dynamics of intervention in failed states in the post-cold … · this research thesis is...

Dynamics of Intervention in

Failed States in the Post-Cold

War Era

Policy Study nr. 1 / 2015

Andreea Rădulescu

Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro

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Abstract

The post-Cold War international system has been extremely uneven in terms of

emerging geopolitical structures. This new world order has directly affected analysts and

policy makers in terms of how to act and interpret the challenges of contemporary global

developments. This research thesis is addressing these issues based on three conceptual

tenets: dangers posed by failed states, intervention and the concept of interdependence. At

the core of this work is the United States’ decision to militarily intervene in failed states.

These types of structures are assumed to challenge the global relationship of economic

interdependence due to their drastic political, economic and social changes. The inquiry

follows a qualitative research design with a focus on two case studies: Somalia and

Afghanistan. This investigation proposes an in-depth analysis regarding the causal

mechanism between interdependence and military intervention in these failed states based

on two main assumptions. The first hypothesis is built on intervention as being a measure

for preventing disruptions in the regional stability of failed states in terms of economic

interdependence. The findings showed that Somalia’s geostrategic location could have spill-

over effects for the U.S. allies in the Horn of Africa, Saudi Arabia or Yemen. The instability in

Somalia endangers the issue of maritime security and the access to energy resources in the

Persian Gulf, as well as the protection of naval trade routes in the region. Afghanistan is a

country in Central Asia which was used as a trade passage, historically. The country also

shares oil resources with other Central Asian republics. The region can be regarded as a

complex network of economic ties and in the U.S. vision the free flow of such resources is

primordial for the enlargement of the liberal zone of peace and the mutual gain of benefits.

Indirectly, the U.S. intervention could be interpreted in a sense that Afghanistan became a

portal of instability which was threatening American values and national interest

understood through economic interdependence. The second hypothesis attempts to

explore the degree of vulnerability experienced by the U.S. in relation to state failure. While

Somalia did not present any immediate danger that might have increased the U.S.

vulnerability, the terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan which plotted the attack from

September 11, 2001 represented solid proof for this assumption. The results are oriented

towards understanding the regional interests of economic interdependence which the U.S.

might have had in the light of the interventions that they have conducted. Overall, the

analysis is valid insofar one recognizes that a holistic viewpoint is needed to understand the

rise of failed states and their regional effects which in turn might trigger world leaders such

as the U.S. to adjust their national interests accordingly.

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Table of Contents List of Tables ........................................................................................................................................... 3

I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 4

II. Research Question Development ................................................................................................... 6

III. Literature review – The major explanations for U.S.-led intervention ....................................... 8

A. International Security and the Danger of Failed States .............................................................. 8

B. Geopolitical interests of the superpower ................................................................................. 11

C. Interdependence ....................................................................................................................... 14

D. Gaps in the Literature Review ................................................................................................... 16

IV. Theoretical Concepts ................................................................................................................ 20

A. Intervention .............................................................................................................................. 20

B. Interdependence ....................................................................................................................... 25

C. The state as a Structural concept and the emergence of Failed States ................................... 30

1. The State ............................................................................................................................... 30

2. Failed States .......................................................................................................................... 33

V. Hypotheses Development ............................................................................................................. 36

VI. Research Design ........................................................................................................................ 41

A. Historical Overview of Somalia and Afghanistan ...................................................................... 42

B. Observations for State Failure .................................................................................................. 45

1. Political Shocks ...................................................................................................................... 46

2. Economic Shocks ................................................................................................................... 53

3. Political Goods ...................................................................................................................... 57

4. Level of Violence ................................................................................................................... 61

C. Observations regarding the two key dyadic relationships: US – Somalia, US – Afghanistan ... 66

1. Geopolitical Factors .............................................................................................................. 66

2. Intervention .......................................................................................................................... 67

3. Economic Interdependence .................................................................................................. 71

VII. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 76

A. Results ....................................................................................................................................... 76

B. Limitations................................................................................................................................. 84

C. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................................. 85

References ............................................................................................................................................ 87



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List of Tables

Aggregate Indicator for the Rule of Law – Somalia (1996-2012)

Aggregate Indicator for the Rule of Law – Afghanistan (1996-2012)

GDP in billions of US dollars – Somalia (1989-1990)

FDI in US dollars – Somalia (1989-1993)

GDP in billions of US dollars – Afghanistan (1996-2001)

FDI in US dollars – Afghanistan (1996-2001)

Literacy Rate for Somali Male and Female Population 15+ years

Ethnic Wars – Somalia (1989-1993)

Ethnic Wars – Afghanistan (1996 – 2001)

Failed States Index – Somalia (2005-2007)

Failed States Index – Afghanistan (2005-2007)



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I. Introduction

The American nation has continuously evolved into a strong, consolidated state

projecting its ideals and values worldwide. Sometimes, over the course of history, in order

to assure their position as a world power, the United States have used the instrument of

intervention for several reasons. First, they wanted to prevent potential challengers from

other continents to attack them. Second, they wanted to keep balances of power –

especially in Europe and Asia. Third, they formulated strategic interests in terms of building

political and economic bases in order to ensure the “vital connecting routes” to other

regions (Graber, 1978: 485).

During the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the United States

mostly intervened only in the states with geographical proximity. One reason was the

expansionist policy dominating the United States vision and examples of such were Florida,

Texas and Mexico (Viotti, 2010: 139-140). Hence, they increased their economic and military

capabilities. Such an example was represented by the construction of the Panama Canal –

which was a vital naval route with access to both the East and West coasts. Thus, the United

States justified their right to restore order in countries where political unrest might have

endangered the region surrounding the canal. However, interventions in more distanced

places was more limited and calculated. For instance, there were situations when the

United States simply refused recognition of various dictatorial or military regimes in Latin

America in the hope that it would block them from progressing in a positive way in the

conduct of economic and foreign policies (Graber, 1978: 487-488).



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The U.S. full military involvement in both World Wars was made under the flag

liberal ideals. Therefore, the League of Nations and later, the United Nations Charter

brought about the concept of collective security through which the United States along with

other countries would reserve the right to protect the perceived common threats to the

world peace and thus, make the “world safe for democracy” (Viotti, 2010: 141-142).

However, when the concept of collective security failed to be employed due to the plethora

of divergent interests and differences in policy making, the U.S. “claimed and continued to

exercise the right of unilateral intervention” (Graber, 1978: 489). Some examples of such

interventions are Korea (1950-1953), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1962), Vietnam (1965-1975) or

Laos and Cambodia (1971) (Viotti, 2010: 142).

The Cold War era has been characterized by the arms race between the East and the

West. The period was based on an ideological battle with the U.S. foreign policy aiming at

containing the spread of the communist regime.

This research thesis focuses on the concept of military intervention in the period

preceding the fall of the Soviet Union, where the U.S. emerged as a global leader advocating

for the spread of democratic values, liberal economy, respect for human rights and the rule

of law. The research on dynamics of intervention found in previous work and proposed for

further analysis in this thesis is considering the nature of international security, the

geostrategic interests of a leading power such as the U.S., and the concept of

interdependence as a potential cause for intervention. In this respect, the puzzle emerges as

it was identified a crucial difference between the explicit causes for intervention in such

failed states (i.e. humanitarian relief, terrorist threats) and the implicit causes which need a



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more in-depth research, in order to understand the processes of decision-making through

different perspectives. In this sense, there have been identified several gaps in the literature

to date and they are followed by an exploration of the theoretical foundation applied to a

small-N case study research design in order to test the validity of the proposed causal

mechanism between economic interdependence and military interventions.

The subsequent chapters are dedicated to the exploration of the theoretical

approaches through a qualitative analysis of two case studies and their historical overview,

state failure observations and dyadic relevance stemming from the hypotheses

development.

II. Research Question Development

Along the history of the United States there were many situations where

intervention was employed and each time frame has been explained as having certain well

defined interests and conditions for the conduct of such actions. The literature covering the

time span from 1990s onwards is considered to require continuous research for explaining

the causes of United States military interventions. It is of value to understand what lies

behind the U.S. foreign policies in undertaking the burden of stabilizing an entire

international system. The costs, the benefits, the risks, the realist and idealist issues

prevailing in the academic circles as topics of debate are going to be projected at a smaller

scale in what comes to represent the research question of this thesis:

What are the causes of U.S. led military intervention in failed states in the post-Cold War

era?



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The research question has been built around several key concepts which have been

strongly debated in the field of political science and international relations. The pillars of

this analysis are the theoretical approach on intervention, the state as a legitimate structure

in the international system, the failed states and the dangers posed by them, and the

modern interdependence theory. Each intervention that took place had a rational reasoning

found in different primary source documents, articles, books on foreign policy analysis and

others.

This research question aspires to bring an extensive understanding for such decision-

making processes beyond the evident reasoning displayed to the public. The goal is to look

at the holistic image of how is intervention defined in the post-Cold War era, what the

target states are and whether there are any linkages between these two elements which

cannot be observed prima facie. The parsimonious path to determining the causality of this

action has introduced the modern interdependence theory, while the entire analysis of the

thesis is focusing on finding explanatory variables from this precise angle. Thus, the holistic

perspective will encompass the framework of regional stability threatened by the turmoil in

these so-called failed states. Moreover, this approach will try to find connections with the

other two theoretical concepts. The following chapters are developing a gradual analysis

starting with the literature review, theory, and an in-depth, qualitative research design. The

thesis will conclude with a critical interpretation of the findings in accordance with all the

elements proposed in the research question and the hypotheses development.



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III. Literature review – The major explanations for U.S.-led

intervention

A. International Security and the Danger of Failed States

The world after the fall of communism has changed substantially. The dimension of

national and international security took more complex forms. In a broad sense, the

literature to date has characterized state failure as being a situation of political, economic

and social chaos where citizens are denied basic public goods (Krasner & Pascual, 2005).

Several studies identify the main threats which are seen to jeopardize the international

security: spill-over wars, massive migrations, transnational organized crime, proliferation,

resource curses, diseases, terrorism (Newman, 2009; Patrick 2007).

Another reiteration of the same point is made by Michael Ignatieff who maintains

that the regions comprised of poor, failing states are seen as “bad neighbourhoods” which

are propagating the internal violence to neighbouring countries and they are creating “a

widening tear in the system of state order, analogous to the tear in the global ozone layer”

(Ignatieff in Mills & Brunner, 2002: 233-234).

In the post-Cold War era, the United States have acknowledged the danger of failed

states on two levels. One was multilateral through the United Nations, European Union,

NATO, non-governmental organizations and their allies. A second one was unilateral and it

has been mentioned in the 1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century where there



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is a direct reference to the notion of failed states. These are being perceived as centres of

unlawful governance, where violent conflict is the norm and where citizens of such entities

will migrate, will engage in civil wars and will spread the current state of affairs to

neighbouring countries, ultimately affecting “U.S. interests and citizens” (The White House,

1998:7).

Krasner and Pascual emphasize that failed states cannot “take advantage of the

global economy…because they lack strong, capable institutions” (2005). In the same way,

developed countries cannot gain the benefits from the economic linkages with such states,

due to the fact that they are so instable that they need institutions to form markets, fiscal

and monetary policies in order to make the country productive (Krasner & Pascual, 2005).

One of the factors that assured the international security is the global economic

interdependence. In this context, the instability of failed states threatens to disrupt it.

In explaining the conditions for the United States military intervention, there are

studies which adopted different positions.

First, Huth assumed that the willingness to intervene in the affairs of another state

must lead to favourable outcomes both domestic and foreign and that domestic policy

makers are rational actors who analyse the stakes of possible interventions in the light of

protecting the international security of their state (1998). These stakes are measured in

military costs and “international security benefits” (Huth, 1998: 747). Thus, the study

showed that if a target state does not have military capabilities for defending itself against a

challenger, then a major power will intervene. However, Huth emphasized on the fact that



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there is an assessment being made with regards to the existing threats posed by “challenger

states” (1998: 748).

Second, Fordham brought forward the argument of technological development of

the 20th century which pushed the United States to readjust their interests since their

security was threatened (2008). In other words, from a geopolitical perspective the United

States were not safe anymore and this led to their involvement in World War I which ended

their isolationist policy (Fordham, 2008).

Third, Snow has depicted the danger of failed states in a comprehensive manner. He

has distinguished between the “First Tier” represented by the developed countries, where

polities are homogeneous economically, socially and politically and there is the “Second

Tier” which combines a plethora of states from political democracies (India) to communist

states (China, North Korea), autocracies and failed states (Somalia, Haiti). The latter type lies

outside the globalizing economy and is associated with violence and instability (Snow,

2004). The term ‘globalizing economy’ can be understood through the lens of liberal

institutionalism where free trade and negotiations towards lowering trade tariffs represent

the norm – such institutions are the World Trade Organization, the EU, NAFTA and others.

Snow is making an insightful argument by maintaining that countries which have not joined

the so-called globalizing economy have done so by “circumstance or by choice” (2004: 312).

Haiti, for example, is seen as being a failed state which has little to offer in terms of

economy. Another example is Afghanistan under the Taliban rule which is considered to

have shut out from the global economy intentionally. To state it parsimoniously, the post-

Cold War era has widened the gap between the richer and the poorer countries, and a great



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majority of the latter could not keep up with the developmental change. Thus, Snow makes

the assumption that these low-developed countries which experience internal turmoil

represent a security issue for the United States – simply because they are functioning

against the prevailing systemic order (2004).

The threats presented by failed states open the debate on whether intervention

should be considered an option, and whether justifying such a policy instrument should

frame the moral imperative of protecting human rights in these structures or should go

beyond by being assessed as attacks to the international security (Ignatieff in Mills and

Brunner, 2002).

B. Geopolitical interests of the superpower

The geopolitical explanation of American military intervention is framed by the

realist theory of international relations. It is important to include an opposing view to the

multilateralism and liberal institutionalism characterized in the previous section, as the topic

of this research thesis cannot be assigned from the beginning to a single school of thought.

The realist paradigm is based on an anarchic international system, where states are

the main actors and rational calculations are the tools which frame their vital interests. In

addition, any state interactions will be a zero-sum game and the use of force will always be

an option. Realism is also characterized by the respect of a state’s sovereignty (Wohlforth in

Smith et. al., 2012).

The realist theory has served well as an explanatory tool during the Cold War when

the United States had a clear-definition of their vital interests – containing the Soviet



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expansion. In this respect there are studies relating the geopolitical interests for foreign

intervention with the rise of the United States as a superpower starting with the Cold War

era.

To start with, Huth has tested interventions by major powers in international crisis

between 1918 and 1988 and he found that, to a certain extent, the military coalitions and

strategic value of a target state can be explanatory factors (Huth, 1998).

Next, there have been made another series of assumptions when it came to the

United States and the use of force. First, “If American vital interests are not threatened, for

instance, then American use of force should not be contemplated.” Second, the use of force

will still be an option if the interest is “less-than-vital” and instead, national security is

threatened (Snow, 2004: 167). Such vital interests were clearly identified during the Cold

War through the Communist expansion which was threatening to engulf U.S. allies.

Moreover, the possible use of nuclear weapons was also a direct threat to the American

military security. After the fall of Communism, Snow maintained that the assessment of

interests and security threats has gained a “psychological dimension of what makes one feel

secure” and thus, makes the analysis of United States intervention more complex (Snow,

2004: 168).

Moreover, the issue of sovereignty has received favourable support from the United

States over the time. They actively promoted the respect for the internal and external affairs

of the state as being the “supreme authority” (Snow, 2006: 46). However, this paradigm has

been criticized during the Cold- War as well as afterwards by opponents who described

sporadic interventions of the United States as contradicting the concept of sovereignty (see



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economic boycott on Cuba in 1960). Snow has framed this contradiction under the term

“ambivalence” (Snow, 2004: 46). In other words, there has not been attained a balance

between what constitute the vital interests of the superpower, the breach of other states’

sovereignty and the image of a self-help system.

Comparing the Cold War period with the one after 1989, it could be safely assumed

that the latter did not clear the air since the new international system, where the United

States was considered to be a superpower, did not fit the parameters laid by the realist

paradigm. Thus, the United States has been considered to continue a foreign policy

characterized by ambivalence also in the post-Cold War period. The classic realist paradigm

infers that military force will always be an option in a world of anarchy. The literature to

date extends this vision by showing how traditional perspectives of sovereignty, security

and interests have radically changed. Snow maintains how the concept of security has

broadened including more complex forms, namely that of individual security in order to

justify new dimensions of intervention such as human rights violations (see Somalia, Bosnia,

Kosovo during the 1990s) (Snow, 2004). This, in turn, became a reiteration of the United

States’ ambivalence.

Robert D. Kaplan has depicted a rather grim and purely geopolitical image of the

world where major powers would acknowledge the need to take a stance in these

situations. He described Africa as being underdeveloped and in his article from 1994 he

argues that the future of this region, in particular, will shift from “central governments” to

“the rise of tribal and regional domains” (Kaplan, 1994: 48). He explained the case of Ivory

Coast by maintaining that after the President had passed away, the country remained in



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shatters due to a weak party network, lack of foreign investment, small army, therefore no

“force to maintain the order”; and a large foreign, non-Ivorian population. Kaplan predicted

an “anarchic implosion of criminal violence”. Today, the Ivory Coast is a centre of instability

especially since the neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone are not performing much

better. It is indeed the threat of regional collapse which is of greater concern, rather than

the one of national collapse. In the light of the threats posed by regional collapse Kaplan

believes that foreign policies targeting failed states will be done “by need rather than by

design” (Kaplan, 1994: 72).

C. Interdependence

The literature is exploring the concept of interdependence in various ways. As an

overview, the notion of interdependence has been understood in different ways across

several studies. Some have argued to have positive consequences. Keohane and Nye have

proposed a positive but broad approach on the meaning of “mutual dependence”

characterized by sensitivity in terms of how fast a state responds to the changes taking

place in the system and by vulnerability in terms of how a state adjusts to such changes

occurring in the system (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 7-11). However, the adjustments to these

changes are considered to be made through cooperation. Others have argued to be linked

to negative consequences if one of the parties involved in the process of interdependence

defects (McMillan, 1997: 34).

Nye Jr. explained how the United States is leading the international system in a

world of change. He emphasized on how security has undertaken other dimensions that



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cover the economic well-being of citizens. Also, he emphasizes on how the new “power

game” has changed in terms of linkages of interdependence between more complex and

simultaneous issues such as security, trade or finance and where the degree of vulnerability

has increased spectacularly (Nye Jr., 1991: 180). It can be considered that the United States’

degree of vulnerability has increased as their ability to control the international economic

developments is not as pervasive as it was during the Cold War.

Nye Jr. proposed an alternative characterization of how the United States is adapting

to the new environment. In this sense, he explained how the United States has more “co-

optive power” understood as a method of influencing other states in forming preferences

for their national interests similar to the American ones and implementing foreign policies

accordingly (Nye Jr., 1991: 191). Nye Jr. concluded on a positive note that despite the post-

Cold War uprisings in weak states cooperation will remain the preferred norm due to the

fact that military interventions will be too expensive (Nye Jr., 1991)

Another more focused study has been made on the “U.S. intervention in Third World

Internal Wars” between 1945 and 1989. Given that the time span of the study is

concentrated on the Cold-War period, the findings of the research are showing that material

and economic interests do not cause U.S. intervention (Yoon, 1997). One limitation of this

study is that it only reflects the Cold-War era and not beyond.

Gartzke et. al. made a study which advocated for the positive consequences of the

economic interdependence maintaining that states would not engage in military conflict if

opportunity costs are higher than the use of force. In addition, the research showed that

liberal dyads are more prone to cooperation when it came to the break-down of economic



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ties. The authors also found that “political shocks” that may damage the economic

interdependence would still use peaceful options to resolve matters (Gartzke, et.al., 2001).

In the light of these findings it is worth mentioning two studies which found that

economic linkages could be causes for state conflict. Fordham conducted a study on the

economic interests, security and American Intervention covering the period of the 20th

century. His findings showed that the longer was a relationship of economic

interdependence between allied dyads, the more likely it was for the United States to

intervene on behalf of their trading partners. Unfortunately, the study did not cover the

post-Cold War era (Fordham, 2008). Barbieri controlled for salience and symmetry of

dependence over a time span between 1870 and 1938. She discovered that extension of

economic ties did not ensure peace and cooperation. In this sense, the study showed that

the more asymmetrical the trade, the more likely a conflict will take place (Barbieri, 1996).

Despite these findings, the study is limited due to its short time span. Other scholars have

also criticized it since the cases chosen are not relevant and a greater number covering a

longer period of time should be considered.

D. Gaps in the Literature Review

There have been identified certain limitations in the literature covering the issues

discussed in the previous sections. For coherence purposes, the enunciation of the limits

posed by the studies considered above will be treated in the order they appear in the

literature review.



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Studies regarding international security issues and causes for American intervention

are limited to the 20th century less the post-Cold War era. Another limitation is that since

the 1990s the notion of failed states is a new and deeply debatable concept having no

agreed upon definition. However, there is a consensus in the literature over the difficulties

of the powerful states in addressing the threats and challenges posed by state failure to the

international security. Therefore, the aspect of whether interventions of major powers such

as the United States in failed states are preventing the disruption of economic

interdependence and thus protecting the international security requires further research.

The literature covering the realist paradigm fails to explain some aspects when it is

put in relation to the research question at hand. The contemporary era has moved past the

traditional military conquest with the countries that may pose a threat to the national

security of the United States not possessing actual capabilities of attacking them. In other

words, countries such as Somalia, Haiti or Afghanistan which are considered to be failed do

not possess the means or the geostrategic interest to attack the United States in a

traditional manner. Second, the wars conducted today are asymmetrical and although such

a discussion is beyond the scope of this research thesis, it is worth mentioning that the

realist view is not providing a comprehensive explanation when it comes to terrorist threats

and the conduct of war on terror. Finally, the post-Cold War era makes it difficult to actually

define the vital interests of a state, and thus actions of intervention in these times become a

puzzle of “interest-threat mismatch” that requires further research (Snow, 2004: 174).

The study conducted by Gartzke et. al. has several drawbacks (2001). First, the cases

are comprised of only contiguous states and major powers and they cover the Cold War



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period. Second, the study takes into account revisionist states as opposed to liberal ones.

Revisionism during the World War II and later during the Cold War was understood as states

which had polities opposed to the prevailing order represented by democracies. In this

sense, the context of revisionist states is marked by ideological competition and by the

threat or use of force employed by such a country to make gains which would balance the

loss of another one (Evans & Newnham, 1998). However, the goal of this research thesis is

to incorporate the concept of failed states seen as an internal institutional collapse which

makes a country unable to maintain economic relations with a major power – in this case

the United States. In this context, it is worth assuming that cooperation with failed states is

severely hurdled due to the fact that external actors have a difficulty in distinguishing the

factions which are reliable enough to regain control of the country and stabilize its

institutions. Presumably, such an action would end the turmoil and pave the path to

economic progress.

Finally, there are several aspects which remain unclear and which are still debated in

the literature. One of them is the United States’ role in the post-Cold War era and thus,

what makes them the global economic watchdog. Another one is represented by the

changed international system with the United States not having an ideological challenger

anymore. Thus, formulating foreign policies and justifying interventions has been difficult

for both policy makers and for the academic sphere to understand and analyse them. A

reiterated example would be the communist threat which was perceived as being a

condition for employing intervention in weaker states. In the last decades, the United States

have considered the deployment of military forces a solution of last resort which would be



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undertaken only if the vital security interests of the state are threatened (Graber, 1978:

495).

Along the history of the United States there were many situations where

intervention was employed and each time frame has been framed by the literature in

clearer parameters. Therefore, this research thesis aims at finding the causes for American

military intervention starting with the post-Cold War era when the world suffered a few

visible systemic changes such as the emergence of the so-called failed states. The

perspective this thesis is focuses on these key transformations which represent a challenge

for both the policy makers and the academic experts.



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IV. Theoretical Concepts

A. Intervention

Intervention is a deeply disputed concept in the academic sphere, especially due to the

fact that it is very theoretical and very difficult to quantify. The dynamics of this policy

instrument have been explained in the literature in terms of measuring the legitimacy of a

given action or presenting scientific arguments which would lead to an improved usage of

such a policy (Rosenau, 1969: 150).

Rosenau identified two characteristics of intervention. One is that it is employed against

the regular or expected conduct of a state and especially in the light of the non-intervention

doctrine. Second, the purpose of intervention is to produce a change in the authority of a

target state. Furthermore, Rosenau presents three dimensions of this theoretical concept:

moral, legal and strategic (1969: 151-155).

First, the moral dimension distinguishes the means by which intervention is employed.

Rosenau has emphasized the fact that this dimension is rather misleading when explaining

the causes of this concept since what deems moral for one person, is immoral for another

one. In other words, the morality of intervention is subjective.

Second, the legal standpoint argued by Rosenau is that “intervention occurs when the

affairs of one state are altered against its will by the actions of another” which implicitly

breaches the concept of sovereignty – an aspect invoked by the realist school as being a

trigger for conflict (1969: 153-154). Therefore, the legal dimension is presented as being a



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coercive act imposed on another state, regardless of the form - military, economic or

diplomatic.

On the one hand, the international law theory has refined the conditions under which

intervention can take place. Therefore, states must comply with certain rules regarding

other similar entities. A state cannot interfere in the internal structure of another country

and it cannot pressure the main institutions of that other state or to interfere in the

“relations between foreign government authorities and their own nationals” (Cassese, 2005:

53). Moreover, states are not allowed to organize, instigate or support the activities of their

organization on the territory of a foreign state.

On the other hand, the principle of non-intervention has received equal attention. To

start with, one state cannot implement the use or threat of force on another entity freely

and without justification. Second, the existence of intergovernmental organizations has

been strongly limiting the actual use of force. Third, the expansion of human rights

conventions has been working in the benefit of non-intervention. It could be uphold that the

principle of non-intervention has been an extension of the traditional concepts of

sovereignty and a modern development in a cooperative direction (Cassese, 2005: 55).

Nonetheless, these international law provisions have created a heated debate on the

thresholds for intervention, regardless of its form. In a critical manner, Cassese explains that

intervention tends to produce “political destabilization; instigating, fomenting and financing

unrest in a foreign country” (Cassese, 2005: 55). Thus, international law stipulates certain

exceptions from the rule such as the decision of a stronger state to offer financial aid to a

weaker. This act, for example, is not considered to be an infringement of the non-



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intervention principle as long as it does not coerce the receiving state to be in the

subordination of the former – in terms of sovereign rights and foreign policy interests

(Cassese, 2005: 55).

Another related concept is known as “forcible intervention” (Cassese, 2005: 297). In this

case, interference is conducted in the internal or external affairs of a state “by the use or

threat of force, to do something (…) in the interest of the intervening State” (Cassese, 2005:

297). Examples of such interventions are known as naval blockades or embargoes, but they

are conducted under the flag of self-defence, or with the pretence of a state to protect its

own citizens. There is also the case for reprisals where a state reserves the right to intervene

in a foreign state on the premise that the latter committed unlawful acts. Overall, if a state

is violating international law it can either be excluded from a convention or treaty, or it may

be held responsible through the use of force (Cassese, 2005:299).

Another issue would be the extent to which states are allowed to use military force in

foreign territories, with the motivation of preserving the respect for human rights across

borders. In theory, Chapter VII on Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of

the Peace, and Acts of Aggression of the United Nations Charter contains provisions of

interference only through Security Council Resolutions (Charter of the United Nations).

Rosenau has finally argued for the basis of a strategic dimension of intervention which

tends to be leaning towards the delicate matter of national interest formulation. In this

sense, intervention is swiftly manipulated for justification when it comes to issues of vital

interests or security threats, since it has been difficult to assess the definitions of the latter.

Therefore, normative approaches of what constitutes to be a vital interest for one country



23

can be considered the opposite for another one and these subjective imperatives tend to

hurdle the scientific process of testing the hypotheses involving the concept of intervention.

Nonetheless, Rosenau concluded that using the national interest as a cause for intervention

is ambiguous and it needs further empirical measurements (Rosenau, 1969:157-158).

Lastly, the theoretical discussion on intervention deserves a reference to the newer

concept found in international law - responsibility to protect (R2P). There are two basic

principles. One is that the sovereignty of a state gives the responsibility to that entity to

protect and secure its citizens within its borders. The other principle is based on whether a

state is suffering from civil war, insurgency or state failure, and if the state is unable or

unwilling to counter this situation, then international law allows the principle of R2P to be

practiced despite the concept of non-intervention (ICISS, 2001).

R2P takes three dimensions. First, there is the responsibility to prevent people from

being afflicted by internal conflict. Second, the responsibility to react is practiced through

economic sanctions or military intervention. Third, the responsibility to rebuild is based on

offering recovery, reconciliation and reconstruction in cases of military intervention (ICISS,

2001).

In essence, the debate around both the concept of intervention and responsibility to

protect stems from the fact that the former is implemented by powerful states in the light

of perceived transnational threats and its just cause is interpreted in a rather volatile

manner. For example, any kind of intervention under the R2P principle should fulfil the “just

cause threshold” and the “precautionary principles” in order to justify military intervention.

In practice, the analysis of various cases such as Rwanda, Kosovo or Somalia have been



24

subject to debate as they did not uniformly fit to the concept of R2P or just intervention and

they more than often breached the sovereignty principle and worsened the situation by not

being able to follow all the protection stages stated under R2P.

A distinctive perspective of intervention has been observed through changes that took

place in the world system. There are two types of systemic changes which have been

identified as affecting the interactions between states. One is represented by the political

advocates for liberal democracy and freedom of trade, goods, people, technology and ideas

which grouped under the so-called notion of “interdependence”. This in turn opened a more

subtle, complex and sophisticated approach towards intervention (Evans and Newnham,

1998:278-281). The second type is represented by the “intergovernmental organizations”

which provided an international setting for states to suggest, propose for voting and adopt

“interventionist policies” (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 280).

The concept of intervention continues to be actively debated in the literature. The

effects of this debate are sometimes costly, since it cannot provide a justifiable and

commonly agreed roadmap for situations when intervention should be employed. This

section reviews the concept from different angles. The diverging perspectives on the use of

this policy instrument emphasize the fact that there is no common agreement which

justifies or dismantles intervention. Therefore, questions addressing the causes for

implementing such an action in the post-Cold War era, especially in failed states are valid

and somewhat quintessential in order to understand the forces governing the international

system in contemporary times.



25

B. Interdependence

The world after the Cold War has ceased to be based on ideological rivalry and political

competition. The liberal view emerged as promoting the image of an “inside looking out”

order where domestic legitimacy of institutions would propagate to other states and the so-

called liberal zone of peace will enlarge making war less likely (Burchill and Linklater, 2013:

59). At the same time, there have been positions which claimed that liberal states will not

engage in conflict with other structures alike or not even with non-liberal states with the

exception of “legitimate self-defence (or in the defence of their legitimate allies), or

intervention in severe cases to protect human rights” (Burchill and Linklater, 2013: 63).

Nonetheless, the challenge arises from the fact that intervention should not be limited to

humanitarian or self-defence explanations. This research aims to look beyond these over-

emphasized and generalized claims which are prevailing in official declarations and in the

literature and address in more depth the causes for intervention in the so-called “failed

states”.

Burchill and Linklater provide a useful image of how the spread of economy would give

states a new platform for negotiation. They argue that interdependence would “replace

national competition and defuse unilateral acts of aggression and reciprocal retaliation”

(2013: 66). For the purpose of incorporating this concept into a grand theoretical approach,

interdependence will be seen through the lens of liberal institutionalism.

Modern interdependence theory is associated with the concept of free trade and non-

tariff barriers. One example is represented by the economic integration of the European



26

Union which historically, provided an alternative to solving disputes between major powers

such as France and Germany. The idea behind this theory is that such a common framework

would bring more benefits to both parties involved rather than being a zero-sum game as it

is depicted in the realist view. The basis of this argument stems from the neo-liberal

assumption of absolute gains - “what will gain me the most?” (Burchill and Linklater, 2013:

67).

Modern interdependence theory also suggests that states cannot unilaterally control the

world developments while regimes known as “sets of principles, norms, rules and decision

making procedures” inhibit the behaviour of states. Thus, institutions and regimes provide a

setting for cooperation and stability, since parties involved in the process of

interdependence know what to expect from each other (Burchill and Linklater, 2013: 67).

In essence, the theory of interdependence suggests that states cannot afford to live in a

world characterized by autarky. The benefits of interdependence have been acknowledged

in the past decades and it is assumed that states would not attempt to endanger the

conditions of economic interdependence, because they are conscious about the penalties

which would bring over them. Although the theory assumes states are rational actors

functioning in an anarchic system, it is mainly based on the idea that international

institutions are preferred to foster cooperation and thus diminishing the effect of anarchy.

Keohane and Nye further developed the concept of interdependence by explaining that

seeking self-interest can also take other forms such as through membership in international

institutions. There is a rigorous view maintaining that conforming to the conduct and

demand of these global organizations reduces the effects of the self-help system and



27

replaces it with a higher degree of compliance and cooperation (Burchill and Linklater,

2013:67). They have also proposed a broader understanding on the notion of

interdependence during the 1970s. As a generality, officials consider that policies at the

domestic level should be adjusted to the world system of interdependence. As an analytic

concept, interdependence is considered to be a mutual dependence between two parties.

One important aspect is that this dependence is affected by external factors such as flows of

money, goods, services, people and communication (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 8).

Moreover, interdependence is inspired by the realist view, being presented as a cost-

benefit calculation. However, the benefits of such a relationship are difficult to quantify,

since the degree of uncertainty a priori is high and the effects are observed over long rather

than short-term periods. In the light of these characteristics, Keohane and Nye developed

two approaches – sensitivity and vulnerability. They explain how a change of one party

which is engaged in the relationship of interdependence is more or less compelling the

other party to adjust accordingly – depending on the change. The sensitivity approach

illustrates how influential are the effects of changes of one party affecting the other party

(Keohane and Nye, 2001: 10-16). For instance, if one assumes that state A is in a relationship

of economic interdependence with state B. State A suffers an economic break-down and

cannot deliver on commitments towards state B. State B depended on certain goods

imported from state A which now make them impossible to acquire. Such a situation reveals

the fact that state B is severely affected by the changes in state A.

The vulnerability approach measures the costs of adjusting to the change produced in

the relationship of interdependence. Therefore, states measure the alternatives they have



28

at hand and then make the decision most favourable to them. One limitation of this second

step is that even though policies are adjusted to changes, the effects can be observed in the

long-run as mentioned earlier. Keohane and Nye give the example of social vulnerabilities

where policies can be put into action faster. For parsimonious reasons, the examples of

state A and state B will be considered again. If state A suffers from a case of famine, and

there is a group protesting in state B for offering aid to the respective state in need, there

can be adopted and implemented a policy of sending food in that part of the world. In other

words, vulnerability is explained in the sense of how deeply are those changes affecting a

state that it is forcing it adjust to the new situation (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 10-16).

In an overall perspective these two approaches have been considered to function in

situations of asymmetrical interdependence where one state is less vulnerable than the

other and therefore it has more leverage in the bargaining game.

Ultimately, Keohane and Nye have tried to build an ideal concept known as “complex

interdependence” (2001: 20) characterized by multiple channels of communication

(interstate level, transgovernmental – where states are the main actors, and transnational

through banks and corporations), an absence of hierarchy and cooperation prevailing over

the use of military force (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 21).

There is a key aspect of this concept which Burchill and Linklater have mentioned rather

concisely. They maintained how over time, and precisely because of cooperation the

possibility of conflict cannot be disregarded (Burchill and Linklater, 2013: 69).

Nonetheless, both Burchill and Linklater and Keohane and Nye make an interesting point

relevant for this research thesis by not dismissing the realist view that conflict is not an



29

option, especially in the case of economic interdependence. They all claim the fact that this

concept has been often manipulated over the history. Burchill and Linklater sustained that

over the time, the United States have been in the position of a growing superpower and

have more or less controlled the developments and norms of interdependence (2013: 69).

Furthermore, Keohane and Nye have offered two aspects which follow the claim that

conflict is still an option:

“drastic social and political change could cause force again to become an important direct

instrument of policy, and even when elites’ interests are complementary, a country that uses

military force to protect another may have significant influence over the other country”

(Keohane and Nye, 2001: 24).

Some examples are represented by the United States threat for intervention in the

beginning of the Cold War where this action prevented the countries in question

(Guatemala – 1954; Dominican Republic – 1965) to experience drastic regime changes which

were not in the interest of the United States (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 24-25).

On the one hand, it is a subtle agreement that under conditions of complex

interdependence, countries would not resort to force since costs and effects are rather

uncertain. However, when military power is employed, it means that vital interests or

national security are threatened and thus, the respective conditions would fall under the

realist paradigm. On the other hand, this research thesis would test whether the drastic

political changes in failing states, alters the relationship of interdependence they have with

other states – in this case the United States and leads for the latter to adjust to such a

change in terms of resorting to force and thus, intervening in those states.



30

The reality of the post-Cold war has showed that failed states suffered such drastic

changes, and in this case they have become even more distanced from becoming members

of international institutions. Although such a membership would constrain their autonomy,

there is a realistic chance it would stabilize them and bent them towards cooperation, which

ultimately would offer them the benefits of interdependence.

In the end, theorizing economic interdependence is a useful tool for the

operationalization of the variables proposed by this research thesis. The manner in which

the concept is explained in the literature emphasizes the puzzle of the research question. In

other words, it is fair to assume that state failure is a threat to the system of economic

interdependence and it may cause a change to which countries such as the United States

have to adjust. How the United States decides to adjust in this situation is accentuated by

the use of military intervention. The theory is leaning towards the myriad of benefits and

the viability of cooperation earned through economic interdependence, but it does not rule

out conflict and intervention. Thus, this research thesis is offered a window of opportunity

to contemplate on whether the international system seeking the enlargement of the liberal

zone of peace, as portrayed in the literature, still has to overcome a new set of complex

problems which are unknown to decision-makers or experts. Failed states could be seen as

drastic changes challenging the order of the post-Cold War world and the protection of

economic interdependence might be a cause for military intervention.

C. The state as a Structural concept and the emergence of Failed States

1. The State



31

The discussion on the notion of failed states requires the introduction of the theoretical

pillar of what constitutes a state in the first place.

The international law provisions suggest that the people living within a given territory

must be bound to a “central structure” that exercises effective control over them (Cassese,

2005: 73). This central structure must enjoy independency from other external ones.

Another element is the territory which should not be under the influence, control or mere

interference of another “sovereign State”. The authorities which have acquired the territory

must also require “effective possession and control over a territory” (Cassese, 2005: 73).

Ultimately, a state must have a territory with well-defined boundaries, a population, a

government, and it should engage in the sphere of international diplomacy with other

entities (John, 2010).

Nonetheless, the debate on the structure of the state has received more foundational

definition starting from the claim that it has control over the developments happening

within well-defined boundaries.

Niccolo Machiavelli maintained how a ruler could conquer a territory by force and hold

on to it. Although this is a realist interpretation of the state, it provides a useful insight for

analysing the structural value of the state. Machiavelli goes on by explaining how the more

unified a territory, the more secure is its entity as a state. The ruler must foresee the risks

that might appear and must take pre-emptive measures to combat them. In other words, a

ruler must have a strategy when conquering a territory by force, due to the fact that

winning over a piece of land does not mean one could not lose it. The conqueror should win

over men of a territory and destroy those who oppose him. In fact, it is the proportional



32

relationship between the ruler and the ruled that keeps a state from falling into chaos.

There is a personal and institutional premise for state control. First, the dominated men

must both love and fear their “prince” (Machiavelli, 1999:35). The ruler must make himself

feared by the men he is dominating, but at the same time his behaviour must reflect

generosity and courage. Moreover, a ruler should not be hated by his citizens, especially in

hid endeavours of keeping them satisfied. Therefore, such an internal unified and strong

state considers external threats just another stepping stone to overcome. Second, the

military capabilities must be created from within the territory and be secured enough to

fight against external enemies. Furthermore, the matter of “establishing power securely” is

resolved through both personal charisma and institutional structures (Machiavelli, 1999:

35). The latter can be reiterated through the following: “Good arms follow good laws”

(Machiavelli, 1999:40). Finally, it is worth quoting the basic premises for building a state -

“good laws, sound defence, reliable allies and inspiring leadership” (1999:77).

In the twentieth century, Max Weber continued the debate on the concept of

statehood. In “Politics as a Vocation” Weber maintained that politics can be associated with

leadership and implicitly, with the concept of state. In other words, the leadership that

Weber refers to is based on a “human community” that has the “monopoly of the legitimate

use of physical force” (Weber, 1946: 78) In essence, the structure of a state is most of the

times determined by higher classes of men dominating the ones inferior to them. In this

sense, violence is considered to be legitimate (Weber, 1946). According to Weber,

domination is understood through the prism of authority. A group of people relate to the

authority governing them through the idea of obedience. This is made either through



33

“custom, by affectual ties, by a purely material complex of interests, or by ideal

(wertrationale) motives” (Weber, 1978: 212).

Weber developed three types of authority or legitimate domination. First, there is the

legal authority comprised of rules which people perceive as binding and thus, they obey this

type of authority. An alternate, but yet logical motive is that men fear the consequences of

not obeying these rules and at the same time, they expect to receive rewards for respecting

this legal authority. Second, the traditional authority is based on “personal loyalty which

results from common upbringing” (Weber, 1978: 227). This type of legitimate domination is

based on “owed obedience” to the leading master. Third, the charismatic authority is

accepted by men as they genuinely believe in the prowess and “virtue of personal trust” of

the leader (Weber, 1978: 216).

In sum, the modern state is associated with domination exerted within defined

boundaries as it is considered that such a structure can employ violence under legitimate

pretences. Weber explains that power is supported and achieved through violence, while

the evolution of the state has seen a shift towards distribution of power in order to further

legitimize the state’s actions. As such, the state is an organization for domination and

ultimately, gaining power requires a degree of education and a strong belief for the

interests of the power holders (Weber, 1946).

2. Failed States

A large part of the research on failed states had its starting point in one article published

by G.B. Helman and S. R. Ratner in Foreign Policy. They describe the emergence of a new



34

political form known as the “failed nation-state” in the post-Cold War era (Helman & Ratner,

1992). They explain how countries such as Haiti, Sudan or Somalia are struggling with “civil

strife, government breakdown, and economic privation” which leads to “violence and

anarchy” (Helman & Ratner, 1992). Consequently, such states were seen to be having spill-

over effects to neighbouring countries through “refugee flows, political instability, and

random warfare” (Helman & Ratner, 1992). The authors make the assumption that other,

more developed states tend to help for the fear that these problems might get out of

control by spreading to neighbouring nations. Countries from regions such as Africa, Asia or

Central America rank on top of the indexes measuring state failure. One explanation is the

period of decolonization when it was considered that such states will best achieve

independency without the interference of foreign powers. Nonetheless, the bipolar

international system during the Cold War encouraged the U.S. and the Soviet Union to seek

allies and thus, keeping the level of interference in developing and lower developed

countries mostly in the African and Asian region. This fact kept such entities dependent on

developed countries. In effect such actions proved to be counter-productive to their own

development, and in some cases it drove them into chaos (Helman & Ratner, 1992).

Rotberg has a rather Weberian approach where for a state to naturally function it must

provide “political goods” to its citizens in terms of security, border control, managing

domestic threats, and “enabling citizens” to solve their issues within the borders of the

territory without resorting to violence. A state fails if its internal authorities cannot

accomplish these requirements. Rotberg provides an understanding of what is in reality a

failed state through different arguments. First, the state is not “able or willing to perform

the fundamental jobs of the nation-state” and it implicitly finds itself on the road to failure



35

(Rotberg, 2003: 6). In this sense, the institutions are faulty, the education and health care

system are chaotic – and absenteeism rises, literacy rates fall, diseases grow and spread;

and poverty increases. Second, the ruler or the ruling faction only enjoys the positive

outcomes because they benefit from the misery of the citizens through increasing

corruption rates and constant food shortages (Rotberg, 2003: 7-8). Third, the ultimate

phase of state failure is the loss of legitimacy when citizens revolt as their living standards

decrease, while the rulers become wealthier (Rotberg, 2002: 87-88). Thus, violence

becomes the norm as it is perceived to be a fair measure against the government (Rotberg,

2003: 9).

Krasner is defining failed states along similar lines as Rotberg and Helman and Ratner.

Therefore, he adds that states with a poor infrastructure, rising crime rates, declining GDP,

different currencies on the same territory, with armies that instigate to violence and which

are not controlled by the government, all represent entities where failure is very likely to be

achieved (Krasner, 2004).

This last theoretical section could be considered the last stop in the cycle of conceptual

explanation presented by this thesis. Naturally, one cannot describe what is understood

through a “failed state” without presenting the bases of a state. Moreover, state failure has

also been empirically measured, and although not all indexes follow the same parameters,

there is a common thread for detecting whether a state is failed or not. Failed states are the

main units of analysis. Consequently, this research thesis addresses the importance of

contemporary concerns posed by such states.



36

V. Hypotheses Development

The use of the United States’ military form of intervention in the post-Cold War

period stays at the core of this research thesis. Therefore, it is important to focus on the

practice of this particular policy instrument. On the basis of Rosenau’s argument, the

operationalization of this variable should be assessed through the actual movement of one

state’s troops into another one. Such an approach would improve the theoretical debate as

it simplifies the complexity of intervention. In this sense, there would be a dissemination of

the cases and the concept would be explored in a more insightful manner (Rosenau, 1969).

The concept of failed states is the second element of focus in the research question.

In this sense, U.S. military intervention will be accounted for cases of failed states in the

post-Cold War period. In practice, this policy instrument was used in a selective manner and

it is safe to assume that the United States used a rational process of taking such action

based on intelligence analysis, evaluation of interests and alternatives. Undoubtedly, testing

hypotheses of concepts such as military intervention and failed states are not only abstract,

but also deeply debated in the literature to date.

This research will propose several premises regarding the causality of the United

States’ military intervention in failed states. To begin with, it is important to clarify the

variables of the research. The independent variable will be the economic interdependence

which is considered to be a cause for U.S. military intervention in failed states as a

dependent variable.



37



38

Dependent Variable: U.S. led Military Intervention

Independent Variable: Economic Interdependence

As a generality, there is a compelling argument for the causality proposed above:

“ Although liberals and democrats have often succumbed to the temptation to intervene to bring

‘civilization’, metropolitan standards of law and order, and democratic government to foreign

peoples who have expressed no demand for them, these interventions find no justifications in a

conception of equal respect for individuals.” (Doyle in Smith et. al., 2012).

This enunciation rejects the idea that interventions have been made for

humanitarian purposes and emphasizes the scope of this research thesis that is looking at

other layers of explanation which go beyond this reasoning at prima facie.

Taking into account the theoretical explanation for the concept of interdependence,

it is important to mention the subtle agreement existing in literature that under conditions

of complex interdependence, countries would not resort to force since costs and effects are

rather uncertain. In turn, when military power is employed, it means that vital interests or

national security are threatened and thus, the respective conditions could be explained

better through the realist paradigm. Nonetheless, this research thesis is testing whether the

drastic political changes in various states mentioned by Keohane and Nye and presented in

the Theory Section–leading them on the path of failure, alters the relationship of

interdependence they have with other states – in this case the United States. In such a



39

situation, a general assumption would be that the United States adjust to such a change in

terms of resorting to force and thus, intervening in those states.

The reality of the post-Cold war showed that failed states suffered such drastic

changes, and they became even more distanced from becoming members of international

economic institutions. Although such a membership would constrain their autonomy, it is

assumed it would give them an incentive for internal stabilization and consequently, would

bend them towards cooperation.

Drawing on the main attributes of the modern interdependence theory proposed by

Keohane and Nye the United States will be considered as being State A and the Failed State

where military intervention occurred as State B. There will be presented some general

assumptions of this research thesis before resuming to the main hypotheses.

The United States need to be able to cooperate with failed states. Due to the fact

that these failed states are characterized by internal chaos, it is difficult for the United

States to find factions in those countries prone to dialogue. Furthermore, the fact that failed

states are outside the globalized economy and thus, outside of the global influence

propagated by the United States, adds to their list of perceived national security threats.

Considering all other viable alternatives, the United States had chosen to militarily intervene

in some states. The use of this policy instrument was due because state failure represented

a change perceived as having expensive effects on the economic interdependence

controlled by America. Such an intervention could be assumed to have been conducted on

the premise that it would bring order into chaos before the system of economic



40

interdependence is altered and later integrate these states into the global economy,

implicitly contributing to their development.

In the light of these ideas, there have been developed the following hypotheses:

H1. H1. If one of the national security interests of State A is defined as protecting its

relations of economic interdependence, then it is likely that military intervention will take

place in State B in order to prevent disruptions in the regional stability which may negatively

affect State A’s relation of economic interdependence with State B and/or its neighbours.

H2. The longer is State B left into chaos, the greater will State A’s vulnerability be and thus,

it will trigger military intervention as a direct reaction to State’s B failure.



41

VI. Research Design

The analysis of this research thesis will focus on two case studies. These have the

goal to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses proposed in the previous section. In this

respect, the primary units of analysis will be comprised of two states as unitary actors.

Objectively, the choice follows the theoretical guideline proposed in the previous chapters.

The two states must fulfill two conditions. First, they should be considered failed at the time

of the intervention. Second, the intervention is identified in the theoretical structure of this

thesis as being military. In this sense, there must be proof of actual movement of troops in

the failed states in question.

Therefore, the two major units of analysis for testing the proposed hypotheses are

represented by U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994 and by the U.S. intervention in

Afghanistan in 2001-present. The analysis aims at finding whether it is a causal relationship

between the concept economic interdependence and military intervention.

Somalia and Afghanistan represent two interesting choices for the operationalization

of the variables in this thesis. There are two perspectives for this choice: one which

considers the regional geopolitical framework and a technical one. First, the regions where

these states are located show evidence for U.S. strategic interests. Somalia is the Horn of

Africa – a zone of political and economic turmoil, and Afghanistan is in Central Asia and used

to represent a passage way for trade routes with other parts of the world, being also a

resourceful country. The second perspective is based on a technical approach. Both cases



42

represent a small-N study and it makes the analysis parsimonious. The ultimate goal is to

explore in-depth the causal mechanism between economic interdependence and military

intervention in failed states.

The research design will follow three observational parameters. First, it will be

presented a historical overview of the states discussed. Evidence showed that this aspect

plays an important factor for explaining state failure and economic interdependence.

Second, observations for state failure will be assessed accounting for a time span of five

years (plus/minus three years according to available data) prior to the actual intervention.

The four main aspects covering this section are political shocks, economic shocks, public

goods and the level of violence. The last part will cover observations based on the dyadic

relationship between U.S. and Somalia and U.S. and Afghanistan. The three perspectives

analyzed are the concept of geopolitics (natural resources, strategic position), the process of

military intervention, and interdependence assumed to benefit all parties.

A. Historical Overview of Somalia and Afghanistan

Somalia was under Siad Barre’s dictatorship from 1969 until 1991. He gained power of

the territory in a bloodless coup, after the assassination of Abdi Rashid Ali Shermanke the

only president elected by the Somali citizens. Barre’s regime started to fall apart when

opposition movements rose against his leadership. These movements increased in intensity,

ultimately, forcing Barre to give up power (BBC, 2013).

Historically, the Somali society has always been divided. The population is known to be

nomadic and organized in clans all over the territory. This structural separatist framework



43

brought along different languages, social hierarchies, and cultures. During the colonial

times, the leadership tried to impose a centralized government. However, only during the

1960s Mogadishu became Somalia’s capital and there were created central institutions such

as the parliament. In addition, the adoption of a constitution during the same time period

allowed for political freedom and competition. This also permitted the appearance of an

endless number of parties. When Siad Barre took over, the constitution and all its provisions

were prohibited and the political organization followed a one party system namely - the

Somali Revolutionary Party (Clarke, 1992: 12). Also, the new regime was influenced by an

Islamist and socialist vision (Ahmed and Green, 1999: 117).

The power apparatus in Somalia has always been extremely decentralized; pastoralism

and farming being the predominant economic activities and people identifying themselves

with the clans they were part of. Comparatively, both colonial leaders and Siad Barre gravely

misunderstood the Somali society. Moreover, Somalia did not share a common national

identity. Therefore, the outcome which followed the fall of Barre’s regime was not

surprising. Anarchy characterized by ethnic conflict became the status quo in Somalia. In

other words, the imposition of centralized institutions accelerated the incidence of internal

conflicts. Moreover, when local leaders took over, they did not know how to employ the

concept of rule of law, equality or basic democratic values which theoretically aimed at

ensuring the populations with a decent standard of living to say the least. Instead, they

made use of their power to increase their personal well-being, instead of projecting it onto

the society as a whole (Coyne and Leeson, 2010: 4-5). In addition, despots such as Barre

showed contempt towards his own citizens through “widespread repression, arbitrary



44

arrest, torture and murder. He became one of the most extravagant human rights’

violators” (Clarke, 1992: 12).

More importantly, Somalia has never had friendly relations with neighbouring nations.

During Barre’s regime, it engaged in a war with Ethiopia with the purpose of reuniting the

territories lived by the Somali population under the same flag. This is an eloquent example

of Barre disregarding Somalia’s societal organization of clanships. In essence, these actions

brought Somalia one step closer to failure (Clarke, 1992:12).

Afghanistan has been characterized by a similar societal structure as Somalia. Due to its

tribal nature, Afghanistan has constantly experienced difficulties in establishing a central

government and when it did, it was due to invasions rather than an internal local decision-

making. During the 1970s, the economy was poor, but autarkic. From 1979 until 1989, the

country lost its economic and political structures as a result of the Soviet Invasion (U.S.

Army of Military History, 2006). The post-Cold War era worsened Afghanistan’s situation.

Although the Soviet Union withdrew its troops, the country stopped receiving funds from

both the Russians and the U.S. The state succumbed into a dreadful civil war between

different ethnical factions. Some of these are worth mentioning such as Uzbeks, Tajikis or

Pasthuns (Library of Congress Country Studies, 1997). In contrast to the limited basic needs

such as fuel or food, Afghanistan’s stockpiles of armament were incredible (Library Of

Congress Country Studies, 1997). The remaining officials in the government were struggling

to pay off the opposition factions in order not to attack Kabul and to keep safe public goods

such as roads or towns (Library Of Congress Country Studies, 1997).



45

Consequently, Afghanistan has suffered consistently throughout history. External

invasions from the past fueled the appearance of extremist factions and further increased

the change of institutional and economic collapse of the country. The experience of periodic

turmoil made the world’s powers confused on whom to establish communication bridges

with, much less who to influence and support ideologically and financially.

Both countries have had difficult struggles. History is a great indicator for explaining the

present situation of failing states. Somalia has always been a factionalized society, and those

rulers, regardless if they were colonists or local leader, failed to understand this aspect.

Hence, the chaotic status of the country has been prevailing for much of its past.

Afghanistan has been an epicenter of turmoil for countless decades. There is no doubt state

failure was approaching at a faster pace.

B. Observations for State Failure

Historically, Somalia and Afghanistan have had difficult internal struggles. They have

been troubling states not only for their society, but also for their neighbours. Nationalist

sentiments of leaders such as Barre drove Somalia into wars where little was achieved. In

Afghanistan, foreign rulers exacerbated the formation of groups which sought to dominate

all aspects of the society, driving the country into chaos and lawlessness.

It is important to note that at the time of the military interventions and more generally,

for the whole post-Cold War period, empirical data used to measure state failure and other

trends were very limited and had a very low reliability. In this sense, the research conducted

on this issue will follow a rather qualitative research design.



46

1. Political Shocks

The term “political shock” aims at shedding light on certain characteristics considered to

be leading to state failure. These will be applied to Somalia and Afghanistan covering a time

span of five years (plus/minus three years due to data availability) prior to the U.S. led

military interventions. The principal characteristics have been identified such as sudden

leadership changes with negative effects, institutional organization in terms judiciary,

legislative and executive powers, democratic participation, rule of law and corruption.

a) Negative effects of Leadership Change

In Somalia, Barre has tried to redress his policies with regards to the Somali citizens

when he acknowledged the violent rise of opposition movements. However, these policies

were clouded by the actual government’s actions against the opposed factions. The final

struggle which led Somalia to failure was a manifesto adopted in 1990 which proposed the

establishment of an interim government and the organization of “a national conference to

reconcile the various ethnic groups now engaged in fighting and subversion” (Clarke, 1992:

30). Nonetheless, most of them were detained by Barre’s authorities. This apparent

appeasement continued with the proposal for a referendum with the scope of adopting a

constitution and allowing open and free elections. Barre even offered his resignation in

exchange for a cease-fire from the rebels’ part.

In reality, the government oppression firmly continued and the proposal was rejected by

the opposition movements. In 1991, Barre was forced to flee the country. Ali Mahdi

Mohammed – leader of the United Somali Congress group has tried to assume the role of

interim president of Somalia. Nonetheless, this change was rejected by the other clan



47

factions and the country fell into a deadly civil war (Clarke, 1992: 34-35). The unilateral

decision of Ali Mahdi Mohammed to assure presidency of Somalia without allowing free and

fair elections instead, represented the final act of repression of a central government which

led the country to civil war.

Afghanistan has also experienced a drastic turn of events regarding leadership change.

In 1996, the country suffered a dramatic political change when the Islamic extremist group

known as the Taliban came to power. This opposition group resisted the Soviet invasion

while being supported by the U.S. government during the 1980s. They were part of the

“Pashtun faction of mujahideen” which used to dominate the southern and eastern part of

Afghanistan (Laub, 2014).

In 1994, the group took over Kandahar and in 1996 they took control over Kabul. At first,

the Taliban seemed to bring stability to the country, replacing the corruption of the Soviets

and the volatile government which remained in power after the Russian withdrawal.

However, the policies imposed by the Taliban forced the population to live under a strict

Islamic rule. Provisions of such a legislation covered punishments of the population such as

“flagellation, amputation and execution” (Laub, 2014). The major restrictions affected the

population at a very deep level with women being forced to wear the burqa “from head to

toe” and abused if they disobeyed what were deemed being un-Islamic provisions. Music

and television were also prohibited. Essentially, the regime isolated Afghanistan from the

international community. Finally, the Pakistani and U.S. intelligence found the country to

provide refuge for terrorist groups (Laub, 2014).



48

b) Institutional Organization

The separation of powers in a state is not only a characteristic of democratic regimes,

but also of offering citizens of a country the basic level of human security. In both Somalia

and Afghanistan it can be observed the absence of the judiciary, legislative and executive

powers during the drastic regime changes described above.

In Somalia, the leader of the United Somali Congress attempted to take over the control

of the government, but he was quickly toppled by opposing factions in 1991. Consequently,

Somalia did not have any functioning government due to the anarchic situation. The

legislative and the Supreme Court also disappeared with the inception of the sectarian and

ethnic conflict (U.S. Department Of State, 1998).

The institutional framework of Afghanistan experienced a severe degree of inoperability

before the Taliban rule came to power (Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan). The leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan was represented by Mullah

Mohammad Omar. He self-appointed as the ruler of the country and took over the power

with his allied forces formed of “Pashtun clerics” (Katzman, 2014).

There was no trace of a functional parliament while the government was kept operational at

a limited level. In addition, the judiciary was practically non-existent and thus, there were no

legal checks and balances for Omar’s decision-making. It became soon clear how the Taliban

leader was able to transform Afghanistan in a center for terrorism by offering asylum to

Osama bin Laden (Katzman, 2014: 4).

Most importantly, the main structures of a state such as the parliament or the

government were inoperable and the only official institutions were minimally staffed

without “modern equipment” (Katzman, 2014: 5-6). Undoubtedly, the Taliban regime did

not receive international recognition due to its lack of institutional framework. By 2001,



49

they were controlling 90 percent of Afghanistan. Only in 2001, the United Nations

recognized a remaining faction controlled by Burhanuddin Rabbani (U.S. Department Of

State, 2001).

One cannot expect that a country is stable when such basic structures are illegitimate

and the rulers lead by instigating fear and violence among the population. If the people of a

country are not able to turn to an institutional framework for safety, welfare and other

public goods which every human being is entitled to, then a state is on the path to achieving

failure in the perception of the international community.

c) Democratic Participation

Considering the description of previous characteristics, it is now clear that the citizens of

neither Somalia nor Afghanistan benefitted from free and fair elections or much less

political competition. In 1991, Somalia was in the midst of an ethnic warfare where the

mere idea of electoral participation did not have the proper setting to flourish. Moreover,

there is no evidence which would imply the existence of any political parties competing for

the leadership of the country. Under these circumstances, there was no case of organized

elections (U.S. Department Of State, 1998).

Islamic extremism in Afghanistan prior to the U.S. military intervention was implicit for

the lack of any type of political participation. For example, comparing Afghanistan with a

communist state during the Cold War era where a constitution was allowing, in theory, the

existence of a political opposition, the Taliban openly monopolized all aspects of the society

by imposing a harsh Islamic legislation. In this sense, it could be observed that whatever the

despotism of the Taliban deemed to be un-Islamic, they corrected it with punishments



50

against the society. The only political formation in the country was represented by the army

and the small circle of acolytes loyal to Omar.

d) Rule of Law

The concept known as the rule of law holds at its basis the fact that all individuals and

institutions within a state follow the legislative provisions of the judiciary power. It is one of

the fundamental aspects of a functioning state. Somalia collapsed into a civil war in 1991.

The clans that turned against Barre and managed to topple him turned the arms against

each other instead of cooperating. There was no doubt that the lack of a higher authority to

govern the country led to no trace of the rule of law (Le Sage, 2005: 21-22). Notably, there is

some empirical data proving that the rule of law in Somalia and Afghanistan was absent. The

earliest empirical evidence which was found in Somalia has been provided by World

Governance Indicators (WGI) for 1996. Three years after the intervention occurred, Somalia

scored a mean of 0.19 for the rule of law indicator. The measurements found in WGI

followed a rank from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). Therefore, it can be observed that the

country has scored rather low and comparing it against the worldwide distribution, ranked

in the bottom (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013).

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013.



51

According to the WGI indicators, Afghanistan scored a mean of 0.09 from 1996 until

2002 for the rule of law indicator. Again, it can be reiterated that compared to other

countries, it achieved a rather low score, but not surprising taking into account the political

setting which was developing at the time prior to the U.S. military intervention in 2001

(Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013).


e) Corruption

The WGI has also shown empirical data for control of corruption. In Somalia, there is no

empirical data for this indicator prior, during or immediately after the military intervention

took place, considering the margin of error of minus/plus three years (Worldwide

Governance Indicators, 2013). However, even the lack of empirical data reiterates the

anarchic situation of Somalia at the time. Evidence for the final struggle of Barre’s regime

showed that the government was ultimately fighting against elite which was hungry for

power and wanted to gain access to the resources of the state for their own benefit. The

socialist regime used “civil service posts and public funds to reward and punish other

opportunistic members of the elite” (Samatar, 1992: 636).

Barre’s government was ruling through the so-called blood ties with the aim of dividing

the opposition, control public property and making the military incapable of action.



52

Corruption went as far as the last attempt of the United Somali Congress to take over the

power in 1991 providing no free election. These actions were soon followed by a bloody civil

war. The opposing factions returned to their parts of the country claiming sovereignty over

them, and the gangs which were marginalized from this process turned against the citizens

by ravaging everything in their way. In essence, the concept of corruption in Somalia can be

identified as opportunism (Samatar, 1992: 637-640). In addition, a non-existent government

in a stateless Somalia could not fill in the vacuum for an empirical observation of the

corruption level.

In Afghanistan there was found some evidence for this indicator. While in 1996 there is

no data, the 1998 measurements assessed a 0 level of control for corruption which

persisted until 2002 (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013). This finding shows that the

Taliban rule brought a despotic regime among the Afghans which was undeniable,

uncontrollable and more importantly, which made it impossible to be challenged from

within.




53

2. Economic Shocks

The economic shocks which will be accounted for state failure in Somalia and

Afghanistan are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fluctuations and traces of foreign direct

investment (FDI) represented by sectors of interest with viable opportunities for foreign

investors. For both the GDP and the FDI, are expected to decrease during the times prior to

the U.S. intervention.

Somalia was not only politically, but also economically isolated during Barre’s socialist

regime. As expected, the economy was nationalized, all trading routes were closed, the

inception of a liberalized economy was replaced by price controls and severe agricultural

and industrial shortages were imposed. Somali people ended up using bribery mechanisms

to survive. For instance, households had to sell major part of their goods to support the

army, the military forces were blocking the water resources and the infrastructure was

destroyed to the point where public goods were getting to the people with great difficulty

(Ahmed and Green, 1999: 119-120). The post-1991 civil war led the remaining of the Somali

economy to the ground. The poor economy led to famine and to human loss. The ethnic

clashes kept trading routes closed with the southern part of the country suffering the most.

Consequently, this was a major driver for the U.S. led UN humanitarian intervention in 1992.

Studies show how Somalia was left “barefoot” as one could note, from any economic or

political goods. The northern bay area of the country with the “most fertile” lands crops

being planted and nourished livestock were “stolen or destroyed by gunmen” (Mubarak,

1997: 2030). Overall, it has been assessed that around fifty percent of the Somali GDP is

covered by the agricultural sector with livestock, bananas, corn or sugar being some of the

principal products which might raise an economic interest to other states. For instance,

bananas are exported overseas, including the United States. Another example is



54

represented by livestock’s skin as a main exported by-product (U.S. Department of State,

1998).

Somalia – GDP 1989-1990 (in billions of US dollars)

1989 1,092,393,020.50

1990 917, 044, 254.00

Source: The World Bank, 2014.

Taking into consideration the empirical data for the GDP measurement, the evidence

is very limited in this respect, but for the time accounted, one can observe a slight decrease.

The evidence for the foreign direct investment was accounted for the period starting with

1989 until 1993. The following table represents the data rather accurately.

Somalia – FDI 1989-1993 (in US dollars)

1989 -41,160,000

1990 5,590,000

1991 -150,000

1992 -60,000

1993 2,000,000

Source: The World Bank, 2014

The main pattern which can be observed for the above data is that towards the end

of Barre’s regime, the financial investment in Somalia was detracted. One observation is

that the isolated economy and trading routes deterred investors from financing the country.

Later, this aspect seemed to fluctuate with a peak in 1993 of positive investment.

Undoubtedly, this could also be associated with the U.S. intervention and the humanitarian



55

relief provided in 1992-1993. Nonetheless, there are views in the literature which echo the

plausibility of a functioning Somali economy which would be better off in the anarchic

situation in the post-1991 period (Mubarak, 1997: 2030).

In comparison, Afghanistan experienced different fluctuations regarding the

economic shocks. The following tables provide detailed information in this regard.

Afghanistan GDP (in US dollars) – 1996-2001

1996 7,810,968,827

1997 9,048,962,719

1998 8,736,033,093

1999 126,804,759,728

2000 167,260,766,750

2001 171,975,001,917


Afghanistan FDI (in US dollars) – 1996-2001

1996 690,000

1997 -1,460,000

1998 -10,000

1999 6,040,000



56

2000 170,000

2001 680,000


In contrast to the initial expectation, the GDP of Afghanistan has increased in the

years previous to the military intervention. It is a rather conflicting finding taking into

consideration that the GDP would be expected to decrease when the country is governed by

such a destabilizing regime. On the one hand, one explanation for this increase might be

represented by Afghanistan’s natural resources such as natural gas exports and minerals or

the production of arms. However, the GDP increase has not been reflected on the

population – as the situation before 2001 has been evaluated at a pre-famine stage. On the

other hand, the agriculture of the country covers sixty-five percent of the total GDP with

products used at the domestic level such as cereals, cotton, wool, or fruits. The industry is

making up for twenty percent of the GDP covering textiles, furniture, raw materials such as

cement, and other resources as natural gas or woven carpets destined for exports (U.S.

Department of State, 2001).

Even in this situation, the qualitative evidence shows that the Taliban leadership was so

harsh and the consistent terrorizing of the population impeded any kind of production of

goods or services which might explain the GDP increase. Nevertheless, there are some

elements which explain this rise in the GDP, but they are all coming from the informal

economy. The Afghanistan exports have been booming during the Taliban rule through the

smuggling of goods across borders, putting at a high disadvantage the local businesses and

the development of the domestic economy. Also, the illicit traffic of opium and heroin have



57

been added to the GDP calculations of the UN Statistical Data as Afghanistan became one of

the biggest producers of poppy fields. All returns from these exports were destined for the

Taliban army and not distributed among the population (Rashid, 1999).

3. Political Goods

The political goods were analyzed in terms of the overall health situation, the

educational system and information on food shortages.

a) Educational System

Before Somalia succumbed to internal ethnic conflict, education was required for all

children between six and fourteen (Raspbridge). All educational stages from primary school

to higher level institutions were covered in the societal structure. During Barre’s regime the

Islamic religion became a mandatory part of the cultural education and, all learning

institutions were government controlled (Library of Congress Country Studies)

Literacy Rate for Somali Male and Female Population 15+ yrs

It can be inferred that the

increased level of violence

prevented the emancipation of

the population after Barre’s

regime.

Source: UNESCO, 2000.

When Somalia succumbed to civil war, “public services in social infrastructure”

comprising educational facilities disappeared (Mubarak, 1997: 2030). Considering the

Year Male Female Source

1985 18 6 UNDP, 1998

1992 41 16 UNDP, 1994

1995 36 14 UNICEF-ESARO,

1996



58

available empirical data for literacy rates, it has been found that in 1992, Somalia had

extremely low ratios for women, and the male population did not touch the threshold of at

least 50 percent. Later, in 1995, there was a slight decrease in these percentages (UNESCO,

2000).

In Afghanistan, there were two educational systems functioning simultaneously in

Afghanistan: the so-called “Islamic madrassas” where children were taught the “basic moral

values and ritual knowledge through the study of the Holy Koran” and other religious

resources, and the “higher level madrassas” which offered higher education (Library of

Congress Country Studies, 1997).

The domination of the Taliban-rule not only brought Afghanistan to a state of anarchy,

but managed to place it among the countries with the highest illiteracy rate in Asia.

Therefore, in 2000 Afghanistan registered a 12.6 percent literacy rate of the 15+ female

population, and a rate of 43.1 percent for the male population (United Nations Statistics

Division, 2014).

b) Health Situation

Both Somalia and Afghanistan are countries which have experienced severe turmoil and

where the health sector suffered an extreme deterioration.

The suffering Somali population had reached its peak during the civil war. Although the

collapse of the health sector started during Barre’s regime, the outcomes intensified after

1991. The destruction of the water wells transformed the country into a center of infectious

diseases very difficult to eradicate. Almost eighty percent of the population contracted

intestinal diseases due to poor or non-existent sanitary facilities. Among other illnesses



59

there were identified pulmonary tuberculosis, smallpox, and malaria (Library of Congress

Country Studies)

The accumulated data showed that the inception of the civil war made it impossible to

gather evidence with regards to how many people could access sanitary facilities. However,

only starting with 1993 data started to be available. It was registered that only 21 percent of

the population benefitted from an improved health situation (United Nations Statistics

Division, 2014). Undoubtedly, the change has been due to the U.S. led military intervention

accompanied by the UN humanitarian relief aid.

Afghanistan’s health services were deeply uneven across the country, covering mostly

the urbanized areas. For instance, there were infant mortality rate was registered at 163 out

of 1000 live births in 1994 (Library of Congress Country Studies, 1997) and there was a mere

21 percent of the population which had actual access to sanitation facilities. These major

issues were due to the Islamic extremism imposed by the Taliban-rule (United Nations

Statistics Division, 2014).

Afghanistan reached one of its lowest points in terms of health security in 1997 when

1.5 million people were “physically disabled by war injuries, including amputation, blindness

and paralysis, as well as debilitating infectious diseases, such as poliomyelitis and leprosy”

(Library of Congress Country Studies, 1997). At some point, the situation was so severe, that

the International Red Cross Committee, World Health Organization and UNICEF sent

humanitarian help to those in need. Although these actions did not reach a broader part of

the population in need, the international organizations which set foot in Afghanistan during



60

the Taliban rule managed to vaccinate approximately four million children from contagious

diseases such as polio (Library of Congress Country Studies, 1997).

c) Food Shortages

On the one hand, there is no empirical evidence of what percentages of the population

have been malnourished during the times prior to the interventions. On the other hand,

both cases present qualitative evidence for famine situations. In Somalia, the socialist

regime destroyed the most important sources for survival – water pumps. The people had

to either reorient towards older sources of water supplies, to drink “poor quality water” or

to buy it at sky rocketing prices (Library of Congress Country Studies, 1992).

The civil war that followed destroyed electricity and communication lines, as well as the

hard infrastructure, maritime and air routes (Mubarak, 1997: 2030). No later than 1992,

Somalia was declared a chronic center of famine and the international community

acknowledged the need to provide humanitarian aid to the vast population.

In 1998, Afghanistan was assessed to have passed the “pre-famine stage”. In this sense,

the U.S. analysts discovered that the country was imposing increased prices on basic food

such as grains. Families were forced to sell their goods in terms of livestock, furniture or

even homes to feed themselves. People were eating “inedible” food which increased the

rates of malnutrition and diseases. The mortality rates also registered an increase

(Committee on International Relations, 2001).

The famine in Somalia and Afghanistan registered prior to the intervention caused

massive migrations to neighbouring countries. Not only refugees seeking safety and shelter

were crossing the borders of these failing states, but also a spillover of infectious diseases



61

among other threats. It was a situation which raised concerns of instability in other

neighbouring states. Borders became more porous and threats were migrating along with

populations in desperate need for basic goods.

4. Level of Violence

In this section it is assessed the level of violence for both Afghanistan and Somalia. The

following empirical data is taken from the Political Instability Task Force 1955-2012. Below it

is provided the coding of the variables measuring this level of violence. The cases were

placed in the wider analytical framework of ethnic wars.

Yrbegin = year when the conflict began

Yrend = year when the conflict ended

MAGFIGHT = scaled number of rebel combatants or activists scored from 0 to 4

(where: 0 = < 100 combatants, 1= 100 to 1000, 2 = 1000 to 5,000, 3 = 5,000 to 15,000, and 4

= > 15,000 combatans)

MAGFATAL = scaled number of fatalities related to the fighting scored from 0 to 4

(where 0 = < 100 fatalities, 1 = 100 to 1000, 2= 1000 to 5000, 3 = 5000 to 10 000, and 4 =

>10 000 fatalities)

MAGAREA = scaled portion of country affected by fighting scored from 0 to 4

(where 0 = < one tenth of the country affected, 1 = one tenth and one or several important

cities/provinces affected, 2 = > one tenth to one quarter and/or the capital city, 3 = one

tenth to one quarter and a large number of urban places, 4 = > one half is affected)



62

AVEMAG = average of the three magnitude scores scored from 0 to 4

(Political Instability Task Force – State Failure Problem Set, 2013: 3-5)

Ethnic wars are considered to be internal conflicts between official, governmental

factions and ethnic groups comprised of the opposition and challenging the incumbents.

Both cases have been experiencing this type of warfare at a distressing scale during the time

prior to the intervention. Each variable is calculated at an annual rate and each score

represents a different level of violence. Below there are the tables for Somalia and

Afghanistan with the assessment of the violence level. (PTIF – State Failure Problem Set,

2013: 6).

Somalia – Ethnic Wars – 1989-1993

YRBEG YREND MAGFIGHT MAGFATAL MAGAREA AVEMAG

1989 1988 Ongoing 3 1 2 2

1990 1988 Ongoing 3 3 2 2.5

1991 1988 Ongoing 3 3 4 3.5

1992 1988 Ongoing 3 2 4 3

1993 1988 Ongoing 4 N/A 4 3.5



63

Source: PTIF – Ethnic Wars Dataset, 2012

Afghanistan – Ethnic Wars – 1996-2001

YRBEG YREND MAGFIGHT MAGFATAL MAGAREA AVEMAG

1996 1992 2001 4 3 4 3.5

1997 1992 2001 4 3 4 3.5

1998 1992 2001 4 3 4 3.5

1999 1992 2001 4 3 4 3.5

2000 1992 2001 4 2 2 3

2001 1992 2001 4 2 2 2.5

Source: PTIF – Ethnic Wars Dataset, 2012

In Somalia, it can be observed that the level of violence is intensifying gradually from

the beginning while towards the end of the time-span it decreases (i.e. lower number of

fatalities registered for 1992). Moreover, the portion of the country affected increases,

reaching the maximum threshold envisioned for this study.

Afghanistan’s development is not entirely different from Somalia’s. For the period

between 1996 and 2001, that is the whole period of the Taliban-rule, the country is

evaluated to experience the highest level of fighting, with the number of fatalities

decreasing in the last two years and the portion of the country affected diminishing. Overall,

both cases experienced a slim statistical reduction in their level of violence as the time span

approached the moment of intervention.



64

This final parameter is a crucial determinant for the state failure observations of

Somalia and Afghanistan. The empirical assessment presented above reiterates the fact that

these states provided little to no human security for their population. The despotic and

anarchic rulings were instigating fear and were oblivious to human dignity. In the end, the

level of violence is an important factor in framing a state as failed and the State Fragility

Index is a useful indicator for proving the status of the cases in question.

The observations for state failure have been addressed from four different

perspectives: political shocks, economic shocks, public goods and the level of violence. All

empirical and qualitative data indicate that Somalia and Afghanistan could be considered

failed in these parameters prior to the intervention. The main comparative aspect is the

manner in which state structures are perceived in democratic, developed countries which

prevail in the international system. Therefore, one limitation of this analysis may be the fact

that some scholars might consider this assessment rather subjective. Nonetheless, the

theoretical chapter intentionally presented the counterpart of a failed state. Afghanistan

and Somalia do not fit the Weberian approach of state legitimacy. It is safe to assume that

even with the prevailing qualitative research employed in this design; these two case studies

are nothing but failed states. Additionally, following Rotberg’s Weberian approach to state

failure, a valid assumption would be that Somalia ceased to have the ability to provide its

population with basic public goods, while the Taliban in Afghanistan willingly isolated the

country from external influences, thus depriving its people from a decent standard of living

and a protective governance. In order to provide a more accurate analysis of what

constitutes a contemporary failed state below there some empirical data from the Failed

States Index:



65

Somalia – Failed States Index 2005-2007

Year Worldwide Rank Score

2005 5 102.3

2006 7 105.9

2007 3 111.1

Source: The Failed States Index, 2013

Afghanistan – Failed States Index 2005-2007

Year Worldwide Rank Score

2005 11 99.0

2006 10 99.8

2007 8 102.3

Source: The Failed States Index, 2013

The Failed States Index is measuring state failure for twelve indicators grouped in

social, economic, political and military aspects. The coding is made on a scale from 1 (low) to

10 (high). The interpretation of the data follows the assumption that the higher the score,

the worse the situation in a given state. The worst a country could rank is 120 on the

proposed scale. The data is presented over the time span between 2005 and 2009. The

observations show that both Somalia and Afghanistan still ranked at the top of the list with

the highest scores over all the indicators.



66

This research thesis acknowledges the fact that the literature on state failure is still

debated and does not rule out the presence of a certain degree of subjectivity and the

existence of a margin error for the set of observations provided in this section.

C. Observations regarding the two key dyadic relationships: US –

Somalia, US – Afghanistan

The next set of observations is drawn from three different elements of inquiry. They are

accounted for the relationship between the U.S. and Somalia and the U.S. and Afghanistan.

First, the geostrategic factors are accounted in terms of geographical position of the country

and natural resources which are assumed to play an important role in the decision-making

process for intervention. Second, the concept of intervention is applied in terms of actual

deployment of U.S. troops in the countries considered, the legal dimension of the concept

and whether the targets posed any crucial threat for the national security of the United

States. Finally, the concept of economic interdependence is based on the assumption that it

brings benefits to all parties involved. In this respect, the set of observations will mostly rely

on evidence gathered from flows of money and trade, and an assessment on the degree of

asymmetric interdependence between the two dyads as presented in the chapter on theory.

1. Geopolitical Factors

For parsimonious reasons, this analysis reflects the relationships between states at the

time of the intervention only, since this is the purpose of the research. Somalia seems to

have an important strategic setting being located in the Horn of Africa and offering

possibilities for maritime security with openness to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Geographically, the country is also close to Yemen, Tanzania, and Saudi Arabia which were

all U.S. allies at the time of the intervention. Somalia’s main activity was pastoralism.



67

However, the land was not used to at its full potential, with only 1.73 percent being arable

(Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). This aspect implies that Somalia presented very limited

opportunities when it came to exploiting its own resources. Objectively, such exploitation is

considered to be beneficial when it is done in the interest of the vast population and not to

reap short-term benefits. Furthermore, among the natural resources found in Somalia which

might have raised the U.S. interest were a large number of unexploited minerals and oil

reserves (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).

Afghanistan is a landlocked state surrounded by strategically important neighbours.

China has been engaging in a beneficial trade relationship with the U.S. for decades. Iran is

posing threats to becoming a regional power. Pakistan has been thought to deeply influence

the developments in Afghanistan since the Soviet occupation. In other words, it has been

considered a rather swing state when it came to making alliances. On the one hand, they

were cooperating with the U.S. intelligence which led to the discovery of terrorist nests in

Afghanistan and on the other hand, they were also fostering part of the Taliban faction and

terrorist developments themselves. Finally, Afghanistan has its northern neighbours

comprised of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. This aspect is important since it

shares significant resources of natural gas at the border with the Central Asian Republics

(Katzman, 2014: 67-68).

2. Intervention

Before proceeding to the analytical part of this section, it is important to present the

overall U.S. political situation at the moment of the interventions. Therefore, in 1992, during

the George W. Bush administration, Colin Powell was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. The so-called “Powell Doctrine” has been an important tenet in the U.S. diplomacy



68

and decision-making at the time. In other words, the post-Cold War world has been

reasoned in the National Security Strategy of 1991 as becoming more volatile and

ambiguous (LaFeber, 2009: 73-75).

In this respect, Powell continued the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s vision

for foreign U.S. troop deployment only under seven conditions. The United States was to

send its military forces only if the national interest was at stake and that is if the interest

was explicitly formulated in order to pose a serious threat to the national security of the

country. In the case of an intervention, the objective was to achieve victory and the

methods for achieving that had to be analyzed against all the other alternatives and their

outcomes. More precisely, it could be assumed the U.S. were bound to employ a Rational

Actor Model in their decision-making process. Moreover, force was to be employed as a

solution of last resort and only with a back-up plan constituted of an exit strategy. In the

end, any deployment of U.S. forces would have to be subject to readjustment if necessary

and the military had to have the approval of the Congress and the population (LaFeber,

2009: 73-75).

In retrospective, not all of these points were respected when interventions in

Afghanistan and Somalia took place. Colin Powell was a pragmatic character and he only

proposed short and clearly determined interventions which were successful such as the case

of Kuwait in 1990. However, the complex developments post 1991 and the humanitarian

disaster that was taking place in Somalia and reiterated by international missions and

humanitarian lobbyists had deeply hurdled the decision-making process.



69

In April 1992, the UN Security Council Resolution 751 urged the international community

to contribute with financial and other resources in the assistance of the Somali population

(UN SC Resolution 751, 1992). The main setback was that the UN troops did not possess the

capabilities to reach to the vast majority of the starving population and proved to be

overwhelmed. The U.S. led UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) deployed

around 30, 000 troops in the country (UK Border Agency, 2011). It is important to point out

that the U.S. interventionist strategy has been and remained rather selective. Undoubtedly,

the United States cannot address all the crises on the globe. However, when the call for

support was made, despite the lack of economic interest and against the general thinking in

the State Department that a crucial national interest should be at stake for deployment of

troops, President Bush acknowledged the fact that America possessed the necessary

capabilities to address the humanitarian disaster in Somalia (Oberdorfer, 1992). After rough

deliberations, it was concluded that the U.S. could pursue the operation despite the Powell

Doctrine. The response was made under the Operation Provide Relief aimed at deterring the

violent clans from ripping off the food aid destined for the masses. Food, by itself,

represented a means of gaining power for the warlords who were selling it at extremely

high prices and causing mass starvation in the country. Unfortunately, the operation did not

achieve its ends.

The famine persisted in Somalia. In December 1992, it was launched Operation Restore

Hope when the U.S. deployment of troops fulfilled the objective of providing a “more fair

distribution of food delivered” (Haulman, 2004: 4). In May 1993, the humanitarian crisis was

considered to have passed.



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In an Address before the World Affairs Council of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts the

situation in Somalia was considered “a horrendous human tragedy which is of utmost

concern to the US Government” (US Department of State, 1992).Moreover, the U.S. was

outraged when one of the acclaimed leaders of Somalia – General Mohamed Farah Aideed

rejected the protective forces offered by the international community. The whole approach

in Somalia was perceived by the U.S. with an imperative need to make the country retie

relations with its neighbours (US Department of State, 1992).

The decision for intervention in Afghanistan has dated back since 1998. The U.S.

intelligence discovered that a terrorist organization led by a so-called Osama bin Laden

planned the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

The response was the air-bombing of several alleged terrorist sites, but there was no

military intervention undertaken (Laub, 2014). In 2001, on September 11, the U.S. was hit in

the terrorist attacks conducted by the Afghanistan based Al Qaeda organization. Considering

the conditions of the Powell Doctrine, the terrorist attacks represented a direct and

undeniable threat to America’s national security. That was the trigger for America to deploy

troops, supported by its allies in searching for what became the most wanted terrorist on

the globe.

Furthermore, the strategic perception brought proof that the Taliban were severely

disrupting the regional stabilization not only through the oppression of the population, but

also through fostering terrorist nests. All these aspects were subject to a spillover effect

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamic Republic of Afghanistan). The mission in Afghanistan was



71

conducted under the name Operation Enduring Freedom and removed the Taliban from the

leadership of the country in an attempt to prevent the hosting of terrorist organizations.

The U.S. accomplished these objectives, but the military presence has persisted until

today. The main observation which could be drawn from this assessment is that the U.S.

acknowledged the volatility of the international system at the turn of the 21st century. The

threats and instability of the world were not coming from the Soviet Union anymore, but

from unexpected developments in various regions on the globe. The U.S. was not risking of

losing its regional allies to communist regimes, but to uncontrollable and less predictive

structural changes.

3. Economic Interdependence

The concept of interdependence seen through the lens of liberal institutionalism

assumes that the relationship between dyads is at best when cooperation is the prevailing

norm. Recalling the theoretical explanations, interdependence can only be sustained if

states involved in this process have regimes which are organized according to specific sets of

principles and rules. It is assumed that two states can benefit from each other if there is a

high degree of cooperation between two stable, central governments. In other words,

interdependence assumes that the presence of official representatives is required to

maintain a relative degree of interdependence. The actors involved in the game of

cooperation are more likely to achieve absolute gains if the official structures of the state

are stable and they can predict, to a certain degree, what to expect from each other.

As a result it is expected that intervention was conducted with the scope of pushing the

failed states in question to forming a central government which would provide the path to

cooperation and thus, deter threats such as terrorism, reduce poverty and prevent



72

infectious diseases from spreading into neighbouring countries. Overall, the action of

intervention on the premise of economic interdependence is expected to prevent a regional

destabilizing effect which could produce a spill-over in U.S. partner nations.

The interdependence will be evaluated for the flow of money, trade and other strategic

resources – such as maritime security, petroleum as well as for the asymmetry between the

United States and each of the cases choses – Somalia and Afghanistan.

The National Security Strategy of the United States was stated in a rather clear manner

in 1991. The U.S. aimed at spreading their principles regarding democracy and a free market

economy in a so-called “new world order”. Also, the strategy assumed that the

developments of the post-Cold War world are not predictable as they used to be prior to

1990 and thus the U.S. assumed the role of global leader due to two simple reasons: their

national power was accounted for having the most capable and powerful military in the

world and a strong economy (The White House, 1991: 3-4). In 1991, America assumed the

responsibility of fighting for “malnutrition, illiteracy, poverty” (The White House, 1991: 8)

and decided to offer assistance to states which made an internal decision to follow the path

to democracy (The White House, 1991: 17). In addition, the U.S. reiterated in their official

strategy the acknowledged danger posed by countries in the Middle East region which

threatened to disrupt any economic ties that the U.S. had in that part of the world (The

White House, 1991: 19). One final amendment stemmed from the U.S. decision to reduce

the number of military forces (The White House, 1991: 31). Overall, it could be inferred the

U.S. goal was to implement a cooperative strategy in a new and ambiguous international

system, but it did not aim to forcefully impose democratic state structures and much less to



73

employ military interventions. This approach could be interpreted as a break from any

massive military engagements in the beginning of the post-Cold War era where the U.S. did

not have any specific objectives to address them. Thus, this is one of the key aspects which

underline the puzzle of this research thesis.

Somali exports were mostly comprised of livestock and their skin. Once the country

became stateless, contrary to any expectations, Somalia’s trade in this sector was four times

higher than during Barre’s regime. Another increase was registered for the export of

bananas and it even attracted foreign direct investment in terms of Italian agricultural

entrepreneurs and the U.S. Dole Fruit Inc. In 1989, the value of livestock and bananas was

estimated at 26 million US dollars. Italy was one of Somalia’s major trading partners along

with Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Also, until the country fell into anarchy, the major suppliers

were represented by Italy, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. (US Department of State, 1998).

Although the statistical data is limited, there are qualitative studies claiming that the

economy was better off during anarchic times from 1991 (see Mubarak, 1997), while other

studies concluded that due to the lack of empirical evidence, the economy could not be

assessed properly for the last decade of the 20th century (Library of Congress Country

Studies)

Furthermore, it is important to identify the basic mutual benefits that could have caused

the U.S. intervention in Somalia. In addition to the reasons presented above, it should be

added the apparent strategic importance of Somalia. Located in the Horn of Africa, the

Berbera Port on the Somali territory proved to be a useful military base for the U.S.

exercises in the Gulf region in the Operation Bright Star in 1981 (US Department of State,



74

1998). Naturally, this deployment of forces was made in order to prevent any regional

conflict in the Persian Gulf (The White House, 1991: 19). Later, the port was used in 1990 to

military support Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf War. However, the U.S. interest has ceased

in this strategic point afterwards. While during Barre’s regime, there were investments

made up to 600 million US dollars and training of the Somalia army, the flow of money and

personnel stopped at the beginning of the 1990s. The Somali army proved to be very

inefficient and the inception of the civil war deterred the U.S. from getting military involved

in the turmoil (Committee on International Relations, 2006). A final reason for the loss of

interest in the Berbera Port was that due to the civil war, the U.S. have simply reoriented its

military bases towards other countries in the region with more secure and better facilities

such as Oman, or Kenya (Committee on International Relations, 2006). U.S. allies – Kenya

and Ethiopia, were ravaged by the Somali-led ethnic war against them. Thus, they lobbied

the U.S. government to stop the training of the Somali army and to cut off their military

funding. It was thought that such acts of aggression were harming the entire region and

implicitly, U.S. relations of interdependence.

In Afghanistan the export of goods accounted for 80 million US dollars in 1996 based on

fruits, nuts, wool, cotton and others with trade partners in Central Asian neighbouring

Republics, Pakistan, Iran, India and the European Community. The imports were estimated

at 150 million US dollars in terms of food, petroleum goods, and regular consumer goods

(US Department of State, 2001). The United States accounted for up to 18 percent of

Afghanistan’s imports (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011). One tenet of the export-import

flow is that the data did not account for the illicit drug trafficking comprised of opium crops.

Afghanistan poses a great threat to the free market economy from this point of view (US



75

Department of State, 2001). These illegal flows of drugs brought large implications for the

regional security. Afghanistan was considered a “gateway for some of the worst evils of drug

and violence, which daily pass through it en route to other parts of the globe” (Senate

Hearing, 2000). In this sense, these actions represented hurdles for neighbouring countries

such as Pakistan which sought the improvement of economic and social connections in

Central Asia. Therefore, issues such as drug trafficking or terrorism fostered by Afghanistan

constituted a breach to regional cooperation and stability.

Overall, the U.S. relationship of interdependence with Somalia and Afghanistan do not

differ much in essence according to the elements of analysis provided in this section. The

intervention in Somalia was also determined by the U.S. regional interest of projecting

democratic and free market values such as freedom, respect for human rights and rule of

law which are indispensable for the stability of the country and implicitly, the stability of key

neighbouring countries considered U.S. allies. In Afghanistan, the ravaged society by civil

war, foreign occupation and violent extremism was another crucial cause for military

intervention (Powell, 1992). The Gulf region covers almost two thirds of world’s oil and a

failed state such as Afghanistan was threatening the free access to this important resource

(The White House, 1991: 1-2). In other words, a peaceful setting of the international system

is preferred for cooperation where justice is served in the people’s interest rather than a

constant state of turmoil (Powell, 1992).



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VII. Conclusion

This chapter is dedicated to the findings, limitations and concluding remarks of this

research thesis. The results will be interpreted along the lines of the research design and the

theoretical guidelines presented in the previous chapters.

A. Results

The thesis proposes two hypotheses, one of which tends to find a direct causal

relationship between the concept of economic interdependence and the decision of a state

to militarily intervene in a failed state and the other one attempts to bring the first

hypothesis further and to explore whether there is any degree of vulnerability perceived in

the whole process of intervention and whether it is reinforced by the economic

interdependence.

The portrayal of the first hypothesis is recalled below:

H1. If one of the national security interests of State A is defined as protecting its relations

of economic interdependence, then it is likely that military intervention will take place in

State B in order to prevent disruptions in the target state’s regional stability which may

negatively affect State A’s relation of economic interdependence with State B and/or its

neighbours.



77

A clearer depiction of the units of analysis mentioned in this hypothesis stems from

State A being represented by the U.S. and State B by the cases for failed states analyzed in

the previous chapter – that is Somalia and Afghanistan.

This thesis aims at testing whether economic interdependence can be considered a

valid cause for military intervention. The hypothesis explores the presumption that

interdependence is not only limited to the cases analyzed in the previous chapter, but it also

affects the stability of the entire regional framework. In this sense, the series of findings

show that a holistic perspective of the developments can find explanations for the causal

relationship between economic interdependence and military intervention.

Historical evidence showed that neither Somalia nor Afghanistan could be imposed

central governments and expect them to follow the path to democracy as it happened with

the majority of the developed states. Second, the observations for state failure proved that

indeed according to the proposed parameters and in a basic comparison to other developed

nations, Somalia and Afghanistan could be considered failed states at the time prior to the

intervention. Third, the dyadic relationships between the U.S. and Somalia and the U.S. and

Afghanistan have shown surprising findings.

The interpretation of interdependence as a cause for military intervention in failed

states has been contemplated on various tiers of analysis. The first tier has considered the

possibility of U.S. national economic interests being in direct connection with Somalia and

Afghanistan categorized as failed states. The second tier has been composed of a regional

perspective where both cases are part of a larger puzzle which contributes to the

preservation of an international system based on economic interdependence.



78

To start with, the geopolitics of Somalia has not been a crucial area of interest for

the U.S. since 1991. The evidence proves that the Port of Berbera does not constitute

anymore a resourceful setting for naval power. The U.S. costs – and that is the funds

directed for the military department for establishing a presence in the area were considered

extremely high, precisely due to Somalia being a failed state without a functioning

government (Committee on International Relations, 2006). Dealing with a failed state is a

very delicate matter since a country such as the U.S. does not know what to expect from the

target state, there is no central body for diplomatic talks, and the line between a potential

ally and an enemy is very blurry due to the factional split within the country.

The National Security Strategy from 1991 is one of the clearest documents in terms

of U.S. foreign policy. It is maintained that the U.S. assumes the global leadership role and

the establishment of a so-called New World Order, but progress such as nation-building in

parts of the world (i.e. the Horn of Africa) must come from within (The White House, 1991,

2-3). This issue is leading to the second tier of analysis concerning the regional perspective

and the puzzle on whether there is any indication of economic interdependence as a causal

linkage to the U.S. intervention in Somalia.

On a broader scale, evidence sustains the fact that the U.S. was interested in the

regional stability, where the danger was perceived as the possibility of a spill-over to

neighbouring countries some of which were U.S. allies. To start with, Somalia was

considered to have a fragile effect on the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. The country’s

openness to the sea would provide safe passage ways to terrorists and thus, would

destabilize a larger part of the world (Committee on International Relations, 2006). Second,



79

even though there is no direct finding which shows a clear causality between economic

interdependence and military intervention in Somalia, there is the acknowledgement of

existing energy resources and the need for maritime security. In a congressional report, it is

stipulated that Somalia’s state failure is negatively affecting the maritime commerce and

other “offshore oil production facilities” (Ploch, 2011: 16). The key interest which proves the

causality of economic interdependence stems from the goal of protecting shipping routes in

the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean (Ploch, 2011:

20). Third, the intervention in 1992 was not only for humanitarian purposes, but it also

accounted for Somalia’s neighbours some of which are U.S. allies. In other words, specific

areas of interests are Tanzania, Yemen and Saudi Arabia (Ploch, 2011: 21). Therefore, the

spread of instability was seen to affect not only the country in question, but would have

destroyed the alliance relationships of the U.S. in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian

Peninsula (Committee on International Relations, 2006). Lastly, the instability of Somalia

would prove to be an advantage for other countries such as Yemen, Saudi Arabia or Iran.

External governments and private actors were feared to end up dominating the Horn of

Africa which was easier when a country such as Somalia was failed (Committee on

International Relations, 2001).

This holistic background for U.S. intervention in Somalia is emphasized by the

evidence stemming from a need for economic interdependence. Undoubtedly, the stability

of Somalia was not a key interest to the U.S., but the one of its regional allies. The U.S.

would have needed Somalia to have a stable government in order to be able to extend its

influence in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf in terms of ensuring cooperation,

spreading U.S. values, influencing the establishment of a free market economy which would



80

impede the propagation of threats such as drug trafficking, terrorism, infectious diseases

and a mutual benefit approach. The ultimate goal is to protect the region from extremist

domination and to rather push for fruitful cooperation.

The U.S. humanitarian assistance in Somalia had larger implications than simply

helping the population in need, which undoubtedly was an imperative of the U.S. policy.

Providing humanitarian aid to the starving population and tackling the deploring drought

was one step ahead towards a cooperative Somalia state. Ultimately, the evidence provides

with an understanding of a preference for an integrated country such as Somalia in the

international system of interdependence to an anarchic one.

The geopolitics of Afghanistan has proved to be as complex as Somalia. Each of the

country’s neighbours represents a strategic interest not only to the U.S., but to the Middle

East and Central Asian region. The disruption of economic ties in the Gulf was seen as

endangering the free flow of oil resources which accounted for two-thirds of the worldwide

reserves (The White House, 1991, V). Also, neighbouring states such as Pakistan were

aiming at expanding their economic channels to the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan

was a centre of instability, massive human rights violations, illicit drug trafficking and a

protective nest for terrorist organizations. An international system paved with so many

imperfections made it very difficult for the U.S. to fulfil its policy of spreading democratic

values based on cooperation, a liberal economy and a safe haven for sustainable

development from which all partner nations could benefit. There is no conspiracy theory to

account for in terms of U.S. regional domination. Their policy has been stated rather clearly

in the National Security Strategy from 1991 where a free market economy was preferred to



81

controlled prices, as well as a free flow of resources which proved to be a better alternative

to the development of the nations. The U.S. vision maintains that mutual benefits should be

achieved through diplomacy and fruitful economic relations. Also, if their involvement is

needed, they will intervene in order to assist the governments which chose democratic

regime change, because it is the only viable and prevailing political structure that proved to

move the world towards progress (The White House, 1991).

There is no doubt the terrorist threat was the leading cause for the U.S. intervention

in Afghanistan in 2001. Taking into consideration the second tier of analysis, the evidence

implies that the regional setting and ultimately the world cannot benefit from the free flow

of resources when terrorism flourishes in a key Central Asian country with the possibility for

spill-over growing bigger every day. In one of the multiple Congress Hearings, the rationale

for intervention in Afghanistan is explicitly determined as a response “to the brutal

September 11 attacks on our territory, our citizens, and our way of life, and to the

continuing threat of terrorist acts against the United States and our friends and allies” (U.S.

Government Printing Office, 2000). Nevertheless, there are factual geostrategic aspects

which enlarge the spectrum of causality and show that Afghanistan was sharing increasing

oil resources with its northern neighbouring nations – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan (Katzman, 2014: 67-68). Second, the historical Silk Road from China was now

hindered by the havoc in Afghanistan. Therefore, the basic trade routes were now

redirected, incurring higher costs, and a reduction of benefits (Katzman, 2014: 67-68). Third,

the terrorist threat can be interpreted in multiple ways, and not only as a national security

risk. In this respect, it was clear that terrorism by itself was just one of the factors

threatening the regional stability and economic interdependence, due to the fact that it



82

became the centre for regional instability. In essence, Afghanistan was considered a

“gateway nation…for people, commerce and cultural exchange between different parts of

Asia and the world” (Senate Hearing, 2000).

Ultimately, there is a substantial amount of evidence stemming from primary source

documents which are implicit for economic interdependence as a cause for military

intervention in failed states. The findings explore a positive direction of the world’s

development. In other words, it is perceived that cooperation is impossible to be achieved,

much less through diplomatic means, when failed states such as Afghanistan and Somalia

are consistently moving farther away from economic, political and social prosperity and they

bring their geographical regions down with them.

The second hypothesis is leaning towards the issue of vulnerability. The modern

interdependence theory suggests that a state becomes not only sensitive to a drastic change

in another state, but also vulnerable since it decides to take a course of action due to that

occurring change. Therefore the second hypothesis proposes the following:

H2. The longer is State B left into chaos, the greater will State A’s vulnerability be and

thus, it will trigger military intervention as a direct reaction to State’s B failure.

The National Security Strategy of 1991 clearly delineates the decision of the U.S. to

be the much needed leader of the world. It is acknowledged the collapse of the communist

regime and thus, the emergence of a new world where the U.S. leadership is

“indispensable” and it cannot develop “without U.S. involvement” (The White House, 1991:

V). Taking into account the results of the first hypothesis, the evidence portrays U.S.’s

vulnerability as being extremely high only in one of the cases. There is no evidence that the



83

state failure in Somalia was affecting the relations of interdependence of the U.S. on such a

great scale that it needed intervention. The only understanding of this case is if one looks at

the overall image of the possibility of regional spill over. That adds to another level of

explanation where the U.S. vulnerability in economic and geostrategic terms would have

increased if one puts into balance the possibility of losing allies such as Tanzania, Saudi

Arabia or Oman.

Developments in Afghanistan and the terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001,

have been the solid proof for the U.S. vulnerability. The country has been hosting terrorist

organizations and internally, it proved to be havoc, and a failed society. The terrorist attacks

were the main aspect that the vulnerability of the U.S. was at a high point. The effects of a

failed state such as Afghanistan had deep repercussions on the greatest nation in the world.

Undoubtedly, the response was quick and represented by a military intervention. This key

moment can be considered as having a very high level of vulnerability, as it shows the

ambiguity of the international system. The borders became more porous, the technologies

are more advanced and more prone to building bio-chemical weapons, the terrorist attacks

left the strongest military in the world speechless, and the global economic infrastructure

has been very vulnerable since the turn of the century (Committee on Government Reform,

2001).

In sum, the U.S. vulnerability has been assessed at an increasing rate since 1991. The

alliance strategy had to be changed as the world has been changing. Military interventions

are made in a “time of uncertain alliances” where energy resources are still valuable,

borders are changing and national securities are at risk. In this case, it depends on the failed



84

state, its geostrategic location and the regional U.S. interests, that this level of vulnerability

is calculated. In cases such as Somalia, the level of vulnerability was not as high as to

become a determinant in the decision for military intervention. In cases such as Afghanistan,

the level of vulnerability was directly perceived through an attack to the homeland security.

Therefore, this hypothesis cannot be completely disconfirmed as it has to be taken on a case

by case basis. Its generality, however, is evident for the vulnerability degree perceived by

the U.S. It is a relevant measurement founded on aspects which are contemporary to

strategic changes in the world system and its adjustment has many variables which are not

to be discussed here as they are beyond the scope of this thesis. Overall, the U.S. has

registered a palpable level of vulnerability with respect to the world’s developments and

failed states are definitely on the agenda for issues to tackle.

B. Limitations

The limitations found in this study are based on several aspects. First, there were

only two cases approached for the analysis. In order to strengthen the validity of the

assumption, there must be considered a broader spectrum of failed states. Second, the data

used for the state failure observations have been very limited and prevailed in their

qualitative nature. There is the need for further research where accurate empirical data

would solidify the validity of the assumptions. Finally, the theoretical concepts covered by

the analysis are deeply debated in the literature. Hence, it is very difficult to find a well-

established theoretical backbone of what constitutes a failed state or how legal and moral

are in fact interventions.



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C. Concluding Remarks

The research question of this thesis has proposed to explore the causes of the U.S.-

led military intervention in failed states after the Cold War. The hypothetical proposal of this

analysis was based on finding evidence on whether the modern interdependence theory can

be a cause for interventions in failed states in the background of a more in-depth level of

observance.

The cases proposed for analysis were Somalia and Afghanistan. The results were

supported by primary source documents declassified and pertaining to the U.S. government.

The findings of this research thesis have shown that economic interdependence is an

indirect cause for military intervention in failed states for one strategic reason: regional

stability. There has been no evidence that Somalia or Afghanistan might have played a

crucial role in the national interests of U.S. foreign policy prior to the moment of the military

deployment, if they are singled out and considered separate entities from the overarching

explanation.

The difference between the two cases stays in the intervention moment. Somalia

qualified as a humanitarian disaster and the U.S. was the only country capable of assisting

the UN in combating the drought. Afghanistan qualified as the highest threat when the U.S.

were attacked by Al Qaeda in 2001. It was the key moment when there was a global

acknowledgement that time and space have been compressed and the concept of security

became vulnerable for all countries in the world.

Turning to the pressing issue of regional stability, the evidence presented a confident

degree of reliability when it comes to the strategic positions of the case studies analyzed in



86

the previous chapters. U.S. alliances in the Horn of Africa and Central Asia proved to be

important enough in order to fulfil the assumption for a causal mechanism between the two

proposed variables. The evidence presented in the previous sections shows how the U.S.

interest in regional stability – including the ones which pertained to the case studies – has

stemmed from a foreign policy based on American leading and advocating for free markets

and democratic values, otherwise unachievable without cooperation and an acceptance of

the benefits of economic interdependence.

The measurement of vulnerability proposed in the second hypothesis has not been

fully confirmed. The U.S. did not perceive the level of vulnerability as increasing in both

cases. One explanation would stay in the fact that the U.S. power is not constantly and

directly affected by all unstable states that exist today in the world. The U.S. does not afford

nor has the interest of deploying military forces wherever there is a sign of instability, due to

the fact that they do not feel vulnerable enough in order to take such measures and they

advocate for internal problem-solving. Therefore, the testing of the second hypothesis was

not confirmed for all the cases proposed in this research thesis.

Concluding, all data used in the analysis of this research thesis is replicable. The

findings are valuable and contribute to the literature dedicated to the research on the

concept of interventions. However, further analysis is required in order to discover whether

economic interdependence is a causal variable for intervention depending on the case in

question and whether it can become a generalized, implicit or even explicit assumption.



87

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Journal Articles



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Ahmed, I.I. and Green, R. H. (1999) ‘The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and

Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction’. Third World

Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 137-127. Available at http://www.somali-

jna.org/downloads/Heritage%20of%20war%20%26%20state%20collapse.pdf

Barbieri, K. (1996). ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path To Peace Or A Source Of Interstate

Conflict’. Journal Of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 29-49.

Clarke, W.S. (1992) ‘Somalia – Background Information for Operation Restore Hope 1992-

93’. Strategic Studies Instituted – U.S. Army War College. Special Report, February 2.

Fordham, B. O. (2008). ‘Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and

American Intervention’. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, pp. 737-758.

Gartzke, E., Li, Q., and Boehmer, C. (2001). ‘ Investing In Peace: Economic Interdependence

And International Conflict’. International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 391-438.

Helman, G.B. & Steven R. Ratner. (1993) ‘Saving Failed States’ Foreign Policy.

Huth, P. K. (1998). ‘Major Power Intervention In International Crises, 1918-1988’. The

Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol.6, No. 4, pp. 744-770.

John, J.D. (2010) ‘The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review

of the Literature and Agenda for Research with Specific Reference to Sub-Saharan Africa’

European Journal of Development Research, Vol 22(1), pp. 10-30.

Kaplan, R. D. (1994) ‘The Coming Anarchy’ Atlantic Monthly, pp. 44-77.

Krasner, S. D. (2004) ‘Sharing Sovereignty New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States’

International Security Vol 29(2); pp. 85-120.

Krasner, S.D., and Pascual, C. (2005) ‘The Danger Of Failed States’. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84,

No.4.

LaFeber, W. (2009) ‘The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine’. Political

Science Quarterly, Vol. 124, No. 1, pp. 71-93.

Laub, Z. (2014) ‘The Taliban in Afghanistan’. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at

http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551?cid=rss-asia-

the_taliban_in_afghanistan-100611

McMillan, S. M. (1997). ‘Interdependence And Conflict’. Mershon International Studies

Review, Vol.41, No. 1, pp. 33-58.


http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Heritage%20of%20war%20%26%20state%20collapse.pdf

http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Heritage%20of%20war%20%26%20state%20collapse.pdf

http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551?cid=rss-asia-the_taliban_in_afghanistan-100611

http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551?cid=rss-asia-the_taliban_in_afghanistan-100611


89

Mubarak, J. A. (1997) ‘The “Hidden Hand” Behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of

Somalia’. World Development, Vol. 25, No. 12, pp. 2027-2041.

Newman, E. (2009) ‘Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian

World’ Contemporary Security Policy Vol 30(3); pp. 421-443.

Oberdorfer, D. (1992) ‘The Path to Intervention, A Massive Tragedy “We Could Do

Something About”’. The Washington Post.

Patrick, S. (2007) ‘“Failed” States And Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy

Dilemmas’ International Studies Review Vol 9, pp. 644-662.

Powell, C. (1992) ‘U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead’. Foreign Affairs. Available at http://www.cfr.org/world/us-forces-challenges-ahead/p7508

Rashid, A. (1999) ‘The Taliban: Exporting Extremism’. Foreign Affairs. Available at

http://lege.net/blog.lege.net/ratical.org/CAH/Rashid99.pdf

Rosenau, J.N. (1969) ‘Intervention As A Scientific Concept’. The Journal Of Conflict

Resolution, Vol.13, No. 2, pp. 149-171.

Rotberg, I.R. (2002) ‘Failed States in A world Of Terror’ Foreign Affairs, Vol 81(4), pp. 127-

140.

Samatar, A.I. (1992) ‘Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal

Convention’. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 625-641.

Yoon, M. Y. (1997). ‘Explaining U.S. Intervention In Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989’.

Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 580-602.

Papers

Coyne, C. J. and Leeson, P.T. (2010) ‘Somalia: Understanding the Feasible Institutions’.

Department of Economics West Virginia University. Available at

http://www.ccoyne.com/Somalia.pdf

ICISS. (2001) ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ Report of the International Commission On

Intervention and State Sovereignty. Available at

http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf

Haulman, D.L. (2004) ‘A Country Too Far: U.S. Military Operations in Somalia, 1992-1994’.

Air Force Historical Research Agency, pp. 1-10.

Katzman, K. (2014). ‘Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy’.

Congressional Research Report Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress.


http://www.cfr.org/world/us-forces-challenges-ahead/p7508

http://lege.net/blog.lege.net/ratical.org/CAH/Rashid99.pdf

http://www.ccoyne.com/Somalia.pdf

http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf


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Katzman, K. (2014) ‘Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance’.

Congressional Research Service Report Prepared for Members And Committees Of

Congress, pp. 1-59. Available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf

Le Sage, A. (2005) ‘Stateless Justice in Somalia. Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives’.

Report of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, pp. 1-59. Available at

http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30862/1/Stateless Justice in

Somalia.pdf?1

Ploch, L. (2011) ‘Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in

Africa’. Congressional Research Service for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees

of Congress.

Rasbridge, L.A. ‘Somali Culture and Health/Disability Perceptions’. Available at

http://www.vtmh.org.au/docs/communityprofiles/somali%20health%20disability%20perce

ptions%20-%20nw%20mrc.pdf

Official Documents

Committee On International Relations (2001) ‘Hearing Before the Committee On

International Relations House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress – First

Session’. November 2001, Serial No. 107-62. Available at

http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa75926.000/hfa75926_0.htm

Committee on Government Reform. (2001) ‘Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National

Strategy’. Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Strategy Veterans Affairs and

International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives,

One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, March 27 (2001), Serial no. 107-18. Available

at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg75970/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg75970.pdf

Committee on International Relations House of Representatives. (2006) ‘Somalia: Expanding

Crisis in the Horn of Africa’. Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human

Rights and International Operations and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and

Nonproliferation – One Hundred Ninth Congress June 29, Serial No. 109-201. Available at

http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa28429.000/hfa28429_0f.htm

The White House. (1991) National Security Strategy of the United States.

The White House. (1998) A National Security Strategy for A New Century.

Senate Hearing. (2000) ‘The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation’. Hearing Before the

Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate – One Hundred Sixth Congress,

Second Session June, 2000. Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-

106shrg68769/html/CHRG-106shrg68769.htm


https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf

http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30862/1/Stateless%20Justice%20in%20Somalia.pdf?1

http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30862/1/Stateless%20Justice%20in%20Somalia.pdf?1

http://www.vtmh.org.au/docs/communityprofiles/somali%20health%20disability%20perceptions%20-%20nw%20mrc.pdf

http://www.vtmh.org.au/docs/communityprofiles/somali%20health%20disability%20perceptions%20-%20nw%20mrc.pdf

http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa75926.000/hfa75926_0.htm

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg75970/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg75970.pdf

http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa28429.000/hfa28429_0f.htm

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg68769/html/CHRG-106shrg68769.htm

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg68769/html/CHRG-106shrg68769.htm


91

UK Border Agency. (2011) ‘Somalia – Country of Origin Information Report’. Country of

Information Service, pp. i-247. Available at

http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/country/uk_cntry_assess/2011/somalia-0511.pdfUnited

Nations Security Council. (1992) ‘Resolution 751’. Adopted Unanimously at the 3069th

meeting.

United Nations. (2014) Charter of The United Nations

US Department of State. (1992) ‘From Cold War to Democratic Peace’. Address Before the

World Affairs Council of Boston, Massachussets, Vol. 3, No. 26, June 29. Available at

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1992/html/Dispatchv3no26.html

U.S. Government Printing Office. (2000) ‘Message from the President of the United States

Transmitting His Periodic Report on the National Emergency with respect to the Taliban in

Afghanistan’. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, House Document 106-268. Available at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-106hdoc268/html/CDOC-106hdoc268.htm

Statistical Data

___. (2012). ‘Ethnic Wars Dataset’. Political Instability Task Force. Available at

http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm

___. (2013) ‘State Failure Problem Set’. Political Instability Task Force. Available at


The Failed States Index. (2005-2007) Rankings. Available at

http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable

Worldwide Governance Indicators. (2013) ‘Country Data Report for Somalia, 1996-2012’.

World Bank Institute. Available at

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home

Worldwide Governance Indicators. (2013) ‘Country Data Report for Afghanistan, 1996-

2012)’. World Bank Institute. Available at


World Development Indicators. (2014) ‘Afghanistan – GDP (Current US Dollars)’. The World

Bank. Available at

http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Afghanistan+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_C

ode%3aNY.GDP.MKTP.CD%3bCountry_Code%3aAFG

World Development Indicators. (2014) ‘Afghanistan – Foreign Direct Investment, Net

Inflows’. The World Bank. Available at


http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/country/uk_cntry_assess/2011/somalia-0511.pdf

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1992/html/Dispatchv3no26.html

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-106hdoc268/html/CDOC-106hdoc268.htm



http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable



http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Afghanistan+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3aNY.GDP.MKTP.CD%3bCountry_Code%3aAFG

http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Afghanistan+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3aNY.GDP.MKTP.CD%3bCountry_Code%3aAFG


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http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Afghanistan+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_C

ode%3aBX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD%3bCountry_Code%3aAFG

World Development Indicators. (2014) ‘Somalia. GDP – Current U.S. Dollars’. The World

Bank. Available at

http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Somalia+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code

%3aNY.GDP.MKTP.CD%3bCountry_Code%3aSOM

World Development Indicators. (2014) ‘Somalia – Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows’.

The World Bank. Available at

http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Somalia+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code

%3aBX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD%3bCountry_Code%3aSOM

Websites

___. ‘Afghanistan National Development Strategy – History’. Ministry Of Foreign Affairs,

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Available at

http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/somalia/9029.htm

___. ‘Somalia – Education’. Library of Congress Country Studies. Available at

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0063)

___. ‘Somalia – From Scientific Socialism to “IMF-ism”, 1981-90’. Library of Congress Country

Studies. Available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0073)

___. ‘Somalia – Health’. Library of Congress Country Studies. Available at


___. (1992) ‘Somalia – Natural Resources and Economic Infrastructure’. Library of Congress

Country Studies. Available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-

bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0074)

___. (1997) ‘Afghanistan – Health’. Library of Congress Country Studies. Available at

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0077)

___.(1997) ‘Afghanistan – Mujahidin Victory: The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’. Library of

Congress Country Studies. Available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-

bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0119)

___. (1997) ‘Afghanistan – Education’. Library of Congress Country Studies. Available at



http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Afghanistan+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3aBX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD%3bCountry_Code%3aAFG

http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Afghanistan+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3aBX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD%3bCountry_Code%3aAFG

http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Somalia+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3aNY.GDP.MKTP.CD%3bCountry_Code%3aSOM

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http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Somalia+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3aBX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD%3bCountry_Code%3aSOM












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___. (1997) ‘Afghanistan – The Fall of Kabul, April 1992’. Library of Congress Country Studies.

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2001-March 2002’. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Available at

http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation Enduring Freedom.htm#p3

___. (2014). ‘Afghanistan – Adult Literacy Rate’. United Nations Statistics Division. Available

at http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inID%3A49

___.(2014). ‘Proportion of the Population Using Improved Sanitation Facilities’. Millenium

Development Goals Database – United Nations Statistics Division. Available at

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3a668%3bcountryID%3a706

___. (2014) ‘Somalia – Proportion of the Population Using Improved Sanitation Facilities’.

Millenium Development Goals Database – United Nations Statistics Division. Available at

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3a668%3bcountryID%3a706

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africa-14094632

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https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

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Country Reports – Somalia. Available at

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http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/afghanistan/10958.htm

http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inID%3A49

http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Somalia+datamart%5bMDG%5d&d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%3a668%3bcountryID%3a706




http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html

http://www.unesco.org/education/wef/countryreports/somalia/rapport_2_4.htm


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