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Effectiveness of the

Convention on Nuclear

Safety (CNS)

International Conference on Effective

Nuclear Regulatory Systems

Vienna, 12 April 2016

Dr. Georg Schwarz, Deputy Director General ENSI

Annatina Müller, Head International Affairs ENSI

Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft

Confédération suisse

Condederazione Svizzera

Confederaziun svizra

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The CNS in brief

The Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) was

adopted in Vienna on 17 June 1994 and entered

into force on 24 October 1996:

• The Convention is a legally binding instrument;

• So far there have been six Review Meetings

(1999, 2002, 2005 2008, 2011 and 2014) and

two Extraordinary Meetings (2009 and 2012);

• As of April 2015, there are 78 Contracting

Parties (CPs) to the Convention and 10 signatory

states that have not yet ratified the Convention.

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The CNS is an incentive Convention

Regulation: The CNS defines the

basic safety standards which shall

be met by Contracting Parties (CP)

Verification: Compliance is

based on a self-assessment

by the CPs and a Peer

Review

Enforcement: The CNS does not

provide for any type of enforcement.

In addition, the contents of the

debates are confidential

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Basic obligations of the CNS

Being a Contracting Party (CP) to the CNS implies

the following three essential commitments:

• To prepare and submit a National Report for

peer review by other CPs and to respond to the

written questions submitted by other CPs;

• To attend the Review Meetings of CPs;

• To participate actively in the review process in

order to allow other CPs to discuss the report and

seek clarification.

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Contracting Parties to the CNS

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Compliance with the CNS obligations

The Summary Report of the 6th Review Meeting

lists the following non-compliances with the

obligations of the CNS:

• Eleven CPs did not submit a National Report;

• Four CPs submitted their National Report after

the deadline for the submission of questions;

• Seven CPs did not attend the Review Meeting;

• Thirty-four CPs did not post any question or

comments.

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Countries with NPPs

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Countries with NPPs

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Significance of CPs with NPPs

CPs with NPPs in operation, permanent

shutdown or under construction:

• Have to report on Articles 6 to 19 of the CNS in

their National Reports;

• The CNS Review Meetings provide a unique

overview of nuclear safety provisions and

issues of these CPs;

• This is especially important for neighboring

countries to those operating NPPs.

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Non complying countries with NPPs

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Countries embarking on nuclear power

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Countries embarking on nuclear power

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Significance of CPs embarking on

nuclear power

CPs planning the construction of their first NPP:

• Are encouraged to report on Articles 7 to 19 of

the CNS in their National Reports;

• All necessary steps taken, or planned to be

taken, prior to the commencement of

construction of the plant with regard to long-

term planning and establishment of the

requisite infrastructure should be described.

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Non complying embarking countries

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Countries with no NPPs planned or in

operation

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Non nuclear Contracting Parties

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Significance of CPs with no NPP

planned or in operation

CPs with no nuclear power plant planned or in

operation:

• Have to report on Articles 7, 8 and 16 of the

CNS in their National Reports;

• In addition these CPs are invited to report on

other types of civilian reactors than NPPs on a

voluntary basis;

• A number of CPs use that possibility to submit

their regulatory infrastructure or the safety of

their research reactors to a voluntary peer

review process.

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Non complying non nuclear countries

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How to improve the CNS?

The analysis of the deficits identified during the 6th

Review Meeting leads to the following areas of

improvements:

• Extension of membership: Encouraging

countries operating NPPs or planning to construct

NPPs to ratify the CNS;

• Improving compliance: Encouraging countries

embarking on nuclear power to actively

participate in the CNS review process;

• Improving the peer review: Clearer guidance,

process improvements, more transparency.

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Improvements to the CNS

Fukushima

Daiichi

Accident

March 2011

Working

Group on

Effectiveness

and

Transparency

6th CNS RM

March/April

2014

Diplomatic

Conference

February

2015

2nd CNS

Extraordinary

Meeting

August 2012

IAEA

Action Plan

September

2011

5th CNS RM

April 2011

Informal

Working

Group IWG

Amended

CNS

Guidelines

INFCRIC

571/572/573

Vienna

Declaration

on Nuclear

Safety

7th CNS RM

April 2017

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Guidance on National Reports

The amendments to INFCIRC 572 include new

reporting requirements inter alia on:

• Peer Review Missions: Planned missions,

publication of review reports;

• Beyond Design Base Accidents: Containment

integrity, SAMG;

• EPR: Resources, multiple reactor sites;

• PSRs: Overview on results, safety culture, hazard re-

evaluation.

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Improvements to the review process

In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the peer

review process the 6th RM adopted a number of

amendments to INFCIRC 571:

• Training courses for the Officers;

• Peer review ahead of the RM not limited to asking

questions to other CPs;

• Introduction of the Country Review Report

(replacing the Rapporteur’s Working Document);

• Availability of the National presentations and the

Country Review Reports on the secure web site.

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Transparency and confidentiality

The contents of the debates during the review of the

national reports are confidential. Transparency

enhancements are therefore limited to:

• Encouraging CPs to publish their National Report,

Questions and Answers and their Country Review

Report;

• Invitation of Journalists to the opening session as

well as to the last part of the final session;

• Web stream of parts of the meeting and of the press

conference.

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Improving/strengthening the safety

objectives of the CNS

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Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety

Principles for the implementation of the objective of the

CNS to prevent accidents:

• New NPPs are to be designed consistent with the

objective of preventing accidents and, should an

accident occur, mitigating possible releases of

radionuclides causing large or early releases;

• Safety improvements are to be implemented in

existing NPPs that are oriented to meet the above

objective;

• National requirements and regulations for

addressing this objective are to take into account

the relevant IAEA Safety Standards.

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Extension of the National Reports

The Vienna Declaration (VD) contains two

commitments to extend the scope of the National

Reports (NR) starting with the 7th RM:

• The principles of the VD should be reflected in the

NRs, with special focus on Art. 18 as well as other

relevant Articles, including Art. 6, 14, 17 and 19;

• Each NR should include an overview of measures for

the safety improvements identified for existing

NPPs.

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Conclusions

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Conclusions

The CNS was very successful since it was adopted in

1994:

• The CNS covers with few exceptions all operating

and planned NPPs of the world;

• The Guidelines of the CNS have been significantly

improved in the last years;

• It is nearly impossible to amend the CNS even in

the aftermath of a severe nuclear accident.

• It still remains to be proven, if voluntary

declarations like the VDNS lead to a credible and

committed improvement of nuclear safety

worldwide.