an impoverished neutrality

8/6/2019 An Impoverished Neutrality

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An Impoverished Neutrality?Public Manager Values in LocalGovernment, Penang, Malaysia

ALI HAIDAR, LIM HONG HAI and LEN PULLIN

This article considers the issue of public managers values at the

local government level in Penang, Malaysia. It is an empirical

study that explores survey and interview responses to develop anunderstanding of the values public managers assume in their

relationship with politicians in office. The findings indicate that the

dominance of the ruling coalition party in Penang appears to have

pushed Penang council officers towards a more passive and

impoverished neutrality ethic and the adoption on occasion of

responsive values. We see no reason to be sanguine that this might

not also be the case with council officers in others states and of

civil servants at other levels of Malaysian government.

One of the main public management issues that has never been satisfactorily

resolved is to whom public servants should be loyal. A mapping exercise

has identified no less than a dozen kinds of objects of loyalty for the civil

servant, yet there is disagreement on their constitution and focus (Waldo,

1985). The problem is significantly reduced if we confine ourselves to the

interface between politicians in office and civil servants (Gregory, 1991;

1997; Aberbach et al., 1981; Aberbach and Rockman, 1988a; 1988b; 1990)

as we do in this present study, but it still remains.

Constitutionalists in countries with Westminster-based systems have

insisted that civil servants owe primary if not sole loyalty to political

superiors, as they are the duly elected representatives of the people

(Armstrong, 1989). This loyalty should be manifest through civil servants

following an ethic of neutrality, giving their best advice to political

superiors and faithfully carrying out laws and policies decided by them

(Armstrong, 1989; Quinlan, 1993). However, the neutrality ethic has come

under pressure from different and somewhat opposing perspectives.

For example, politicians in power, unhappy with the indifference andlack of policy or ideological commitment of neutral civil servants, have

demanded greater sympathy and responsiveness to their political goals and


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agendas (Keating, 1990; 1995). There is a view that these demands have

been met to some extent through the triumph of managerialism in some

countries (OFaircheallaigh et al., 1999). In others, including the UK,

developments such as the alleged politicisation of the civil service have

been attributed as much to the longevity of one-party government as to the

new managerial culture (Painter and Isaac-Henry, 1997: 3045), but what

do we mean by these terms?

To begin with, we can safely state that managerialism is characterised by

an emphasis on delegating work to managers, holding them responsible for

results and focusing on outputs rather than procedures (Hughes, 1998). It

also embraces the introduction of greater competition within the public

sector, the corporatisation of government agencies, replacing job-for-life

employment relationships with performance-based, fixed-term or contractemployment. It can also include replacing or diminishing the power over

employment matters by public service boards and empowering politicians

to hire and fire public servants at their will (Hughes, 1998). For some

observers, the changing nature of public servant employment has been one

of the most contentious aspects of managerialism (Parker, 1989; Considine,

1988; Self, 1995).

These observers argue that the empowerment of politicians over the

human resource aspect of the employment of public servants threatens the

official with a conscience (Parker, 1989: 345), and that politicians in theirsearch for greater control over public servants have weakened the legitimate

role of public servants in the constitutional system, and have threatened

official independenceand the ethic of public service(Parker, 1989: 3434).

Furthermore, as a result of managerialism, public servants could become

loyal instruments of ministerial authority (Considine, 1988: 8). Others note

that managerialism can lead to public servants telling their political superiors

what they want to hear, to tailoring their actions or their style to the whim of

the moment and not having an eye on the public interest (Waterford, 1988

in Keating, 1990: 394). Similarly, managerialism can displace or imperil thecapacity for public managers to act as the communitys conscience ... and

promote the public interest through an ethical regard for community welfare

and the common good (Uhr, 1990: 25).

In addition to the real or potential threat to neutrality values posed by

managerialism, it is also argued that the relationship between politicians and

public servants is associated with the nature of the political structure in

which they exist (Williams, 1985). For example, public servant values are

likely to be significantly different in a political environment where there are

periodic changes in government compared to one where a single political

party is in power over an extended period (Painter and Isaac-Henry, 1997).

PUBLIC MANAGER VALUES IN MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 89


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servants to be more vulnerable to demands for responsive behaviour when

there is no effective opposition party challenging political power.

The primacy of the neutrality ethic in governing politicalcivil servant

relationships has also been questioned, due to serious problems arising from

its practice (Jackson, 1987; OToole, 1990). These problems mainly

emanate from politicians in office and are exacerbated by responsive civil

servants. To counter this development, some external critics would have

non-partisan civil servants transcend strict or sole loyalty to political

superiors in order to serve a putatively larger common good or public

interest (Jackson, 1987; 1988; OToole, 1990; Wamsley et al., 1990).

Although not indifferent to the public interest under the neutrality ethic,

civil servants are urged by these observers to make the public interest their

primary loyalty. Civil servants would still be loyal to political superiors butonly on the condition that their superiors policies serve the public interest.

Civil servants have been urged to assume this trustee role by writers in

various countries, including the USA (Wamsley et al., 1990), Britain

(OToole, 1990) and Australia (Jackson, 1988; 1987).

The conflicting prescriptions of neutrality, responsiveness and

trusteeship raise concerns about the actual acceptance and practice by civil

servants, as it has long been recognised that the way ethical dilemmas are

handled is critical to the overall health and welfare of the political system

(Gortner, 1991: 15). It is a matter of good governance to ascertain anddetermine the values that guide the behaviour of civil servants in relation to

ruling politicians. Irrespective of the need, this process has been

insufficiently performed in Malaysia. For example, the general studies of

the values of Malaysian federal civil servants (Scott, 1968; Puthucheary,

1978) are not focused on politicalcivil servant relations. While local

government in Malaysia has been the subject of extensive previous study

(Norris, 1980; Cheema and Hussain, 1978; Tennant, 1973b; Beaglehole,

1974), most studies were conducted more than 20 years ago and have

mainly been confined to local government reform (Cheema and Hussain,1978; Beaglehole, 1974; Norris, 1974), local government elections

(Tennant, 1973a), urbanisation (Cheema, 1974) and financial management

(Tayib et al., 1999). We seek to begin to redress the lack of knowledge in

this area in Malaysia by examining the values that guide council officers in

their relationship with councillors.

MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTEXT

Local government, the third tier in the administrative structure of Malaysian

government, is the creature of the states, which are themselves the second

90 L OC AL G OV ER NM EN T STU DI E S


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Ali, 2000; Lim, 2001: 18990). This coalition, now known as the National

Front, has been in continuous power at the federal level and in almost all

states since independence from the British in 1957. The coincidence of the

Westminster tradition of neutrality, the appointment rather than election of

councillors, their key decision-making role in senior council officer

employment and an unbroken rule by a dominant coalition party combine to

make Malaysian local government civil servants an appropriate group for

the study of public service values.

STUDY SETTING

The study is set in the state of Penang, one of the 13 states of the Federation

of Malaysia. Penang provides a suitable environment to test the values thatguide council officers in their relationship with councillors. As previously

identified, Penang was the first British-type local government formed in

Malaysia (Norris, 1980), the first local government in Malaysia to hold

democratic elections, and Penang council officers were the first public

servants in Malaysia to be introduced to the Westminster tradition of public

service neutrality. However, these are not the only reasons to situate this

study in Penang.

The Malaysian federal government and most of the states of peninsular

Malaysia, except Trengganu and Kelantan, have been under the control ofthe same coalition party since Malaysian independence in 1957.

Importantly, Penang is the only state where none of the individual parties in

the ruling coalition hold an absolute majority in the State Legislative

Assembly (SLA). The four main parties representing the coalition in Penang

State are the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the two

Chinese-based political parties of Malaysia, the Malay Chinese Association

(MCA) and Gerakan within the Barisan National Party (BN) and the

Malaysian Indian Congress. Penang is also the only state in Malaysia where

the majority of the population is non-Malay.The balance of political power at the state level in Malaysia is a crucial

issue in the context of this discussion. It is logical to expect that the coalition

SLA in Penang will provide a greater degree of check and balance within

the political arm of government than that of any other state in Malaysia.

This check and balance should, in theory, provide an appropriate

environment for the practice of neutral values in public service. Especially

when coupled with the long historical tradition of neutrality experienced by

Penang council officers. In itself this is not a remarkable conclusion and

does not in isolation justify a study of this nature, unless there is or has been

another variable or dimension that threatens or has threatened council



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nature of council officer employment in Malaysia. Even though Malaysia

has not introduced a managerialist perspective in public management, all

human resource matters relating to local government officers come under

the direct control of councillors. As discussed previously, the empowerment

of politicians over the employment of public servants has been argued by

some observers to be a potential threat to public service ethics (Parker,

1989; Uhr, 1990; Considine, 1988) and, hence, to the neutrality of Penang

council officers.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The current public management values literature has a preoccupation with

normative ethics and a consequential sparsity of empirical analysis (Rainey,1992; Menzel, 1993). It largely treats public management values as a

collective or portmanteau concept (Richards and Smith, 1968: 157) with

few attempts to systematically distinguish and classify its various

dimensions (Pratchett and Wingfield, 1996; Maranto and Skelley, 1992). A

sampling of the literature or official codes cannot fail to show variations in

the number and kind of values that civil servants should uphold and the order

of their importance. This inherent variability suggests the usefulness of

specifying the nature of public management values issues being examined

(for example, in terms of relationships or interfaces with various significantothers) and developing an empirical framework comprising meaningful

value categories. We achieve rigour in this present study by limiting our

focus to politicalcivil servant role relations and by developing an

appropriate dimensional approach to the study of public manager values

consistent with that developed by Pratchett and Wingfield (1996) and

Maranto and Skelley (1992). We do not pretend that this approach

encompasses the multitude of views on what public service ethics comprises.

We identify three main dimensions in respect of civil servants

relationships with their political superiors (Table 1). These are the object ofobedience, the degree of anonymity, and the degree of partisanship. A civil

servants position on each of these dimensions will collectively form his/her

value profile in relation to political superiors. This may vary from one civil

servant to another. For heuristic purposes, three distinct ideal type (Weber,

1949) value-patterns are identified, these are labelled neutral, responsive

and trustee (Table 1). Each ideal pattern offers a benchmark against which

changing values and perceptions can be analysed and current values

compared.

In the context of our ideal types, neutral civil servants owe obedience to

the law and to their political superiors conditional upon the latter acting



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leaking serves the public interest. Leaking may always be illegal but it is not

always unethical or immoral (1988: 248). Civil servants who subscribe to

the trustee value-pattern forsake anonymity to promote the public interest.

METHODOLOGY

The local government restructuring of the mid-1970s left Penang with two

municipal councils:Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang(MPPP) andMajlis

Perbandaran Seberang Perai (MPSP), or Penang Island Municipal Council

and Seberang Perai Municipal Council. The MPPP administers an area of

approximately 293 square kilometres with a multi-ethnic population of

about 600,000. The MPSP is the largest local authority in Malaysia covering

an area of 738 square kilometres with a multi-ethnic population of about391,000 in 2000 (ESCAP, 2001). Both councils comprise 24 appointed

councillors.

The research methodology adopted a combination of questionnaire

survey and semi-structured interviews to determine the position of Penang

council officers (PCOs) on each of the value dimensions identified above

(Table 1). In line with our interest in the values of civil servants that deal

directly with politicians in office, the target group was the heads and deputy

heads of administrative departments. Both MPPP and MPSP have nine

departments each. Each department has a head and one or more deputiescomprising a total of 42 civil servants or, as we term them in this article,

Penang Council Officers (PCOs). There were 32 responses to the

questionnaire survey (75 per cent of our target group). Of these, 21 were

from MPPP and the other 11 from MPSP. The questionnaire survey sought

responses to a set of discrete questions testing each of the value patterns.

The main aim of this approach was to provide a broad understanding of the

main patterns of the respondents received behaviour that could later be

verified, followed up and/or supplemented by the interview process.

The survey respondents represented all MPPP departments and themajority of MPSP departments, a diversity that should enhance confidence

in our findings (Felts and Schumann, 1997: 364). On the other hand, there

are possible limitations arising from social desirability bias in self-reporting

as well as from the respondents interpretation of value terms and the

absence of reference to specific cases of value conflict (Frederick and

Weber, 1990: 128). To reduce and help overcome these limitations, the

survey findings, as previously identified, were verified through the use of

semi-structured interviews (Bryant and Pullin, 1997; Brannen, 1992).



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DATA AND RESULTS

Table 2 indicates the proportion of council officers who agreed, were not

sure or disagreed with each variable in the neutrality value-pattern. It can be

seen from the table that there is considerable support for neutral values inthe majority of the dimensions tested. In the obedience dimension, the

findings indicate very strong support that the PCOs will impartially

implement council policy in accordance with rules and regulations (91 per

cent), while the majority (69 per cent) supported the view that they will only

carry out the lawful orders of councillors. The respondents also strongly

supported the neutral value of non-partisanship. When advising councillors

they will provide views and information on all relevant matters even if they

do not coincide with those of the councillors (81 per cent) and this extended

to considering the preferences of their superiors and the public interest (84per cent).

Table 3 indicates the proportion of respondent support or otherwise for

each dimension in the responsive value pattern. The data shows little or no

support for each of the responsive value dimensions. In terms of the

obedience dimension, only a few respondents (19 per cent) appeared willing

to promote councillor interests during the course of policy implementation

and even fewer (13 per cent) were comfortable with the notion of blind

obedience and implementing all of their superiors orders, even illegal ones.

When it came to responsive partisanship, again, only a few respondents (19per cent) agreed that they would limit their views and information to that

which supported their superiors policy preferences and none of them (zero

per cent) agreed that they would provide policy formulation advice which

supported the councillors policy preferences and nothing else. In concert

with their seeming overall desire for anonymity in public management, very

few (13 per cent) of PCOs indicated that they would make public comment

that promoted support for councillors.


TABLE 2

NEUTRALITY DIMENSION RESPONSES

Dimension Variables Agree Unsure DisagreeTested % % %

Obedience I implement policies impartially and in accordance 91 3 6with rules and regulations.

Obedience I carry out only the lawful orders of the councillors. 69 22 9Partisanship When advising, I provide views and information on 81 16 3

all relevant matters, even if they do not coincide withthose of the councillors.

Partisanship In providing policy formulation advice, I consider 84 9 6both the preferences of my superior and the publicinterest.

Anonymity I never make public comment or disclose information 100 0 0


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Table 4 indicates the proportion of council officers who agreed, were not

sure or disagreed with each variable in the trustee value-pattern. Support for

this pattern was positive but weaker and more mixed than support for the

neutral value-pattern. While there was strong support (84 per cent) for using

their discretion when implementing policies to make them as far as possible

in the public interest, there was much less support from respondents (45 per

cent) for only implementing those policies which are in the public interest.

Similarly, while there was support in the partisanship dimension foradopting the public interest as the primary concern in policy formulation (59

per cent), there was less support (47 per cent) for only providing councillors

with advice that promotes the public interest. The final dimension in the

trustee pattern is anonymity, the willingness or otherwise of a PCO to go

public without proper authorisation and disclose information about policies

which were against the PCOs view of the public interest. The findings

indicate that none of the respondents agreed with this statement (zero per

cent) and they would avoid making public comment or disclosure in this

respect.Although the above discussion indicates some support for trustee values

among the respondents, there was only majority support when they were

implementing policy (84 per cent) and in policy formulation (59 per cent).

These statements can both be interpreted as non-confrontational and they

promote a passive rather than active trustee focus. In contrast, a minority of

the respondents would only implement policies that were in the public

interest (45 per cent) and only provide advice that promoted the public

interest (47 per cent). Importantly, although they are trustee-oriented, these

statements require more active trustee behaviour on the part of the PCO and

hence entail more risk of exposure. The most active trustee statement, which


TABLE 3

RESPONSIVE DIMENSION RESPONSES


Obedience I implement all orders of my superior even if they 13 13 75are not lawful or are against the public interest.

Obedience I promote the interests of the councillors and 19 22 59the ruling party while I implement policies.

Partisanship While advising councillors, I only provide views 19 16 66and information that support their policy preferences.

Partisanship When providing policy formulation advice, I 0 25 75consider the preferences of my superior and nothingelse.

Anonymity I only make public comments and disclose 13 23 65information that promotes public support for thecouncillors.


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on policies they considered against the public interest, received no support

at all from the respondents. These survey findings suggest that while public

servants may identify with trustee values, the majority will tend to adopt

passive rather than active ways of manifesting their support for these values.

This finding is more consistent with the traditional view of neutrality rather

than trustee-type values. In the remainder of this section we consider the

interview and other data to further expand upon and qualify the quantitative

data considered so far.It is interesting to note that the neutral value-pattern is the only one

supported by the survey respondents across all dimensions. We argue that

neutrality has endured in this environment partly because PCOs believe that

the councillors, as political representatives, have the right to decide on and

direct the policy framework. One departmental head supported this view by

pointing out that we do not have council election[s] but the fact that they

[councillors] are appointed by the State government means they are also

supposed to be representing the general public. There was undeniable

recognition among council officers of the constitutionally established role

division between officers and politicians. The officers acknowledgment

and unqualified acceptance of this role division was summed up by one

officer who stated that:

The councillors are the policy makers in council so they are the

decision makers, council is something like a mini sort of parliament.

Whenever council wants to make a decision in terms of policy they

are the ones who have the final say. As far as officers [are concerned]

... we are running [the] day to day administrative work, we are doingthe day to day programs approved by council. But whenever there is


TABLE 4

TRUSTEE DIMENSION RESPONSES


Obedience I only implement policies which, in my view, are in 45 32 23the public interest.

Obedience When implementing policies, I use my discretion to 84 9 6make them as consistent as possible with the publicinterest.

Partisanship While advising, I only provide views and information 47 22 31that promote the public interest.

Partisanship When providing policy formulation advice my primary 59 28 13consideration is to promote the public interest.

Anonymity I comment publicly or disclose information on policies 0 10 90which, in my view, are against the public interest, evenwhen it is not expressly authorised by my superior.


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officers, our responsibilities are to study and present [our findings] to

the council for a decision.

The legitimacy of council and the council officers duty to obey was

summed up by one interview respondent who stated that as an officer:

of the council I am supposed to defend the council decision. I am paid

to do so. I am not here to express my own personal views My duty is

to the council not to individual councillors. So if the council has made

that decision then I would defend the decision by rationalising and

supporting that decision. That is the way I have been trained that is the

way I think There are lot of decisions the council rejects, I may

disagree with council but I have one duty to support and defend the

decision of the council, otherwise I should not be here.The same officer limited their involvement and responsiveness to councillor

and public interest demands by stating that they would not do things

beyond [the] call of my duty, for instance trying to get support of the public

and to stir up things.

The issue of technical expertise in the context of the role division

between council officers and politicians was emphasised by another council

officer who argued that while council officers bring their technical expertise

to the policy process not every decision is a matter of technical opinion.

Furthermore, it was stated that council officers are quite incapable of

making the contributions that politicians make as councillors take political

factors into account and [these factors] are more important than technical

factors.

Neutrality has also endured because it serves as a protective shield for

PCOs against pressure from councillors. The interviews identified that some

councillors are quite assertive and at times very aggressive in pursuing their

own policy and political objectives and aspirations which they expect PCOs

to support. When undue pressure of this nature occurs, the PCOs useneutrality as a screen or barrier to protect themselves from charges of non-

compliant and non-supportive behaviour.

However, political pressure has unmistakably affected the practice of

neutrality. PCOs play safe by adopting a very formal approach to their role.

For example, some of those interviewed insist that their views are recorded

when their advice is ignored but most simply take the attitude that their job

finishes when their advice is tendered. Many are reluctant, even scared, to

take a firm stand on policy issues because fingers will be pointed by

councillors. One PCO indicated that we do not want to exercise ourdiscretion because we feel that the councillors will come after us.Another

f h i h d d h



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within the ranks of council officers was associated with a take care of

yourself culture where officers felt isolated, exposed and susceptible to

councillor pressure when policy issues are contentious and confronting.

This is sick. An officer who is looking for some kind of guidance andsupport, you may not find it there; he is on his own. No group support

If you want to do things properly, interpret things properly, there is

nobody to take care of you, nobody is here to protect you; there is no

godfather here.

This perceived lack of desire to take a firm stand on matters of policy

interpretation and implementation is also associated with the nature of the

employment relationship of the council officers themselves. Those

interviewed were acutely conscious of their dependency on councillors forongoing employment in their respective council. Staffing in local

government is the direct responsibility of the authorities [the councillors],

which have the right, subject to few exceptions, to appoint and dismiss

(Norris, 1980: 6). Under the Local Government Act 1976, the appointed

councillors have an important, and at times decisive, influence over officer

selection, promotion and salary increases (LGA, 1976: s.16). While there

are council committees which make these human resource decisions, the

councillors have significant representation on them and are in effect the

power brokers in any significant human resource decision. The majority ofPCOs viewed the role of councillors in respect of their promotion and

continued employment as decisive, with a significant capability to take

disciplinary action against non-conformists.

It has been argued that public managers cannot complain about the

requirement to be obedient (Jackson, 1988; Thompson, 1985). They are

morally obliged to obey the lawful commands of their political superiors

and accept these duties on their own volition. The moment they find these

duties disagreeable they are free to resign (Jackson, 1988; Thompson,

1985). However, the implicit assumption underlying this argument is alabour market context where there are alternative employment choices for

those with the particular skills of public servants, which is not the case in

Malaysia. There are three factors which limit or confine the public manager

employment choice in Malaysia.

First, although there have been proposals in the past to establish a

country-wide local government service in Malaysia, it remains a wish rather

than a reality. As a result, council officers are employed by and serve a

specific local government council with little or no opportunity to transfer or

move within the service to other councils. In reality, labour market

opportunities for local government officers are extremely limited. Second,



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few, if any, public employment opportunities that the coalition party cannot

influence. Therefore, if you upset one part of the political elite you are likely

to limit the chance of public employment elsewhere. As a consequence, with

few employment alternatives, PCOs are highly vulnerable to the displeasure

of councillors. Finally, the neutrality principle, as a Westminster style of

public administration solution for securing a competent civil service under

competitive party politics, requires for its sustenance some measure of

restraint or discipline on the part of political parties in power (Williams,

1985). One such restraint is provided by the alternation of parties in power.

This alternation also restrains PCOs from opportunistically taking sides to

further their careers. The continued rule by a dominant party, with little or

no prospect of party alternation, weakens the incentives and restraints for

both ruling politicians and PCOs, tempting politicians to demand moreresponsiveness and PCOs to succumb to such temptation.

We earlier identified that the trustee value-pattern received some support

in the survey findings. This is because PCOs saw themselves as more

objective and able to see the public interest more clearly than the

appointed councillors, who often pursued narrow, sectional interests.

However, our respondents reported that they generally refrain from resisting

or arguing against councillors preferences or decisions on the grounds that

these preferences were contrary to the public interest. This is consistent with

the questionnaire response in Table 4, where none of them supportedviolating the norm of anonymity by speaking out against mistaken

policies. However, their agreement (84 per cent) that they use their

discretion to consider the public interest while implementing policies does

not conflict, because one action is confrontational and the other is not. We

can conclude, then, that the majority of officers use their discretion to

promote the public interest only when there is no risk of open confrontation

with councillors, and their support for the trustee values is more passive

than active.

DISCUSSION

Matters of convention, political traditions and circumstances primarily

condition the values guiding politicalcivil servant relations in

parliamentary systems. The overall picture emerging in this study is one of

predominantly neutral PCOs who further the public interest when

opportune, without risking open conflict with councillors; PCOs who also

resort to responsive behaviour when circumstances dictate that it is prudent

to do so, especially during policy implementation. This pragmatic elemental

combination of the various value-patterns and the reasons offered for such



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conflicting expectations in a complex and difficult environment. An

environment that is not of their making and not entirely to their liking.

This coping occurs in a way that avoids serious conflict with their

political superiors. Avoidance is needed not only for self-protection but also

for maintaining a workable relationship essential for their effectiveness as

council officers. The coping also serves to minimise dissonance for PCOs

themselves. It allows the respondents to see themselves as neutral

professionals who serve a larger purpose, namely the public interest. True,

they promote the public interest only when circumstances permit and at

times they even engage in responsive behaviour. However, both these

seeming departures from neutrality are seen as a necessary and pragmatic

adaptation to a recalcitrant political world and, as such, are not seen as

seriously compromising their role conception.Civil service neutrality, the bedrock of parliamentary systems, endures

as the main value-pattern governing councillorofficer relations in local

government in Penang. However, it has also undergone some changes,

which we suggest are associated with PCOs coping with political

conditions. Below we highlight these changes and comment on their

implications for council performance. First, however, it merits notice that

the changes to neutrality have come not from PCOs fealty to the public

interest but from other sources.

The trustee value-pattern persists alongside but does not seriouslychallenge neutrality. The former is accepted and presumably to some extent

practised, but only in a passive way so as to minimise conflict with political

superiors. Some would probably find it heartening that PCOs still find

meaning and appeal in serving the public interest. Those troubled or

revolted by politiciansexcesses may wish for a more robust trustee role and

defence of the public interest by these PCOs. However, civil service

trusteeship of the public interest does not sit well with democratic theory

(Burke, 1986: 317) and is particularly scorned in parliamentary systems

with their clear and unified political hierarchy (Quinlan, 1993: 542). Tothose who believe that civil service trusteeship of the public interest is both

proper and properly subject to legitimate political authority, when it

conflicts with the managers duty up the line, it takes second place

(Corbett, 1996: 198), the behaviour of PCOs in this regard may be just what

it should be. Indeed, such a non-confrontational and subordinated

promotion of the public interest by civil servants is often seen as an integral

part of an extended notion of neutrality itself (Richards and Smith, 1968).

Our evidence indicates that the practice of neutrality by PCOs is more

passive than active. It is passive because PCOs do not feel secure enough in

the current political environment to speak their mind openly and frankly



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passive neutrality by defensive and even demoralised PCOs deprives

councillors of the full benefit of civil service advice. Such an outcome

negates to some extent the rationale for according permanent tenure to

PCOs and confidentiality in their advice to political superiors. This

diminution of neutrality can fairly be regarded as an impoverishment of the

values of PCOs, as its effect on council performance would appear to be

unequivocally and entirely adverse.

Councillors who are secure in power tend to demand greater

responsiveness from PCOs. Given this, one may feel relieved that

responsiveness in the Penang local government context finds little favour

among PCOs and that their responsive behaviour is confined to compliance

with councillor requests in specific cases of administration. However, this

responsive behaviour, even though involuntary, is a departure from theimpartial implementation of laws by a neutral civil service. As such, PCO

acceptance of it constitutes a further impoverishment of neutral values.

Nor should its obvious downside be overlooked simply because it is

commonly practised. If rampant or unchecked, particularistic interventions

by councillors and subservience by PCOs seriously risk cheapening the

currency of the law. This increases public cynicism and further encourages

citizens to resort to political influence in their dealings with the civil

service. It should be pointed out that a highly politicised administration is a

different matter, and hence criticism of it detracts not at all from the principle that administrative decisions are properly subject to political

review and reconsideration in a democracy.

CONCLUSION

We find that the dominance of the ruling coalition appears to have pushed

PCOs towards a more passive and impoverished neutrality ethic.

Consideration needs to be given to whether this is also true of council

officers in other states and of civil servants at other levels of the Malaysiangovernment. However, we see no reason to be sanguine. Penang is the only

Malaysian state in which no single party in the ruling coalition has a

majority of seats in the state legislature or in the local councils. This

diversity imposes a higher degree of inter-party check and balance within

the ruling coalition in Penang than in other states. Yet we have found that

PCOs have succumbed somewhat to political pressures to be more

responsive. If this has happened in Penang, where there is the longest

history of British administration, which emphasises neutrality values and

checks and balances among political parties, a fortiori the same effect is

likely to be more pronounced in other National Front-controlled states. It is



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partner is dominant and holds a clear majority of legislative and/or council

seats. This also applies to the states of Kelantan and Trengganu controlled

by the main Malay opposition party of PAS. Clearly, the interests of good

governance suggest that more research and greater public attention to the

values of Malaysian civil servants would not be remiss in a society that

prides itself on state led development.

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an impoverished neutrality

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