Dynamics of Intervention in
Failed States in the Post-Cold
War Era
Policy Study nr. 1 / 2015
Andreea Rădulescu
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
1
Abstract
The post-Cold War international system has been extremely uneven in terms of
emerging geopolitical structures. This new world order has directly affected analysts and
policy makers in terms of how to act and interpret the challenges of contemporary global
developments. This research thesis is addressing these issues based on three conceptual
tenets: dangers posed by failed states, intervention and the concept of interdependence. At
the core of this work is the United States’ decision to militarily intervene in failed states.
These types of structures are assumed to challenge the global relationship of economic
interdependence due to their drastic political, economic and social changes. The inquiry
follows a qualitative research design with a focus on two case studies: Somalia and
Afghanistan. This investigation proposes an in-depth analysis regarding the causal
mechanism between interdependence and military intervention in these failed states based
on two main assumptions. The first hypothesis is built on intervention as being a measure
for preventing disruptions in the regional stability of failed states in terms of economic
interdependence. The findings showed that Somalia’s geostrategic location could have spill-
over effects for the U.S. allies in the Horn of Africa, Saudi Arabia or Yemen. The instability in
Somalia endangers the issue of maritime security and the access to energy resources in the
Persian Gulf, as well as the protection of naval trade routes in the region. Afghanistan is a
country in Central Asia which was used as a trade passage, historically. The country also
shares oil resources with other Central Asian republics. The region can be regarded as a
complex network of economic ties and in the U.S. vision the free flow of such resources is
primordial for the enlargement of the liberal zone of peace and the mutual gain of benefits.
Indirectly, the U.S. intervention could be interpreted in a sense that Afghanistan became a
portal of instability which was threatening American values and national interest
understood through economic interdependence. The second hypothesis attempts to
explore the degree of vulnerability experienced by the U.S. in relation to state failure. While
Somalia did not present any immediate danger that might have increased the U.S.
vulnerability, the terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan which plotted the attack from
September 11, 2001 represented solid proof for this assumption. The results are oriented
towards understanding the regional interests of economic interdependence which the U.S.
might have had in the light of the interventions that they have conducted. Overall, the
analysis is valid insofar one recognizes that a holistic viewpoint is needed to understand the
rise of failed states and their regional effects which in turn might trigger world leaders such
as the U.S. to adjust their national interests accordingly.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
2
Table of Contents List of Tables ........................................................................................................................................... 3
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 4
II. Research Question Development ................................................................................................... 6
III. Literature review – The major explanations for U.S.-led intervention ....................................... 8
A. International Security and the Danger of Failed States .............................................................. 8
B. Geopolitical interests of the superpower ................................................................................. 11
C. Interdependence ....................................................................................................................... 14
D. Gaps in the Literature Review ................................................................................................... 16
IV. Theoretical Concepts ................................................................................................................ 20
A. Intervention .............................................................................................................................. 20
B. Interdependence ....................................................................................................................... 25
C. The state as a Structural concept and the emergence of Failed States ................................... 30
1. The State ............................................................................................................................... 30
2. Failed States .......................................................................................................................... 33
V. Hypotheses Development ............................................................................................................. 36
VI. Research Design ........................................................................................................................ 41
A. Historical Overview of Somalia and Afghanistan ...................................................................... 42
B. Observations for State Failure .................................................................................................. 45
1. Political Shocks ...................................................................................................................... 46
2. Economic Shocks ................................................................................................................... 53
3. Political Goods ...................................................................................................................... 57
4. Level of Violence ................................................................................................................... 61
C. Observations regarding the two key dyadic relationships: US – Somalia, US – Afghanistan ... 66
1. Geopolitical Factors .............................................................................................................. 66
2. Intervention .......................................................................................................................... 67
3. Economic Interdependence .................................................................................................. 71
VII. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 76
A. Results ....................................................................................................................................... 76
B. Limitations................................................................................................................................. 84
C. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................................. 85
References ............................................................................................................................................ 87
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
3
List of Tables
Aggregate Indicator for the Rule of Law – Somalia (1996-2012)
Aggregate Indicator for the Rule of Law – Afghanistan (1996-2012)
GDP in billions of US dollars – Somalia (1989-1990)
FDI in US dollars – Somalia (1989-1993)
GDP in billions of US dollars – Afghanistan (1996-2001)
FDI in US dollars – Afghanistan (1996-2001)
Literacy Rate for Somali Male and Female Population 15+ years
Ethnic Wars – Somalia (1989-1993)
Ethnic Wars – Afghanistan (1996 – 2001)
Failed States Index – Somalia (2005-2007)
Failed States Index – Afghanistan (2005-2007)
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
4
I. Introduction
The American nation has continuously evolved into a strong, consolidated state
projecting its ideals and values worldwide. Sometimes, over the course of history, in order
to assure their position as a world power, the United States have used the instrument of
intervention for several reasons. First, they wanted to prevent potential challengers from
other continents to attack them. Second, they wanted to keep balances of power –
especially in Europe and Asia. Third, they formulated strategic interests in terms of building
political and economic bases in order to ensure the “vital connecting routes” to other
regions (Graber, 1978: 485).
During the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the United States
mostly intervened only in the states with geographical proximity. One reason was the
expansionist policy dominating the United States vision and examples of such were Florida,
Texas and Mexico (Viotti, 2010: 139-140). Hence, they increased their economic and military
capabilities. Such an example was represented by the construction of the Panama Canal –
which was a vital naval route with access to both the East and West coasts. Thus, the United
States justified their right to restore order in countries where political unrest might have
endangered the region surrounding the canal. However, interventions in more distanced
places was more limited and calculated. For instance, there were situations when the
United States simply refused recognition of various dictatorial or military regimes in Latin
America in the hope that it would block them from progressing in a positive way in the
conduct of economic and foreign policies (Graber, 1978: 487-488).
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
5
The U.S. full military involvement in both World Wars was made under the flag
liberal ideals. Therefore, the League of Nations and later, the United Nations Charter
brought about the concept of collective security through which the United States along with
other countries would reserve the right to protect the perceived common threats to the
world peace and thus, make the “world safe for democracy” (Viotti, 2010: 141-142).
However, when the concept of collective security failed to be employed due to the plethora
of divergent interests and differences in policy making, the U.S. “claimed and continued to
exercise the right of unilateral intervention” (Graber, 1978: 489). Some examples of such
interventions are Korea (1950-1953), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1962), Vietnam (1965-1975) or
Laos and Cambodia (1971) (Viotti, 2010: 142).
The Cold War era has been characterized by the arms race between the East and the
West. The period was based on an ideological battle with the U.S. foreign policy aiming at
containing the spread of the communist regime.
This research thesis focuses on the concept of military intervention in the period
preceding the fall of the Soviet Union, where the U.S. emerged as a global leader advocating
for the spread of democratic values, liberal economy, respect for human rights and the rule
of law. The research on dynamics of intervention found in previous work and proposed for
further analysis in this thesis is considering the nature of international security, the
geostrategic interests of a leading power such as the U.S., and the concept of
interdependence as a potential cause for intervention. In this respect, the puzzle emerges as
it was identified a crucial difference between the explicit causes for intervention in such
failed states (i.e. humanitarian relief, terrorist threats) and the implicit causes which need a
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
6
more in-depth research, in order to understand the processes of decision-making through
different perspectives. In this sense, there have been identified several gaps in the literature
to date and they are followed by an exploration of the theoretical foundation applied to a
small-N case study research design in order to test the validity of the proposed causal
mechanism between economic interdependence and military interventions.
The subsequent chapters are dedicated to the exploration of the theoretical
approaches through a qualitative analysis of two case studies and their historical overview,
state failure observations and dyadic relevance stemming from the hypotheses
development.
II. Research Question Development
Along the history of the United States there were many situations where
intervention was employed and each time frame has been explained as having certain well
defined interests and conditions for the conduct of such actions. The literature covering the
time span from 1990s onwards is considered to require continuous research for explaining
the causes of United States military interventions. It is of value to understand what lies
behind the U.S. foreign policies in undertaking the burden of stabilizing an entire
international system. The costs, the benefits, the risks, the realist and idealist issues
prevailing in the academic circles as topics of debate are going to be projected at a smaller
scale in what comes to represent the research question of this thesis:
What are the causes of U.S. led military intervention in failed states in the post-Cold War
era?
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
7
The research question has been built around several key concepts which have been
strongly debated in the field of political science and international relations. The pillars of
this analysis are the theoretical approach on intervention, the state as a legitimate structure
in the international system, the failed states and the dangers posed by them, and the
modern interdependence theory. Each intervention that took place had a rational reasoning
found in different primary source documents, articles, books on foreign policy analysis and
others.
This research question aspires to bring an extensive understanding for such decision-
making processes beyond the evident reasoning displayed to the public. The goal is to look
at the holistic image of how is intervention defined in the post-Cold War era, what the
target states are and whether there are any linkages between these two elements which
cannot be observed prima facie. The parsimonious path to determining the causality of this
action has introduced the modern interdependence theory, while the entire analysis of the
thesis is focusing on finding explanatory variables from this precise angle. Thus, the holistic
perspective will encompass the framework of regional stability threatened by the turmoil in
these so-called failed states. Moreover, this approach will try to find connections with the
other two theoretical concepts. The following chapters are developing a gradual analysis
starting with the literature review, theory, and an in-depth, qualitative research design. The
thesis will conclude with a critical interpretation of the findings in accordance with all the
elements proposed in the research question and the hypotheses development.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
8
III. Literature review – The major explanations for U.S.-led
intervention
A. International Security and the Danger of Failed States
The world after the fall of communism has changed substantially. The dimension of
national and international security took more complex forms. In a broad sense, the
literature to date has characterized state failure as being a situation of political, economic
and social chaos where citizens are denied basic public goods (Krasner & Pascual, 2005).
Several studies identify the main threats which are seen to jeopardize the international
security: spill-over wars, massive migrations, transnational organized crime, proliferation,
resource curses, diseases, terrorism (Newman, 2009; Patrick 2007).
Another reiteration of the same point is made by Michael Ignatieff who maintains
that the regions comprised of poor, failing states are seen as “bad neighbourhoods” which
are propagating the internal violence to neighbouring countries and they are creating “a
widening tear in the system of state order, analogous to the tear in the global ozone layer”
(Ignatieff in Mills & Brunner, 2002: 233-234).
In the post-Cold War era, the United States have acknowledged the danger of failed
states on two levels. One was multilateral through the United Nations, European Union,
NATO, non-governmental organizations and their allies. A second one was unilateral and it
has been mentioned in the 1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century where there
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
9
is a direct reference to the notion of failed states. These are being perceived as centres of
unlawful governance, where violent conflict is the norm and where citizens of such entities
will migrate, will engage in civil wars and will spread the current state of affairs to
neighbouring countries, ultimately affecting “U.S. interests and citizens” (The White House,
1998:7).
Krasner and Pascual emphasize that failed states cannot “take advantage of the
global economy…because they lack strong, capable institutions” (2005). In the same way,
developed countries cannot gain the benefits from the economic linkages with such states,
due to the fact that they are so instable that they need institutions to form markets, fiscal
and monetary policies in order to make the country productive (Krasner & Pascual, 2005).
One of the factors that assured the international security is the global economic
interdependence. In this context, the instability of failed states threatens to disrupt it.
In explaining the conditions for the United States military intervention, there are
studies which adopted different positions.
First, Huth assumed that the willingness to intervene in the affairs of another state
must lead to favourable outcomes both domestic and foreign and that domestic policy
makers are rational actors who analyse the stakes of possible interventions in the light of
protecting the international security of their state (1998). These stakes are measured in
military costs and “international security benefits” (Huth, 1998: 747). Thus, the study
showed that if a target state does not have military capabilities for defending itself against a
challenger, then a major power will intervene. However, Huth emphasized on the fact that
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
10
there is an assessment being made with regards to the existing threats posed by “challenger
states” (1998: 748).
Second, Fordham brought forward the argument of technological development of
the 20th century which pushed the United States to readjust their interests since their
security was threatened (2008). In other words, from a geopolitical perspective the United
States were not safe anymore and this led to their involvement in World War I which ended
their isolationist policy (Fordham, 2008).
Third, Snow has depicted the danger of failed states in a comprehensive manner. He
has distinguished between the “First Tier” represented by the developed countries, where
polities are homogeneous economically, socially and politically and there is the “Second
Tier” which combines a plethora of states from political democracies (India) to communist
states (China, North Korea), autocracies and failed states (Somalia, Haiti). The latter type lies
outside the globalizing economy and is associated with violence and instability (Snow,
2004). The term ‘globalizing economy’ can be understood through the lens of liberal
institutionalism where free trade and negotiations towards lowering trade tariffs represent
the norm – such institutions are the World Trade Organization, the EU, NAFTA and others.
Snow is making an insightful argument by maintaining that countries which have not joined
the so-called globalizing economy have done so by “circumstance or by choice” (2004: 312).
Haiti, for example, is seen as being a failed state which has little to offer in terms of
economy. Another example is Afghanistan under the Taliban rule which is considered to
have shut out from the global economy intentionally. To state it parsimoniously, the post-
Cold War era has widened the gap between the richer and the poorer countries, and a great
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
11
majority of the latter could not keep up with the developmental change. Thus, Snow makes
the assumption that these low-developed countries which experience internal turmoil
represent a security issue for the United States – simply because they are functioning
against the prevailing systemic order (2004).
The threats presented by failed states open the debate on whether intervention
should be considered an option, and whether justifying such a policy instrument should
frame the moral imperative of protecting human rights in these structures or should go
beyond by being assessed as attacks to the international security (Ignatieff in Mills and
Brunner, 2002).
B. Geopolitical interests of the superpower
The geopolitical explanation of American military intervention is framed by the
realist theory of international relations. It is important to include an opposing view to the
multilateralism and liberal institutionalism characterized in the previous section, as the topic
of this research thesis cannot be assigned from the beginning to a single school of thought.
The realist paradigm is based on an anarchic international system, where states are
the main actors and rational calculations are the tools which frame their vital interests. In
addition, any state interactions will be a zero-sum game and the use of force will always be
an option. Realism is also characterized by the respect of a state’s sovereignty (Wohlforth in
Smith et. al., 2012).
The realist theory has served well as an explanatory tool during the Cold War when
the United States had a clear-definition of their vital interests – containing the Soviet
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
12
expansion. In this respect there are studies relating the geopolitical interests for foreign
intervention with the rise of the United States as a superpower starting with the Cold War
era.
To start with, Huth has tested interventions by major powers in international crisis
between 1918 and 1988 and he found that, to a certain extent, the military coalitions and
strategic value of a target state can be explanatory factors (Huth, 1998).
Next, there have been made another series of assumptions when it came to the
United States and the use of force. First, “If American vital interests are not threatened, for
instance, then American use of force should not be contemplated.” Second, the use of force
will still be an option if the interest is “less-than-vital” and instead, national security is
threatened (Snow, 2004: 167). Such vital interests were clearly identified during the Cold
War through the Communist expansion which was threatening to engulf U.S. allies.
Moreover, the possible use of nuclear weapons was also a direct threat to the American
military security. After the fall of Communism, Snow maintained that the assessment of
interests and security threats has gained a “psychological dimension of what makes one feel
secure” and thus, makes the analysis of United States intervention more complex (Snow,
2004: 168).
Moreover, the issue of sovereignty has received favourable support from the United
States over the time. They actively promoted the respect for the internal and external affairs
of the state as being the “supreme authority” (Snow, 2006: 46). However, this paradigm has
been criticized during the Cold- War as well as afterwards by opponents who described
sporadic interventions of the United States as contradicting the concept of sovereignty (see
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
13
economic boycott on Cuba in 1960). Snow has framed this contradiction under the term
“ambivalence” (Snow, 2004: 46). In other words, there has not been attained a balance
between what constitute the vital interests of the superpower, the breach of other states’
sovereignty and the image of a self-help system.
Comparing the Cold War period with the one after 1989, it could be safely assumed
that the latter did not clear the air since the new international system, where the United
States was considered to be a superpower, did not fit the parameters laid by the realist
paradigm. Thus, the United States has been considered to continue a foreign policy
characterized by ambivalence also in the post-Cold War period. The classic realist paradigm
infers that military force will always be an option in a world of anarchy. The literature to
date extends this vision by showing how traditional perspectives of sovereignty, security
and interests have radically changed. Snow maintains how the concept of security has
broadened including more complex forms, namely that of individual security in order to
justify new dimensions of intervention such as human rights violations (see Somalia, Bosnia,
Kosovo during the 1990s) (Snow, 2004). This, in turn, became a reiteration of the United
States’ ambivalence.
Robert D. Kaplan has depicted a rather grim and purely geopolitical image of the
world where major powers would acknowledge the need to take a stance in these
situations. He described Africa as being underdeveloped and in his article from 1994 he
argues that the future of this region, in particular, will shift from “central governments” to
“the rise of tribal and regional domains” (Kaplan, 1994: 48). He explained the case of Ivory
Coast by maintaining that after the President had passed away, the country remained in
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
14
shatters due to a weak party network, lack of foreign investment, small army, therefore no
“force to maintain the order”; and a large foreign, non-Ivorian population. Kaplan predicted
an “anarchic implosion of criminal violence”. Today, the Ivory Coast is a centre of instability
especially since the neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone are not performing much
better. It is indeed the threat of regional collapse which is of greater concern, rather than
the one of national collapse. In the light of the threats posed by regional collapse Kaplan
believes that foreign policies targeting failed states will be done “by need rather than by
design” (Kaplan, 1994: 72).
C. Interdependence
The literature is exploring the concept of interdependence in various ways. As an
overview, the notion of interdependence has been understood in different ways across
several studies. Some have argued to have positive consequences. Keohane and Nye have
proposed a positive but broad approach on the meaning of “mutual dependence”
characterized by sensitivity in terms of how fast a state responds to the changes taking
place in the system and by vulnerability in terms of how a state adjusts to such changes
occurring in the system (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 7-11). However, the adjustments to these
changes are considered to be made through cooperation. Others have argued to be linked
to negative consequences if one of the parties involved in the process of interdependence
defects (McMillan, 1997: 34).
Nye Jr. explained how the United States is leading the international system in a
world of change. He emphasized on how security has undertaken other dimensions that
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
15
cover the economic well-being of citizens. Also, he emphasizes on how the new “power
game” has changed in terms of linkages of interdependence between more complex and
simultaneous issues such as security, trade or finance and where the degree of vulnerability
has increased spectacularly (Nye Jr., 1991: 180). It can be considered that the United States’
degree of vulnerability has increased as their ability to control the international economic
developments is not as pervasive as it was during the Cold War.
Nye Jr. proposed an alternative characterization of how the United States is adapting
to the new environment. In this sense, he explained how the United States has more “co-
optive power” understood as a method of influencing other states in forming preferences
for their national interests similar to the American ones and implementing foreign policies
accordingly (Nye Jr., 1991: 191). Nye Jr. concluded on a positive note that despite the post-
Cold War uprisings in weak states cooperation will remain the preferred norm due to the
fact that military interventions will be too expensive (Nye Jr., 1991)
Another more focused study has been made on the “U.S. intervention in Third World
Internal Wars” between 1945 and 1989. Given that the time span of the study is
concentrated on the Cold-War period, the findings of the research are showing that material
and economic interests do not cause U.S. intervention (Yoon, 1997). One limitation of this
study is that it only reflects the Cold-War era and not beyond.
Gartzke et. al. made a study which advocated for the positive consequences of the
economic interdependence maintaining that states would not engage in military conflict if
opportunity costs are higher than the use of force. In addition, the research showed that
liberal dyads are more prone to cooperation when it came to the break-down of economic
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
16
ties. The authors also found that “political shocks” that may damage the economic
interdependence would still use peaceful options to resolve matters (Gartzke, et.al., 2001).
In the light of these findings it is worth mentioning two studies which found that
economic linkages could be causes for state conflict. Fordham conducted a study on the
economic interests, security and American Intervention covering the period of the 20th
century. His findings showed that the longer was a relationship of economic
interdependence between allied dyads, the more likely it was for the United States to
intervene on behalf of their trading partners. Unfortunately, the study did not cover the
post-Cold War era (Fordham, 2008). Barbieri controlled for salience and symmetry of
dependence over a time span between 1870 and 1938. She discovered that extension of
economic ties did not ensure peace and cooperation. In this sense, the study showed that
the more asymmetrical the trade, the more likely a conflict will take place (Barbieri, 1996).
Despite these findings, the study is limited due to its short time span. Other scholars have
also criticized it since the cases chosen are not relevant and a greater number covering a
longer period of time should be considered.
D. Gaps in the Literature Review
There have been identified certain limitations in the literature covering the issues
discussed in the previous sections. For coherence purposes, the enunciation of the limits
posed by the studies considered above will be treated in the order they appear in the
literature review.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
17
Studies regarding international security issues and causes for American intervention
are limited to the 20th century less the post-Cold War era. Another limitation is that since
the 1990s the notion of failed states is a new and deeply debatable concept having no
agreed upon definition. However, there is a consensus in the literature over the difficulties
of the powerful states in addressing the threats and challenges posed by state failure to the
international security. Therefore, the aspect of whether interventions of major powers such
as the United States in failed states are preventing the disruption of economic
interdependence and thus protecting the international security requires further research.
The literature covering the realist paradigm fails to explain some aspects when it is
put in relation to the research question at hand. The contemporary era has moved past the
traditional military conquest with the countries that may pose a threat to the national
security of the United States not possessing actual capabilities of attacking them. In other
words, countries such as Somalia, Haiti or Afghanistan which are considered to be failed do
not possess the means or the geostrategic interest to attack the United States in a
traditional manner. Second, the wars conducted today are asymmetrical and although such
a discussion is beyond the scope of this research thesis, it is worth mentioning that the
realist view is not providing a comprehensive explanation when it comes to terrorist threats
and the conduct of war on terror. Finally, the post-Cold War era makes it difficult to actually
define the vital interests of a state, and thus actions of intervention in these times become a
puzzle of “interest-threat mismatch” that requires further research (Snow, 2004: 174).
The study conducted by Gartzke et. al. has several drawbacks (2001). First, the cases
are comprised of only contiguous states and major powers and they cover the Cold War
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
18
period. Second, the study takes into account revisionist states as opposed to liberal ones.
Revisionism during the World War II and later during the Cold War was understood as states
which had polities opposed to the prevailing order represented by democracies. In this
sense, the context of revisionist states is marked by ideological competition and by the
threat or use of force employed by such a country to make gains which would balance the
loss of another one (Evans & Newnham, 1998). However, the goal of this research thesis is
to incorporate the concept of failed states seen as an internal institutional collapse which
makes a country unable to maintain economic relations with a major power – in this case
the United States. In this context, it is worth assuming that cooperation with failed states is
severely hurdled due to the fact that external actors have a difficulty in distinguishing the
factions which are reliable enough to regain control of the country and stabilize its
institutions. Presumably, such an action would end the turmoil and pave the path to
economic progress.
Finally, there are several aspects which remain unclear and which are still debated in
the literature. One of them is the United States’ role in the post-Cold War era and thus,
what makes them the global economic watchdog. Another one is represented by the
changed international system with the United States not having an ideological challenger
anymore. Thus, formulating foreign policies and justifying interventions has been difficult
for both policy makers and for the academic sphere to understand and analyse them. A
reiterated example would be the communist threat which was perceived as being a
condition for employing intervention in weaker states. In the last decades, the United States
have considered the deployment of military forces a solution of last resort which would be
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
19
undertaken only if the vital security interests of the state are threatened (Graber, 1978:
495).
Along the history of the United States there were many situations where
intervention was employed and each time frame has been framed by the literature in
clearer parameters. Therefore, this research thesis aims at finding the causes for American
military intervention starting with the post-Cold War era when the world suffered a few
visible systemic changes such as the emergence of the so-called failed states. The
perspective this thesis is focuses on these key transformations which represent a challenge
for both the policy makers and the academic experts.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
20
IV. Theoretical Concepts
A. Intervention
Intervention is a deeply disputed concept in the academic sphere, especially due to the
fact that it is very theoretical and very difficult to quantify. The dynamics of this policy
instrument have been explained in the literature in terms of measuring the legitimacy of a
given action or presenting scientific arguments which would lead to an improved usage of
such a policy (Rosenau, 1969: 150).
Rosenau identified two characteristics of intervention. One is that it is employed against
the regular or expected conduct of a state and especially in the light of the non-intervention
doctrine. Second, the purpose of intervention is to produce a change in the authority of a
target state. Furthermore, Rosenau presents three dimensions of this theoretical concept:
moral, legal and strategic (1969: 151-155).
First, the moral dimension distinguishes the means by which intervention is employed.
Rosenau has emphasized the fact that this dimension is rather misleading when explaining
the causes of this concept since what deems moral for one person, is immoral for another
one. In other words, the morality of intervention is subjective.
Second, the legal standpoint argued by Rosenau is that “intervention occurs when the
affairs of one state are altered against its will by the actions of another” which implicitly
breaches the concept of sovereignty – an aspect invoked by the realist school as being a
trigger for conflict (1969: 153-154). Therefore, the legal dimension is presented as being a
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
21
coercive act imposed on another state, regardless of the form - military, economic or
diplomatic.
On the one hand, the international law theory has refined the conditions under which
intervention can take place. Therefore, states must comply with certain rules regarding
other similar entities. A state cannot interfere in the internal structure of another country
and it cannot pressure the main institutions of that other state or to interfere in the
“relations between foreign government authorities and their own nationals” (Cassese, 2005:
53). Moreover, states are not allowed to organize, instigate or support the activities of their
organization on the territory of a foreign state.
On the other hand, the principle of non-intervention has received equal attention. To
start with, one state cannot implement the use or threat of force on another entity freely
and without justification. Second, the existence of intergovernmental organizations has
been strongly limiting the actual use of force. Third, the expansion of human rights
conventions has been working in the benefit of non-intervention. It could be uphold that the
principle of non-intervention has been an extension of the traditional concepts of
sovereignty and a modern development in a cooperative direction (Cassese, 2005: 55).
Nonetheless, these international law provisions have created a heated debate on the
thresholds for intervention, regardless of its form. In a critical manner, Cassese explains that
intervention tends to produce “political destabilization; instigating, fomenting and financing
unrest in a foreign country” (Cassese, 2005: 55). Thus, international law stipulates certain
exceptions from the rule such as the decision of a stronger state to offer financial aid to a
weaker. This act, for example, is not considered to be an infringement of the non-
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
22
intervention principle as long as it does not coerce the receiving state to be in the
subordination of the former – in terms of sovereign rights and foreign policy interests
(Cassese, 2005: 55).
Another related concept is known as “forcible intervention” (Cassese, 2005: 297). In this
case, interference is conducted in the internal or external affairs of a state “by the use or
threat of force, to do something (…) in the interest of the intervening State” (Cassese, 2005:
297). Examples of such interventions are known as naval blockades or embargoes, but they
are conducted under the flag of self-defence, or with the pretence of a state to protect its
own citizens. There is also the case for reprisals where a state reserves the right to intervene
in a foreign state on the premise that the latter committed unlawful acts. Overall, if a state
is violating international law it can either be excluded from a convention or treaty, or it may
be held responsible through the use of force (Cassese, 2005:299).
Another issue would be the extent to which states are allowed to use military force in
foreign territories, with the motivation of preserving the respect for human rights across
borders. In theory, Chapter VII on Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression of the United Nations Charter contains provisions of
interference only through Security Council Resolutions (Charter of the United Nations).
Rosenau has finally argued for the basis of a strategic dimension of intervention which
tends to be leaning towards the delicate matter of national interest formulation. In this
sense, intervention is swiftly manipulated for justification when it comes to issues of vital
interests or security threats, since it has been difficult to assess the definitions of the latter.
Therefore, normative approaches of what constitutes to be a vital interest for one country
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
23
can be considered the opposite for another one and these subjective imperatives tend to
hurdle the scientific process of testing the hypotheses involving the concept of intervention.
Nonetheless, Rosenau concluded that using the national interest as a cause for intervention
is ambiguous and it needs further empirical measurements (Rosenau, 1969:157-158).
Lastly, the theoretical discussion on intervention deserves a reference to the newer
concept found in international law - responsibility to protect (R2P). There are two basic
principles. One is that the sovereignty of a state gives the responsibility to that entity to
protect and secure its citizens within its borders. The other principle is based on whether a
state is suffering from civil war, insurgency or state failure, and if the state is unable or
unwilling to counter this situation, then international law allows the principle of R2P to be
practiced despite the concept of non-intervention (ICISS, 2001).
R2P takes three dimensions. First, there is the responsibility to prevent people from
being afflicted by internal conflict. Second, the responsibility to react is practiced through
economic sanctions or military intervention. Third, the responsibility to rebuild is based on
offering recovery, reconciliation and reconstruction in cases of military intervention (ICISS,
2001).
In essence, the debate around both the concept of intervention and responsibility to
protect stems from the fact that the former is implemented by powerful states in the light
of perceived transnational threats and its just cause is interpreted in a rather volatile
manner. For example, any kind of intervention under the R2P principle should fulfil the “just
cause threshold” and the “precautionary principles” in order to justify military intervention.
In practice, the analysis of various cases such as Rwanda, Kosovo or Somalia have been
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
24
subject to debate as they did not uniformly fit to the concept of R2P or just intervention and
they more than often breached the sovereignty principle and worsened the situation by not
being able to follow all the protection stages stated under R2P.
A distinctive perspective of intervention has been observed through changes that took
place in the world system. There are two types of systemic changes which have been
identified as affecting the interactions between states. One is represented by the political
advocates for liberal democracy and freedom of trade, goods, people, technology and ideas
which grouped under the so-called notion of “interdependence”. This in turn opened a more
subtle, complex and sophisticated approach towards intervention (Evans and Newnham,
1998:278-281). The second type is represented by the “intergovernmental organizations”
which provided an international setting for states to suggest, propose for voting and adopt
“interventionist policies” (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 280).
The concept of intervention continues to be actively debated in the literature. The
effects of this debate are sometimes costly, since it cannot provide a justifiable and
commonly agreed roadmap for situations when intervention should be employed. This
section reviews the concept from different angles. The diverging perspectives on the use of
this policy instrument emphasize the fact that there is no common agreement which
justifies or dismantles intervention. Therefore, questions addressing the causes for
implementing such an action in the post-Cold War era, especially in failed states are valid
and somewhat quintessential in order to understand the forces governing the international
system in contemporary times.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
25
B. Interdependence
The world after the Cold War has ceased to be based on ideological rivalry and political
competition. The liberal view emerged as promoting the image of an “inside looking out”
order where domestic legitimacy of institutions would propagate to other states and the so-
called liberal zone of peace will enlarge making war less likely (Burchill and Linklater, 2013:
59). At the same time, there have been positions which claimed that liberal states will not
engage in conflict with other structures alike or not even with non-liberal states with the
exception of “legitimate self-defence (or in the defence of their legitimate allies), or
intervention in severe cases to protect human rights” (Burchill and Linklater, 2013: 63).
Nonetheless, the challenge arises from the fact that intervention should not be limited to
humanitarian or self-defence explanations. This research aims to look beyond these over-
emphasized and generalized claims which are prevailing in official declarations and in the
literature and address in more depth the causes for intervention in the so-called “failed
states”.
Burchill and Linklater provide a useful image of how the spread of economy would give
states a new platform for negotiation. They argue that interdependence would “replace
national competition and defuse unilateral acts of aggression and reciprocal retaliation”
(2013: 66). For the purpose of incorporating this concept into a grand theoretical approach,
interdependence will be seen through the lens of liberal institutionalism.
Modern interdependence theory is associated with the concept of free trade and non-
tariff barriers. One example is represented by the economic integration of the European
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
26
Union which historically, provided an alternative to solving disputes between major powers
such as France and Germany. The idea behind this theory is that such a common framework
would bring more benefits to both parties involved rather than being a zero-sum game as it
is depicted in the realist view. The basis of this argument stems from the neo-liberal
assumption of absolute gains - “what will gain me the most?” (Burchill and Linklater, 2013:
67).
Modern interdependence theory also suggests that states cannot unilaterally control the
world developments while regimes known as “sets of principles, norms, rules and decision
making procedures” inhibit the behaviour of states. Thus, institutions and regimes provide a
setting for cooperation and stability, since parties involved in the process of
interdependence know what to expect from each other (Burchill and Linklater, 2013: 67).
In essence, the theory of interdependence suggests that states cannot afford to live in a
world characterized by autarky. The benefits of interdependence have been acknowledged
in the past decades and it is assumed that states would not attempt to endanger the
conditions of economic interdependence, because they are conscious about the penalties
which would bring over them. Although the theory assumes states are rational actors
functioning in an anarchic system, it is mainly based on the idea that international
institutions are preferred to foster cooperation and thus diminishing the effect of anarchy.
Keohane and Nye further developed the concept of interdependence by explaining that
seeking self-interest can also take other forms such as through membership in international
institutions. There is a rigorous view maintaining that conforming to the conduct and
demand of these global organizations reduces the effects of the self-help system and
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
27
replaces it with a higher degree of compliance and cooperation (Burchill and Linklater,
2013:67). They have also proposed a broader understanding on the notion of
interdependence during the 1970s. As a generality, officials consider that policies at the
domestic level should be adjusted to the world system of interdependence. As an analytic
concept, interdependence is considered to be a mutual dependence between two parties.
One important aspect is that this dependence is affected by external factors such as flows of
money, goods, services, people and communication (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 8).
Moreover, interdependence is inspired by the realist view, being presented as a cost-
benefit calculation. However, the benefits of such a relationship are difficult to quantify,
since the degree of uncertainty a priori is high and the effects are observed over long rather
than short-term periods. In the light of these characteristics, Keohane and Nye developed
two approaches – sensitivity and vulnerability. They explain how a change of one party
which is engaged in the relationship of interdependence is more or less compelling the
other party to adjust accordingly – depending on the change. The sensitivity approach
illustrates how influential are the effects of changes of one party affecting the other party
(Keohane and Nye, 2001: 10-16). For instance, if one assumes that state A is in a relationship
of economic interdependence with state B. State A suffers an economic break-down and
cannot deliver on commitments towards state B. State B depended on certain goods
imported from state A which now make them impossible to acquire. Such a situation reveals
the fact that state B is severely affected by the changes in state A.
The vulnerability approach measures the costs of adjusting to the change produced in
the relationship of interdependence. Therefore, states measure the alternatives they have
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
28
at hand and then make the decision most favourable to them. One limitation of this second
step is that even though policies are adjusted to changes, the effects can be observed in the
long-run as mentioned earlier. Keohane and Nye give the example of social vulnerabilities
where policies can be put into action faster. For parsimonious reasons, the examples of
state A and state B will be considered again. If state A suffers from a case of famine, and
there is a group protesting in state B for offering aid to the respective state in need, there
can be adopted and implemented a policy of sending food in that part of the world. In other
words, vulnerability is explained in the sense of how deeply are those changes affecting a
state that it is forcing it adjust to the new situation (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 10-16).
In an overall perspective these two approaches have been considered to function in
situations of asymmetrical interdependence where one state is less vulnerable than the
other and therefore it has more leverage in the bargaining game.
Ultimately, Keohane and Nye have tried to build an ideal concept known as “complex
interdependence” (2001: 20) characterized by multiple channels of communication
(interstate level, transgovernmental – where states are the main actors, and transnational
through banks and corporations), an absence of hierarchy and cooperation prevailing over
the use of military force (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 21).
There is a key aspect of this concept which Burchill and Linklater have mentioned rather
concisely. They maintained how over time, and precisely because of cooperation the
possibility of conflict cannot be disregarded (Burchill and Linklater, 2013: 69).
Nonetheless, both Burchill and Linklater and Keohane and Nye make an interesting point
relevant for this research thesis by not dismissing the realist view that conflict is not an
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
29
option, especially in the case of economic interdependence. They all claim the fact that this
concept has been often manipulated over the history. Burchill and Linklater sustained that
over the time, the United States have been in the position of a growing superpower and
have more or less controlled the developments and norms of interdependence (2013: 69).
Furthermore, Keohane and Nye have offered two aspects which follow the claim that
conflict is still an option:
“drastic social and political change could cause force again to become an important direct
instrument of policy, and even when elites’ interests are complementary, a country that uses
military force to protect another may have significant influence over the other country”
(Keohane and Nye, 2001: 24).
Some examples are represented by the United States threat for intervention in the
beginning of the Cold War where this action prevented the countries in question
(Guatemala – 1954; Dominican Republic – 1965) to experience drastic regime changes which
were not in the interest of the United States (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 24-25).
On the one hand, it is a subtle agreement that under conditions of complex
interdependence, countries would not resort to force since costs and effects are rather
uncertain. However, when military power is employed, it means that vital interests or
national security are threatened and thus, the respective conditions would fall under the
realist paradigm. On the other hand, this research thesis would test whether the drastic
political changes in failing states, alters the relationship of interdependence they have with
other states – in this case the United States and leads for the latter to adjust to such a
change in terms of resorting to force and thus, intervening in those states.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
30
The reality of the post-Cold war has showed that failed states suffered such drastic
changes, and in this case they have become even more distanced from becoming members
of international institutions. Although such a membership would constrain their autonomy,
there is a realistic chance it would stabilize them and bent them towards cooperation, which
ultimately would offer them the benefits of interdependence.
In the end, theorizing economic interdependence is a useful tool for the
operationalization of the variables proposed by this research thesis. The manner in which
the concept is explained in the literature emphasizes the puzzle of the research question. In
other words, it is fair to assume that state failure is a threat to the system of economic
interdependence and it may cause a change to which countries such as the United States
have to adjust. How the United States decides to adjust in this situation is accentuated by
the use of military intervention. The theory is leaning towards the myriad of benefits and
the viability of cooperation earned through economic interdependence, but it does not rule
out conflict and intervention. Thus, this research thesis is offered a window of opportunity
to contemplate on whether the international system seeking the enlargement of the liberal
zone of peace, as portrayed in the literature, still has to overcome a new set of complex
problems which are unknown to decision-makers or experts. Failed states could be seen as
drastic changes challenging the order of the post-Cold War world and the protection of
economic interdependence might be a cause for military intervention.
C. The state as a Structural concept and the emergence of Failed States
1. The State
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
31
The discussion on the notion of failed states requires the introduction of the theoretical
pillar of what constitutes a state in the first place.
The international law provisions suggest that the people living within a given territory
must be bound to a “central structure” that exercises effective control over them (Cassese,
2005: 73). This central structure must enjoy independency from other external ones.
Another element is the territory which should not be under the influence, control or mere
interference of another “sovereign State”. The authorities which have acquired the territory
must also require “effective possession and control over a territory” (Cassese, 2005: 73).
Ultimately, a state must have a territory with well-defined boundaries, a population, a
government, and it should engage in the sphere of international diplomacy with other
entities (John, 2010).
Nonetheless, the debate on the structure of the state has received more foundational
definition starting from the claim that it has control over the developments happening
within well-defined boundaries.
Niccolo Machiavelli maintained how a ruler could conquer a territory by force and hold
on to it. Although this is a realist interpretation of the state, it provides a useful insight for
analysing the structural value of the state. Machiavelli goes on by explaining how the more
unified a territory, the more secure is its entity as a state. The ruler must foresee the risks
that might appear and must take pre-emptive measures to combat them. In other words, a
ruler must have a strategy when conquering a territory by force, due to the fact that
winning over a piece of land does not mean one could not lose it. The conqueror should win
over men of a territory and destroy those who oppose him. In fact, it is the proportional
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
32
relationship between the ruler and the ruled that keeps a state from falling into chaos.
There is a personal and institutional premise for state control. First, the dominated men
must both love and fear their “prince” (Machiavelli, 1999:35). The ruler must make himself
feared by the men he is dominating, but at the same time his behaviour must reflect
generosity and courage. Moreover, a ruler should not be hated by his citizens, especially in
hid endeavours of keeping them satisfied. Therefore, such an internal unified and strong
state considers external threats just another stepping stone to overcome. Second, the
military capabilities must be created from within the territory and be secured enough to
fight against external enemies. Furthermore, the matter of “establishing power securely” is
resolved through both personal charisma and institutional structures (Machiavelli, 1999:
35). The latter can be reiterated through the following: “Good arms follow good laws”
(Machiavelli, 1999:40). Finally, it is worth quoting the basic premises for building a state -
“good laws, sound defence, reliable allies and inspiring leadership” (1999:77).
In the twentieth century, Max Weber continued the debate on the concept of
statehood. In “Politics as a Vocation” Weber maintained that politics can be associated with
leadership and implicitly, with the concept of state. In other words, the leadership that
Weber refers to is based on a “human community” that has the “monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force” (Weber, 1946: 78) In essence, the structure of a state is most of the
times determined by higher classes of men dominating the ones inferior to them. In this
sense, violence is considered to be legitimate (Weber, 1946). According to Weber,
domination is understood through the prism of authority. A group of people relate to the
authority governing them through the idea of obedience. This is made either through
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
33
“custom, by affectual ties, by a purely material complex of interests, or by ideal
(wertrationale) motives” (Weber, 1978: 212).
Weber developed three types of authority or legitimate domination. First, there is the
legal authority comprised of rules which people perceive as binding and thus, they obey this
type of authority. An alternate, but yet logical motive is that men fear the consequences of
not obeying these rules and at the same time, they expect to receive rewards for respecting
this legal authority. Second, the traditional authority is based on “personal loyalty which
results from common upbringing” (Weber, 1978: 227). This type of legitimate domination is
based on “owed obedience” to the leading master. Third, the charismatic authority is
accepted by men as they genuinely believe in the prowess and “virtue of personal trust” of
the leader (Weber, 1978: 216).
In sum, the modern state is associated with domination exerted within defined
boundaries as it is considered that such a structure can employ violence under legitimate
pretences. Weber explains that power is supported and achieved through violence, while
the evolution of the state has seen a shift towards distribution of power in order to further
legitimize the state’s actions. As such, the state is an organization for domination and
ultimately, gaining power requires a degree of education and a strong belief for the
interests of the power holders (Weber, 1946).
2. Failed States
A large part of the research on failed states had its starting point in one article published
by G.B. Helman and S. R. Ratner in Foreign Policy. They describe the emergence of a new
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
34
political form known as the “failed nation-state” in the post-Cold War era (Helman & Ratner,
1992). They explain how countries such as Haiti, Sudan or Somalia are struggling with “civil
strife, government breakdown, and economic privation” which leads to “violence and
anarchy” (Helman & Ratner, 1992). Consequently, such states were seen to be having spill-
over effects to neighbouring countries through “refugee flows, political instability, and
random warfare” (Helman & Ratner, 1992). The authors make the assumption that other,
more developed states tend to help for the fear that these problems might get out of
control by spreading to neighbouring nations. Countries from regions such as Africa, Asia or
Central America rank on top of the indexes measuring state failure. One explanation is the
period of decolonization when it was considered that such states will best achieve
independency without the interference of foreign powers. Nonetheless, the bipolar
international system during the Cold War encouraged the U.S. and the Soviet Union to seek
allies and thus, keeping the level of interference in developing and lower developed
countries mostly in the African and Asian region. This fact kept such entities dependent on
developed countries. In effect such actions proved to be counter-productive to their own
development, and in some cases it drove them into chaos (Helman & Ratner, 1992).
Rotberg has a rather Weberian approach where for a state to naturally function it must
provide “political goods” to its citizens in terms of security, border control, managing
domestic threats, and “enabling citizens” to solve their issues within the borders of the
territory without resorting to violence. A state fails if its internal authorities cannot
accomplish these requirements. Rotberg provides an understanding of what is in reality a
failed state through different arguments. First, the state is not “able or willing to perform
the fundamental jobs of the nation-state” and it implicitly finds itself on the road to failure
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
35
(Rotberg, 2003: 6). In this sense, the institutions are faulty, the education and health care
system are chaotic – and absenteeism rises, literacy rates fall, diseases grow and spread;
and poverty increases. Second, the ruler or the ruling faction only enjoys the positive
outcomes because they benefit from the misery of the citizens through increasing
corruption rates and constant food shortages (Rotberg, 2003: 7-8). Third, the ultimate
phase of state failure is the loss of legitimacy when citizens revolt as their living standards
decrease, while the rulers become wealthier (Rotberg, 2002: 87-88). Thus, violence
becomes the norm as it is perceived to be a fair measure against the government (Rotberg,
2003: 9).
Krasner is defining failed states along similar lines as Rotberg and Helman and Ratner.
Therefore, he adds that states with a poor infrastructure, rising crime rates, declining GDP,
different currencies on the same territory, with armies that instigate to violence and which
are not controlled by the government, all represent entities where failure is very likely to be
achieved (Krasner, 2004).
This last theoretical section could be considered the last stop in the cycle of conceptual
explanation presented by this thesis. Naturally, one cannot describe what is understood
through a “failed state” without presenting the bases of a state. Moreover, state failure has
also been empirically measured, and although not all indexes follow the same parameters,
there is a common thread for detecting whether a state is failed or not. Failed states are the
main units of analysis. Consequently, this research thesis addresses the importance of
contemporary concerns posed by such states.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
36
V. Hypotheses Development
The use of the United States’ military form of intervention in the post-Cold War
period stays at the core of this research thesis. Therefore, it is important to focus on the
practice of this particular policy instrument. On the basis of Rosenau’s argument, the
operationalization of this variable should be assessed through the actual movement of one
state’s troops into another one. Such an approach would improve the theoretical debate as
it simplifies the complexity of intervention. In this sense, there would be a dissemination of
the cases and the concept would be explored in a more insightful manner (Rosenau, 1969).
The concept of failed states is the second element of focus in the research question.
In this sense, U.S. military intervention will be accounted for cases of failed states in the
post-Cold War period. In practice, this policy instrument was used in a selective manner and
it is safe to assume that the United States used a rational process of taking such action
based on intelligence analysis, evaluation of interests and alternatives. Undoubtedly, testing
hypotheses of concepts such as military intervention and failed states are not only abstract,
but also deeply debated in the literature to date.
This research will propose several premises regarding the causality of the United
States’ military intervention in failed states. To begin with, it is important to clarify the
variables of the research. The independent variable will be the economic interdependence
which is considered to be a cause for U.S. military intervention in failed states as a
dependent variable.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
37
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
38
Dependent Variable: U.S. led Military Intervention
Independent Variable: Economic Interdependence
As a generality, there is a compelling argument for the causality proposed above:
“ Although liberals and democrats have often succumbed to the temptation to intervene to bring
‘civilization’, metropolitan standards of law and order, and democratic government to foreign
peoples who have expressed no demand for them, these interventions find no justifications in a
conception of equal respect for individuals.” (Doyle in Smith et. al., 2012).
This enunciation rejects the idea that interventions have been made for
humanitarian purposes and emphasizes the scope of this research thesis that is looking at
other layers of explanation which go beyond this reasoning at prima facie.
Taking into account the theoretical explanation for the concept of interdependence,
it is important to mention the subtle agreement existing in literature that under conditions
of complex interdependence, countries would not resort to force since costs and effects are
rather uncertain. In turn, when military power is employed, it means that vital interests or
national security are threatened and thus, the respective conditions could be explained
better through the realist paradigm. Nonetheless, this research thesis is testing whether the
drastic political changes in various states mentioned by Keohane and Nye and presented in
the Theory Section–leading them on the path of failure, alters the relationship of
interdependence they have with other states – in this case the United States. In such a
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
39
situation, a general assumption would be that the United States adjust to such a change in
terms of resorting to force and thus, intervening in those states.
The reality of the post-Cold war showed that failed states suffered such drastic
changes, and they became even more distanced from becoming members of international
economic institutions. Although such a membership would constrain their autonomy, it is
assumed it would give them an incentive for internal stabilization and consequently, would
bend them towards cooperation.
Drawing on the main attributes of the modern interdependence theory proposed by
Keohane and Nye the United States will be considered as being State A and the Failed State
where military intervention occurred as State B. There will be presented some general
assumptions of this research thesis before resuming to the main hypotheses.
The United States need to be able to cooperate with failed states. Due to the fact
that these failed states are characterized by internal chaos, it is difficult for the United
States to find factions in those countries prone to dialogue. Furthermore, the fact that failed
states are outside the globalized economy and thus, outside of the global influence
propagated by the United States, adds to their list of perceived national security threats.
Considering all other viable alternatives, the United States had chosen to militarily intervene
in some states. The use of this policy instrument was due because state failure represented
a change perceived as having expensive effects on the economic interdependence
controlled by America. Such an intervention could be assumed to have been conducted on
the premise that it would bring order into chaos before the system of economic
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
40
interdependence is altered and later integrate these states into the global economy,
implicitly contributing to their development.
In the light of these ideas, there have been developed the following hypotheses:
H1. H1. If one of the national security interests of State A is defined as protecting its
relations of economic interdependence, then it is likely that military intervention will take
place in State B in order to prevent disruptions in the regional stability which may negatively
affect State A’s relation of economic interdependence with State B and/or its neighbours.
H2. The longer is State B left into chaos, the greater will State A’s vulnerability be and thus,
it will trigger military intervention as a direct reaction to State’s B failure.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
41
VI. Research Design
The analysis of this research thesis will focus on two case studies. These have the
goal to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses proposed in the previous section. In this
respect, the primary units of analysis will be comprised of two states as unitary actors.
Objectively, the choice follows the theoretical guideline proposed in the previous chapters.
The two states must fulfill two conditions. First, they should be considered failed at the time
of the intervention. Second, the intervention is identified in the theoretical structure of this
thesis as being military. In this sense, there must be proof of actual movement of troops in
the failed states in question.
Therefore, the two major units of analysis for testing the proposed hypotheses are
represented by U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994 and by the U.S. intervention in
Afghanistan in 2001-present. The analysis aims at finding whether it is a causal relationship
between the concept economic interdependence and military intervention.
Somalia and Afghanistan represent two interesting choices for the operationalization
of the variables in this thesis. There are two perspectives for this choice: one which
considers the regional geopolitical framework and a technical one. First, the regions where
these states are located show evidence for U.S. strategic interests. Somalia is the Horn of
Africa – a zone of political and economic turmoil, and Afghanistan is in Central Asia and used
to represent a passage way for trade routes with other parts of the world, being also a
resourceful country. The second perspective is based on a technical approach. Both cases
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
42
represent a small-N study and it makes the analysis parsimonious. The ultimate goal is to
explore in-depth the causal mechanism between economic interdependence and military
intervention in failed states.
The research design will follow three observational parameters. First, it will be
presented a historical overview of the states discussed. Evidence showed that this aspect
plays an important factor for explaining state failure and economic interdependence.
Second, observations for state failure will be assessed accounting for a time span of five
years (plus/minus three years according to available data) prior to the actual intervention.
The four main aspects covering this section are political shocks, economic shocks, public
goods and the level of violence. The last part will cover observations based on the dyadic
relationship between U.S. and Somalia and U.S. and Afghanistan. The three perspectives
analyzed are the concept of geopolitics (natural resources, strategic position), the process of
military intervention, and interdependence assumed to benefit all parties.
A. Historical Overview of Somalia and Afghanistan
Somalia was under Siad Barre’s dictatorship from 1969 until 1991. He gained power of
the territory in a bloodless coup, after the assassination of Abdi Rashid Ali Shermanke the
only president elected by the Somali citizens. Barre’s regime started to fall apart when
opposition movements rose against his leadership. These movements increased in intensity,
ultimately, forcing Barre to give up power (BBC, 2013).
Historically, the Somali society has always been divided. The population is known to be
nomadic and organized in clans all over the territory. This structural separatist framework
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
43
brought along different languages, social hierarchies, and cultures. During the colonial
times, the leadership tried to impose a centralized government. However, only during the
1960s Mogadishu became Somalia’s capital and there were created central institutions such
as the parliament. In addition, the adoption of a constitution during the same time period
allowed for political freedom and competition. This also permitted the appearance of an
endless number of parties. When Siad Barre took over, the constitution and all its provisions
were prohibited and the political organization followed a one party system namely - the
Somali Revolutionary Party (Clarke, 1992: 12). Also, the new regime was influenced by an
Islamist and socialist vision (Ahmed and Green, 1999: 117).
The power apparatus in Somalia has always been extremely decentralized; pastoralism
and farming being the predominant economic activities and people identifying themselves
with the clans they were part of. Comparatively, both colonial leaders and Siad Barre gravely
misunderstood the Somali society. Moreover, Somalia did not share a common national
identity. Therefore, the outcome which followed the fall of Barre’s regime was not
surprising. Anarchy characterized by ethnic conflict became the status quo in Somalia. In
other words, the imposition of centralized institutions accelerated the incidence of internal
conflicts. Moreover, when local leaders took over, they did not know how to employ the
concept of rule of law, equality or basic democratic values which theoretically aimed at
ensuring the populations with a decent standard of living to say the least. Instead, they
made use of their power to increase their personal well-being, instead of projecting it onto
the society as a whole (Coyne and Leeson, 2010: 4-5). In addition, despots such as Barre
showed contempt towards his own citizens through “widespread repression, arbitrary
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
44
arrest, torture and murder. He became one of the most extravagant human rights’
violators” (Clarke, 1992: 12).
More importantly, Somalia has never had friendly relations with neighbouring nations.
During Barre’s regime, it engaged in a war with Ethiopia with the purpose of reuniting the
territories lived by the Somali population under the same flag. This is an eloquent example
of Barre disregarding Somalia’s societal organization of clanships. In essence, these actions
brought Somalia one step closer to failure (Clarke, 1992:12).
Afghanistan has been characterized by a similar societal structure as Somalia. Due to its
tribal nature, Afghanistan has constantly experienced difficulties in establishing a central
government and when it did, it was due to invasions rather than an internal local decision-
making. During the 1970s, the economy was poor, but autarkic. From 1979 until 1989, the
country lost its economic and political structures as a result of the Soviet Invasion (U.S.
Army of Military History, 2006). The post-Cold War era worsened Afghanistan’s situation.
Although the Soviet Union withdrew its troops, the country stopped receiving funds from
both the Russians and the U.S. The state succumbed into a dreadful civil war between
different ethnical factions. Some of these are worth mentioning such as Uzbeks, Tajikis or
Pasthuns (Library of Congress Country Studies, 1997). In contrast to the limited basic needs
such as fuel or food, Afghanistan’s stockpiles of armament were incredible (Library Of
Congress Country Studies, 1997). The remaining officials in the government were struggling
to pay off the opposition factions in order not to attack Kabul and to keep safe public goods
such as roads or towns (Library Of Congress Country Studies, 1997).
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
45
Consequently, Afghanistan has suffered consistently throughout history. External
invasions from the past fueled the appearance of extremist factions and further increased
the change of institutional and economic collapse of the country. The experience of periodic
turmoil made the world’s powers confused on whom to establish communication bridges
with, much less who to influence and support ideologically and financially.
Both countries have had difficult struggles. History is a great indicator for explaining the
present situation of failing states. Somalia has always been a factionalized society, and those
rulers, regardless if they were colonists or local leader, failed to understand this aspect.
Hence, the chaotic status of the country has been prevailing for much of its past.
Afghanistan has been an epicenter of turmoil for countless decades. There is no doubt state
failure was approaching at a faster pace.
B. Observations for State Failure
Historically, Somalia and Afghanistan have had difficult internal struggles. They have
been troubling states not only for their society, but also for their neighbours. Nationalist
sentiments of leaders such as Barre drove Somalia into wars where little was achieved. In
Afghanistan, foreign rulers exacerbated the formation of groups which sought to dominate
all aspects of the society, driving the country into chaos and lawlessness.
It is important to note that at the time of the military interventions and more generally,
for the whole post-Cold War period, empirical data used to measure state failure and other
trends were very limited and had a very low reliability. In this sense, the research conducted
on this issue will follow a rather qualitative research design.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
46
1. Political Shocks
The term “political shock” aims at shedding light on certain characteristics considered to
be leading to state failure. These will be applied to Somalia and Afghanistan covering a time
span of five years (plus/minus three years due to data availability) prior to the U.S. led
military interventions. The principal characteristics have been identified such as sudden
leadership changes with negative effects, institutional organization in terms judiciary,
legislative and executive powers, democratic participation, rule of law and corruption.
a) Negative effects of Leadership Change
In Somalia, Barre has tried to redress his policies with regards to the Somali citizens
when he acknowledged the violent rise of opposition movements. However, these policies
were clouded by the actual government’s actions against the opposed factions. The final
struggle which led Somalia to failure was a manifesto adopted in 1990 which proposed the
establishment of an interim government and the organization of “a national conference to
reconcile the various ethnic groups now engaged in fighting and subversion” (Clarke, 1992:
30). Nonetheless, most of them were detained by Barre’s authorities. This apparent
appeasement continued with the proposal for a referendum with the scope of adopting a
constitution and allowing open and free elections. Barre even offered his resignation in
exchange for a cease-fire from the rebels’ part.
In reality, the government oppression firmly continued and the proposal was rejected by
the opposition movements. In 1991, Barre was forced to flee the country. Ali Mahdi
Mohammed – leader of the United Somali Congress group has tried to assume the role of
interim president of Somalia. Nonetheless, this change was rejected by the other clan
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
47
factions and the country fell into a deadly civil war (Clarke, 1992: 34-35). The unilateral
decision of Ali Mahdi Mohammed to assure presidency of Somalia without allowing free and
fair elections instead, represented the final act of repression of a central government which
led the country to civil war.
Afghanistan has also experienced a drastic turn of events regarding leadership change.
In 1996, the country suffered a dramatic political change when the Islamic extremist group
known as the Taliban came to power. This opposition group resisted the Soviet invasion
while being supported by the U.S. government during the 1980s. They were part of the
“Pashtun faction of mujahideen” which used to dominate the southern and eastern part of
Afghanistan (Laub, 2014).
In 1994, the group took over Kandahar and in 1996 they took control over Kabul. At first,
the Taliban seemed to bring stability to the country, replacing the corruption of the Soviets
and the volatile government which remained in power after the Russian withdrawal.
However, the policies imposed by the Taliban forced the population to live under a strict
Islamic rule. Provisions of such a legislation covered punishments of the population such as
“flagellation, amputation and execution” (Laub, 2014). The major restrictions affected the
population at a very deep level with women being forced to wear the burqa “from head to
toe” and abused if they disobeyed what were deemed being un-Islamic provisions. Music
and television were also prohibited. Essentially, the regime isolated Afghanistan from the
international community. Finally, the Pakistani and U.S. intelligence found the country to
provide refuge for terrorist groups (Laub, 2014).
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
48
b) Institutional Organization
The separation of powers in a state is not only a characteristic of democratic regimes,
but also of offering citizens of a country the basic level of human security. In both Somalia
and Afghanistan it can be observed the absence of the judiciary, legislative and executive
powers during the drastic regime changes described above.
In Somalia, the leader of the United Somali Congress attempted to take over the control
of the government, but he was quickly toppled by opposing factions in 1991. Consequently,
Somalia did not have any functioning government due to the anarchic situation. The
legislative and the Supreme Court also disappeared with the inception of the sectarian and
ethnic conflict (U.S. Department Of State, 1998).
The institutional framework of Afghanistan experienced a severe degree of inoperability
before the Taliban rule came to power (Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan). The leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan was represented by Mullah
Mohammad Omar. He self-appointed as the ruler of the country and took over the power
with his allied forces formed of “Pashtun clerics” (Katzman, 2014).
There was no trace of a functional parliament while the government was kept operational at
a limited level. In addition, the judiciary was practically non-existent and thus, there were no
legal checks and balances for Omar’s decision-making. It became soon clear how the Taliban
leader was able to transform Afghanistan in a center for terrorism by offering asylum to
Osama bin Laden (Katzman, 2014: 4).
Most importantly, the main structures of a state such as the parliament or the
government were inoperable and the only official institutions were minimally staffed
without “modern equipment” (Katzman, 2014: 5-6). Undoubtedly, the Taliban regime did
not receive international recognition due to its lack of institutional framework. By 2001,
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
49
they were controlling 90 percent of Afghanistan. Only in 2001, the United Nations
recognized a remaining faction controlled by Burhanuddin Rabbani (U.S. Department Of
State, 2001).
One cannot expect that a country is stable when such basic structures are illegitimate
and the rulers lead by instigating fear and violence among the population. If the people of a
country are not able to turn to an institutional framework for safety, welfare and other
public goods which every human being is entitled to, then a state is on the path to achieving
failure in the perception of the international community.
c) Democratic Participation
Considering the description of previous characteristics, it is now clear that the citizens of
neither Somalia nor Afghanistan benefitted from free and fair elections or much less
political competition. In 1991, Somalia was in the midst of an ethnic warfare where the
mere idea of electoral participation did not have the proper setting to flourish. Moreover,
there is no evidence which would imply the existence of any political parties competing for
the leadership of the country. Under these circumstances, there was no case of organized
elections (U.S. Department Of State, 1998).
Islamic extremism in Afghanistan prior to the U.S. military intervention was implicit for
the lack of any type of political participation. For example, comparing Afghanistan with a
communist state during the Cold War era where a constitution was allowing, in theory, the
existence of a political opposition, the Taliban openly monopolized all aspects of the society
by imposing a harsh Islamic legislation. In this sense, it could be observed that whatever the
despotism of the Taliban deemed to be un-Islamic, they corrected it with punishments
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
50
against the society. The only political formation in the country was represented by the army
and the small circle of acolytes loyal to Omar.
d) Rule of Law
The concept known as the rule of law holds at its basis the fact that all individuals and
institutions within a state follow the legislative provisions of the judiciary power. It is one of
the fundamental aspects of a functioning state. Somalia collapsed into a civil war in 1991.
The clans that turned against Barre and managed to topple him turned the arms against
each other instead of cooperating. There was no doubt that the lack of a higher authority to
govern the country led to no trace of the rule of law (Le Sage, 2005: 21-22). Notably, there is
some empirical data proving that the rule of law in Somalia and Afghanistan was absent. The
earliest empirical evidence which was found in Somalia has been provided by World
Governance Indicators (WGI) for 1996. Three years after the intervention occurred, Somalia
scored a mean of 0.19 for the rule of law indicator. The measurements found in WGI
followed a rank from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). Therefore, it can be observed that the
country has scored rather low and comparing it against the worldwide distribution, ranked
in the bottom (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013).
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
51
According to the WGI indicators, Afghanistan scored a mean of 0.09 from 1996 until
2002 for the rule of law indicator. Again, it can be reiterated that compared to other
countries, it achieved a rather low score, but not surprising taking into account the political
setting which was developing at the time prior to the U.S. military intervention in 2001
(Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013).
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013.
e) Corruption
The WGI has also shown empirical data for control of corruption. In Somalia, there is no
empirical data for this indicator prior, during or immediately after the military intervention
took place, considering the margin of error of minus/plus three years (Worldwide
Governance Indicators, 2013). However, even the lack of empirical data reiterates the
anarchic situation of Somalia at the time. Evidence for the final struggle of Barre’s regime
showed that the government was ultimately fighting against elite which was hungry for
power and wanted to gain access to the resources of the state for their own benefit. The
socialist regime used “civil service posts and public funds to reward and punish other
opportunistic members of the elite” (Samatar, 1992: 636).
Barre’s government was ruling through the so-called blood ties with the aim of dividing
the opposition, control public property and making the military incapable of action.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
52
Corruption went as far as the last attempt of the United Somali Congress to take over the
power in 1991 providing no free election. These actions were soon followed by a bloody civil
war. The opposing factions returned to their parts of the country claiming sovereignty over
them, and the gangs which were marginalized from this process turned against the citizens
by ravaging everything in their way. In essence, the concept of corruption in Somalia can be
identified as opportunism (Samatar, 1992: 637-640). In addition, a non-existent government
in a stateless Somalia could not fill in the vacuum for an empirical observation of the
corruption level.
In Afghanistan there was found some evidence for this indicator. While in 1996 there is
no data, the 1998 measurements assessed a 0 level of control for corruption which
persisted until 2002 (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013). This finding shows that the
Taliban rule brought a despotic regime among the Afghans which was undeniable,
uncontrollable and more importantly, which made it impossible to be challenged from
within.
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
53
2. Economic Shocks
The economic shocks which will be accounted for state failure in Somalia and
Afghanistan are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fluctuations and traces of foreign direct
investment (FDI) represented by sectors of interest with viable opportunities for foreign
investors. For both the GDP and the FDI, are expected to decrease during the times prior to
the U.S. intervention.
Somalia was not only politically, but also economically isolated during Barre’s socialist
regime. As expected, the economy was nationalized, all trading routes were closed, the
inception of a liberalized economy was replaced by price controls and severe agricultural
and industrial shortages were imposed. Somali people ended up using bribery mechanisms
to survive. For instance, households had to sell major part of their goods to support the
army, the military forces were blocking the water resources and the infrastructure was
destroyed to the point where public goods were getting to the people with great difficulty
(Ahmed and Green, 1999: 119-120). The post-1991 civil war led the remaining of the Somali
economy to the ground. The poor economy led to famine and to human loss. The ethnic
clashes kept trading routes closed with the southern part of the country suffering the most.
Consequently, this was a major driver for the U.S. led UN humanitarian intervention in 1992.
Studies show how Somalia was left “barefoot” as one could note, from any economic or
political goods. The northern bay area of the country with the “most fertile” lands crops
being planted and nourished livestock were “stolen or destroyed by gunmen” (Mubarak,
1997: 2030). Overall, it has been assessed that around fifty percent of the Somali GDP is
covered by the agricultural sector with livestock, bananas, corn or sugar being some of the
principal products which might raise an economic interest to other states. For instance,
bananas are exported overseas, including the United States. Another example is
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
54
represented by livestock’s skin as a main exported by-product (U.S. Department of State,
1998).
Somalia – GDP 1989-1990 (in billions of US dollars)
1989 1,092,393,020.50
1990 917, 044, 254.00
Source: The World Bank, 2014.
Taking into consideration the empirical data for the GDP measurement, the evidence
is very limited in this respect, but for the time accounted, one can observe a slight decrease.
The evidence for the foreign direct investment was accounted for the period starting with
1989 until 1993. The following table represents the data rather accurately.
Somalia – FDI 1989-1993 (in US dollars)
1989 -41,160,000
1990 5,590,000
1991 -150,000
1992 -60,000
1993 2,000,000
Source: The World Bank, 2014
The main pattern which can be observed for the above data is that towards the end
of Barre’s regime, the financial investment in Somalia was detracted. One observation is
that the isolated economy and trading routes deterred investors from financing the country.
Later, this aspect seemed to fluctuate with a peak in 1993 of positive investment.
Undoubtedly, this could also be associated with the U.S. intervention and the humanitarian
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
55
relief provided in 1992-1993. Nonetheless, there are views in the literature which echo the
plausibility of a functioning Somali economy which would be better off in the anarchic
situation in the post-1991 period (Mubarak, 1997: 2030).
In comparison, Afghanistan experienced different fluctuations regarding the
economic shocks. The following tables provide detailed information in this regard.
Afghanistan GDP (in US dollars) – 1996-2001
1996 7,810,968,827
1997 9,048,962,719
1998 8,736,033,093
1999 126,804,759,728
2000 167,260,766,750
2001 171,975,001,917
Source: The World Bank, 2014
Afghanistan FDI (in US dollars) – 1996-2001
1996 690,000
1997 -1,460,000
1998 -10,000
1999 6,040,000
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
56
2000 170,000
2001 680,000
Source: The World Bank, 2014
In contrast to the initial expectation, the GDP of Afghanistan has increased in the
years previous to the military intervention. It is a rather conflicting finding taking into
consideration that the GDP would be expected to decrease when the country is governed by
such a destabilizing regime. On the one hand, one explanation for this increase might be
represented by Afghanistan’s natural resources such as natural gas exports and minerals or
the production of arms. However, the GDP increase has not been reflected on the
population – as the situation before 2001 has been evaluated at a pre-famine stage. On the
other hand, the agriculture of the country covers sixty-five percent of the total GDP with
products used at the domestic level such as cereals, cotton, wool, or fruits. The industry is
making up for twenty percent of the GDP covering textiles, furniture, raw materials such as
cement, and other resources as natural gas or woven carpets destined for exports (U.S.
Department of State, 2001).
Even in this situation, the qualitative evidence shows that the Taliban leadership was so
harsh and the consistent terrorizing of the population impeded any kind of production of
goods or services which might explain the GDP increase. Nevertheless, there are some
elements which explain this rise in the GDP, but they are all coming from the informal
economy. The Afghanistan exports have been booming during the Taliban rule through the
smuggling of goods across borders, putting at a high disadvantage the local businesses and
the development of the domestic economy. Also, the illicit traffic of opium and heroin have
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
57
been added to the GDP calculations of the UN Statistical Data as Afghanistan became one of
the biggest producers of poppy fields. All returns from these exports were destined for the
Taliban army and not distributed among the population (Rashid, 1999).
3. Political Goods
The political goods were analyzed in terms of the overall health situation, the
educational system and information on food shortages.
a) Educational System
Before Somalia succumbed to internal ethnic conflict, education was required for all
children between six and fourteen (Raspbridge). All educational stages from primary school
to higher level institutions were covered in the societal structure. During Barre’s regime the
Islamic religion became a mandatory part of the cultural education and, all learning
institutions were government controlled (Library of Congress Country Studies)
Literacy Rate for Somali Male and Female Population 15+ yrs
It can be inferred that the
increased level of violence
prevented the emancipation of
the population after Barre’s
regime.
Source: UNESCO, 2000.
When Somalia succumbed to civil war, “public services in social infrastructure”
comprising educational facilities disappeared (Mubarak, 1997: 2030). Considering the
Year Male Female Source
1985 18 6 UNDP, 1998
1992 41 16 UNDP, 1994
1995 36 14 UNICEF-ESARO,
1996
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
58
available empirical data for literacy rates, it has been found that in 1992, Somalia had
extremely low ratios for women, and the male population did not touch the threshold of at
least 50 percent. Later, in 1995, there was a slight decrease in these percentages (UNESCO,
2000).
In Afghanistan, there were two educational systems functioning simultaneously in
Afghanistan: the so-called “Islamic madrassas” where children were taught the “basic moral
values and ritual knowledge through the study of the Holy Koran” and other religious
resources, and the “higher level madrassas” which offered higher education (Library of
Congress Country Studies, 1997).
The domination of the Taliban-rule not only brought Afghanistan to a state of anarchy,
but managed to place it among the countries with the highest illiteracy rate in Asia.
Therefore, in 2000 Afghanistan registered a 12.6 percent literacy rate of the 15+ female
population, and a rate of 43.1 percent for the male population (United Nations Statistics
Division, 2014).
b) Health Situation
Both Somalia and Afghanistan are countries which have experienced severe turmoil and
where the health sector suffered an extreme deterioration.
The suffering Somali population had reached its peak during the civil war. Although the
collapse of the health sector started during Barre’s regime, the outcomes intensified after
1991. The destruction of the water wells transformed the country into a center of infectious
diseases very difficult to eradicate. Almost eighty percent of the population contracted
intestinal diseases due to poor or non-existent sanitary facilities. Among other illnesses
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
59
there were identified pulmonary tuberculosis, smallpox, and malaria (Library of Congress
Country Studies)
The accumulated data showed that the inception of the civil war made it impossible to
gather evidence with regards to how many people could access sanitary facilities. However,
only starting with 1993 data started to be available. It was registered that only 21 percent of
the population benefitted from an improved health situation (United Nations Statistics
Division, 2014). Undoubtedly, the change has been due to the U.S. led military intervention
accompanied by the UN humanitarian relief aid.
Afghanistan’s health services were deeply uneven across the country, covering mostly
the urbanized areas. For instance, there were infant mortality rate was registered at 163 out
of 1000 live births in 1994 (Library of Congress Country Studies, 1997) and there was a mere
21 percent of the population which had actual access to sanitation facilities. These major
issues were due to the Islamic extremism imposed by the Taliban-rule (United Nations
Statistics Division, 2014).
Afghanistan reached one of its lowest points in terms of health security in 1997 when
1.5 million people were “physically disabled by war injuries, including amputation, blindness
and paralysis, as well as debilitating infectious diseases, such as poliomyelitis and leprosy”
(Library of Congress Country Studies, 1997). At some point, the situation was so severe, that
the International Red Cross Committee, World Health Organization and UNICEF sent
humanitarian help to those in need. Although these actions did not reach a broader part of
the population in need, the international organizations which set foot in Afghanistan during
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
60
the Taliban rule managed to vaccinate approximately four million children from contagious
diseases such as polio (Library of Congress Country Studies, 1997).
c) Food Shortages
On the one hand, there is no empirical evidence of what percentages of the population
have been malnourished during the times prior to the interventions. On the other hand,
both cases present qualitative evidence for famine situations. In Somalia, the socialist
regime destroyed the most important sources for survival – water pumps. The people had
to either reorient towards older sources of water supplies, to drink “poor quality water” or
to buy it at sky rocketing prices (Library of Congress Country Studies, 1992).
The civil war that followed destroyed electricity and communication lines, as well as the
hard infrastructure, maritime and air routes (Mubarak, 1997: 2030). No later than 1992,
Somalia was declared a chronic center of famine and the international community
acknowledged the need to provide humanitarian aid to the vast population.
In 1998, Afghanistan was assessed to have passed the “pre-famine stage”. In this sense,
the U.S. analysts discovered that the country was imposing increased prices on basic food
such as grains. Families were forced to sell their goods in terms of livestock, furniture or
even homes to feed themselves. People were eating “inedible” food which increased the
rates of malnutrition and diseases. The mortality rates also registered an increase
(Committee on International Relations, 2001).
The famine in Somalia and Afghanistan registered prior to the intervention caused
massive migrations to neighbouring countries. Not only refugees seeking safety and shelter
were crossing the borders of these failing states, but also a spillover of infectious diseases
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
61
among other threats. It was a situation which raised concerns of instability in other
neighbouring states. Borders became more porous and threats were migrating along with
populations in desperate need for basic goods.
4. Level of Violence
In this section it is assessed the level of violence for both Afghanistan and Somalia. The
following empirical data is taken from the Political Instability Task Force 1955-2012. Below it
is provided the coding of the variables measuring this level of violence. The cases were
placed in the wider analytical framework of ethnic wars.
Yrbegin = year when the conflict began
Yrend = year when the conflict ended
MAGFIGHT = scaled number of rebel combatants or activists scored from 0 to 4
(where: 0 = < 100 combatants, 1= 100 to 1000, 2 = 1000 to 5,000, 3 = 5,000 to 15,000, and 4
= > 15,000 combatans)
MAGFATAL = scaled number of fatalities related to the fighting scored from 0 to 4
(where 0 = < 100 fatalities, 1 = 100 to 1000, 2= 1000 to 5000, 3 = 5000 to 10 000, and 4 =
>10 000 fatalities)
MAGAREA = scaled portion of country affected by fighting scored from 0 to 4
(where 0 = < one tenth of the country affected, 1 = one tenth and one or several important
cities/provinces affected, 2 = > one tenth to one quarter and/or the capital city, 3 = one
tenth to one quarter and a large number of urban places, 4 = > one half is affected)
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
62
AVEMAG = average of the three magnitude scores scored from 0 to 4
(Political Instability Task Force – State Failure Problem Set, 2013: 3-5)
Ethnic wars are considered to be internal conflicts between official, governmental
factions and ethnic groups comprised of the opposition and challenging the incumbents.
Both cases have been experiencing this type of warfare at a distressing scale during the time
prior to the intervention. Each variable is calculated at an annual rate and each score
represents a different level of violence. Below there are the tables for Somalia and
Afghanistan with the assessment of the violence level. (PTIF – State Failure Problem Set,
2013: 6).
Somalia – Ethnic Wars – 1989-1993
YRBEG YREND MAGFIGHT MAGFATAL MAGAREA AVEMAG
1989 1988 Ongoing 3 1 2 2
1990 1988 Ongoing 3 3 2 2.5
1991 1988 Ongoing 3 3 4 3.5
1992 1988 Ongoing 3 2 4 3
1993 1988 Ongoing 4 N/A 4 3.5
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
63
Source: PTIF – Ethnic Wars Dataset, 2012
Afghanistan – Ethnic Wars – 1996-2001
YRBEG YREND MAGFIGHT MAGFATAL MAGAREA AVEMAG
1996 1992 2001 4 3 4 3.5
1997 1992 2001 4 3 4 3.5
1998 1992 2001 4 3 4 3.5
1999 1992 2001 4 3 4 3.5
2000 1992 2001 4 2 2 3
2001 1992 2001 4 2 2 2.5
Source: PTIF – Ethnic Wars Dataset, 2012
In Somalia, it can be observed that the level of violence is intensifying gradually from
the beginning while towards the end of the time-span it decreases (i.e. lower number of
fatalities registered for 1992). Moreover, the portion of the country affected increases,
reaching the maximum threshold envisioned for this study.
Afghanistan’s development is not entirely different from Somalia’s. For the period
between 1996 and 2001, that is the whole period of the Taliban-rule, the country is
evaluated to experience the highest level of fighting, with the number of fatalities
decreasing in the last two years and the portion of the country affected diminishing. Overall,
both cases experienced a slim statistical reduction in their level of violence as the time span
approached the moment of intervention.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
64
This final parameter is a crucial determinant for the state failure observations of
Somalia and Afghanistan. The empirical assessment presented above reiterates the fact that
these states provided little to no human security for their population. The despotic and
anarchic rulings were instigating fear and were oblivious to human dignity. In the end, the
level of violence is an important factor in framing a state as failed and the State Fragility
Index is a useful indicator for proving the status of the cases in question.
The observations for state failure have been addressed from four different
perspectives: political shocks, economic shocks, public goods and the level of violence. All
empirical and qualitative data indicate that Somalia and Afghanistan could be considered
failed in these parameters prior to the intervention. The main comparative aspect is the
manner in which state structures are perceived in democratic, developed countries which
prevail in the international system. Therefore, one limitation of this analysis may be the fact
that some scholars might consider this assessment rather subjective. Nonetheless, the
theoretical chapter intentionally presented the counterpart of a failed state. Afghanistan
and Somalia do not fit the Weberian approach of state legitimacy. It is safe to assume that
even with the prevailing qualitative research employed in this design; these two case studies
are nothing but failed states. Additionally, following Rotberg’s Weberian approach to state
failure, a valid assumption would be that Somalia ceased to have the ability to provide its
population with basic public goods, while the Taliban in Afghanistan willingly isolated the
country from external influences, thus depriving its people from a decent standard of living
and a protective governance. In order to provide a more accurate analysis of what
constitutes a contemporary failed state below there some empirical data from the Failed
States Index:
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
65
Somalia – Failed States Index 2005-2007
Year Worldwide Rank Score
2005 5 102.3
2006 7 105.9
2007 3 111.1
Source: The Failed States Index, 2013
Afghanistan – Failed States Index 2005-2007
Year Worldwide Rank Score
2005 11 99.0
2006 10 99.8
2007 8 102.3
Source: The Failed States Index, 2013
The Failed States Index is measuring state failure for twelve indicators grouped in
social, economic, political and military aspects. The coding is made on a scale from 1 (low) to
10 (high). The interpretation of the data follows the assumption that the higher the score,
the worse the situation in a given state. The worst a country could rank is 120 on the
proposed scale. The data is presented over the time span between 2005 and 2009. The
observations show that both Somalia and Afghanistan still ranked at the top of the list with
the highest scores over all the indicators.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
66
This research thesis acknowledges the fact that the literature on state failure is still
debated and does not rule out the presence of a certain degree of subjectivity and the
existence of a margin error for the set of observations provided in this section.
C. Observations regarding the two key dyadic relationships: US –
Somalia, US – Afghanistan
The next set of observations is drawn from three different elements of inquiry. They are
accounted for the relationship between the U.S. and Somalia and the U.S. and Afghanistan.
First, the geostrategic factors are accounted in terms of geographical position of the country
and natural resources which are assumed to play an important role in the decision-making
process for intervention. Second, the concept of intervention is applied in terms of actual
deployment of U.S. troops in the countries considered, the legal dimension of the concept
and whether the targets posed any crucial threat for the national security of the United
States. Finally, the concept of economic interdependence is based on the assumption that it
brings benefits to all parties involved. In this respect, the set of observations will mostly rely
on evidence gathered from flows of money and trade, and an assessment on the degree of
asymmetric interdependence between the two dyads as presented in the chapter on theory.
1. Geopolitical Factors
For parsimonious reasons, this analysis reflects the relationships between states at the
time of the intervention only, since this is the purpose of the research. Somalia seems to
have an important strategic setting being located in the Horn of Africa and offering
possibilities for maritime security with openness to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Geographically, the country is also close to Yemen, Tanzania, and Saudi Arabia which were
all U.S. allies at the time of the intervention. Somalia’s main activity was pastoralism.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
67
However, the land was not used to at its full potential, with only 1.73 percent being arable
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). This aspect implies that Somalia presented very limited
opportunities when it came to exploiting its own resources. Objectively, such exploitation is
considered to be beneficial when it is done in the interest of the vast population and not to
reap short-term benefits. Furthermore, among the natural resources found in Somalia which
might have raised the U.S. interest were a large number of unexploited minerals and oil
reserves (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).
Afghanistan is a landlocked state surrounded by strategically important neighbours.
China has been engaging in a beneficial trade relationship with the U.S. for decades. Iran is
posing threats to becoming a regional power. Pakistan has been thought to deeply influence
the developments in Afghanistan since the Soviet occupation. In other words, it has been
considered a rather swing state when it came to making alliances. On the one hand, they
were cooperating with the U.S. intelligence which led to the discovery of terrorist nests in
Afghanistan and on the other hand, they were also fostering part of the Taliban faction and
terrorist developments themselves. Finally, Afghanistan has its northern neighbours
comprised of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. This aspect is important since it
shares significant resources of natural gas at the border with the Central Asian Republics
(Katzman, 2014: 67-68).
2. Intervention
Before proceeding to the analytical part of this section, it is important to present the
overall U.S. political situation at the moment of the interventions. Therefore, in 1992, during
the George W. Bush administration, Colin Powell was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The so-called “Powell Doctrine” has been an important tenet in the U.S. diplomacy
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
68
and decision-making at the time. In other words, the post-Cold War world has been
reasoned in the National Security Strategy of 1991 as becoming more volatile and
ambiguous (LaFeber, 2009: 73-75).
In this respect, Powell continued the Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s vision
for foreign U.S. troop deployment only under seven conditions. The United States was to
send its military forces only if the national interest was at stake and that is if the interest
was explicitly formulated in order to pose a serious threat to the national security of the
country. In the case of an intervention, the objective was to achieve victory and the
methods for achieving that had to be analyzed against all the other alternatives and their
outcomes. More precisely, it could be assumed the U.S. were bound to employ a Rational
Actor Model in their decision-making process. Moreover, force was to be employed as a
solution of last resort and only with a back-up plan constituted of an exit strategy. In the
end, any deployment of U.S. forces would have to be subject to readjustment if necessary
and the military had to have the approval of the Congress and the population (LaFeber,
2009: 73-75).
In retrospective, not all of these points were respected when interventions in
Afghanistan and Somalia took place. Colin Powell was a pragmatic character and he only
proposed short and clearly determined interventions which were successful such as the case
of Kuwait in 1990. However, the complex developments post 1991 and the humanitarian
disaster that was taking place in Somalia and reiterated by international missions and
humanitarian lobbyists had deeply hurdled the decision-making process.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
69
In April 1992, the UN Security Council Resolution 751 urged the international community
to contribute with financial and other resources in the assistance of the Somali population
(UN SC Resolution 751, 1992). The main setback was that the UN troops did not possess the
capabilities to reach to the vast majority of the starving population and proved to be
overwhelmed. The U.S. led UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) deployed
around 30, 000 troops in the country (UK Border Agency, 2011). It is important to point out
that the U.S. interventionist strategy has been and remained rather selective. Undoubtedly,
the United States cannot address all the crises on the globe. However, when the call for
support was made, despite the lack of economic interest and against the general thinking in
the State Department that a crucial national interest should be at stake for deployment of
troops, President Bush acknowledged the fact that America possessed the necessary
capabilities to address the humanitarian disaster in Somalia (Oberdorfer, 1992). After rough
deliberations, it was concluded that the U.S. could pursue the operation despite the Powell
Doctrine. The response was made under the Operation Provide Relief aimed at deterring the
violent clans from ripping off the food aid destined for the masses. Food, by itself,
represented a means of gaining power for the warlords who were selling it at extremely
high prices and causing mass starvation in the country. Unfortunately, the operation did not
achieve its ends.
The famine persisted in Somalia. In December 1992, it was launched Operation Restore
Hope when the U.S. deployment of troops fulfilled the objective of providing a “more fair
distribution of food delivered” (Haulman, 2004: 4). In May 1993, the humanitarian crisis was
considered to have passed.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
70
In an Address before the World Affairs Council of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts the
situation in Somalia was considered “a horrendous human tragedy which is of utmost
concern to the US Government” (US Department of State, 1992).Moreover, the U.S. was
outraged when one of the acclaimed leaders of Somalia – General Mohamed Farah Aideed
rejected the protective forces offered by the international community. The whole approach
in Somalia was perceived by the U.S. with an imperative need to make the country retie
relations with its neighbours (US Department of State, 1992).
The decision for intervention in Afghanistan has dated back since 1998. The U.S.
intelligence discovered that a terrorist organization led by a so-called Osama bin Laden
planned the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
The response was the air-bombing of several alleged terrorist sites, but there was no
military intervention undertaken (Laub, 2014). In 2001, on September 11, the U.S. was hit in
the terrorist attacks conducted by the Afghanistan based Al Qaeda organization. Considering
the conditions of the Powell Doctrine, the terrorist attacks represented a direct and
undeniable threat to America’s national security. That was the trigger for America to deploy
troops, supported by its allies in searching for what became the most wanted terrorist on
the globe.
Furthermore, the strategic perception brought proof that the Taliban were severely
disrupting the regional stabilization not only through the oppression of the population, but
also through fostering terrorist nests. All these aspects were subject to a spillover effect
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamic Republic of Afghanistan). The mission in Afghanistan was
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
71
conducted under the name Operation Enduring Freedom and removed the Taliban from the
leadership of the country in an attempt to prevent the hosting of terrorist organizations.
The U.S. accomplished these objectives, but the military presence has persisted until
today. The main observation which could be drawn from this assessment is that the U.S.
acknowledged the volatility of the international system at the turn of the 21st century. The
threats and instability of the world were not coming from the Soviet Union anymore, but
from unexpected developments in various regions on the globe. The U.S. was not risking of
losing its regional allies to communist regimes, but to uncontrollable and less predictive
structural changes.
3. Economic Interdependence
The concept of interdependence seen through the lens of liberal institutionalism
assumes that the relationship between dyads is at best when cooperation is the prevailing
norm. Recalling the theoretical explanations, interdependence can only be sustained if
states involved in this process have regimes which are organized according to specific sets of
principles and rules. It is assumed that two states can benefit from each other if there is a
high degree of cooperation between two stable, central governments. In other words,
interdependence assumes that the presence of official representatives is required to
maintain a relative degree of interdependence. The actors involved in the game of
cooperation are more likely to achieve absolute gains if the official structures of the state
are stable and they can predict, to a certain degree, what to expect from each other.
As a result it is expected that intervention was conducted with the scope of pushing the
failed states in question to forming a central government which would provide the path to
cooperation and thus, deter threats such as terrorism, reduce poverty and prevent
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
72
infectious diseases from spreading into neighbouring countries. Overall, the action of
intervention on the premise of economic interdependence is expected to prevent a regional
destabilizing effect which could produce a spill-over in U.S. partner nations.
The interdependence will be evaluated for the flow of money, trade and other strategic
resources – such as maritime security, petroleum as well as for the asymmetry between the
United States and each of the cases choses – Somalia and Afghanistan.
The National Security Strategy of the United States was stated in a rather clear manner
in 1991. The U.S. aimed at spreading their principles regarding democracy and a free market
economy in a so-called “new world order”. Also, the strategy assumed that the
developments of the post-Cold War world are not predictable as they used to be prior to
1990 and thus the U.S. assumed the role of global leader due to two simple reasons: their
national power was accounted for having the most capable and powerful military in the
world and a strong economy (The White House, 1991: 3-4). In 1991, America assumed the
responsibility of fighting for “malnutrition, illiteracy, poverty” (The White House, 1991: 8)
and decided to offer assistance to states which made an internal decision to follow the path
to democracy (The White House, 1991: 17). In addition, the U.S. reiterated in their official
strategy the acknowledged danger posed by countries in the Middle East region which
threatened to disrupt any economic ties that the U.S. had in that part of the world (The
White House, 1991: 19). One final amendment stemmed from the U.S. decision to reduce
the number of military forces (The White House, 1991: 31). Overall, it could be inferred the
U.S. goal was to implement a cooperative strategy in a new and ambiguous international
system, but it did not aim to forcefully impose democratic state structures and much less to
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
73
employ military interventions. This approach could be interpreted as a break from any
massive military engagements in the beginning of the post-Cold War era where the U.S. did
not have any specific objectives to address them. Thus, this is one of the key aspects which
underline the puzzle of this research thesis.
Somali exports were mostly comprised of livestock and their skin. Once the country
became stateless, contrary to any expectations, Somalia’s trade in this sector was four times
higher than during Barre’s regime. Another increase was registered for the export of
bananas and it even attracted foreign direct investment in terms of Italian agricultural
entrepreneurs and the U.S. Dole Fruit Inc. In 1989, the value of livestock and bananas was
estimated at 26 million US dollars. Italy was one of Somalia’s major trading partners along
with Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Also, until the country fell into anarchy, the major suppliers
were represented by Italy, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. (US Department of State, 1998).
Although the statistical data is limited, there are qualitative studies claiming that the
economy was better off during anarchic times from 1991 (see Mubarak, 1997), while other
studies concluded that due to the lack of empirical evidence, the economy could not be
assessed properly for the last decade of the 20th century (Library of Congress Country
Studies)
Furthermore, it is important to identify the basic mutual benefits that could have caused
the U.S. intervention in Somalia. In addition to the reasons presented above, it should be
added the apparent strategic importance of Somalia. Located in the Horn of Africa, the
Berbera Port on the Somali territory proved to be a useful military base for the U.S.
exercises in the Gulf region in the Operation Bright Star in 1981 (US Department of State,
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
74
1998). Naturally, this deployment of forces was made in order to prevent any regional
conflict in the Persian Gulf (The White House, 1991: 19). Later, the port was used in 1990 to
military support Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf War. However, the U.S. interest has ceased
in this strategic point afterwards. While during Barre’s regime, there were investments
made up to 600 million US dollars and training of the Somalia army, the flow of money and
personnel stopped at the beginning of the 1990s. The Somali army proved to be very
inefficient and the inception of the civil war deterred the U.S. from getting military involved
in the turmoil (Committee on International Relations, 2006). A final reason for the loss of
interest in the Berbera Port was that due to the civil war, the U.S. have simply reoriented its
military bases towards other countries in the region with more secure and better facilities
such as Oman, or Kenya (Committee on International Relations, 2006). U.S. allies – Kenya
and Ethiopia, were ravaged by the Somali-led ethnic war against them. Thus, they lobbied
the U.S. government to stop the training of the Somali army and to cut off their military
funding. It was thought that such acts of aggression were harming the entire region and
implicitly, U.S. relations of interdependence.
In Afghanistan the export of goods accounted for 80 million US dollars in 1996 based on
fruits, nuts, wool, cotton and others with trade partners in Central Asian neighbouring
Republics, Pakistan, Iran, India and the European Community. The imports were estimated
at 150 million US dollars in terms of food, petroleum goods, and regular consumer goods
(US Department of State, 2001). The United States accounted for up to 18 percent of
Afghanistan’s imports (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011). One tenet of the export-import
flow is that the data did not account for the illicit drug trafficking comprised of opium crops.
Afghanistan poses a great threat to the free market economy from this point of view (US
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
75
Department of State, 2001). These illegal flows of drugs brought large implications for the
regional security. Afghanistan was considered a “gateway for some of the worst evils of drug
and violence, which daily pass through it en route to other parts of the globe” (Senate
Hearing, 2000). In this sense, these actions represented hurdles for neighbouring countries
such as Pakistan which sought the improvement of economic and social connections in
Central Asia. Therefore, issues such as drug trafficking or terrorism fostered by Afghanistan
constituted a breach to regional cooperation and stability.
Overall, the U.S. relationship of interdependence with Somalia and Afghanistan do not
differ much in essence according to the elements of analysis provided in this section. The
intervention in Somalia was also determined by the U.S. regional interest of projecting
democratic and free market values such as freedom, respect for human rights and rule of
law which are indispensable for the stability of the country and implicitly, the stability of key
neighbouring countries considered U.S. allies. In Afghanistan, the ravaged society by civil
war, foreign occupation and violent extremism was another crucial cause for military
intervention (Powell, 1992). The Gulf region covers almost two thirds of world’s oil and a
failed state such as Afghanistan was threatening the free access to this important resource
(The White House, 1991: 1-2). In other words, a peaceful setting of the international system
is preferred for cooperation where justice is served in the people’s interest rather than a
constant state of turmoil (Powell, 1992).
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
76
VII. Conclusion
This chapter is dedicated to the findings, limitations and concluding remarks of this
research thesis. The results will be interpreted along the lines of the research design and the
theoretical guidelines presented in the previous chapters.
A. Results
The thesis proposes two hypotheses, one of which tends to find a direct causal
relationship between the concept of economic interdependence and the decision of a state
to militarily intervene in a failed state and the other one attempts to bring the first
hypothesis further and to explore whether there is any degree of vulnerability perceived in
the whole process of intervention and whether it is reinforced by the economic
interdependence.
The portrayal of the first hypothesis is recalled below:
H1. If one of the national security interests of State A is defined as protecting its relations
of economic interdependence, then it is likely that military intervention will take place in
State B in order to prevent disruptions in the target state’s regional stability which may
negatively affect State A’s relation of economic interdependence with State B and/or its
neighbours.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
77
A clearer depiction of the units of analysis mentioned in this hypothesis stems from
State A being represented by the U.S. and State B by the cases for failed states analyzed in
the previous chapter – that is Somalia and Afghanistan.
This thesis aims at testing whether economic interdependence can be considered a
valid cause for military intervention. The hypothesis explores the presumption that
interdependence is not only limited to the cases analyzed in the previous chapter, but it also
affects the stability of the entire regional framework. In this sense, the series of findings
show that a holistic perspective of the developments can find explanations for the causal
relationship between economic interdependence and military intervention.
Historical evidence showed that neither Somalia nor Afghanistan could be imposed
central governments and expect them to follow the path to democracy as it happened with
the majority of the developed states. Second, the observations for state failure proved that
indeed according to the proposed parameters and in a basic comparison to other developed
nations, Somalia and Afghanistan could be considered failed states at the time prior to the
intervention. Third, the dyadic relationships between the U.S. and Somalia and the U.S. and
Afghanistan have shown surprising findings.
The interpretation of interdependence as a cause for military intervention in failed
states has been contemplated on various tiers of analysis. The first tier has considered the
possibility of U.S. national economic interests being in direct connection with Somalia and
Afghanistan categorized as failed states. The second tier has been composed of a regional
perspective where both cases are part of a larger puzzle which contributes to the
preservation of an international system based on economic interdependence.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
78
To start with, the geopolitics of Somalia has not been a crucial area of interest for
the U.S. since 1991. The evidence proves that the Port of Berbera does not constitute
anymore a resourceful setting for naval power. The U.S. costs – and that is the funds
directed for the military department for establishing a presence in the area were considered
extremely high, precisely due to Somalia being a failed state without a functioning
government (Committee on International Relations, 2006). Dealing with a failed state is a
very delicate matter since a country such as the U.S. does not know what to expect from the
target state, there is no central body for diplomatic talks, and the line between a potential
ally and an enemy is very blurry due to the factional split within the country.
The National Security Strategy from 1991 is one of the clearest documents in terms
of U.S. foreign policy. It is maintained that the U.S. assumes the global leadership role and
the establishment of a so-called New World Order, but progress such as nation-building in
parts of the world (i.e. the Horn of Africa) must come from within (The White House, 1991,
2-3). This issue is leading to the second tier of analysis concerning the regional perspective
and the puzzle on whether there is any indication of economic interdependence as a causal
linkage to the U.S. intervention in Somalia.
On a broader scale, evidence sustains the fact that the U.S. was interested in the
regional stability, where the danger was perceived as the possibility of a spill-over to
neighbouring countries some of which were U.S. allies. To start with, Somalia was
considered to have a fragile effect on the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. The country’s
openness to the sea would provide safe passage ways to terrorists and thus, would
destabilize a larger part of the world (Committee on International Relations, 2006). Second,
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
79
even though there is no direct finding which shows a clear causality between economic
interdependence and military intervention in Somalia, there is the acknowledgement of
existing energy resources and the need for maritime security. In a congressional report, it is
stipulated that Somalia’s state failure is negatively affecting the maritime commerce and
other “offshore oil production facilities” (Ploch, 2011: 16). The key interest which proves the
causality of economic interdependence stems from the goal of protecting shipping routes in
the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean (Ploch, 2011:
20). Third, the intervention in 1992 was not only for humanitarian purposes, but it also
accounted for Somalia’s neighbours some of which are U.S. allies. In other words, specific
areas of interests are Tanzania, Yemen and Saudi Arabia (Ploch, 2011: 21). Therefore, the
spread of instability was seen to affect not only the country in question, but would have
destroyed the alliance relationships of the U.S. in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian
Peninsula (Committee on International Relations, 2006). Lastly, the instability of Somalia
would prove to be an advantage for other countries such as Yemen, Saudi Arabia or Iran.
External governments and private actors were feared to end up dominating the Horn of
Africa which was easier when a country such as Somalia was failed (Committee on
International Relations, 2001).
This holistic background for U.S. intervention in Somalia is emphasized by the
evidence stemming from a need for economic interdependence. Undoubtedly, the stability
of Somalia was not a key interest to the U.S., but the one of its regional allies. The U.S.
would have needed Somalia to have a stable government in order to be able to extend its
influence in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf in terms of ensuring cooperation,
spreading U.S. values, influencing the establishment of a free market economy which would
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
80
impede the propagation of threats such as drug trafficking, terrorism, infectious diseases
and a mutual benefit approach. The ultimate goal is to protect the region from extremist
domination and to rather push for fruitful cooperation.
The U.S. humanitarian assistance in Somalia had larger implications than simply
helping the population in need, which undoubtedly was an imperative of the U.S. policy.
Providing humanitarian aid to the starving population and tackling the deploring drought
was one step ahead towards a cooperative Somalia state. Ultimately, the evidence provides
with an understanding of a preference for an integrated country such as Somalia in the
international system of interdependence to an anarchic one.
The geopolitics of Afghanistan has proved to be as complex as Somalia. Each of the
country’s neighbours represents a strategic interest not only to the U.S., but to the Middle
East and Central Asian region. The disruption of economic ties in the Gulf was seen as
endangering the free flow of oil resources which accounted for two-thirds of the worldwide
reserves (The White House, 1991, V). Also, neighbouring states such as Pakistan were
aiming at expanding their economic channels to the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan
was a centre of instability, massive human rights violations, illicit drug trafficking and a
protective nest for terrorist organizations. An international system paved with so many
imperfections made it very difficult for the U.S. to fulfil its policy of spreading democratic
values based on cooperation, a liberal economy and a safe haven for sustainable
development from which all partner nations could benefit. There is no conspiracy theory to
account for in terms of U.S. regional domination. Their policy has been stated rather clearly
in the National Security Strategy from 1991 where a free market economy was preferred to
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
81
controlled prices, as well as a free flow of resources which proved to be a better alternative
to the development of the nations. The U.S. vision maintains that mutual benefits should be
achieved through diplomacy and fruitful economic relations. Also, if their involvement is
needed, they will intervene in order to assist the governments which chose democratic
regime change, because it is the only viable and prevailing political structure that proved to
move the world towards progress (The White House, 1991).
There is no doubt the terrorist threat was the leading cause for the U.S. intervention
in Afghanistan in 2001. Taking into consideration the second tier of analysis, the evidence
implies that the regional setting and ultimately the world cannot benefit from the free flow
of resources when terrorism flourishes in a key Central Asian country with the possibility for
spill-over growing bigger every day. In one of the multiple Congress Hearings, the rationale
for intervention in Afghanistan is explicitly determined as a response “to the brutal
September 11 attacks on our territory, our citizens, and our way of life, and to the
continuing threat of terrorist acts against the United States and our friends and allies” (U.S.
Government Printing Office, 2000). Nevertheless, there are factual geostrategic aspects
which enlarge the spectrum of causality and show that Afghanistan was sharing increasing
oil resources with its northern neighbouring nations – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan (Katzman, 2014: 67-68). Second, the historical Silk Road from China was now
hindered by the havoc in Afghanistan. Therefore, the basic trade routes were now
redirected, incurring higher costs, and a reduction of benefits (Katzman, 2014: 67-68). Third,
the terrorist threat can be interpreted in multiple ways, and not only as a national security
risk. In this respect, it was clear that terrorism by itself was just one of the factors
threatening the regional stability and economic interdependence, due to the fact that it
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
82
became the centre for regional instability. In essence, Afghanistan was considered a
“gateway nation…for people, commerce and cultural exchange between different parts of
Asia and the world” (Senate Hearing, 2000).
Ultimately, there is a substantial amount of evidence stemming from primary source
documents which are implicit for economic interdependence as a cause for military
intervention in failed states. The findings explore a positive direction of the world’s
development. In other words, it is perceived that cooperation is impossible to be achieved,
much less through diplomatic means, when failed states such as Afghanistan and Somalia
are consistently moving farther away from economic, political and social prosperity and they
bring their geographical regions down with them.
The second hypothesis is leaning towards the issue of vulnerability. The modern
interdependence theory suggests that a state becomes not only sensitive to a drastic change
in another state, but also vulnerable since it decides to take a course of action due to that
occurring change. Therefore the second hypothesis proposes the following:
H2. The longer is State B left into chaos, the greater will State A’s vulnerability be and
thus, it will trigger military intervention as a direct reaction to State’s B failure.
The National Security Strategy of 1991 clearly delineates the decision of the U.S. to
be the much needed leader of the world. It is acknowledged the collapse of the communist
regime and thus, the emergence of a new world where the U.S. leadership is
“indispensable” and it cannot develop “without U.S. involvement” (The White House, 1991:
V). Taking into account the results of the first hypothesis, the evidence portrays U.S.’s
vulnerability as being extremely high only in one of the cases. There is no evidence that the
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
83
state failure in Somalia was affecting the relations of interdependence of the U.S. on such a
great scale that it needed intervention. The only understanding of this case is if one looks at
the overall image of the possibility of regional spill over. That adds to another level of
explanation where the U.S. vulnerability in economic and geostrategic terms would have
increased if one puts into balance the possibility of losing allies such as Tanzania, Saudi
Arabia or Oman.
Developments in Afghanistan and the terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001,
have been the solid proof for the U.S. vulnerability. The country has been hosting terrorist
organizations and internally, it proved to be havoc, and a failed society. The terrorist attacks
were the main aspect that the vulnerability of the U.S. was at a high point. The effects of a
failed state such as Afghanistan had deep repercussions on the greatest nation in the world.
Undoubtedly, the response was quick and represented by a military intervention. This key
moment can be considered as having a very high level of vulnerability, as it shows the
ambiguity of the international system. The borders became more porous, the technologies
are more advanced and more prone to building bio-chemical weapons, the terrorist attacks
left the strongest military in the world speechless, and the global economic infrastructure
has been very vulnerable since the turn of the century (Committee on Government Reform,
2001).
In sum, the U.S. vulnerability has been assessed at an increasing rate since 1991. The
alliance strategy had to be changed as the world has been changing. Military interventions
are made in a “time of uncertain alliances” where energy resources are still valuable,
borders are changing and national securities are at risk. In this case, it depends on the failed
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
84
state, its geostrategic location and the regional U.S. interests, that this level of vulnerability
is calculated. In cases such as Somalia, the level of vulnerability was not as high as to
become a determinant in the decision for military intervention. In cases such as Afghanistan,
the level of vulnerability was directly perceived through an attack to the homeland security.
Therefore, this hypothesis cannot be completely disconfirmed as it has to be taken on a case
by case basis. Its generality, however, is evident for the vulnerability degree perceived by
the U.S. It is a relevant measurement founded on aspects which are contemporary to
strategic changes in the world system and its adjustment has many variables which are not
to be discussed here as they are beyond the scope of this thesis. Overall, the U.S. has
registered a palpable level of vulnerability with respect to the world’s developments and
failed states are definitely on the agenda for issues to tackle.
B. Limitations
The limitations found in this study are based on several aspects. First, there were
only two cases approached for the analysis. In order to strengthen the validity of the
assumption, there must be considered a broader spectrum of failed states. Second, the data
used for the state failure observations have been very limited and prevailed in their
qualitative nature. There is the need for further research where accurate empirical data
would solidify the validity of the assumptions. Finally, the theoretical concepts covered by
the analysis are deeply debated in the literature. Hence, it is very difficult to find a well-
established theoretical backbone of what constitutes a failed state or how legal and moral
are in fact interventions.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
85
C. Concluding Remarks
The research question of this thesis has proposed to explore the causes of the U.S.-
led military intervention in failed states after the Cold War. The hypothetical proposal of this
analysis was based on finding evidence on whether the modern interdependence theory can
be a cause for interventions in failed states in the background of a more in-depth level of
observance.
The cases proposed for analysis were Somalia and Afghanistan. The results were
supported by primary source documents declassified and pertaining to the U.S. government.
The findings of this research thesis have shown that economic interdependence is an
indirect cause for military intervention in failed states for one strategic reason: regional
stability. There has been no evidence that Somalia or Afghanistan might have played a
crucial role in the national interests of U.S. foreign policy prior to the moment of the military
deployment, if they are singled out and considered separate entities from the overarching
explanation.
The difference between the two cases stays in the intervention moment. Somalia
qualified as a humanitarian disaster and the U.S. was the only country capable of assisting
the UN in combating the drought. Afghanistan qualified as the highest threat when the U.S.
were attacked by Al Qaeda in 2001. It was the key moment when there was a global
acknowledgement that time and space have been compressed and the concept of security
became vulnerable for all countries in the world.
Turning to the pressing issue of regional stability, the evidence presented a confident
degree of reliability when it comes to the strategic positions of the case studies analyzed in
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
86
the previous chapters. U.S. alliances in the Horn of Africa and Central Asia proved to be
important enough in order to fulfil the assumption for a causal mechanism between the two
proposed variables. The evidence presented in the previous sections shows how the U.S.
interest in regional stability – including the ones which pertained to the case studies – has
stemmed from a foreign policy based on American leading and advocating for free markets
and democratic values, otherwise unachievable without cooperation and an acceptance of
the benefits of economic interdependence.
The measurement of vulnerability proposed in the second hypothesis has not been
fully confirmed. The U.S. did not perceive the level of vulnerability as increasing in both
cases. One explanation would stay in the fact that the U.S. power is not constantly and
directly affected by all unstable states that exist today in the world. The U.S. does not afford
nor has the interest of deploying military forces wherever there is a sign of instability, due to
the fact that they do not feel vulnerable enough in order to take such measures and they
advocate for internal problem-solving. Therefore, the testing of the second hypothesis was
not confirmed for all the cases proposed in this research thesis.
Concluding, all data used in the analysis of this research thesis is replicable. The
findings are valuable and contribute to the literature dedicated to the research on the
concept of interventions. However, further analysis is required in order to discover whether
economic interdependence is a causal variable for intervention depending on the case in
question and whether it can become a generalized, implicit or even explicit assumption.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
87
References Books
Burchill, S. and A. Linklater (eds) (2013) Theories of International Relations, 5th ed (China:
Palgrave Macmillan).
Cassese, A. (2005) International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Evans, G. and Newnham, J. (1998). Dictionary Of International Relations (England: Penguin
Books).
Gerth, H.H. and C. Wright Mills (eds). (1946) Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pp. 77-128
(New York : Oxford University Press).
Graber, A. D. (1978) Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. (United States of America:
Charles Scribner’s Sons).
Ignatieff, M. (2002). ‘Intervention And State Failure’. In Mills, N. and Brunner, K. (eds) The
New Killing Fields – Massacre And The Politics Of Intervention (United States of America:
Basic Books), pp. 229-244.
Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S. (2001). Power And Interdependence, 3rd edn. (United States:
Longman).
Machiavelli, N. (1999) The Prince (England: Penguin Books).
Nye, S. J. Jr. (1991). Bound To Lead – The Changing Nature of American Power (United States
Of America: Basic Books).
Rotberg, R. (2003) ‘Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators’ In R.
Rotberg (ed.) State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press), pp. 1-25.
Snow, D. (2004). National Security For A New Era – Globalization And Geopolitics (United
States: Pearson Longman).
Viotti, P. R. (2010) American Foreign Policy. (Cambridge, UK: Polity).
Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press).
Wohlforth, W. C. (2012). ‘Realism And Foreign Policy’. In Smith, S., Hadfield, A., and Dunne,
T. (2nd ed.) Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 35-
53.
Journal Articles
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
88
Ahmed, I.I. and Green, R. H. (1999) ‘The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and
Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction’. Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 137-127. Available at http://www.somali-
jna.org/downloads/Heritage%20of%20war%20%26%20state%20collapse.pdf
Barbieri, K. (1996). ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path To Peace Or A Source Of Interstate
Conflict’. Journal Of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 29-49.
Clarke, W.S. (1992) ‘Somalia – Background Information for Operation Restore Hope 1992-
93’. Strategic Studies Instituted – U.S. Army War College. Special Report, February 2.
Fordham, B. O. (2008). ‘Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and
American Intervention’. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, pp. 737-758.
Gartzke, E., Li, Q., and Boehmer, C. (2001). ‘ Investing In Peace: Economic Interdependence
And International Conflict’. International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 391-438.
Helman, G.B. & Steven R. Ratner. (1993) ‘Saving Failed States’ Foreign Policy.
Huth, P. K. (1998). ‘Major Power Intervention In International Crises, 1918-1988’. The
Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol.6, No. 4, pp. 744-770.
John, J.D. (2010) ‘The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review
of the Literature and Agenda for Research with Specific Reference to Sub-Saharan Africa’
European Journal of Development Research, Vol 22(1), pp. 10-30.
Kaplan, R. D. (1994) ‘The Coming Anarchy’ Atlantic Monthly, pp. 44-77.
Krasner, S. D. (2004) ‘Sharing Sovereignty New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States’
International Security Vol 29(2); pp. 85-120.
Krasner, S.D., and Pascual, C. (2005) ‘The Danger Of Failed States’. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84,
No.4.
LaFeber, W. (2009) ‘The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine’. Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 124, No. 1, pp. 71-93.
Laub, Z. (2014) ‘The Taliban in Afghanistan’. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551?cid=rss-asia-
the_taliban_in_afghanistan-100611
McMillan, S. M. (1997). ‘Interdependence And Conflict’. Mershon International Studies
Review, Vol.41, No. 1, pp. 33-58.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
89
Mubarak, J. A. (1997) ‘The “Hidden Hand” Behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of
Somalia’. World Development, Vol. 25, No. 12, pp. 2027-2041.
Newman, E. (2009) ‘Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian
World’ Contemporary Security Policy Vol 30(3); pp. 421-443.
Oberdorfer, D. (1992) ‘The Path to Intervention, A Massive Tragedy “We Could Do
Something About”’. The Washington Post.
Patrick, S. (2007) ‘“Failed” States And Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy
Dilemmas’ International Studies Review Vol 9, pp. 644-662.
Powell, C. (1992) ‘U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead’. Foreign Affairs. Available at http://www.cfr.org/world/us-forces-challenges-ahead/p7508
Rashid, A. (1999) ‘The Taliban: Exporting Extremism’. Foreign Affairs. Available at
http://lege.net/blog.lege.net/ratical.org/CAH/Rashid99.pdf
Rosenau, J.N. (1969) ‘Intervention As A Scientific Concept’. The Journal Of Conflict
Resolution, Vol.13, No. 2, pp. 149-171.
Rotberg, I.R. (2002) ‘Failed States in A world Of Terror’ Foreign Affairs, Vol 81(4), pp. 127-
140.
Samatar, A.I. (1992) ‘Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal
Convention’. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 625-641.
Yoon, M. Y. (1997). ‘Explaining U.S. Intervention In Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989’.
Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 580-602.
Papers
Coyne, C. J. and Leeson, P.T. (2010) ‘Somalia: Understanding the Feasible Institutions’.
Department of Economics West Virginia University. Available at
http://www.ccoyne.com/Somalia.pdf
ICISS. (2001) ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ Report of the International Commission On
Intervention and State Sovereignty. Available at
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf
Haulman, D.L. (2004) ‘A Country Too Far: U.S. Military Operations in Somalia, 1992-1994’.
Air Force Historical Research Agency, pp. 1-10.
Katzman, K. (2014). ‘Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy’.
Congressional Research Report Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress.
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
90
Katzman, K. (2014) ‘Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance’.
Congressional Research Service Report Prepared for Members And Committees Of
Congress, pp. 1-59. Available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf
Le Sage, A. (2005) ‘Stateless Justice in Somalia. Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives’.
Report of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, pp. 1-59. Available at
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30862/1/Stateless Justice in
Somalia.pdf?1
Ploch, L. (2011) ‘Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in
Africa’. Congressional Research Service for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees
of Congress.
Rasbridge, L.A. ‘Somali Culture and Health/Disability Perceptions’. Available at
http://www.vtmh.org.au/docs/communityprofiles/somali%20health%20disability%20perce
ptions%20-%20nw%20mrc.pdf
Official Documents
Committee On International Relations (2001) ‘Hearing Before the Committee On
International Relations House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress – First
Session’. November 2001, Serial No. 107-62. Available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa75926.000/hfa75926_0.htm
Committee on Government Reform. (2001) ‘Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National
Strategy’. Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Strategy Veterans Affairs and
International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives,
One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, March 27 (2001), Serial no. 107-18. Available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg75970/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg75970.pdf
Committee on International Relations House of Representatives. (2006) ‘Somalia: Expanding
Crisis in the Horn of Africa’. Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human
Rights and International Operations and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and
Nonproliferation – One Hundred Ninth Congress June 29, Serial No. 109-201. Available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa28429.000/hfa28429_0f.htm
The White House. (1991) National Security Strategy of the United States.
The White House. (1998) A National Security Strategy for A New Century.
Senate Hearing. (2000) ‘The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation’. Hearing Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate – One Hundred Sixth Congress,
Second Session June, 2000. Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
106shrg68769/html/CHRG-106shrg68769.htm
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
91
UK Border Agency. (2011) ‘Somalia – Country of Origin Information Report’. Country of
Information Service, pp. i-247. Available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/country/uk_cntry_assess/2011/somalia-0511.pdfUnited
Nations Security Council. (1992) ‘Resolution 751’. Adopted Unanimously at the 3069th
meeting.
United Nations. (2014) Charter of The United Nations
US Department of State. (1992) ‘From Cold War to Democratic Peace’. Address Before the
World Affairs Council of Boston, Massachussets, Vol. 3, No. 26, June 29. Available at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1992/html/Dispatchv3no26.html
U.S. Government Printing Office. (2000) ‘Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting His Periodic Report on the National Emergency with respect to the Taliban in
Afghanistan’. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, House Document 106-268. Available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-106hdoc268/html/CDOC-106hdoc268.htm
Statistical Data
___. (2012). ‘Ethnic Wars Dataset’. Political Instability Task Force. Available at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm
___. (2013) ‘State Failure Problem Set’. Political Instability Task Force. Available at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm
The Failed States Index. (2005-2007) Rankings. Available at
http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable
Worldwide Governance Indicators. (2013) ‘Country Data Report for Somalia, 1996-2012’.
World Bank Institute. Available at
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Worldwide Governance Indicators. (2013) ‘Country Data Report for Afghanistan, 1996-
2012)’. World Bank Institute. Available at
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
World Development Indicators. (2014) ‘Afghanistan – GDP (Current US Dollars)’. The World
Bank. Available at
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Afghanistan+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_C
ode%3aNY.GDP.MKTP.CD%3bCountry_Code%3aAFG
World Development Indicators. (2014) ‘Afghanistan – Foreign Direct Investment, Net
Inflows’. The World Bank. Available at
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
92
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Afghanistan+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_C
ode%3aBX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD%3bCountry_Code%3aAFG
World Development Indicators. (2014) ‘Somalia. GDP – Current U.S. Dollars’. The World
Bank. Available at
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Somalia+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code
%3aNY.GDP.MKTP.CD%3bCountry_Code%3aSOM
World Development Indicators. (2014) ‘Somalia – Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows’.
The World Bank. Available at
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Somalia+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code
%3aBX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD%3bCountry_Code%3aSOM
Websites
___. ‘Afghanistan National Development Strategy – History’. Ministry Of Foreign Affairs,
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Available at
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/somalia/9029.htm
___. ‘Somalia – Education’. Library of Congress Country Studies. Available at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0063)
___. ‘Somalia – From Scientific Socialism to “IMF-ism”, 1981-90’. Library of Congress Country
Studies. Available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0073)
___. ‘Somalia – Health’. Library of Congress Country Studies. Available at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0064)
___. (1992) ‘Somalia – Natural Resources and Economic Infrastructure’. Library of Congress
Country Studies. Available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0074)
___. (1997) ‘Afghanistan – Health’. Library of Congress Country Studies. Available at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0077)
___.(1997) ‘Afghanistan – Mujahidin Victory: The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’. Library of
Congress Country Studies. Available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0119)
___. (1997) ‘Afghanistan – Education’. Library of Congress Country Studies. Available at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0069)
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
93
___. (1997) ‘Afghanistan – The Fall of Kabul, April 1992’. Library of Congress Country Studies.
Available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0120)
___. (1998) ‘Somalia – Profile’. U.S. Department Of State. Available at
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/somalia/9029.htm
___. (2001) ‘Afghanistan – Profile’. U.S. Department of State. Available at
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/afghanistan/10958.htm
___.(2006) ‘The United States Army in Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom, October
2001-March 2002’. U.S. Army Center of Military History. Available at
http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation Enduring Freedom.htm#p3
___. (2014). ‘Afghanistan – Adult Literacy Rate’. United Nations Statistics Division. Available
at http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inID%3A49
___.(2014). ‘Proportion of the Population Using Improved Sanitation Facilities’. Millenium
Development Goals Database – United Nations Statistics Division. Available at
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Somalia+datamart%5bMDG%5d&d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%
3a668%3bcountryID%3a706
___. (2014) ‘Somalia – Proportion of the Population Using Improved Sanitation Facilities’.
Millenium Development Goals Database – United Nations Statistics Division. Available at
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=Somalia+datamart%5bMDG%5d&d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%
3a668%3bcountryID%3a706
BBC. (2013) Somalia Profile – Timeline. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-14094632
Central Intelligence Agency. (2011) Afghanistan – The World Factbook. Available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html
Central Intelligence Agency. (2012) The World Factbook-Somalia. Available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html
UNESCO. (2000) ‘Adult Literacy’. World Education Forum - The EFA 2000 Assessment:
Country Reports – Somalia. Available at
http://www.unesco.org/education/wef/countryreports/somalia/rapport_2_4.htm
Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro
94