Download - a c d is NUR 1 1985 OCCPAP ACDIS Library
a c d is NUR 1 1985 OCCPAP ACDIS Library
THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION
IN AFRICAA THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
June, 1985
Maqsud H Nun
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 330 Davenport Hall
607 South Mathews Street Urbana, Illinois 61801
Maqsud Ul Hasan Nun is a Ford Research Associate with the Office of Arms Control for the year 1984-85 A Pakistani national Mr Nun holds an MSc (International Relations) from the Quald-e-Azam University, Islamabad and an MA (International Relations) from the Australian National University Canberra After a year of doctoral work at The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, he is completing a doctorate m International Studies from the University of South Carolina, Columbia His professional experience includes service as a commissioned officer in the Pakistan army after having graduated from The Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul At present, Mr Nun is affiliated with the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad
Acknowledgements
I am thankful to Profs James M Roherty and Gordon B Smith of the Dept of Government and International Studies University of South Carolina for their helptul comments on an earlier draft of this research article My grateful thanks are also due to the Program m Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana for providing necessary funding, which made the research and completion of this research piece possible and finally but not least profuse thanks to Mary Anderson and Suzanne Osmundson for their prompt and superb typing workThe author is exclusively responsible for the views expressed and neither the above named gentlemen nor the Program in Arms Control, University of Illinois necessarily support these opinions
I BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT Oí THE PROBLEM
Since the early 1970s and more specifically from 1975 onwards the
Soviet-Cuban relationship has assumed a meaningful military dimension in
sub-Saharan Africa The African continent once the exclusive preserve of
European colonial powers is today, an arena for the Superpowers and for former
colonial and African regional powers as well With the intrusion of
extra-continental powers such as the Soviet Union and Cuba a new variable has
been introduced in the military equation on the African continent More
specifically, the active collaboration and co-ordination of the Soviet-Cuban
military machines in the internal civil war of Angola (1975-76) and later in the
Ethiopian - Somali border war of Ogaden (1977-78) has led many observers to
postulate grandiose designs on the part of International Communism sponsored
and supported from the nerve center in Moscow * Cuba as a Communist state
located m the Western Hemisphere is consequently seen as a tool or adjunct of
Moscow - ready and willing to do Moscow s bidding in Third World countries
While the close congruence of objectives in Africa was facilitated by
certain systemic factors e g the prevailing atmosphere of 'detente and the
collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire following the 25 April 1974
"Captain's Coup" in Lisbon, this rather unusual instance of symbiotic military
partnership between the Soviet Union and a small developing power like Cuba
merits a systematic inquiry The Soviet-Cuban military nexus, has impacted
heavily on the military fortunes of these two states At present besides
Angola and Ethiopia which claim to be Marxist-Leninist there are in Africa four
others, and another ten are designated by the USSR as progressive which entails
a demonstration of socialist orientation' While the Soviet-Cuban military
presence is felt in these states, it is nowhere as pronounced as in Angola and
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2Ethiopia where sizeable Cuban military contingents still remain deployed
II SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
Characterized as a subordinate state system in international relations
Africa is likely to remain, in the foreseeable future, politically
economically, and militarily dependent on outside powers for support The
African state structure is inherently weak and has lately come under increased
strain due to economic debts crushing refugee problems ̂ border fratricidal
conflicts due to arbitrary colonial partition schemes,^ and inter-ethnic and
religious tensions Above all this, is superimposed the phenomenon of
modernization whicbj has accentuated these problems further Moreover, the
impotency of regional organizations, such as the OAU (Organization of African
Unity) and others has led to erosion of regional norms, portending further
prospects of intervention and counter-intervention by regional^ and
extra-regional powers ̂ Thus, according to many observers, intra-nation and
inter-nation conflijct and violence are likely to be dominant in Africa for the
balance of the century ®Whether military intervention is brought about by internal factors of
weakness and internal dissension of states (targets of intervention) or
occasioned by Big Power rivalry (strategic economic or political), it is
becoming an increasingly multilateral phenomenon lhat is, Big Powers seldom
act unilateraly for fear of rival Superpower retaliation and international
opprobrium As part of their strategy, the Superpowers tend to co-opt and
enlist their allies for intervention Also, it has been observed that in a
joint or collaborative interventionary undertaking the intervening actors
usually have common interests and objectives This is amply manifested in the
i
boviet-Cuban military interventions in Africa fo be sure there are
differences between the two, but they have been able to act within broadly
defined common goals and objectives However if future interventionary
behavior is a likely feature of the African sub-system, there will also be
intra-alliance strains ^The proxy" or "patron relationship is difficult to identify as reliable
information of a strictly military nature is not easily available Where such a
relationship exists the parties are loath to admit it The major partner does
not like to advertise its domination and control, while the junior partner is
reticent to acknowledge its subordination and coercion Moreover there are
some conceptual difficulties as to how much influence a "patron" wields over its
"proxy" When does a "proxy" act on its own interests as opposed to that of its
"patron" and what are the "national" or "real" interests of different parties9
Furthermore "proxies" are not a homogenous group but are differentiated by
critical differences m functions and tasks The Cubans, East Germans, North
Koreans and other East European nations — all m various capacities are
performing specialized roles and functions m Africain the case of Cuba its African exploits cover besides strictly combat
roles, the added functions of a "civic soldier" 10 In Central America, Cubans
have concentrated more on providing arms, training, and propaganda support to
various leftist factions (particularly to the ruling regime in Nicaragua and
opposing leftist factions in El Salvador) ^ The East Germans for their part
are mainly involved m a training and advisory capacity, especially pertaining
to intelligence and security type functions As far as South Yemen is
concerned, it may serve only one function, i e to provide base facilities
North Korea has relied on providing military advisory teams, and finally, other
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members of the Lastern bloc (Czechoslovakia Hungary Bulgaria and Poland)
specialize in the provision of diverse military functions ranging from
training, support, provision of weapons and internal security ^
This study will try to demonstrate that smaller powers linked to
Superpowers, can employ the disadvantage of smaller size to their own benefit by
exercising leverage on some issues vis-a-vis their 'patron in fact, the
smaller powers aligned to Superpowers have certain assets to their credit, e g
the ability to concentrate on a single issue, willingness to take greater risks,
a greater threshold for sacrifice and suffering, if required centralization of
its decision-making structures, effective use of its natural resources, and
possibly threatening a new alignment with the opposite Superpower In
addition military interventions by outside powers differ qualitatively
depending on the size of the intervening power While those by major powers are
generally related to strategic power balances, ideological, economic diplomatic
or military interests, for the minor powers the prime motivations for
interventionary behavior are target regime's incompatibility and border disputes
arising before independence Therefore, when a major and a minor power have
participated m tandem in a military operation m another country, the goals and
objectives of the two participating states are often mixed ^
III CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TERMINOLOGY
Since this is a study of the proxy' relationship there is a need to
operationalise the concept for better understanding Military intervention in
coming decades, will increase m scope and frequency, and will more often than
not take a more indirect dimension ^ The Big Powers will want to influence the outcome of internal conflicts of different developing nations by having recourse
5
to such multiple instruments as intelligence activities international fronts
special cultural activities, overt and covert propaganda provision of arms and
logistical support direct military and political support and advisory training
in the countries contiguous to the conflict deployment of large military
formations m aid of local states and internal security training and
assistance ^In tact the term 'proxy'^ has been a recent addition to the vocabulary of
international relations While 'proxy' behavior is not a new phenomenon in the
conflict of nations it has come into vogue only after World War II Post-World
War II developments make 'proxy' expecially employable as a form for a variety
of reasons In the first place with the advent of nuclear weapons and the
consequent fear of a strategic nuclear exchange chances of direct confrontation
between the two Superpowers have receded Secondly 'proxies' it not suiting
the interests of the Superpowers can be easily disposed of thirdly it is the
Superpowers who have the capability, interest and will to arm and support these
'proxies' The states functioning as 'proxies' often choose to identify with a
Super or a Big Power for economic and security reasons Lately, however, some
middle ranking powers have attempted to cultivate and promote these 'proxies'
And finally, with the resurgence of nationalism, especially in the Third World,
the use of direct military threat and intervention by the Superpowers provokes
resentment and condemnation Hence one way to circumvent criticism is for the
Super Power to act indirectly through its intermediaries or 'proxy' forces to
further its global interestsMuch of the conceptual ambiguity of the term arises from a failure to
distinguish between 'proxy' as a classification of interstate relationship
(e g , X is a 'proxy' of Y) and proxy as a mode of strategic maneuver (eg X
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intervened in Y through "proxy ) When we use the term "proxy as a bilateral
relationship between two states it invariably means the following
(1) lhat it is coerced, controlled or directed by the patron state
(2) That it is acting as a substitute for another state
(3) That its interests are subservient to the 'patron power and it is
principally serving those interests,
(4) That there is some commonality of interests between the two parties
However, in the case of "proxy" as a strategic maneouver it leads to a
less restrictive definition Although there is still the element to cater for
the principal partner's preponderant interest and collusive behavior for
intervention, it does not necessarily follow that the "patron" will or can
control the "proxy" Relatedly it is instructive to differentiate between a
"proxy and an ally' In the case of the latter, there is a perceived
commonality of interests or objectives combined with an element of a voluntary
and willing co-operationAccording to Walter Laqueur, the use of 'proxies has been "the most
interesting, innovative, and, on the whole the most effective technique" the
Soviets have employed m the Third World ^ As mentioned above, one way of
indirect intervention is not to act alone but to delegate responsibility to someone else entirely or in part in the words of Vanneman and James
In a proxy war the armed forces of one nation serve the interests of another nation The principal power is the sponsor in the sense that its material support makes the venture possible (emphasis added) and its clear disapproval would seriously deter the proxy from embarking on the venture ^
7
The extant literature speaks of these types of relationships in different
and sometimes confusing terminology A country which intervenes on behalf of a
Super Power is, for example, sometimes characterised as a tool' puppet',
'satellite' 'surrogate' 'agent', 'pawn', or using a somewhat milder
expression its 'client' Although there are many turns of this expression used
by both the Superpowers the most common and frequently used in professional
literature is that of 'proxy' or 'satellite We shall use these terms in the
course of our analysis in this study
It would be proper here to highlight the difference between a satellite
and a 'proxy' - thought to be synonymous by some scholars While 'satellite'
nations like e g , East Germany may perform many functions of surrogates' or
'proxies' m providing training missions, intelligence missions and tasks of
internal security to some Third World countries m the Middle East and Africa
their form and nature of relationship is quite distinct from that of a 'proxy'
'Proxy' states have the discretion to terminate the relationship with its
'patron' whenever desired from its 'patron' or 'principal' and in addition,
wield more leverage than the 'satellites' ^0 As an illustration, it is
unthinkable for any of the Eastern bloc countries and now even Afghanistan
(which forms a part of the Soviet security zone) to act independently in face of
direct Soviet military presence On the other hand 'proxies' (if we use them
in the commonly ascribed meanings) can threaten disengagement and enjoy greater
leverage over 'patron' power in foreign policy behavior The classic example
being that of Cuba
8
IV LITERAIURE REVIEW 01 PROXY'/"PATRON' RELATIONSHIP CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION
Many writers have developed hypotheses on the nature and pattern of the
Soviet-Cuban relationship in Africa as demonstrated through the conjoint
military operations in Angola and EthiopiaOne school of thought sees Cuba as an indebted, compliant and servile state
of the USSR and hence a 'proxy' or 'surrogate' in Africa and elsewhere This
proxy' thesis is manifest, particularly in the various policy forums of the
U S government 21 The same theme of Soviet 'hegemony' and Cuban 'capitulation
is seen m the writings of Jorge Dominguez 22 Dominguez is a noted author of a
number of articles on the domestic roots of Cuban foreign policy Also U S
senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY)23 has termed the Cubans as the 'Gurkhas
of the Russian Empire'2^ This 'surrogate' thesis becomes quite pronounced in
the monographs of the Institute for the Study of Conflict (London) by e g
David Rees and Brian Cozier 25 The same thesis is implicit in the earlier
analyses of Peter Vanneman and Martin James 26 An Australian writer T B
Millar, in the same vein, opines that the Cubans are little more than
mercenaries m thin disguise 22 LiRewise, A Suarez and Lars Bondstam2^ echo
the same theme in their writings on the Soviet-Cuban nexus in Africa
Among the implications of the 'Soviet-surrogate' thesis is that Cuba not
only takes orders from Moscow regardless of its own interests, but also that the
USSR should be held accountable for Cuban involvement in the Third world In
point of fact, most of the writers advocating the 'dependency' or
'proxy/surrogate' thesis take the Soviet military invasion of Czechoslovakia of
August 1968 and Castro's endorsement (which is open to different
9
interpretations) as a benchmark event According to most of these writers this
marked a breakpoint event and henceforth Cuba had no independent will or
volition of its own and was too eager to do Moscow's bidding ^9 £n this
connection, it is germane to point out the latest study from the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University in which Taylor and
Townsend propound the same well-worn thesis of Cuba as 'an archetype of a
proxy 'Another school those of the revisionists if we may so characterise them
posit the thesis that the Cubans are a self-directed, revolutionary nation which
has taken upon themselves the role of 'socialist internationalism or
'proletarian internationalism' to combat 'international imperialism by
providing moral and material support to the 'liberation movements' in the Third
World particularly m Africa, the Caribbean and Central America This argument
can be gleaned from testimony by Lourdes Casal in the Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on International
Relations 31 Another writer, Nelson Valdes^ hews the same line as above
Finally African Sovietologists such as Nolutshunghu take a more sympathetic
view of Cuba as 'more of an independent maverick' than the Soviet's
catspawIn a rather well-documented and frequently quoted article on this subject
William Durch^ traces the roots of Cuban military involvement in the Third
World (Algeria, Vietnam and Syria) and other lesser military missions in Africa
prior to Angola A somewhat analogous analysis of Cuban African activities in
chronological order is provided by Jorge I Dominguez 35 The same line of
argument is also taken up by Connell-Smith-^ who views Cuban relations with the
Third World predating the Soviet Union and concludes, that during the last
10
twenty years Castro has been much less of a "puppet' than the pre-independence
Cuban leaders of the U b Jin Valenta^ plays down Moynihan's metaphor of the
Cubans as the "Gurkhas of the Russian Empire In his assessment, it is more a
case of congruence of common objectives and goals of allies between the Cubans
and the Soviets - at least m the case of Angola, if not later in Ethiopia
Yet another study by William Leo Grande^ traces U S -Cuban relations, and
ends on a prescriptive note At one point it mentions serious discrepancies in
the Soviet-Cuban policy outlook in the 1970s According to Le Grande's
analysis, the Soviet and Cuban perspectives diverged on some policy issues m
Angola and Ethiopia For example, in Angola, the Cuban troops helped the late
President Agostmho Neto's moderate faction of the MPLA to defeat the 1977 coup
attempt by Nito Alve's pro-Soviet faction Also m the case of Ethiopia there
were significant policy differences between the Cubans and the Soviets over
committing Cuban troops against Eritrean 'insurgency' in the northern province
of Eritrea, adjacent to the Red Sea In other words, while the Soviets pressed
hard for a military solution through the use of massive military force m the
solution of the Eritrean question, the Cubans insisted on a political settlement»in view of their previous support for the Eritrean cause of self-determination
Going even further back, the Cuban brand of militant , revolutionary
overthrow of regimes in Latin America m the 1960s, did not go well with the
more circumspect and cautious Soviet approach This, sometimes, led to bitter
exchanges of doctrinal debate and polemics Furthermore, on other international
issues such as Cuba's zealous advocacy of the New International Economic Order
as leader of the Non-Aligned Movement m the Third World, the Soviet support has
remained at best, lukewarm and unenthusiastic Of particular note is the issue
of nuclear proliferation where the Soviets have been extremely conservative on
11
the question of passing nuclear technology to the developing countries And
last but not least the Soviets though ready and quick to exploit any domestic
turmoil in the Caribbean and Central America, are reluctant to have more Cubas'
in the region and therefore quite unwilling to further underwrite the increasing
costs of 'socialist construction' This is mainly due to their past repeated
failures in the Third World region with its intractable problems together with
increased strains on the Soviet economy in recent years ^ 9
ihe same perspective of Cuban independence of will and action is
highlighted in Vanneman and Martin ^0 They suggest that this is especially true
in the case of Ethiopia Likewise Bissell s ^ opinion about Egypt s military
intervention in South Yemen (1962-68) sensitises us to regional interests rather
than the Soviet sponsorship In a similar vein, writers like Halperin 2̂
Klmghof fer Skurnik,^ and Treverton^ advance the same above - mentioned
general thesis of Cuban autonomous-cum-self directed behaviorThe third perspective, which is more intellectually appealing to us, is
spelled out by Edward Gonzeles m his later writings Explicitly combining the
above two theses, he terms it as the 'paladin thesis '^6 This thesis maintains
that Cuba must necessarily capitalise upon Soviet interests and objectives in
the Third World, and in the process continue to advance its own interests This
thesis sees Cuba's motives as complex According to this view, by linking
itself with the Soviet Union and also the Third World in Latin America and Africa, it increases its leverage with both This leverage may mean as argued
by Lawrence H Theriot,attracting more economic and military aid from the
Soviet Union Or, it may enable it to derive a greater degree of independence
or given its assets, exercize more meaningful influence over Soviet policy in
Africa or to mobilize its population for 'internationalist duties' in Africa as
12
a foreign policy success - thus gaining legitimacy for the Castro regime This
point is well taken by another observer who sees Cuba's internationalism closely
linked to the nature of the regime and its continuity a major tenet of its
foreign policy being the 'irreversibility of the Cuban revolution' and thus the
survival of the regime itself ^ the same context James Nelson Goodsell
quotes a World Bank Cubanologist who remarked
fhe desires of both Cuba and the Soviet Union may coincide, and Cuba may be providing the troops that the Soviet Union is not would not provide But Cuba could not be there if it didn t want to be ^
The same theme was echoed by Brigadier-General James A Williams Deputy
Director for Estimates in the Defence Intelligence Agency, certainly not an
impartial observer when he testified at the 1978 House of Representatives
Hearings
I think, sir, that some of this zeal on the part of the Cubans who see themselves as the model for the Third World and developing nations truly believe that theirs is the way to go 50
Further, the very fact of Soviet 'expansionist' policy in the African
continent allows Cuba some degree of influence over its patron because of its
instrumental role in furthering those objectives These objectives in the
assessment of the same writer, could not be achievable by the Soviets alone in
AfricaAnother observer on Cuban foreign policy behavior m the Third World
(particularly Latin America and Africa), Carla Robbins,cites Cuba's
Afro-Spanish heritage and Third World revolutionary credentials as motivating factors in its African exploits Rather than being commissioned by the Soviet
13
Union to do the dirty' job argues the writer it was the mating of common
objectives and the provision of Soviet military and economic wherewithal with
availability of Cuban combat contingents which made joint Angola and Ethiopian
military operations a successAssigning merit to the Cuban initiatives m Africa Carla Robbins cites the
fact that the Cubans despite all the concessions to the Soviet Union after late
1960s did not for a moment yield m their unstinted support for African
liberation movements In fact, as she argued 'if there had been any radical
change it was in Moscow s policy toward Africa not Havana's 1 Continuing
further in the same study she states that Moscow's decision to join forces with
Havana in late 1975 by the airlift of Cuban troops to Angola and provision of
arms and equipment constituted a significant change where Moscow actually
seemed to be following Havana's lead - not the other way round ^2
And finally another observer of Cuban foreign policy behavior in Africa,
Merritt Robins, explained Cuba's assertiveness and activist posture in Africa m
mid-1970s as an attempt to end its isolation, secure allies and end its
'embarrassing one-way dependence" on the Soviet Union by serving as the bridge
between the Soviet bloc and the Third World and implicitly repaying the massive
debt to the USSR with military diplomacy as the medium of exchange ^3
V CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION SMALL STA1E VS BIG STATE
One is tempted to see in the Cuban-Soviet relationship a prime example of a
small vs big state interaction If for example, during the 1960s the Cubans
were actively challenging the Soviet Union on various foreign policy issues, it
becomes difficult to understand how and why they should be subservient to them
in the 1970s We postulate the thesis that as a small power, Cuba has
14
maintained substantial leverage and bargaining position over its 'patron the
Soviet-Union Moreover Cuba s assertive role m Africa in the mid-1970s was
occasioned not so much by Soviet dictate or direction Many factors were
responsible e g the systemic environment of the Superpower's near strategic
equivalence the prevailing atmospherics of 'detente', the Portuguese hasty
decision to décolonisé the post-Vietnam and Watergate syndrome Moreover
Cuba historically, had already established links with the revolutionary
movements in Lusophone Africa since the early 1960s and there was now a
propitious opportunity to act And finally, there was the rise of the
non-aligned movement which Castro was eager to lead
Over the last decade certain international relations theorists have
focussed on small powers 54 one thesis from this literature particularly
appropriate to the Cuban case is Albert Hirschraan's 'dependency management
which suggests that under certain conditions a smaller power may come to
exercize greater leverage over its bigger partner, given its negotiating skill,
and political conditions Also even the strength with which the interests are
held may give the dependent or client state more power to choose than the
overall structure of inequality would suggest 55
As regards the often mentioned issue of 'exploitation' by the stronger
against the small, there is little empirical evidence to demonstrate it Sometimes, it is said, the bigger power may willingly wi^h to be 'exploited by
smaller states in international transactions First, as William Riker claims
the bigger power collects some sort of illusory psychological returns for being
the 'greatest' in exchange for what it is forced to pay off its more sensible
patron with real or tangible benefits, secondly acording to Olson and
Zeckhauser the collective goods of an alliance or of any other international
15
relationship selfishly mike more sense for the largest single member of the
whole such that it will make disproportionate efforts to keep the entire
structure going thirdly as to why larger states are likely to do small state s
bidding is that some sort of ideological concern for others got the large state
to become larger in the first place And finally based on the strength or weakness principle it is the smallest side which is least willing to yield on
concessions and can threaten re-alignment or even its extinction thus sometimes
raising its bargaining stakes in fact the extant literature offers five
basic approaches to the definitional problem of a small state First some
writers totally reject the concept of definition because of the insufficiencies
of the concept as an analytical tool A second group of writers laments the
problems and difficulties of definition and remains very skeptical as to the
operationalisation of the concept Among these are included Annette Baker Fox
V Sveics Mario Hirsh and 1 Mathisen A third approach tries to
operationalise the concept through employment of some tangible variables like
population area GNP and size and number of the armed forces This view is
advanced by among others, Peter Wiles, Ronald Barston, Simon Kuznets J
Rapapport, L Mateba and J Therattil A fourth group relates to the perceptual
aspect i e , those states which perceive themselves to be small The works of
R Keohane and R Rothstein, fall in this category The fifth approach
seemingly an eclectic one, integrates all the above criteria and is
characterized prominently in the works of R Vayrnyen and M Handel
For purposes of our study, the empirical referents for a small state would
include indices like 1) Low rank/status as measured by either objective (hard)
or subjective (perceptual) data (2) limited economic and military capability
(
l b
hence dependence and vulnerability to external threats and (J) limited scope of
interests
VI SELLC11VE USE OF ItRM "PROXY'
While going through the literature on the patron-client" relationship - at
least in the case of Africa, one is struck by the importance given to the Soviet
Union while the role of the U S is either considered less interesting or less
extensive Of course a perusal of the Soviet press and publications reverses
this image and tends to go to the other extreme in this regard, some observers
feel that the discussion should be focused on other levels of analyses i e
not on the international level alone ^8As an illustration Girling5 ̂mentions at least two cases of American
"proxy" relationships in civil wars Taiwan acting as a "proxy" m Burma
between 1950 and I960, and South Africa during the civil war in Angola in
1975-76 An another example of "proxy" intervention is mentioned by Towle60
when he refers to the relationship between France and Morocco in connection with
the civil war in the Shaba province of Zaire In Shaba I (April 1977) the Moroccan troops flew in American trench and Belgian aircraft this becomes more
so in the case of Shaba II (May 1978), where an inter-African force of Moroccan
and Senegalese was supported by contingents from Togo Ivory Coast the
Gameroons, and Gabon to support the incumbent Mobutu regime in Zaire
Furthermore there have been instances of military intervention by regional
military powers like Tanzania against Uganda's Amin in North Africa Egypt s
military intervention in the South Yemen War (196Z-6/) involving nearly 80 000
troops, also Egypt's supportive intervention in Sudan against southern
secessionistic civil war and Libya s interventions m neighboring Chad 61
i 7
An analogous example in this controversy of patron-proxy could be cited
that of the U S -Israel relationship It hardly needs emphasis that the security and indeed survival of the present state of Israel could not have been
possible without the active U S military, economic and political support
Needless to say Israel's geo-political location m the Arab heartland and deep
emotional ties make it as a matter of vital interest' to the U S foreign
policy - thus accounting for this 'special relationship
Yet when the Soviet Union or other Communist or even Arab nations
castigate the Israelis as pawns' of the U S , it is rejected peremptorily both
by the U S its allies and Israel But as recent events in the Middle East m
the early 1980s have amply demonstrated the Israelis have not hesitated to take
some bold actions in line with their own national self-interest and contrary to
U S interests Of particular note is the pre-emptive strike against Iraq's
nuclear facilities (June 1981) preemptive military surgical strike in Lebanon
(June 1982) and assiduous consolidation of settlements on the Western Bank and
Gaza All these were purportedly in definance of U S policies and desires of
effecting reconciliation in the region ^2Likewise South Africa's military strike in Angola in 1976 and subsequent
punitive surgical attacks deep in Angolan and Mozambiquean territories since
1981 have been motivated by their own security concerns much to the discomfiture
of the U S Administration If this is added to South African go-slow and
sometimes foot-dragging anti-apartheid policies domestically U S faces
increased risk of condemnation by Black African states and other Third World
countries for failure of its 'constructive engagement policy in South Africa
In our opinion there emerges from the foregoing discussion a kind of a
synthesis of a mutual exploitation' thesis A perceptive study m this
ib
context is by David Ronteldt who detines one particular torm of small state
with his notion ot 'super-clients 64 According to this concept the very tact
of being publicly proclaimed as a 'client' of that Superpower gives that country
a special privileged status And, if that countLy is like former Shah's Iran
for the U S and present day Cuba for the Soviet Union it is bestowed based
on its geo-political salience a 'super-client status Having thus invested in
that smaller state its prestige it becomes rather obligatory upon that
Superpower to support defend and ensure the survival of that state Further
the status of this 'super-client' increases when the ideological atmosphere is
ideologically polarized or it is endowed with some unique geo-political or
resource assets or when its ethnic lobbies are firmly lodged in the 'patron
state or when the potential loss ' of the client threatens to become
significant for symbolic reasonsNonetheless it need not imply that a smaller power' can always manipulate
the Superpower to its advantage For the Superpower on its part, may also take
a few precautions as a safeguard For example, it may not give a blank cheque
to its smaller ally set limits to its behavior through moral pressure
withholding ot economic aid, or if worse comes to worst, retaliate with force to
inflict punishment Also a smaller power may use the stratagem of threatening
its collapse or extinction as a ploy for extorting military and economic aid
But this could be a risky venture, for in the event of being lightly taken or ignored by that Superpower it could mean a total future loss of bargaining
power
Applying the above super-client'analogy to the Cuban case we find that
the Soviet Union has come to place a high stake in its ideological premise of
the notion of irreversibility of socialist revolutions 65 This has led the
Soviet Union to be generally consistent and steadfast in support of the
Communist-installed regimes particularly m Eastern Europe That primarily
explains its military interventions around its peripheral areas (Hungary 1956
Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979) and forward projection of military
power by intervening in tandem with Cuba in Angola and Ethiopia Although there
is no formal military treaty between the Soviet Union and Cuba the Soviet
commitment is guaranteed through the maintenance of a 300Û man strong brigade
permanently based m Cuba, together with 1600 military advisors and technical
personnel and further 3000 Soviet employed civilians In addition Bear-D
maritime reconnaissance planes MiG-21 184 Fishbeds of various types 37 MiG-23
BN, 23 BN Flogger-Fs and an interceptor squadron of 15 MiG-23 Flogger-Es are deployed on the island-nation 66 0n the economic side, the Soviet Union
maintains economic leverage through export of oil at subsidized rates market
for Cuban sugar, and membership in CMEA
Despite policy differences the Soviet Union seems committed to guarantee
Cuba's survival as a socialist state Like Israel for the U S , Cuba has
behaved at times like a recalcitrant ally, but the Soviets have paid this price
to demonstrate to its arch-rival the U S , its Warsaw Pact allies Third World
'socialist oriented' nations and the developing nations at large that it is
generally a steady and steadfast partner Although Brezhnev's predecessors
Khrushchev and Stalin reconciled to the rupture of ties with its socialist
allies like China and Yugoslavia, it seems difficult to believe that
post-Chernenko leadership wíl do likewise with Cuba under any conceivable
20
circumstancesAgain there is a caveat to the above thesis We do not postulate that
cuba is dictating the Soviet foreign policy behavior That will seem going to
the other end of the spectrum lo be sure, the Soviets, as befits a Superpower
have also kept Castro in line by keeping him in power through military and
economic support Also they have prevented him from becoming too
self-sufficient as to challenge the USSR Further they have been able to
harness and capitalize Castro's image and influence in the Third World to
support their otherwise difficult-to-achieve ambitions and foreign policy goals
particularly in Africa and Latin America in the late 1970s In sum through the
Cuban medium, they have garnered at least in the initial stages some sympathy
and recognition from most of the African nations via their support tor
liberation struggle in Lusophone AfricaGenerally speaking over the years the world system has tended towards
greater polycentrism New nations have, in the process for a variety of
factors been able to exercize leverage vis a vis their patron powers Of
course their foreign policies have been circumscribed through supply and
control of military and economic aid by these donor pwoers yet these recipient
nations have sometimes very able capitalized on their unique geo-strategic
location resource capabilities, diversified arms procurement options and
improved more indigenous weapons production capabilities For the Superpowers
the need tor foreign exchange through sales of arms upkeep of their R and D
capabilities and increased competition among other suppliers - has all made the
recipients more flexible in their decision making Furthermore global powers
have global interests and have need for base rights intelligence and
surveillance requirements protection of threatened scarce raw materials and
2 i
mineral resources imperatives ol alliances to keep the balance ol power with
their adversary and sometimes need lor testing their weaponry m battle
conditions All these argue for a kind ol "reverse dependence " on their
proteges and hence the latter s enhanced bargaining position 67 Moreover
Superpowers may also require the services of "proxies" to further their
interests as war between proxies is probably less likely to escalate to
nuclear war whereas a direct confrontation between Superpowers runs that risk
VII PROXY/ALLILS/MhRCLNARIbS COhTRADiClIONS AND AMBIGUITIES
A close scrutiny of many studies of this Soviet-Cuban military nexus in
Africa reveal that many writers remain ambivalent about the use of these terms
lor example two very recent studies bearing on this relationship suffer trom
such typical contradictions As an example Taylor and Townsend*^ characterize
"proxy" as a symbiotic albeit lopsided relationship" But continuing in the
same context, they term Cuba as 'the archetype of proxy" and mention that the
Cubans are stationed in Africa not due to any revolutionary bent, but because of
Soviet military assistance and Kremlm"s approval ^9Another writer Bruce Porter, hews the same line in his recent book and
comments
the Soviet-Cuban relationship, as tar as it pertains to Third World conflicts has not been so much that of a commander and subordinate as that of a highly dependent Soviet ally obliging its mentor with enthusiasm
On another occasion in the same work, he cites Cuba's ideological links
close party ties and heavy economic dependence on the Soviet Union as cogent
reasons for Cuban "proxy status and behavior m Africa
21
Illustrative is the case also of the Strategic Survey 1978 where again
there seems some equivocation While Cuba's role in the Angolan civil war is
seen as that of a 'surrogate force through Soviet long range projection
capabilities m the same place by way of summary it is referred to as
Soviet-Cuban 'partnership' ^ However in the same context, when other examples
are enumerated of small powers which when provided with aid, have operated at
great distances from their own territories (e g Belgium, Senegal, and Morocco)
m the invasion of Shaba province of Zaire (1977-7B) the expressions used are
quite different ihey are like for instance Irench-Moroccan and U S -French
co-operation '
Another U S government study Annual Report to the Congress - 1Y 1986
invariably equates 'proxies for 'allies' while discussing Soviet power
projection capabilities in the Third world -̂3
Likewise K L Adelman sees the successful Soviet-Cuban military
interventions as having been consummated through 'Cuban mercenaries and Russian
arms' nonetheless the two above-mentioned French-Moroccan interventions are
euphemistically termed as 'rescue operations' ^4
A still another study of Soviet military aid to Africa by Major Bruce
Arlmghaus synonymously uses the terms 'allies' with 'surrogates ' While the
author headlines his title as 'Soviet surrogate', in his subsequent narration
and description of events, he tends to counter his own categorization And to
cap it all in his conclusive remarks sums up thusly
Even the closest Soviet allies m the region - the hast Europeans and the Cubans (emphasis added) - are not mere puppets of the Soviet policy Each appears to pursue, within limitation its own economic and political goals in the region ^5
23
Proceeding further in the same vein he also sees North Korea's policies
and aid programs to the newly independent Zimbabwe in a more independent line
and tree Irom Moscow's control which would preclude them I North Korea] from
acting as Soviet surrogates 7®
Aguila and Grabendorff two perceptive observers of Cuban policies in
Central America and the Caribbean view Cuba as a regional military power 77
although relying on the Soviet Union For Aguila it is a 'regionally intrusive
power',70 namely, a nation exhibiting politically significant involvement beyond
its borders - an involvement determined in turn by its very 'objective power
motivation location and international position' 7 ̂ However, later while
reviewing Cuba's pro-Soviet tilt m the NAM (Non Aligned Movement) and identical
"institutional-organizational and functional-behavioral traits of a Soviet-type
system ,®0 they tend to reverse their earlier formulations and characterize
Cuban behavior as 'proxy' of the Soviets ®*
Likewise, Warner succumbs to the same fallacy of equating Soviet's Cuban
'allies'®^ Wich Soviet sponsored 'surrogates' and 'clients' like the Cubans or
East Germans ®®
Relatedly, a recent study by the Department of Defence, The Soviet
Military 1985 faces the same conceptual confusion As an illustration, while
Cuba is termed as 'Soviet proxy'®^ and other socialist bloc countries as
'surrogates' and 'clients',®5 they are also referred to as 'counterparts'®® in
other placesFinally, it would be in order here to deal with the often used term
'mercenary' - sometimes used synonymously with 'proxy ' In an excellent study,
a serving U S Defence Intelligence officer, Gerry S Thomas makes five
24
functional goupings of military operative types in the African context (1)
Standing army (2) auxiliary (3) partisan (4) agent and (5) mercenary forces 87
His typology is as follows
MILITARY OPERAI1VL TYPES88
OPERATIVE LOCAL CITIZEN OWN GOVT SUPPORT
INTEGRATED INTO NATIONAL STRUCTURE
Army Yes/No Yes Yes
Auxiliary No Yes Yes/No
Agent No Yes No
Partisan Yes No No
Mercenary No No No
According to the above typology a mercenary is
1) Not a citizen of the country for which he is fighting
2) Neither receives nor is sent overt support by his government
3) Takes a direct part m the hostilities outside the established structure of
the standing army,
Judged by the above criteria, the Cuban early suppprt to the Lumumbist and
Mulelist secessionist rebels in Congo in 1964 may be characterized as 'agent
type of support, but is distinguishable from the large scale combat auxiliary'
presence in Angola (1973-76) and later m Ethiopia (1977-78) Theretore it is
not a case of 'mercenary' force in any of the above three cases 8 ̂ Nonetheless,
the support accorded to UNITA and FNLA, the rival organizations to the MPLA
25
through foreign nationals could be termed as "mercenary support" Also the
Katanga gendarmes sent to overthrow Zaire's Mobutu regime in Shaba crises had
"mercenary" support
Again perusing the Soviet press and literature one comes across frequent
use of "Western mercenaries" - invariably blurring their meanings and using it
as a catch-all term for all Western supported revolutionary or guerrilla 90groups
Vili OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMINOLOGY
The foregoing discussion has sensitized us to the imperative of fixing
defined boundaries on these amorphous and easily-bandied-around terms In our
opinion, "proxy" relationship^ has specific dimensions to it To some
observers a "proxy intervention" appears to symbolize the interest of the
principal (A) to the proxy (B) However there has to be some degree of allied
and compatibility of mutual interests This aspect of interests has already
been referred to in the literature survey of writers like Bissell Berner
Connell-Sraith Duncan, Klinghoffer, Millar, Ra"anan, Traverton, Valenta and
Vanneman and James
Another dimension of "proxy relationship" is the material relationship
between A and B That is, without material support provided by A to B it would
not be possible for B to effect intervention on behalf of A Sometimes an
essential feature of all discussions of 'proxy relationship" is whether A
exercized influence or power over B However, power as a concept is difficult
to define It is generally referring to statements like that B is submissive
to A cannot resist its demands, or accept its directions and the like
26
And finally the relationship between A and ß is sometime also connected
with the idea of co-ordination of activities There is thus as idea of
burden-sharing or division of responsibilities so that the successful execution
of intervention is ultimately dependent on the actions of both parties Ihis
aspect is borne out, for instance in the writings of Bissell and Vanneman and
JamesIt is generally assumed that an intervenor intervenes on behalf of another
power because of positive or negative sanctions (or threats of such sanctions)
which may be directed against it For as commonly suggested, without such
sanctions, that supposed intervention may not come about 'Positive sanctions'
may mean rewards like transfer of resources (military and economic aid), while
'negative sanctions' may signify either withholding of these benefits or
punitive measures like trade embargoes and moratoriums
Combining the power and material support relationship, we would rely on
Duner's typology of supposed proxy relationship ^2 It is as follows
Pressured to Not PressuredIntervene to Intervene
Receives (is dependent on) material support Proxy I Partner
Does not receive (is not dependent on) material support Proxy 2 Autonomous Actor
This phenomenon of intervention is now divided into four different cases -
thus making a more differentiated and a nuanced approach to the subject As
shown above, there are two different types of 'proxies' i e , (Proxy I and Proxy
27
2) It hardly needs mention that the one most discussed type in international
relations is m the left hand quadrant But from a theoretical angle it is
equally important to focus attention on the lower left-hand quadrant
The reason why there has always been interest in the first type of proxy
relationship' is the assumption that in view of the material support received,
it becomes obligatory for the recipient state to subordinate its interests to
the patron But as the typology shows it may well be that the intervenor is
not subservient but may well be acting on its own The literature thus surveyed
reveals that the Soviet ambitions and activist policies in Africa (Angola and
Ethiopia) could not have been possible if the junior partner had not chosen to
physically intervene with its own combat troops As regards the argument that
Cubans were indebted for Soviet military economic help, it did surely,
condition Cuban behavior Nonetheless, one has to go beyond these facile
explanations and appreciate the radical Cuban nationalism and Castro's fierce
defiance and independently charismatic image in most of the developing
countries Also, if one chronologically traces the Cuban interest in Africa,
one finds that due to a variety of reasons (ideological, cultural and ethnic)
their presence and support to African liberation movements predated those of the
Soviets— going back, to the mid-1960s
IX CONCLUSION
The focus of this study is on the nature, form and pattern of Soviet-Cuban
military relationship in Africa This is with particular reference to the two
case studies of Angola and Ethiopia and we would like to further analyze (in a
later study) this relationship in light of Duner's typology Admittedly, there
are not enough of replications of these type of joint Soviet-Cuban military
28
co-operation Nonetheless bat>ed on these two case studies we could
confidently draw some generalizations and should such similar interventions
take place m the future the findings could be further tested
The specific question posed in this study is Is this relationship
basically that of 'patron-client" or mutual partnership or one where the
junior ally or partner, given its unique assets tends to exercise some leverage
on its major partner7 There are three main hypotheses which will be tested in a
later study They are
(1) The greater the expanding global interests of the Soviet Union, the greater will be its dependence on allies to act on its behalf,(2) There is no direct correlation between provision of economic and military aid and as a consequence subservience of the recipient's domestic or even foreign policy policies to that of the donor's(3) Certain regional powers given their unique geostrategic assets, may act as autonomous actors (within broad parameters of its patron state) and also may exercise 'reverse influence'
In closing this study, in a modest way, has broadly surveyed the
literature on the Soviet-Cuban military nexus m Africa and laid a theoretical
framework for subsequent detailed analysis As a policy guideline, the lessons
learned could perhaps form a basis for the U S or any major power contemplating
any 'anticipatory involvement'^3 m a bid to avert likely future Third World
conflicts Needless to say, it is easier said than done lor m the complex
protean reality of the dynamics of ferment and change affecting most of the
developing world primarily which is indigenous and autonomous and hence beyond
the Superpowers to completely influence or control
29
END NOIES
1 This thesis is defended in e g I Greig The Communist Challenge to Africa An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies (London foreign Affairs Pub Coy Ltd 1977) Also see Robert Moss 'On Standing Up to the Russians in Africa ' Policy Review voi 5, summer 1978 pp 98-116, Julian Araery, The Crisis m Southern Africa Policy Review fall 1977 Kenneth Adelman "The Black Man's Burden Foreign Policy Fall 1977, Bayard Rustin and Carl Gersham, Africa Soviet Imperialism and Retreat of American Power ’ Commentary, October 1977 A well-documented but sometimes verging on the alarmist side is Peter Vanneman and W Martin James III Soviet Foreign Policy in Southern Africa, Institute of South Africa, December 1982
2 At present approximately 35 000-37 000 Cuban troops are stationed m Sub-Saharan Africa (See U S Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 4th ed , (Washington GP0, April 1985) p 1163 I William Zartraan, Africa as a Subordinate State System in InternationalRelations 1 International Organization voi 21 No 3 19674 At present over half of the world's refugees are in Africa, totaling about five million and with the largest concentration in the Horn of Africa due to the 1978 Ethiopian-Somali conflict in the Ogaden For details on this read Aderanti Adepoju, "The Refugee Situation in the Horn of Africa and Sudan " Issues - A Journal of Africanist Opinion, vol XII, No 3, Spring-Summer 1982, pp 29-34
5 J Barron Boyd, Jr , 'The Origins of Boundary Conflict in Africa, in MarkW DeLancey ed , Aspects of International Relations in Africa (Columbia South Carolina, December 1978) pp 159-1906 For a good analytical study on military interventions from regional African powers and other multi-forms of interventions see S N MacFarlane,Intervention and Security m Africa,' International Affairs, London Voi 60
No 1, pp 53-67, Relatedly, on a general breakdown of regional norms in Africa read his "Africa's Decaying Security System and the Rise of Intervention," International Security Voi 8, No 4 Spring 1984 pp 127-149
7 That the regional dynamics of conflict in the Horn of Africa is further exacerbated by the Super-Power rivalry is ably argued by Samuel M Makmda 'Conflict and the Super-Power s in the Horn of Africa, ' Third World Quarterly, Voi 4, No 1, January 1982, pp 93-1038 A rather gloomy prognosis for increased conflict is spelled out in Raymond W Capson, "African Flashpoints Prospects for Armed International Conflict ' Orbis Voi 25 No 4 Winter 1982 pp 903-923 and Dennis Austin, "Things Fall Apart,' Ibid, pp 925-9479 For example, the American airlift operation involving Belgian and Moroccan interventionary forces during Shaba II and the British use of Ascension Islands during the 1982 Falkland war (See Gregory F Traverton, "Defence Beyond Europe," Survival Vol XXV No 5 September-October 1983, pp 216-226 )
30
10 This term is used by Jorge L Dominguez 'The Civil Soldier in J I Dominguez Cuba Order and Revolution (Ca Harvard University Press, 1978) pp 341-37911 This theme is reflected in Jin Valenta s 'Soviet Policy m Central America " Survey - A Journal of bast and West Studies Voi 27 Autumn-Winter 1983 pp 287-30312 Trond Gilberg 'Lastern European Military Assistance to the Third World in Daniel S Papp ed, Communist Nation's Military Assistance (Boulder Colo Westview Press 1983), pp 72-93
13 Lloyd Jensen Explaining Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ Prentice Hall Inc , 1982) pp 227-22814 Frederick S Pearson and Robert Baumann, Foreign Military Intervention by Large and Small Powers, International Interactions I (October 1977), p 277
15 On various instruments and levels of involvement (e g , direct and indirect combat involvement direct and indirect para-combat involvement, and direct supply activities see Bertil Duner "The Many-Pronged Spear External Military Intervention in Civil Wars m the 1970s Journal of Peace Research, Vol 20 No 1, 1983, p 6016 Bertil Duner, Military Involvement The Escalation of International Conllicts (Stockholm The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1980) Research Report No 517 The subsequent theoretical discussion of 'proxy' behavior is heavily drawn from an excellent analysis done by Christopher Lamb, ' The Nature of Proxy Warfare" in William J Taylor, Jr and Steven Maaranen, The Future of Conflict in the 1980s (Lexington, Mass Lexington Books, 1982) pp 169-170
18 Walter Laqueur in W Laqueur ed , The Pattern of Soviet Conduct m the Third World (New York Praeger, 1983) p 11
19 Peter Vanneman and Martin James "Soviet Thrust into the Horn of Africa, Strategic Review, Voi Spring 1978, p 3420 However, even these satellites' appear to pursue tyithin limits their owneconomic and political interests m Africa, and sometimes are even m competition with each other For an elaboration of this point of view see Bruce E Arlinghaus, Military Development in Africa The Political and Economic Risks of Arms Transfers (Boulder, Colo Westview Press, 1984), p 35 In additionalso see m the same context, Joseph P Smaldone, "Soviet and Chinese Military Aid and Arms Transfers to Africa A Contextual Analysis ' in Warren Weinstein and Thomas H Hennkson eds Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations (New York Praeger Pub 1980) pp 76-116 Further, also see Jay Ross 'North Korean Advisors Arrive to Train Force in Zimbabwe," Washington Post, August 11
1981 and ‘Zimbabwe Follies oí the Fifth brigade Economist pp 48-49
October 30 1982
21 bee e g , the Pentagon study Soviet Military Power 1985 4th ed, April 1983, (Washington D C US Govt Printing Office 1983) pp 113-131
22 Jorge Dominguez Cuban Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs Qtly, Voi 57 Summer 1978, pp 83-10823 See "Castro Russia's Cat's Paw U S News and World Report, June 12 1978, pp 20-2324 For a proper role of the Gurkha forces as a mercenary force see an account by a former Gurkha officer Robin Adshead "The Gurkhas - Past Present and Future7 ’ Jane's Defence Weekly Voi 3 No 9, 2 March 1985 p 359
25 See e g , David Rees, "Soviet Strategic Penetration of Africa," Conflict Studies No 77, pp 1-21 and especially Brian Cozier The Surrogate Forces of the Soviet Union," Conflict Studies No 92 February 1978 pp 1-20
26 Peter Vanneraan and Martin James The Soviet Intervention in Angola Intentions and Implications " Strategic Review, Summer 1976, pp 96-103 also see their later piece Soviet Coercive Diplomacy Saudi Arabia " Air Force Magazine, March 1981, p 120
27 T B Millar, "Conflict and Intervention" in Mohammad Ayub, ed , Conflict and Intervention m the Third World (London Croom Helm, 1980)
28 A Suarez, Soviet Influence on Internal Politics of Cuba’ in A Rubinstein, Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World, and Lars Bondstam,External Involvement in Ethiopia Eritrea, ’ in B Davidson, L Cliff and B H Selassie, Behind the War in Eritrea (Nottingham Spokesman 1980)
29 See e g , Carmelo Mesa Lago, Cuba in the 1970s K S Karol, Guerrillas in Power (Hill and Wang 1970) Edward Gonzeles, "Relationship with the Soviet Union" in Mesa lago ed , Revolutionary Change in Cuba (University of Pittsburgh Press 1970), Leon Goure and Julian Weinkle, "Cuba's New Dependency," Problems of Communism, March-Apnl 1972 In addition see Edward Gonzeles, Cuba Under Castro The Limits of Charisma (Houghton Mifflin, 1974), Irving Louis Horowitz, ed , Cuban Communism (Trans-Action Press, 1977) Jaime Suchlicki, ed Cuba, Castro and Revolution (University of Miami Press, 1972) However, some of these writers have revised some of their earlier views of Cuban behavior and have incorporated some other factors in light of Cuba's renewedinternationalism' after mid-1970s m Africa In this regard see e g , Edward
Gonzeles Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy, Problems of Communism January-February 197630 See William J Taylor, Jr and James J Townsend, ‘Soviet Proxy Warfarem Robert Kupperman and William J Taylor, Jr , eds , Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000 (Lexington, Mass Lexington Books, 1984), pp 209-226
32
31 Lourdes Casal's testimony in the Hearings betöre the Subcommittee onInternational House of Representatives 93th Congress 2nd Session March 14 and 15, April 5 and 12 1978, pp 80-8532 Nelson Valdes Revolutionary Solidarity in Angola m Cole ßiasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago eds , Cuba in the World, (Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979) pp 87-11933 Sam C Nolutshungu 'African Interests and Soviet Power The Local Context of Soviet Policy," Soviet Studies, Vol XXXIV No 3 July 1982 p 408
34 William J Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle Last IromAlgeria to Angola " Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol II 1978 pp 34-74
35 Jorge I Dominguez, "The Armed Forces and Foreign Relations m Blaster andMesa Lago, eds Cuba m the World, pp 53-86
36 Connel-Smith Castro's Cuba in World Affairs 1959-79," fhe World Today January 1979 pp 15-2337 Jin Valenta is a specialist and an acute observer of Soviet military interventionary behavior in Lastern behavior and the Third World countries In this case read his, "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention m Angola, 1975, Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol II 1978 pp 3-3338 William M Leo Grande, "Cuba's Policy Recycled, Foreign Policy, No 46 Spring 1982, pp 105-119
39 Ibid40 Peter Vanneman and Martin James "Soviet Intervention m the Horn of Africa Intentions and Implications,' Policy Review, No 5 1978, pp 15-36
41 R E Bissell, 'Soviet Use of Proxies in Third World The Case of Yeman " Soviet Studies, Voi 30, 1978, pp 87-10642 M Halperin, The Cuban Role in Southern Africa" in J Seller, ed ,Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup (Boulder Westview Press 1980) pp 23-4343 A J Klmghoffer Soviet Policy Toward Africa Impact of the Angolan War," in R W Duncan, ed , Soviet Policy in the Third World (NY Pergamon Press, 1980), pp 196-211 also see his "The Soviet Union and the Super Power rivalry in Africa in Bruce L Arlinghaus, ed , African Security Issues Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity (Boulder, Col Westview Press, 1984), pp 19-3844 W A E Skurnik 'Africa and the Super-Powers, ' Current History, Voi 71, No 421, pp 145-148 179-180 184
33
45 G G Traverton, Cuba After Angola The World Today, January 1977 pp 17-2746 Ihis 'paladin thesis is very succinctly elaborated by Edward Gonzeles m Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa in David Albright ed Communism in
Africa (Bloomington and London Indiana University Press, 1980), pp 145-167
47 Lawrence H Theriot, Cuban Foreign Trade A Current Assessment (Washington D C US Department of Commerce, Office of L-W Policy and Planning, Industry and Trade Administration, 1978)
48 Enrique Baloyra Herp, Internationalism and the Limits of Autonomy Cuba's foreign Relations m Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S Tulchin, Latin American Nations m World Politics (Boulder and London Westview Press, 1984) p 169
49 As quoted m James Nelson Goodseli The Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 197850 See "The Impact of Cuban-Soviet Ties in the Western Hemisphere,' - Hearings before the House International Relations Committee March 14, 15 April 5, 12 1978 (Washington, D C US Govt Printing Office, 1978), p 14
51 The reasons for Castro's 'New Internationalism' are very well spelled out in Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New Yorx McGraw Hill Book Company 1983) pp 181-18252 Ibid , p 20653 Merritt Robbins, The Soviet-Cuban Relationship in Roger E Kanet, ed , Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Praeger Special Studies, 1982) pp 154, 157-15854 The literature on the subject is substantial For a sampling see, for instance, Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small State (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1967) V V Sveics, Small Nation Survival Political Defence m Unequal Conflict (Jericho, NY Exposition Press, 1970) Trygve Mathieson, The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of Great Powers (Oslo Universitetsforlaget, 1971) Peter Wiles, 'The Importance of Country Size A Question But Not a Subject,' Unpublished Paper 1978 Ronald P Barton, ed , The Other Powers Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States (London George Allen and Unwin, 1973) Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth of Small Nations' om AG Robinson ed , Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (New York St Martin's Press, 1960) Jacques Rapaport Ernest Mateba and Joseph Theratili, Small States and Territory Status and Problems (New York UNITAR Studies, 1971) Robert 0 Keohane "Lilliputians' Dilemmas Small States in International Politics " International Organization, Spring 1969, Robert L Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York Columbia University Press, 1968), Raimo Vayrynen, 'On the Definition and Measurement of Small States," Co-Operation and Conflict, No 6, 1971 and Michael I Hendel, Weak States in the International System (London Frank Cass 1981)
34
53 Albert Hirschman Beyond Asynimetery critical Notes on Myself as a Young Man and on borne Other Old Friends International Organization, Voi 32 Winter 1978, pp 45-5056 The foregoing section is heavily drawn from an excellent analysis by George H Quester The Difficult Question of International Exploitation, The Jerusalem Journal of International Affairs Voi 6 No 2 I9ö2 pp 1-23
57 For details of this literature review see Neils Armstrup ’The Perennial Problem of Small States " Co-Operation and Conflict January 1976
58 In this regard a mention can be made to Johan Galtung's structural thesisthat the Western world's relationships with the Third world are already well established through a complex web of social, economic and political ties from pre-independence days (See Johan Caltung A Structural Theory of Imperialism, Journal of Peace and Conflict Research No 2 1971 pp 81-117
59 J L Girling, America and the Third World Revolution and Intervention (London, Boston and Heneley Routledge and Kegal Paul 1980)
60 P Towle, The Strategy Of War by Proxy, Working Paper No 20, (Canberra The Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University 198061 lhat the international system is progressively getting diffuse and more decentralized by giving greater degree of autonomy and leverage, and hence military involvement by regional powers, is ably analyzed m Edward A Kolodziej and Robert Harkavy, "Developing States and the International Security System " Journal of International Affairs Voi 34, No 1, pp 59-87
In this context also refer to an excellent study of regional middle powers' defence policy formation from a comparative perspective by James M Roherty, ed , Defence Policy Formation Towards Comparative Analysis, International Relations Series No 6, Institute of International Studies (Durham N C Carolina Academic Press, 198U) For a case study of regional military involvement under former Shah's Iran see Maqsud Nun ’Regional Military Involvement A Case Study of Iran Under the Shah," Pakistan Horizon - Qtly , the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, Vol XXXVII, No 4, Fourth Quarter 1984, pp 32-4562 See Noam Chomsky's new book The Fateful Triangle The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (London Pluto Press 1983, especially pp 464-46963 This 'mutual exploitation thesis is spelled out in libyan-Sovietrelationship by John W Amos "Libya in Chad Soviet Surrogate or Nomadic Imperialist " Conflict All Warfare Short of War - An International Journal Voi 5, No 1 1983, p 6
35
64 David Ronfeldt, Super-Clients and Super-Powers - Cuba Soviet Union/IranUnited States P-5945 (Santa Monica Calilornia Rand Corporation April 1978) Another small piece albeit proving the surrogate thesis implicitly underscores the indispensability of countries luce Cuba Vietnam and Israel for the Super-Powers See Charles E Waterman, Why Super-Powers Pay the bills for big Armies for Small friends Such Surrogates are a Relatively Cheap and 'Wondrous" Weapon ' Christian Science Monitor, June 6 1985 p 11
65 That this idealized principle has always corresponded to actual reality in Africa is open to question given the inability and constraints of the Soviet Union to influence and control events in these "client" nations
66 For details see, 'Soviet Military Presence in Cuba Jane's Defence Weekly Voi 3 No 17, 27 April 1985, pp 714-71567 An excellent empirical discussion of the increasing leverage of a number of these developing small states vis a vis the bigger states in terms of arms dependence can be found m Ariel Levite and Athanassios Platias, Evaluating Small State's Dependence on Arms Imports An Alternative Perspective,Occasional Perspective No 16 (Cornell University Peace Studies Program) June 1983 p 73 For increased arms production capacity in some areas - nearly 20 Third World countries, with brazil emerging as the fifth largest arms seller to many Persian Gulf and West African countries (nearly $2 billion in 1984) read Geoffrey Aronson The Third World's booming New Industry Weapons Washington Post 16 June 1985, p C-l68 William J Taylor and James J Townsend "Soviet Proxy Warfare ' in RobertH Kupperman and William J Taylor eds , Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000 (Lexington, Mass Lexington Books, 1984), p 210
69 Ibid70 bruce D Porter The USSR m Third World Conflicts Soviet Arms andDiplomacy in Local War 1945-1980 (London Cambridge University Press, 1984)P 230, p 55
71 Strategic Survey, 1978 (London IISS 1979), pp 12-17
72 Ibid , p 17
73 Caspar W Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress - FY 1986 (WashingtonD C US Gov't Printing Office 1985), pp 19, 21, 30, 32
74 For instance read Kenneth L Adelman, 'African Security Facts andFantasies," Comparative Strategy - An International Journal, Voi 2, No 1, 1980, p 10375 Bruce E Arlmghaus Military Development in Africa The Political and Economic Risks of Arms fransfers (Boulder and London Westview Press, 1984),pp 34-35
36
76 Ibid , p 36 the same theme is reiterated in John F Copper and Daniel S Papp, eds Communist Nation's Military Assistance (Boulder Col Westview Press 1983)77 See Juan de Aguila Cuba's Foreign Policy in Central America and the Caribbean in Jennie K. Lincoln and Elizabeth G Fens eds fhe Dynamics of Latin American Policies Challenges for the 1980s Westview Special Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean (Boulder and London Westview Press 1984) pp 251-266, and Wolf Grabendorff, The Role of Regional Powers in Central America Mexico, Venezuela Cuba and Columbia, m Heraldo Munoz and Josephs Tulchi Latin American Nations in World Politics, 1984 (Boulder and London Westview Press 1984)78 Aguila The Dynamics of Latin American Policies p 252
79 Louis J Canton and Steven L Spiegai The International Relations ofRegions " in Richard A Falk and Saul H Menlovitz eds Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco W H Freeman and Company 1973) as cited inIbid80 Antonio Jorge "How Exportable is the Cuban Model9 pp 211-233 in Barry B Levine, ed The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean (Boulder Westview Press 1983), p 227
81 Aguila, The Dynamics of Latin American Policies p 257
82 See Edward L Warner III, "The Defence Policy of the Soviet Union' inDouglas J Murray and Paul R Viotti, eds , The Defence Policies of Nations A Comparative Study (Baltimore and London The Johns Hopkins Univ Press 1982)p ÏÏÏ6
83 Ibid , p 8884 See e g , Dept of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1985 (Washington, D CUS Gov't Printing Office) p 118 Although rich in description and details, this document tends to give only one-sided facts and figures and not comparative data so as to present the reader with a balanced perspective
85 Ibid , p 12186 Ibid p 12087 Gerry S Ihomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa (Boulder and London Westview Press 1984) p 2
88 Ibid , pp 5-6