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Conflict resilience among community forestry user groups

Citation for published version:Sharma, J & Nightingale, A 2014, 'Conflict resilience among community forestry user groups: experiences inNepal', Disasters, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 517–539. https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12056

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):10.1111/disa.12056

Link:Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer

Document Version:Peer reviewed version

Published In:Disasters

Publisher Rights Statement:© Sharma, J., & Nightingale, A. (2013). Community Forestry User-Groups and Conflict: Experiences of a DonorSupported Community Forestry Programme in Nepal. Disasters.

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Download date: 25. Jul. 2020

Conflict resilience among community forestry user groups: experiences

in Nepal

Andrea Nightingale Associate Professor, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden, and Honorary Fellow, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Edinburgh, and Jeevan Raj Sharma Lecturer, School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, UK.

Abstract

ThisarticleexplorestheimpactofviolentconflictinNepalonthefunctioningofcommunityforestryuser‐groups(CFUGs),particularlythosesupportedbytheDFIDfundedLivelihoodsandForestryProgramme.Thekeyquestionsare:whatexplainstheresilienceofCFUGsoperatingatthetimeofconflict?Whatinstitutionalsetupandstrategiesallowedthemtocontinueworkingunderconflict?Whatlessonscanbedrawnfordonorsupporteddevelopmentaroundtheglobe?TheworkcontributestootherresearchontheeverydayexperienceoflivinginconflictforresidentsofNepal.ThestudysuggeststhatCFUGresiliencewasduetotheinstitutionalsetupofcommunityforestryandtheuseofvarioustacticsbyCFUGs.Theinstitutionaldesignofcommunityforestry(structure)wasveryimportantforresilience,butitwastheabilityofgroupstosupportandusethatstructureeffectivelythatwasthedeterminingfactorintheirresilience.

Keywords:violentconflict,communityforestry,Nepal,resourcegovernance,politicalecology

Introduction

TheMaoistinsurgencyinNepal(1996‐2006)hadasignificantimpactontheabilityofdevelopmentprojectstocontinueoperatinginruralareasofNepal.Communityforestryuser‐groups(CFUGs),however,provedtobesurprisinglyresilientandwereabletofunctioninmanyplaces.PreviousstudieshavesoughttounderstandwhetherCFUGswereresilientandtheimpactoftheconflictonfear,mobilityanddevelopmentinacommunityforestrycontext.(Rechlinetal.,2007).Herewefocusonwhycommunityforestryfaredsodifferentlyfromotherkindsofdevelopmentprogrammesandindoingso,weshedlightonhowruralresidentsdisplayedremarkablecreativity,resilienceandtenacityinthefaceofviolenceandintimidationbybothconflictingparties.Thisoffersinsightsforpolicymakers,aidagenciesandpractitionersinvolvedindevelopmentworkinconflictaffectedareasontherangeoffactorsthathelpsupportpeopleintheseareas,includingtacticsemployedbyresidentsthemselves.ThearticlediscussestheexperiencesofworkinginconflictbyCFUGssupportedthroughUK’sDepartmentforInternational

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Development(DFID)undertheLivelihoodsandForestryProgramme(LFP).1Thekeyquestionsengagedare:whatexplainstheresilienceofCFUGsoperatingatthetimeofconflict?WhatinstitutionalsetupandstrategiesusedbyCFUGsallowedthemtocontinueworkingunderconditionsofconflict?Whatlessonscanbedrawnfromthiscasefordonorsupporteddevelopmentworkaroundtheglobalinavarietyofconflict‐riddencontexts?ByexploringthesequestionswecontributetootherresearchontheeverydayexperienceoflivinginconflictbyruralresidentsofNepal(Shah,2008,ShneidermanandTurin,2004a,Lecomte‐Tilouine,2009,Pettigrew,2008,Gersony,2003)andhelptoprobethecontributionsandlimitationsinconflictsituationsofdonor‐supportedmodesofoperationinnaturalresourcemanagement.

Nepaliswellknownforitssuccessfulcommunityforestryprogrammesandindeed,itisseenasaglobalmodelforparticipatorynaturalresourcegovernance.TheForestAct(1993)gaveCFUGsthelegalauthoritytomanagetheirlocalforestsforsustainableproduction.Sincethattimetheprogrammehasproliferatedacrossthecountryandcurrentlytherearemorethan15,000CFUGslocatedinalldistricts(Ojhaetal.,2008).Theprogrammeislargelysupportedbyanumberofbi‐lateraldonorsincludingDFID,butthereareasignificantnumberofuser‐groupslocatedindistrictsnotsupportedbydonors.CFUGsarelocal,self‐governedinstitutionsboundbywrittenconstitutionsandoperationalplansthataredevelopedinconsultationwiththegovernmentforestryoffice.Ideally,theymakedecisionsbyconsensus,withmembersappointingexecutivecommitteestomanageday‐to‐dayissues,whilstannualormorefrequentassembliesofmembersoverseethecommittees’workandendorsemajordecisions.Inpractice,decisionsareoftenmadebymajorityandissuesofelitecapturearesignificant(Arnold,1998,Neupane,2003,Nightingale,2006,Nightingale,2005,Khadka,2010,Nightingale,2003,Ojha,2008,Ojhaetal.,2008,Thoms,2008,TimsinaandPaudel,2002).DFIDhasbeenoneoftheprincipaldonorsforNepal’scommunityforestryprogramme,andthesecondphaseofsupport—LFP(2001–2011)—workedin15districtswithabout4,600usergroupsrepresentingroughlyhalfamillionhouseholds.MostoftheDistrictlevelprogrammewasdeliveredthroughserviceproviders(localNGOs)whohelpedimproveusergroupgovernance,developthelivelihoodsandincomesofgroupmembers,andensureaccesstoresourcesanddecisionmakingbysociallydisadvantagedgroups.Thisarrangementhasmeantcommunityforestryissomewhatuniqueamongdonor‐supportedprogrammesinthatitissimultaneouslyconsideredagovernmentprogramme,donorsupportedandacommunityinstitutionfromtheperspectiveofruralresidents(TimsinaandPaudel,2002).Aswillbeillustratedbelow,thisliminal,ormultiple,statuscontributedtothe

1 LFP was keen to explore why CFUGs were so resilient during the conflict in Nepal, something for which all the forestry donors and independent researchers already had anecdotal evidence. This study was commissioned by them, engaging independent researchers who worked with their field level staff to collect the data. As a result, the research was contained to LFP areas only. We have also triangulated the data here with evidence we have from other parts of Nepal where we have worked on community forestry for many years.

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resilienceofcommunityforestryuser‐groups(CFUGs)duringtheconflictperiodinNepal.

Fieldworkforthestudywasconductedinmid‐2009in18CFUGsfrom6districtswhereLFPworked—oneeachintheEastandWest,twoeachintheTeraiandMid‐WestregionsofNepal.WedeliberatelyrefertothesebroadgeographicalareasratherthanDistrictstohelpmaintainanonymityforallactorsinvolvedinourstudy.Ineachdistrict,onecasestudywaschosenfroma‘leastsensitive’(statecontrolledareas),‘sensitive’(disputed)and‘highlysensitive’(controlledbytheMaoists)areabasedonthecategorisationsusedbyLFPduringtheconflict.2Thegoalwastocapturedifferencesinoperationdependingontheimpactoftheinsurgency.GiventhedesiretogaininsightintowhyCFUGswereresilient,qualitativeinterviewswithCFUGmembersandotherlocalkeyinformantswereconductedbyateamofresearchersfollowingasemi‐structuredquestionnaire.Thequestionsweredesignedtoelicitopenendedanswersandencourageddiscussioningroupinterviews.Thedatawasanalyzedforemergingthemes,issuesalreadybelievedtobeimportantbasedonanecdotalevidence,andconvergenceaswellasdivergenceinthenarrativesprovidedbythegroups.Aremarkableamountofconvergencewasfoundinthedata,indicatingtheresultsarewidelyapplicabletotheNepalcontext,withenoughdivergencetofeelconfidenttheresearchdesignwasrobust(ErzbergerandPrien,1997).GiventhediversityofNepalandunevenimpactoftheconflict,weexpectedsomedivergenceinthefindings.

In the following sections,we first give a short sketch of the insurgency period inNepal and its relationship with development. We then briefly discuss ‘resilience’beforepresentingevidencefromthefieldabouthowandwhyCFUGswere(orwerenot)resilientduringtheconflict.Wehavedividedtheanalysis into threesections:structure,strategiesandtacticsandvulnerability.Thefirstsectionexploreshowthestructure of the groups contributed to resilience. This is important for projectplanners and managers globally to understand how the overall structure of adevelopmentinterventionlikecommunityforestrycanhelpensuretheprogrammewillbeabletocontinueoperatinginthefaceofviolentconflict.Thesecondsectiondetails the strategies and tactics used by CFUG members to ensure they could

2 The categories of low, medium and high sensitivity were developed for Safe and EffectiveDevelopment in Conflict (SEDC) protocols and reflect the perspective of donors and serviceproviders.Whilethiswastheoriginalintentionofthecategories,anotherlogicmightbeappropriatetounderstandhowCFUGswereaffectedandthebestwaytosupporttheminthefuture.Ourstudyclearly revealed that from the perspective of the CFUGs, the most sensitive groups in terms ofresiliencewere those thatwerecaughtbetween theMaoistsand theArmy(‘sensitive’underSEDCcategorisation).Theyfacedthebiggestchallengesintermsofoperatingandinmanycases,displayedthe most creativity in devising coping strategies. In this sense, we understand them to be ‘mostsensitive’. The pressure they experienced put them at risk, but perhaps also offered themopportunitiestodevelopfromagovernance,inclusionandincomegenerationperspective.Thewaystheexperienceoftheconflictimpactedongroupsthereforeisakeyissuewhenevaluatingresilienceaswellasprovidinginsightsintotheeverydayexperiencesofconflict.

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continue functioning. This contributes empirical evidence on how the conflictunfolded in different parts of Nepal and its impact on the everyday livelihoodstrategies of rural residents. The third section looks at vulnerability and givesevidencefromgroupswhowerenotabletocontinuefunctioningsufficientlytobecalled‘resilient’.Thefindingsinthislattersectionhelptosupportsomeofthekeymessagesemergingfromtheearliersections,andalsoprovidearicherpictureoftheeverydayexperiencesofconflict.

MaoistInsurgencyanddonor‐supporteddevelopmentworkinNepal

Theinsurgency(orso‐called‘MaoistPeople’sWar’)soughttooverthrowthemonarchyandentrenchedfeudalrelationshipsacrossNepal,takinginspirationfromtheShiningPathinPeru.TheinsurgencyprimarilyengagedNepal’ssecurityforces(police,andinthelatterstagesoftheconflict,thearmy),butimpacteduponnearlyallpeopleinthecountry.Initially,theinsurgencybeganinwesternNepalandby2002hadspreadacrossthecountry,controllingsignificantareasoftheruralcountrysideanddisruptingmostdevelopmentactivities(Hutt,2004,Thapa,2004).Localgovernanceinallconflictaffectedareaswastransformedaspoliticalleadersfledinfearoftheirlives,orjoinedwillingly(orunwillingly)theinsurgents.SomeplaceswerecompletelyMaoistcontrolledandintheseplacestheyoperatedaparallelstate,or‘Peoples’Governments’(jansankar),(Lund,2006,ShneidermanandTurin,2004b,Ogura,2008);otherareassawtheprovisionofservicesandgovernancebythelocalstatecollapseasgovernmentemployeeswereunabletocarryouttheirduties(DoniniandSharma,2008).Inthiscontext,thereiswide‐spreadevidencethatcommunityforestryusergroups(CFUGs)tookupthejobofprovidingservicesinlocalareasandappearedtohavebeenabletooperatemoreeffectivelythananyotherkindofgroup(Pokharel,Ojha,&Paudel,2005).

Byanystandard,theemergenceandspreadoftheMaoistinsurgencybetween1996and2006isspectacular(BoninoandDonini,2009).UsingtheclassicalMaoisttacticof‘encirclingthecities’andforcingthepoliceandadministrationintodistrictheadquarters,theinsurgentseffectivelyresistedstablegovernmentaccessandoperationofdevelopmentprogrammesthroughoutNepal.Bymid‐2006,overtwothirdsoftheapproximatelyfourthousandsecretariesofVillageDevelopmentCommittees(VDCs)—thelowesttierofelectedgovernmentinruralareas—hadbeendisplacedtodistrictheadquarters(DoniniandSharma,2008,InternationalCrisisGroup(ICG),2010).

AlthoughtheMaoistswerenotabletocompletelyblockdevelopmentprogrammes,theybecameanimportantforceandgatekeeper,disruptingtheimplementationofprogrammestheydidnotapprove,orextractingfundsfromprojectstoallowtheprogrammestocontinue.Astheconflictprogressed,theMaoistsmovedfromapositionofopposingalldevelopmentprogrammestoamoreregulatoryapproach,forcingprogrammestocomplywithcertaincriteriaanddemandsratherthanstoppingtheiroperation.Therelationshipbetweendevelopmentprogrammesand

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theinsurgentsalsodependedonthestanceandpersonalityofthelocalpartycommander,thefundingagencysupportingtheprogramme,andtheaccountabilityandinclusivenessintheprojects(ShneidermanandTurin,2004a).

Onthebasisofourworkandothers,itappearsthatdevelopmentwasimportantfortheMaoistsinatleastinthreeways(SharmaandDonini,2010).First,(andheretheparallelswiththeShiningPatharestriking(BourqueandWarren,1989)),resistingdevelopmentwasatactictodenystatepresenceintheruralareasofNepal.Second,theresourcesthatcamewithdevelopmentprogrammeswereoftenimportantsourcesofrevenuefortheMaoists.Thisisparticularlytrueoftheforestrysector.Third,thediscoursesofinclusionandequalityusedbymanyofthedevelopmentprogrammeswerecompatiblewiththeMaoistagendaofsocialtransformationandthereforedisruptingsomeprogrammeswaspoliticallyandideologicallyproblematicforlocalcommanders.ByexploringhowandwhyCFUGswereresilientintheconflict,weareabletoillustratesomeofthesubtleandtodateunpublished,aspectsoftheconflict.Namely,perspectivesfromruralresidentsonhowtheMaoistssoughttobothcontrolbutalsonegotiateand‘winover’theallegianceoftheruralpopulation.

Explainingresilienceinconflict

We define resilience as the ability of CFUGs to respond to conflict conditions,negotiate difficulties and return to regular functioning after a period of pressure.Morespecifically,weexplorewhethergroupsretainedasenseofidentity,sufficientinfrastructureandsharedpurpose tobeable to resume ‘regular’ functioningafterthe conflict ended. The findings from the research showed four key reasons forresilience.

First,theabilitytoclaimanddemonstratefairnesswascrucialforgroupstoresistdemandsbyboththeconflictingparties(MaoistsandtheNepalArmy).FairnessinCFUGpracticeshelpedkeepallmemberscommittedtothegroupandtoovercomeproblemstheyencountered.Byensuringtheirpracticeswerejust,CFUGswereableto claim themoral high ground and use that as a strong platform fromwhich tonegotiateoperatingspace.

Second, community forestry is seen as community owned, neutral, equitable andpro‐poor;thusbenefitingallmembersandnotapartofthestate.Importantly,whileCFUGs have support from both donors and the state, community forestry is notbelieved to be imposed by outsiders. CFUGs gave villagers an identity that wasneutralanddistinct fromtheothermorepoliticallyproblematic identities inruralareas such as caste, ethnicity, class or political party membership (Nightingale,2011). This neutral identity helped to protect the group and its members inparticularcontexts.

Third,community forestryuser‐groupsbothownand control significant financialandphysical(forestry)resources.TheseresourceswereneededbytheNepalArmy

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and the Maoists and to ensure they had access to them, both parties needed tonegotiatewiththeCFUGs.Herethedistinctionmadebypoliticalecologistsbetweencontroloverandaccesstoresourcesiscrucial.Controloverresourcesindicateslegalrights and control over decision making in everyday practice, whereas accessindicates the ability to gain access to and use forest resources (Ribot andPeluso,2003,PeetandWatts,2004).OurstudyfoundinsomeareasCFUGslostcontrolovertheir accounts or their forest resourcesor both, butwere able to retain access tothem.

Four, all the groups interviewed expressed a strong determination to continueactively operating. This commitment to the CFUG led to a number of creativestrategiestocopewithpressurefromtheconflictingparties.Italsoledtostrategiesto retain access to resources evenwhen groups relinquished various elements oftheir control over them.While in some respects these groups seem to have lostcontrol over their forest, it is important to recognise the extent to which theircreative strategies contributed to the long term resilience of the group bymaintainingaccess.

Inordertoillustrateandsupporttheseconclusions,wenowturntothestructuralfeatures of community forestry as a programme and CFUGs as institutions thathelped contribute to their resilience before exploring some of their creativestrategies.

1.Structuresofresilience

Community forestryasaprogramme,andCFUGsasinstitutions,haveanumberofstructuralordesignfeaturesthatcontributedtotheirresilienceduringtheconflict.Itisimportanttostress,however,thatthesestructuralfeaturesarenotadequateinthemselves. The most important finding from this study is that CFUG membersdisplayed remarkable creativity and commitment to operating and it was onlythrough their daily practices and use of these institutional features that thestructure itself was meaningful in promoting resilience (explored in the secondsectionbelow).However,wealso found thatgroupswhowereveryweak in theirstructure—particularlyinproperaccountingprocedures—lostresiliencefasterthanthose who were sound. We explore this more fully below under points ofvulnerability (third section). On a positive note, many groups appear to havebecomestrongerasaconsequenceofpressurefromtheconflict.

SenseofOwnership

Community forestry operational plans and constitutions give user groups a largemeasureofautonomyindecision‐makingandinregulatingtheharvestingofforestproducts.Theforestlandtechnicallyisownedbythestate,butCFUGshavetherighttocontrolallresourcesandrevenuesgeneratedfromit(Khadka,2010,Nightingale,2005,Ojhaetal.,2008,Thoms,2008,TimsinaandPaudel,2002).GroupsthereforefeelagreatdealofownershipovertheforestandbelievetheCFUGis‘their’group.Theautonomygivenbythedesignofcommunityforestryisthusakeyreasonwhy

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CFUGs are perceived to be ‘local’ groups and not part of the state or a donorprogramme.

During theconflict theusergroups thusasserted that theywere localgroups thathademergedfromthegrassroots,andthattheyworkedfortheneedsofeveryoneintheir communities. They were said to be run by local people (and not) bygovernmentemployees.ThiswasaverydifficultclaimforeithertheMaoistsortheNepalArmytocounterandwasakeypartofmanygroups’negotiatingstrategies.Manygroupswereawarethatthischaracteristicwasimportantfortheirability tooperateinconflict:

Itwaseasierforustoworkbecausewefeelthatit(thecommunityforest]isours;itbelongstous…Thesituationmightbedifferentwhereusergroupsareextremelyrich,butIamtalkingaboutourarea(whereusergroupsarenotsorich),wherepeopledirectlyimplementtheactivities.HadexternalNGOs,INGOsandforeignersintervenedinouractivities,theMaoistswouldhavestoppedtheactivities…(Westernregion,disputed)

The study also found exampleswhereuser groupswere seen as belonging to thelocalpeoplewhereasthedistrictforestofficewasnot.Forexample,

Thecommunityforestrybuilding…[was]inthesamecompoundasthedistrictforestoffice’srangepost.TheMaoists[whoincludedusergroupmembers]blewuptherangepostbutnotthecommunityforestrybuilding…(Terairegion,Maoist‐controlledarea)

Here,thegroupwasabletosavetheCFUGbuilding,butagovernmentforestryofficebuildinginthesamecompoundwasdestroyedasitwasconsideredpartofthestate.In the narrative, the group members said the Maoists wanted to blow up thebuilding, but user‐group members—who were also Maoists—convinced thecommanders to leave their building alone. Overall, the structure of communityforestrythatgivesCFUGsautonomyandcontroloverresources,alsoalloweduser‐groups to assert that they ‘own’ the group and this characteristic helped to givethemaplatformfromwhichtoresistinterferencewiththeirgroups.

Inclusion,Livelihoodsandpro‐poorpractices

Closely related to theabovepoint, thecommunity forestryprogramme is foundedonprinciplesofinclusion.LFPasaprojecthasworkedtoensurerepresentationandto encourage participation on the part ofmarginalised communitymembers. Thestructuralcommitmentto ‘pro‐poor’policiesincludingaccesstoresourcesandtheuseofCFUGfundsforpro‐poorprojects,wasvitaltotheclaimsmadebyCFUGsthattheir goalswere compatiblewith those of theMaoists. Thus, the core researcherfrom theMid‐West summarized the interviewmaterial from a sensitive group asfollows:

Thewarringside[Maoists]werepositivetowardsCFUGsastheyfounditsrules,regulations,andinclusivestructurerelevantandjustified,andquitesimilarto

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thatoftheirs.Thishelpedalotinthemanagementofthecommunityforestandininitiatinganydialoguewiththem(Mid‐Westernregion,disputedarea)

In many cases, the CFUGs were able to show that they provided all communitymemberswithequitableaccesstoresourcesandCFUGassets.ThiswasaclaimthatinmostplacestheMaoistswereunabletocounterandultimatelyrespected.ItwasalsodifficultfortheArmytoblockorargueagainstinclusive,pro‐pooractivitiesthatsupportruraldevelopment inremoteareas.Theseactivitiesarea corepartof thestate’sdevelopmentagendaandfortheArmytoactivelyworkagainstitwouldhavebeen disastrous. In otherwords, the CFUGs had themoral high ground. In someplaces the Army did make the operation of CFUGs very difficult and memberscreated a variety of strategies to overcome these problems, but as a centralisedpolicy,theArmycommandcouldnotbeseentohaltactivitiesthatweresocentraltopeople’slivelihoods.

Structuresthatencourageleadershipandnegotiationskills

Respectforcommunityforestry,however,wasnotnecessarilygrantedimmediatelyoreasilybytheconflictingparties.Rather,CFUGshadtoengageindialoguewiththeMaoistsand/ortheArmyinordertoconvincethemthattheCFUGwasalegitimatelocal organisation, politically neutral andworking for the needs of all communitymembers. Such skills appear to be ‘learned’ through community forestry.Structurally,CFUGsencouragepublicparticipationbymembersandrequiregroupleaderstocultivateconsensusinthegroup.CFUGsalsohavetonegotiatewithothernearby groups or District Forest Officers, all of which gives them significantexperience in negotiation and consensus building with a variety of differentstakeholders, even if somerealexclusionscontinuetoplague theprogrammeasawhole (see Khadka, 2010, Neupane, 2003, Nightingale, 2006, Nightingale, 2005).User‐groupmembersexpresseddirectlyhowtheseskillswereusefultothemduringtheconflictbygiving themtheconfidencetostanduptotheArmyortheMaoists.Forexampleonegroupsaid,

TheMaoistsopposedoursystemofpayforfuelwoodandtimberandtoldusersthatyoudon'tneedtopay…wediscussedthisissueandalluserssaidtherulesare for us, for our own benefits we didn’t need to be afraid from externalthreats….Webecamestrongonourdecisionsandimplementation[ofthefees].Thedecisionswerealso favourable forMaoist families, their familymemberswerealsosupportiveonthedecisions.(Westernregion,Maoistcontrolledarea)

InclusivepracticesthatunderpinLFP’sapproachtocommunityforestryhaveclearlybeen internalized by CFUGs and as a consequence the group developed andmaintainedintegrityandresilience.

TheLFPandotherdonorprogrammeshavebeenconcernedaboutthetendencyforelites todominateCFUGsandhavesought tocounterbalance thatbyencouraginggroups to give leadership positions and a voice to women, the poor and otherdisadvantaged people within groups. During the conflict, however, we have

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evidence that this so‐called ‘elite capture’ oftenworked to their advantage. ElitesCFUGs members often had social capital and networks within the Army or theMaoistcommanders(orboth)andwereabletoutilisetheseskillsandnetworkstofacilitatetheirnegotiations.Forexample,

The chairperson was very good in negotiating with police, army and theMaoists.WhenapproachedbytheMaoistshewouldshowthemourrecordstodemonstrate that the decisions of the committee were transparent. (Mid‐westernregion,disputedarea)

HerewewanttoemphasizethatthenegotiatingskillsandnetworksofCFUGleadersin many places developed from community forestry (Kharel, 1993). There isthereforeamixedpatternofCFUGsbeingdominatedbypeoplewhoalreadyhavesignificant social power, as well as community forestry being a context whereinpeoplegainsocialpowerbyvirtueofmanagingthegroups.

Basedonthisevidence,weconcludethatthreemainstructuralelementsgaveusergroups bargaining power and thus resilience. First, community forestry hasdevelopedgroupmembers’abilitiestonegotiatewithelites;muchofthisconfidenceto speak out has been learned from the functioning of their groups,which has inpart been promoted by donors, and in part is integral to the structure of theprogramme. Second, the proper implementation of community forestry, includingopen and clear decision‐making, transparent accounts and group consensusbuilding,werevitalfortheirabilitytoprojectapositiveoutwardimage.Third,thesocial networks of many user group office holders with key members of theconflictingparitiesgavethemaccesstocommandersonbothsides.

FinancialTransparency

Another key structural aspect was user groups’ generally open and transparentfinancial systems. All groups have to present their annual accounts with a clearrecord of the transactions to their annual general assemblies wherein everyhousehold is expected to have at least one representative. The importance oftransparent functioning, and inparticular financial transparency,was consistentlymentionedbyrespondentsasakeyreasonforusergroups’resilience:

TheMaoistsdidnotsuspectusduetothetransparencyofouraccounts.Weusedourfundstobuildculverts,gravelourroad,plantseedlings,erectfences…forourrevolvingfundandtofundgoatraisingbypoorhouseholds.Seeingthis,theydidnotobstructus...(Terairegion,disputedarea)

ThetransparentoperationofusergroupaccountsallowedCFUGleaderstobackuptheir claims that they were engaged in pro‐poor activities and were using theirrevenuesforappropriatelocaldevelopmentactivities.InmanyplacesthisappeasedtheMaoists, althoughmostuser groups still had to give forceddonations.Groupsfromall thedifferentregionsgaveexamplesofcontesting thesedonations(locallyknownas ‘taxes’).Forexample,usergroups intheeastof thecountrymanagedtonegotiate a lower rate of forced donation by negotiating collectively through

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FECOFUN3. In 2005, the Maoists had demanded 30% of user group funds.Individually the groups had been unable to resist these demands, whilst takingcollective action had put them in a stronger position and enabled them tosuccessfullynegotiate.

The written nature of operational plans and constitutions, lists of members andrecordsofdecisions,activitiesand financesmeanttheycouldbeshowntoanyonewhoquestionedtheircredibility.Thereareotherpowerissuesassociatedwiththeemphasis onwritten recordswithin community forestry (Nightingale, 2005,Ojha,2008), but during the conflict, such records proved to be vital for retainingoperatingspace.

Groupconsensusbuilding

Another important structural feature of user groups is that major decisions aresupposed to be reached by consensus at public meetings in line with traditionalvillagesystemsthatareseenas‘informal’and‘just’(GellnerandHachhethu,2008).Indeed,thecommitmentto ‘kurramiloune’ (compromiseorconsensusbuilding)inNepalisapervasiveculturalnorminanykindofnegotiation.Thiskindofdecisionmaking strengthens group cohesion and inmost cases people will abide by suchdecisionseveniftheydisagree(Joshietal.,1997).

Manyusergroupstoldhowgroupcohesionwasveryimportantforenablinggroupstocontinueworkingduringthearmedconflict.Itwasalsoclearthatpressuresfromoutsideactuallypromotedusergroupcohesion.Itwassaidthatgroupswhofailedtostick together during the conflict were forced to cease operating,whilst cohesiveCFUGsweremuchstronger.

They[Maoists]cametousfor30%[ofourfund]...Wecalledageneralassembly…anddecidedthatwecouldnotgive30%…thereweresomethreats…butwewerenotafraidaswewereunited...(Easternregion,disputedarea)

Allthegroupsmadeitquiteclearthatgroupcohesion,alongwithtransparency,wasvital and in the below section on tactical strategies, evidence of the variouswaysthatCFUGshelpedtopromotegroupcohesionisclear.Thestructuralcommitmentin community forestry to issues of transparency and inclusive participation thuscontributedtoresilience.Developmentprogrammesthatseektopromoteinclusionandtransparency,therefore,aremorelikelytobeabletooperateinconflict.Indeed,inNepalsuchprincipleswere institutionalisedas ‘goodpractice’ throughSafeandEffectiveDevelopmentinConflictguidelines.

3 FECOFUN is a national federation of community forestry user groups. It acts as a civil society association to lobby for user group rights and works through a network of regional and local branches.

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Donorstrategies

Astheintensityofthearmedconflictheightened,manydevelopmentprogrammespromotedwaysofworkingthatmitigatedconflictandminimisedrisks.ProgrammessupportedbytheUK’sDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID),includingLFP,encouragedtheirstaffandpartnerstoworkaccordingto:

a)theSafeandEffectiveDevelopmentinConflict(SEDC)protocols,whichcallforengaging indialoguewiththeconflictingparties,maintainingneutrality,andworkinginwaysthatdirectmoreresourcestothelocalandgrassrootslevels;and

b) the basic operating guidelines (BOGs) of Nepal’s development partnersthat set out the standards expected of their projects and staff (includingtransparency and accountability in the use of resources, zero tolerance ofcorruptionandrespectforallpeople);andtheminimumconditionsrequiredfrompoliticalandmilitaryforces(freedomfromthreatoractualviolence,nomisdirectionofprojectresources,freedomofmovement).

Whilecertainlythereareanecdotalaccountsofdevelopmentworkerspaying‘taxes’to the Maoists, engaging in egregious corruption beyond this payment wasconsideredhazardous for individuals.There isevidencethatLFP’scommitment tothese ways of working along with other programme structural features wereimportantforpromotingusergroupresilienceinthefollowingthreeways:

First,theuseofadecentralisednetworkoflocalactors(animators)asserviceproviders(localNGOsandotherorganisations)toimplementLFPprogrammeactivitiesmeantthatitwasabletocontinueprovidingsupporteventoremotegroupsthroughouttheconflict.RespondentsfromadjacentusergroupsinadisputedareaintheWeststressedtheimportanceandskillofalocalserviceprovider.

[TheMaoists]askedallusergroupstopay40%oftheirincome…Buttheanimatorsaidthattheprogrammewasworkingforpoorpeople,womenandDalitstohelpthemincreasetheirincomes...Hesaid,“ifyouseesomethingundesirablehappeninganditissupportedbyus,thenyoucanstopourworkandwewillsendtheprogrammeaway.”Afterwards,theMaoistsputnomorepressureontheanimator[andthereforetheprogrammewasabletocontinue](Westernregion,disputedarea)

Second,oneofLFP’sstrategieswastobuildtheconfidenceofserviceprovidersandtheirfieldstafftocontinueworkingbyorientingtheminconflictsensitivedevelopmentandtheBOGs.Theseapproacheswerethendisseminatedtotheusergroupsbytheserviceproviders.Manyusergroupsappeartohavetakenupconflictsensitivecommunicationandimpartialitystrategiessuchasinformingtheconflictingpartiesoftheirmeetings.Theyavoided“being‘fororagainst’anyconflictingpartyandtriedtomaintainimpartiality”(West,State‐controlledarea).

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Theyalsotookanyopportunitytoemphasisetheirtransparency,neutralityandopennesstogainoperatingspaceandmaintainaccesstotheirresources.Importantly,neutralitywasaclaimsuccessfullymadebyusergroups,thoughitdidnotnecessarilymeantheywerepoliticallyneutral.

Third,LFPandDFID’scommitmenttopovertyreduction,tacklingsocialexclusion,perceivedpoliticalneutrality,andengagingindialoguewithbothconflictingpartieshelpedpromoteapositiveimageforusergroupsinLFP’sareas.TheMaoistsviewedtheactivitiesofinternationaldevelopmentpartnersasacceptableaslongastheirreasonsforoperatingwereconsistentwiththeMaoistagenda.DFID’sperceivedneutralstanceintheconflict4,combinedwiththeirpromotionofgrassrootsandappropriatelocalinstitutions,wasvitaltotheimageusergroupswereabletoproject.Thiswasincontrasttosomedevelopmentpartnerswhodidnotmaintainperceivedpoliticalneutrality.

From this account it is clear that the structure of community forestry helpedsupport CFUGs in a variety of ways but it is impossible to say which structuralaspects were more important than others. In part this is because of the unevennatureof theconflictacross thestudysites—thegroupswerenot facingthesamepressures—but also because in many cases it appears that structural elementscombined conferred resilience. Financial transparency was not sufficient withoutgood leadership and consensus in the group, for example; and the politicalneutralityofDFIDaswellasthedecentralisednatureoftheirprogrammedeliverywere both required for local service providers to continue supportingCFUGs.WenowturntohowCFUGsusedthesestructuralfeaturestotheiradvantageaspartofasuiteofcreativetactics.

2.StrategiesofResilience

Asacommunityforestryusergroupweneededtobeactive…WespoketothedistrictchapterofFECOFUN…andwewereencouraged…Hadwegoneinactivebecauseoftheconflict…wewouldnothavebeenabletomaintainoursavingandcreditfund…and…maybepeoplewouldhavedestroyedtheforest...(Easternregion,disputedarea)

In this section, we detail the creative, tactical strategies groups used to continueoperating.Notallgroupsusedall thesestrategiesandmanygroupschanged theirstrategies as the conflict progressed. But rather than looking for empiricalconsistency, we believe this illustrates more general conceptual points. To haveresilience, groups need to have the capacity to learn and respond in a flexiblemannertoconditionsthatarechangingandunpredictable.Italsohelpstoadddepth

4 The UK deliberately took a neutral political stance in Nepal, unlike the USA (via George Bush) which branded the Maoists terrorists. USAID was more or less forced to cease operating in rural areas as a result.

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totheissueofwhygroupswereresilientduringtheconflict,andgivesinsightintotheeverydayexperienceoflivinginconflict.

Politicalandsocialdiversity

Asmentioned,mostusergroupsthatretainedhighlevelsofresiliencewerecarefultoremainneutral,andperhapsmostresourcefully,theyusedthedifferentpoliticalaffiliationsof theirmembers to claim theirneutrality. For example, oneMid‐Westusergrouptoldhow,iftheyneededtotraveltothedistrictcentre,theybroughtwiththem people from different parties, and if stopped by the Maoists, their Maoistmembercouldvouchforthemandsimilarly,ifstoppedbytheNepalArmy,membersofthemainstreampoliticalpartieswouldidentifytheothersas‘CFUGmembers’.

Here,weseethewaythatCFUGsgavevillagersaneutral,defensibleidentity.Maoistaffiliated members can be simply ‘CFUG members’ when in the context of CFUGbusiness.WewanttobeclearthatwedonotbelievethatCFUGswere‘harbouring’Maoists, rather, people in rural localities havemultiple identities and at differentmoments in time and in different spaces they move between these identities(Nightingale,2011).WhendoingCFUGbusiness,thepeopleinquestionwere‘CFUGmembers’ and nothing else at that particularmoment. The groups also sought todemonstratethattheyweresociallyinclusive.Asexplainedabove,mostCFUGsandthe donors supporting them have socially inclusive policies that target women,Dalitsand themembersofother traditionallymarginalisedgroups toensure theirparticipation (Nightingale, 2002,Khadka, 2010,Gilmour andFisher, 1991, Kharel,1993, Hobley, 1996, Ojha et al., 2008). Given the Maoists agenda to overturnentrenchedhierarchiesinNepalesesociety,theinclusivenessofCFUGsfitwellwiththeiragenda. Itwasalmost impossible for localMaoistcommanders toshutdowngroups that were considered ‘equitable’ by their members without riskingunderminingtheirpoliticalagenda.

Opportunitiesfordialogue

Oneofthemostcommonstrategiesusedbyusergroupswastoengageindialoguewiththeconflictingparties.Theysoughttonegotiateoperatingspaceandinmanyinstances thiswas successful, even if theuser groups lost somedegreeof controlover their resources. Yet by giving up some control, we argue that our findingssuggestthegroups’mainconcernwastomaintainaccesstotheirforestsandtheirfunds, and where possible, to retain operating autonomy. Such strategies havestrong antecedents in the cultural commitment to ‘compromise’ (kurramiloune)thatrunsacrossNepalesesociety.

In almost all the study areas, the user groups engaged in dialoguewith both theMaoists and theNepal Army,with the extent towhich they had contactwith oneside or the other depending on who controlled the area. User groups used their

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connectionswiththeconflictingpartiestohelpthemnegotiate,andtheyoftenbuiltrelationshipsastheconflictprogressed.

Wetoldthemthattheyshouldnotdisturbourusergroup’swork…weusedourcontact…weknewtheperson…sothathelped.Itiseasytonegotiatewithknownpeople…(Westernregion,disputedarea)

Many of the groups reported that the Maoists were easier to negotiate with,althoughthestudyfoundevidencepointingtodifficultnegotiationswithbothsides.

Wealsohadadiscussionwith[theMaoists]…andtoldthemthatwe,andnotthem,woulddecidewhatwastobedonewithfundallocation,etc.Thatwasthedecisionwemadebyconsensus.Insteadofbeingaffectedbythemandtheirdecisions,weimpressedthemwithourcommunitydevelopmentactivities.(Westernregion,Maoist‐controlledarea)

In the Terai a number of strategies emerged in one group including: holdingmeetings and dialogue with both sides to keep them informed about user groupactivities; placing Maoist members on committees and in special interest sub‐groups; andallowing theMaoists to collect fuelwood freeof cost in thebeginningandat50%ofthestandardratelater.Thus,thisgroupmadeconcessionsoncontrolbyplacingMaoistsonitscommittee,butas theconflictprogressed, theuserstooksome control back by charging for fuelwood;compromises which helped retainaccesstotheirresources.What is of interest here is that groups tried, with varying degrees of success, tonegotiateandcompromisewithbothconflictparties.Intheabovequotes,itisalsocrucial to note that the link between CFUG Maoist members and the rest of thegroupwasvitalforconvincingtheMaoiststhatthegroupshouldretaincontrolovertheir management decisions. Such personal connections are the way business isusuallyachieved inNepal.Having ‘yourownperson’ (afnomanche) inanofficeorkey position is vital to whether or not ordinary citizens are able to successfullynegotiatewithgovernmentofficesorobtainjobs(Bista,1991,Dahal,2008,Gellneretal.,1997).Theconflictperiodwasnodifferentinthisregard,andpeoplesoughttocreateandmobilisepersonalconnectionstonegotiatewiththeconflictingparties.

Eatingtogether

OneofthereasonsthattheusergroupsfounditeasiertonegotiatewiththeMaoistswastheopportunitiestheyhadtositandtalkwiththem.EatingtogetherhasalwaysbeenanimportantsymbolicactivityinruralNepal.TheMaoistsdemandedfoodandhospitality to break down historical caste, gender and ethnicity hierarchies; tosupporttheirmovement;andtoasserttheirauthority.Yetthesedemandswerenotnecessarilystraightforwardactsofdominanceasoncethevisitorswereseatedandgivenfood,manyvillagerswereabletoreasserttheirpower(seealsoPettigrewandShneiderman,2004,Pettigrew,forthcoming).ThesemomentsatthehearthbecameanopportunitytospeaktotheMaoistsabouttheiractivities.

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TheMaoistscameregularlytoeat...Weusedtodiscussaboutthebenefitsofourforestandhowweweresupportingthepoor.Aspoorcommunitiesaretheirtargettoexpandtheirpartymembership…sotheydidnotinterfereortrytoclosedownouractivities.(Westernregion,disputedarea)

Mealtimesandtheprivatespacesofhomesthereforebecameopportunitiesforusergroupmemberstoexpoundonthepositiveaspectsofcommunityforestry.SeveralgroupscreatednegotiatingspacebyinvitingtheMaoiststocomeandeatwiththem.

Wesaidtothem…“whysendusletters…statingtheamountyouneed?…Youcancomeandeat…andwecandiscuss”(Westernregion,Maoist‐controlledarea)

ThewaysthattheMaoistsbroughttheconflictintotheprivatespacesofpeople’severydayliveshasbeenamplydemonstratedbyotherstudies(Nightingale,2011,Shneiderman,2003,ShneidermanandTurin,2004b,Shneiderman,2009,Pettigrew,2008).TheyshownotonlyhowtheMaoistsinsistedonaccesstosuchspaces,butalsohowvillagersoftenfeltmoreempoweredtoasserttheirownagendasliterallyattheirhearthsides.Butthisaccounthereshowshowruralresidentsturnedsuchtactics‘back’ontheMaoistsandactivelyinvitedtheMaoistsintothespacesoftheirhomesinordertocapitaliseonthebargainingpowersuchlocationsaffordedthem.

Holdingmeetings

Theprivatespacesofhomesprovidedonesortofspacetonegotiate,whereasmanygroupsfoundpublicassembliesamuchmoredifficultplacetoconducttheeverydaybusinessofforestgovernance.TheMaoistsandtheArmyplaceddemandsonhow,when orwhere local residents assembled, and as a result,many groupsmodifiedtheirfunctioningtoensurecontinuedaccesstotheirresources.Themostcommonmodifications were shifting decision making to all users or changing where andwhendecisionmakersmet.

Somegroupsmoveddecisionmakingfromtheirexecutivecommitteestotheentiregrouptodemonstratethecohesionofmembersandensurethatnomembercouldcontestadecision:

Weemphasizedgroupconsensusratherthanthecommittee’sdecisions…allthedecisionsweremadethroughassembliesorbyconsensus.(Westernregion,State‐controlledarea)

More often, executive committees became more central, as the holding of largemeetingswasdisapprovedofby theNepalArmy. It seems that themost commonstrategy was to find sheltered, private spaces to hold meetings to provide somemeasureofsafety:

[Atthattime]itcouldbedangeroustogatheroutsideforgroupmeetings.Butweusedtositinasmallhut.Inspiteofthefear,usergroupsoperated.Bothconflictingpartiesknewtheroleofcommunityforestryinprotecting

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ourvillagefromthedangeroftheriverchangingcourse.(Terairegion,disputedarea)

Anotherstrategywastochangethedateofmeetings,oftenatthelastminute,sothattheMaoists(orlessoften,theNepalArmy)werelesslikelytodisruptthem.

Astheconflictprogressed,manygroupsadoptedSEDC‐typestrategiesandsoughttokeeptheiractivitiesasopenaspossible,whilestilltryingtomaintainsomeprivacytodebate their affairs. Thesekindsof strategies give insight intohow the conflictaffectedpeople’severydaylivesinruralNepal.Theabilitytogather,planandholdassembliesofanykindbecamedifficultifnotdangerousinmostplaces.InsomeoftheMaoist controlled areas, such assemblieswerewelcomed, provided theywereheld as part of ‘People’s Governments’ activities. What is most striking is thetenacitywithwhichpeoplesoughtavarietyofcreativestrategiestomaintainaccesstovitalforestresourcesandcontinuewiththebusinessofeverydaygovernanceoftheCFUG.Wenowturntosomeof themoresurprisingandresourcefulstrategiesemployed.

Othercreativestrategies

Duringtheconflict,manyusersfounditdifficulttogototheirforesttocollectforestproducts.TheywerescaredoftheMaoistsandtheNepalArmyandofbeingcaughtin the forest during a confrontation. However, as forest productswere (and are)essential for most users’ livelihoods, negotiating access to their forests was veryimportant.

Inadditiontothestrategiesalreadymentioned,groupscreatedwaysofprovingthattheywereCFUGmemberstoavoidharassmentorviolencewhenenteringforestedareas,namelyby issuing identitycards.Thisuseof identitycards toprovepeoplewere group members seems to have been widespread. The kind of cards issuedvaried; butmost often, itwas a systemnegotiatedwith the localMaoist or,moreoften,NepalArmycommanders.OneoftheusergroupsinaNepalArmycontrolledarea agreed on making a fixed number of cards that the army kept. Membersrequestedacardwhentheyplannedtogototheforest,withonecardpergroupofpeople.

AnotherstrategyusedbyagroupinanareawheretheMaoistsandtheNepalArmyoftenclashedwastothinouttheirforest:

WecarriedoutheavythinningandpruninginoneblockastheNepalArmyusedtopassthroughun‐noticedandwewishedtoseeiftheywerepassingthrough.Also,thismadeitdifficultfortheMaoiststoambushtheNepalArmyastheycouldnothideintheforest.Previously…theMaoistshad

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ambushed[anarmypatrol]andkilledanofficer,andinretaliationthearmyhadkilledsixvillagers.(Westernregion,disputedarea)

Bythinningtheforest,thisgroupregainedcontrolovertheirforest,andpresumablytheirresources,sincetheyhadstockpiledthetreestheycutdownfor lateruse. Insomerespects,thisgroupsacrificedsomeofitslong‐termforestmanagementgoalsin order to alleviate the short term pressures of living under conflict. Yet, byengaging in this tactic, the group clearly felt their livelihoods would be bestprotectedinboththeshortandlongterm.

Useoffunds

One of the issues raisedmost frequently by respondentswas the control of usergroup funds. The Maoists imposed forced donations on any person or groupperceived to have funds in order to finance their ‘People’s War’. Nearly all thegroups interviewed told how they had to compromise with the Maoists to resisthandingoverlarge‘donations’andtoretainsomecontroloverhowtheirfundswerespent.Forexample:

TheyinitiallyaskedforNR20,000…Wecalledtogetherallofthetenlocalusergroups…anddecidednottoregister…ThentheMaoistscamebackwithademandtoregisterwithaNR1,000fineplusNR100perperson…Wecalledageneralassembly…anddecidednottopay…Intheend,wethoughtweshould‘survive’[protectourselves]….andsodecidedtocollectNR50perusergroupmember(Easternregion,disputedarea)

Although thesegroupsdid losesomecontrolover their revenue, theymanaged tonegotiatesothattheyendeduponlygivingatokenamount.Thegroupmanagedtoretainsomecontrolovertheirfund,butlostmorecontrolovertheirforests.

Inadditiontonegotiation,anothercommonstrategywasforusergroupstospendtheir cash reserves quickly on projects that would be deemed ‘pro‐poor’ orappropriate in the eyes of the Maoists. This finding is particularly important, asdonorsworkingwithcommunity forestryknewthatexpenditure increasedduringtheconflictbutdidnotunderstandwhy.

WehadNR90,000…thiswentfordifferentactivitiesincludingNR8,000totheMaoists…andalsoforbenefitingpoorpeople….Basically,theycontrolledourfinances...[Laterintheconflict]wehadNR10,000anddecidedtogiveittotheschoolratherthantotheMaoists…Wemanagedtouseourmoneyforlocalserviceslikeschoolsandforcommunitybenefit…Wecontinuedtowork…andmadeourexpensespublic.(Westernregion,Maoist‐controlledarea)

Despitemanysimilarexamples,notallgroupssuccessfullyprotectedtheirfinances.Some tried keeping two sets of accounts—one to show theMaoists (with lesser

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amounts)andanotheraccurateone.Butmostsaidthatthiswastoorisky,andastheconflictprogressedtheystoppedthispractice.Oneexceptionwasagroupthatfounditselfunderpotentiallyhighdemandsfromthestate.

AftertheGovernmentmadethepolicy[intheyear2000]thateachusergrouphadtopay40%ofitsrevenuestotheGovernment,wekepttwosetsofaccountstohideourincome...Wekeptoneup‐to‐daterecordforinternalpurposesandanothertoshowtheGovernment.Buteveryhouseholdknewthestatusofourfund.(Westernregion,disputedarea)

In the Terai, one group ‘compromised’ to retain control over their resources byallowingtheMaoiststousetheirCFUGtimberstamptoselltheirtimberinexchangeforbeinglefttooperate.TheMaoistswerekeentoselltimberfromCFUGstoraiserevenuebutcouldnotdosowithoutanofficialstampsotheyhadtoobtainonefromsomewhere. Allowing theMaoists to use their stampwas a very risky strategy, ifcaught,thegroupwouldhavebeeninviolationofthelaw,butitwasariskthegroupfelttheyhadtotake,orwasworthtaking.

TheseexamplesshowthevarietyofstrategiesandtacticsusedbyCFUGstoretaintheir ability to operate during the conflict. Through all these examples, theconfidencegroupmembersgainedthroughcommunityforestryinpromotingtheirownneedsandagendaseventoactorsmorepowerful(andviolent)thanthemselvesbecomesclear.Such insights showtheresilienceaswellas someof thesufferingsthattheconflictbroughttopeople’severydaylives.

3.Explainingvulnerability

Inadditiontothesuccessstoriesrecountedabove,thestudyfoundthatanumberofgroupswerelessresilientduringtheconflict.Itwasusergroupswholackedasoundstructurewhoweremostvulnerable—inparticularthosewhoseuseoffundswasnottransparentorwascorrupt.Thesegroupswereunabletoclaimthe‘moralhighground’and,accordingtothetestimoniesofpeoplefamiliarwiththegroups,someof thedisadvantagedmembersworkedagainst theirowngroupsbecause they feltthe processes were unjust. Groups were also vulnerable when the compromisestheywereforcedtomakeweretoogreat.

GroupswheretheMaoistsforciblytookcontrolofexecutivecommitteesseemedtohave lostmorecontrolofdecisionmakingthan inplaceswhere theywereable toretainmorecontroloverthecommittee.ExperiencefromaMaoistcontrolledareainTerai showed that although all the political partieswere represented in the usergroups, the Maoists dominated everyone. They placed their cadres on thecommittees,promotedtheirparty’sdecisionsandexpelledandpunishedcommitteememberswhodidnotagreewiththem.

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Manygroups,andespeciallythoseindisputedareas,hadstoriesofmajorstruggles,offearandofbeingunabletooperate,includingthefollowinggroup,whichhadtogiveupcontroloverhowitsfundswerespent.

Ourbudgetwasnotunderourcontrol…theMaoistsmanagedit…Andtherewasembezzlement…Wehadtodowhatevertheysaid…(Westernregion,Maoist‐controlledarea)

OnegroupfromadisputedareaintheMid‐Westsaidthatalackofgroupcohesionresulting from the politicisation of group activities causedmany problemsdue tothecontinuousdebatesbetweena factionopting for theneworderofferedby theMaoists,andtheotherfactionthatoptedfortheoldorder.IntheTerai,onegroupclaimedthatnearbyusergroupshadbeenunabletooperate‘duetocorruption’.Theconflict seems to have thrown into relief any problems with corruption ordomination of decision making by elite members. Finally, some groups were notable to operate at all during the conflict and today are still struggling to re‐starttheircommittees.

ItseemsthatusergroupsthatlostlargepartsoftheirfundstotheMaoistslostthemost resilience.Manyof thegroups that lost controlover their forestsduring theconflict have since re‐established control once the fear of going to the forestwasremoved.Butgroupswhohadtorelinquishlargeamountsofmoneyorwereunabletoretaincontroloverhowtheir fundswerespentsufferedmore.Themembersofsuchgroupslostasenseofworkingforacommongoalandstoppedfollowingusergroups rules such as prohibitions on open grazing. These findings point to someimportantareasforfurtherresearch.ThefundsandforestresourcesofCFUGswasnotonlydesiredbytheconflictingparties,butwasalsoanimportantfocalpointforthegroups. If access to the forest and their cash fundswas curtailed significantly,thegroupitselflostfocusandanidentity.Asdonorsseektosupportdevelopmentinthe face of conflict, attention to the structures and practices that will help localpeople to retain access to their financial aswell as physical resources is vital forensuringlong‐termlivelihoodcontinuity.

Conclusions

This study explored the factors that contributed to CFUGs resilience during theconflictinNepal.Thereasonswerenotthesameforeachgroup,buttherearesomecommonpatterns.Thedesignofcommunityforestryasanationalprogrammeandthe institutional structure supported by LFP specifically were clearly central forhelping to generate an image of neutrality aswell as pro‐poor, inclusive and justprocesses of forestmanagement. The decentralised nature of community forestryand its emphasis on public, transparent systems of governance, is the mostimportantaspectofstructure.Thisimagewasfundamentalforgroupstobeabletoclaim the right to operate and inmany instances, to claim a ‘moral high ground’whennegotiatingwiththeconflictparties.TheMaoistsandtheArmyfounditverydifficult to contest a CFUG’s right to access and control over their resources

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providedthegroupcoulddemonstratetheywereoperatingcorrectly.Furthermore,goodgovernanceandcapacitybuildinginthegroupmeantthatindividualmembershadwell developed negotiating skills that they used confidentlywith the conflictparties.

Second, CFUGs were resilient because they had resources, both physical andfinancial.Financialresourcesinparticularseemtohavebeenextremely importantastheymadeCFUGsbothatargetandgavethembargainingleverage.TheMaoistssoughttotaxCFUGstofinancetheirwar,butitwasalsoanassettheCFUGssoughttoretaincontrolover.Perhapsinpartbecausethefundswerecollective,ratherthanindividual,itwasdifficultfortheMaoiststotrytoseizeallthefundsastheydidwithmanyprivateindividualsandlandlords.Andthereisnodoubtthatinmanyplaces,CFUGmemberswerealsoMaoistandtheyhelpedtoconvincelocalcommandersnottotakealltheCFUGassets.

Thecontroloverresourcesalsohelpedtogivegroupsareasonforstickingtogetherand to engage in dialogue with the conflict parties if their control and access toresourceswasthreatened.Inparticular,theysoughttomaintainaccesstoboththeircash fundsand their forestry resources,even if todosorequired themtogiveupsomecontroloverthem.Astheconflictprogressed,itseemsthatallpartieschangedtheir tactics somewhat. The Army andMaoists realised that they could not denylocal people access to resources they required for their daily subsistence overextendedperiodsoftime,andthattheycouldnotcontrolforestspaceswithouttheassistanceofCFUGs.

Third,CFUGsshowedtremendouscapacityforlearningandadaptationwhichweatleast inpart attribute to theother twokey reasonswehave identified: the soundstructure of community forestry and the desire to retain their resources. CFUGsemployed a wide variety of creative strategies tomaintain access to and controlover theirresourcesandCFUGcommittees, including: identitycards, changing thecontext or the timing of theirmeetings, negotiatingwith the conflict parties, andrelinquishingsomecontrolovertheirprocessesinordertokeepthegroupanditsresourcesintact.Thislatterpointisthemostcontentiousandpointstosomeofthevulnerabilities of CFUGs. Where the compromises to keep functioning were toogreat, groups lost resilienceandmanyof thesegroups continue to struggle in thepost‐conflict setting. Nevertheless, we believe it is important to recognise thatresilienceimpliesanabilitytorespondflexiblytochangeandthereforemanyofthecompromisesmadeintermsofaccessandcontroldonotmeanthegroupswerenotresilient.Itisthusimportanttoevaluatetheconsequencesoftheirstrategiestobeabletosaytheywerenotresilientandtoprovidesomecluesastohowtomaintainresilience.

CFUGsweremostvulnerablewhentheydidnothaveasoundstructure,particularlywhen their use of funds was not transparent. In such cases, their ownmembersworkedwerecomplicit inunderminingtheirresilienceduetoasenseofexclusionfrombothdecisionmaking and resources. Groupswere also vulnerablewhen thecompromises they were forced to make were too great, particularly if they

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relinquished large amounts of cash. All groups were accustomed to giving someinformaltaxestogovernmentofficials,sotheydidnotobjectinprincipletogivingatax to the Maoists, rather they objected if they believed the amounts demandedwere too high. Most of the CFUGs interviewed successfully negotiated lower‘donations’, but those groups who were forced to give large amounts foundthemselvesfoundering.

Finally, the question of justice returned again and again in our study in all thegroups.Theneedforcommunityforestrypracticesanddecisionstobejustinordertosurviveduringtheconflictwasathemethatwasrepeatedinavarietyofdifferentguisesintheinterviews.Importantly,suchideasofjusticearestronglyentrenchedinruralNepal(perhapsinpartbecauseoftheMaoists’teachingswhichalsofocusedon issuesofdistributive justice), andCFUGsused these ideas toclaimtheright tooperate.TheyevenusedideasofjusticetoargueagainstMaoistdemandsonthem,andithelpedthemtoretainanimageofneutralitywiththeArmy.Inthissense,theagendaofcommunityforestrywasnotincompatiblewiththatoftheMaoists.SuchanagendawasalsoonethattheArmycouldnoteasilydenyandrequiredthemtomakecompromiseswithCFUGsoveraccesstoforeststhroughouttheconflict.Thus,the conflicting parties and CFUGs learned throughout the insurgency period andmostCFUGswereabletonegotiateoperatingspaceforthemselvesonthebasisthattheiractivitieswereforthebenefitofall,andnecessarilyfortheirsurvival.

These stories have helped to explain why (and how) CFUGs remained resilientduring the conflict. Such lessons are crucial for development planners as theyattempt to promote natural resource management regimes that can weather thechallenges posed by climate change and violent conflict. The stories also give usanotherlookintotheeverydayexperienceofconflictinNepalandshowhowpeopleused institutions,creativityandskills they learnedthroughcommunity forestry tocreate space for livelihood activities and maintain a commitment to long termforestrymanagement.Not all groupswere successful, of course, but nevertheless,theexperiencefromNepalhelpstoshowtheagencyandpowerofruralresidentsinthe face of conflict as a counter weight to narratives that frame them simply asvictimsorperpetratorsofviolence.

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