east asian security and defence digest 30
TRANSCRIPT
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Asia's military spending goes up
Increased military spending may
shift power dynamics in East Asia,
namely between the US, Japan and
China
EAST ASIANSECURITY AND DEFENCE
DIGEST
EDITOR’S NOTE - TIAGO MAURÍCIOResearcher at Kyoto University and Orient Institute
Last week's most relevant news must
have been the findings of huge deposits of
Rare Earth Elements (REE) off the coast of
Minamitorishima, Japan's eastern most
island, located to the Southeast of Tokyo
(see map). According to preliminary figures,
the abundance of these minerals would
provide Japan self-sufficiency for a
staggering 230 years, and more findingsare yet to be confirmed. More probes have
been undertaken within the island's
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) as well as
in international waters between the main
archipelago and this remote island,
indicating the existence of equally massive
deposits. The consequences are obvious.
China is currently the major producer
and export of REE, holding approximately
98% of world's output in the sector. As the
minerals are key materials in the high-
technology industry, being incorporated in
LCD monitors, electric batteries, car
components and so forth, Japan has
witnessed a growing dependence on the
Chinese market to meet its requirements.
Furthermore, this dependence has had a
clear impact in the country's foreign policy
toward China, as the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands incident of September 2010 well
demonstrated. Briefly put, China decided
to halt its exports of rare earth minerals to
Japan as its Coast Guard arrested anddetained a Chinese fisherman who rammed
two the coast guard's vessels, promptly
causing a bilateral crisis between the
world's major trading partners.
With these findings, there remain
doubts regarding the best way to exploit
these resources. There are important
technological limitations which need be
overcome as well as financial investment
into the corporate. But if successful, this
venture could well represent a shift in
Japan's foreign policy toward China and
contribute to its economic revamping at
the same time.
!
!
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What's the status in China's space
quest?
“There is a condescending tone to
much of the international reportage on
China's recent space docking and
expedition to its first space laboratory,
Tiangong 1. Commentators applaud
China's progress in space exploration but
claim they are decades behind the USand Russia, who achieved similar feats in
the 1970s.
These reports fail to account for the
'leapfrog' effect of technological
advances, and the benefit of experience
from other nations. Such effects are
propelling much of Africa from being
disconnected from telecommunications
to enjoying broadband wireless services
in just a few years. The effects are just as
significant for China's space missions.”
“China's quickening pace in
space” (Morris Jones - The Lowy
Interpreter).
A non-military, Swiss-type Japan
“China is not a military threat to
Japan, and even if it were the US cannot
and will not go to war with China to
protect Japan. The notion that the US–
Japan military alliance is a form of
deterrence is nonsense. The right wayforward for Japan is to abrogate the
defence treaty with the US. US military
bases in Japan should be closed and
military personnel sent home. Japan
should use diplomacy to achieve ‘win-
win’ resolutions of disputes with China,
including territorial disputes.
Japan should aim to become an
‘Asian Switzerland’. This concept, which
was widely endorsed immediately after
the war, is now barely mentioned at a
time when East Asia is gradually
descending into military competition.
Japan should return to the peace spirit
that characterised the aftermath of the
war, when the nation decided to work
toward world peace.”
“US–China collusion and the way forward
for Japan” (Susumu Yabuki - East Asia
Forum).
China's strategic moderation may prevent
conflict in South China Sea
“Encounters of the kind that has just
concluded safely, after two months of
tension, are only going to become more
and more frequent in the overfished
South China Sea; and as the region’s
fishermen grow ever angrier, as they find
their living increasingly difficult to come
by, those encounters will unavoidably
become potential flashpoints.
By adopting the Scarborough Model and
expanding its white-hull fleet, China
deserves credit for furnishing itself with a
toolkit with which to deal with these
disputes forcefully, but non-militarily. That
reduces the likelihood of conflict. But at
the same time, the countries confronting
China at sea must remember that the
nationalistic gallery that Beijing plays to
has no love for not-so-hard power
solutions. They must not give Chinacause to abandon them.”
“China’s Not-So-Hard Power
Strategy” (Trefor Moss - The Diplomat).
Obama's failure to turn Russia into an ally
“ "The b igges t p rob lem o f t h i s
administration's policy was their attempt
to separate different issues," Kozlovsky,
the opposition activist, put it to me. "They
said that you could cooperate on, say,
nonproliferation and disagree on humanrights, and it's OK. It didn't work because
Moscow doesn't think or act this way --
and also because all these things are
connected."
But perhaps this assessment of the reset
is too harsh. It has, after all, resulted in
one undisputed achievement -- the
disillusionment of the liberal intelligentsia,
the one Russian group traditionally a
stalwart American ally. Lilia Shevtsova, asenior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow
Center argued in a recent essay in the
American Interest that today's equivalent
of the Soviet dissident isn't looking to
Washington for moral or intellectual
support anymore. Shevtsova expanded
on her thesis to me via email. The new
orientation, she wrote, "is not anti-
Americanism in its traditional form. This is
criticism of connivance regarding the
Kremlin and rejection of the normative
dimension in dealing with Putin. Thisattitude is becoming very popular among
the liberals."
In other words, the reset has achieved the
worst of all possible outcomes: It has
made a renewed enemy of Putin, and it's
alienated the best and brightest of our
would-be allies too.”
“Putin's Got America Right Where He
Wants It” (Michael Weiss - Foreign
Policy).
Further tensions will emerge in South
China Sea
“Over the weekend, the China National
Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) quietly
announced that nine new blocks in the
South China Sea were now open to
foreign oil companies for exploration and
development. This move reflects one of
the starkest efforts by China to assert its
maritime rights in these disputed waters –and constitutes a direct challenge to
Vietnam’s own claims.”
“The South China Sea Oil Card” (Taylor
Fravel - China Power).
What can one make of the US Congress'
handling of defence?
“I mention this because I've just
been reading Towell's essay in a fairly
new book, Congress and the Politics ofNational Security. I covered the military
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for decades, but I didn't realize it until
reading the essay that the Armed
Services Committees are anomalies,
having unique and far more intrusive
powers than do other committees. "The
Constitution assigns Congress a degree
of authority over the organization and
equipage of the armed services that has
no parallel in terms of the relationship of
the legislative branch with other executivebranch agencies," he writes. "The Senate
Armed Serv ices Commit tees draws
particularly strong leverage from the fact
that promotions for military officers-unlike
those for civil servants-require Senate
confirmation."”
“Congress and defense: Somebody finally
steps up to explain how this thing
works” (Thomas Ricks - Foreign Policy).
Looking back into the Korean War
“The ‘fourth Korean War’, which
started on 25 June 1950 with a surprise
attack from the North against the South,
was an attempt to unify the country, butsoon escalated to the level of a proxy
World War III, involving some 20
countries. After three years of fratricidal
conflict , and despite the strong
opposition from the ROK President Rhee
Syngman, delegates from North Korea,
China and the United Nations Command
signed the Armistice Agreement on 27
July 1953. Six decades later, a peace
treaty has not yet been formalised.
The first step toward ending thisfourth Korean War would be for the
regional neighbours to formally recognise
the two Korean states. Both China and
Russia have already establ ished
diplomatic and trade relations with South
Korea, while continuing to provide
economic aid and security assurances to
keep North Korea afloat. It is now time for
the US and Japan to recognise North
Korea, assuage its security concerns and
lift economic sanctions.”
“The Korean War and East Asia” (Leonid
Petrov - East Asia Forum).
Dealing with North Korea
“Last Tuesday, U.S. Congressman
Hank Johnson and his adviser Jonathan
Ossoff criticized what they described as a
“dangerous provision” in this year’s house
version of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA). The provision,
which calls for the Obama administrationto consider deploy ing addit ional
conventional and nuclear forces to the
Western Pacific, isn’t near ly as
“dangerous” as Johnson and Ossoff
make it out to be. It is, instead, a
reasonable effort to pursue U.S. policy
goals in Northeast Asia.
Johnson and Ossoff don’t give it a fair
shake. For starters, one can’t help but
wonder if they have actually read the
provision, whose language, which they
describe as “Dr. Strangelove-esque,” isanything but. Congress, the provision
reads, “encourages further steps,
including such steps to deploy additional
conventional forces of the United States
and redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to
the Western Pacific region.””
“ A big stick for North Korea?” (Michael
Mazza - American Enterprise Institute).
Pyongyang's "Sea of Fire" Reassessed
“For more than a decade, conventional
wisdom has held that North Korea could
subject the South Korean capital of Seoul
to devastating artillery attack. With a
greater metropolitan population of
24,000,000, Seoul has the largest
population density of all the OECD
countries, eight times more dense than
New York City, and three times more
dense than Tokyo/Yokohama. Aimed at
Seoul, North Korea’s prodigious amount
of artillery, particularly its 170mm Koksan
guns and 240mm multiple rocket
launchers, could kill “millions of people”
the event of war on the Korean peninsula.
The “Sea of Fire” scenario first surfaced
after the Clinton Administration decided
not to attack North Korean nuclear
facilities in 1994. Coincidence? Maybe,
but since then it’s been used to trump
discussion of any military action against
North Korea, for whatever reason.
Uncertainty about how military actionwould play out, as well as the North’s
unpredictability, means that virtually
anything anyone proposed risked the
“Sea of Fire”. This haunting scenario has
played a role in how policymakers and
wonks view engagement with the North.”
“North Korea Can’t Really Turn Seoul Into
a “Sea of Fire”” (Kyle Mizokami - Asia
Security Watch).
The Size of the US Navy Matters
“History is unkind to sea powers that
invent fudge factors – golly-gee
technology, tactical mastery, indomitable
élan – to explain away numerical
shortfalls. The interwar Imperial Japanese
Navy had boundless faith in Japanese
seafarers’ resolve and tactical virtuosity.
Commanders talked themselves into
believing that these intangibles wouldnegate superior U.S. Navy numbers. Their
navy now litters the bottom of the Pacific
– in large part because Rosie the Riveter
and her comrades turned out warships
and merchantmen like sausages during
World War II, overwhelming Japan with
insurmountable numbers. Quantity does
matter. Let’s not succumb to the sort of
thinking that beguiled Tokyo in those
fateful years.”
“U.S. Navy’s Quantity Problem” (James
Holmes - Flashpoints).
Some reasons why China didn't attend
the Shangri-La Dialogue en masse
“Central Asia's magisterial valleys,
like the Fergana or the high plateaus of
the Pamirs, have long been thought to be
the location of the mythical Shangri-La.
This idyllic hidden valley, where
peace-loving people age only ever so
slowly, not only inspired James Hilton towrite his eponymous book but also
Southeast Asian billionaire Robert Kuok
to found the Shangri-La Hotel in
Singapore. And the luxury hotel has lent
its name to the annual Shangri-La
Dialogue, the International Institute for
Strategic Studies' Asia Security Summit,
regularly attended by defence ministers
from the region and the US Secretary of
Defense.”
“China prefers the real Shangri-
La” (Rafaello Pantucci & Alexandros
Petersen- The Lowy Interpreter).
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Breaking free of dependence on
Chin's REE?
“The possible implications are
obvious. Japan's dependence on
Chinese rare earth elements can
soon become a reality of the past,
thusly attaining leverage over its
s t ra teg i c partner over key
elements for its vital industrial
complex. One must recall the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Incident
of September 2010 and China's
reprisal over Japan's Coast Guard
apprehension of a Chinese trawlerby cutting its exports of REE to
Japan. Due to the Japanese
economy's dependence on these
elements, dealings over territorial
disputes have been continuously
winded down in order to avoid
escalation and major economic
disruptions in the larger bilateral
trade relationship in the world.”
“Digging the Right Hole? Japan,
China and Rare Earth Minerals”
(Tiago Mauricio - JFPO).
Further thoughts on Japan's newdefence minister
“Japanese Pr ime Min ister
Yoshihiko Noda recently reshuffled
his cabinet as a means of courting
the support of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) for
legislation related to increasing the
consumption tax. Noda replaced
five of his 18 cabinet members,
including Defense Minister Naoki
Tanaka and Land, Infrastructure,
Transport, and Tourism MinisterTakeshi Maeda, both of whom
were censured in the House of
Councilors. Yet, the change that
has drawn the most attention is
the appointment of Tanaka’s
successor, Satoshi Morimoto. This
is because Morimoto is an
academic, not a politician, making
him the first non-politician to
become Japan’s top defense chief
since World War II. But although
the media and opposition partieshave joined in criticizing his
appointment, Noda’s choice
deserves praise. Finally, Japan hasa d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r w i t h
unquestionable expertise.”
“Japan’s Sensible New Defense
Chief”
(Jeffrey Hornung - The Diplomat).
Taking the pulse of Japan-EU
relations
““Apathy” is a word often used to
describe relations between Europeand Japan. But even though the
two sides are geographically
remote from each other, neither
can afford to neglect these
relations, given the recent changes
in the international environment
and the resulting need to rethink
d ip lomat ic s t ra teg i es . The
opportunities for strengthening
Japan-Europe ties are particularly
r i p e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
Mediterranean area stretching fromNorth Africa to the Middle East,
JAPAN
HIGHLIGHTSJAPAN FINDS MASSIVE
QUANTITIES OF RARE
EARTH MATERIALS IN
EASTERN MOST ISLAND
!
Talking about the SDF's role in
Japanese foreign policy is to talk about
hard vs. soft power
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where the Arab Spring has brought
political change to many countries as
well as a desire for economic and
po l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . H o w e v e r ,
cooperation will not bring significant
results unless it is part of a coherent
plan. If Japan can project a global
vision, its ties with Europe will
contribute to significant results.
Japan must convey its own vision,while relying on a multilateral
framework to address a variety of
global problems such as the issue of
the environment, rather than limiting
itself to its separate, bilateral ties with
the United States, China, and
Europe .”
“Partnering with Europe to Expand
Diplomatic Options”
(Sakai Kazunari - Nippon.com).
Insightful accounts of Japan's climate
policy
“The problem is that there are not
e n o u g h p o l i c i e s s u p p o r t i n g
renewables, which currently account
for only 6% of energy mix. The
nuclear power is presented as the
only way to achieve emissions
reduction. The good thing is that
recently Industry Minister Yukio
Edano approved the introduction offeed-in tariffs, which means a boost
in clean energy investments. It is said
that the government will decide its
energy policy in summer this year.
Clearly, Japan is now at a turning
point and it needs a vision for future
both in energy and in environment
policies. ”
“Japan's Climate Change Policy”
(Monika Ostrowska - JFPO).
Settling the textbooks issue dispute?
“In this article I will offer a brief
exposition of the way history
textbooks are currently produced in
Japan and how they are used in
primary and secondary education.
Though the characteristics of Japan’s
textbook system have recently
become well known among Japan
specialists around the world, there
s e e m s t o b e c o n s i d e r a b l emisunderstanding on the subject
among historians not specializing in
Japan and among the public.”
“Japan’s History Textbook System:
Creation, Screening, and Selection”
(Mitani Hiroshi - Nippon.com).
Settling the textbooks issue dispute?“In this article I will offer a brief
exposition of the way history
textbooks are currently produced in
Japan and how they are used in
primary and secondary education.
Though the characteristics of Japan’s
textbook system have recently
become well known among Japan
specialists around the world, there
s e e m s t o b e c o n s i d e r a b l e
misunderstanding on the subject
among historians not specializing inJapan and among the public.”
“Japan’s History Textbook System:
Creation, Screening, and Selection”
(Mitani Hiroshi - Nippon.com).
Understanding Japanese ODA
“Gaiatsu or the fore igner
pressure on the Japanese ODA
structure has influenced, specially,
the size of Japanese aid (Monterrey
Consensus) and even, at times, the
allocation of that aid to country
recipients. However, the usage of aid
has been a result of naiatsu or
internal political factors. Three
domestic political factors have been
determinants of these practices:
cultural values, national interest and
institutions. Without enter into so
much details, it can be said that, first,
cu l t u ra l va lues i n Japa nese
government and society is shaped bythe own Japanese experience on
development, that includes a strong
state participating in the market and
business decisions, as well as the
emphasis on growth as a key driver
of development. Second, national
interest in Japanese aid has justified
the engagement of Japanese
business organizations and the use of
tied aid to help expand Japanese
business activities abroad. Japanese
firms have been invo lved inimplementing Japanese aid projects
in fields such as construction or
engineering. Finally, the technical
institutions involve in aid, such as
JICA (merged with JBIC) have
actually little political influence. And,
considering that other organizations
and ministries could also provide its
own grant to developing countries,
coordination among institutions has
been of much concern. Overall,
internal political factors or naiatsubased on national interest is the
ground for the management of aid by
t h e J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t .
Nonetheless, Japan has responded
to external pressures by making
some formal adjustments to the aid
structure. ”
“The Role of Japanese ODA and
International Cooperation the in the
Current Economic Crisis”
(Carla Bringas - JFPO).
The Self-Defense Forces, Soft Power
and Japanese Security
“Wha t is the sof t pow er
dimension of a hard power asset?
Can the Self-Defense Forces exercise
soft power? Does it pertain to the
perception in public opinion as to the
utility and value of the Self-Defense
Forces? Is the performance of its
missions according to legal precepts
or not? And what to say of the
legitimacy of its existence? Is there
leg i t i mac y bey ond the leg a l
framework within which the SDFwork? Does the Constitution still
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stand as a contested institution in
Japanese society insofar as the SDF
are concerned?
First of all, soft power as
conceived by Nye, as well as hard
power, are analytical concepts, not
normative ones, and as such they
entail different epistemological
implications. Due to the legal
constraints that act upon Japan's
armed forces, they cannot be strictly
defined as a 'hard power asset'.
Following Nye, they cannot coerce
threats, potential or otherwise, only
defend or deter. Due to article 9 of
the Constitution, "the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a
sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of
settling international disputes."”
“Riposte: 2012 Tokyo SDF's Military
March”
(Tiago Mauricio - JFPO).
Do the Self-Defense Forces Have
Soft Power?
“It appeared to me that it was in
fact not difficult to make that relation
due to the specificity of the SDFs. As
they are not devoid or destitute ofrelated political values. If we look into
the history of SDF's constitution and
the present values inherent to the
implementation of Japan Security
Policy, principles related to Pacifism
or Legitimacy are definitely there,
otherwise there would be no sense to
debate about the possible SDF's
"normalization".
Therefore my previous post tried
to underline that the character and
uniqueness of the SDFs and itsrelated legitimacy and political values
constitute in fact a Soft Power asset
that describe Japan's ability to attract
and co-opt rather than coerce.”
“Clarifications on Why the SDF or
Other Hard Power Assets May Have
a Soft Power Dimension”
(Rui Faro Saraiva - JFPO).
JFPO INTERVIEW:
Interview with Oscar Gómez -
PostDoc at Doshisha University,
Japan
“Human Security is a hot topic when
it comes to studies in international
security, often providing lively
debates on what it is and is not, as
well as to its relevance to policy-
making and so forth. I know you havefocused on this very topic during your
doctoral level research leading up to
a PhD thesis on the subject. Before
tackling some of the issues of Human
Security, however, I would like to ask
you what is your understanding of
Human Security and what value do
you attach to it insofar as the
academic and policy-making worlds
are concerned. How did you develop
your conceptual framework?
Human security is an idea
with great potential that is
still on a preliminary stage of
its evolution. It was born
during the early days of the
Human Development Reports
by the UNDP, a big surprise
because human development
was also a relatively new
concept in those days and
piling up neologisms is not
sound at the policy-making
level—although that is farfrom unheard of. Authors of
the report echoed several
voices related to security
studies that were feeling the
emptiness left by the Cold
War, and advanced this
enormous and amorphous
idea in order to channelize
the equally enormous peace
dividend that the first world
was expecting in those days.
Thereon, human security hasbeen gradually gaining a
place on the universe of
i d e a s a n d h a s b e e n
discussed among different
epistemic communities.
The basic claim underlying
human security is that, by the
early nineties, what had been
done in the name of security
was not human. This claim
has been followed by several
attempts to sketch what amore human security could
be, the very place from where
the unresolved debates you
mention start. It is natural for
such a question to become a
matter of endless discussion,
but what is important in my
opinion is to note that the
original claim has never been
denied, and so the idea has
survived all kinds of attacks.
There are two relevant issues
about this basic claim of
human security that explain
its resilience, as well as its
slow evolution. First, it comes
in the shape of an advocacy
claim: we know what we do
not want and can urge for
change, even if we are not
sure about what we want and
how to get it. In other words,it is inspiring, motivating, but
at the same time offers you
little clue about where to
start. Here I think it is
important to highlight the
significance of UNDP rolling
human security out first. Not
only does it make the urge for
a n e w s e c u r i t y l e s s
s u s p i c i o u s f o r t h e
international community, but
also moved the discussionout of the traditional circles of
strategic studies and opened
it to a large range of actors.
The second characteristic is
that human security moves
primarily on the realm of
ethics. Attaching human to
security is meant to make a
fundamental difference; it is
not a simple modifier as
economic in economic
security, and thus it is moredemanding when treating it
rigorously is the aim. This is
not to say that it has no
policy implications, but that
the modus operandi is not
the typical one: human
security is not something you
straightforwardly implement;
instead, initially it may serve
to improve evaluation of
existing practices, then it can
also allow ideas from theperiphery at the technical or
normative levels to become
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policy options, and later
those ideas may interbreed
and become new policy tools
and practices even without
using human security in the
rhetoric. It is similar to what
David Miller has said about
po l i t ica l ph i losophy in
general: it invites to deeper
changes that take time butnot because of that are less
relevant.
As for the way I developed
my framework, I thought that
the PhD was the ideal time
fo r em bar k in g on b i g
questions and so attempted
a fresh start. On the one
hand, acknowledged that
t h e r e w a s a l r e a d y a
cons ide rab le grou p ofpractitioners and scholars
that had given a try to the
concept, so I selected and
analysed two cases of
implementation in depth, in
order to understand what
were the challenges behind—
those were research on
several initiatives in the
P h i l i p p i n e s a n d t h e
experience of the UN Trust
Fund for Human Security. So
one half of my view comes
from reflecting on some of
the experiences so far.
On the other hand, I was
fascinated to find how under
investigated the concept of
security is and, finding
neither input in the existent
human security literature, I
a l s o e m ba rk e d o n a n
exploration of the basic
issues that talking aboutsecurity and humans involve.
This resulted in some basic
questions I consider any
human security analysis
should deal with, some
factors modifying those
questions, and (I believe)
improved understanding
about the position of the
concept in relation to other
r e l a t e d c o n c e p t s — bu t
explaining all those would notfit the interview format, so I
leave it there.
I have to admit that joining
these two branches has not
been a successful story, but
the resulting collection of
findings has served to leave
some byzantine discussions
aside, and propose some
ways forward.
Picking up from the first question,
there is indeed a great fuss being
made about the utility of the concept
to policy-making, especially to
foreign policy. With Japan and
Canada having featured Human
Security as a key concept in their
approaches toward international
security, how can the concept be
incorporated as an instrument of
policy?
As I mentioned, human
security was an appealing
idea without a clear path for
realization, so the following
decade and a half was a
laboratory for politicians,
bureaucrats, academics and
some practitioners who paid
heed to the calling. The
results of this first generation
of initiatives have not been all
that successful, but the
e x p e r i e n c e s l e f t h a v e
become the base for future
initiatives and that is a great
contribution.
In Europe, Mary Kaldor has
lead efforts to use human
security in order to reframe
the European Union defence
policy. She and her team
have been c rea t ing a
framework of principles in
order to serve as a basis forthat reform. One of the main
implications is renewing the
EU capabilities in order to
response to the kind of crisis
of our days, and so it is
closely linked to the reform of
the t radi t ional secur i ty
apparatus. In my opinion this
can hurt the image of the
concept elsewhere, but it is a
valid policy option and a
much needed reflection.
Sectors in Japan and in
Europe have advanced other
possible application: they
have proposed using human
security to help framing a
r e p l a c e m e n t t o t h e
Millennium Development
Goals, in these days under
discussion on Rio+20. I think
this is an attractive option
that can well help reachingthe kind of agreement
pursued through the MDGs
(some of that here: http://
www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/
HumanSecurityFinal.pdf )
But foreign policy is just one
of possible application of
ideas gathered through
human security—and far from
an ideal one since that sector
is very resistant against theevaluations that are required
for a sound evolution, not to
mention its instability.
In domestic policy, human
security has been used to
support peace processes, to
support security sector
reform initiatives, to discuss
t h e p r o b l e m s o f
unsustainable development,
t o a s s e s s t h e f u t u r e
challenges of a society and
so. The Human Development
Reports are a good start for
further reading. Here the
most pressing obstacle is the
actual occurrence of change:
human security entails a
change on the situations
citizens recognize as security,
and if change is not attained
t h r o u g h t h e p o l i c i e s
proposed, the possibility of a
wider support is drasticallyreduced.
One of the themes that has arisen in
our conversations on the subject
deals with the limitations of thinking
about Human Security along the lines
of territorial states. How important is
it to understand this state-centred
framework and to develop a fuller
understanding of Human Security by
overcoming such limitations?
The place of the state inside
human security theorizing
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has always been problematic.
What the original claim of
1994 was opposing was
prec ise ly s ta te-cent red
security, but that never meant
t h e S t a t e n o t b e i n g
necessary anymore.
From the promotion of a
fresh start in the study ofsecurity—others call it “an
opening”—it is necessary to
recognize that “who the
provider(s) of security is(are)”
is only one of several basic
security questions—six in my
count—and the state is a
conspicuous but not the only
answer to that question.
A human security analysis
thus usually starts by definingother questions, principally
understanding the threat at
hand or describing the
populat ion endangered.
Then, the analysis moves on
t o po n de r t h e m e a n s
available to deal with the
causal web of the situation
resulting from the analysis
and just then the state may
a pp e a r a s a po s s i b l e
provider. Most probably it will
play a leading role, but it
might not be able to provide
security by itself.
Perhaps, in practice the
clearest example of what this
means is explained in the
Latvian Human Security
Report of 2003. Posed with
the challenge of making a
human security analysis, the
team forego for a while the
issue of defining a threat orlist of threats, and instead
made emphasis on what
made the citizens actually
feel and be secure. They
c a l l e d t h e r e s u l t a
“constellation of security
providers” and it describes
the ways in which security is
attained at different levels,
from the psychological to the
international.
Moving on to a more specific case
study, I am aware of your research in
the context of the Tohoku disasters of
11/3. In this regard, can you tell us
exactly what is the interplay between
Human Security and the way that the
d i s a s t e r r e l i e f e f f o r t s w e re
conducted? Additionally, can you
advance some of the earlier results of
your findings?
For me it is important to keepalways one foot on the
ground, and thus I think
i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o t e s t
whatever ideas emerge from
theoretical analysis on real
situations. Therefore, after
the disaster I wanted to
check if the findings of the
P h D y e a r s h a d a n y
applicability. I got my PhD
from Tohoku University and
was in Sendai city during thedisaster, so that gave me the
opportunity to experience
closely many of the situations
triggered then, starting point
of my work nowadays.
The first thing that impacted
me after the earthquake was
the role played by grocery
stores in sustaining a basic
influx of food to the city. This
shock me as an amazing
fact, given that these shops
tend to disappear, and so, in
c o m p a n y w i t h s o m e
professors and students of
Tohoku University and Miyagi
University, carried out a small
survey in order to understand
t h e r e s i l i e n c e o f t h e
greengrocers. The research
hints that, as suggested in
the previous question, during
a large emergency in a city
neither the government norc i t i ze ns a re the most
adequa te p rov ide rs o f
secur i ty. Inhabitants of
modern cities depend on
companies to get food and
only those companies are
capable to protect the city
from emergencies. Because
of its flexibility and closeness
to the people—among others
—grocery stores are capable
of getting rid of populationf e a r s r i g h t a f t e r a n
e a r t h q u a k e , b u t t h e i r
subsistence in normal times
cannot be taken for granted.
The second issue about
which I have been working is
international relations and the
disaster , main ly about
foreigners in Sendai and
M i y a g i . M a n y e m o t i v e
discussions on the issuehave been around since last
year but very few academic
analyses are present—and
less so focusing on ground
zero. Three factors are of my
i n t e r e s t : i n f o r m a t i o n
provision/demand, issues of
identity during the emergency
and organizations providing
relief. Now I am in the
process of analysing the
primary data, but cancomment on a couple of
findings.
Safety confirmation is a great
challenge for future mega-
disasters, but not in the way
it is usually talked about. The
i n f o r m a t i o n a n d
communication technologies
we are used to are of great
utility to bridge distances but
are dangerously prone to
spread the over reaction of
e x t e r n a l o b s e r v e r s ,
something in many ways
destabilizing. Most of the
persons in Sendai were able
to confirm safety with their
beloved ones in two days,
but thereon the same means
were used to distribute
information without context
and pressure persons to
leave the city. Channels of
information created forf o r e i g n e r s d u r i n g t h e
emergency were clogged by
p e o p l e o u t s i d e t h e
emergency area, while the
information that people in
ground zero needed was
mainly available on local
media, nowhere else, but the
outside pressure prevented
them from reaching it. This
can trigger the movement of
large numbers of persons inmoments when calm is
needed.
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In the same line, focusing on
mega-disasters in globalized
terr i tor ies, i t might be
convenient for nation-states
to forgo their entrenched duty
towards compatriots, and let
the official providers in
charge do their job. There are
many reasons for that: duringthe emergency there is no
evidence that foreigners were
d i s c r i m i n a t e d o r n o t
protected by their peers or
the people around, and any
additional help for a group of
people that is not particularly
in danger would be better
reoriented to those who really
need help. Other reason is
that not all the states, almost
none I would say, have thecapacity to actually offer the
help they are dreaming of
providing. Sometimes, it
might rather add to the
problems of the persons they
try to help. And for those
states that eventually have
the capacity to do their
heroic part, they should
reflect that with their actions
they would affect negatively
the stability of the disaster
area. It is common to hear
t h a t m a n y o f t h e
displacements that followed
the disaster in Sendai were
m o t i v a t e d b e c a u s e
somebody else did it. If the
safety of people is what
matters, they better try to
keep their constituencies on
c h e c k a n d h e l p
d i s s e m i n a t i n g r e l i a b l e
sources of information not
trying to politically profit fromthe disaster. However, I am
afraid that doing cheap
po l i t i cs abroad i s too
tempting an option for
governments.
Looking back into the way that
Human Security has been introduced
to the discourse on security at large,
what is the present trend insofar as
its ability to promote an alternative
framework for both the study andpractice of security is concerned?
Human security thinking is
entering into a second
generation. This is mainly
motivated by new initiatives
and reflections of what
happened so far, as well as
the entertaining but unfruitful
discussion on which threats
are human security and
which not fading gradually.
I already mentioned Kaldor
and also about the future of
the MDGs. About the latter I
would like to add that human
s e c u r i t y m a y g a i n
prominence as a way to think
of global priorities in a more
general scope. Last year was
the first time that most of the
world poor populations were
living in countries that werenot poor. This can mean that
the end of development
a g e n d a s i s i n s i g h t .
Development as a category is
useful whi le you could
differentiate developed and
developing countries, and
make the whole international
system work around the logic
of this division. But were this
division stop making sense,
other kinds of agendas would
become necessary. Human
security has been tried in this
way through the APEC, no
minor achievement given the
economies there gathered,
and the example could be
reproduced in other forums.
The lat ter impl ies that
development practitioners/
scholars are also starting to
become more active in this
scholarship—even the WorldBank give it a try last year.
Besides, more scholars from
international relations have
started to feel the heat, and
there is an increas ing
p r o d u c t i o n o f t r a n s -
disciplinary studies of human
security.
The main challenge is to keep
elaborating on the best ways
t o r e a l i z e t h e b a s i cprinciple(s) in the field, and
trial and error might well be
the on ly opt ion . Bo th
theoretical and practical
approaches are welcomed,
but necessarily reflecting on
what has been done so far.
Lastly, this is an investigative field
very much alive in Japan. To illustrate
it, the Japan Association of Human
Security Studies has been foundedrecently, and you are a distinct
member of that organisation. Would
you care to explain to us the
objectives of this initiative and
perhaps inform us on what are the
scheduled activities for those with an
interest in Human Security?
The Association (JAHSS) was
created last year following
the work of a consortium of
universities interested indeve loping educat iona l
programs related to human
security. Hence, the main
objective is to support these
efforts through forums for
sha r ing ou tcomes and
generating discussion while
testing students’ presentation
skills—this is so because we
work mainly in English but
our members are not only
foreigners.
We plan to have annual
c o n f e r e n c e s e v e r y
September, this year in Aichi
University, during which we
have a thematic day for key
speakers, and another day of
general presentations in
order to strengthen our
network. We also plan to
publish two times a year a
peer-reviewed electronic
journal, for young scholars togain visibility and established
ones to get in touch with our
readership.
All the information is in the
h o n e p a g e ( h t t p : / /
www.janp.sfc.keio.ac.jp/
JAHSS/index.html ). If readers
are interested, June 30 is the
dea d l i ne fo r bo th the
conference and the journal,
and we may have a call forposters later as well.”
7/31/2019 East Asian Security and Defence Digest 30
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EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE DIGESTEditor: TIAGO MAURICIO
Editor’s Mailbox: mauricio.tiago.47x(at)st.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Kyoto, Japan
East Asia Security and Defence Digest covers expert analysis
and news highlights on East Asian Security and Defence Affairs.
The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of JFPO.
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