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Outdoor recreation research: Different approaches, different values?

JØRUND AASETRE & VEGARD GUNDERSEN

J. Aasetre & V. Gundersen. 2012. Outdoor recreation research: Different approaches, different values? Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift�Norwegian Journal of Geography Vol. 66, 193�203. ISSN 0029-1951.

Different approaches to outdoor recreation research influence how recreational values are articulated. The article presents a

theoretical comparison between two recreation research traditions that have been influential in both Norwegian outdoor recreation

research and American wilderness research and management. The authors compare how both research traditions fit two predefined

valuation models, with one model oriented towards economists’ perception of values and the other oriented towards humanistic

philosophy. They contend that the two research traditions are connected in their conceptual construct of values. Studies labelled

‘motivational recreation research’ fit with an economic-oriented value model, whereas ‘place-oriented recreation research’ puts

greater emphasis on non-utilitarian values compatible with a constitutive value model. Consideration of the kind of values that a

given research tradition promotes is very important for research outputs and management practice.

Keywords: recreation research, values, value taxonomies

Jørund Aasetre, Department of Geography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway.

E-mail: jorund.aasetre@svt.ntnu.no; Vegard Gundersen, Norwegian Institute for Nature Research, Fakkelgarden, NO-2624

Lillehammer, Norway, E-mail: vegard.gundersen@nina.no

Introduction

In Norway, c.90% of the population participates in outdoor

recreation at least once a year, a participation rate that has

been relatively stable over recent decades. Each recreationist

makes an average of 96 day trips during the course of a year

(Odden 2008, 62). This level of activity means that outdoor

recreation is a more common leisure activity than visiting

either cinemas or theatres. Self-reporting surveys such as

those analysed by Odden (2008) are admittedly questionable

if survey participants claim to engage in activities that are

socially admirable, and if being active and participating in

outdoor recreation is regarded as socially attractive (Jensen

1999). However, even if those living in Norway undertake

only one-third of the number of outings reported, outdoor

recreation would still be one of the most important leisure

activities for the population in Norway. Although it may be

inappropriate to conflate the frequency of an activity with its

quality or importance, the figures suggest that outdoor

recreation is an important activity for the well-being of the

population.

Outdoor recreation in Norway benefits from an undispu-

table principle of open access to all uncultivated land

(Allemannsrett), enshrined in the Outdoor Recreation Act

of 1957 (Friluftsloven) (Miljøverndepartementet 1957).

Motives for pursuing outdoor recreation range from the

public health benefits of increased activity in urban-

proximate natural areas to revenues generated through

tourism activity in and around national parks in high

mountain areas. The Nordic outdoor life tradition

(friluftsliv, or life in the open air) is characterized by its

simplicity and popularity � focusing on being outside in the

landscape for general well-being and encounters with nature

that are removed from a context of formal competition

(Miljøverndepartementet 1957). Even though in this article

we use the term outdoor recreation, this does not entirely

capture the gestalt of Norwegian friluftsliv described above.

The traditional definition of friluftsliv is being challenged

by a national trend of increased commercialization of

Norwegian natural and semi-natural areas as well as changes

and new developments in an increasingly diverse array of

outdoor recreational activities (Odden 2008) and of motives

for pursuing them (Kleiven 2009). For example, friluftsliv

includes nature-based tourism � provided it adheres to the

principles of simple and sustainable use of nature (e.g.

excluding helicopter-assisted skiing). At same time, govern-

ment policies now enable economic development in high

mountain national parks (Kleiven 2009), and nature-based

tourism development has considerable economic importance

for surrounding communities. Traditionally, recreation re-

search has differentiated principally between urban and

purist-oriented users, but in recent years the local ‘rural

harvester’ focusing on subsistence harvesting such as hunt-

ing and fishing has become a target user group in research

(Forberg 2002; Kleiven 2002). The research responses to this

emerging complexity in outdoor recreation are diverse, and

different disciplines take different perspectives (e.g. conflicts,

functions, and values). In this article, we describe the

diversity of ways in which individuals assign values in

outdoor recreation, although we recognize that research on

values may be biased towards some types of values at the

cost of other types of values.

Outdoor recreation research has a strong tradition of

being an applied science with a positivistic scientific

perspective (Kaltenborn 1993). However, an increasing focus

on discursive perspectives in outdoor recreation research

(Skar 2010) demands better understanding of normative

structures that underlie the science (Patterson & Williams

1998). Using outdoor recreation values research as an

example, we investigate the differences between traditional

approaches of investigate-measure-explain (rationalist, answer-

oriented, and rule-based) and analyse-and-deconstruct

in accordance with a discursive perspective (relativist,

problem-oriented, and exemplar-based). These two research

Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift�Norwegian Journal of Geography Vol. 66, 193�203. ISSN 0029-1951

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traditions are important for assessing both how we assign

value to nature and how it is used.

Outdoor recreation depends significantly on the quality of

environmental settings. Because outdoor recreation often

takes place in natural or semi-natural environments, nature

management is of major importance. In Norway, this falls

under the joint responsibility of the Directorate for Nature

Management, the environmental departments under the

county governors, and the municipalities. The Directorate

for Nature Management (Direktoratet for naturforvaltning

2011a; 2011b) is committed to ‘knowledge-based manage-

ment’. Knowledge-based management emphasizes research,

but it can be questioned whether and to what degree research

perspectives also define how values are addressed or how the

values addressed define a particular approach to research.

Perceptions of knowledge define what values are taken into

consideration, whereas what is perceived as knowledge is

also a reflection of values. The notion of value-free research

is highly problematical, and investigators often have specific

value biases underlying how their research contributes to the

accumulation of knowledge (Berger & Luckmann 1967;

Latour 1993). This is an important question, because the

choice of research perspective has direct consequences for

policy. These arguments imply that also recreation research

is value-biased. There appears to be no earlier studies

discussing different recreation research traditions in relation

to how values are articulated in a Nordic context. Our aim is

to address the following research question:

Are different traditions in outdoor recreation research biased so that

specific value frameworks become more relevant than others?

This principal question will be addressed through the

following sub-questions:

. What prevailing research traditions can be identified in

outdoor recreation research?

. How can the identified traditions be linked to value

frameworks?

. Are some value frameworks lost or discriminated in

existing or predominant research traditions?

Value and recreation research

Two main conceptualizations of values capable of influen-

cing recreation research approaches in a Norwegian context

can be identified: the conventional value model and

constitutive value models.

The conventional value model incorporates a range of

value taxonomies that originate from economics and

psychology. In a conventional value model, values transcend

a particular object or situation and reflect aspects of a

person’s opinions, personality, and understanding of them-

self (Rokeach 1973; Brown 1984). Brown (1984) presents a

value concept from the discipline of economics that

incorporates three different ‘realms:’ the conceptual realm

that refers to individuals’ ideals, the object-oriented realm

that refers to values assigned to specific objects or situa-

tions, and the relational realm that can mediate assigned

values based on the relationship a person has to have

towards an object or situation. With reference to neoclassi-

cal economics, actors are perceived as relating to their

surroundings as ‘economic man’ (Vatn 2005), which refers

to ‘a hypothetical individual who acts rationally and with

complete knowledge, but entirely out of self-interest and the

quest to maximize personal utility’ (Businessdictonary.

com 2011).

The preferences for specific benefits in the conventional

value model are perceived as ‘given’ (Hausman & McPherson

1996). The pursuit of utilities is considered rational. Objects

are then valued as a single ‘variable’ that varies on a scale

from high to low (and often measured in monetary terms).

When classifying values, conventional value taxonomies

differentiate value on the basis of the type of use. Such value

taxonomies often use a scale from use value (direct use) to

what often is labelled as ‘existence value’. Existence value

incorporates aspects such as nature conservation value,

moral value, and altruistic value. A conventional value

taxonomy (based on Tyrvainen 1999 and Turner et al.

1994) is shown in Fig. 1, and includes categories designated

as direct and indirect use values, as well as options such as

value, bequest value, and existence value. Altogether, use

values and non-use values are expected to cover the whole

spectrum of values associated with recreational areas.

The motivational factors behind valuation may vary, even

for existence value or altruistic value. Economist A.M.

Freeman III (2003, 141) claims:

Motivations do not play an important role in the empirical

analysis of the demand for market goods . . . . So why should

motivation be important in the case of non-use value? Arguments

about motivations seem to be offered primarily to persuade the

reader of the plausibility of the hypothesis that non-use values are

positive. However, the real test of this hypothesis will come from

the data.

Here, Freeman posits that it is the total value of objects

measured on a single scale that is important, not the

motivational factors behind this measured value. From this

outline, we summarize the main points of the conventional

value model as follows:

. An actor gives value to an object based on their

relationship with that object and on the utility that object

may give.

. The valuation of an object is based on perceiving people

as rational actors oriented towards maximizing utility.

The constitutive value model is an alternative value taxonomy

based on perspectives introduced by philosopher Per

Ariansen (1997). The term ‘constitutive values’ is partly

derived from the verb ‘constitute’. To constitute something

involves creating it, not in the sense of physical creation, but

in the meaning of creating the identity and definition of an

object. People constitute what objects are, and thereby give

them value. To constitute something is always done in a

relational manor (Ariansen 1997). People do not classify

objects that have no meaning to them. The taxonomy is

segmented into three main classes: demand value, instru-

mental value, and constitutive value. Constitutive values are

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further divided into cultural identity value, ethical value, and

religious-spiritual value (Fig. 2).

The philosophy of constitutive values is a constructivist

approach. Ariansen (1997) refers to Latour’s (1993) book We

Have Never Been Modern, in which Latour argues that objects

cannot be given an objectively value-free description isolated

from the subject, and hence highlights the problems of the

‘modern constitution’ of objectivism. To a large extent, both

the properties and the essence of objects are defined according

to the type of human engagement with them (Shaw 2001).

Personality � including identity, religious beliefs, and

moral convictions � is shaped through interactions with the

surroundings, and influences how people constitute

the objects around them. This two-way interaction includes

the deeper feelings and experiences of the ‘life-world’.

Religious belief or moral conviction may place value on

objects without any benefits to individuals. Ariansen (1997)

sees this as placing an obligation on individuals. If a person

has moral or religious convictions about the ecosystem, this

may place on that person obligations that are not coupled

with any benefits.

Non-utilitarian values that are deeply rooted in people’s

religion, identity, and morality are not necessarily objectively

true or temporally invariable.1 Many examples of constitu-

tive values are deeply rooted in cultural and religious

traditions and yet can be very controversial at same time

(e.g. circumcision of young girls). Constitutive values are

essential for humans to function in the world around them,

and are at the same time dynamic and culturally constructed.

Such a situation emphasizes people’s own responsibility to

reflect on what values they feel committed to, in that manner

enhancing their social responsibility.

In addition to constitutive values, the constitutive value

model also includes demand values and instrumental values

Fig. 1. A conventional value taxonomy (based on Tyrvainen 1999 and Turner et al. 1994)

Fig. 2. Example of a constitutive value taxonomy (based on Ariansen 1997)

NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 66 (2012) Outdoor recreation research: Different approaches, different values? 195

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(Ariansen 1997) (Fig. 2). Demand values, also labelled

intrinsic values or terminal values (Rokeach 1973), are

values appreciated for their own sake. This contrasts with

instrumental value (or extrinsic value), where value depends

on demand. Both demand and instrumental values stand in

contrast to constitutive values.

The label ‘constitutive values’ is used by other authors

besides Ariansen (1997). Norberg (2004) uses the term

constitutive values in her analysis of the relationship

between values and school practices in Sweden. She uses

the term as a label for fundamental values, i.e. those values

of fundamental meaning to us. Shafer-Landau (2007) uses

the metaphor of a stroke of the brush in a painting when

describing constitutional values. It has no value in itself, but

acquires value through the value of the painting. Although

not related to the work of Ariansen (1997), both ways of

thinking fit with the constitutive value model. We describe

the constitutive value model as including:

. values based on objects or situations giving preferable

benefits, or that are instrumental in gaining such benefits

. values that are important because they are part of how

people consciously and unconsciously constitute them-

selves and the world around themselves without necessa-

rily giving any direct benefits.

Methods

The objective of this article is to investigate the relationship

between scientific approaches in recreation research and

values. We use two different recreation research traditions

inspired by Kaltenborn’s (1993) description of outdoor

recreation research in Norway, and Patterson & Williams’

(2005) division of the field into two research paradigms.

These two traditions have been influential on the evolution

of recreation research in Norway, exemplified by the works

of Kaltenborn (1993), Meyer (1996), Skar (2010), and

others. We use international literature that has been

important in the development of Norwegian recreation

research (Kaltenborn 1993). We are aware that other

research perspectives could have been used in the article,

for example perspectives focusing on different recreational

activities. Our choice of research perspective is based on its

epistemological relevance.

We selected the two value models to be represented by

each end of a value taxonomy spectrum; one model had to

be conventional and widely used, whereas the other had

to represent a clear alternative. The two models represent

a conventional economic-oriented model, and a model

oriented to humanistic traditions.

Although the two research approaches were strategically

selected and are compared in our article, the description uses

a ‘nesting approach’, taking selected works as a reference

point and then nesting literature analysis backward and

forward. This can be seen as a special type of snowball or

chain sampling (Miles & Huberman 1994, 28) used in

conjunction with texts and not with informants. To reduce

bias, we also use criteria from historians’ methods of ‘source

criticism’ (Kjeldstadli 1999). One such criterion is to have

several sources supporting the same interpretation. How the

two research traditions relate to values is identified through

content analysis based on critical reading. The two tradi-

tions are compared by identifying their differences and

similarities.

Conceptualization of values inconventional recreation research

Investigation of the history of outdoor recreation research

provides insight into how different traditions have concep-

tualized values. A central construct in this history is what

Kaltenborn (1993) labelled ‘motivational recreation research’

(MRR). This is strongly influenced by psychology, but

incorporates additional influences from economics and

landscape planning. Since the 1990s, the approach has been

criticized by researchers oriented towards the humanities and

phenomenology.

MRR is influenced by several psychological approaches.

The hierarchy of demands (Maslow 1970) and expectancy

theory (Lawler 1973) are important underlying theories.

Expectancy theory holds that people are satisfied if their use

and experiences fulfil their expectations, implying that

recreationists act as rational individuals. Although not

mentioned explicitly, the MRR approach also incorporates

elements of ‘the reasoned action model’ (Ajzen & Fishbein

1980; Ajzen & Driver 1992), which posits that human

behaviour is a result of individual attitudes and social

norms.

Although MRR builds on psychology, other disciplines

and ideas have also been influential. The concept of

‘carrying capacity’ evolved from ecological theory and is

often used in wildlife management, but the main principles

of the concept have also been incorporated in outdoor

recreation research and management. A researcher or

manager can use carrying capacity to identify thresholds

for how many users specific recreation areas can tolerate.

This application is problematical, however, because there are

no common preferences regarding user crowdedness (Burch

1981). Shafer (1969) addressed the problem in his research

paper The Average Camper Who Doesn’t Exist. This led the

research discourse towards a more sociological and psycho-

logical understanding of what became labelled ‘social

carrying capacity’ (Graefe et al. 1984).

The recreation opportunity spectrum (ROS) (Driver &

Brown 1978; Clark & Stankey 1979) is a recreation manage-

ment approach evolved from the motivational recreation

research tradition (Kaltenborn 1993). This approach is also

strongly influenced by economic theory. Both a supply-

demand metaphor and a marked segmentation approach can

be easily identified in the ROS concept. The deduction from

Shafer’s (1969) work to user or marked segmentation in the

ROS model seems obvious. Because of this underlying

economic model, the ROS research tradition has been

criticized for using a product metaphor that reduces people’s

recreational behaviour to the consumption of recreational

benefits (Williams et al. 1992; Patterson et al. 1998). The

ROS concept originated in North America, and has been

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adapted and used in Norway and Sweden (Wallsten 1988;

Vistad 1995; Fredman et al. 2005), and in the High Arctic of

Svalbard (Kaltenborn & Emmelin 1993). The ROS approach

has been influential because it fits into a general zoning

tradition in area planning. A more process-oriented plan-

ning approach is the ‘limits of acceptable change’ (LAC)

method (Stankey et al. 1985). The LAC model combines the

concept of transactive planning (Friedman 1976) with a

reformulated carrying capacity concept. The ROS and LAC

models share many features and are often combined.

The ‘reasoned action model’ (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980) is

often used when describing how recreationists make deci-

sions. Although this is a type of ‘bounded rationality’

(Simon 1957), such a model portrays recreationists as

conscious actors making decisions based on personal

preferences. Inspired by this, Driver et al. (1991), in the

classical psychometrical tradition, developed ‘the recreation

experience preference’ (REP) scale, consisting of 19 classes

of benefits associated with recreation in nature landscapes,

such as solitude, nature experience, and achievement. Even if

Driver et al. (1991) emphasize the latter factors as motiva-

tional, the scale could be perceived as a classification system

of benefits or utilities attained by recreationists.

In our judgment, motivational recreation research fits well

with the conventional value method. There is a gradual

transition between motivational recreation research and

economic research. Finnish forest economist Tyrvainen

(1999) classifies different benefits from urban forests as

‘social benefits’, ‘aesthetic and architectural benefits’, ‘cli-

matic physical benefits’, ‘ecological benefits’, and ‘economic

benefits’. There is a close resemblance between these classes

of benefits and the 19 classes of benefits in the REP scale.

The REP scale regards recreationists as motivated by

benefits, and has a clear utilitarian orientation. Even if the

scale includes benefits such as introspection and spirituality,

that could be associated as constitutive values, they are

measured in the same way as pure utility-oriented benefits.

The use of the ‘reasoned action model’ as a rationale for

connecting preferences to behaviour, where recreationists try

to satisfy their needs, implies a view that recreationists are

consumers of pure benefits. However, rationality in this

model is more like bounded rationality. Viewing recreation-

ists as rational actors seeking satisfaction has also been

labelled ‘the commodity metaphor’ (Williams et al. 1992).

The elements of the motivational research tradition we

highlight here do not include all aspects of recreation

research. From our perspective, however, the motivational

recreation research paradigm fits well with the conventional

value model. Even if some of its elements seem to fit the

constitutive value model, we conclude that the elements it

contains � for example, the REP scale � are built into the

conventional value model.

Place-based approaches and constitutivevalues

Motivational recreation research has been criticized for

employing a ‘commodity metaphor’ because it oversimplifies

individuals’ values and neglects the emotional ties people

can have to places they visit (Williams et al. 1992). Theory

regarding favourite places and place attachment arose from

both environmental psychology and phenomenological or-

ientations within sociology, psychology, and geography.

Such theory emphasizes the meaning of place without an

easily identified motivational or rational bond between the

user and the environment (Relph 1976; Williams & Stewart

1998; Vorkinn & Riese 2001; Skar 2010). For example, an

experienced-based perspective based on the philosophical

ideas of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Skar 2010) describes

how the interactions between humans and nature can be

seen as relational, intuitive, and dynamic. Humans assign

meanings (values) to nature based on lived experience,

through nature that affects the users and stimulates new

expressions and experiences. The relationship between hu-

mans and nature does not only have the potential for change

according to the historical, cultural, and social context, but

is also strongly related to situational factors (Skar 2010).

The concept ‘sense of place’ is frequently employed to

include a deeper approach to the humanistic and phenom-

enological dimensions of individuals’ bonds to their sur-

roundings (Norberg-Schulz 1980). The concept is inspired,

in part, by psychological research (Proshansky et al. 1983;

Korpela 1992; Williams et al. 1992) and by concepts of place

in geography (Tuan 1974; Relph 1976; Agnew & Duncan

1989; Massey 1991). Gieryn (2000, 465) states that places are

not only materially ‘carved out’ of space, but also ‘inter-

preted, narrated, understood, felt, and imagined . . . the

meaning or value of the same place is labile . . . flexible in

the hands of different people or cultures, malleable over

time, and inevitably contested’. There are clear differences

between environmental psychology’s ‘place attachment’,

which describes the bond a person has to a place (few

dimensions, affective, and measurable), and the much more

complex concept of ‘sense of place’ (Patterson & Williams

1998). The literature on feelings attached to places does not

focus much on specific attributes in landscapes as such.

From a management point of view, this approach implies

more focus on specific localities and viewing each place as a

totality, not just as a sum of attributes that may be

manipulated (Gundersen & Makinen 2009).

The ‘humanistic turn’ towards sense of place and place

attachment is still contested in outdoor recreation research,

with mixed reactions to the usefulness of the place concept

(Patterson & Williams 2005). Some researchers perceive the

place concept as rather fuzzy and difficult to implement

in landscape planning and management, whereas others

perceive this fuzziness as necessary to capture the complexity

of place. Patterson & Williams (2005) view the different

reactions as expressions of different research paradigms.

There is a strong divide in social science between realist and

post-positivist researchers on one side and relativist or

constructionist researchers on the other. Some disciplines,

such as psychology, are more on the positivist side, whereas

others, for example within social sciences and humanities, are

more analytical and critical, and more on the relativist side.

An example of the positivistic tradition to place attachment is

the use of psychometric scales based on attitudinal questions

in surveys (Williams & Roggenbuck 1989; Meyer 1996;

NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 66 (2012) Outdoor recreation research: Different approaches, different values? 197

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Williams & Vaske 2003). Such studies have developed a

quantitative index (e.g. Meyer (1996) uses four items) to

measure place attachment. Further, they are mostly based on

quantitative approaches and epistemologically represent a

(post-)positivist approach to place attachment closer

affiliated to the motivational recreation research tradition

than to the more humanistic place-oriented tradition.

Place-oriented recreation research and values

Identity value as a sub-type of constitutive values is closely

related to the concept of sense of place derived from

phenomenology and place attachment derived from envir-

onmental psychology, concepts that often also include

spiritual and ethical values. They are all values classified

as constitutive values by Ariansen (1997) (Fig. 2).

In response to Ariansen, a question that can be asked is:

Could spiritual and ethical values easily fit into the

conventional value model? As an example, the REP scale

(Driver et al. 1991) includes identity and spiritual values. If

we claim that the place-oriented approach fits best within

the constitutive value approach, we need stronger and

additional evidence. In the section headed ‘Value and

recreation research’ we have defined important criteria for

the constitutive value model. The notion that values are a

part of how people (both consciously and subconsciously)

constitute themselves and the world around themselves

without necessarily gaining any direct benefits fits well

within the place-oriented approach that focuses on the

bonding between people and places. In such a tradition,

people define themselves partly through their bond to the

world around them, including places. There is clearly

consistency between how the place-oriented approach per-

ceives the relationship between people and places, and how

objects or places are perceived as having constitutive values.

In assigning value to places, people include their own self-

identity. This indicates that by definition the place-oriented

approach is oriented towards the constitutive value model.

This suggestion is also supported by the criticism levelled by

proponents of the place-oriented approach against the

commodity metaphor (Williams et al. 1992), which they

perceive as purely utilitarian. The contrast between how the

place-oriented and motivational recreation traditions con-

ceptualize peoples’ relationship with places underlines the

essential importance of scientific orientation for how values

are understood.

Both the motivational recreation research tradition and

place-oriented recreation research developed gradually, in-

spired by differing impulses. At the same time, the place-

oriented tradition evolved as a reaction to the motivational

recreation research. We show the development of theory in

recreation research in Fig. 3. At the top of the tree are some

classical works from the 1970s, which were important for what

later became referred to as motivational recreation research.

Fig. 3. The theoretical relationship between different elements in the development of motivational recreation research and place-oriented recreation research

198 J. Aasetre & V. Gundersen NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 66 (2012)

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Additionally, market segmentation and demand supply

models were important for the development of the recreation

opportunity spectrum (ROS) model of rational recreational

planning. Further development to the LAC model involved

aspects of transactive planning. Nonetheless, we suggest that

conventional recreational planning models struggle to include

aspects such as the emotional and symbolic meaning of

recreational areas that are important in the sense of place

concept.

Discussion

Scientific orientation is important for how values are

articulated; one should be aware of one’s normative position

when choosing a scientific framework. In discussing the

meaning of recreation values, we have to take the complexity

of research traditions into account. Both socially con-

structed research approaches and value taxonomy models

are dynamic and open for debate. We find positive and

negative arguments and challenges for both value models.

Next, we highlight some conceptual questions and themes of

relevance for understanding how the two value models

respond to different themes within the framework of

recreation research.

Is nothing sacred any longer?

The place approach has clear linkage to how values are

constructed in the constitutive value model, and fits well into

a critical discourse on life in a postmodern world. In his

work, Liquid Modernity, Bauman (2000) describes postmo-

dern citizens as opportunists, people who act under un-

certainty and constantly make trade-offs as consumers

essentially looking for the best bid. In the simplest manner,

the commodity metaphor reduces the recreationist to a pure

consumer that seeks to satisfy their needs and wants, a

consumer that neither is looking for a higher meaning nor

acting on moral obligations.

Several authors have criticized Bauman’s (2000) portrayal

of post or late modernity, partly because he paints an overly

cynical portrait of postmodern ‘man’ as a single-minded

egoistic consumer (Nilsen 2007; Atkinson 2008). An earlier

critique against the consumerist view of humans, contained

in the idea of optimizing ‘economic man’, was articulated by

Sen (1977) in his term ‘rational fools’. The work of Bauman

(2000) in itself can be interpreted as a warning against the

risk of liquid modernity, where nothing is sacred any longer.

Most individuals would probably claim that their lives and

actions are guided by deeper meanings, something ‘solid’ (to

use Bauman’s terminology). We think that unease about

what Bauman calls ‘liquid modernity’ indicates that people

realize the importance of non-utilitarian constitutive values.

However, we do not deny that Bauman identifies important

characteristics of postmodern living; the emphasis put on

consumer-oriented analytical models can be seen as an

indicator of this. A solely utilitarian view that focuses on

consumption may lead to a risk of losing the deeper meaning

of life, i.e. a risk of commercialization and a sense that

nothing is sacred any longer. In that case, the constitutive

value model gives more possibilities than the conventional

value model for perceiving objects or situations as placing

sacred obligations on us. The consumer-orientation that is

implicit in the concept of liquid modernity fits very well with

the conventional value model and a consumer-oriented way

of conceptualizing recreation values. This is best illustrated

by the REP scale (Driver et al. 1991), a model where

different experiences are valued on the same scale. Another

example of commodification of recreation is the ROS model

(Driver & Brown 1978; Clark & Stankey 1979), based on

market segmentation, where different user groups can

consume different experience opportunities in different

zones. The same consumer-orientation is not formalized in

the place-based approach.

Sense of place and the danger of essentialism

The place-oriented approach grew out of a critical view of

motivational recreation research and the commodity meta-

phor (Williams et al. 1992), where nothing is sacred any

longer. There may be a risk with the sense of place concept

that it becomes too nostalgic when looking for solid values.

However, the place concept includes a variety of different

meanings and perspectives. Researchers in geography have

traditionally used three different and interwoven dimensions

of place (Agnew & Duncan 1989):

1. Location � which focuses on the localization of different

phenomena, e.g. economic geography employs location

theories to investigate why a particular industry might

exist in a particular place

2. Locale � which focuses on the different social interac-

tions at a particular place, viewing place as social

context (Giddens 1984)

3. Sense of place � which focuses on the experiences,

attachments and bonds that exist between people and

places.

The geographer Massey (1991) cautioned against the risks of

becoming too nostalgic and conservative through an essen-

tialist view of place. Yet it is not merely nostalgia to

acknowledge that people’s bonds to and perceptions of

places are created through dynamic interactions at specific

locations. The criticism of the nostalgic sense of place

concept has especially grown as a consequence of globaliza-

tion. Massey (1991) introduced the concept ‘global sense of

place’, focusing on dynamic urban neighbourhoods, but

with relevance for the management of recreation areas. She

claims that it is possible to have strong attachment to

modern urban places that have ‘the whole world in itself ’

without being reactionary or defensive, and maintains that

places are not isolated but gain their identity through long-

lasting interactions with other places. Each place may be

perceived as ‘articulated moments in networks of social

relations and understandings’ (Massey 1991, 28). Massey

suggests that places should be perceived as meeting places

for different human and social interactions. A place is

dynamic through changing social relations as time moves

on, i.e. setting the sense of place dimension in relation to the

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location and locale dimension of places. Hence, places have

no clear boundaries, because they change over time and

between different social groups. Ultimately, a place cannot

have just one identity; individuals will experience and define

the place differently based on their own experiences, actions,

and relations. Essentialism is problematical in the place-

oriented approach, which emphasizes people’s bonds to

recreational places. The conventional value model is by

definition relative, and therefore not as open for essential-

ism. The emphasis Massey (1991) puts on the relational

concept of people-place bounding indicates that constitutive

values are socially constructed.

Lacking a moral dimension

Utilitarian values may raise moral dilemmas. Safeguarding

the well-being of our fellow citizens may be a moral value

that cannot be judged only from a utilitarian perspective.

This leads to normative ethics where judgements on right

and wrong are based on morality and norms. Most people

would agree that a person’s right to exist should not be

judged based on economic welfare. Instead, most people

would judge the right of existence as a basic ‘human right’,

which is a sacred value that cannot be traded away.

Human rights are interesting as an example of moral

values, and can be seen as a parallel to intrinsic value in

nature (Callicott 2002). Universal human rights have been

an issue in both public and scientific discourses. The concept

of human rights is deeply rooted in Western philosophy and

thinking. The principle of universal human rights has been

challenged by statements that ‘Asiatic values’ are based on

principles that differ from ‘Western values’ (Bruun &

Jacobsen 2000; Neary 2002). At the same time, it is argued

that the concept of ‘Asiatic values’ is constructed by

authoritarian rulers arguing against the idea of universal

human rights. This is a dilemma regarding constitutive

values. If the arguments of cultural relativism are accepted,

then it also has to be accepted that moral values are socially

constructed and simultaneously lose some of their meaning.2

If non-utility oriented constitutive values place obligations

on people, they cannot be traded. Religious beliefs and

cultural identities can be examples of such values, such as

sacred mountains in the Himalayas and other sacred places

that are rooted in cultural identity. Another, perhaps more

readily apparent, example is that most humans are uneasy

about negotiating the price for killing another person. We

cannot bargain over the life of a fellow citizen, and hence we

commit ourselves to moral obligations that something is

sacred. A consequence of such a statement is that it would

be morally problematical in such cases to use willingness to

pay as a way of valuing objects. Non-utilitarian constitutive

values are not open for buying and selling.

The dichotomy between ecocentric and anthropocentric

values in environmental research includes some elements of

morality. However, such research has been used more to

predict environmental preferences or activity patterns than it

has been used as a management perspective in recreation

research. Ecocentric values are controversial because it is

often claimed that ecosystems possess value independent of

human thinking and valuation (Hargrove 2003). Since

humans cannot confer with other species of animals or with

plants, critics contend that ecocentric value statements are

also based on human preferences and attitudes. The inclusion

of such views without reducing them to utilitarian values

could be built on the same moral positions as human rights,

i.e. the existence of moral principles of higher importance

than the losses or gains of individuals or groups. These

principles concern ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, regardless of particular

contexts and individual preferences. Such values are lost in

motivational recreation research, and possibly also the place-

oriented approach because it only builds on emotional bonds,

not on a conscious moral choice. The moral dimension may

be seen as criticism of the traditional motivational recreation

research. Much research within this tradition focuses on

people’s motives for pursuing recreation (Ajzen & Fishbein

1980; Ajzen & Driver 1992) or on the utilitarian values for the

users (Driver et al. 1991). The moral dimension is clearly

a part of the constitutive value model, even if the place-

tradition itself does not focus much on morality.

Value models and philosophical orientation

The two different value models described above seem to be

grounded within different views on the philosophy of

science. The constitutive value model corresponds to ex-

istentialistic philosophy, as for example Heidegger’s (1962

[1927]) concept of ‘dasein’, or being in the world, a way of

thinking that erodes the traditional divide between subject

and object. Our lives in the world define who we are, and

the nature of places defines how we live in them.

Such conceptualization makes it easier to understand why

constitutive values are obligational, because understanding

ourselves in a certain manner means we also have to accept

specific values in the world we live in. For example, in many

cases, we take our surroundings in daily life as given; it is

first when the old oak we used to pass every day is cut down

that we stop and think about the situation. In our lives, we

have many habits and relationships that we do not reflect

about before we are forced to. We may have a favourite place

in a forest that we like to visit in our leisure time, but mostly

we do not reflect on our attachment to the place before the

forest is cut down. We do not need to reflect on every step we

take when visiting a forest, or in our life in general, but the

divide between subject and object has traditionally been seen

as the starting point of rational thinking: to stop up, take a

step beside ourselves, and analyse the situation. This way of

thinking has roots that can be traced back to Descartes, and

constitutes a starting point for the positivistic and post-

positivistic paradigms in science (Wollan 2003). The con-

ventional value model, in which a subject assigns value to an

object or situations based rational judgments of utility and

personal preferences, fits well with the post-positivistic way

of rational thinking. Conversely, an existentialistically or-

iented view of values (constitutive value model) fits with the

humanistic recreation research tradition, which differs in

methods and results from the rationalistic post-positivistic

research tradition.

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Even if most of the place-oriented tradition is basically

humanistic, we assume that place attachment research is

closer to the post-positivist research tradition. This implies

that the difference between demand and instrumental values

on the one hand and constitutive values on the other is

fundamentally rooted in different scientific paradigms.

Patterson & Williams (1998; 2005) explain the negative

reactions among some researchers to the place-oriented

approach by differences in philosophy of science and

inadequate understanding of the complexity of the place

concept. Sack (1992) describes the dilemma of the abstrac-

tion of place in science and modernism as ‘the view from

nowhere to somewhere’. Different disciplines examine place

through methods that can almost be described as a

perspective from nowhere. For Sack, place is a concrete

focal point where all aspects are integrated: nature, social

relations, and meaning. A concrete and specific somewhere

can be experienced, understood, and explained from multi-

ple research discipline perspectives (or different epistemolo-

gical perspectives). In Norway, Kaltenborn (1998) criticizes

the difficulties of implementing the place-oriented approach

in management and research because of the difficulties of

defining an object for research. Operationalization and

operational validity are classical positivistic concepts, illus-

trating how the critique is firmly placed in a specific

scientific tradition.

A composite value taxonomy

We have shown that different traditions in recreation

research include different ways of conceptualizing values.

In the constitutive value model, demand values and instru-

mental values are either directly or indirectly utilitarian

values. Hence, they also fit into the conventional value

model. In our view, demand and instrumental values may be

measured, for example, by preference scales such as the REP

scale, making a post-positivist approach sufficient. However,

constitutional values place obligations on us by focusing on

existential questions, and consequently the situation calls for

a humanistic approach. We therefore argue that the two

value models build on different scientific paradigms, and

have to be open for radically different ways of thinking.

A solution may be to try to combine the two value models

into a composite model that bridges them, as we illustrate in

Fig. 4. We have documented that identity values are

attempts to conceptualize both a utilitarian value through

the REP scale and a constitutive value through the place-

oriented approach. Different values can perhaps be con-

ceptualized to varying degrees to include instrumental

(demand) and constitutive components. The relative

strength of the different components will vary from situation

to situation.

Figure 4 places demand values and instrumental values

within the economic and psychological research orientation,

which we describe as a conventional value taxonomy. In

relation to particular places, this perspective could be

described as the perspective from nowhere (Sack 1992).

However, constitutive values are placed in the humanistic

and philosophical research orientation. Constitutive values

can be considered to be place-specific.

Conclusions

In this article we have discussed how different scientific

approaches include different models of conceptualizing

values and the implications for management and policy.

The motivational recreation tradition can easily end in what

some critics label the commodity metaphor. The place

attachment tradition, on the other hand, includes non-

utilitarian values. However, within the internal place-based

discourse, some raise concerns about an essentialist view of

the value of places. Nonetheless, the place-based tradition

seems to complement the motivational research tradition in

such a way that the two traditions in combination reduce the

risk of the commodity metaphor. This conclusion is

supported by Sen’s (1977) description of ‘rational fools’

and by Bauman’s (2000) thinking on ‘liquid modernity’.

Even so, we find that reflection on moral principles such as

Fig. 4. The constitutive value model and the economic-oriented model combined

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human rights or environmental morality may be lacking in

existing research approaches. The place attachment tradition

takes such values partly into account, but only as emotion-

ally-based or taken-for-granted values. Conscious morality

based on philosophical thinking is not included in any of the

described traditions. Our conclusions and managerial advice

are hence the following:

. When recreation research is used, we have to be aware of

value biases in the different traditions.

. Only when reflecting on diverse approaches will a more

comprehensive picture of the values attributed to a

landscape be taken into consideration.

. Commodity values as well as non-utilitarian values and

morality have to be included in judgements concerning

the allocation of recreation resources.

. Including constitutive values makes optimization difficult

because in extreme cases we may talk about ‘sacred

values’.

. ‘Sacred values’ are moral values included in the consti-

tutive value model, but are not so well represented in

either of the two recreation research traditions discussed.

The place-tradition also may be at risk of being to

nostalgic.

. Placing emphasis on people’s experiences of their life-

world implies that management needs to take account of

the specific situations of people’s experiences when

making management decisions. This can best be done

with interactive communicative approaches.

Notes

1 Hargrove (2003) argues for what he calls ‘weak anthropocentric intrinsic

value’ because he doubts that it is possible to persuade ordinary people to

believe that values can exist independent of human thinking.

2 Non-Western values include a variety of moral rules and ideals. In relation

to outdoor recreation, it is interesting to note that some classify rights of

access to nature for the purpose of outdoor recreation as a form of Asiatic

value (Soffield 2009).

Acknowledgements. � The authors thank Per Ariansen, Department of

Philosophy, University of Oslo, for inspiration through his work on

constitutive values and environmental ethics. He has, however, no responsi-

bility for our interpretation of his work. We are also grateful to two

anonymous reviewers and to Erik Stange, Norwegian Institute for Nature

Research, for constructive comments.

Manuscript submitted 12 July 2011; accepted 4 June 2012

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