ea institutions slides 2009

8/14/2019 EA Institutions Slides 2009

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Gov 1760: OutlineGov 1760: Outline

The Six Party Talks as a solution to a prisoners dilemma Iteration Monitoring Punishment

The ASEAN Regional Forum as a socializing environment

Evolution of institutional features Evolution of the agenda


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Six Party Talks

Iteration Not permanent, but design to offer benefits from

long-term cooperation De-nuclearization of DPRK Energy supplies Normalization of relations with the US


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Six Party Talks

Monitoring of commitments Denuclearization -- IAEA, US Energy supplies -- DPRK Normalization -- DPRK, US

IAEA inspection team


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Six Party Talks

Punishment If DPRK defected -- US could cut off energy

supplies, stopping normalization process,sanctions etc.

If US defected -- DPRK could restart nuclearreprocessing, export nuclear technology


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Six Party Talks

Collapse of 6PT due tointernal politics in DPRK

beginning Fall 2008? Showing toughness while

internally weak or in atransition?

Modeling third actors(e.g. take into accountdomestic political actors)or two differentsimultaneous games can

be complicated


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Origins of the ARFOrigins of the ARF strategic environment in Asia after the collapse of the

USSR in 1991 uncertain

concerns about US withdrawal from Asia concerns about what type of state China might be

May 1993, ASEAN Foreign Ministers proposesextending dialogue to other states that met under therubric of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference

(PMC) July 1993, ASEAN decides to set up ARF July 1994, first meeting of the ARF


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The ARF The ARF s structures structure institutional features

low-keyed, stressing informality

participants not members no separate ARF secretariat decisions made by flexible consensus norm of comfortable evolution

the use of track II to propose new ideas and todiscuss controversial ones (e.g. Council onSecurity Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) (CSCAP)


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ARF 2001

ARF 2007


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The ARF The ARF s attractivenesss attractiveness

for China, a key target of the ARF, traditionally skeptical of multilateral institutions

preferred bilateral negotiations ARF a low cost multilateral institution

for other Asian states, ARF was low cost, potentially high gain

not very intrusive clarification of Chinese intentions possibly changing Chinese intentions and interests


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The ARF The ARF s effectss effects

Changing PRC comfort level inside a multilateralinstitution

socialization? the emergence of proto-multilateralist preferences among

those most directly involved in regional security dialogues(e.g. the Foreign Ministrys Asia Department)

interested in protecting Chinas participation from internal critics interested in new concepts of cooperative security


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Evolution of the ARF structureEvolution of the ARF structure

institutional development creation of regularized working groups to handle

more complex agenda inter-sessional support group confidence building

measures (CBMs) inter-sessional meetings

search and rescue (SAR), peacekeeping operations (PKO)


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Frequency of ARF intersessional Track Imeetings


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Evolution of the ARFs agenda

South China Sea Chinese didnt stop it from moving onto the agenda in

1995 Confidence Building Measures

military transparency defense white papers non-traditional security (CT and crime, disaster relief)

Preventive Diplomacy enhanced role for the ARF Chairs good offices Expert and Eminent Persons group


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The record of EA security institutions Mixed success?

PD institutions (6PT, KEDO) have helped constrain proliferation,but not prevent the DPRK from going nuclear

Socialization institutions (ARF) have developed habits of cooperation, but avoided the really dangerous issues

Yet interstate conflict is relatively low, especially comparedto predictions in the early 1990s. Why?

Track I and II have resolved PDs, provided information, changedstate goals and appropriate means? Arms build ups have deterred conflict? Economic integration has created new benefits and raised costs of

political conflict?

ea institutions slides 2009

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