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Evolution of cooperation
Gilberto Câmara, Earth System Science Center, INPE
Licence: Creative Commons ���� By Attribution ���� Non Commercial ���� Share Alikehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/
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Acknowledgments for using previous material
Martin Nowak (Harvard University, USA) Francisco C. Santos (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium) Craig Callender (Philosophy, Univ California San Diego, USA) Ana Aguiar (INPE, Brazil) Tiago Carneiro (Federal University of Ouro Preto, Brazil) Guy Brasseur (NCAR, USA)
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What cooperation can achieve...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0HrjevD2vhk&feature=related
Those were the days…
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Collective spatial action: volunteered GI
Are Brazilians less cooperative? Less tech-savvy? Does google solve their problems? Are they happy with their public data?
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Collective spatial action: pedestrian modelling
Batty, “Agent-Based Pedestrian Modelling”, in: Advanced Spatial Analysis, ESRI Press, 2003.
Notting Hill Carnival (London)
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Collective spatial action: deforestation
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Fossil fuel
Land use change
10
8
6
4
2
1960 20101970 1990 20001980
CO2 e
mis
sion
s (P
gC y
-1) 8.7
1.2
9.9 PgC
12% of total
Le Quéré et al. 2009, Nature-geoscience, 2009
Collective spatial action: global change
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An explicit spatial problem in global change: land change
“Land-change science has emerged as a foundational element of global environment change and sustainability science” (Rindfuss et al, “Developing a science of land change”, PNAS, 2004).
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source: Global Land Project Science Plan (IGBP)
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Impacts of global land change
More vulnerable communities are those most at risk
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Nature: Physical equations Describe processes
Society: Decisions on how to Use Earth´s resources
We need spatially explicit models to understand human-environment interactions
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Modelling collective spatial actions: the complex systems approach
1. Situated individuals (persons, groups, agents)2. Interaction rules - communication3. Decision rules - actions4. Properties of space
photo: Chico Albuquerque
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Nature: Physical equations Describe processes
Society: Decisions on how to Use Earth´s resources
Our spatially explicit models need good social theories to guide them
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We need social theories to understand human-environment interactions Survey
Moran, “Environmental Social Science: Human-Environment Interactions and Sustainability” (2010)
Social simulationSchelling, “Micromotives and macrobehavior” (1978).Batty, “Cities and complexity” (2005).
Game theoryvon Neumann and Morgenstern, “Theory of games and economic behavior” (1944)Nash, "Equilibrium points in n-person games“ (1950).
Evolutionary dynamicsMaynard Smith, ”Evolution and the theory of games” (1982)Axelrod, “Evolution of cooperation” (1988).Novak, “Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life” (2005).
Institutional analysisOstrom, “Governing the commons” (1990).
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Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968)
Assume a common-property resource (exclusion is difficult and joint use involves subtractability) with no property rights. (Pasture open to all)
Each herdsman tries to keep as many sheep as possible on the commons. Each tries to maximize gain.
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Add those sheep!
The rational herdsman concludes that he should add another sheep. And another…And another…And so does each herdsman
“Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest…”
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Prisoners’ DilemmaTwo suspects are caught and put in different rooms (no
communication). They are offered the following deal:1. If both of you confess, you will both get 3 years in prison2. If you confesses whereas the other does not, you will get 1
year and the other gets 5 years in prison .3. If neither of you confess, you both will get 2 years in prison.
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Prisioner´s Dillema as a Model for the Tragedy of the Commons
1. Suppose the commons can support 2 sheep at no cost and that each additional sheep put in the commons has a cost of 1/3 of its price due to overgrazing.
2. Assume two herdsman with one sheep on the commons each.
3. If a herdsman puts another sheep in the commons, he receives all the proceeds from the sale of each additional animal. His temptation is 4/3 and the sucker´s payoff for the other herdsman is -1/3.
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Prisioner´s Dillema as a Model for the Tragedy of the Commons
Payoff matrix
DC
C
D
1 -1/3
1/3 4/3
other
you
You are the herdsman. What are your options? Do you cooperate or defect?
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Tragedy of the Commons?
Everybody’s property is nobody’s property (Hardin)
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Preconditions for the tragedy of the commons
Lack of restraint on pursuits of self-interest
Consequences are externalities (I don’t have to pay)
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Externalities in the global commons
Activity of one person has an impact on the well-being of another.
Positive externalities (or external benefits): Benefits realized by those who didn’t pay for them.
Negative externalities (or external costs): Costs borne by those who didn’t generate them. Byproducts that harm others.
SUVs in USA Climate Change in Africa
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Is the tragedy of the commons inevitable?
Experiments show that cooperation emerges if virtuous interactions exist
source: Novak, May and Sigmund (Scientific American, 1995)
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Repeated prisioner´s dillema
source: Novak, May and Sigmund (Scientific American, 1995)
Four different strategies for repeated prisioner´s dillema
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Repeated prisioner´s dillema
source: Novak, May and Sigmund (Scientific American, 1995)
Evolution of prisioner´s dillema comparing different strategies
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How can cooperation happen?Nowak MA (2006). “Five rules for the evolution of cooperation” Science 314:1560-1563(most highly cited multidisciplinary paper – ISI, 1st quarter 2010)
"I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins“ (J.B.S. Haldane)
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Five rules for evolution of cooperation
b = benefit for the recepient c= cost for the donor
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Common pool resources (Elinor Ostrom)
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The ultimate common pool resource
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Governing the commons
[Ostrom, Science, 2005]
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Governing the commons: Ostrom´s conditions
1. Clearly defined boundaries
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
3. Collective-choice arrangements:
4. Monitoring and graduated Sanctions.
5. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
6. Minimal recognition of rights to organize.
7. Organized governance activities.
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Ostrom on governing the commons
“The challenge is how best to limit the use of natural resources so as to ensure their long-term economic viability.”
“Neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural resource systems.”
“Optimal equilibrium with centralized control is based on assumptions concerning accuracy of information, monitoring capabilities, sanctioning reliability, and zero costs of administration.”
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Conclusion
Spatial models of human-environment interactions can support the study of common pool resources