east asian security and defence digest 29

7/31/2019 East Asian Security and Defence Digest 29

1/9[1]

China's New Aircraft?

Beijing's efforts to counter US's

military capabilities in East Asia

may have come to fruition with the

development of a new fighter jet

that can be a response to the

controversial F-35.

EAST ASIANSECURITY AND DEFENCE

DIGEST

EDITORS NOTE - TIAGO MAURCIOResearcher at Kyoto University and Orient Institute

This past week as seen possibly

dramatic events whose consequences will

be far-reaching both to Japan and East

Asia. Firstly, the modifications to Japan's

nuclear security policy by inserting an

unequivocal reference to national security

can entail the possibility of a future

development of nuclear weapons, or sosome analysts claim. Secondly, another

jurisdictional provision dealing with the use

of space has eased its clauses on the strict

prohibition of using that dimension for

military purposes. Though applicable to

dual-use surveillance technology, it can set

the precedent for more ambitious space

programs that may guarantee Japan a

place in the unfolding quest for outer space

advantages.

The opinionated lore, however, has not

yet expressed their views on any of these

subjects. Instead, JFPO's Rui Faro Saraiva

has brought to the attention of the

community the dramatic reality of Japan-

China mutual perceptions. With an

overwhelming majority of both publics

sharing a negative view of their strategic

neighbour, one can get a glimpse of the

difficulties that lie ahead. Furthermore,there are also serious concerns regarding

the potential for more bilateral incidents,

such as that which occurred in September

2010 involving a Chinese trawler and two

Japanese Coast Guard vessels, spiking

anti-Chinese feeling in Japan. These are

very important trends that ought to be bore

in mind in the future whilst fostering mutual

cooperation, transparency and dialogue to

defuse straining ties from being severed.

!

!


2/9[2]

Can the Senate Reverse President

Obama's Defence Cuts?

But China certainly isn't shy about

its heavenly ambitions. In 2011, Beijing

announced plans to put a man on the

moon by 2020, and its space agency has

publicly suggested establishing a "base

on the moon as we did in the South Pole

and the North Pole." Still, Washington has

given little thought to the possibility thatonce a permanent sett lement is

established, Beijing might seek to assert

extraterrestrial territorial sovereignty,

effectively declaring part of the moon's

surface Chinese territory.

The idea isn't as wild as it sounds.

During the Cold War, the possibility of

countries claiming territory on the moon

or other planets was considered realistic

enough that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty

was enacted to prevent it. Washington is

wearing blinders, though, if it thinks this

piece of paper will prevent a Chinese

lunar land grab. And if China is tempted

to seize some territory, such a move

would surely be a game-changer for

international security. A new realm of

competition beyond Earth's orbit would

alter great-power politics back home as

dramatically as the 1957 launch of

Sputnik spurred the Soviet-American race

to the moon in the first place.

Red Moon Rising (John Hickman -

Foreign Policy).

The State-of-the-art in ROK-US Relations

The United States and South Korea

hav e ma i n ta ine d a s t ro ng and

longstanding alliance for almost six

decades, withstanding significant

changes in their internal dynamics and

the geopolitical climate. In recent years

the two nations have sought to broaden

their relationship to cover economic

development and emerging nontraditional

security challenges. Now the alliance isperhaps the strongest it has been, but

changes loom in both domestic and

international politics. Maintaining forward

progress among these changi ng

environments will be a test for the two

partners in the coming years.

The Sixth Seoul-Washington Forum:

Moving the United States-Korea

Relationship Forward in Changing

Environments (Sung-Joo Han - The

Brookings Institute).

Reshuffling Power Distribution in Asia

Certainly the word 'pivot' has dramatic

connotations. Some may imagine troop

transports flying from Kabul to the Korean

Peninsula, or of aircraft carriers sailing

from the Persian Gulf towards the South

China Sea. The term 'rebalance' may be

less dramatic, but it is a more accurate

description of the new US strategy. In

fact, we will probably see several types ofre-balancing in coming years.

The first is quantitative. 'Rebalance'

doesn't really signify the movement of

resources from West Asia to the Pacific.

The term signifies that, in the post-

Afghanistan world, there will be a greater

relative focus of US defence resources in

the Asia Pacific as compared with other

regions of the world. Much of that focus

will be on the US Navy. For example, the

current 50/50 split of naval resources

between the US Pacific and Atlantic fleets

will become 60/40 by 2020. (It may be a

surprise to some that 50% of the US

Navy is still based in the Atlantic more

than 20 years after the end of the Cold

War; these things change slowly.)

'Asian pivot' is really an 'Asian re-

balance' (David Brewster - The Lowy

Interpreter).

China's Preeminence in the Rare Earth

Elements

Japan accounts for a third of the global

demand and receives 82 percent of its

REE from China. Thus, it is particularly

sensitive to any reduction in China's REE

export quota. Despite Wen Jiabaos

reassurance that REE would not be used

as a diplomatic tool, China temporarily

imposed a de facto export ban to Japan

after the 2010 Diaoyutai/Senkaku

maritime incident, hastening Japanese

efforts to secure REE elsewhere.

Japanese companies have formed

partnerships with companies in Vietnam,

India and Australia to mine in those

countries. Japan has also been actively

engaged in urban mining - the recycling

of end products such as mobile phones

to recover REE materials. Moreover, it

aims to slash domestic consumption of

REE by 30 per cent in the next two years.

Attempts to create a supply chain outside

China seek to lessen the blow of the

export restriction without tackling it

directly. The obvious option would be to

bring a case to the WTO to force China

into lifting the restrictions. Such a move is

not without precedent. In 2009, the US,EU and Mexico filed a case against

Chinese export restrictions on nine raw

materials. China responded by claiming

the general exception under Article XX of

GATT that trade restrictions can be

imposed for the purpose of natural

resource conservation and the protection

of public health, but the WTO Panel

rejected Chinas defence.

Rare Earths: The Dragon's Pearl (Edith

Lai - The Heptagon Post).

India Reacts to Washington's Asia Pivot

The US and India held their third annual

strategic dialogue in Washington on 13

June 2012. At the second dialogue in

June 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton pressed India to assume a more

proactive leadership role in the Asia

Pacific region, exhorting it to not just

look east, but continue to engage and act

east as well.

US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta

enthusiastically restated the same

message during his recent post-Shangri-

La Dialogue swing through New Delhi.

The US pivot and Indias look

east (Sourabh Gupta - East Asia Forum).

China's Bet on Countering US Naval

Capabilities in Its Near Abroad

Are Chinas Near Seas Anti-Navy

capabilities aimed directly at the United

States?

Yes, but its more complicated than

that. In the military realm, Washington

and Beijing face a situation that is

complex both in concept and in policy

implications. In contrast to its mostly-

settled land borders , Chinas island and

maritime zone claims in the Near Seas

remain mostly unresolved.

To further its still-contested claims in

these Three Seas (the Yellow, East

China, and South China Seas), China is

developing increasingly-sophisticated

capabilities to hold at risk forces of the

U.S. and its allies and friends in that

region and its immediate approaches.While some of these anti-access/area

denial (A2/AD)or, from Beijings
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3/9[3]

perspective, counter-intervention

capabilities are naval in nature, land-

based missiles controlled by the Second

Artillery Force and land-based aircraft

constitute many of the most potent and

potentially effective ones. Thus, merely

comparing the two nations navies as a

whole, whatever allowances are made for

the fact that the globally-distributed and -

tasked U.S. Navy could not divert the

majority of its platforms to the Near Seaseven in wartime, fails to capture the true

extent of the Peoples Liberation Army

(PLA)s emerging challenge to the U.S.

Navy. For this reason, some U.S.

government analysts refer to Chinas A2/

AD forces as an Anti-Navy .

Are Chinas Near Seas Anti-Navy

capabilities aimed directly at the United

States? (Andrew Erickson - Information

Dissemination).

Is India Really a Swing State in US's

Asian Strategy?

If he felt any disappointment at not

achieving any substantial breakthrough in

talks with Indian Defense Minister A.K.

Antony, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon

Panetta didnt show it publicly. On a

swing through Asia that started with

Singapores annual Shangri-La Dialogue,

Panetta had hoped to bring the Indian

defense establishment on board for a

rebalancing strategy that many believe is

aimed squarely at China.

Why India Snubbed U.S. (Nitin Gokhale- Foreign Policy).

The Trans-Pacific Partnership in

Perspective

At their summit in Beijing on May 13,

the leaders of China, Japan, and South

Korea agreed to start negotiations on a

trilateral free trade agreement by the end

of the year. For Japan, 30% of whose

total exports go to China and South

Korea, the elimination of tariffs under

such an FTA would be a major plus. Andit has been calculated that it would boost

Japans gross domestic product by 0.3%.

So the agreement to start talks is

welcome. But we cannot be certain that

the negotiations will actually be launched

as agreed before the year ends. For one

thing, South Korea has a deficit in its

trade with Japan. Furthermore, South

Korean companies would be better

served by a bilateral FTA between their

country and China than by a trilateral

agreement that would level the playingfield between them and their Japanese

rivals in the Chinese market.

Looking Ahead in Promoting Free Trade

and Sustaining Japans Defense

Industry (Shiraishi Takashi -

Nippon.com).

Behold, China's Response to the

Controversial F-35?

Another hypothesis is that this is the

long-rumored single-seat variant of

Hongdus L-15 advanced jet trainer. The

L-15 is a twin-engine design similar to theYak-130. A single-seat light attack variant

would be a logical development. It could

be an attractive export offering and a

much needed replacement for the

PLAAFs obsolete Q-5 light attack aircraft.

But given the heavy security presence

around the air frames transporter, it is

most plausible that this is either a mock-

up or static test frame of Shenyang

Aircraft Corporations latest combat

aircraft program. The images reveal an air

frame that bears a strong resemblance to

a model displayed by Shenyang in arecent UAV exhibition. While the unveiling

of a flying prototype may not take place

this year, photos of the mock-up/static

test frame is proof that there is at least

one other advanced combat aircraft

project in China other than the J-20.

Chinas homegrown F-35? (Wilson

Chau - Asia Security Watch).

South Pacific Islands' Strategic Drift

The recent Chinese involvement in

Yap, and the FSM as a whole, may be

nothing more than a coincidence between

three interests: a private Chinese

company seeking to make profit; the

Chinese government trying to quell its

Mal thus ian fears by secur ing a

dependable food source for its enormous

population; and the FSM government

trying to develop infrastructure and a

sustainable economic sector that a nearly30-year-old agreement with the US has

failed to develop. Yet given the FSMs

geo-political situation between China and

the US, Chinas ever increasing defence

budget, and the proximity of these islands

and their territorial waters to US military

installations in Guam and the Kwajalein

Atol l, there is reason to fear that

something that started as mutually

beneficial will devolve into something that

is mutually detrimental.

Micronesias future between China and

the US (Scott Leis - East Asia Forum).

An Overview of China's Regional Impact

How is the rise of China changing

East Asia? In order to understand what is

happening, we need to consider the

impact of Chinas growing influence from

a number of different perspectives. In this

article, I want to look at some of the ways

in which an increasingly assertive China is

shaping the regional order in East Asia,

how other countries in the region are

reacting to Chinas rise, and the ways

Chinese economic cooperation is

changing the overall situation in East

Asia.

The Rise of China and Its Significance

for East Asia (Shiraishi Takahashi -

Nippon.com).
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4/9[4]

Japan's Role in Myanmar's

Democratisation

The Japanese governments idea of

appointing me ambassador stems, I

think, from the success of a unique

Nippon Foundation project for assisting

ethnic minorities in Myanmar. Initiatives

und er thi s pro j ect inc lud e the

construction of elementary schools and

the distribution of medicine boxes

[called okigusuri in Japanese] containing

traditional medicines. The school

construction, in particular, gives even

ethn ic minorities living in remote

mountainous areas a sense that the

central governments democratization is

bringing tangible results. In the state of

Shan, for instance, inhabited by several

ethnic groups, around 200 elementary

schools have been constructed already

under the project. And work is moving

forward on the construction of 100

schools in the state of Rakhine, where

religious conflict has been escalating.

The Road to True

Democracy in Myanmar

(Sasakawa Yohei -Nippon.com).

The Deployment of Osprey Aircraft to

Okinawa Raises Local Concerns

Okinawa is once again showing signs

of increasing public protest against

decision made by Tokyo's central

government regarding the United States'

military presence in the island. This time,

the speakers and microphones were

voicing the concerns of more than 5,000

people who fear that the scheduled

redeployment of MV-22 Osprey aircrafts

from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)

Iwakuni to MCAS Futenma later this year

is a serious hazard to the population.

Fears have been ignited following two

incidents involving Ospreys in recent

months. Firstly in Morocco, where a

crash in April has led to the fatally of the

two crewmen onboard. Secondly, last

week's crash in Florida has once again

led Okinawans to question the safety of

operating the twin- tilt-rotor aircraft in a

densely populated area. Fears over a

repetition of the 2004 US helicopter

crash in Okinawa International University

are undoubtedly fueling some of the

protesters to ask for the withdrawal of

Prime Minister Noda's decision for

redeployment. Not to mention the noise

pollu tion the aircr aft' s rotors are

(in)famously known to create.

Okinawa and the

Redeployment of Ospreys toFutenma

JAPAN

HIGHLIGHTS

OKINAWA WITNESSES LOCAL

PROTESTS OVER

DEPLOYMENT OF OSPREYS!

Mutual Perceptions Among

Japanese and Chinese Are At

Extreme Low
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5/9[5]

(Tiago Mauricio - JFPO).

What Happened to Japan's Leadership

Model?

But Japan has been suffering dramatic

reverses in two critical areas - population

and cutting edge industries. With nearly a

quarter of its people already over 65, Japan

is aging more rapidly than any other major

country and will see 40 percent of its people

at the age of 65 or older by 2050. Also, by

2050, the total population will drop from

today's 128 million to only 95 million. That

will make achieving any kind of growth and

paying the retirement and health costs of

the elderly extremely difficult. Meanwhile,

on the industrial scene, much of the

Japanese semiconductor industry that

nearly killed off Silicon Valley in the 1980srecently declared bankruptcy in the face of

aggressive competition from the likes of

Korea's Samsung and Hynix and Taiwan's

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing

Company. Similarly, Korea's Samsung and

LG are running away with the flat panel

electronic display market once the preserve

of Japan's Sony and Sharp. Finally, Korea's

Hyundai/Kia Motors is taking great chunks

of market share away from the Japanese

auto companies in the North American,

European, South American, and Chinese

markets while the Korea ship builders have

pushed the Japanese into only a small

share of the high end ship bui ldin g

business.

Back to Japan's Future

(Clyde Prestowitz - Foreign Policy).

Perceptions and Misperceptions in Japan-

China Relations

This survey came to my attention during

the prime time news on NHK. About 84% of

Japanese respondents said they have a

negative impression of China, while 64.5%

of Chinese indicated that the feeling is

mutual regarding Japan. Its the highest

percentage of negative views seen among

Japanese respondents since 2005. In a very

simplistic and generalized way we could say

that most of the Japanese have a negative

perception about China, and the same

occurs with the majority of Chinese peoplewhen they think about Japan.

Japan and China Mutual

Perceptions

(Rui Faro Saraiva -JFPO).

With Interests Rising in East Asia, Will

Russia Follow Suit?

As China steps up its external

econ omic coope rat i on act i v i t i es ,

international institutions like the ADB, along

with bilateral aid organizations and

i n t e r n a t i o n a l n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l

organizations, are actively working to build

their ties with the responsible Chinese

organs in connection with the Mekong

region. Japan has also been forming a

relationship with China in connection with

the region. Since 2008 the two countries

foreign ministries have been engaging in

policy dialogue on Mekong region. Dialogue

is also being conducted within the region

for example, between JICA Overseas

Offices and the economic and commercial

sections of the Chinese embassies in

Cambodia and Myanmar. Meanwhile,

Japanese companies have been building

global partnerships with their Chinese

counterparts in locations around the world,

including joint undertakings in Vietnam for

thermal power plant and cement plant

construction.

Chinas External Economic

Cooperation: Ties to the

Mekong Region

(Kitano Naohiro -Nippon.com).

Interview with Linus Hagstrm

Continuing ours series of interviews with

specialists on Japanese foreign and

security policy and East Asian affairs at

Japan Foreign Policy Observatory (JFPO),

yet again we bring you another renown

scholar whose significant contributions to

Japanese studies have earned him a

privileged status in the global intellectual

landscape. Professor Linus Hagstrm is a

dist ingu ish ed aca demi c with a long

repertoire of publications, conferences and

positions, and therefore an authority in

security studies not only with regards to

Japan but also more broadly.

I first met Professor Hagstrm at an event

in the University of Kobe, where Professor

Minohara Tosh held a conference with

several other academics. Hagstrm's

presentation followed the results of his

research on "Chinese Aggression and

Japanese Defeat: Deconstructing Narratives

on the 2010 Senkaku Islands Incident."

Incidentally, I have penned down a few

thoughts in the aftermath of the said

conference which may give you a glimpse of

the ideas presented. What followed was a

heated and rich debate that aroused my

interest to look a bit deeper into the

process in which Japan's identity politicsshapes its foreign policy decisions, namely

in times of crises.

Wanting to find out more about the

relevance of the constructivist turn in IR

scholarship on Japan's foreign and security

policy, I then had the pleasure of arranging

an interview with Prof. Hagstrm. He is

currently a Japan Foundation scholar at

Kyoto University's Graduate School of Law,

in a bu ild ing opp osi te to min e. Wediscus sed severa l issues concerni ng

Japan's internal and external dimensions

an d ho w th e ch an gi ng st ra te g i c

environment is forcing policy-makers to

adapt and reinvent established formulas to

deal with both emerging and longstanding

risks and threats. As our meeting ended, I

kindly invited him to answer a few questions

for Japan Foreign Policy Observatory. The

following is the result of yet another

discussion.

But before I share with you Hagstrm's
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6/9[6]

in si gh ts , al lo w me to do a sh or t

presentation for those of you who are not

familiar with his work. The bio is taken

directly from the professor's personal

website, which can be accessed at: http://

www.linushagstrom.org

Linus Hagstrm is currently Japan

Foundation Fellow and Visiting Professor at

Kyoto University (January to July 2012),

Senior Research Fellow and East Asia

Program Chair at the Swedish Institute of

International Affairs, Research Fellow at the

Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History

and Antiquities, and Associate Professor of

Political Science at Stockholm University.

He is also Research Associate at The

European Institute of Japanese Studies and

the East Asia Peace Programme, Editorial

Board Member of Pacific Affairs,and BoardMember of the Scholarship Foundation for

the Study of Japanese Society.

Hagstrms research covers Japanese

foreign- and security policy, JapanChina

relations, the North Korean nuclear issue

and Japanese domestic politics. His primary

field of expertise is foreign policy analysis,

and he has worked extensively with power

analysis. Hagstrm is currently interested in

interpretation and identity.

: : INTERVIEW : :

In analysing Japan's foreign and security

policy, North Korea is a curious case study

that may allow us to understand Japan's

role as a regional security actor. In your co-

edited book "North Korea Policy: Japan and

the Great Powers", you have explored this

facet of Japan's policy toward the Peninsula

and one gets the sense that Tokyo's posture

towards Pyongyang is indicative of the

commitment toward the pursuit of a

proactive role internationally. But how is this

issue perceived by the political leadership in

Japan? Can we resume it to an interest in

the abduction issue, its nuclear programme

and impact on regional security, or are there

other dimensions often overlooked?

Its true that Ive from time to time been

analyzing the multilateral coordination of

North Korea policy as a case of Japanese

foreign and security policy. The background

is that Ive a problem with the way in which

Japan is most often seen as lacking in

agency in its foreign and security policyas

if it were merely an appendix to the USA.

This view is shared by the US mainstream

an d rad ic a l an a ly s ts l i k e Gav an

McCormack , although there are big

differences in the nuances and particularlyin the normative aspects of their arguments.

Ive argued that North Korea policy is a

good case to test this view of Japan.

The reason is basically that its a case

where the interests of all regional actors

intersect, overlap and also collide. I'm not

sure if "proactive" most appropriately

captures my findings, but where most

analysts have seen a passive and largely

insignificant Japan in the multilateral

coordination of North Korea policy, and at

time s an obstr uct ive and ther efor e

insignificant Japan, my articles on the

subject make three interrelated arguments:

1. The gist of my article The Dogma of

Japanese insignificance is that analyses of

the multilateral coordination describe quite

a few Japanese behaviors which could be

interpreted in terms of Japanese exercises

of power over other actors, but that they

entirely fail to make that interpretation. The

reason is arguably that the view of Japan as

weak and subservient in its foreign and

security policy has functioned as a lens,

enabling certain interpretations and

disabling others.

2. Another articleNormalizing Japan

argued basically that Japan has often been

accused of obstructing the process of the

Six-Party Talks by relentlessly bringing up

the abduction issue, but that most analysts

fail to acknowledge the component of

Japanese power. Namely, by conditioning

the use of economic incentives on the

normalization of diplomatic relations and by

conditioning normalization on a full solution

of the abduction issue, Japan keeps

withholding what is deemed as a crucial

component in a future lasting solution of the

nuclear conundrum.

3. A third articleCritiquing the Idea of

Japanese Exceptionalismargues that

Japan's approach to the North Korean

nuclear issue has been seen as unique and

exceptional, but that it actually compares

rather well with that of other actors

involved. All seem to favor short-term

national gains before denuclearization. No

one seems fully committed to solving the

nuclear issue.

4. The implication of the three articles is

that in the multilateral coordination of North

Korea policy Japan has been exercising

power over the other actors in attempts to

secure national interests. Hence, it is

already behaving quite "normally" in itsNorth Korea policy.

North Korea's regime and international

behaviour also questions Japan's direct

peace and security, not just its role in the

region. Despite that, it appears that the

DPRK checks Japan's efforts to delineate a

strategy for East Asia, or indeed the political

will to engage with these issues. Is Japan

devoid of a strategy toward its near-

abroad?

First of all, I don't think North Korea is a

serious threat to Japan. Still, as I have

argued in the co-authored piece Among

Threats and a Perfect Excuse, the fact that

its constructed as a threat of sorts in

Japanese discourses is quite interesting

and probably reflective of a Japanese

interest in not securitizing China. North

Korea provides Japan with a very good

excuse to undertake changes in its security

policy, which had probably been better

understood in the context of the rising

China.

As for the question of the presence or

absence of a Japanese strategy, I think the

commonly held notion that Japan lacks a

strategy is very interesting in itself. When I

tell people in Japan what I'm doing research

about the most common reaction is to ask

"but is there such a thing as a Japaneseforeign and security policy?" In short, most

people seem to think that a strategic

component is lacking in Japanese foreign

and security policy. In this context I think

it's worthwhile first to point out that

"strategy" seems to be something we

usually ascribe enemies or threats to

ourselves, while the threatened self is

usually seen as devoid of strategic thinking;

and second to remind that in Chinese

discourses Japan is typically construed as

very strategic. Whether Japan has a

strategy or not is thus a matter of
http://www.linushagstrom.org/http://www.linushagstrom.org/http://www.linushagstrom.org/http://www.linushagstrom.org/


7/9[7]

interpretation, and to claim that it does, or

that it doesn't, itself tends to fulfill strategic

goals.

This strategic debate on Japan's role in the

world is now very much alive with the rise of

China. Though cooperative powers in many

areas, they also have some very important

tension points that might have an impact in

the relationship as a whole. That became

evident in the aftermath of the Senkaku/

Diaoyu Islands incident of 2010. How has

this incident been construed in Japan

regarding the larger strategic debate as

aforementioned?

Overall I think the aspect if tension in the

bi lat eral relat i onshi p is commonl y

overstated. It is clear that there remains

many divisive issues, but at the same time I

think there has been a quite consistent

pattern of Japan accommodating the rise of

China since 1978. This is an argument that I

make in a coauthored article (with Bjrn

Jerden) that is forthcoming in Journal of

East Asian Studies. In the wake of the

Senkaku/Diaoyu incident in September 2010

most analy sts in Japa n and abroad

understood the process and outcome of the

incident as yet another instance of weak

Japan and strong China, and as evidence ofthe power shift occurring in East Asia and

around the worldthe rise of China and

Japan's decline.

However, this image isnt unproblematic,

because available data actually lend

themselves to rather contradictory

interpretations. Although it was arguably

Tokyo that escalated the incident by taking

unprecedented measures, namely by

detaining the Chinese captain, Japan was

discursively construed as the reasonable

party while China was understood as

aggressive, clearly to the advantage of

Japan and the disadvantage of China. This

is by the way the topic of another

forthcoming article in Chinese Journal of

International Politics.

Muc h ha s bee n wri tte n on Jap an' s

"normalisation", it becoming a civilian or

normative power and thus represent a force

for good in word affairs. Where do you see

this debate of Japan's "exceptionalism"

going?

There is no consensus about the standards

of "normality" and as I pointed out before

Japan could in many ways be understood

as quite "normal" already. I think this debate

is mostly about identity, both Japan's

identity and the identity of those, which

seek to define Japan. I'm currently working

on an article discussing notions of Japan's

"excep tionalis m" and "normali zation"exactly in such terms, and I don't want to

forego my analysis anymore than this.

In the conversation we had you mentioned

the emphasis the Swedish academy is

investing in becoming a hub for Japanese

studies in Europe, and how it should

dev elop a diff ere nt voi ce, the reby

countering the existent dominant discourse

by the American School, as it were. Could

you explain to us what are your views on thecurrent state of affairs in Japanese studies

in North America and Europe and what

trend s you see deve lopin g, perh aps

illustrating with the Swedish case?

I think Japan's IR as a subject is far more

developed in the USA than in Europe, and

one can clearly see how the US research is

most often related to American strategic

interests in East Asia. The US debate takes

plac e with in quit e clea rly defin edperimeters, characterized by the shared

int eres t of retain ing the US as the

preeminent actor in the East Asian theater.

Some European scholars take part in the

debat e on Japan's IR witho ut ever

questioning the assumptions upon which it

is conducted, and without ever challenging

its US centrism.

Th e fir st step is cl ea rl y to try to

problematize the taken-for-grantedness of

the most pervasive assumptions in this

debateto discuss them in terms of

interpretations and to provide different

interpretations. This is something that I've

been preoccupied with over the past

decade. The next step might be to try to

construe a more "European voice" in the

analysis of East Asian IR, and to think more

carefully about what interests Europe

might have. I'm not sure this is something

I'm personally going to be very much

engaged in, but to some extent it is already

happe ning within the fram ework ofEurope an Japan Advanced Rese arch

Network under the leadership of my

colleague in Stockholm, Professor Marie

Sderberg.

I should also add that there is curiously

much research on East Asian international

politics going on in Stockholm already,

although people and resources are divided

between a number of institutes and

institutions. Marie, others, and I share anambition to keep developing Stockholm into

a hub of both Japanese studies and East

Asian studies more broadly, not least by

attracting good PhD candidates and

postdocs.

It is only fitting to express my sincerest

gratitude to Linus Hagstrm for kindly

conceding to share his thoughts with JFPO

and our readership. We will continue

following his work attentively and pay closeattention to developments in Europe's

Japanese studies panorama.

Interview with Linus

Hagstrm (Tiago Mauricio -JFPO).
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8/9[8]

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restored in DVD format
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9/9

Japan and China Mutual Perceptions by Rui Faro

Saraiva

Interview with Linus Hagstrm by Tiago Mauricio

Remembering Manzanar by Aleksandra Babovic

Okinawa and the Redeployment of Ospreys to

Futenma by Tiago Maurcio

A World Maritime Outlook by Tiago Mauricio

EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE DIGESTEditor: TIAGO MAURICIO

Editors Mailbox: mauricio.tiago.47x(at)st.kyoto-u.ac.jp

Kyoto, Japan

East Asia Security and Defence Digest covers expert analysis

and news highlights on East Asian Security and Defence Affairs.

The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do

not necessarily reflect the views of JFPO.

JAPAN FOREIGN POLICYOBSERVATORY(JFPO)

HTTP://WWW.JAPANFPO.ORG/
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east asian security and defence digest 29

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