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Outdoor recreation research: Different approaches, different values?
JØRUND AASETRE & VEGARD GUNDERSEN
J. Aasetre & V. Gundersen. 2012. Outdoor recreation research: Different approaches, different values? Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift�Norwegian Journal of Geography Vol. 66, 193�203. ISSN 0029-1951.
Different approaches to outdoor recreation research influence how recreational values are articulated. The article presents a
theoretical comparison between two recreation research traditions that have been influential in both Norwegian outdoor recreation
research and American wilderness research and management. The authors compare how both research traditions fit two predefined
valuation models, with one model oriented towards economists’ perception of values and the other oriented towards humanistic
philosophy. They contend that the two research traditions are connected in their conceptual construct of values. Studies labelled
‘motivational recreation research’ fit with an economic-oriented value model, whereas ‘place-oriented recreation research’ puts
greater emphasis on non-utilitarian values compatible with a constitutive value model. Consideration of the kind of values that a
given research tradition promotes is very important for research outputs and management practice.
Keywords: recreation research, values, value taxonomies
Jørund Aasetre, Department of Geography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway.
E-mail: [email protected]; Vegard Gundersen, Norwegian Institute for Nature Research, Fakkelgarden, NO-2624
Lillehammer, Norway, E-mail: [email protected]
Introduction
In Norway, c.90% of the population participates in outdoor
recreation at least once a year, a participation rate that has
been relatively stable over recent decades. Each recreationist
makes an average of 96 day trips during the course of a year
(Odden 2008, 62). This level of activity means that outdoor
recreation is a more common leisure activity than visiting
either cinemas or theatres. Self-reporting surveys such as
those analysed by Odden (2008) are admittedly questionable
if survey participants claim to engage in activities that are
socially admirable, and if being active and participating in
outdoor recreation is regarded as socially attractive (Jensen
1999). However, even if those living in Norway undertake
only one-third of the number of outings reported, outdoor
recreation would still be one of the most important leisure
activities for the population in Norway. Although it may be
inappropriate to conflate the frequency of an activity with its
quality or importance, the figures suggest that outdoor
recreation is an important activity for the well-being of the
population.
Outdoor recreation in Norway benefits from an undispu-
table principle of open access to all uncultivated land
(Allemannsrett), enshrined in the Outdoor Recreation Act
of 1957 (Friluftsloven) (Miljøverndepartementet 1957).
Motives for pursuing outdoor recreation range from the
public health benefits of increased activity in urban-
proximate natural areas to revenues generated through
tourism activity in and around national parks in high
mountain areas. The Nordic outdoor life tradition
(friluftsliv, or life in the open air) is characterized by its
simplicity and popularity � focusing on being outside in the
landscape for general well-being and encounters with nature
that are removed from a context of formal competition
(Miljøverndepartementet 1957). Even though in this article
we use the term outdoor recreation, this does not entirely
capture the gestalt of Norwegian friluftsliv described above.
The traditional definition of friluftsliv is being challenged
by a national trend of increased commercialization of
Norwegian natural and semi-natural areas as well as changes
and new developments in an increasingly diverse array of
outdoor recreational activities (Odden 2008) and of motives
for pursuing them (Kleiven 2009). For example, friluftsliv
includes nature-based tourism � provided it adheres to the
principles of simple and sustainable use of nature (e.g.
excluding helicopter-assisted skiing). At same time, govern-
ment policies now enable economic development in high
mountain national parks (Kleiven 2009), and nature-based
tourism development has considerable economic importance
for surrounding communities. Traditionally, recreation re-
search has differentiated principally between urban and
purist-oriented users, but in recent years the local ‘rural
harvester’ focusing on subsistence harvesting such as hunt-
ing and fishing has become a target user group in research
(Forberg 2002; Kleiven 2002). The research responses to this
emerging complexity in outdoor recreation are diverse, and
different disciplines take different perspectives (e.g. conflicts,
functions, and values). In this article, we describe the
diversity of ways in which individuals assign values in
outdoor recreation, although we recognize that research on
values may be biased towards some types of values at the
cost of other types of values.
Outdoor recreation research has a strong tradition of
being an applied science with a positivistic scientific
perspective (Kaltenborn 1993). However, an increasing focus
on discursive perspectives in outdoor recreation research
(Skar 2010) demands better understanding of normative
structures that underlie the science (Patterson & Williams
1998). Using outdoor recreation values research as an
example, we investigate the differences between traditional
approaches of investigate-measure-explain (rationalist, answer-
oriented, and rule-based) and analyse-and-deconstruct
in accordance with a discursive perspective (relativist,
problem-oriented, and exemplar-based). These two research
Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift�Norwegian Journal of Geography Vol. 66, 193�203. ISSN 0029-1951
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traditions are important for assessing both how we assign
value to nature and how it is used.
Outdoor recreation depends significantly on the quality of
environmental settings. Because outdoor recreation often
takes place in natural or semi-natural environments, nature
management is of major importance. In Norway, this falls
under the joint responsibility of the Directorate for Nature
Management, the environmental departments under the
county governors, and the municipalities. The Directorate
for Nature Management (Direktoratet for naturforvaltning
2011a; 2011b) is committed to ‘knowledge-based manage-
ment’. Knowledge-based management emphasizes research,
but it can be questioned whether and to what degree research
perspectives also define how values are addressed or how the
values addressed define a particular approach to research.
Perceptions of knowledge define what values are taken into
consideration, whereas what is perceived as knowledge is
also a reflection of values. The notion of value-free research
is highly problematical, and investigators often have specific
value biases underlying how their research contributes to the
accumulation of knowledge (Berger & Luckmann 1967;
Latour 1993). This is an important question, because the
choice of research perspective has direct consequences for
policy. These arguments imply that also recreation research
is value-biased. There appears to be no earlier studies
discussing different recreation research traditions in relation
to how values are articulated in a Nordic context. Our aim is
to address the following research question:
Are different traditions in outdoor recreation research biased so that
specific value frameworks become more relevant than others?
This principal question will be addressed through the
following sub-questions:
. What prevailing research traditions can be identified in
outdoor recreation research?
. How can the identified traditions be linked to value
frameworks?
. Are some value frameworks lost or discriminated in
existing or predominant research traditions?
Value and recreation research
Two main conceptualizations of values capable of influen-
cing recreation research approaches in a Norwegian context
can be identified: the conventional value model and
constitutive value models.
The conventional value model incorporates a range of
value taxonomies that originate from economics and
psychology. In a conventional value model, values transcend
a particular object or situation and reflect aspects of a
person’s opinions, personality, and understanding of them-
self (Rokeach 1973; Brown 1984). Brown (1984) presents a
value concept from the discipline of economics that
incorporates three different ‘realms:’ the conceptual realm
that refers to individuals’ ideals, the object-oriented realm
that refers to values assigned to specific objects or situa-
tions, and the relational realm that can mediate assigned
values based on the relationship a person has to have
towards an object or situation. With reference to neoclassi-
cal economics, actors are perceived as relating to their
surroundings as ‘economic man’ (Vatn 2005), which refers
to ‘a hypothetical individual who acts rationally and with
complete knowledge, but entirely out of self-interest and the
quest to maximize personal utility’ (Businessdictonary.
com 2011).
The preferences for specific benefits in the conventional
value model are perceived as ‘given’ (Hausman & McPherson
1996). The pursuit of utilities is considered rational. Objects
are then valued as a single ‘variable’ that varies on a scale
from high to low (and often measured in monetary terms).
When classifying values, conventional value taxonomies
differentiate value on the basis of the type of use. Such value
taxonomies often use a scale from use value (direct use) to
what often is labelled as ‘existence value’. Existence value
incorporates aspects such as nature conservation value,
moral value, and altruistic value. A conventional value
taxonomy (based on Tyrvainen 1999 and Turner et al.
1994) is shown in Fig. 1, and includes categories designated
as direct and indirect use values, as well as options such as
value, bequest value, and existence value. Altogether, use
values and non-use values are expected to cover the whole
spectrum of values associated with recreational areas.
The motivational factors behind valuation may vary, even
for existence value or altruistic value. Economist A.M.
Freeman III (2003, 141) claims:
Motivations do not play an important role in the empirical
analysis of the demand for market goods . . . . So why should
motivation be important in the case of non-use value? Arguments
about motivations seem to be offered primarily to persuade the
reader of the plausibility of the hypothesis that non-use values are
positive. However, the real test of this hypothesis will come from
the data.
Here, Freeman posits that it is the total value of objects
measured on a single scale that is important, not the
motivational factors behind this measured value. From this
outline, we summarize the main points of the conventional
value model as follows:
. An actor gives value to an object based on their
relationship with that object and on the utility that object
may give.
. The valuation of an object is based on perceiving people
as rational actors oriented towards maximizing utility.
The constitutive value model is an alternative value taxonomy
based on perspectives introduced by philosopher Per
Ariansen (1997). The term ‘constitutive values’ is partly
derived from the verb ‘constitute’. To constitute something
involves creating it, not in the sense of physical creation, but
in the meaning of creating the identity and definition of an
object. People constitute what objects are, and thereby give
them value. To constitute something is always done in a
relational manor (Ariansen 1997). People do not classify
objects that have no meaning to them. The taxonomy is
segmented into three main classes: demand value, instru-
mental value, and constitutive value. Constitutive values are
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further divided into cultural identity value, ethical value, and
religious-spiritual value (Fig. 2).
The philosophy of constitutive values is a constructivist
approach. Ariansen (1997) refers to Latour’s (1993) book We
Have Never Been Modern, in which Latour argues that objects
cannot be given an objectively value-free description isolated
from the subject, and hence highlights the problems of the
‘modern constitution’ of objectivism. To a large extent, both
the properties and the essence of objects are defined according
to the type of human engagement with them (Shaw 2001).
Personality � including identity, religious beliefs, and
moral convictions � is shaped through interactions with the
surroundings, and influences how people constitute
the objects around them. This two-way interaction includes
the deeper feelings and experiences of the ‘life-world’.
Religious belief or moral conviction may place value on
objects without any benefits to individuals. Ariansen (1997)
sees this as placing an obligation on individuals. If a person
has moral or religious convictions about the ecosystem, this
may place on that person obligations that are not coupled
with any benefits.
Non-utilitarian values that are deeply rooted in people’s
religion, identity, and morality are not necessarily objectively
true or temporally invariable.1 Many examples of constitu-
tive values are deeply rooted in cultural and religious
traditions and yet can be very controversial at same time
(e.g. circumcision of young girls). Constitutive values are
essential for humans to function in the world around them,
and are at the same time dynamic and culturally constructed.
Such a situation emphasizes people’s own responsibility to
reflect on what values they feel committed to, in that manner
enhancing their social responsibility.
In addition to constitutive values, the constitutive value
model also includes demand values and instrumental values
Fig. 1. A conventional value taxonomy (based on Tyrvainen 1999 and Turner et al. 1994)
Fig. 2. Example of a constitutive value taxonomy (based on Ariansen 1997)
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(Ariansen 1997) (Fig. 2). Demand values, also labelled
intrinsic values or terminal values (Rokeach 1973), are
values appreciated for their own sake. This contrasts with
instrumental value (or extrinsic value), where value depends
on demand. Both demand and instrumental values stand in
contrast to constitutive values.
The label ‘constitutive values’ is used by other authors
besides Ariansen (1997). Norberg (2004) uses the term
constitutive values in her analysis of the relationship
between values and school practices in Sweden. She uses
the term as a label for fundamental values, i.e. those values
of fundamental meaning to us. Shafer-Landau (2007) uses
the metaphor of a stroke of the brush in a painting when
describing constitutional values. It has no value in itself, but
acquires value through the value of the painting. Although
not related to the work of Ariansen (1997), both ways of
thinking fit with the constitutive value model. We describe
the constitutive value model as including:
. values based on objects or situations giving preferable
benefits, or that are instrumental in gaining such benefits
. values that are important because they are part of how
people consciously and unconsciously constitute them-
selves and the world around themselves without necessa-
rily giving any direct benefits.
Methods
The objective of this article is to investigate the relationship
between scientific approaches in recreation research and
values. We use two different recreation research traditions
inspired by Kaltenborn’s (1993) description of outdoor
recreation research in Norway, and Patterson & Williams’
(2005) division of the field into two research paradigms.
These two traditions have been influential on the evolution
of recreation research in Norway, exemplified by the works
of Kaltenborn (1993), Meyer (1996), Skar (2010), and
others. We use international literature that has been
important in the development of Norwegian recreation
research (Kaltenborn 1993). We are aware that other
research perspectives could have been used in the article,
for example perspectives focusing on different recreational
activities. Our choice of research perspective is based on its
epistemological relevance.
We selected the two value models to be represented by
each end of a value taxonomy spectrum; one model had to
be conventional and widely used, whereas the other had
to represent a clear alternative. The two models represent
a conventional economic-oriented model, and a model
oriented to humanistic traditions.
Although the two research approaches were strategically
selected and are compared in our article, the description uses
a ‘nesting approach’, taking selected works as a reference
point and then nesting literature analysis backward and
forward. This can be seen as a special type of snowball or
chain sampling (Miles & Huberman 1994, 28) used in
conjunction with texts and not with informants. To reduce
bias, we also use criteria from historians’ methods of ‘source
criticism’ (Kjeldstadli 1999). One such criterion is to have
several sources supporting the same interpretation. How the
two research traditions relate to values is identified through
content analysis based on critical reading. The two tradi-
tions are compared by identifying their differences and
similarities.
Conceptualization of values inconventional recreation research
Investigation of the history of outdoor recreation research
provides insight into how different traditions have concep-
tualized values. A central construct in this history is what
Kaltenborn (1993) labelled ‘motivational recreation research’
(MRR). This is strongly influenced by psychology, but
incorporates additional influences from economics and
landscape planning. Since the 1990s, the approach has been
criticized by researchers oriented towards the humanities and
phenomenology.
MRR is influenced by several psychological approaches.
The hierarchy of demands (Maslow 1970) and expectancy
theory (Lawler 1973) are important underlying theories.
Expectancy theory holds that people are satisfied if their use
and experiences fulfil their expectations, implying that
recreationists act as rational individuals. Although not
mentioned explicitly, the MRR approach also incorporates
elements of ‘the reasoned action model’ (Ajzen & Fishbein
1980; Ajzen & Driver 1992), which posits that human
behaviour is a result of individual attitudes and social
norms.
Although MRR builds on psychology, other disciplines
and ideas have also been influential. The concept of
‘carrying capacity’ evolved from ecological theory and is
often used in wildlife management, but the main principles
of the concept have also been incorporated in outdoor
recreation research and management. A researcher or
manager can use carrying capacity to identify thresholds
for how many users specific recreation areas can tolerate.
This application is problematical, however, because there are
no common preferences regarding user crowdedness (Burch
1981). Shafer (1969) addressed the problem in his research
paper The Average Camper Who Doesn’t Exist. This led the
research discourse towards a more sociological and psycho-
logical understanding of what became labelled ‘social
carrying capacity’ (Graefe et al. 1984).
The recreation opportunity spectrum (ROS) (Driver &
Brown 1978; Clark & Stankey 1979) is a recreation manage-
ment approach evolved from the motivational recreation
research tradition (Kaltenborn 1993). This approach is also
strongly influenced by economic theory. Both a supply-
demand metaphor and a marked segmentation approach can
be easily identified in the ROS concept. The deduction from
Shafer’s (1969) work to user or marked segmentation in the
ROS model seems obvious. Because of this underlying
economic model, the ROS research tradition has been
criticized for using a product metaphor that reduces people’s
recreational behaviour to the consumption of recreational
benefits (Williams et al. 1992; Patterson et al. 1998). The
ROS concept originated in North America, and has been
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adapted and used in Norway and Sweden (Wallsten 1988;
Vistad 1995; Fredman et al. 2005), and in the High Arctic of
Svalbard (Kaltenborn & Emmelin 1993). The ROS approach
has been influential because it fits into a general zoning
tradition in area planning. A more process-oriented plan-
ning approach is the ‘limits of acceptable change’ (LAC)
method (Stankey et al. 1985). The LAC model combines the
concept of transactive planning (Friedman 1976) with a
reformulated carrying capacity concept. The ROS and LAC
models share many features and are often combined.
The ‘reasoned action model’ (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980) is
often used when describing how recreationists make deci-
sions. Although this is a type of ‘bounded rationality’
(Simon 1957), such a model portrays recreationists as
conscious actors making decisions based on personal
preferences. Inspired by this, Driver et al. (1991), in the
classical psychometrical tradition, developed ‘the recreation
experience preference’ (REP) scale, consisting of 19 classes
of benefits associated with recreation in nature landscapes,
such as solitude, nature experience, and achievement. Even if
Driver et al. (1991) emphasize the latter factors as motiva-
tional, the scale could be perceived as a classification system
of benefits or utilities attained by recreationists.
In our judgment, motivational recreation research fits well
with the conventional value method. There is a gradual
transition between motivational recreation research and
economic research. Finnish forest economist Tyrvainen
(1999) classifies different benefits from urban forests as
‘social benefits’, ‘aesthetic and architectural benefits’, ‘cli-
matic physical benefits’, ‘ecological benefits’, and ‘economic
benefits’. There is a close resemblance between these classes
of benefits and the 19 classes of benefits in the REP scale.
The REP scale regards recreationists as motivated by
benefits, and has a clear utilitarian orientation. Even if the
scale includes benefits such as introspection and spirituality,
that could be associated as constitutive values, they are
measured in the same way as pure utility-oriented benefits.
The use of the ‘reasoned action model’ as a rationale for
connecting preferences to behaviour, where recreationists try
to satisfy their needs, implies a view that recreationists are
consumers of pure benefits. However, rationality in this
model is more like bounded rationality. Viewing recreation-
ists as rational actors seeking satisfaction has also been
labelled ‘the commodity metaphor’ (Williams et al. 1992).
The elements of the motivational research tradition we
highlight here do not include all aspects of recreation
research. From our perspective, however, the motivational
recreation research paradigm fits well with the conventional
value model. Even if some of its elements seem to fit the
constitutive value model, we conclude that the elements it
contains � for example, the REP scale � are built into the
conventional value model.
Place-based approaches and constitutivevalues
Motivational recreation research has been criticized for
employing a ‘commodity metaphor’ because it oversimplifies
individuals’ values and neglects the emotional ties people
can have to places they visit (Williams et al. 1992). Theory
regarding favourite places and place attachment arose from
both environmental psychology and phenomenological or-
ientations within sociology, psychology, and geography.
Such theory emphasizes the meaning of place without an
easily identified motivational or rational bond between the
user and the environment (Relph 1976; Williams & Stewart
1998; Vorkinn & Riese 2001; Skar 2010). For example, an
experienced-based perspective based on the philosophical
ideas of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Skar 2010) describes
how the interactions between humans and nature can be
seen as relational, intuitive, and dynamic. Humans assign
meanings (values) to nature based on lived experience,
through nature that affects the users and stimulates new
expressions and experiences. The relationship between hu-
mans and nature does not only have the potential for change
according to the historical, cultural, and social context, but
is also strongly related to situational factors (Skar 2010).
The concept ‘sense of place’ is frequently employed to
include a deeper approach to the humanistic and phenom-
enological dimensions of individuals’ bonds to their sur-
roundings (Norberg-Schulz 1980). The concept is inspired,
in part, by psychological research (Proshansky et al. 1983;
Korpela 1992; Williams et al. 1992) and by concepts of place
in geography (Tuan 1974; Relph 1976; Agnew & Duncan
1989; Massey 1991). Gieryn (2000, 465) states that places are
not only materially ‘carved out’ of space, but also ‘inter-
preted, narrated, understood, felt, and imagined . . . the
meaning or value of the same place is labile . . . flexible in
the hands of different people or cultures, malleable over
time, and inevitably contested’. There are clear differences
between environmental psychology’s ‘place attachment’,
which describes the bond a person has to a place (few
dimensions, affective, and measurable), and the much more
complex concept of ‘sense of place’ (Patterson & Williams
1998). The literature on feelings attached to places does not
focus much on specific attributes in landscapes as such.
From a management point of view, this approach implies
more focus on specific localities and viewing each place as a
totality, not just as a sum of attributes that may be
manipulated (Gundersen & Makinen 2009).
The ‘humanistic turn’ towards sense of place and place
attachment is still contested in outdoor recreation research,
with mixed reactions to the usefulness of the place concept
(Patterson & Williams 2005). Some researchers perceive the
place concept as rather fuzzy and difficult to implement
in landscape planning and management, whereas others
perceive this fuzziness as necessary to capture the complexity
of place. Patterson & Williams (2005) view the different
reactions as expressions of different research paradigms.
There is a strong divide in social science between realist and
post-positivist researchers on one side and relativist or
constructionist researchers on the other. Some disciplines,
such as psychology, are more on the positivist side, whereas
others, for example within social sciences and humanities, are
more analytical and critical, and more on the relativist side.
An example of the positivistic tradition to place attachment is
the use of psychometric scales based on attitudinal questions
in surveys (Williams & Roggenbuck 1989; Meyer 1996;
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Williams & Vaske 2003). Such studies have developed a
quantitative index (e.g. Meyer (1996) uses four items) to
measure place attachment. Further, they are mostly based on
quantitative approaches and epistemologically represent a
(post-)positivist approach to place attachment closer
affiliated to the motivational recreation research tradition
than to the more humanistic place-oriented tradition.
Place-oriented recreation research and values
Identity value as a sub-type of constitutive values is closely
related to the concept of sense of place derived from
phenomenology and place attachment derived from envir-
onmental psychology, concepts that often also include
spiritual and ethical values. They are all values classified
as constitutive values by Ariansen (1997) (Fig. 2).
In response to Ariansen, a question that can be asked is:
Could spiritual and ethical values easily fit into the
conventional value model? As an example, the REP scale
(Driver et al. 1991) includes identity and spiritual values. If
we claim that the place-oriented approach fits best within
the constitutive value approach, we need stronger and
additional evidence. In the section headed ‘Value and
recreation research’ we have defined important criteria for
the constitutive value model. The notion that values are a
part of how people (both consciously and subconsciously)
constitute themselves and the world around themselves
without necessarily gaining any direct benefits fits well
within the place-oriented approach that focuses on the
bonding between people and places. In such a tradition,
people define themselves partly through their bond to the
world around them, including places. There is clearly
consistency between how the place-oriented approach per-
ceives the relationship between people and places, and how
objects or places are perceived as having constitutive values.
In assigning value to places, people include their own self-
identity. This indicates that by definition the place-oriented
approach is oriented towards the constitutive value model.
This suggestion is also supported by the criticism levelled by
proponents of the place-oriented approach against the
commodity metaphor (Williams et al. 1992), which they
perceive as purely utilitarian. The contrast between how the
place-oriented and motivational recreation traditions con-
ceptualize peoples’ relationship with places underlines the
essential importance of scientific orientation for how values
are understood.
Both the motivational recreation research tradition and
place-oriented recreation research developed gradually, in-
spired by differing impulses. At the same time, the place-
oriented tradition evolved as a reaction to the motivational
recreation research. We show the development of theory in
recreation research in Fig. 3. At the top of the tree are some
classical works from the 1970s, which were important for what
later became referred to as motivational recreation research.
Fig. 3. The theoretical relationship between different elements in the development of motivational recreation research and place-oriented recreation research
198 J. Aasetre & V. Gundersen NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 66 (2012)
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Additionally, market segmentation and demand supply
models were important for the development of the recreation
opportunity spectrum (ROS) model of rational recreational
planning. Further development to the LAC model involved
aspects of transactive planning. Nonetheless, we suggest that
conventional recreational planning models struggle to include
aspects such as the emotional and symbolic meaning of
recreational areas that are important in the sense of place
concept.
Discussion
Scientific orientation is important for how values are
articulated; one should be aware of one’s normative position
when choosing a scientific framework. In discussing the
meaning of recreation values, we have to take the complexity
of research traditions into account. Both socially con-
structed research approaches and value taxonomy models
are dynamic and open for debate. We find positive and
negative arguments and challenges for both value models.
Next, we highlight some conceptual questions and themes of
relevance for understanding how the two value models
respond to different themes within the framework of
recreation research.
Is nothing sacred any longer?
The place approach has clear linkage to how values are
constructed in the constitutive value model, and fits well into
a critical discourse on life in a postmodern world. In his
work, Liquid Modernity, Bauman (2000) describes postmo-
dern citizens as opportunists, people who act under un-
certainty and constantly make trade-offs as consumers
essentially looking for the best bid. In the simplest manner,
the commodity metaphor reduces the recreationist to a pure
consumer that seeks to satisfy their needs and wants, a
consumer that neither is looking for a higher meaning nor
acting on moral obligations.
Several authors have criticized Bauman’s (2000) portrayal
of post or late modernity, partly because he paints an overly
cynical portrait of postmodern ‘man’ as a single-minded
egoistic consumer (Nilsen 2007; Atkinson 2008). An earlier
critique against the consumerist view of humans, contained
in the idea of optimizing ‘economic man’, was articulated by
Sen (1977) in his term ‘rational fools’. The work of Bauman
(2000) in itself can be interpreted as a warning against the
risk of liquid modernity, where nothing is sacred any longer.
Most individuals would probably claim that their lives and
actions are guided by deeper meanings, something ‘solid’ (to
use Bauman’s terminology). We think that unease about
what Bauman calls ‘liquid modernity’ indicates that people
realize the importance of non-utilitarian constitutive values.
However, we do not deny that Bauman identifies important
characteristics of postmodern living; the emphasis put on
consumer-oriented analytical models can be seen as an
indicator of this. A solely utilitarian view that focuses on
consumption may lead to a risk of losing the deeper meaning
of life, i.e. a risk of commercialization and a sense that
nothing is sacred any longer. In that case, the constitutive
value model gives more possibilities than the conventional
value model for perceiving objects or situations as placing
sacred obligations on us. The consumer-orientation that is
implicit in the concept of liquid modernity fits very well with
the conventional value model and a consumer-oriented way
of conceptualizing recreation values. This is best illustrated
by the REP scale (Driver et al. 1991), a model where
different experiences are valued on the same scale. Another
example of commodification of recreation is the ROS model
(Driver & Brown 1978; Clark & Stankey 1979), based on
market segmentation, where different user groups can
consume different experience opportunities in different
zones. The same consumer-orientation is not formalized in
the place-based approach.
Sense of place and the danger of essentialism
The place-oriented approach grew out of a critical view of
motivational recreation research and the commodity meta-
phor (Williams et al. 1992), where nothing is sacred any
longer. There may be a risk with the sense of place concept
that it becomes too nostalgic when looking for solid values.
However, the place concept includes a variety of different
meanings and perspectives. Researchers in geography have
traditionally used three different and interwoven dimensions
of place (Agnew & Duncan 1989):
1. Location � which focuses on the localization of different
phenomena, e.g. economic geography employs location
theories to investigate why a particular industry might
exist in a particular place
2. Locale � which focuses on the different social interac-
tions at a particular place, viewing place as social
context (Giddens 1984)
3. Sense of place � which focuses on the experiences,
attachments and bonds that exist between people and
places.
The geographer Massey (1991) cautioned against the risks of
becoming too nostalgic and conservative through an essen-
tialist view of place. Yet it is not merely nostalgia to
acknowledge that people’s bonds to and perceptions of
places are created through dynamic interactions at specific
locations. The criticism of the nostalgic sense of place
concept has especially grown as a consequence of globaliza-
tion. Massey (1991) introduced the concept ‘global sense of
place’, focusing on dynamic urban neighbourhoods, but
with relevance for the management of recreation areas. She
claims that it is possible to have strong attachment to
modern urban places that have ‘the whole world in itself ’
without being reactionary or defensive, and maintains that
places are not isolated but gain their identity through long-
lasting interactions with other places. Each place may be
perceived as ‘articulated moments in networks of social
relations and understandings’ (Massey 1991, 28). Massey
suggests that places should be perceived as meeting places
for different human and social interactions. A place is
dynamic through changing social relations as time moves
on, i.e. setting the sense of place dimension in relation to the
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location and locale dimension of places. Hence, places have
no clear boundaries, because they change over time and
between different social groups. Ultimately, a place cannot
have just one identity; individuals will experience and define
the place differently based on their own experiences, actions,
and relations. Essentialism is problematical in the place-
oriented approach, which emphasizes people’s bonds to
recreational places. The conventional value model is by
definition relative, and therefore not as open for essential-
ism. The emphasis Massey (1991) puts on the relational
concept of people-place bounding indicates that constitutive
values are socially constructed.
Lacking a moral dimension
Utilitarian values may raise moral dilemmas. Safeguarding
the well-being of our fellow citizens may be a moral value
that cannot be judged only from a utilitarian perspective.
This leads to normative ethics where judgements on right
and wrong are based on morality and norms. Most people
would agree that a person’s right to exist should not be
judged based on economic welfare. Instead, most people
would judge the right of existence as a basic ‘human right’,
which is a sacred value that cannot be traded away.
Human rights are interesting as an example of moral
values, and can be seen as a parallel to intrinsic value in
nature (Callicott 2002). Universal human rights have been
an issue in both public and scientific discourses. The concept
of human rights is deeply rooted in Western philosophy and
thinking. The principle of universal human rights has been
challenged by statements that ‘Asiatic values’ are based on
principles that differ from ‘Western values’ (Bruun &
Jacobsen 2000; Neary 2002). At the same time, it is argued
that the concept of ‘Asiatic values’ is constructed by
authoritarian rulers arguing against the idea of universal
human rights. This is a dilemma regarding constitutive
values. If the arguments of cultural relativism are accepted,
then it also has to be accepted that moral values are socially
constructed and simultaneously lose some of their meaning.2
If non-utility oriented constitutive values place obligations
on people, they cannot be traded. Religious beliefs and
cultural identities can be examples of such values, such as
sacred mountains in the Himalayas and other sacred places
that are rooted in cultural identity. Another, perhaps more
readily apparent, example is that most humans are uneasy
about negotiating the price for killing another person. We
cannot bargain over the life of a fellow citizen, and hence we
commit ourselves to moral obligations that something is
sacred. A consequence of such a statement is that it would
be morally problematical in such cases to use willingness to
pay as a way of valuing objects. Non-utilitarian constitutive
values are not open for buying and selling.
The dichotomy between ecocentric and anthropocentric
values in environmental research includes some elements of
morality. However, such research has been used more to
predict environmental preferences or activity patterns than it
has been used as a management perspective in recreation
research. Ecocentric values are controversial because it is
often claimed that ecosystems possess value independent of
human thinking and valuation (Hargrove 2003). Since
humans cannot confer with other species of animals or with
plants, critics contend that ecocentric value statements are
also based on human preferences and attitudes. The inclusion
of such views without reducing them to utilitarian values
could be built on the same moral positions as human rights,
i.e. the existence of moral principles of higher importance
than the losses or gains of individuals or groups. These
principles concern ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, regardless of particular
contexts and individual preferences. Such values are lost in
motivational recreation research, and possibly also the place-
oriented approach because it only builds on emotional bonds,
not on a conscious moral choice. The moral dimension may
be seen as criticism of the traditional motivational recreation
research. Much research within this tradition focuses on
people’s motives for pursuing recreation (Ajzen & Fishbein
1980; Ajzen & Driver 1992) or on the utilitarian values for the
users (Driver et al. 1991). The moral dimension is clearly
a part of the constitutive value model, even if the place-
tradition itself does not focus much on morality.
Value models and philosophical orientation
The two different value models described above seem to be
grounded within different views on the philosophy of
science. The constitutive value model corresponds to ex-
istentialistic philosophy, as for example Heidegger’s (1962
[1927]) concept of ‘dasein’, or being in the world, a way of
thinking that erodes the traditional divide between subject
and object. Our lives in the world define who we are, and
the nature of places defines how we live in them.
Such conceptualization makes it easier to understand why
constitutive values are obligational, because understanding
ourselves in a certain manner means we also have to accept
specific values in the world we live in. For example, in many
cases, we take our surroundings in daily life as given; it is
first when the old oak we used to pass every day is cut down
that we stop and think about the situation. In our lives, we
have many habits and relationships that we do not reflect
about before we are forced to. We may have a favourite place
in a forest that we like to visit in our leisure time, but mostly
we do not reflect on our attachment to the place before the
forest is cut down. We do not need to reflect on every step we
take when visiting a forest, or in our life in general, but the
divide between subject and object has traditionally been seen
as the starting point of rational thinking: to stop up, take a
step beside ourselves, and analyse the situation. This way of
thinking has roots that can be traced back to Descartes, and
constitutes a starting point for the positivistic and post-
positivistic paradigms in science (Wollan 2003). The con-
ventional value model, in which a subject assigns value to an
object or situations based rational judgments of utility and
personal preferences, fits well with the post-positivistic way
of rational thinking. Conversely, an existentialistically or-
iented view of values (constitutive value model) fits with the
humanistic recreation research tradition, which differs in
methods and results from the rationalistic post-positivistic
research tradition.
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Even if most of the place-oriented tradition is basically
humanistic, we assume that place attachment research is
closer to the post-positivist research tradition. This implies
that the difference between demand and instrumental values
on the one hand and constitutive values on the other is
fundamentally rooted in different scientific paradigms.
Patterson & Williams (1998; 2005) explain the negative
reactions among some researchers to the place-oriented
approach by differences in philosophy of science and
inadequate understanding of the complexity of the place
concept. Sack (1992) describes the dilemma of the abstrac-
tion of place in science and modernism as ‘the view from
nowhere to somewhere’. Different disciplines examine place
through methods that can almost be described as a
perspective from nowhere. For Sack, place is a concrete
focal point where all aspects are integrated: nature, social
relations, and meaning. A concrete and specific somewhere
can be experienced, understood, and explained from multi-
ple research discipline perspectives (or different epistemolo-
gical perspectives). In Norway, Kaltenborn (1998) criticizes
the difficulties of implementing the place-oriented approach
in management and research because of the difficulties of
defining an object for research. Operationalization and
operational validity are classical positivistic concepts, illus-
trating how the critique is firmly placed in a specific
scientific tradition.
A composite value taxonomy
We have shown that different traditions in recreation
research include different ways of conceptualizing values.
In the constitutive value model, demand values and instru-
mental values are either directly or indirectly utilitarian
values. Hence, they also fit into the conventional value
model. In our view, demand and instrumental values may be
measured, for example, by preference scales such as the REP
scale, making a post-positivist approach sufficient. However,
constitutional values place obligations on us by focusing on
existential questions, and consequently the situation calls for
a humanistic approach. We therefore argue that the two
value models build on different scientific paradigms, and
have to be open for radically different ways of thinking.
A solution may be to try to combine the two value models
into a composite model that bridges them, as we illustrate in
Fig. 4. We have documented that identity values are
attempts to conceptualize both a utilitarian value through
the REP scale and a constitutive value through the place-
oriented approach. Different values can perhaps be con-
ceptualized to varying degrees to include instrumental
(demand) and constitutive components. The relative
strength of the different components will vary from situation
to situation.
Figure 4 places demand values and instrumental values
within the economic and psychological research orientation,
which we describe as a conventional value taxonomy. In
relation to particular places, this perspective could be
described as the perspective from nowhere (Sack 1992).
However, constitutive values are placed in the humanistic
and philosophical research orientation. Constitutive values
can be considered to be place-specific.
Conclusions
In this article we have discussed how different scientific
approaches include different models of conceptualizing
values and the implications for management and policy.
The motivational recreation tradition can easily end in what
some critics label the commodity metaphor. The place
attachment tradition, on the other hand, includes non-
utilitarian values. However, within the internal place-based
discourse, some raise concerns about an essentialist view of
the value of places. Nonetheless, the place-based tradition
seems to complement the motivational research tradition in
such a way that the two traditions in combination reduce the
risk of the commodity metaphor. This conclusion is
supported by Sen’s (1977) description of ‘rational fools’
and by Bauman’s (2000) thinking on ‘liquid modernity’.
Even so, we find that reflection on moral principles such as
Fig. 4. The constitutive value model and the economic-oriented model combined
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human rights or environmental morality may be lacking in
existing research approaches. The place attachment tradition
takes such values partly into account, but only as emotion-
ally-based or taken-for-granted values. Conscious morality
based on philosophical thinking is not included in any of the
described traditions. Our conclusions and managerial advice
are hence the following:
. When recreation research is used, we have to be aware of
value biases in the different traditions.
. Only when reflecting on diverse approaches will a more
comprehensive picture of the values attributed to a
landscape be taken into consideration.
. Commodity values as well as non-utilitarian values and
morality have to be included in judgements concerning
the allocation of recreation resources.
. Including constitutive values makes optimization difficult
because in extreme cases we may talk about ‘sacred
values’.
. ‘Sacred values’ are moral values included in the consti-
tutive value model, but are not so well represented in
either of the two recreation research traditions discussed.
The place-tradition also may be at risk of being to
nostalgic.
. Placing emphasis on people’s experiences of their life-
world implies that management needs to take account of
the specific situations of people’s experiences when
making management decisions. This can best be done
with interactive communicative approaches.
Notes
1 Hargrove (2003) argues for what he calls ‘weak anthropocentric intrinsic
value’ because he doubts that it is possible to persuade ordinary people to
believe that values can exist independent of human thinking.
2 Non-Western values include a variety of moral rules and ideals. In relation
to outdoor recreation, it is interesting to note that some classify rights of
access to nature for the purpose of outdoor recreation as a form of Asiatic
value (Soffield 2009).
Acknowledgements. � The authors thank Per Ariansen, Department of
Philosophy, University of Oslo, for inspiration through his work on
constitutive values and environmental ethics. He has, however, no responsi-
bility for our interpretation of his work. We are also grateful to two
anonymous reviewers and to Erik Stange, Norwegian Institute for Nature
Research, for constructive comments.
Manuscript submitted 12 July 2011; accepted 4 June 2012
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