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THE NEED FOR DEVELOPING A POSITIVE LEADERSHIP CULTURE FOR BANGLADESH ARMY
Major Mohammad Alam Tareque, psc, East Bengal
“A favourable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient"- Gary Klein (Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions)
Introduction
1. The future war would be very complex and likely to begin at short notice.
The type of war that Bangladesh Army is expected to be involved in is a “limited
war in nature”1. The limited war is of short duration and being fought at high
tempo and intensity. It would involve lethal weapons thus requiring great
dispersion across the engagement area. In future conflicts, at the very outset,
advanced fighting forces would try to upset the chain of command of the enemy
by disrupting communications. This may be achieved by the use of electro
magnetic pulse, by employing conventional special forces or by using
unconventional forces. The battle field situation will be very fluid where
psychological warfare coupled with the media would aim to propagate rumour to
confuse commanders at all levels. The increased reach of integral firepower and
surveillance resources, including space-based systems will make the area of
operation deeper and wider. There will be non linear operations and exist threat
from enemy special forces to rear areas which will necessitate earmarking of
troops to provide security to lines of communication. All these will perforce
necessitate decentralisation of command and control as much as possible.
1Operations of War, Volume One, GSTP 0032, p 1-4.1
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2. Our present doctrine is: “To blend the conventional with the
unconventional warfare from the very beginning of the breakout of the
hostilities”.2 According to our present doctrine, the Unconventional Force
Commander will receive mission type orders from the overall commander. The
Unconventional Force will also require breaking up in small groups. Junior
leaders will have to lead The Unconventional Force independently and in
isolation. The Unconventional Force Commander will be responsible for planning,
execution and improvisation to achieve the mission. 3 In the perspective of future
conflict, considering these above mentioned attributes of our new doctrine, it is
obvious that any sub unit level commander has to adapt his unit with fast moving
fluid situations. Employing the sub unit or a unit is much easier under the
instructions from higher headquarters but what will happen when the
communication is lost and the sub unit commanders (say lieutenants and
captains) need to act without detailed orders from superiors?
3. “Command is based on task and situation. The task lays down the aims to
be achieved, which the commander charged with achieving it must keep in the
forefront of his mind. Task and situation give rise to the mission...The mission
must be a clearly defined aim to be pursued with all one's powers...The
commander must leave his subordinates freedom of action, to the extent that
2 Ibid.3Ibid, pp 32-03198.
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doing so does not imperil his intention.”4 The quoted statement summarises what
a commander must do in case of not receiving any further instructions from
superior as a result of lost communication. GSTP 0032 states further: “he
(commander) must not go into such details that the initiative of the subordinates
is curbed. The answer is Auftragstaktik”5. Thus, this specifies the necessity of
adopting Mission Tactics. The term Mission Tactics has been evolved from the
German term ‘Auftragstaktik’ (German word ‘Auftrag’ means task/mission and
‘taktik’ is tactics). This term defines the essence of mission oriented tactics: “the
Commander only tells subordinates what tasks to accomplish, but not how to
accomplish”.6 Therefore, adopting this approach requires a deliberate training
and a command climate based on mutual trust. If Bangladesh Army is to adopt
Mission Tactics then it needs to generate a new positive leadership culture vis a
vis a culture of initiative, hence we must begin by creating the right frame of mind
in our troops and officers. The question is “Are we preparing for that”?
4. The paper will discuss and examine the need for developing a leadership
culture of initiative for Bangladesh Army with a view to adopting the Mission
Tactics. I will therefore, explore rather than to define the significance of
leadership based on initiative for adopting Mission Tactics and relate it to the
perspective of Bangladesh Army. In doing so, First, I will present the concept of
4Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's
Defence Publishers, 1985), p. 228.5GSTP 0032, Op Cit, p 5-2 (0511). 6John T Nelsen II, Auftragstaktik: A case for Decentralised Combat Leadership, (The Challenge of Military
Leadership), p 29.3
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Mission Tactics and then I will list down the constraints of the Bangladesh Army’s
Leadership that need to be scored to cope with the demand of Mission Tactics.
Second, I would propose how we can inculcate a positive leadership culture
based on initiative to overcome those constraints and facilitate adopting the
Mission Tactics concept for Bangladesh Army. My intent in writing this essay is to
stir debate on this important issue. Frankly, I do not have all the answers, just a
number of questions for those of us in the Bangladesh Army to grapple with. If
this paper causes other officers to think about our lack of a positive leadership
culture then I have been successful.
AIM
5. The aim of this paper is to analyse the need for developing a positive
leadership culture based on initiative for Bangladesh Army with a view to
adopting Mission Tactics.
Scope
6. The paper will only discuss the mission tactics i.e. tactics carried out with
mission oriented command and control and to adopt this approach why do we
need to develop a positive leadership culture based on initiative. We believe that
the adoption of Mission Tactics is already settled in GSTP 0032 therefore, the
debate whether or not the Mission Tactics is relevant for Bangladesh Army is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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The Concept of Mission Tactics
7. The term Mission Tactics, which is developed from German term
‘Auftragstaktik’, is also adopted by advanced armies of the USA, the UK and the
Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). ‘Auftrgastaktik’ was officially incorporated in
German ‘Warmacht’ manual in 1888 though its origin can be traced back to
‘Prussian Military Reforms’ that began in 18087. Out of necessity, the Prussian
Army studied the problem to rectify their acknowledged deficiencies in decision-
making at the lower echelons. The Prussians then commissioned the Drill
Regulations of the Infantry (1888). It stipulated that commanders should give
subordinates general directions of what were to be done, allowing them freedom
to determine how to do it. That was the start of allowing decision making at the
lower levels in the Army. It encouraged commanders to be "thinking leaders" who
can make tactical judgments on their own and who would also be less likely to
"freeze up" when faced with new situations without formal instructions. This
tactics was practiced and advocated by two most successful commanders of
German Army – Guderian and Rommell. The German Army regulations describe
'Auftragstaktik' as: “A command and control procedure within which the
subordinate is given extensive latitude, within the framework of the intention of
the individual giving the order, in carrying out his mission. The missions are to
include only those restraints which are indispensable for being able to interact
with others, and it must be possible to accomplish them by making use of the
7H W Koch, A History of Prussia, pp 180-187.5
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subordinate's forces, resources, and the authority delegated to him. Mission
oriented command and control requires uniformity in the way of thinking, sound
judgment and initiative, as well as responsible actions at all levels.”8
8. One must be curious to know why this term ‘Auftragstaktik’ is adopted as
Mission Tactics / Directive Control by armies like the USA, the UK and the IDF
despite the fact that Germans lost World War II. One of the reasons may be that
the combination of ‘Auftragstaktik’ and ‘Blitzkreig’ let the Germans win many
battles fought being outnumbered. For the IDF the reason is: “At the primary or
individual level there are other factors that provide IDF soldiers with high levels of
morale and combat motivation. These are, “for each soldier, a goal, a role, and a
reason for self-confidence.”9…“Indeed, the IDF’s traditional emphasis on Mission
Tactics gives subordinates right down the chain of command the greatest
possible freedom of action.”10 The IDF practiced successfully this approach of
Mission Tactics in two of the Arab-Israeli lightning wars, in 1956 and 1967. In
Mission Tactics the military commanders give its subordinate leaders a clearly
defined goal (the mission) and the forces needed to accomplish that goal with a
time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leader then
implements the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large
extent, initiative and a freedom which enables flexibility in execution. Mission
8Armor,90(January-February 1981),"The German Army's Mission Oriented Command and Control," p 12.
9Frederick J. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps,” in Handbook of Military Psychology, ed.
Reuven Gal and David A. Mangelsdorff (Chichester, Eng.: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), pp. 453-54.
10Concept of “directive control” or “mission-oriented” control, Richard E. Simpkin, “Command from the
Bottom,” Infantry (March-April 1985).6
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Tactics frees higher leadership from tactical details. Thus, the word is something
of a misnomer. It is not a tactic per se (and certainly not limited to the tactical
level). It is more of a method of leadership. So far, the leader character is
concerned, initiative in a leader flow from his willingness to step forward, take
charge of a situation and act promptly – completely on his own authority, if
necessary.
Mission Tactics, Its Components and the Role of Leadership
9. Mission Tactics is a decentralised command and leadership philosophy
that demands decisions and action at the lowest level of command where there is
an intimate knowledge of the situation and the commander's intention from the
beginning of an operation. The mission order is merely a technique that is used
to implement and execute mission oriented command. Mission oriented
command is based on a belief in the ability of an individual's creative action to
solve a problem without recourse to higher authority; the mission order is only the
small component of Mission Tactics that we see in the field. But there are other
components of Mission Tactics listed as following:
a. Mutual trust among leaders based on each leader's intimate personal
knowledge of the capabilities of the others.
b. Training and organisation in everything the army does to reinforce the
primacy of the judgment of the man on the scene (decentralisation).
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c. A willingness to act on the part of all leaders and those who aspire to be
leaders.
d. Simple, commonly accepted and understood operations’ concepts.
10. Mission Tactics is a style of command that holds that command and
control needs to be structured so that the leaders of small units are given the
freedom to respond to fast changing tactical situations and challenges.
Furthermore, the leaders are able to seize unforeseen opportunities and to act,
even without orders, to achieve favourable results.11 With Mission Tactics, a
commander in the midst of fast changing operations and pressed for time will
reduce his “orders” to the essentials only. An order for a major operation might fit
on one page and would never exceed three or four pages. They must not be
cluttered with intelligence and logistic details that could be dealt with through staff
channels. They set out clearly and simply the commander’s intention, his
subordinates’ tasks, the resources available to them, and the constraints they
must observe.12 The subordinate leader then considers these in the context of
Mission Analysis, which is a process whereby the subordinate leader is forced to
consider the Directive in relation to the Main Effort and the commander’s intent.
The subordinate leader’s Mission Analysis takes place in the presence of his
commander to gain a clear mental picture of what must be done.13 Mission
Tactics therefore demands that all leaders possess flexibility of mind and
11 Capt. I. A. Hope, Directive Control and Mission Analysis: Keys to Manoeuvre Warfare at Company Level, Infantry Journal, vol. 31, Spring 1997.12 R. Simpkin, Race to the Swift, (London: Brassey’s, 1985, reprinted 2000), p. 57.13 Hope, Op Cit. p 11.
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courage to act decisively even without direction. By stressing command over
control, Mission Tactics endeavours to maximize the effect of the leadership and
tactical skills of junior leaders. Missions are thus conducted by the junior leaders
“themselves reading the instantaneous local situation and reacting to it with their
understanding of the aim and plan.”14 The real basis of Mission Tactics is “an
unbroken chain of trust and mutual respect running from the operational
commander to the section commander.”15 This chain leaves the subordinate free
to act as he sees fit in the furtherance of his superior’s intention, and assures him
of support even if he makes an error of judgment.16Its three most important
components are:
a. The issuing of Directives by commanders.
b. The designation of Main Efforts by commanders.
c. The conduct of Mission Analysis by subordinate leaders17.
Positive Leadership Culture and Our Situation
11. Having discussed the above concept of Mission Tactics, it is needless to
put more argument in favour of a positive proactive leadership that is must for 14 Simpkin, Op Cit. p 23.15 Ibid. p 230.16 Ibid, p 239.17 Mark Gaillard, Second Lieutenant, Their Intelligent Initiative and Its Cultivation: A New Leadership Doctrine for Manoeuvre Warfare, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, vol 3, no 4, Winter 2000/2001, pp 8-10.
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adopting the concept. Positive Leadership Culture can be defined as ‘the ability
to adapt the army to a decentralised command structure that favours the use of
initiative’. B H Liddell Hart says: “. . . any approach to warfighting is highly
dependent upon leadership…Mission Tactics is the ‘cultivation’ of ‘intelligent
initiative’ by junior leaders.” The Bangladesh Army has already taken the bold
step to adopt a new doctrine of blending conventional with the unconventional
warfare in its training. Both the concept and philosophy are slowly evolving in the
doctrinal manuals. The Germans took almost a century to change and over 56
years, they were successful in applying their ideas to war. Hence, to effectively
blend conventional warfare with the unconventional warfare with an approach to
Mission Tactics, we need to start on the right footing. What is the right footing?
The answer lies in two very important points that we can learn from the German
experience:
A. A positive leadership culture that fits Bangladesh Army officers,
warrant officers and soldiers.
b. The need to inculcate initiative through the ranks.
These two points are related: to practise Mission Tactics we need a leadership
culture that is undoubtedly based on initiative.
12. The Bangladesh Army has long been operating using the traditional
authoritarian approach requiring strict obedience to orders to accomplish the
mission. We have the knack for long and detailed orders even before executing
the mission. Now for the requirement of blending conventional and
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unconventional warfare, the environment has become more conducive for
mission accomplishment. A key tenet of blending conventional and
unconventional warfare: commanders equip themselves to accomplish their
assigned missions according to the commander's intent. The value of
decentralised command lies in the fact that it treasures the initiative of
subordinates, striving to harness their creative energies towards simultaneous
problem solving at all levels. The desired effect is speed in operations based on
the ability to make sound judgments developed through trial and error. Adequate,
not perfect, solutions are sought. Leaders involved in carrying out mission type
orders make a rapid estimate of the situation, adopt a sound course of action as
feasible and execute it decisively. In this view, speed is more essential than
precision; a decent plan carried out immediately is expected and superior to a
superb plan carried out much later.
13. Our leadership culture today suffers from the stigma of 'loss of face'.
There is always the fear that mistakes by subordinates will be seen as a failure
on the part of the commander's ability. 'Losing face' at a field training exercise, ln
a major inspection, is not easy to accept. During a setback, commanders look for
scapegoats to pay the price for the mistakes. We need to change this frame of
mind and understand that this is a major obstacle in developing initiative in the
officers and men alike. Mission Tactics emphasises trust between the superior
and his subordinates. Over controlling or playing safe is a reflection of the
commander's insecurity. William S Lind, a renowned warfare theorist, advised:
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"... to be able to fight the enemy, you need a command and control system based
on leadership and monitoring ... Both leadership and monitoring are valueless
without trust... trust by the commander that his subordinates will understand him
while carrying out his desires, and trust by those subordinates that they will be
supported when exercising their initiative.” The question is ‘are we allowed taking
initiative and making mistakes’? Certainly not, if it was so, then buzz words like:
‘zero error syndrome’, ‘spoon feeding’, ‘over supervision’, ‘over ensuring’, ‘super
imposing of commanders’ etc. would not have been so much familiar in
Bangladesh Army.
14. The Bangladesh Army is promulgating the new doctrine of blending
conventional with unconventional warfare for meeting the new challenges in the
battlefield. As such, our officers and men are being trained to embrace this new
approach to war. Our training environment is slowly changing to accommodate
the Mission Tactics approach to warfare. We should train to create a frame of
mind in our officers and men that allows them to think and act aggressively. Thus
the emphasis is on independent decision making, accepting responsibility and
taking the initiative; and all these should include training to fight battles, not
merely training for the sake of training. The junior commissioned and non
commissioned officers (JCO&NCOs) are very important leaders for any army.
Our army had been lacking in this aspect and we had also been late to realise
this. However, the recent measures of introducing sergeants’ course and platoon
leaders’ course to train the JCOs and NCOs are certainly an encouraging step.
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But, mere training them in training institutions would not make them capable of
executing missions after receiving mission type orders; they also need to be
tested and most importantly allowed to make mistakes in field training exercises.
Positive Leadership Culture for Bangladesh Army: The Way Ahead
15. General Franks’ “right command climate”, the psychological manifestation
of the chain of mutual trust and respect, is the sine qua non of Mission Tactics
leadership. To create and sustain this, the commander must be able to
decentralize his command and control with trust. 18 We should get into the culture
of issuing general instructions, relying on subordinates to get the job done within
a broad guideline. On the other side, one important caveat to this is that
subordinates must first be professional in getting the job done in the most
efficient manner without his superiors having to supervise it. This is how the two
way traffic is completed, earning the trust of the superior commander by making
oneself competent enough. The junior leaders must have the necessary
experience to do things right. Plans must be viewed as provisional, with the
understanding that no plan is ever implemented exactly as envisioned.
Commanders must think on their own feet, always aggressively analysing,
recommending, anticipating and adjusting. Thus, initiative, if it is to be
encouraged in the army, must be supported by a positive leadership culture, a
viable command and control system and mutual trust at all levels.
18 J. Shaw, “Examining the Mechanics of Change: How We Can Create Manoeuvre Warfare”, British Army Review, vol. 97 (April 1991), p. 20.
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16. The effective application of Mission Tactics is dependent on individual
willingness and capability to apply non conformist and unique solutions when
crisis arises. The readiness of all ranks to depart from "the plan" once it no longer
supports the Commander’s desired end state is essential and must be
assumable by each level of command. The Army must accept and continue
teaching its officers, JCOs and NCOs that illogical obedience to issued tasks/
orders is rigidity and no longer acceptable because it does not support an
evolution to Mission Tactics. We often say while teaching tactics, ‘to think out of
the box’, but do we really patronise our junior leaders to do so. An army survives
and grows, physically, intellectually and spiritually through its risk takers.
However, we do not here support the breaking of regulations, or the placing of
soldiers in training under unnecessary or unjustifiable risk. We should however,
find out the edge of the allowed envelope to take prudent risk. Take, for example,
the Army we have now over the years, many of us who avoid anything to do with
training involving risk, especially the live fire training of soldiers in tactical
scenarios. We avoid the challenge not because of the risk to the soldiers, but
because of the perceived risk of our own careers, if something goes wrong.
Therefore, we prefer security and safety and play it safe at the cost of the
standard of training. Risk takers challenge the comfortable warmth of the status
quo; they are willing to trade their potential within the hierarchy for accepting a
degree of responsibility the bureaucracy has decided to find distasteful. Even
legitimate risk takers disturb the hierarchy because they refuse to "stay in the
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box” and there is no risk-taking, in the box. We preach them to think out of the
box but prefer to stay in the box. This contradiction must be settled.
17. We must provide both training and the environment for initiative to
develop. The starting point is to delegate more responsibility to our junior
commanders and soldiers. It requires giving them authority and responsibility and
giving them the implicit trust to get the job done. This however, does not mean
that standards are lowered or that mistakes are not corrected. Junior leaders
should be allowed to make mistakes but not blunders. They need to do it first,
know what is wrong, and then correct their mistakes. They need to gradually be
given more latitude to shoulder heavier responsibilities. Each leader and soldier
will begin to invest more effort and pride in ensuring that the best is exacted from
their respective section, platoon, company and unit. A culture of independent
thinking and aggressive decision making for peacetime training is crucial in
developing initiative. Commanders and soldiers need to be encouraged and
trained to make decisions at short notice. Unit commanders at all levels must
move away from the insecurity complex. Change, if managed well, is for the good
of the Army, not the individual. People are unwilling to change or make partial
changes only to find faults and then revert to the old ways of doing things. The
famous saying, "the army is going round in circles" is a symptom of this insecurity
complex. Our attitude should be to, ‘Find fault with the logic used to select the
approach and correct it through training, but never blame the soldier’s willingness
to try.’
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18. Mission tactics benefits the senior commanders by freeing time to focus
on higher level concerns rather than looking after the detail of subordinate’s
execution. The senior prescribes the method of execution only to the degree that
is essential for coordination. The senior intervenes in a subordinate's execution
only by exception when things go hundred and eighty degree opposite. Because,
“The advantage which a commander thinks he can attain through continued
personal intervention is largely illusory. By engaging in it, he assumes a task that
really belongs to others, whose effectiveness he thus destroys. He also multiplies
his own tasks to a point where he can no longer fulfill the whole of them.”19 Thus
initiative allows continuing the speed (high tempo) of operations that we desire.
Uninhibited by excessive restrictions from above, subordinates can adapt their
actions to the changing ‘fluid’ situations. They inform the commander of what
they have done, but they do not wait for permission. Mission Tactics serves as a
contract between senior and subordinate. The senior agrees to provide
subordinates with the support necessary to help them accomplish their missions
but without unnecessarily prescribing their actions. The senior is obligated to
provide the guidance that allows subordinates to exercise proper judgment and
initiative. The subordinate is obligated to act in conformity with the intent of the
senior. The subordinate agrees to act responsibly and loyally and not to exceed
the proper limits of authority. Mission Tactics requires subordinates to act with
19 Helmuth von Moltke, Prussian Field Marshal, quoted in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Command
and Control (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], Final draft, August 2000), 1-14.
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"top sight"—a grasp of how their actions fit into the larger situation.9 In other
words, subordinates must always think above their own levels in order to
contribute to the accomplishment of the higher mission. It is obvious that we
cannot allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing unity, or
focus to the various efforts. To do so would be to dissipate our strength. We seek
unity not principally through imposed control but through harmonious initiative
and lateral coordination within the context provided by guidance from above.
Conclusion
19. The concept of Mission Tactics is a necessity for conducting war following
the new doctrine of blending conventional with unconventional warfare. Mission
Tactics does not mean merely decentralization of control; rather it is the freedom
of action delegated to junior leaders to achieve the mission ordered by superior
commanders. Commanders at all levels must be accorded considerable freedom
for initiative. Such latitude can generate the speed of response that is critical to
battle field success. The fog and friction of war may invalidate the carefully
wrought plans of higher authority, leaving the individual commander the best
judge of the immediate tactical situation. Mission Tactics demand junior leaders
to think aggressively, make independent decisions, assume responsibility of
being in charge of the situation, showing initiative , boldness and are prepared to
take prudent risks.
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20. Risk taking stems from initiative. What is different about risk taking in this
context is the importance attached to making an independent decision when
circumstances dictate. An incorrect but earnest decision is far preferable to lack
of action. A "zero defects" mindset tends to discourage subordinate’s initiative.
The other important factor is understanding commander's intent by the entire
command and control process. Commander's intent binds together various tasks,
and defines the desired end state. In determining the prudence of their decisions,
subordinates should assess their projected initiatives in accordance with the
commander's intent. They must act within the commander's intent to ensure unity
of effort.
21. Finally, superior subordinate relations must be characterised by mutual
trust. Such trust furnishes the subordinate with the confidence to exercise
initiative without concerns about reprimand for error or bad judgment. Likewise,
superiors have confidence that subordinates will carry out orders and exercise
their initiative consonant with the superior's intent. Mutual trust is thus a
manifestation of superior subordinate professionalism. Mutually trusting
individuals, moreover, are those most likely to anticipate one another's actions, to
understand intuitively how the others are thinking, hence setting in train a
harmony of minds whereby detailed instructions are unnecessary.
Recommendation
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19. An integrated theory of the nature of war is needed to fight in the near
future in addition to desirable character and leadership attributes; command and
control, senior subordinate relationships, application of tactics, acquisition of new
knowledge, education and training. The move towards this positive leadership
culture is ultimately to develop a new frame of mind which is the crux of the
Mission Tactics concept. Therefore, Bangladesh Army must change the existing
leadership psyche to facilitate moving forward to a positive leadership culture
based on initiative.
September 2007 MOHAMMAD ALAM TAREQUE
Sylhet Cantonment Major
Bibliography
1. H W Koch, A History of Prussia.
2. I. A. Hope, Capt, Directive Control and Mission Analysis: Keys to
Manoeuvre Warfare at Company Level, Infantry Journal, vol. 31, Spring 1997.
3. John T Nelsen II, Auftragstaktik; A case for Decentralised Combat
Leadership, (The Challenge of Military Leadership).
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4. J. Shaw, Examining the Mechanics of Change: How We Can Create
Manoeuvre Warfare, British Army Review, vol. 97 (April 1991).
5. Mangelsdorff (Chichester, Eng.: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), Frederick J.
Manning; Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps, Handbook of Military
Psychology, ed. Reuven Gal and David A.
6. Mark Gaillard, Second Lieutenant, Their Intelligent Initiative and Its
Cultivation: A New Leadership Doctrine for Manoeuvre Warfare, The Army
Doctrine and Training Bulletin, vol 3, no 4, Winter 2000/2001.
7. Operations of War, Volume One, GSTP 0032.
8. Richard E. Simpkin, Concept of “directive control” or “mission-oriented”
control, “Command from the Bottom”, Infantry (March-April 1985),
9. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century
Warfare, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985).
10. The German Army's Mission Oriented Command and Control, Armor
90(January-February 1981).
AUTHOR’S BIODATA
Major Mohammad Alam Tareque, psc, East Bengal is the General Staff Officer Grade 2 (Coordination), of Tactics Wing, School of Infantry and Tactics. He is an infantryman who belongs to 19 th
BMA Long Course. He was born in Charging Nine and was later assigned to 27 and 51 Infantry Regiments at various capacities. Major Tareque is a distinguished instructor of Bangladesh Military
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Academy and School of Infantry and Tactics. He is a graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur and holds a masters degree in Defence Studies, a masters in English from National University, an MBA from Bangladesh Institute of Human Resource Management (BIHRM) and a Diploma in UN Peace Support Operations from United Nations Institute of Training and Research (UNITAR), New York. He had tour of duties with the United Nations in 1992-1993 and in 2005-2006 as a member of United Nation’s Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and United Nation’s Operations in Western Sahara (MINURSO) respectively.
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