOWED women to goand get what was needed. I imagine this was the result of two fac-

tors: a) their fear of the enraged poor, b) their own popular origins,

and c) their sympathetic inability to turn away masses of mothers

at a moment like this.

Two things happened at this point. First, things did get out of hand.

They were unable to do this in an orderly fashion. When people

heard what was happening, they rushed over. Young men in par-ticular started riling things up, liberally taking and distributing all

kinds of goods to those gathered. Second, and more importantly,

the retail and supermarket executivess got wind of this unaccept-

able reality--cops ALLOWING workers to take was they needed!--

and it was at this point that they held their meeting with Bachelet,

a meeting that is no longer being reported in the news.

Helped by the sensationalist harangues of Concepcions mayor,Bachelet and Perez Yoma at that point acceded to business de-

mand to send in the army. At this point, most of the affected towns

of the South have been heavily militarized. There are now 11,000

troops in Concepcin alone! Their treatment of local residents

has been extremely violent and arbitrary. Scenes of soldiers de-

taining and pointing their guns at workers are reminiscent of the


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page 23


militarys behavior after the 1973 coup. Yet this time, the Socialist

Party is squarely behind the repression. Bachelet and other heads

of the SP have thrown their full weight behind these measures;

indeed, they ordered them!

The New York Times reporting on this is confused (whats new?).

But law enforcement authorities, heeding the cries of

residents that they lacked food and water, eventually

settled on a system that allowed staples to be taken but

not televisions and other electronic goods. Ms. Bachelet

announced that the government had reached a deal with

supermarket chains to give away food to needy residents.

Her aides also called on residents not to hoard gas or food,

both of which were being bought up in huge amounts by

residents fearful of shortages.

The settlement allowing staples to be taken was the on the ground

reality before the meeting. Since then, its hard to imagine that the

supermarket chains agreed to give away food. By Sunday night,

there were 1300-1500 troops on the streets of Concepcion. 2000+were deployed to the region. By this Monday morning 160+ resi-

dents of Concepcion had been arrested for looting. The following

day, up to 100 more were arrested. Its hard to imagine that you

would need such a militarization and that so many people would

have to be forcefully apprehended if the big supermarkets were

giving away food. In fact, I have found no reports of these super-

market chains fullling their part of the alleged deal.

The repressive logic of the militarization has even hampered res-

cue efforts. As the NYT reported, reghters in Concepcion were

about to lower a rescuer deep into the rubble when the scent of

tear gas red at looters across the street forced them to interrupt

their efforts. Warding off looters obviously took priority over sav-

ing lives! Yet, as the high numbers of detainees on Tuesday sug-

gests, the looters did not back down without rst making their

point. When the states hardware prevented them from redistrib-uting goods from the megastores, they rst set them ablaze before

relinquishing the streets.

Part of the motivation of some of the looters was a shapeless class

rage aimed precisely at emptying these stores. People know that

they, their families and their neighbors dont have access to this


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stuff, so the idea for a minority of the looters is to take everything

(or at least leave nothing), even if they cant directly consume it

all. Better to have the stuff in their control, in their neighborhoods,

rather than on the shelves of closed supermarkets.

Targeting the Point of Consumption

The earthquake exposed a basic reality of todays Chile. There are

the millions of working people who have been systematically ex-

cluded from/by the current development model. What you see in

the faces of the thousands of people looting is desperation to se-

cure the goods needed for daily survival. Vast chunks of Chiles

working class live day to day in the most precarious conditions.

People have gone days without eating, said Orlando Salazar, one

of the looters at the supermarket. The only option is to come here

and get stuff for ourselves. He said this only 24 hours after the

quake.

His exaggeration reected more than the hyperbole that these ca-

lamities evoke; workers in Concepcin, and throughout Chile, ex-

perience chronic deprivation. Ironically, the quake offered themthe opportunity to obtain the food, water, etc., which under normal

circumstances they are not sure to come by. The quake has thus

revealed the daily and basic material uncertainty that neoliberal-

ism has produced for large swaths of the working class in Chile.

Whereas popular attempts by Haitians to cover their basic necessi-

ties (which were also met with guns) represented a collective sense

of abandonment and were organized to address needs commu-nally, in Chile the looting reects an paroxysmal reaction by des-

perate workers grabbing a small piece of what one of the worlds

most unequal societies denies them on a daily basis. Moreover, as

these workers who survive in the informal economy have at best a

precarious foothold in formal labor markets, their grievances are

far more likely to explode against sites of consumption and dis-

tribution rather than at the point of production. At the same time,

the neoliberal state will increasingly respond to the exacerbationof social problems through the barrel of the gun.

A return to class politics?

A nal question involves what political developments we might

expect following the earthquake. Here are very brief comments.


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page 25


For one, I think that the disaster will tend to bolster the current

regime in Chile. The two competing alliances will confront this

situation with common language and policies. This is clear in their

shared desire for and appreciation of the militarized response.This will tend to reinforce their power-sharing arrangements and

lock in their hold on governing institutions.

On the other side of the political ledger, unfortunately, things are

not too encouraging. Unlike in Haiti, there are no strong move-

ments and popular organizations that we can expect to be reacti-

vated and to make coherent and defensible demands on the state.

Instead, we might see the initial building blocks of new move-

ments as people organize to address their basic needs and to re-

spond to the states inefcacy and/or class bias in reconstruction

efforts. Unfortunately the radical left is so weakened, that they will

be unable to play a very important and constructive role when and

if these ghts emerge. Given this layout of political forces, its hard

to imagine that the very real class rage that exists in Chile will be

channeled into a coherent and purposeful radical class agenda.

But, on a more promising note, people may be more open to in-dependent class politics as they directly experience the states


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page 26


blatant anti-popular and exclusionary response to the earthquake.

The repression of ordinary folks trying to feed their families alone

is denitely going to piss more than a few off. As their daily rou-

tines are disrupted, they will be thrust into new struggles and beopen to new analyses. Already there are signs that people are turn-

ing to self-organization. As one Santiago resident warned: Soon,

people are going to start organizing and demanding that [ofcials]

fulll the many promises they have made on television and radio.

There could be a repeat of the popular response to the 1985 Mexi-

co City earthquake, when people, left to fend for themselves, orga-

nized relief and reconstruction efforts on a community and neigh-

borhood basis. This self-activity of workers and the urban poor

was one of the factors that fed into the mass mobilizations and

insurgent movements that exploded during the ensuing decade. If

the small and till now marginal left can step in and provide a bit of

direction to incipient post-earthquake organizing efforts in Chile,

there may be promising baby steps in the right direction.


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page 27


Rene Rojas is an activist in New York City.

These articles frst appeared on the Solidarity website:

www.solidarity-us.org


28/28

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