8/6/2019 ECO 8 Bonn 2011 English Version

1/2

As Parties are about to enter into thesecond round of informals on the 1.5Creview, ECO suggests delegates recall thatthe review was meant to assess the adequacyof the long-term temperature goal, as well asthe progress towards achieving it (whichaccording to ECO includes both countries

targets as well as the support to be providedto the developing countries). ECO sides withthose Parties that plan to shape the scopeand modalities around the global goal, anddid not find the suggestion made by the USAand Japan exactly constructive, namely toreview the Convention as such. Not only isthere no mandate for that, ECO also believesthis would be fast start to a dead end and asheer waste of time, which we are fastrunning out of.

Thus, for todays informal, ECO kindlyreminds Parties that while comparability,transparency and accuracy are all critical for

reporting actions, sound modalities will behighly crucial for a meaningful review. ECOis convinced that everyone in the roomagrees on a sound scientific basis. Forexample, the need to move to a 1.5Ctemperature goal (and associated emissionpathways) might have implications onsubsequent timeline adjustments to ensurethe input from IPCC AR5 is incorporatedinto the process. Parties next year will alsowant a technical paper on the scientific,technical, and socio-economic issues relatingto temperature increase of 1.5C ready for

the beginning of the review. Oh, and dontforget: modalities that do not specify whatwill happen with the findings of the revieware certain to miss the point. Review so as tolead to action.

The painful fact that the US opposesking about sources of long-term financeeded to meet the $100bn commitment by20 (a commitment championed by the USthe run up to Copenhagen), seems to ECOggestive of a wilful amnesia. Has the USgotten that fast start finance will only takeup to the end of 2012? What then? Willfall off a cliff, and only then look up to see

e mountain? With FSF due to run outelve months after Durban, ECO feels thate time is right to get real about the post-

t-start years. Its good to plan ahead,ht?ECO finds it tricky right now, to peerough the fog. Developed country Parties

e yet to outline a path for climate financest 2012. Are some developed countriesrhaps looking to scale back their climateance spending? Most of FSF wasntactly additional anyway, but simply acycling of old pledges and already planneddget lines. Yet, post-2012, if Parties arentying attention (and making the case inpitals) the level of public climate finance one table could end up shamefully less than

F - with dire consequences for adaptationd mitigation efforts and for the credibilitythe promises countries brought into thepenhagen discussions.

ECO suggests that those eager to ensureme form of mid-term finance in the run

to 2020, take a look at how they willfluence legislative processes and budgetcles in developed country capitals. Tonnect with those cycles, Parties might wantOP17 to send a strong political signal thatd-term finance is vital to securing progressa fair, ambitious and binding agreement

herwise developing countries wont seeuch in 2013. Since Copenhagen, when theF pledge was made (with some countriesly just releasing their existing fundingligations), ECO has learned quite a fewsons - such as the need for FSF to be

clearly additional to development aid targets.The signal needs to go home no sources, nofinance, and no deal.

ECO is sadly aware that both the fast startfinance amounts and the long-term $100bncommitment fall far short of anticipatedneeds. But whatever its shortcomings, the$100bn were the benchmark set by someParties to our negotiations. Is it unreasonablethat ECO now urges that these same Partiesestablish a clear, transparent and accountablepathway, for scaling up public climate finance

commitments after 2012? If your promisesare modest, the least you can do is achievethem.

ECO is a rational observer. And it seemslogical to us that the fast-start baseline of$10bn a year must become a starting point,from which to build up to 2020. How else isit possible for developed, to present a credibletrajectory towards meeting the $100bncommitment? And, since we have learned tobe a little cautious about developed countrypromises, we would also (with respect) wish tosee concrete signposts for delivery, at 2013,2015 and 2018. Of course, ECO wouldnt

want to meddle too much with what adelivery plan should look like, but our(kindergarten) math tells us that to get from$10bn a year in 2012 to $100bn a year by2020, might require quite a bit of scaling up.Of course, developed country financeministries (who have demonstrated theirconsummate ability to manage the globaleconomy), are much better placed than us tocontemplate the pathway needed deliver atleast $20bn in 2013.And funnily enough, ECO would also like

to make sure that the money on offer hasnt

already been promised (one, five, ten, orfifteen times). The last time we looked, peopleimpacted by climate change hadntmiraculously stopped needing support toaddress their basic development needs

- Continued on Page 2, Column 3

!"#$%&'()'*+%+),(((((((((((((-+))(((((((((((((./)'(011((((((((((((()*+()'2,"'&&'3

#,,/'()+(4(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((5+"/$'(!665####((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((73''(+7(!8%3*'

!!"#$%&'$())*$+,(-.'%)/$(0$12*3425)6*7)*8&-$!*5.62*7)*8&-$462,+'$&8$7&926$.*8)6*&:2*&-$;2*%2-7$!*5.62*7)*8$

"2*$&8$8%)$F1G"""$7)):*H'$.*$I2**J$K,*)$BL??C$

!"#$)7&.-M$&/7.*.'86&:2*N;-.7&8)*)8E26>C26H $O$!"#$E)('.8)M$%P+MQQ;-.7&8)*)8E26>C26HQ);23*)E'-)P)6' $O$!/.826.&-QR62/,;:2*M$K2'%,&$S&66&;%

"#

./)'

!"#$%#&'#($

)**+#

Mid-Term Finance Gap Looms Large

Review on theReview

http://climatenetwork.org/eco-newslettershttp://climatenetwork.org/eco-newslettersmailto:administration@climatenetwork.orgmailto:administration@climatenetwork.org

8/6/2019 ECO 8 Bonn 2011 English Version

2/2

Belaruss efforts to promote accounting of

removals from wetlands in the LULUCFsector could achieve significant impact on theground, particularly when looked at from adomestic perspective. While promotingwetlands restoration under the UNFCCC, athome Belarus is planning to develop anambitious new program of peatlandsdrainage and extraction.

Emissions from degraded peatlands inBelarus have fallen significantly by 80.6percent from 1990 levels. Despite thisprogress, Belarus ranks eighth in the world onpeat-carbon emissions.

But this positive trend may soon be broken.The government plans to build nine new peatplants and use the extracted peat as fuel;inevitably increasing emissions from peatextraction and burning.

Concern is mounting, particularly as plans

include peatlands drainage and extraction

from a number of protected areas recentlyrestored with the help of internationalassistance projects. In fact, according topreliminary information, should these plansmove forward, approximately 20 naturereserves would be either partially orcompletely eliminated, along with theirdiverse biodiversity

Sadly, access to dirty fuel sources seems tobe more important to the Belarusiangovernment than the protected areas it hasreceived support to preserve, and it is unlikelythat Belaruss current plans will subside. This

domestic reality is one clear example of theimportant difference the inclusion ofmandatory wetland management inLULUCF would make towards ensuringcountries take responsibility for wetlandconservation.

Yesterdays negotiations over whether told an additional session later this year left

udwig wondering if negotiators might beore concerned about his amusement thanvancing the negotiations. Parties seemedore interested in coming to agreement onritical issues such as whether September isthe Spring or the Fall, than on how such a

ssion could be made useful! And the cling-ng sound track of loose change seemed to

ng, as the only Parties to raise concerns

out an additional session were those thatould be expected to contribute toward it.While Ludwig appreciates negotiatorsorking to hard to keep him amused, hent help but wonder, instead of fightinger the seasons, how about working towardsaking an extra session worth the money?

The lack of ambition in current mitigationdges, and consequent climate impactjectories, likewise show that Parties no

nger can avoid the question of loss &

mage. The Work Programme agreed on inncn is still an empty shell and needs to be

bstantiated with concrete plans in thission. It is ECOs understanding that failingaccomplish this here and now would meanther delay and impact the procedures of programme until the next fall session

ost COP17 that is).The Cancn decisions provide a goodrting point to include aspects, which aretical to address the needs of all vulnerableuntries impacted as a result of worseningmate change. ECO believes that the

ecific issues that need to be addressed are:st, the work programme should elaborated galvanize support on national andbnational approaches ranging from riskduction strategies (as per the Hyogoamework for Action) to social security andotection measures to viable risk sharingd t r ans f e r op t ions . Second , anernational Climate Risk Insurance Facilityould be discussed in order to provide

mely, need based and adequate support foruntries in case of severe climate effects,

ensuring a risk reduction paradigm. Thirdly,Parties must not shy away from discussing theissues around slow-onset impacts such as sealevel rise, desertification, loss of biodiversity

or impacts on agriculture potentials, whichalready affect vulnerable populationsworldwide. In looking for common grounds,Parties should structure the programme indifferent phases under each topic area; (i)ways to assess loss & damage; (ii) possibleimplementation options including theiropportunities and limitations; and (iii)implementa t ion opt ions under theConvention and accompanying processes.

Lack of clarity (or position) on loss &damage is not acceptable for stalling orinaction because its a matter of survival for

the most vulnerable. Rather, the workprogramme offers the chance for Partiestogether with stakeholders to show,understand, and implement solutions tominimize loss & damage, that otherwisecould not be implemented. This should alsobe understood by some parties that seem tobe deliberately confusing the process.

ECO will follow the Parties in undertakingthe work programme and provide input ast h e y m o v e a l o n g t o d e v e l o precommendations for future negotiations.

!"#$%&'()'*+%+),(((((((((((((-+))(((((((((((((./)'(011((((((((((((()*+()'2,"'&&'3

#,,/'()+(4(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((5+"/$'(!665####((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((73''(+7(!8%3*'

Continued from Page 1, Column 2

(around $130bn globally.)! Mid-term financemust be new and additional finding old,already pledged money under yourdeveloped country mattress is not tolerable.

It doesnt take an ECO article (though weof course believe that helps!) to make thepoint that climate financing cant be based

just on pledges. Pledges may work for the

initial years following the fast start period,but if Parties are at all serious about movingtoward the 2020 goal, then ECO proposesan altogether more rigorous approach. Acombination of significant additionalbudgetary commitments (based on theprinciple of fair shares) and funding comingfrom a set of innovative sources must bephased in as they become available.

Reaching political agreement on amechanism to generate revenues frominternational shipping and aviation (with nonet incidence on developing countries) is one

step that could practically address theexisting financing gaps. ECO agrees withBolivia that a financial transaction tax wouldalso provide much needed additionalfinance. And ECO has also been attracted bythe idea of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)to provide immediately available capital tofinance climate action in developingcountries. Options abound. Choices, choices!But who will take the first step, and help usfind that pot of gold at the end of therainbow?

Loss & Damage: Time to Set ActivitiesHere and Now

Ludwig in Bonn

Unstable Lady Belarus