Download - An Impoverished Neutrality
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
1/21
An Impoverished Neutrality?Public Manager Values in LocalGovernment, Penang, Malaysia
ALI HAIDAR, LIM HONG HAI and LEN PULLIN
This article considers the issue of public managers values at the
local government level in Penang, Malaysia. It is an empirical
study that explores survey and interview responses to develop anunderstanding of the values public managers assume in their
relationship with politicians in office. The findings indicate that the
dominance of the ruling coalition party in Penang appears to have
pushed Penang council officers towards a more passive and
impoverished neutrality ethic and the adoption on occasion of
responsive values. We see no reason to be sanguine that this might
not also be the case with council officers in others states and of
civil servants at other levels of Malaysian government.
One of the main public management issues that has never been satisfactorily
resolved is to whom public servants should be loyal. A mapping exercise
has identified no less than a dozen kinds of objects of loyalty for the civil
servant, yet there is disagreement on their constitution and focus (Waldo,
1985). The problem is significantly reduced if we confine ourselves to the
interface between politicians in office and civil servants (Gregory, 1991;
1997; Aberbach et al., 1981; Aberbach and Rockman, 1988a; 1988b; 1990)
as we do in this present study, but it still remains.
Constitutionalists in countries with Westminster-based systems have
insisted that civil servants owe primary if not sole loyalty to political
superiors, as they are the duly elected representatives of the people
(Armstrong, 1989). This loyalty should be manifest through civil servants
following an ethic of neutrality, giving their best advice to political
superiors and faithfully carrying out laws and policies decided by them
(Armstrong, 1989; Quinlan, 1993). However, the neutrality ethic has come
under pressure from different and somewhat opposing perspectives.
For example, politicians in power, unhappy with the indifference andlack of policy or ideological commitment of neutral civil servants, have
demanded greater sympathy and responsiveness to their political goals and
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
2/21
agendas (Keating, 1990; 1995). There is a view that these demands have
been met to some extent through the triumph of managerialism in some
countries (OFaircheallaigh et al., 1999). In others, including the UK,
developments such as the alleged politicisation of the civil service have
been attributed as much to the longevity of one-party government as to the
new managerial culture (Painter and Isaac-Henry, 1997: 3045), but what
do we mean by these terms?
To begin with, we can safely state that managerialism is characterised by
an emphasis on delegating work to managers, holding them responsible for
results and focusing on outputs rather than procedures (Hughes, 1998). It
also embraces the introduction of greater competition within the public
sector, the corporatisation of government agencies, replacing job-for-life
employment relationships with performance-based, fixed-term or contractemployment. It can also include replacing or diminishing the power over
employment matters by public service boards and empowering politicians
to hire and fire public servants at their will (Hughes, 1998). For some
observers, the changing nature of public servant employment has been one
of the most contentious aspects of managerialism (Parker, 1989; Considine,
1988; Self, 1995).
These observers argue that the empowerment of politicians over the
human resource aspect of the employment of public servants threatens the
official with a conscience (Parker, 1989: 345), and that politicians in theirsearch for greater control over public servants have weakened the legitimate
role of public servants in the constitutional system, and have threatened
official independenceand the ethic of public service(Parker, 1989: 3434).
Furthermore, as a result of managerialism, public servants could become
loyal instruments of ministerial authority (Considine, 1988: 8). Others note
that managerialism can lead to public servants telling their political superiors
what they want to hear, to tailoring their actions or their style to the whim of
the moment and not having an eye on the public interest (Waterford, 1988
in Keating, 1990: 394). Similarly, managerialism can displace or imperil thecapacity for public managers to act as the communitys conscience ... and
promote the public interest through an ethical regard for community welfare
and the common good (Uhr, 1990: 25).
In addition to the real or potential threat to neutrality values posed by
managerialism, it is also argued that the relationship between politicians and
public servants is associated with the nature of the political structure in
which they exist (Williams, 1985). For example, public servant values are
likely to be significantly different in a political environment where there are
periodic changes in government compared to one where a single political
party is in power over an extended period (Painter and Isaac-Henry, 1997).
PUBLIC MANAGER VALUES IN MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 89
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
3/21
servants to be more vulnerable to demands for responsive behaviour when
there is no effective opposition party challenging political power.
The primacy of the neutrality ethic in governing politicalcivil servant
relationships has also been questioned, due to serious problems arising from
its practice (Jackson, 1987; OToole, 1990). These problems mainly
emanate from politicians in office and are exacerbated by responsive civil
servants. To counter this development, some external critics would have
non-partisan civil servants transcend strict or sole loyalty to political
superiors in order to serve a putatively larger common good or public
interest (Jackson, 1987; 1988; OToole, 1990; Wamsley et al., 1990).
Although not indifferent to the public interest under the neutrality ethic,
civil servants are urged by these observers to make the public interest their
primary loyalty. Civil servants would still be loyal to political superiors butonly on the condition that their superiors policies serve the public interest.
Civil servants have been urged to assume this trustee role by writers in
various countries, including the USA (Wamsley et al., 1990), Britain
(OToole, 1990) and Australia (Jackson, 1988; 1987).
The conflicting prescriptions of neutrality, responsiveness and
trusteeship raise concerns about the actual acceptance and practice by civil
servants, as it has long been recognised that the way ethical dilemmas are
handled is critical to the overall health and welfare of the political system
(Gortner, 1991: 15). It is a matter of good governance to ascertain anddetermine the values that guide the behaviour of civil servants in relation to
ruling politicians. Irrespective of the need, this process has been
insufficiently performed in Malaysia. For example, the general studies of
the values of Malaysian federal civil servants (Scott, 1968; Puthucheary,
1978) are not focused on politicalcivil servant relations. While local
government in Malaysia has been the subject of extensive previous study
(Norris, 1980; Cheema and Hussain, 1978; Tennant, 1973b; Beaglehole,
1974), most studies were conducted more than 20 years ago and have
mainly been confined to local government reform (Cheema and Hussain,1978; Beaglehole, 1974; Norris, 1974), local government elections
(Tennant, 1973a), urbanisation (Cheema, 1974) and financial management
(Tayib et al., 1999). We seek to begin to redress the lack of knowledge in
this area in Malaysia by examining the values that guide council officers in
their relationship with councillors.
MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTEXT
Local government, the third tier in the administrative structure of Malaysian
government, is the creature of the states, which are themselves the second
90 L OC AL G OV ER NM EN T STU DI E S
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
4/21
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
5/21
Ali, 2000; Lim, 2001: 18990). This coalition, now known as the National
Front, has been in continuous power at the federal level and in almost all
states since independence from the British in 1957. The coincidence of the
Westminster tradition of neutrality, the appointment rather than election of
councillors, their key decision-making role in senior council officer
employment and an unbroken rule by a dominant coalition party combine to
make Malaysian local government civil servants an appropriate group for
the study of public service values.
STUDY SETTING
The study is set in the state of Penang, one of the 13 states of the Federation
of Malaysia. Penang provides a suitable environment to test the values thatguide council officers in their relationship with councillors. As previously
identified, Penang was the first British-type local government formed in
Malaysia (Norris, 1980), the first local government in Malaysia to hold
democratic elections, and Penang council officers were the first public
servants in Malaysia to be introduced to the Westminster tradition of public
service neutrality. However, these are not the only reasons to situate this
study in Penang.
The Malaysian federal government and most of the states of peninsular
Malaysia, except Trengganu and Kelantan, have been under the control ofthe same coalition party since Malaysian independence in 1957.
Importantly, Penang is the only state where none of the individual parties in
the ruling coalition hold an absolute majority in the State Legislative
Assembly (SLA). The four main parties representing the coalition in Penang
State are the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the two
Chinese-based political parties of Malaysia, the Malay Chinese Association
(MCA) and Gerakan within the Barisan National Party (BN) and the
Malaysian Indian Congress. Penang is also the only state in Malaysia where
the majority of the population is non-Malay.The balance of political power at the state level in Malaysia is a crucial
issue in the context of this discussion. It is logical to expect that the coalition
SLA in Penang will provide a greater degree of check and balance within
the political arm of government than that of any other state in Malaysia.
This check and balance should, in theory, provide an appropriate
environment for the practice of neutral values in public service. Especially
when coupled with the long historical tradition of neutrality experienced by
Penang council officers. In itself this is not a remarkable conclusion and
does not in isolation justify a study of this nature, unless there is or has been
another variable or dimension that threatens or has threatened council
92 L OC AL G OV ER NM EN T STU DI E S
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
6/21
nature of council officer employment in Malaysia. Even though Malaysia
has not introduced a managerialist perspective in public management, all
human resource matters relating to local government officers come under
the direct control of councillors. As discussed previously, the empowerment
of politicians over the employment of public servants has been argued by
some observers to be a potential threat to public service ethics (Parker,
1989; Uhr, 1990; Considine, 1988) and, hence, to the neutrality of Penang
council officers.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The current public management values literature has a preoccupation with
normative ethics and a consequential sparsity of empirical analysis (Rainey,1992; Menzel, 1993). It largely treats public management values as a
collective or portmanteau concept (Richards and Smith, 1968: 157) with
few attempts to systematically distinguish and classify its various
dimensions (Pratchett and Wingfield, 1996; Maranto and Skelley, 1992). A
sampling of the literature or official codes cannot fail to show variations in
the number and kind of values that civil servants should uphold and the order
of their importance. This inherent variability suggests the usefulness of
specifying the nature of public management values issues being examined
(for example, in terms of relationships or interfaces with various significantothers) and developing an empirical framework comprising meaningful
value categories. We achieve rigour in this present study by limiting our
focus to politicalcivil servant role relations and by developing an
appropriate dimensional approach to the study of public manager values
consistent with that developed by Pratchett and Wingfield (1996) and
Maranto and Skelley (1992). We do not pretend that this approach
encompasses the multitude of views on what public service ethics comprises.
We identify three main dimensions in respect of civil servants
relationships with their political superiors (Table 1). These are the object ofobedience, the degree of anonymity, and the degree of partisanship. A civil
servants position on each of these dimensions will collectively form his/her
value profile in relation to political superiors. This may vary from one civil
servant to another. For heuristic purposes, three distinct ideal type (Weber,
1949) value-patterns are identified, these are labelled neutral, responsive
and trustee (Table 1). Each ideal pattern offers a benchmark against which
changing values and perceptions can be analysed and current values
compared.
In the context of our ideal types, neutral civil servants owe obedience to
the law and to their political superiors conditional upon the latter acting
PUBLIC MANAGER VALUES IN MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 93
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
7/21
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
8/21
leaking serves the public interest. Leaking may always be illegal but it is not
always unethical or immoral (1988: 248). Civil servants who subscribe to
the trustee value-pattern forsake anonymity to promote the public interest.
METHODOLOGY
The local government restructuring of the mid-1970s left Penang with two
municipal councils:Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang(MPPP) andMajlis
Perbandaran Seberang Perai (MPSP), or Penang Island Municipal Council
and Seberang Perai Municipal Council. The MPPP administers an area of
approximately 293 square kilometres with a multi-ethnic population of
about 600,000. The MPSP is the largest local authority in Malaysia covering
an area of 738 square kilometres with a multi-ethnic population of about391,000 in 2000 (ESCAP, 2001). Both councils comprise 24 appointed
councillors.
The research methodology adopted a combination of questionnaire
survey and semi-structured interviews to determine the position of Penang
council officers (PCOs) on each of the value dimensions identified above
(Table 1). In line with our interest in the values of civil servants that deal
directly with politicians in office, the target group was the heads and deputy
heads of administrative departments. Both MPPP and MPSP have nine
departments each. Each department has a head and one or more deputiescomprising a total of 42 civil servants or, as we term them in this article,
Penang Council Officers (PCOs). There were 32 responses to the
questionnaire survey (75 per cent of our target group). Of these, 21 were
from MPPP and the other 11 from MPSP. The questionnaire survey sought
responses to a set of discrete questions testing each of the value patterns.
The main aim of this approach was to provide a broad understanding of the
main patterns of the respondents received behaviour that could later be
verified, followed up and/or supplemented by the interview process.
The survey respondents represented all MPPP departments and themajority of MPSP departments, a diversity that should enhance confidence
in our findings (Felts and Schumann, 1997: 364). On the other hand, there
are possible limitations arising from social desirability bias in self-reporting
as well as from the respondents interpretation of value terms and the
absence of reference to specific cases of value conflict (Frederick and
Weber, 1990: 128). To reduce and help overcome these limitations, the
survey findings, as previously identified, were verified through the use of
semi-structured interviews (Bryant and Pullin, 1997; Brannen, 1992).
PUBLIC MANAGER VALUES IN MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 95
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
9/21
DATA AND RESULTS
Table 2 indicates the proportion of council officers who agreed, were not
sure or disagreed with each variable in the neutrality value-pattern. It can be
seen from the table that there is considerable support for neutral values inthe majority of the dimensions tested. In the obedience dimension, the
findings indicate very strong support that the PCOs will impartially
implement council policy in accordance with rules and regulations (91 per
cent), while the majority (69 per cent) supported the view that they will only
carry out the lawful orders of councillors. The respondents also strongly
supported the neutral value of non-partisanship. When advising councillors
they will provide views and information on all relevant matters even if they
do not coincide with those of the councillors (81 per cent) and this extended
to considering the preferences of their superiors and the public interest (84per cent).
Table 3 indicates the proportion of respondent support or otherwise for
each dimension in the responsive value pattern. The data shows little or no
support for each of the responsive value dimensions. In terms of the
obedience dimension, only a few respondents (19 per cent) appeared willing
to promote councillor interests during the course of policy implementation
and even fewer (13 per cent) were comfortable with the notion of blind
obedience and implementing all of their superiors orders, even illegal ones.
When it came to responsive partisanship, again, only a few respondents (19per cent) agreed that they would limit their views and information to that
which supported their superiors policy preferences and none of them (zero
per cent) agreed that they would provide policy formulation advice which
supported the councillors policy preferences and nothing else. In concert
with their seeming overall desire for anonymity in public management, very
few (13 per cent) of PCOs indicated that they would make public comment
that promoted support for councillors.
96 L OC AL G OV ER NM EN T STU DI E S
TABLE 2
NEUTRALITY DIMENSION RESPONSES
Dimension Variables Agree Unsure DisagreeTested % % %
Obedience I implement policies impartially and in accordance 91 3 6with rules and regulations.
Obedience I carry out only the lawful orders of the councillors. 69 22 9Partisanship When advising, I provide views and information on 81 16 3
all relevant matters, even if they do not coincide withthose of the councillors.
Partisanship In providing policy formulation advice, I consider 84 9 6both the preferences of my superior and the publicinterest.
Anonymity I never make public comment or disclose information 100 0 0
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
10/21
Table 4 indicates the proportion of council officers who agreed, were not
sure or disagreed with each variable in the trustee value-pattern. Support for
this pattern was positive but weaker and more mixed than support for the
neutral value-pattern. While there was strong support (84 per cent) for using
their discretion when implementing policies to make them as far as possible
in the public interest, there was much less support from respondents (45 per
cent) for only implementing those policies which are in the public interest.
Similarly, while there was support in the partisanship dimension foradopting the public interest as the primary concern in policy formulation (59
per cent), there was less support (47 per cent) for only providing councillors
with advice that promotes the public interest. The final dimension in the
trustee pattern is anonymity, the willingness or otherwise of a PCO to go
public without proper authorisation and disclose information about policies
which were against the PCOs view of the public interest. The findings
indicate that none of the respondents agreed with this statement (zero per
cent) and they would avoid making public comment or disclosure in this
respect.Although the above discussion indicates some support for trustee values
among the respondents, there was only majority support when they were
implementing policy (84 per cent) and in policy formulation (59 per cent).
These statements can both be interpreted as non-confrontational and they
promote a passive rather than active trustee focus. In contrast, a minority of
the respondents would only implement policies that were in the public
interest (45 per cent) and only provide advice that promoted the public
interest (47 per cent). Importantly, although they are trustee-oriented, these
statements require more active trustee behaviour on the part of the PCO and
hence entail more risk of exposure. The most active trustee statement, which
PUBLIC MANAGER VALUES IN MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 97
TABLE 3
RESPONSIVE DIMENSION RESPONSES
Dimension Variables Agree Unsure DisagreeTested % % %
Obedience I implement all orders of my superior even if they 13 13 75are not lawful or are against the public interest.
Obedience I promote the interests of the councillors and 19 22 59the ruling party while I implement policies.
Partisanship While advising councillors, I only provide views 19 16 66and information that support their policy preferences.
Partisanship When providing policy formulation advice, I 0 25 75consider the preferences of my superior and nothingelse.
Anonymity I only make public comments and disclose 13 23 65information that promotes public support for thecouncillors.
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
11/21
on policies they considered against the public interest, received no support
at all from the respondents. These survey findings suggest that while public
servants may identify with trustee values, the majority will tend to adopt
passive rather than active ways of manifesting their support for these values.
This finding is more consistent with the traditional view of neutrality rather
than trustee-type values. In the remainder of this section we consider the
interview and other data to further expand upon and qualify the quantitative
data considered so far.It is interesting to note that the neutral value-pattern is the only one
supported by the survey respondents across all dimensions. We argue that
neutrality has endured in this environment partly because PCOs believe that
the councillors, as political representatives, have the right to decide on and
direct the policy framework. One departmental head supported this view by
pointing out that we do not have council election[s] but the fact that they
[councillors] are appointed by the State government means they are also
supposed to be representing the general public. There was undeniable
recognition among council officers of the constitutionally established role
division between officers and politicians. The officers acknowledgment
and unqualified acceptance of this role division was summed up by one
officer who stated that:
The councillors are the policy makers in council so they are the
decision makers, council is something like a mini sort of parliament.
Whenever council wants to make a decision in terms of policy they
are the ones who have the final say. As far as officers [are concerned]
... we are running [the] day to day administrative work, we are doingthe day to day programs approved by council. But whenever there is
98 L OC AL G OV ER NM EN T STU DI E S
TABLE 4
TRUSTEE DIMENSION RESPONSES
Dimension Variables Agree Unsure DisagreeTested % % %
Obedience I only implement policies which, in my view, are in 45 32 23the public interest.
Obedience When implementing policies, I use my discretion to 84 9 6make them as consistent as possible with the publicinterest.
Partisanship While advising, I only provide views and information 47 22 31that promote the public interest.
Partisanship When providing policy formulation advice my primary 59 28 13consideration is to promote the public interest.
Anonymity I comment publicly or disclose information on policies 0 10 90which, in my view, are against the public interest, evenwhen it is not expressly authorised by my superior.
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
12/21
officers, our responsibilities are to study and present [our findings] to
the council for a decision.
The legitimacy of council and the council officers duty to obey was
summed up by one interview respondent who stated that as an officer:
of the council I am supposed to defend the council decision. I am paid
to do so. I am not here to express my own personal views My duty is
to the council not to individual councillors. So if the council has made
that decision then I would defend the decision by rationalising and
supporting that decision. That is the way I have been trained that is the
way I think There are lot of decisions the council rejects, I may
disagree with council but I have one duty to support and defend the
decision of the council, otherwise I should not be here.The same officer limited their involvement and responsiveness to councillor
and public interest demands by stating that they would not do things
beyond [the] call of my duty, for instance trying to get support of the public
and to stir up things.
The issue of technical expertise in the context of the role division
between council officers and politicians was emphasised by another council
officer who argued that while council officers bring their technical expertise
to the policy process not every decision is a matter of technical opinion.
Furthermore, it was stated that council officers are quite incapable of
making the contributions that politicians make as councillors take political
factors into account and [these factors] are more important than technical
factors.
Neutrality has also endured because it serves as a protective shield for
PCOs against pressure from councillors. The interviews identified that some
councillors are quite assertive and at times very aggressive in pursuing their
own policy and political objectives and aspirations which they expect PCOs
to support. When undue pressure of this nature occurs, the PCOs useneutrality as a screen or barrier to protect themselves from charges of non-
compliant and non-supportive behaviour.
However, political pressure has unmistakably affected the practice of
neutrality. PCOs play safe by adopting a very formal approach to their role.
For example, some of those interviewed insist that their views are recorded
when their advice is ignored but most simply take the attitude that their job
finishes when their advice is tendered. Many are reluctant, even scared, to
take a firm stand on policy issues because fingers will be pointed by
councillors. One PCO indicated that we do not want to exercise ourdiscretion because we feel that the councillors will come after us.Another
f h i h d d h
PUBLIC MANAGER VALUES IN MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 99
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
13/21
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
14/21
within the ranks of council officers was associated with a take care of
yourself culture where officers felt isolated, exposed and susceptible to
councillor pressure when policy issues are contentious and confronting.
This is sick. An officer who is looking for some kind of guidance andsupport, you may not find it there; he is on his own. No group support
If you want to do things properly, interpret things properly, there is
nobody to take care of you, nobody is here to protect you; there is no
godfather here.
This perceived lack of desire to take a firm stand on matters of policy
interpretation and implementation is also associated with the nature of the
employment relationship of the council officers themselves. Those
interviewed were acutely conscious of their dependency on councillors forongoing employment in their respective council. Staffing in local
government is the direct responsibility of the authorities [the councillors],
which have the right, subject to few exceptions, to appoint and dismiss
(Norris, 1980: 6). Under the Local Government Act 1976, the appointed
councillors have an important, and at times decisive, influence over officer
selection, promotion and salary increases (LGA, 1976: s.16). While there
are council committees which make these human resource decisions, the
councillors have significant representation on them and are in effect the
power brokers in any significant human resource decision. The majority ofPCOs viewed the role of councillors in respect of their promotion and
continued employment as decisive, with a significant capability to take
disciplinary action against non-conformists.
It has been argued that public managers cannot complain about the
requirement to be obedient (Jackson, 1988; Thompson, 1985). They are
morally obliged to obey the lawful commands of their political superiors
and accept these duties on their own volition. The moment they find these
duties disagreeable they are free to resign (Jackson, 1988; Thompson,
1985). However, the implicit assumption underlying this argument is alabour market context where there are alternative employment choices for
those with the particular skills of public servants, which is not the case in
Malaysia. There are three factors which limit or confine the public manager
employment choice in Malaysia.
First, although there have been proposals in the past to establish a
country-wide local government service in Malaysia, it remains a wish rather
than a reality. As a result, council officers are employed by and serve a
specific local government council with little or no opportunity to transfer or
move within the service to other councils. In reality, labour market
opportunities for local government officers are extremely limited. Second,
PUBLIC MANAGER VALUES IN MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 101
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
15/21
few, if any, public employment opportunities that the coalition party cannot
influence. Therefore, if you upset one part of the political elite you are likely
to limit the chance of public employment elsewhere. As a consequence, with
few employment alternatives, PCOs are highly vulnerable to the displeasure
of councillors. Finally, the neutrality principle, as a Westminster style of
public administration solution for securing a competent civil service under
competitive party politics, requires for its sustenance some measure of
restraint or discipline on the part of political parties in power (Williams,
1985). One such restraint is provided by the alternation of parties in power.
This alternation also restrains PCOs from opportunistically taking sides to
further their careers. The continued rule by a dominant party, with little or
no prospect of party alternation, weakens the incentives and restraints for
both ruling politicians and PCOs, tempting politicians to demand moreresponsiveness and PCOs to succumb to such temptation.
We earlier identified that the trustee value-pattern received some support
in the survey findings. This is because PCOs saw themselves as more
objective and able to see the public interest more clearly than the
appointed councillors, who often pursued narrow, sectional interests.
However, our respondents reported that they generally refrain from resisting
or arguing against councillors preferences or decisions on the grounds that
these preferences were contrary to the public interest. This is consistent with
the questionnaire response in Table 4, where none of them supportedviolating the norm of anonymity by speaking out against mistaken
policies. However, their agreement (84 per cent) that they use their
discretion to consider the public interest while implementing policies does
not conflict, because one action is confrontational and the other is not. We
can conclude, then, that the majority of officers use their discretion to
promote the public interest only when there is no risk of open confrontation
with councillors, and their support for the trustee values is more passive
than active.
DISCUSSION
Matters of convention, political traditions and circumstances primarily
condition the values guiding politicalcivil servant relations in
parliamentary systems. The overall picture emerging in this study is one of
predominantly neutral PCOs who further the public interest when
opportune, without risking open conflict with councillors; PCOs who also
resort to responsive behaviour when circumstances dictate that it is prudent
to do so, especially during policy implementation. This pragmatic elemental
combination of the various value-patterns and the reasons offered for such
102 L OC AL G OV ER NM EN T STU DI E S
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
16/21
conflicting expectations in a complex and difficult environment. An
environment that is not of their making and not entirely to their liking.
This coping occurs in a way that avoids serious conflict with their
political superiors. Avoidance is needed not only for self-protection but also
for maintaining a workable relationship essential for their effectiveness as
council officers. The coping also serves to minimise dissonance for PCOs
themselves. It allows the respondents to see themselves as neutral
professionals who serve a larger purpose, namely the public interest. True,
they promote the public interest only when circumstances permit and at
times they even engage in responsive behaviour. However, both these
seeming departures from neutrality are seen as a necessary and pragmatic
adaptation to a recalcitrant political world and, as such, are not seen as
seriously compromising their role conception.Civil service neutrality, the bedrock of parliamentary systems, endures
as the main value-pattern governing councillorofficer relations in local
government in Penang. However, it has also undergone some changes,
which we suggest are associated with PCOs coping with political
conditions. Below we highlight these changes and comment on their
implications for council performance. First, however, it merits notice that
the changes to neutrality have come not from PCOs fealty to the public
interest but from other sources.
The trustee value-pattern persists alongside but does not seriouslychallenge neutrality. The former is accepted and presumably to some extent
practised, but only in a passive way so as to minimise conflict with political
superiors. Some would probably find it heartening that PCOs still find
meaning and appeal in serving the public interest. Those troubled or
revolted by politiciansexcesses may wish for a more robust trustee role and
defence of the public interest by these PCOs. However, civil service
trusteeship of the public interest does not sit well with democratic theory
(Burke, 1986: 317) and is particularly scorned in parliamentary systems
with their clear and unified political hierarchy (Quinlan, 1993: 542). Tothose who believe that civil service trusteeship of the public interest is both
proper and properly subject to legitimate political authority, when it
conflicts with the managers duty up the line, it takes second place
(Corbett, 1996: 198), the behaviour of PCOs in this regard may be just what
it should be. Indeed, such a non-confrontational and subordinated
promotion of the public interest by civil servants is often seen as an integral
part of an extended notion of neutrality itself (Richards and Smith, 1968).
Our evidence indicates that the practice of neutrality by PCOs is more
passive than active. It is passive because PCOs do not feel secure enough in
the current political environment to speak their mind openly and frankly
PUBLIC MANAGER VALUES IN MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 103
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
17/21
passive neutrality by defensive and even demoralised PCOs deprives
councillors of the full benefit of civil service advice. Such an outcome
negates to some extent the rationale for according permanent tenure to
PCOs and confidentiality in their advice to political superiors. This
diminution of neutrality can fairly be regarded as an impoverishment of the
values of PCOs, as its effect on council performance would appear to be
unequivocally and entirely adverse.
Councillors who are secure in power tend to demand greater
responsiveness from PCOs. Given this, one may feel relieved that
responsiveness in the Penang local government context finds little favour
among PCOs and that their responsive behaviour is confined to compliance
with councillor requests in specific cases of administration. However, this
responsive behaviour, even though involuntary, is a departure from theimpartial implementation of laws by a neutral civil service. As such, PCO
acceptance of it constitutes a further impoverishment of neutral values.
Nor should its obvious downside be overlooked simply because it is
commonly practised. If rampant or unchecked, particularistic interventions
by councillors and subservience by PCOs seriously risk cheapening the
currency of the law. This increases public cynicism and further encourages
citizens to resort to political influence in their dealings with the civil
service. It should be pointed out that a highly politicised administration is a
different matter, and hence criticism of it detracts not at all from the principle that administrative decisions are properly subject to political
review and reconsideration in a democracy.
CONCLUSION
We find that the dominance of the ruling coalition appears to have pushed
PCOs towards a more passive and impoverished neutrality ethic.
Consideration needs to be given to whether this is also true of council
officers in other states and of civil servants at other levels of the Malaysiangovernment. However, we see no reason to be sanguine. Penang is the only
Malaysian state in which no single party in the ruling coalition has a
majority of seats in the state legislature or in the local councils. This
diversity imposes a higher degree of inter-party check and balance within
the ruling coalition in Penang than in other states. Yet we have found that
PCOs have succumbed somewhat to political pressures to be more
responsive. If this has happened in Penang, where there is the longest
history of British administration, which emphasises neutrality values and
checks and balances among political parties, a fortiori the same effect is
likely to be more pronounced in other National Front-controlled states. It is
104 L OC AL G OV ER NM EN T STU DI E S
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
18/21
partner is dominant and holds a clear majority of legislative and/or council
seats. This also applies to the states of Kelantan and Trengganu controlled
by the main Malay opposition party of PAS. Clearly, the interests of good
governance suggest that more research and greater public attention to the
values of Malaysian civil servants would not be remiss in a society that
prides itself on state led development.
REFERENCES
Aberbach, J.D. and B.A. Rockman, 1988a, Image IV Revisited: Executive and Political Roles,Governance, 1/1, pp.125.
Aberbach, J.D. and B.A. Rockman, 1988b, Mandates or Mandarins? Control and Discretion inthe Modern Administrative State,Public Administration Review, 48/2, pp.60612.
Aberbach, J.D. and B.A. Rockman, 1990, American and German Federal Executives Technocratic and Political Attitudes,International Social Science Journal, 42/1, pp.318.
Aberbach, J.D. and B.A. Rockman, 1994, Civil Servants and Policy Makers: Neutral orResponsive Competence, Governance, 7/4, pp.4619.
Aberbach, J.D., R.D. Putnam and B.A. Rockman, 1981,Bureaucrats and Politicians in WesternDemocracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Ali, A.H., 2000, Bernama the Malaysian National News Agency: Certain Groups Trying to Disrupt Civil Service Neutrality, [Internet] Malaysian National News Agency, Accessed1/16/2002, available from http://proquest.umi.com.
Armstrong, R., 1989, The Duties and Responsibilities of Civil Servants in Relation to Ministers,in G. Marshall (ed.), Ministerial Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
pp.14044.Beaglehole, J.H., 1974, Local Government in West Malaysia The Royal Commission Report,Journal of Administration Overseas, 13 (April), pp.34857.
Brannen, J., 1992, Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches: An Overview, in J.Brannen (ed.), Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research (Aldershot:Avebury), pp.337.
Bryant, M. and L.J. Pullin, 1997, Industrial Restructuring in Three Regions: An Analysis ofCommunity Response to the Threat of Industry Closure/Downsizing, in K. Spooner and S.Wright (ed.), Centralism, Enterprise Focus and Individualism: Where is the Balance andWhat are the Implications? (Sydney: School of Management, University of TechnologySydney), pp.97114.
Buchanan, B., 1975, Red Tape and the Service Ethic: Some Unexpected Differences between
Public and Private Managers,Administration and Society, 6, pp.42344.Burke, J.P., 1986,Bureaucratic Responsibility (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).Cheema, G.S., 1974, Administrative Responses to Urbanisation in Western Malaysia,Journal
of Administration Overseas, 16 (October), pp.24047.Cheema, G.S. and S.A. Hussain, 1978, Local Government Reform in Malaysia,Asian Survey,
18 (June), pp.57791.Considine, M., 1988, The Corporate Management Framework as Administrative Science: A
Critique,Australian Journal of Public Administration, 47/1, pp.418.Corbett, D.C., 1996, Australian Public Sector Management(St Leonards, NSW: Allen and
Unwin).Crouch, H., 1996, Government and Society in Malaysia (St Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin).ESCAP, 2001, Country Paper: Malaysia, Economic and Social Commission for the Asia Pacific,
Accessed 23/11/2001, Available from www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/country/malaysia/malaysia.htm.
Felts A and A Schumann 1997 Local Government Administrators: A Balance Wheel
PUBLIC MANAGER VALUES IN MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 105
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
19/21
Frederick, W.C. and J. Weber, 1990, The Values of Corporate Managers and their Critics: AnEmpirical Description and Normative Implications, in W.C. Frederick and L.E. Preston(ed.), Business Ethics: Research Issues and Empirical Studies (London: Preston, JAI),
pp.12344.Gortner, H.F., 1991,Ethics for Public Managers (New York: Praeger).
Gregory, R.J., 1991, The Attitudes of Senior Public Servants in Australia and New Zealand:Administrative Reform and Technocratic Consequence?, Governance, 4/3, pp.295331.
Gregory, R.J., 1997, After the Reforms: Some Patterns of Attitudinal Change among SeniorPublic Servants in Canberra and Wellington,Australian Journal of Public Administration,56/1, pp.8299.
Heclo, H., 1975, OMB and the Presidency The Problem of Neutral Competence,PublicInterest, 38/1, pp.8098.
Hughes, O.E., 1998,Public Management and Administration, 2nd edn. (Melbourne: Macmillan).Jackson, M., 1988, The Public Interest, Public Service and Democracy,Australian Journal of
Public Administration, 47/3, pp.24151.Jackson, M.W., 1987, The Eye of Doubt: Neutrality, Responsibility and Morality,Australian
Journal of Public Administration, 46/3, pp.28092.Keating, M., 1990, Managing for Results in the Public Interest,Australian Journal of Public
Administration, 49/4, pp.38798.Keating, M., 1995, Public Service Values,Australian Quarterly 67 (Summer), pp.1525.Kernaghan, K, 1976, Politics, Policy and Public Servants: Political Neutrality Revisited,
Canadian Public Administration, 19/3, pp.43256.LGA, 1976,Local Government Act, Malaysia.Lim, H.H., 2001, Public Administration: The Effects of Executive Domination, in K.W. Loh
and B.T. Khoo (eds.), Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices (Richmond:Curzon Press), pp.16597.
Maranto, R. and B.D. Skelley, 1992, Neutrality: An Enduring Principle of the Federal Service,American Review of Public Administration, 22/3, pp.17387.
Menzel, D.C., 1993, Ethics Induced Stress in the Local Government Workplace, PublicPersonnel Management, 22/4, pp.52336.Milne, R.S., 1967, Government and Politics in Malaysia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin).
Norris, M.W., 1974, Local Government in West Malaysia The Royal Commission Report andAfter, Studies in Comparative Local Government, 8 (April), pp.521.
Norris, M.W., 1980,Local Government in Peninsular Malaysia (London: Gower).OFaircheallaigh, C., J. Wanna and P. Weller, 1999,Public Sector Management in Australia: New
Challenges, New Directions (Melbourne: Macmillan).OToole, B.J., 1990, T.H. Green and the Ethics of Senior Officials in British Central
Government,Public Administration, 68 (Autumn), pp.33752.Painter, C., and K. Isaac-Henry, 1997, Conclusion: The Problematical Nature of Public
Management Reform, in K. Isaac-Henry, C. Painter and C. Barnes (eds.),Management in
the Public Sector: Challenge and Change (Oxford: Alden Press), pp.283308.Parker, R.S., 1989, The Administrative Vocation,Australian Journal of Public Administration,
48/4, pp.33645.Pratchett, L. and M. Wingfield, 1996, Petty Bureaucracy and Woolly-Minded Liberalism? The
Changing Ethos of Local Government Officers,Public Administration, 74/4, pp.63956.Puthucheary, M., 1978, The Politics of Administration: The Malaysian Experience (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press).Quinlan, M., 1993, Ethics in the Public Service, Governance, 6/4, pp.53844.Rainey, H.G., 1992, Reward Preferences among Public and Private Managers: In Search of the
Service Ethic,American Review of Public Administration, 16, pp.288302.Richards, D. and M.J. Smith, 1968, The Gatekeepers of the Common Good, in A. Hondeghem
(ed.),Ethics and Accountability in a Context of Governance and New Public Management(Amsterdam: IOS Press), pp.15163.
Rourke, F.E., 1992, Responsiveness and Neutral Competence in American Bureaucracy,PublicAd i i t ti R i 52/6 539 46
106 L OC AL G OV ER NM EN T STU DI E S
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
20/21
Sarji, A.H.A., 1993, The Changing Civil Service: Malaysias Competitive Edge (Malaysia:Pelanduk Publications).
Scott, J C., 1968,Political Ideology in Malaysia (New Haven: Yale University Press).Self, P., 1995, The Consequences of Reorganising Government on Market Lines,Australian
Journal of Public Administration, 54/3, pp.33945.
Spann, R.N., 1973,Public Administration in Australia, 3rd edn. (Sydney: Government Printer).Tayib, M., H.M. Coombs and J.R.M. Ameen, 1999, Financial Reporting by Malaysian Local
Authorities,International Journal of Public Sector Management, 12/2, pp.10320.Tennant, P., 1973a, The Abolition of Elective Local Government in Penang,Journal of South
East Asian Studies (March), pp.7387.Tennant, P., 1973b, The Decline of Elective Local Government in Malaysia, Asian Survey
(April), pp.34765.Thompson, D.F., 1985, The Possibility of Administrative Ethics,Public Administration Review,
45/5, pp.55561.Uhr, J., 1987, Rethinking the Senior Executive Service: Executive Development as Political
Education,Australian Journal of Public Administration, 46/1, pp.2036.Uhr, J., 1990, Ethics and the Australian Public Service: Making Managerialism Work,Current
Affairs Bulletin, 66/11, pp.227.Waldo, D., 1985, The Enterprise of Public Administration (California: Chandler and Sharp).Wamsley, G.L. et al., 1990, Refounding Public Administration (Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications).Weber, M., 1949, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch (New
York: The Free Press).Williams, C., 1985, The Concept of Bureaucratic Neutrality, Australian Journal of Public
Administration, 44/1, pp.4658.
PUBLIC MANAGER VALUES IN MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 107
-
8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality
21/21