Acasestudyinvaluedestruction:EastmanKodak&SterlingDrugs
Kodakentersbiddingwar¨ Inlate1987,EastmanKodak
enteredintoabiddingwarwithHoffmanLaRocheforSterlingDrugs,apharmaceuticalcompany.
¨ ThebiddingwarstartedwithSterlingDrugstradingatabout$40/share.
¨ At$72/share,Hoffmandroppedoutofthebiddingwar,butKodakkeptbidding.
¨ At$89.50/share,Kodakwonandclaimedpotentialsynergiesexplainedthepremium.
Kodakwins!!!!
!
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EarningsandRevenuesatSterlingDrugs
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Sterling Drug under Eastman Kodak: Where is the synergy?
0500
1,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,0004,5005,000
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Revenue Operating Earnings
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KodakSaysDrugUnitIsNotforSale…but…
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¨ AnarticleintheNYTimesinAugustof1993suggestedthatKodakwaseagertosheditsdrugunit.¤ Inresponse,EastmanKodakofficialssaytheyhavenoplanstosellKodak’sSterlingWinthrop
drugunit.¤ LouisMattis,ChairmanofSterlingWinthrop,dismissedtherumorsas“massivespeculation,
whichfliesinthefaceofthestatedintentofKodakthatitiscommittedtobeinthehealthbusiness.”
¨ Afewmonthslater…Takingastrideoutofthedrugbusiness,EastmanKodaksaidthattheSanofiGroup,aFrenchpharmaceuticalcompany,agreedtobuytheprescriptiondrugbusinessofSterlingWinthropfor$1.68billion.¤ SharesofEastmanKodakrose75centsyesterday,closingat$47.50ontheNewYorkStock
Exchange.¤ SamuelD.Isalyananalyst,saidtheannouncementwas“verygoodforSanofiandverygood
forKodak.”¤ “Whenthedivestituresarecomplete,Kodakwillbeentirelyfocusedonimaging,” saidGeorge
M.C.Fisher,thecompany'schiefexecutive.¤ TherestoftheSterlingWinthropwassoldtoSmithklinefor$2.9billion.
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ApplicationTest:Whoowns/runsyourfirm?
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¨ Lookat:BloombergprintoutHDSforyourfirm¨ Whoarethetopstockholdersinyourfirm?¨ Whatarethepotentialconflictsofintereststhatyousee
emergingfromthisstockholdingstructure?
Control of the firm
Outside stockholders- Size of holding- Active or Passive?- Short or Long term?
Inside stockholders% of stock heldVoting and non-voting sharesControl structure
Managers- Length of tenure- Links to insiders
Government
Employees Lenders
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Case2:VotingversusNon-votingShares&GoldenShares:Vale
Vale Equity
Common (voting) shares3,172 million
Preferred (non-voting)1,933 million
Golden (veto) shares owned
by Brazilian govt
Valespar(54%(Non/Brazilian(
(ADR&Bovespa)(29%(
Brazilian(Ins=tu=onal(6%(
Brazilian(retail(5%( Brazilian(
Govt.(6%(
Valespar(1%(
Non.Brazilian((ADR&Bovespa)(
59%(
Brazilian(Ins<tu<onal(18%(
Brazilian(retail(18%(
Brazilian(Govt.(4%(
Litel&Participaço 49.00%Eletron&S.A. 0.03%Bradespar&S.A. 21.21%Mitsui&&&Co. 18.24%BNDESPAR 11.51%
Valespar(ownership
Vale has eleven members on its board of directors, ten of whom were nominated by Valepar and the board was chaired by Don Conrado, the CEO of Valepar.
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Case4:LegalrightsandCorporateStructures:Baidu¨ TheBoard:Thecompanyhassixdirectors,oneofwhomisRobinLi,
whoisthefounder/CEOofBaidu.Mr.LialsoownsamajoritystakeofClassBshares,whichhavetentimesthevotingrightsofClassAshares,grantinghimeffectivecontrolofthecompany.
¨ Thestructure:BaiduisaChinesecompany,butitisincorporatedintheCaymanIslands,itsprimarystocklistingisontheNASDAQandthelistedcompanyisstructuredasashellcompany,togetaroundChinesegovernmentrestrictionsofforeigninvestorsholdingsharesinChinesecorporations.
¨ Thelegalsystem:Baidu’soperatingcounterpartinChinaisstructuredasaVariableInterestEntity(VIE),anditisunclearhowmuchlegalpowertheshareholdersintheshellcompanyhavetoenforcechangesattheVIE.
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II.Stockholders'objectivesvs.Bondholders'objectives
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¨ Intheory:thereisnoconflictofinterestsbetweenstockholdersandbondholders.
¨ Inpractice:Stockholderandbondholdershavedifferentobjectives.Bondholdersareconcernedmostaboutsafetyandensuringthattheygetpaidtheirclaims.Stockholdersaremorelikelytothinkaboutupsidepotential
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Examplesoftheconflict..
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¨ Adividend/buybacksurge:Whenfirmspaycashoutasdividends,lenderstothefirmarehurtandstockholdersmaybehelped.Thisisbecausethefirmbecomesriskierwithoutthecash.
¨ Riskshifting:Whenafirmtakesriskierprojectsthanthoseagreedtoattheoutset,lendersarehurt.Lendersbaseinterestratesontheirperceptionsofhowriskyafirm’sinvestmentsare.Ifstockholdersthentakeonriskierinvestments,lenderswillbehurt.
¨ Borrowingmoreonthesameassets:Iflendersdonotprotectthemselves,afirmcanborrowmoremoneyandmakeallexistinglendersworseoff.
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III.FirmsandFinancialMarkets
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¨ Intheory:Financialmarketsareefficient.Managersconveyinformationhonestlyandandinatimelymannertofinancialmarkets,andfinancialmarketsmakereasonedjudgmentsoftheeffectsofthisinformationon'truevalue'.Asaconsequence-¤ Acompanythatinvestsingoodlongtermprojectswillberewarded.
¤ Shorttermaccountinggimmickswillnotleadtoincreasesinmarketvalue.
¤ Stockpriceperformanceisagoodmeasureofcompanyperformance.
¨ Inpractice:Therearesomeholesinthe'EfficientMarkets'assumption.
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Managerscontrolthereleaseofinformationtothegeneralpublic
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¨ Informationmanagement(timingandspin):Information(especiallynegative)issometimessuppressedordelayedbymanagersseekingabettertimetoreleaseit.Whentheinformationisreleased,firmsfindwaysto“spin”or“frame”ittoputthemselvesinthebestpossiblelight.
¨ Outrightfraud:Insomecases,firmsreleaseintentionallymisleadinginformationabouttheircurrentconditionsandfutureprospectstofinancialmarkets.
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Evidencethatmanagersdelaybadnews?
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DO MANAGERS DELAY BAD NEWS?: EPS and DPS Changes- byWeekday
-6.00%
-4.00%
-2.00%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday F r i d a y
% Chg(EPS) % Chg(DPS)
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Somecritiquesofmarketefficiency..
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¨ Investorirrationality:Thebaseargumentisthatinvestorsareirrationalandpricesoftenmovefornoreasonatall.Asaconsequence,pricesaremuchmorevolatilethanjustifiedbytheunderlyingfundamentals.Earningsanddividendsaremuchlessvolatilethanstockprices.
¨ Manifestationsofirrationality¨ Reactiontonews:Somebelievethatinvestorsoverreactto
news,bothgoodandbad.Othersbelievethatinvestorssometimesunderreacttobignewsstories.
¨ Aninsiderconspiracy: Financialmarketsaremanipulatedbyinsiders;Pricesdonothaveanyrelationshiptovalue.
¨ Shorttermism:Investorsareshort-sighted,anddonotconsiderthelong-termimplicationsofactionstakenbythefirm
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Aremarketsshortsightedandtoofocusedonthenearterm?Whatdoyouthink?
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¨ Focusingonmarketpriceswillleadcompaniestowardsshorttermdecisionsattheexpenseoflongtermvalue.a. Iagreewiththestatementb. Idonotagreewiththisstatement
¨ Allowingmanagerstomakedecisionswithouthavingtoworryabouttheeffectonmarketpriceswillleadtobetterlongtermdecisions.a. Iagreewiththisstatementb. Idonotagreewiththisstatement
¨ Neithermanagersnormarketsaretrustworthy.Regulations/lawsshouldbewrittenthatforcefirmstomakelongtermdecisions.a. Iagreewiththisstatementb. Idonotagreewiththisstatement
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Aremarketsshortterm?Someevidencethattheyarenot..
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¨ Valueofyoungfirms:Therearehundredsofstart-upandsmallfirms,withnoearningsexpectedinthenearfuture,thatraisemoneyonfinancialmarkets.Whywouldamyopicmarketthatcaresonlyaboutshorttermearningsattachhighpricestothesefirms?
¨ Currentearningsvs Futuregrowth:Iftheevidencesuggestsanything,itisthatmarketsdonotvaluecurrentearningsandcashflowsenoughandvaluefutureearningsandcashflowstoomuch.Afterall,studiessuggestthatlowPEstocksareunderpricedrelativetohighPEstocks
¨ Marketreactiontoinvestments:Themarketresponsetoresearchanddevelopmentandinvestmentexpendituresisgenerallypositive.
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Ifmarketsaresoshortterm,whydotheyreacttobiginvestments(thatpotentiallylowershorttermearnings)sopositively?
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Butwhataboutmarketcrises?
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¨ Marketsaretheproblem:Manycriticsofmarketspointtomarketbubblesandcrisesasevidencethatmarketsdonotwork.Forinstance,themarketturmoilbetweenSeptemberandDecember2008ispointedtoasbackingforthestatementthatfreemarketsarethesourceoftheproblemandnotthesolution.
¨ Thecounter:Therearetwocounterargumentsthatcanbeoffered:¤ Theeventsofthelastquarterof2008illustratethatwearemore
dependentonfunctioning,liquidmarkets,withrisktakinginvestors,thaneverbeforeinhistory.Aswesaw,nogovernmentorotherentity(bank,Buffett)isbigenoughtostepinandsavetheday.
¤ Thefirmsthatcausedthemarketcollapse(banks,investmentbanks)wereamongthemostregulatedbusinessesinthemarketplace.Ifanything,theirfailurescanbetracedtotheirattemptstotakeadvantageofregulatoryloopholes(badlydesignedinsuranceprograms…capitalmeasurementsthatmissriskyassets,especiallyderivatives)
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IV.FirmsandSociety
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¨ Intheory:Allcostsandbenefitsassociatedwithafirm’sdecisionscanbetracedbacktothefirm.
¨ Inpractice:Financialdecisionscancreatesocialcostsandbenefits.¤ Asocialcostorbenefitisacostorbenefitthataccruestosocietyasawholeandnottothefirmmakingthedecision.n Environmentalcosts(pollution,healthcosts,etc..)n QualityofLife'costs(traffic,housing,safety,etc.)
¤ Examplesofsocialbenefitsinclude:n creatingemploymentinareaswithhighunemploymentn supportingdevelopmentininnercitiesn creatingaccesstogoodsinareaswheresuchaccessdoesnotexist
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SocialCostsandBenefitsaredifficulttoquantifybecause..
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¨ Cannotknowtheunknown:Theymightnotbeknownatthetimeofthedecision.Inotherwords,afirmmaythinkthatitisdeliveringaproductthatenhancessociety,atthetimeitdeliverstheproductbutdiscoverafterwardsthatthereareverylargecosts.(Asbestoswasawonderfulproduct,whenitwasdevised,lightandeasytoworkwith…Itisonlyafterdecadesthatthehealthconsequencescametolight)
¨ Eyesofthebeholder:Theyare‘person-specific’,sincedifferentdecisionmakerscanlookatthesamesocialcostandweightthemverydifferently.
¨ Decisionparalysis:Theycanbeparalyzingifcarriedtoextremes.
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Atestofyoursocialconsciousness:Putyourmoneywhereyoumouthis…
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¨ AssumethatyouworkforDisneyandthatyouhaveanopportunitytoopenastoreinaninner-cityneighborhood.Thestoreisexpectedtoloseaboutamilliondollarsayear,butitwillcreatemuch-neededemploymentinthearea,andmayhelprevitalizeit.
¨ Wouldyouopenthestore?¤ Yes¤ No
¨ Ifyes,wouldyoutellyourstockholdersandletthemvoteontheissue?¤ Yes¤ No
¨ Ifno,howwouldyourespondtoastockholderqueryonwhyyouwerenotlivinguptoyoursocialresponsibilities?