dr. moch nur ichwan - megawati and radical islamism
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Megawati and Radical Islamism
Moch Nur Ichwan
(IIAS, Leiden/IAIN Sunan Kalijaga)
Paper written for the Third International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS-3)Raffles City Convention Centre, Swisstel, The StamfordSingapore, 19 - 22 August 2003
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Megawati and Radical Islamism
Moch Nur Ichwan
Their numbers are few, but they could become
a pebble in the shoe of the government.
--Megawati Soekarnoputri
The horrific terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001
have changed the world order. According to George W. Bush, the world was then
divided in two: with us/US or against us/US. The United States waged the global
war against terrorism. Megawati Soekarnoputri was the first leader of a Muslim
country to visit the United States after the attacks and expressed the support of
Indonesia in the US-led war against terrorism. She said that Indonesia strongly
condemns terrorism in all of its forms and manifestations and that Indonesia is
ready to cooperate with the US and other civilized countries on counter-terrorism
and pledged to cooperate with the international community in combating
terrorism.1
This paper analyzes Indonesian state discourses on radical Islamism under
Megawati Soekarnoputris administration, and their impact on Islamist political
discourse in post-New Order Indonesia.
Weak State, Radical Islamism and New Public Sphere
The state oppressive discourse of Islamism in the 1980s was followed by a moretolerant discourse in the 1990s, especially since the establishment of ICMI in 1990.
Soehartos cabinet became the so- called green cabinet (kabinet hijau royo-royo),
and the parliament green Peoples House of Representative (DPR hijau royo-royo).
Hijau royo-royo in this context means fully Islamized. This is due to the fact that
1The statements were made by President Megawati Soekarnoputri in her address at the gala dinner
in Washington DC, held by the United States-Indonesia Society, 19 September 2001. The JakartaPost, 21 September 2001.
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most of the ministries and members of the parliament were ICMI members. A
number of governmental lite later joined ICMI either in national or local level.
Mosques or mushallas were established in almost each governmental office. MoreIslamized activities were done. During the Ramadan month, for instance, some
ministries and local governmental official conducted the so-called safari
Ramadan; and both Ministry of Education and Ministry Religious Affairs obliged
the state public and Islamic schools to organize pesantren kilat Ramadan. The
political Hajj to Mecca became a new phenomenon among the government elite,
especially after Soehartos hajj in 1991. Olivier Roy called this phenomenon
conservative Islamization.2
The impact of this policy was tremendous. Unlike in the pre-1990s era, the
government did not police and control the Islamic teaching circles (halaqahs)
established in almost all secular universities. These circles were established by
and for students by inviting Islamic preachers. The circles were a-political and
aimed at satisfying the students religious hunger due to their lack of religious
Islamic knowledge gained in previous education. Religious preachers with Middle
Eastern background were commonly preferred to those ofpesantren, IAIN (State
Institute of Islamic Studies) or Western background. This was related to their
search for authenticity: Middle Eastern Islam was regarded more authentic than
other kinds of Islam. They regarded that pesantrens do not teach an authentic
Islam because they tolerate and even accommodate local culture. Moreover, for
them, IAINs taught only Islam as object of study and not Islam as a comprehensive
way of life. They regarded the scholars of the IAIN background as having been
secularized, like those who were educated in the West. For this reason, a number
of scholars of Middle Eastern background were successful in attracting students
religious curiosity. These later converted to become Islamist circles.
The late New Order policy that tolerated Islamist circles to grow resulted in theestablishment of Islamist parties and movements in the Reformation order. In the
beginnings these halaqahs were a-political and established independently. Yet,
when both local and national politics disturbed their interests, they moved to be
political and established networks among other local halaqahs. The issue of
religion was easily played by some politicians to mobilise them against their
2Olivier Roy, Changing Patterns among Radical Islamic Movements, Brown Journal of World
Affairs, Vol. VI, Issue 1, 1999.
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opponents. During the Habibie era, for instance, they were organised for
pragmatic political interest to defend his position in power. Habibie was
represented as a Muslim leader (pemimpin Islam) that ruled and struggled for thesake of Islam. These organisations, containing networks of halaqahs, later
organised themselves as Islamist movements, such as Laskar Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir,
Majelis Mujahidin, and empowered the existing Islamist political party, such as
PPP, or established their own political parties, such as PBB and Partai Keadilan
(Justice Party). All of these Islamist parties and movements later tried to dominate
the discourse of Islam by attempting to dominate public sphere and mass media.
They brought again the issue of Islam as the state basis into the political discourse.
In his analysis of Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Soeharto Indonesia,
Martin van Bruinessen commented on the state position on radical Islamic
opposition in Indonesia under four regimes. It is, in this connection, worth
quoting him at length:
It has been observed by several scholars that governments of Muslim countries (and
perhaps especially the secular governments among them) have often, in order to
pre-empt radical Islamic opposition movements, taken policy measures that have
served to Islamize the economy, legislation and culture. One might think ofSoehartos courting the Islamists as another example in a series of similar
accommodations, were it not that Soeharto did not have to fear a strong Islamic
opposition movement but rather released such a movement and managed to keep it
as his apologists and defenders. Of the post-Soeharto governments, Habibies
depended even more on the support of the Islamists than Soeharto did, and it was
under him that radical Muslims were given arms and were employed as paramilitary
auxiliaries of the police and army. Abdurrahman Wahid had to face these violent
radical groups and attempted to bridle them but failed because of his weak control
over the armed forces. There was little doubt that the armed groups were sponsored
and given free rein by Wahids military and civilian opponents. President Megawatihas even less legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim radicals, not only because she is a
woman but also because her party is perceived to be dominated by anti-Muslim
elements. This has given the conservative Muslim elements in her coalition
(represented by vice-president Hamzah Haz) extra leverage, that may result in some
Islamizing measures. It has also made her dependent on, if not hostage to, the
military. The arrest of Ja`far Umar Thalib in May 2002 and the absence of serious
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protests against it suggest that it may well be possible to contain the radical groups
but at the cost of the militarys return to power.3
The national crisis that began in 1997 led to the removal from power of the
authoritarian Soeharto regime in 1998. But the crisis did not end with the
successive regimes of B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and even Megawati
Soekarnoputri. As far as the state and Islam are concerned, both the post-
authoritarian transitional politics and the long economic crisis had engendered
two interrelated developments: first, the weakening of the state and the
problematization of almost all statist things; second, the availability of Islam as
alternative ideology, especially for Islamist Muslims.
Soon after the collapse of Soeharto regime, Pancasila had been problematized
mostly by certain Islamic organizations and groups. Most of the nationalists are
the loyal supporters of Pancasila ideology. The Habibie era witnessed the
abandoning of the law no. 8 of 1985 concerning theAsas Tunggal, Pancasila as the
sole basis of political and mass organisations. Pancasila remain the ideology of the
state, but there no longer obligation of political and mass organisations to adopt it
as their official ideology. Many Muslim political parties and mass organisations
mentioned Islam as the official ideology, some mentioned both Pancasila and
Islam.4
The re-emergence of Islamist politics in Indonesian political sphere led to the
demystification of Pancasila as Asas Tunggal and the re-emergence of the long
suspended discussion of Islamic shariah and the Jakarta Charter. They proposed
Islam as state ideology, as in the 1940s and 1950s, and Islamic shariah as state law.
They have two main arguments: first, the majority of Indonesian population are
Muslims; second, Pancasila ideology, as human-made ideology, is proven
incapable of rescuing people from the multi-dimensionaleconomic, political andmoralcrises facing Indonesia. Two other important issues in this context were
3Martin van Bruinessen, Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Soeharto Indonesia, 2002, http.
www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/
4See Martin van Bruinessen, Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islam relations in
Indonesia, in: Ingrid Wessel (ed.), Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1996, pp. 19-34, and Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam. Muslims and democratization inIndonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
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the attempt to amend Article 29 on Religion of the 1945 Constitution and the
implementation of Shari`a Courts (Mahkamah Syar`iyah) in Aceh. Some Islamic
parties proposed to amend the Article on Religion by inserting the seven words ofthe Jakarta Charter: dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi para
pemeluknya (with the obligation for adherents of the faith to carry out Islamic
shariah). The proposal was challenged not only by nationalist and Christian
parties but also by some other Muslim-based parties. The amendment of the
Article on Religion failed.5 The implementation of Shariah Courts (Mahkamah
Syar`iyah) in Aceh was based on Presidential Decision no. 11 of 2003, issued on 3
March 2003. The central Indonesian government gave Aceh broad autonomy
allowing it, among other things, to implement partial shariah law and have its
own shariah police and educational system. But these developments, howeverinteresting, are the subject for a quite separate paper.
Radical Islamic Groups: Local and Transnational
There are radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, such as the Islamic Defender Front
(FPI), Laskar Jihad,6 Hizbut Tahrir and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).7 The
other radical movement, which is known by Indonesian Muslims through
international media and intelligence reports, is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) a group
that is alleged to have connections with al-Qaeda.8 The ignorance of IndonesianMuslims regarding this radical movement (i.e., JI) is due to the fact that they had
never seen it in public life. For this reason too, Din Syamsuddin, the secretary of
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) and the leader of Muhammadiyah, rejected the
existence of this movement. However, gradually they began especially after the
Bali blast to believe that this movement really does exist. Unlike FPI, Laskar
Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir and MMI that are basically local organizations, JI is
transnational and concerned with the international problems. However, by
5 See Moch. Nur Ichwan, The Seven Word Controversy, IIAS Newsletter#30, March 2003.
6On Laskar Jihad, see Hasan, Noorhaidi, Faith and politics: the rise of the Laskar Jihad in the era
of transition in Indonesia, Indonesia 73 (2002), 145-169.
7On various radical Islamic movements, see: International Crisis Group, Indonesia: violence and
radical Muslims. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2001; in the context of Jakarta, see: Chaider S.Bamualim et al., Radikalisme agama dan perubahan sosial di DKI Jakarta [Religious radicalism andsocial change in the Special Region of Jakarta], research report, PBB IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah &Bappeda Pemda DKI Jakarta, 1999/2000.8 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, New Delhi, 2002, p. 198; Sidney Jones (e.g., 2002).
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contrast, the former are concerned with local problems and opposed to the
Indonesian secular government.
Terrorist Attacks: September 11, Bali Blast and JW Marriott
Following the September 11th tragedy, Megawati was soon behind the United
States war against terrorism. Cooperation between the US and Indonesia was then
established within the framework of a joint counter-terrorism program.9 This effort
was received positively by most Indonesians, with the limited exception of those in
certain Islamist circles, which are actually quite small in number when compared
with the total number of Indonesian Muslims. However, the internal political
situation was complicated. For instance, several radical Islamic opposition groupscriticized her position; and it seems that, as a result of these domestic political
developments, Megawati then softened her support for the United States war
against terrorism at least publicly.
The Bali Blast of 12 October 2002 convinced Megawati that terrorism perpetrated
in the name of Islam existed in Indonesia. Soon after the bombing, most
international media especially CNN pictured Abu Bakar Baasyir and the
organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which is allegedly connected with Al Qaedaand Osama bin Laden, as the primary suspects in connection with the bombing. By
way of contrast, the Indonesian police and intelligence services were hesitant to
present such a judgment. Indonesia did not have an adequate legal framework for
dealing with terrorism. Since the abandonment of the Anti-Subversion Law in the
era ofReformasi, Indonesia had no law or regulation allowing the police to arrest
people based solely on information from intelligence reports. Moreover, it was a
common belief in Indonesia even until quite recently that most intelligence
reports are unreliable.
It was after the Bali Blast that Megawati issued Governmental Regulation in Lieu
of Law no 1 of 2002 on War against Terrorist Crimes and the Presidential
9The United States and Indonesia are committed to assisting each other in this fight against
terrorism by undertaking a long-term security and counter-terrorism program valued at a little over$50 million. Of this amount, about $47 million would be spent to upgrade police capability andabout $4 million on military training. http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/press_rel/factsheet_jkt.html.
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Instruction no 4 of 2002 that instructs the Coordinating State Minister of Politics
and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to take the necessary steps to
implement that Regulation. The latter was given the responsibility to formulatecomprehensive and integrated policies to annihilate terrorism and control the
implementation of these policies. The government then issued the Law no. 15 and
16 of 2003 on Anti-Terrorism in April 2003. However, the formulation of this Law
was problematic for a number of reasons: first, some Muslim groups rejected the
US bias of this law, which could be manipulated to annihilate the Islamic
opposition groups; second, some others, including some Human Rights
organizations, associated its content with the New Order Anti-Subversive Law. 10
Eventually the main suspects associated with the Bali Blast Amrozi and Imam
Samudra were sentenced to death by the courts. The question of Baasyirsinvolvement in the blast was not yet settled. However, the latter was brought to
court in connection with other charges in connection with alleged plotting of a
coup, illegal immigration and the church bombings of 2000.
The JW Marriott hotel was attacked by terrorists on 5 August 2003. 11 Most
international media associated it with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al-Qaeda.
However, Megawatis government was very careful in responding this terrorist
attack by not giving comment on the possible suspects. The Indonesian Chief of
Police, Dai Bachtiar, merely indicated that the modus operandi of the bombing
was similar to that of Bali Blast. Moreover, the Coordinating State Minister of
Politics and security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, warned the public not to
blame any particular group including JI before the investigation was complete.12
The Minister of Defense, Matori Abdul Djalil, suggested issuing the Internal
Security Act (ISA), like that in Singapore and Malaysia. But this suggestion was
rejected by most human rights organizations and activists. The latter argued that
10Imparsial (The Indonesian Human Right Watch), for instance, demanded the amendment of this
Anti- Terrorism Law because it contains articles that can easily be manipulated to serve theregimes political interests. Kompas, 5 July 2003.
11Suspicions of foul play were in part supported by reports circulated primarily on the Internet
of events that were said to have occurred prior to the Marriott blast including, for instance, that: 1)The US Embassy cancelled the booking of 10-20 rooms in that hotel. The cancellation was date-marked on 8.00 West Indonesian Time, Tuesday, or only 4.5 hours before the explosion; 2) Jakartapolice seized documents in July 2003 showing terrorists were planning an attack in the area aroundthe Marriott Hotel; 3) Hotel bosses said staff and guests had been evacuated before the blast. See ,e.g., http://www.freedomfiles.org/war/jakarta.htm. It may be noted that similar reports circulatedin the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001.12
Kompas, 13 August 2003.
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ISA could be misused and abused by the government to suppress its opponents,
including human rights activists.13
Reflections
Why has Megawatis government seemed so slow in responding terrorism? First,
since the Soeharto era, Indonesia has witnessed a number of such terrorist
attacks, done both by Soehartos opposition groups and by alleged intelligence
operations, including that during and soon after Soeharto resignation in May 1998.
During the Soeharto era, most of the attacks were not traceable, and only innocent
suspects were brought to court. Second, the Indonesian police and intelligence
services are weak (and this has been the case even until recently), so that they arenot capable of overcoming terrorism. Third, Megawati was aware of the possible
politicization of the terrorist issues by some of her opposition groups, especially
from certain Islamic parties and groups. There are other factors that might also
have influenced Megawatis position. First, some radical Islamic groups are very
sensitive when it comes to the issue of terrorism which has long been associated
with Islam so that the war against terrorism is perceived as a war against Islam.
Second, the interference of foreign states, including the USA and Australia,
triggered criticisms among both the people and politicians of Megawatis
dependency on those states. They suspected that this interference could not beseparated from their political and economic interests in this country.
Unlike the previous governments (Habibies and Abdurrahmans), the closeness of
Megawatis government with military forces and the police have given it more
power in fighting terrorism. In fact, the latter had good experience in facing radical
Islamism during the Soeharto era. They have good relationships with nationalists
rather than with Islamic groups (including liberal Islamic groups). That is why,
during his presidency, Abdurrahmans order to fight against radicalism was notheard by the military and police elite. In the beginning of the Megawati era,
radicalism was actually given more room to articulate its ideological discourse and
activities.
13Kedaulatan Rakyat, 14 August 2003.
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The question faced by Megawati and indeed by other governments is whether
radicalism should be fought even it does not bring about any terror. Soeharto,
especially before the 1990s, answered positively. But Megawati as well as Habibieand Abdurrahman responded negatively, because not all radical movements or
organizations lead to violence and terror. Some Islamic radical movements even
condemned terrorism, including the attacks of September 11th, the Bali Blast and
the JW Marriott terrorist attacks. They would be crushed only if they provoke
others to commit violence and terror, or they do so themselves. Will Megawati
adopt Soehartos approach in the war against terrorism? We shall have to wait and
see.
To conclude, the move toward radicalization within Islam should be challenged by
Muslims themselves, as any effort from external forces would be seen and easily
manipulated as an effort against Islam. Moderate and liberal Muslims should
articulate and be given wider room in articulating their ideas, even if they are
often condemned by the radical groups as being agents of the West. Any terrorist
act is an attack on humanity that is strongly condemned by the Quran as fasad
(disordered deeds) and as an act against Islam itself. Like others, Muslims should
also participate actively in this war against terrorism. Nonetheless, in this radical-
Islam centered analysis of terrorism, we should not blind ourselves to the
possibility of other more hazardous terrorisms.
Yogyakarta, 18 August 2003
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Bibliography
Articles and Books
Bamualim, Chaider S. et al., Radikalisme agama dan perubahan sosial di DKIJakarta [Religious radicalism and social change in the Special Region of Jakarta],Jakarta: PBB IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah & Bappeda Pemda DKI Jakarta,1999/2000.
Bruinessen, Martin van, Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-SoehartoIndonesia, http: www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/;2002.
Bruinessen, Martin van, Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islamrelations in Indonesia, in: Ingrid Wessel (ed.), Indonesien am Ende des 20.
Jahrhunderts. Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1996, pp. 19-34.
Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al Qaeda, New Delhi, 2002, p. 198; Sidney Jones (e.g.,2002).
Hasan, Noorhaidi, Faith and politics: the rise of the Laskar Jihad in the era oftransition in Indonesia, Indonesia 73 (2002), pp. 145-169.
Hefner, Robert W., Civil Islam. Muslims and democratization in Indonesia.Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Ichwan, Moch. Nur, The Seven Word Controversy, IIAS Newsletter 30 (March2003).
International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, Brussels:International Crisis Group, 2001
Roy, Olivier, Changing Patterns among Radical Islamic Movements, BrownJournal of World Affairs 6: 1 (1999).
Newspapers and Internets
The Jakarta Post
Kompas
Kedaulatan Rakyat
http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/press_rel/factsheet_jkt.html.
http://www.freedomfiles.org/war/jakarta.htm.