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THE NEED FOR DEVELOPING A POSITIVE LEADERSHIP CULTURE FOR BANGLADESH ARMY

Major Mohammad Alam Tareque, psc, East Bengal

“A favourable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient"- Gary Klein (Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions)

Introduction

1. The future war would be very complex and likely to begin at short notice.

The type of war that Bangladesh Army is expected to be involved in is a “limited

war in nature”1. The limited war is of short duration and being fought at high

tempo and intensity. It would involve lethal weapons thus requiring great

dispersion across the engagement area. In future conflicts, at the very outset,

advanced fighting forces would try to upset the chain of command of the enemy

by disrupting communications. This may be achieved by the use of electro

magnetic pulse, by employing conventional special forces or by using

unconventional forces. The battle field situation will be very fluid where

psychological warfare coupled with the media would aim to propagate rumour to

confuse commanders at all levels. The increased reach of integral firepower and

surveillance resources, including space-based systems will make the area of

operation deeper and wider. There will be non linear operations and exist threat

from enemy special forces to rear areas which will necessitate earmarking of

troops to provide security to lines of communication. All these will perforce

necessitate decentralisation of command and control as much as possible.

1Operations of War, Volume One, GSTP 0032, p 1-4.1

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2. Our present doctrine is: “To blend the conventional with the

unconventional warfare from the very beginning of the breakout of the

hostilities”.2 According to our present doctrine, the Unconventional Force

Commander will receive mission type orders from the overall commander. The

Unconventional Force will also require breaking up in small groups. Junior

leaders will have to lead The Unconventional Force independently and in

isolation. The Unconventional Force Commander will be responsible for planning,

execution and improvisation to achieve the mission. 3 In the perspective of future

conflict, considering these above mentioned attributes of our new doctrine, it is

obvious that any sub unit level commander has to adapt his unit with fast moving

fluid situations. Employing the sub unit or a unit is much easier under the

instructions from higher headquarters but what will happen when the

communication is lost and the sub unit commanders (say lieutenants and

captains) need to act without detailed orders from superiors?

3. “Command is based on task and situation. The task lays down the aims to

be achieved, which the commander charged with achieving it must keep in the

forefront of his mind. Task and situation give rise to the mission...The mission

must be a clearly defined aim to be pursued with all one's powers...The

commander must leave his subordinates freedom of action, to the extent that

2 Ibid.3Ibid, pp 32-03198.

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doing so does not imperil his intention.”4 The quoted statement summarises what

a commander must do in case of not receiving any further instructions from

superior as a result of lost communication. GSTP 0032 states further: “he

(commander) must not go into such details that the initiative of the subordinates

is curbed. The answer is Auftragstaktik”5. Thus, this specifies the necessity of

adopting Mission Tactics. The term Mission Tactics has been evolved from the

German term ‘Auftragstaktik’ (German word ‘Auftrag’ means task/mission and

‘taktik’ is tactics). This term defines the essence of mission oriented tactics: “the

Commander only tells subordinates what tasks to accomplish, but not how to

accomplish”.6 Therefore, adopting this approach requires a deliberate training

and a command climate based on mutual trust. If Bangladesh Army is to adopt

Mission Tactics then it needs to generate a new positive leadership culture vis a

vis a culture of initiative, hence we must begin by creating the right frame of mind

in our troops and officers. The question is “Are we preparing for that”?

4. The paper will discuss and examine the need for developing a leadership

culture of initiative for Bangladesh Army with a view to adopting the Mission

Tactics. I will therefore, explore rather than to define the significance of

leadership based on initiative for adopting Mission Tactics and relate it to the

perspective of Bangladesh Army. In doing so, First, I will present the concept of

4Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's

Defence Publishers, 1985), p. 228.5GSTP 0032, Op Cit, p 5-2 (0511). 6John T Nelsen II, Auftragstaktik: A case for Decentralised Combat Leadership, (The Challenge of Military

Leadership), p 29.3

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Mission Tactics and then I will list down the constraints of the Bangladesh Army’s

Leadership that need to be scored to cope with the demand of Mission Tactics.

Second, I would propose how we can inculcate a positive leadership culture

based on initiative to overcome those constraints and facilitate adopting the

Mission Tactics concept for Bangladesh Army. My intent in writing this essay is to

stir debate on this important issue. Frankly, I do not have all the answers, just a

number of questions for those of us in the Bangladesh Army to grapple with. If

this paper causes other officers to think about our lack of a positive leadership

culture then I have been successful.

AIM

5. The aim of this paper is to analyse the need for developing a positive

leadership culture based on initiative for Bangladesh Army with a view to

adopting Mission Tactics.

Scope

6. The paper will only discuss the mission tactics i.e. tactics carried out with

mission oriented command and control and to adopt this approach why do we

need to develop a positive leadership culture based on initiative. We believe that

the adoption of Mission Tactics is already settled in GSTP 0032 therefore, the

debate whether or not the Mission Tactics is relevant for Bangladesh Army is

beyond the scope of this paper.

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The Concept of Mission Tactics

7. The term Mission Tactics, which is developed from German term

‘Auftragstaktik’, is also adopted by advanced armies of the USA, the UK and the

Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). ‘Auftrgastaktik’ was officially incorporated in

German ‘Warmacht’ manual in 1888 though its origin can be traced back to

‘Prussian Military Reforms’ that began in 18087. Out of necessity, the Prussian

Army studied the problem to rectify their acknowledged deficiencies in decision-

making at the lower echelons. The Prussians then commissioned the Drill

Regulations of the Infantry (1888). It stipulated that commanders should give

subordinates general directions of what were to be done, allowing them freedom

to determine how to do it. That was the start of allowing decision making at the

lower levels in the Army. It encouraged commanders to be "thinking leaders" who

can make tactical judgments on their own and who would also be less likely to

"freeze up" when faced with new situations without formal instructions. This

tactics was practiced and advocated by two most successful commanders of

German Army – Guderian and Rommell. The German Army regulations describe

'Auftragstaktik' as: “A command and control procedure within which the

subordinate is given extensive latitude, within the framework of the intention of

the individual giving the order, in carrying out his mission. The missions are to

include only those restraints which are indispensable for being able to interact

with others, and it must be possible to accomplish them by making use of the

7H W Koch, A History of Prussia, pp 180-187.5

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subordinate's forces, resources, and the authority delegated to him. Mission

oriented command and control requires uniformity in the way of thinking, sound

judgment and initiative, as well as responsible actions at all levels.”8

8. One must be curious to know why this term ‘Auftragstaktik’ is adopted as

Mission Tactics / Directive Control by armies like the USA, the UK and the IDF

despite the fact that Germans lost World War II. One of the reasons may be that

the combination of ‘Auftragstaktik’ and ‘Blitzkreig’ let the Germans win many

battles fought being outnumbered. For the IDF the reason is: “At the primary or

individual level there are other factors that provide IDF soldiers with high levels of

morale and combat motivation. These are, “for each soldier, a goal, a role, and a

reason for self-confidence.”9…“Indeed, the IDF’s traditional emphasis on Mission

Tactics gives subordinates right down the chain of command the greatest

possible freedom of action.”10 The IDF practiced successfully this approach of

Mission Tactics in two of the Arab-Israeli lightning wars, in 1956 and 1967. In

Mission Tactics the military commanders give its subordinate leaders a clearly

defined goal (the mission) and the forces needed to accomplish that goal with a

time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leader then

implements the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large

extent, initiative and a freedom which enables flexibility in execution. Mission

8Armor,90(January-February 1981),"The German Army's Mission Oriented Command and Control," p 12.

9Frederick J. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps,” in Handbook of Military Psychology, ed.

Reuven Gal and David A. Mangelsdorff (Chichester, Eng.: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), pp. 453-54.

10Concept of “directive control” or “mission-oriented” control, Richard E. Simpkin, “Command from the

Bottom,” Infantry (March-April 1985).6

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Tactics frees higher leadership from tactical details. Thus, the word is something

of a misnomer. It is not a tactic per se (and certainly not limited to the tactical

level). It is more of a method of leadership. So far, the leader character is

concerned, initiative in a leader flow from his willingness to step forward, take

charge of a situation and act promptly – completely on his own authority, if

necessary.

Mission Tactics, Its Components and the Role of Leadership

9. Mission Tactics is a decentralised command and leadership philosophy

that demands decisions and action at the lowest level of command where there is

an intimate knowledge of the situation and the commander's intention from the

beginning of an operation. The mission order is merely a technique that is used

to implement and execute mission oriented command. Mission oriented

command is based on a belief in the ability of an individual's creative action to

solve a problem without recourse to higher authority; the mission order is only the

small component of Mission Tactics that we see in the field. But there are other

components of Mission Tactics listed as following:

a. Mutual trust among leaders based on each leader's intimate personal

knowledge of the capabilities of the others.

b. Training and organisation in everything the army does to reinforce the

primacy of the judgment of the man on the scene (decentralisation).

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c. A willingness to act on the part of all leaders and those who aspire to be

leaders.

d. Simple, commonly accepted and understood operations’ concepts.

10. Mission Tactics is a style of command that holds that command and

control needs to be structured so that the leaders of small units are given the

freedom to respond to fast changing tactical situations and challenges.

Furthermore, the leaders are able to seize unforeseen opportunities and to act,

even without orders, to achieve favourable results.11 With Mission Tactics, a

commander in the midst of fast changing operations and pressed for time will

reduce his “orders” to the essentials only. An order for a major operation might fit

on one page and would never exceed three or four pages. They must not be

cluttered with intelligence and logistic details that could be dealt with through staff

channels. They set out clearly and simply the commander’s intention, his

subordinates’ tasks, the resources available to them, and the constraints they

must observe.12 The subordinate leader then considers these in the context of

Mission Analysis, which is a process whereby the subordinate leader is forced to

consider the Directive in relation to the Main Effort and the commander’s intent.

The subordinate leader’s Mission Analysis takes place in the presence of his

commander to gain a clear mental picture of what must be done.13 Mission

Tactics therefore demands that all leaders possess flexibility of mind and

11 Capt. I. A. Hope, Directive Control and Mission Analysis: Keys to Manoeuvre Warfare at Company Level, Infantry Journal, vol. 31, Spring 1997.12 R. Simpkin, Race to the Swift, (London: Brassey’s, 1985, reprinted 2000), p. 57.13 Hope, Op Cit. p 11.

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courage to act decisively even without direction. By stressing command over

control, Mission Tactics endeavours to maximize the effect of the leadership and

tactical skills of junior leaders. Missions are thus conducted by the junior leaders

“themselves reading the instantaneous local situation and reacting to it with their

understanding of the aim and plan.”14 The real basis of Mission Tactics is “an

unbroken chain of trust and mutual respect running from the operational

commander to the section commander.”15 This chain leaves the subordinate free

to act as he sees fit in the furtherance of his superior’s intention, and assures him

of support even if he makes an error of judgment.16Its three most important

components are:

a. The issuing of Directives by commanders.

b. The designation of Main Efforts by commanders.

c. The conduct of Mission Analysis by subordinate leaders17.

Positive Leadership Culture and Our Situation

11. Having discussed the above concept of Mission Tactics, it is needless to

put more argument in favour of a positive proactive leadership that is must for 14 Simpkin, Op Cit. p 23.15 Ibid. p 230.16 Ibid, p 239.17 Mark Gaillard, Second Lieutenant, Their Intelligent Initiative and Its Cultivation: A New Leadership Doctrine for Manoeuvre Warfare, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, vol 3, no 4, Winter 2000/2001, pp 8-10.

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adopting the concept. Positive Leadership Culture can be defined as ‘the ability

to adapt the army to a decentralised command structure that favours the use of

initiative’. B H Liddell Hart says: “. . . any approach to warfighting is highly

dependent upon leadership…Mission Tactics is the ‘cultivation’ of ‘intelligent

initiative’ by junior leaders.” The Bangladesh Army has already taken the bold

step to adopt a new doctrine of blending conventional with the unconventional

warfare in its training. Both the concept and philosophy are slowly evolving in the

doctrinal manuals. The Germans took almost a century to change and over 56

years, they were successful in applying their ideas to war. Hence, to effectively

blend conventional warfare with the unconventional warfare with an approach to

Mission Tactics, we need to start on the right footing. What is the right footing?

The answer lies in two very important points that we can learn from the German

experience:

A. A positive leadership culture that fits Bangladesh Army officers,

warrant officers and soldiers.

b. The need to inculcate initiative through the ranks.

These two points are related: to practise Mission Tactics we need a leadership

culture that is undoubtedly based on initiative.

12. The Bangladesh Army has long been operating using the traditional

authoritarian approach requiring strict obedience to orders to accomplish the

mission. We have the knack for long and detailed orders even before executing

the mission. Now for the requirement of blending conventional and

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unconventional warfare, the environment has become more conducive for

mission accomplishment. A key tenet of blending conventional and

unconventional warfare: commanders equip themselves to accomplish their

assigned missions according to the commander's intent. The value of

decentralised command lies in the fact that it treasures the initiative of

subordinates, striving to harness their creative energies towards simultaneous

problem solving at all levels. The desired effect is speed in operations based on

the ability to make sound judgments developed through trial and error. Adequate,

not perfect, solutions are sought. Leaders involved in carrying out mission type

orders make a rapid estimate of the situation, adopt a sound course of action as

feasible and execute it decisively. In this view, speed is more essential than

precision; a decent plan carried out immediately is expected and superior to a

superb plan carried out much later.

13. Our leadership culture today suffers from the stigma of 'loss of face'.

There is always the fear that mistakes by subordinates will be seen as a failure

on the part of the commander's ability. 'Losing face' at a field training exercise, ln

a major inspection, is not easy to accept. During a setback, commanders look for

scapegoats to pay the price for the mistakes. We need to change this frame of

mind and understand that this is a major obstacle in developing initiative in the

officers and men alike. Mission Tactics emphasises trust between the superior

and his subordinates. Over controlling or playing safe is a reflection of the

commander's insecurity. William S Lind, a renowned warfare theorist, advised:

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"... to be able to fight the enemy, you need a command and control system based

on leadership and monitoring ... Both leadership and monitoring are valueless

without trust... trust by the commander that his subordinates will understand him

while carrying out his desires, and trust by those subordinates that they will be

supported when exercising their initiative.” The question is ‘are we allowed taking

initiative and making mistakes’? Certainly not, if it was so, then buzz words like:

‘zero error syndrome’, ‘spoon feeding’, ‘over supervision’, ‘over ensuring’, ‘super

imposing of commanders’ etc. would not have been so much familiar in

Bangladesh Army.

14. The Bangladesh Army is promulgating the new doctrine of blending

conventional with unconventional warfare for meeting the new challenges in the

battlefield. As such, our officers and men are being trained to embrace this new

approach to war. Our training environment is slowly changing to accommodate

the Mission Tactics approach to warfare. We should train to create a frame of

mind in our officers and men that allows them to think and act aggressively. Thus

the emphasis is on independent decision making, accepting responsibility and

taking the initiative; and all these should include training to fight battles, not

merely training for the sake of training. The junior commissioned and non

commissioned officers (JCO&NCOs) are very important leaders for any army.

Our army had been lacking in this aspect and we had also been late to realise

this. However, the recent measures of introducing sergeants’ course and platoon

leaders’ course to train the JCOs and NCOs are certainly an encouraging step.

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But, mere training them in training institutions would not make them capable of

executing missions after receiving mission type orders; they also need to be

tested and most importantly allowed to make mistakes in field training exercises.

Positive Leadership Culture for Bangladesh Army: The Way Ahead

15. General Franks’ “right command climate”, the psychological manifestation

of the chain of mutual trust and respect, is the sine qua non of Mission Tactics

leadership. To create and sustain this, the commander must be able to

decentralize his command and control with trust. 18 We should get into the culture

of issuing general instructions, relying on subordinates to get the job done within

a broad guideline. On the other side, one important caveat to this is that

subordinates must first be professional in getting the job done in the most

efficient manner without his superiors having to supervise it. This is how the two

way traffic is completed, earning the trust of the superior commander by making

oneself competent enough. The junior leaders must have the necessary

experience to do things right. Plans must be viewed as provisional, with the

understanding that no plan is ever implemented exactly as envisioned.

Commanders must think on their own feet, always aggressively analysing,

recommending, anticipating and adjusting. Thus, initiative, if it is to be

encouraged in the army, must be supported by a positive leadership culture, a

viable command and control system and mutual trust at all levels.

18 J. Shaw, “Examining the Mechanics of Change: How We Can Create Manoeuvre Warfare”, British Army Review, vol. 97 (April 1991), p. 20.

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16. The effective application of Mission Tactics is dependent on individual

willingness and capability to apply non conformist and unique solutions when

crisis arises. The readiness of all ranks to depart from "the plan" once it no longer

supports the Commander’s desired end state is essential and must be

assumable by each level of command. The Army must accept and continue

teaching its officers, JCOs and NCOs that illogical obedience to issued tasks/

orders is rigidity and no longer acceptable because it does not support an

evolution to Mission Tactics. We often say while teaching tactics, ‘to think out of

the box’, but do we really patronise our junior leaders to do so. An army survives

and grows, physically, intellectually and spiritually through its risk takers.

However, we do not here support the breaking of regulations, or the placing of

soldiers in training under unnecessary or unjustifiable risk. We should however,

find out the edge of the allowed envelope to take prudent risk. Take, for example,

the Army we have now over the years, many of us who avoid anything to do with

training involving risk, especially the live fire training of soldiers in tactical

scenarios. We avoid the challenge not because of the risk to the soldiers, but

because of the perceived risk of our own careers, if something goes wrong.

Therefore, we prefer security and safety and play it safe at the cost of the

standard of training. Risk takers challenge the comfortable warmth of the status

quo; they are willing to trade their potential within the hierarchy for accepting a

degree of responsibility the bureaucracy has decided to find distasteful. Even

legitimate risk takers disturb the hierarchy because they refuse to "stay in the

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box” and there is no risk-taking, in the box. We preach them to think out of the

box but prefer to stay in the box. This contradiction must be settled.

17. We must provide both training and the environment for initiative to

develop. The starting point is to delegate more responsibility to our junior

commanders and soldiers. It requires giving them authority and responsibility and

giving them the implicit trust to get the job done. This however, does not mean

that standards are lowered or that mistakes are not corrected. Junior leaders

should be allowed to make mistakes but not blunders. They need to do it first,

know what is wrong, and then correct their mistakes. They need to gradually be

given more latitude to shoulder heavier responsibilities. Each leader and soldier

will begin to invest more effort and pride in ensuring that the best is exacted from

their respective section, platoon, company and unit. A culture of independent

thinking and aggressive decision making for peacetime training is crucial in

developing initiative. Commanders and soldiers need to be encouraged and

trained to make decisions at short notice. Unit commanders at all levels must

move away from the insecurity complex. Change, if managed well, is for the good

of the Army, not the individual. People are unwilling to change or make partial

changes only to find faults and then revert to the old ways of doing things. The

famous saying, "the army is going round in circles" is a symptom of this insecurity

complex. Our attitude should be to, ‘Find fault with the logic used to select the

approach and correct it through training, but never blame the soldier’s willingness

to try.’

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18. Mission tactics benefits the senior commanders by freeing time to focus

on higher level concerns rather than looking after the detail of subordinate’s

execution. The senior prescribes the method of execution only to the degree that

is essential for coordination. The senior intervenes in a subordinate's execution

only by exception when things go hundred and eighty degree opposite. Because,

“The advantage which a commander thinks he can attain through continued

personal intervention is largely illusory. By engaging in it, he assumes a task that

really belongs to others, whose effectiveness he thus destroys. He also multiplies

his own tasks to a point where he can no longer fulfill the whole of them.”19 Thus

initiative allows continuing the speed (high tempo) of operations that we desire.

Uninhibited by excessive restrictions from above, subordinates can adapt their

actions to the changing ‘fluid’ situations. They inform the commander of what

they have done, but they do not wait for permission. Mission Tactics serves as a

contract between senior and subordinate. The senior agrees to provide

subordinates with the support necessary to help them accomplish their missions

but without unnecessarily prescribing their actions. The senior is obligated to

provide the guidance that allows subordinates to exercise proper judgment and

initiative. The subordinate is obligated to act in conformity with the intent of the

senior. The subordinate agrees to act responsibly and loyally and not to exceed

the proper limits of authority. Mission Tactics requires subordinates to act with

19 Helmuth von Moltke, Prussian Field Marshal, quoted in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Command

and Control (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], Final draft, August 2000), 1-14.

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"top sight"—a grasp of how their actions fit into the larger situation.9 In other

words, subordinates must always think above their own levels in order to

contribute to the accomplishment of the higher mission. It is obvious that we

cannot allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing unity, or

focus to the various efforts. To do so would be to dissipate our strength. We seek

unity not principally through imposed control but through harmonious initiative

and lateral coordination within the context provided by guidance from above.

Conclusion

19. The concept of Mission Tactics is a necessity for conducting war following

the new doctrine of blending conventional with unconventional warfare. Mission

Tactics does not mean merely decentralization of control; rather it is the freedom

of action delegated to junior leaders to achieve the mission ordered by superior

commanders. Commanders at all levels must be accorded considerable freedom

for initiative. Such latitude can generate the speed of response that is critical to

battle field success. The fog and friction of war may invalidate the carefully

wrought plans of higher authority, leaving the individual commander the best

judge of the immediate tactical situation. Mission Tactics demand junior leaders

to think aggressively, make independent decisions, assume responsibility of

being in charge of the situation, showing initiative , boldness and are prepared to

take prudent risks.

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20. Risk taking stems from initiative. What is different about risk taking in this

context is the importance attached to making an independent decision when

circumstances dictate. An incorrect but earnest decision is far preferable to lack

of action. A "zero defects" mindset tends to discourage subordinate’s initiative.

The other important factor is understanding commander's intent by the entire

command and control process. Commander's intent binds together various tasks,

and defines the desired end state. In determining the prudence of their decisions,

subordinates should assess their projected initiatives in accordance with the

commander's intent. They must act within the commander's intent to ensure unity

of effort.

21. Finally, superior subordinate relations must be characterised by mutual

trust. Such trust furnishes the subordinate with the confidence to exercise

initiative without concerns about reprimand for error or bad judgment. Likewise,

superiors have confidence that subordinates will carry out orders and exercise

their initiative consonant with the superior's intent. Mutual trust is thus a

manifestation of superior subordinate professionalism. Mutually trusting

individuals, moreover, are those most likely to anticipate one another's actions, to

understand intuitively how the others are thinking, hence setting in train a

harmony of minds whereby detailed instructions are unnecessary.

Recommendation

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19. An integrated theory of the nature of war is needed to fight in the near

future in addition to desirable character and leadership attributes; command and

control, senior subordinate relationships, application of tactics, acquisition of new

knowledge, education and training. The move towards this positive leadership

culture is ultimately to develop a new frame of mind which is the crux of the

Mission Tactics concept. Therefore, Bangladesh Army must change the existing

leadership psyche to facilitate moving forward to a positive leadership culture

based on initiative.

September 2007 MOHAMMAD ALAM TAREQUE

Sylhet Cantonment Major

Bibliography

1. H W Koch, A History of Prussia.

2. I. A. Hope, Capt, Directive Control and Mission Analysis: Keys to

Manoeuvre Warfare at Company Level, Infantry Journal, vol. 31, Spring 1997.

3. John T Nelsen II, Auftragstaktik; A case for Decentralised Combat

Leadership, (The Challenge of Military Leadership).

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4. J. Shaw, Examining the Mechanics of Change: How We Can Create

Manoeuvre Warfare, British Army Review, vol. 97 (April 1991).

5. Mangelsdorff (Chichester, Eng.: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), Frederick J.

Manning; Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps, Handbook of Military

Psychology, ed. Reuven Gal and David A.

6. Mark Gaillard, Second Lieutenant, Their Intelligent Initiative and Its

Cultivation: A New Leadership Doctrine for Manoeuvre Warfare, The Army

Doctrine and Training Bulletin, vol 3, no 4, Winter 2000/2001.

7. Operations of War, Volume One, GSTP 0032.

8. Richard E. Simpkin, Concept of “directive control” or “mission-oriented”

control, “Command from the Bottom”, Infantry (March-April 1985),

9. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century

Warfare, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985).

10. The German Army's Mission Oriented Command and Control, Armor

90(January-February 1981).

AUTHOR’S BIODATA

Major Mohammad Alam Tareque, psc, East Bengal is the General Staff Officer Grade 2 (Coordination), of Tactics Wing, School of Infantry and Tactics. He is an infantryman who belongs to 19 th

BMA Long Course. He was born in Charging Nine and was later assigned to 27 and 51 Infantry Regiments at various capacities. Major Tareque is a distinguished instructor of Bangladesh Military

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Academy and School of Infantry and Tactics. He is a graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur and holds a masters degree in Defence Studies, a masters in English from National University, an MBA from Bangladesh Institute of Human Resource Management (BIHRM) and a Diploma in UN Peace Support Operations from United Nations Institute of Training and Research (UNITAR), New York. He had tour of duties with the United Nations in 1992-1993 and in 2005-2006 as a member of United Nation’s Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and United Nation’s Operations in Western Sahara (MINURSO) respectively.

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