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LOCAL CULTURES RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION
Exemplary Persons and Their Attendant Values
JEANNE HO-YING FUNanyang Technological University, Singapore
CHI-YUE CHIU
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Taking a social identity perspective, the authors predict that when responding to the dominating influence of
the global culture brought in by the Western economic powers, Hong Kong Chinese will recognize the global
cultures superiority in status attributes (e.g., competence, achievement), while at the same time maintaining
positive evaluations of Chinese culture on solidarity attributes (traditional moral values). The authors test this
hypothesis by examining the Chinese and Western exemplary persons listed spontaneously by Hong Kong
Chinese undergraduates and the kind of values carried by these exemplary persons. In three studies, partici-
pants associate traditional Chinese exemplary persons with both solidarity and status values and traditionalWestern exemplary persons with status values only. Additionally, participants also associate contemporary
Western exemplary persons with Western rights-based moral values, suggesting that contemporary Western
exemplary persons could be important drivers of changes in the moral values in Hong Kong.
Keywords: culture; exemplary persons; values; globalization
The possible effects of globalization on local cultures have generated heated debates in the
social sciences. One critical issue in the debate is whether globalization ultimately leads to
homogenization of cultures via global hegemony. Researchers from many social science disci-
plines have approached this question from their disciplinary perspective. However, despitesome recent calls for psychological analyses of globalization (Arnett, 2002), psychologists have
not been enthusiastic participants in this dialogue. Yet any answer to the prospect of cultural
homogenization will be incomplete without systematic analyses of the psychological responses
to globalization. In this article, we examine how Hong Kong Chinese respond to Western and
global cultures by examining the cultural values carried by exemplary persons in Hong Kong.
In the following section, we review different views of local cultures responses to globalization
in the social science literature and discuss the psychological responses of Hong Kong Chinese
to globalization from the perspective of the social identity theory. Next, we introduce a method
we developed to examine psychological responses to globalization and present the results of
three studies that looked at how Hong Kong Chinese maintain their Chinese cultural heritagein response to globalization.
GLOBALIZATION AND HOMOGENIZATION OF CULTURES
Globalization involves the spread of the global economy to regional economies around
the world. It requires integration of local economies into the global market. Culturally, the
AUTHORS NOTE: We would like to thank Harry Triandis, Michael Morris, Yoshi Kashima, and Chung-Fang Yang for their
insightful comments on the earlier drafts of this article. Correspondences concerning this article should be sent to Jeanne
Ho-Ying Fu, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798; e-mail: [email protected].
JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 38 No. 5, September 2007 636-653
DOI: 10.1177/0022022107305244
2007 Sage Publications
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rapid growth of global linkages and global consciousness has led to reorganization of social
life on a global scale. As Robertson (1992) noted, globalization involves the compression of
the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole (p. 8). Some con-
straints that once bound different knowledge traditions have disintegrated. For example, in
China, it is common to find commercial messages promoting individualism and modern lifestyles in popular magazines targeting the younger generation (Zhang & Shavitt, 2003).
There are two different views on how local culture responds to globalization. The first
view predicts that globalization would inevitably lead to the demise of local cultures and
homogenization of world cultures. According to this view, Western nations, representatives
of the global culture, are not only perceived to be more economically advanced than non-
Western nations, but they are often seen as reference nations in the realm of cultural restruc-
turing. The global culture, which privileges consumerism, individualism, competition, and
efficiency, has been characterized in some non-Western countries as new, modern, scientific,
and results oriented (Lam, Lau, Chiu, Hong, & Peng, 1999; Pilkington & Johnson, 2003).
In addition, the global market emphasizes the use of scientific knowledge and technol-ogy to achieve controllable and predictable results. To compete in the global market,
instead of relying on traditional knowledge and experiences, local economies need scien-
tific knowledge and professional training in business administration. It is not surprising
that globalization in many developing countries is often accompanied by a vast demand for
science education and MBA programs (Chiu & Hong, 2006; Fischer, 1999; Tzeng &
Henderson, 1999).
Globalization has also transformed the consumption patterns in local economies, as evi-
dent in the spread of global brand-name goods and restaurant chains (Daniels, 2003) and
the proliferation of global advertising that exploits similar basic material desires and cre-
ates similar lifestyles (Parameswaran, 2002). Indeed, the global success of global brandssuch as McDonalds and Starbucks has led some writers to predict an inevitable coloniza-
tion of world cultures by international corporate brands (Falk, 1999).
However, other writers hold a different view, believing that some aspects of the local
culture would survive the erosive effects of globalization. For example, Lal (2000) believes
that although the material beliefs (beliefs pertinent to making a living) in the global cul-
ture will gain popularity as a country is integrated into the global market, beliefs pertinent
to social relationship and morality in local cultures are relatively resistant to the influence
of globalization. Additionally, multinational survey data revealed that although economic
development is accompanied by increased adherence to values that emphasize secular-
ism, scientific rationality, and individualism, the broad knowledge tradition that defines
personhood and sociality in a society (e.g., Protestantism, Confucianism) is relatively
resistant to the erosive effects of globalization (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Likewise, ethno-
graphic studies of mobile phone use in South Korea (Yoon, 2003) and MTV in East Asia
(Santana, 2003) found that proliferation of global products and services in East Asia,
instead of destroying local cultures, has played a crucial role in reinforcing and reinvent-
ing traditional moral values in local communities.
THE SOCIAL IDENTITY PERSPECTIVE
The social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) offers a theoretical perspective tounderstand how a local culture may accept the values embedded in the global culture with-
out giving up the core values in the local culture. In the face of globalization, a central
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638 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
issue confronting the local culture is how it is possible to acknowledge the competitive
advantages of the capitalist logic and its attendant values in the global market and at the
same time affirm the positive distinctiveness of the heritage culture. Based on the assump-
tion that group memberships constitute an integral part of an individuals self-definition,
social identity theorists have expounded on the different cognitive and behavioral strate-gies a low-status group would adopt to protect its collective self-esteem when confronting
the dominating influence of another group (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). One such strategy
involves differential evaluations of the in-group and the dominating group on different
dimensions.
Early empirical demonstrations of this strategy made use of the fact that language vari-
ations within and between speech communities are important markers of the language
users social group memberships. As such, perceivers can infer a speakers group mem-
berships from his or her voice, and the characteristics attributed to the speaker may reflect
the perceivers attitudes toward the speakers inferred membership. In these studies, the
participants listened to recordings of bilingual speakers reading a passage in one of the tar-get languages and to a translation of the same passage in the second target language.
Unaware that they were listening to two readings of each of several bilinguals, the partic-
ipants rated the speakerspersonalities (see Krauss & Chiu, 1998; Ryan & Giles, 1982, for
reviews). Typically, ratings of speakers personalities can be organized into two evaluative
dimensions: status and solidarity (Ryan, Giles, & Sebastian, 1982). The status dimension,
including such competence-related attributes as successful, competent, and intelligent, is
positively correlated with sociopolitical power. Subordinate linguistic groups usually give
more favorable ratings to the dominant linguistic groups than to their own group on this
dimension (e.g., Callan, Gallois, & Forbes, 1983; Giles, Henwood, Coupland, Harriman,
& Coupland, 1992; Lyczak, Fu, & Ho, 1976; Sebastian & Ryan, 1985).The solidarity dimension includes social, moral attributes such as trustworthy, friendly,
kind, and benevolent. Minority group members typically rate speakers of their own lan-
guage more favorably than speakers of the standard dominant group language on the soli-
darity dimension (e.g., Bond, 1985; Giles et al., 1992; Hogg, Joyce, & Abrams, 1984;
Lyczak et al., 1976; Tong, Hong, Lee, & Chiu, 1999). This pattern of evaluation may
reflect an attempt by the less powerful group to maintain positive evaluation of the group
while acknowledging the power difference between its group and the dominant group.
Extending this finding to local cultures responses to the global culture, we may
expect individuals in a local culture to acknowledge the dominating global cultures
superiority on the status dimension, while maintaining a positive perception of the local
culture on the solidarity dimension. Individuals adopting this strategy would distinguish
between modernization and Westernization, with modernization involving acquisition of
specific skills and competencies that have fueled the economic development in the West
and Westernization involving adoption of the Western socialmoral values. With this strat-
egy, people in the local community can accept modernization and resist Westernization at
the same time. As a result, they may not see modernization as a threat to the fundamental
social and moral values in the local culture.
Bond and King (1985) have applied the social identity perspective to understand Hong
Kong Chineses responses to the global culture, which was brought in through coloniza-
tion and then institutionalized through rapid industrialization. In a survey, Bond and King
found that most Hong Kong Chinese respondents (about 70%) believed that modernizationinvolved technology, behavior, or material progress, whereas Westernization involved val-
ues, thinking, or Western cultural traditions. Almost two thirds of respondents (64%) also
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believed that modernization could proceed in Hong Kong without much cultural implica-
tions. About half of them claimed that they managed to preserve their Chineseness by
holding onto basic Chinese moral values, such as filial piety and respect for teachers.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH USING EXEMPLARY PERSONS
As the preliminary findings from Bond and King (1985) indicated, in Hong Kong, the
global culture is generally perceived to have originated in the West. Accordingly, in our
study of responses to the global culture in Hong Kong, we focus on the extent to which
status and solidarity values are exemplified by the individuals whom Hong Kong Chinese
consider to be exemplary persons in China and the West.
We chose this analytic strategy for two reasons. First, exemplary persons are important
carriers of culture. Exemplary persons are real or fictional figures who possess qualities
that are so positively evaluated in the culture that others would do well to copy.1 Exemplarypersons may be persons with outstanding achievements or persons who have endured mis-
fortunes or met with failures in the pursuit of socially desirable goals. Both successful and
unsuccessful exemplary persons can incite imitation among individuals in the culture
(Lockwood, Marshall, & Sadler, 2005). Although successful exemplary persons inspire
individuals to pursue similar excellence, unsuccessful exemplary persons encourage indi-
viduals to learn from the exemplary persons mistakes and from their persistence in pur-
suing socially desirable goals.
Widely recognized exemplary persons are usually idealized figures that embody certain
highly valued virtues in the culture (Chiu & Hong, 2006). As such, they are public repre-
sentations of cultural ideals and important vehicles for transmitting cultural values. InChinese societies, young children often learn cultural values by reading or listening to sto-
ries about exemplary persons whose behaviors exemplify these values. For example, the
value of filial piety is introduced to children through the well-known Twenty-Four
Parables of Filial Piety, which describes and glorifies various filial behaviors displayed by
24 famous sons or daughters in Chinese history. Similarly, in Hong Kong, young children
often learn Western values through stories of exemplary persons in Western cultures. For
example, they learn the value of honesty through the story of the U.S. President George
Washington and the value of creativity through the stories of Marie Curie, James Watt,
Thomas Edison, and the Wright brothers. Western moral values such as equality, human
rights, and freedom are learned through the stories of Abraham Lincoln.
Second, according to the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), group members
collectively construct prototypes of the group to represent the groups defining, positively
distinctive attributes. A prototype is often an exemplary person in the group. According to
Hogg (2004), prototypes rarely describe average or typical ingroup membersrather
they are polarized away from outgroup features and describe ideal, often hypothetical,
ingroup members (p. 229). Thus, according to the social identity theory, exemplary per-
sons in a local culture and their attendant values represent the cultures defining qualities
from which its members derive a sense of positive distinctiveness and collective esteem
vis--vis comparison with the global culture. As such, exemplary persons and their atten-
dant values provide rich materials for understanding globalization and value negotiation.
In this article, we reported three studies conducted in Hong Kong that used the methoddescribed earlier to examine the exemplification of status and solidarity values by individ-
uals who are considered to be exemplary persons from local (Chinese) culture and global
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mentioned exemplary persons in Chinese culture were Confucius (551 BC to 479 BC,
philosopher; the percentage of participants who listed this exemplary person was 80.0%),
Sun Yat-Sen (1866 to 1925, founder of the Republic of China; listed by 55.0%), Mencius
(370 BC to 286 BC, philosopher; 55.0%), Li Bai (701 to 762, poet; 45.0%), Zhuangzi (369
BC to 286 BC, philosopher; 40.0%), and Du Fu (712 to 770, poet; 40.0%).Of the 105 Western exemplary persons listed, 85.7% were men. The six most frequently
mentioned exemplary persons in Western cultures were James Watt (75.0%), Mother
Teresa (30.0%), Sir Isaac Newton (25.0%), Napoleon Bonaparte (25.0%), Jesus Christ
(25.0%), and Ludwig van Beethoven (20.0%).
For each participant and for each value, we took the mean of the ratings assigned to the
listed Chinese exemplary persons and the mean of the ratings assigned to the listed Western
exemplary persons. Next, we took the mean of the six values in each of the two value cate-
gories (Chinese solidarity values or status values). A 2 (Culture of Exemplary Person) X 2
(Value Category) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant
main effect of value category, F(1, 18) = 9.55,p < .01, 2p = .35, and a significant main effectof culture, F(1, 18) = 23.21,p < .001, 2p = .56. We interpreted these main effects in the con-
text of the significant Culture X Value Category interaction, F(1, 18) = 8.97,p < .01, 2p =
.33.3 As shown in Figure 1, Chinese exemplary persons were perceived to exemplify Chinese
solidarity values (M= 4.47, SD = 0.79) and status values (M= 4.77, SD = 0.41) to a similar
extent, F(1, 19) = 3.49, ns. Western exemplary persons exemplified status values (M= 4.77,
SD = 0.42) more than they did Chinese solidarity values (M= 3.96, SD = 0.60), F(1, 18) =
49.26,p < .001, 2p = .73. In addition, Chinese and Western exemplary persons did not differ
in how much they exemplified status values, t(19) = 0.00, ns. However, compared to Western
exemplary persons, Chinese exemplary persons were perceived to exemplify solidarity val-
ues more, t(19) = 2.55,p < .05, d= .73.We also used exemplary persons as our unit of analysis, treating each exemplary person
listed by the participant as a case in the analysis. First, we took the mean ratings of the six val-
ues in each value category for each exemplary person. Next, we performed a 2 (Culture of
Exemplary Person) X 2 (Value Category) ANOVA on the mean ratings. Gender of the exem-
plary persons was not included in the analysis because the small number of female exemplary
persons (7.66%) yielded highly unstable estimates of the dependent measures for female
exemplary persons. As in the analysis that used participants as the unit of analysis, there was
a significant main effect of value category, F(1, 220) = 67.59,p < .001, 2p = .24, a significant
main effect of culture, F(1, 220) = 8.57,p < .005, 2p = .04, and a significant Culture X Value
Category interaction, F(1, 220) = 14.61,p < .001, 2p = .06. Chinese and Western exemplary
persons did not differ in how much they exemplify status values, t(221) = 0.07, ns. However,
compared to Western exemplary persons, Chinese exemplary persons were perceived to exem-
plify Chinese solidarity values more, t(221) = 2.11,p < .05, d= 0.50.
In short, the pilot study and the main study yielded consistent results. In the pilot study,
when presented with exemplary persons in Hong Kongs grade school curriculum, Hong
Kong Chinese college students spontaneously listed solidarity values when the exemplary
persons were from Chinese culture and status values when the exemplary persons were
from Western cultures. In the main study, compared to Western exemplary persons,
Chinese exemplary persons exemplified Chinese moral (solidarity) values more. These
results are consistent with the social identity theory prediction that Hong Kong Chinese
continue to value Chinese moral values; the exemplary persons from Chinese culture thatthe participants aspired to imitate were perceived to exemplify these values more than
those from Western culture.
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2004). Thus, the pattern of results in Study 1 should emerge only when the historical
figures are positive figures (when they are like exemplary persons). However, according to
the priming account, the pattern of results in Study 1 would emerge regardless of whether
the historical figures are positive or negative figures. For instance, as long as the historical
figures are Chinese persons, they should exemplify Chinese traditional moral values.
METHOD
Participants. Fifty Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates (15 men, 34 women, and 1 did
not report gender), with a mean age of 20.25 (SD = 2.26), participated in the current study
in return for course requirement credit.
Procedures. The procedures were the same as those in Study 1, with the exception that
the participants were instructed to list up to six historical figures in Chinese history and six
historical figures in Western history. Four Hong Kong Chinese undergraduates (2 men, 2women; mean age = 19.50, SD = 0.58) assigned a valence score to each historical figure
according to the following scheme: 1 = negative figures, 2 = neutral figures, and 3 =pos-
itive figures (a few figures were perceived as ambivalent or vague, and they were coded as
missing data). The correlations of the valence ratings between the four coders ranged from
.57 to .88 (median = .81). An average valence score was obtained for each historical figure
by taking the mean of the four coders ratings. The mean of the valence scores was 2.48
(SD = 0.59).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A list of historical figures generated by the participants was compiled. Of the 296
Chinese historical figures generated, 91.9% were men. The six most frequently mentioned
figures in Chinese history were Qin Shi Huang (259 BC to 210 BC, Emperor of the Qin
Dynasty; percentage of participants who mentioned this figure was 62.0%), Yue Fei (1103
to 1141, a general in the Sung Dynasty; 48.0%), Sun Yat-Sen (44.0%), Li Bai (32.0%), Liu
Bei (161 to 223, ruler of the State of Shu; 30.0%), and Zhuge Liang (181-234, a chief mil-
itary advisor; 26.0%).
Of the 282 Western historical figures listed, 96.1% were men. The six most frequently
mentioned figures in Western history were Adolf Hitler (56.0%), Napoleon Bonaparte
(48.0%), George Washington (32.0%), Alexander the Great (30.0%), Abraham Lincoln
(28.0%), and Marco Polo (28.0%).
We treated each historical figure as a case in our analysis. For each historical figure, we
computed the mean exemplification rating on each of the two value categories. We mean
centered the valence score to avoid potential problems caused by multicollinearity. Next,
we fitted a 2 (Culture of Historical Figure) X 2 (Value Category) X Valence generalized
linear model to the data, with valence as a mean-centered continuous variable. Again,
gender of the historical figures was not included in the analysis because very few female
historical figures were listed (6.03%). The following effects were significant: the main
effects of culture, F(1, 558) = 9.84,p < .001, 2p = .02, valence, F(1, 558) = 78.74,p mean) exemplified Chinese solidarity values
(M= 4.56, SD = 1.11) slightly more than status values (M= 4.37, SD = 0.82), F(1, 196) =
5.91,p < .05, 2p = .03, whereas positive Western historical figures (valence > mean) exem-
plified status values (M= 4.46, SD = 0.75) more than Chinese solidarity values (M= 3.71,
SD = 1.10), F(1, 198)= 83.33,p < .001,2p = .30. Furthermore, compared to positive Western
historical figures, positive Chinese historical figures exemplified Chinese solidarity values
more, t(396) = 3.29,p < .01, d= .77. As in Study 1, Chinese and Western historical figures
did not differ in how much they exemplified status values, t(396) = 0.51, ns.
For negative historical figures (valence centered at 1 SD below the mean), the only signif-icant effect was the main effect of value category, F(1, 558) = 100.89, p < .001, 2p = .15.
Status values (M= 4.11, SD = 0.88) were exemplified more than solidarity values (M= 3.36,
SD = 1.16), t(182) = 6.95,p < .01, d= .73, by these negative historical figures. The Culture X
Value Category interaction was not significant, F(1, 558) = 0.00, ns.
In short, the results from Study 1 were replicated when the valence of the historical
figures was positive. However, when the valence of the historical figures was negative,
Chinese and Western historical figures did not differ in the types of values they exempli-
fied. These findings eliminated the alternative hypothesis that any Chinese or Western
stimulus person would produce the value association pattern in Study 1.
STUDY 3
Results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that Chinese exemplary persons or positively eval-
uated Chinese historical figures are associated with both solidarity (Chinese moral) and
status values and Western exemplary persons or positively evaluated historical figures are
associated with status values only. The current study was designed to replicate these find-
ings and address several concerns. First, it may be argued that the participants recalled the
widely recognized Chinese and Western exemplary persons in Hong Kong but did not
admire or aspire personally to possess the values these persons exemplify. To address this
issue, in Study 3, participants were asked to list the exemplary persons they themselves
admired and aspired to become. In addition, they were not constrained to list exemplary
persons from any particular culture. Instead, we sorted the exemplary persons the partici-
pants listed according to the culture to which the exemplary persons belonged.
Second, although Hong Kong undergraduates do not associate Western exemplary per-
sons with Chinese moral values, they may associate them with Western moral values. It is
possible that through their exposure to Western cultures, Hong Kong Chinese also aspire
to become some Western exemplary persons who embody Western moral values. If that is
the case, Western moral values may find a way to enter the value system in Hong Kong.
To explore this possibility, in the current study, we included moral values from Western
culture, such as human rights and individuality, and asked the participants to rate theexemplary persons on these values.
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Finally, according to the social identity theory, a group may construct different proto-
types when the specific out-group that forms the basis of social comparison changes
(Hogg, 2004). Similarly, a new set of exemplary persons carrying different values may
emerge and become widely recognized in a society as the comparison group changes. In
the context of Hong Kong, the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 has given rise to new
intercultural dynamics:A rapidly growing concern in the city during and immediately after
the political transition was the positive distinctiveness of Hong Kong people vis--vis
Chinese mainlanders. There is evidence that during this period, Hong Kong people polar-
ized themselves away from Chinese mainlanders by emphasizing Hong Kong peoplesadherence to Western moral values such as human rights and democracy (Lam et al., 1999;
Tong et al., 1999). Indeed, soon after Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, the city
was known to the world as the City of Protest. There were large-scale rallies, with tens of
thousands of protesters taking to the streets in Hong Kong to protest for freedom of speech
and other political rights. Thus, it is possible that in response to this shift in the out-group
as the basis for social comparison, Hong Kong Chinese have constructed a new set of
exemplary persons who embody such Western moral values as democracy and human
rights. Aggregating scores across exemplary persons from different epochs in the previous
two studies might have overlooked this subtle development. In the current study, we
explored this issue by examining the values exemplified by historical and contemporaryexemplary persons. We assumed that the values represented by historical exemplary
Figure 2. Mean Ratings of How Much Positive and Negative Chinese and Western Historical Figures
Exemplified Different Categories of Values in Study 2NOTE: Error bars denote standard errors.
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Historical Figures
Negative
Chinese
Negative
Western
Positive
Western
Positive
Chinese
Solidarity Values Status Values
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Fu, Chiu / GLOBALIZATION AND VALUES 647
representatives of Western culture than were Chinese exemplary persons (M= 2.88, SD =
1.34), F(1, 242) = 159.65,p < .001, 2p = .40, for the main effect of culture. In addition, con-temporary exemplary persons (M= 3.71, SD = 1.29) were seen as better representatives of
Western culture than were historical ones (M= 3.31, SD = 1.74; d= .26), F(1, 242) = 12.52,
p < .001, 2p = .05, for the main effect of epoch. The significant Culture of Exemplary Person
X Epoch interaction, F(1, 242) = 14.78,p < .001, 2p = .06, indicated that historical and con-
temporary Western exemplary persons did not differ in how well they represented Western
culture (M= 4.64, SD = 1.02 versusM= 4.60, SD = 0.99), F(1, 94) = 0.05, ns. It is interest-
ing that contemporary Chinese exemplary persons (M= 3.25, SD = 1.18) were viewed as
better representatives of Western culture than were historical Chinese exemplary persons
(M= 2.10, SD = 1.32), F(1, 148) = 28.15,p < .001, 2p = .16.
Attendant values of the exemplary persons. Table 1 shows the correlation between how
well the exemplary persons represented Chinese and Western cultures and how much they
exemplified the three categories of values. The better the exemplary persons represented
Chinese culture, the more they were perceived to exemplify Chinese moral values (r= .15,
p < .05). The better the exemplary persons represented Western culture, the more they were
perceived to exemplify Western moral values (r= .23,p < .01) and status values (r= .17,
p < .05). Finally, the better the exemplary persons represented Western culture, the less
they were perceived to exemplify Chinese moral values (r= .12,p < .05).
To examine how exemplary persons from different cultures and epochs differed in the
values they exemplified, we performed a 2 (Culture of Exemplary Person) X 2 (Epoch of
Exemplary Person) X 3 (Value Category) ANOVA on the exemplification ratings. The fol-
lowing effects were significant: the main effect of value category, F(2, 486) = 26.02,p