election upsets, who’s next?

Election upsets, who’s next?

Bert Colijn, ING Economics Department 20 April 2017Amsterdam, +31 (0)6 30 656 223

Assessing socio-economic problems and the populist vote

Table of contents

Summary of situation – 3

Perceptions about socio-economic situation – 5

Developments in socio-economic situation – 9

Sentiment about key election themes – 17

Summary and implications - 23

Socio-economic conditions in Italy suggest an election upset more than in France

2

In the past year, election upsets seem to have become the norm. In the US presidential election, the EU-referendum in the UK, the Ukraine referendum in the Netherlands and the constitution referendum in Italy, a vote against the establishment prevailed. In the recent Dutch elections, the populist Freedom Party gained seats in parliament and became the second largest party. Factors such as globalisation, European institutions, and immigration and integration were key themes in most of the votes.

A common factor among populist voters is that there are higher percentages of them among the lesser educated, those with lower income and the elderly, although these percentages differ across countries.

With elections in France, Germany, Italy and the UK coming up, many of the same topics in recent elections and referenda feature prominently in the debate. Especially in France and Italy, the populist vote commands a substantial share in opinion polls. In this report, we find that of those countries, Italy seems to be the most at risk of a populist win given economic conditions and perceptions, with France coming second. While there are many other factors at play that are not related to the economy, this seems to reflect the current polls quite well.

3

Italy seems most susceptible to an anti-establishment vote given the socio-economic developments over the past decade

Italy shows the highest risk of an election upset influenced by socio-economic conditions. Real incomes are still lower than 10 years ago, making this a lost decade for many Italians. The many Italian SMEs have suffered from globalisation. Perception of benefits of participation in the euro and the EU is low, creating a breeding ground for anti-EU parties. Currently, parties with such a stance have a majority in Italian opinion polls.

In France, the popular perception of the standard of living and the economic future is very low. France is no outlier in terms of economic developments for the more vulnerable groups since the crisis, though. The dual labour market is a hot topic, reducing chances for the young. More extreme options have emerged on both the left and the right with Mélenchon and Le Pen, giving the anti-establishment vote a significant share in opinion polls.

The snap elections in the UK will likely result in a victory for the Conservative Party and PM May as they are projected to win additional seats in parliament. The economy has recovered more strongly in the UK than on the continent and although many feel left behind due to low wage growth, poor employment protection and low job security, this is unlikely to cause an election upset this time around.

HIGHER LOWER

Which election poses the highest risk of a populist win, givensocio-economic conditions?

In Germany, economic growth has been exceptional compared to the rest of Europe throughout the crisis years. Especially in 2009-13, Germany outperformed significantly and has since managed to reduce the unemployment rate to 3.9%. Still, underemployment and low wages seem to be simmering issues in Germany. While this is the case, populists in Germany are not gaining ground in opinion polls for the general election in the fall.

Perceptions about thesocio-economic situation

5

Lesser educated have seen their standard of living decrease

Only in Germany have people with lower (up to “primary”) levels of education seen their standard of living improve over the past five years, according to the ING Motivaction Empowerment Report. The gap in perception of standard of living by education category has been large as the higher (“tertiary”) educated have seen a strong improvement over the same period. France and Italy are the exceptions here, but there is also still a large gap in the perception of developments in living conditions.

For the next five years, the view barely changes despite improving economic conditions across Europe. The higher educated areconfident about their standard of living improving in coming years, whereas the less educated think their standard of living will deteriorate further. This is an important gauge of concerns among a large part of the electorate.

Source: ING Motivaction Empowerment Report, 2016

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France Germany Italy Netherlands UK

Ba

lan

ce,

%

Has your standard of living increased in the

past 5 years?

Low education Middle education High education

-60

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0

10

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Will your standard of living increase in the

next 5 years?

Low education Middle education High education

6

Older voters are more pessimistic about the future

By age group, we see a similar pattern as for education. Older voters have perceived their standard of living as having deteriorated everywhere except for in Germany and the UK. While there is a natural bias towards more progress in the standard of living for the young, this still illustrates the concerns that older voters have. Expectations for the future among older voters are particularly low in France, Italy and the Netherlands. Without exception, people in the 55-64 category expect their standard of living to fall in the coming five years.

Source: ING Motivaction Empowerment Report, 2016

-80

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60


Ba

lan

ce,

%

Has your standard of living increased in past

5 years?

18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64

-80

-60

-40

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0

20

40

60


Will your standard of living increase in the

next 5 years?

18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64

7

Confidence of the young and well-educated is structurally higher

In most countries, people with lower incomes are less confident. This also holds for education, with the less educated havinglower confidence than the higher educated. In all countries, we see that the gap in confidence between higher and less educated increased during the crisis years. The UK is a remarkable exception as the confidence of the less educated has increased while that of the higher educated declined ahead of the Brexit vote. There is a clear split in confidence by age group, with the elderly less confident than the young. In recent months this gap has fallen significantly in most countries.

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Gap in confidence between high and low education

Germany France Italy Netherlands UK

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Gap in confidence between 18-24s and 65+s


Source: European Commission, ING Economics

Developments in thesocio-economic situation

9

Real income growth has been weak for years in most countries

The crisis has had a negative impact on incomes throughout Europe. In Italy, real disposable income growth has been negative for the past decade. In the UK and Netherlands, real disposable income has not reached pre-crisis levels. Remarkably, real income growth by education group does not suggest weakest growth for the lesser educated. In fact, this is only the case in Germany, whereas income growth has strengthened significantly in the UK. In Italy, all groups have seen realincome decline significantly, while in the Netherlands all education groups have suffered from the crisis and have not yet reached the pre-crisis peak.

Source: Eurostat, ING Economics

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Real median disposable household income growth: 2008-2015

Low education Medium education High education

10

Equality marginally increased over the crisis years

Inequality is not as bad in Europe as it is in the US, but developments in the Gini coefficient, an often-used indicator of inequality, show that Italy has seen inequality increase in recent years. In the UK, this has not been the case but inequality is still at a higher level than in the large continental European countries. In France, inequality has been decreasing since thepeak of the crisis in 2011 and inequality is now lower than in Germany.

0,25

0,27

0,29

0,31

0,33

0,35

0,37

0,39

0,41

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Gini coefficient

Germany France Italy Netherlands UK USSource: OECD, ING Economics

11

While older generations have seen income grow faster, wealth has been impacted negatively in almost all countries

Over 2010 to 2014 the younger generation has seen their wealth decline significantly. Still, except for Germany, older generations have all seen their assets lose value over the four year period. This can amount to substantial losses though, asolder generations generally have much more to lose than the younger and are closer to retirement or have even retired. This can cause precarious situations, given the dependence on savings.

-100%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

Eurozone Germany France Italy Netherlands

Growth of median inflation adjusted net wealth by age of household reference person (2010 - 2014)

16-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+Source: ECB, ING Economics

12

Unemployment among lesser educated and elderly still much higher than pre-crisis

The lesser-educated generally have the higher unemployment rates, but after the crisis have also faced longer periods of weakness. In France, this is very apparent as unemployment for the lesser educated has continued to rise, while people with high levels of education barely saw an increase in unemployment.

In the UK and Germany, unemployment rates among the lesser educated are low, but the quality of employment is an important topic of discussion in both countries. Zero- or one-hour contracts in the UK and ‘mini jobs’ - which pay below the minimum wage - in Germany frequently pose concern.

Older workers may have lower unemployment rates than the young, but have a harder time getting back to work and, given the end of attractive early retirement regulations in most European countries, finding a job again is often a necessity.

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Unemployment rate, lesser educated


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Unemployment rate, age 50-74


Source: Eurostat

13

Participation has improved, but not for everyone

In France the participation problem is most apparent. As unemployment continues to increase for lesser educated “prime age” workers (aged between 25 and 54), participation is dropping rapidly. We look at prime age participation here, as participation is still increasing for older workers. European countries are stimulating people to work longer through increasingthe pension age and other incentives, masking declines among the younger age groups.

Italy also has not seen participation increase and has very low participation in general. This is not necessarily a sign of economic weakness - female participation is low in Italy, rooted at least partly in culture. Still, the decline in participation for lesser educated “prime age” workers poses concern.

60

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2000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015

Low education participation, age 25-54


Source: Eurostat

45

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65

70

75

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Participation, age 15-74


14

Job security has decreased in most of Europe

An often-mentioned concern for voters is the lack of job security. Not only has the crisis caused people to lose jobs, but contracts that people work under increasingly lack protection for workers. In many European countries the number of temporary contracts has increased, making it easier to let people go and consequently making it more difficult to buy a house. In recent years, especially the Netherlands has seen this number increase substantially. In countries such as the UK, where regular jobs are not highly protected, this is less of an issue,.

0,00

0,50

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6=

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cte

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Employment protection of regular contracts

2008 2013

Source: Eurostat, OECD

0

5

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25

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

% of employees with a temporary contract


15

Manufacturing as a traditional engine of job growth seems over

Manufacturing jobs have been disappearing for decades as technology and outsourcing have significantly reduced the demand for workers in traditional industry, particularly for less educated workers. In Europe, the decline has been largest in traditional manufacturing countries such as Germany and Italy. Still, the percent of all disappearing manufacturing jobs lost to offshoring is highest in the Netherlands. While the amount of jobs lost is not large, the percent lost to globalisation is higher in the Netherlands than elsewhere.

Source: Eurostat, Eurofound

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Manufacturing shares in total employment


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Netherlands Italy UK France Germany

% jobs lost to offshoring out of total jobs lost

in manufacturing

2008-2009 2010-2014 2015-2016 2003-2016

Sentiment on key election themes

17

The image of the EU has taken a hard hit over the past crisis years

Since the crisis, trust in European institutions has decreased, creating scope for anti-euro and anti-EU platforms for populists to campaign on. The image of the EU has been tarnished almost everywhere, but the situation seems to be of most concern in Italy. The proportion of people that think Italy has not benefited from EU membership is much higher than in other countries, at more than 33%. Interestingly, the balance has actually tilted positively, ahead of the EU-referendum in the UK.

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% thinks country has not benefited from EU


Source: Eurobarometer

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Image of the EU - positive or negative


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The image of the euro has divided between countries recently

In recent years Italy has seen support for the euro weaken further, while the number of people that are against the euro has declined significantly in Germany. In the Netherlands, support for the euro is quite low but has stabilized over recent years.

Trust in the European Central Bank has fallen significantly since its inception, particularly over recent crisis years. In Italy, distrust peaked in 2011 and has since come down to levels similar to Germany and France. The largest drop in sentiment took place prior to QE in most countries, surprising given the negative sentiment towards the programme in countries such as the Netherlands and Germany.

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% against the euro

Germany France Italy Netherlands

Source: Eurobarometer

19

Globalisation is perceived particularly negatively in Italy and France

Globalisation has been an important theme in the American presidential elections. The view that Americans did not benefit from globalisation is widely shared in certain parts of American society. In Europe, this view is most prevalent in France and Italy, while in Germany and Netherlands many people think globalisation has been positive for their economies.

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%

Our country’s involvement in the global economy is a …

Good thing Bad thing Don't know

Source: Pew Research

20

Immigration is a top concern for many across Europe

People rank immigration as one of the most immediate problems their country is facing. The percent of people ranking it as a top two concern for their country has increased strongly over the past years and seems closely correlated with the number of people seeking asylum. With the number of asylum applicants having declined since the deal between Turkey and the EU, the number of people ranking this as a top concern has been falling again but is still at elevated levels. Italy, hosting asylumseekers mostly from Africa, has continued to see numbers of asylum seekers increase.

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Note: Immigration concern measured by Eurobarometer question: “Is immigration one of the two most important issues facing our country?”Source: Eurobarometer, Eurostat

Asylum applicants

Immigration concern (right axis)

21

Migration has mostly picked up in Germany though

Migration is more a social issue than an economic one. When looking at immigrants - including economic migrants -accepted into the country, Germany is clearly the country with the highest level of immigration as a proportion of the total population. This matches the large percentage of Germans mentioning immigration as one of the two most important issues facing their country. In France and Italy, the number of immigrants is around just 0.5% of the total population.

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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Immigrants as % of total population

Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) France Italy Netherlands United Kingdom

Source: Eurostat

Summary and implications

23

Different problems across Europe cause different concerns

WORSE BETTER

Relative assessment of variables between countries

Current levels

Income inequality Medium Medium High Low High

Unemployment of lower educated Good Bad Bad Good Good

Unemployment of older people Good Bad Bad Bad Good

Labour force participation of lower educated Medium Good Bad Good Medium

% temporary jobs Medium Medium Medium Bad Good

Labour protection Good Good Good Good Bad

Developments 2008-latest

Income inequality growth Medium Medium High Medium Low

Income growth of lower educated Low Medium Low Low High

Wealth growth of age group 55+ High Low Low Low NA

Unemployment of lower educated Good Bad Bad Medium Good

Unemployment of age group 50+ Good Bad Bad Bad Good

Labour force participation of lower educated Medium Bad Good Medium Good

% temporary jobs Good Medium Medium Bad Medium

Labour protection Good Medium Medium Medium Bad

Globalisation impact Medium Medium Bad Medium Good

Source: ING

Le

vels

Growth

24

Italy stands out in terms of poor socio-economic performance, creating a breeding ground for populism

Italy

France UK

Netherlands

Germany

Better economic situation with worse development

since 2008

Better economic situation with better development since

2008

Worse economic situation with worse development

since 2008

Worse economic situation with better development since

2008

ING’s relative assessment of variables between countries

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Any support to the recovery in the coming year would be favourable for political stability in Italy and the Eurozone

Elections in France are around the corner, making it unlikely that conditions and perceptions will change much before the vote. A victory for Marine Le Pen is not unimaginable as she will likely make it through to the 2nd round, although it is not our base case that she will win. The surge of Jean-Luc Mélenchon has brought another Eurosceptic within reach of the 2nd round, with Mélenchon and Le Pen both going through a possibility.

In Italy, three parties with a strong anti-euro stance currently together score over 50% in the polls. With elections expected in 1Q18 and in May at the latest, there is little time for economic conditions to improve. To reduce unemployment, create wage growth and improve confidence, it seems necessary to maintain an accommodative fiscal stance over the course of the coming year. This would favour political stability in Italy and with that in the Eurozone, despite causing Italy to fail to adhere to the medium-term targets in the Stability and Growth Pact. Given the situation that the Eurozone is currently in, that seems reasonable.

Le Pen

Macron

Fillon

First round

Forza Italia

Democratic Party

Five star movement

Lega Nord

AfD

Social Democrats

Christian Democrats

Note: monthly average of polls through April (until April 18), source: ING

Mélenchon

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So what happens if a …

Economy

Policy

Markets

Populist victory Establishment victory

A push towards gaining more domestic control will likely occur, including a possible Eurozone exit. The checks and balances in the political system will be key to the success of this. Less EU integration seems certain.

Business as usual to prevail with an establishment victory, although the divide with the large % of populist voters must be bridged. Further pushes towards EU integration will have to be practical and won’t be large.

Markets have only priced in some of the risk and will respond negatively if euro break-up risk increases. Higher spreads, a weaker euro and a lower risk-free rate should prevail.

The market response will likely be positive, but smaller than the negative impact of a populistvictory. The risk of a future populist win will remain, depending on how well the country performs under establishment leadership.

The uncertainty of a possible break-up and possible smaller policy changes will likely dampen investment further. Any move towards an exit would take investment further from its potential and could curb domestic demand.

With lower political uncertainty, there is an upside to investment growth. More EU collaboration could lift growth potential, but with substantial resistance to further integration, the question remains how much can be done.

Note: for more on the future of the Eurozone and populism, click here

http://pull.xmr3.com/cgi-bin/pull/DocPull/808-172966-1527/3787683/2017022320120556_E.pdf

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Brussels

Peter Vanden Houte Chief Economist, Belgium, Eurozone 32 2 547 8009

Julien Manceaux Senior Economist, 32 2 547 3350France, Belgium, Switzerland

Philippe Ledent Senior Economist, Belgium, Luxembourg 32 2 547 3161

Steven Trypsteen Economist, Ireland, Portugal 32 2 547 3379

Geoffrey Minne Economist, Spain 32 2 547 3386

Frankfurt

Carsten Brzeski Chief Economist, Germany, Austria 49 69 27 222 64455

Inga Burk Economist, Germany, Austria 49 69 27 222 66131

Milan

Paolo Pizzoli Senior Economist, EMU, Italy, Greece 39 02 55226 2468

Amsterdam

Maarten Leen Head of Macro Economics 31 20 563 4406

Teunis Brosens Senior Economist, Eurozone 31 20 563 6167

Bert Colijn Senior Economist, Eurozone 31 20 563 4926

Raoul Leering Head of International Trade Analysis 31 20 563 4407

Marieke Blom Chief Economist, Netherlands 31 20 576 0465

Dimitry Fleming Senior Economist, Netherlands 31 20 576 0465

Jeroen van den Broek Head of DM Strategy and Research 31 20 563 8959

Maureen Schuller Head of Covered Bond Strategy and 31 20 563 8941Financials Research

Martin van Vliet Senior Rates Strategist 31 20 563 8801

Benjamin Schroeder Senior Rates Strategist 31 20 563 8955

Quentin Gilletta de Debt Strategist 31 20 563 8957Saint Joseph

Hamza Khan Head of Commodities Strategy 31 20 563 8958

Warren Patterson Commodities Strategist 31 20 563 8921

Mark Harmer Senior Credit Analyst, Financials 31 20 563 8964

Suvi Platerink Kosonen Senior Credit Analyst, Banks 31 20 563 8029

Hendrik Wiersma Senior Credit Analyst, TMT 31 20 563 8961

Job Veenendaal Credit Analyst, Consumer Products 31 20 563 8956and Retail

Roelof-Jan van den Akker Head of Technical Analysis 31 20 563 8178

Get in touch

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Emerging Markets

New York

Gustavo Rangel Chief Economist, LATAM 1 646 424 6464

London

Dorothee Gasser-Châteauvieux Chief Economist, EMEA 44 20 7767 6023

Nicholas Smallwood Senior Emerging Markets 44 20 7767 1045

Credit Analyst

Bucharest

Ciprian Dascalu Chief Economist, Romania 40 31 406 8990

Silviu Pop Junior Economist, Romania 40 31 406 8991

Budapest

Péter Virovácz Senior Economist, Hungary 36 1 235 8757

Istanbul

Muhammet Mercan Chief Economist, Turkey 90 212 329 0751

Manila

Joey Cuyegkeng Senior Economist, Philippines 632 479 8855

Moscow

Dmitry Polevoy Chief Economist, Russia and CIS 7 495 771 7994Egor Fedorov Senior Credit Analyst, Russia and CIS 7 495 755 5480

Prague

Jakub Seidler Chief Economist, Czech Republic 420 257 47 4432

Warsaw

Rafal Benecki Chief Economist, Poland 48 22 820 4696

Piotr Poplawski Senior Economist, Poland 48 22 820 4078

Jakub Rybacki Economist, Poland 48 22 820 4608

Karol Pogorzelski Economist, Poland 48 22 820 4891

Singapore

Tim Condon Head of Research & Chief Economist, Asia 65 6232 6020

Prakash Sakpal Economist, Asia 65 6232 6181

Disclaimer

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This publication has been prepared by ING (being the Wholesale Banking business of ING Bank N.V. and certain subsidiary companies) solely for information purposes. It is not an investment recommendation and it is not investment, legal or tax advice or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any financial instrument. Reasonable care has been taken to ensure that this publication is not untrue or misleading when published, but ING does not represent that it is accurate or complete. ING does not accept any liability for any direct, indirect or consequential loss arising from any use of this publication. Unless otherwise stated, any views, forecasts, or estimates are solely those of the author(s), as of this date and are subject to change without notice.

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Data from Macrobond and Bloomberg, unless otherwise noted.

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