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ROM N
W RF R
drian
oldsworthy
General ditor o n Keegan
SSELL
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book h as b ee n a p le as ur e to
write
and I should like to
thank
all
the
friends
and
family
who
read and commented
on
the
various drafts
notably
lan
Haynes
ian Deeks and especially
lan Hughes.
The lat ter
took part along
with
Glyn
Quigley in a highly
stimulating
series
of
seminars
on
the Second Punic War run
j oi nt ly by
Louis
Rawlings
and
myself
as
part
of the Cardi ff University
MA
rogramme in
1996-7.
Several of
the ideas in
the
second
chapter were derived
rom
the
discussions in these
s es si on s. I have f ol lo we d Louis
ideas
on
early
oman warfare
extensively
in the first chapter.
Similarly
in
chapter
5
I have
rawn much inspiration from
Hugh Elton s
splendid
Warfare in
oman
urope
and it is appropriate for me to acknowledge
my
debt to both
of
them.
However
he views e xpre ssed here a re m y
own
and
not
necessarily
shared
by
either
scholar.
would
a lso like to express
my
thanks
to
the team at Cassell
and
especially
enny Gardiner for all
their
work on
the
volume and to Malcolm Swanston for
is splendid
maps
and illustrations.
DRIAN GOLDSWORTHY
en rth
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CONTENTS
5 CRISIS AND
REFORM
The
army of
the
Principate;
Training and tactics;
Rome and Parthia; axRomana The
frontiers
3
Civil
wars
and
usurpations;
The
late Roman army;
Barbarians
and
the
western
Empire; Sassanid Persia
and
th e east; Disaster at Adrianople
6
CONTROLLING THE WORLD
AD 14 193
9 5
22 4
22
2
5
2 8
2
2 2
The end of the western army; Conclusion
T LES
GLOSS RY
IOGR PHIES ND
M IN
SOURCES
FURTHER RE DING
INDEX
PICTURE
CREDITS
6
COLLAPSE IN THE WEST
RECOVERY IN THE EAST
CKNOWLEDGEMENTS
5
MAP LIST
CHRONOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
T o
OVERCOME THE
PROUD IN WAR
7
EARLY
ROME AND THE
CONQUEST
OF ITALY
The
Republic
25
THE
WARS
WITH CARTHAGE
AND THE HELLENISTIC
KINGDOMS
The Roman army
in
t he mid Republic; The
army in batt le; The first
Punic
wa r
and
naval
warfare; Land
warfare
against Carthage and
th e
Hellenistic world
4
WORLD CONQUEST
BC AD
Northern
Italy; Spain;
The
rise of
the
professional
army;
The great
conquests;
The
last
phase
of
Roman expansion
77
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K Y
T
M PS
Political colours
oman
mpire
dependent state
unless otherwise
indic ted
Symbols
on map
X b ttle
fort
o siege
ame
style
P RTHI N
MPIR
Thrace
S R TlONS
independent state
province
major trib l group
Geographical symbols
urban area
oman road
defensive line
river
seasonal river
canal
border
Military movements
tt ck
retre t
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M A P LIST
I T H E
RO MA N
C ON QU ES T O F I TA LY 265 BC ;
3
8
RO ME
IN
TH E LATE
REPUBLIC
3
8
2 T H E
PUNIC
W A RS 264 146 BC
5
6
-7
3·
HANNIBAL S CAMPAIGNS
I N I TA LY 218 203 BC
63
4·
CANNAE
66-7
5·
ZA MA
68 9
6 MAGNESIA
7
2
-3
7·
T H E
R O M AN E M PI R E
AD 14
7
8
-9
8
CAESAR S
CAMPAIGNS IN
GAUL 58 50 BC
84
9·
SIEGE
OF
ALESIA
86-7
10 CIVIL W A RS
9
8
-9
11
PHARSALUS: PHASES
I
2 AN D 3
100 1
12 T H E
RO MA N
EMPIRE AD
68
114-
1
5
13·
P ARTHIAN
W A RS
13
2
14·
T H E SIEGE
OF
JERUSALEM
AD
70
14°
IS ·
T H E RO MA N EMPIRE IN
AD
214
14
8
-9
16
T H E
F RON T IE RS I N
NORTHERN BRITAIN
15
2
17·
T H E BATTLE O F S T RA S BO U RG
17
8
-9
18
RO ME S EASTERN
FRONTIER
18
7
19·
SIEGE OF A M ID A
19
1
2
T H E
RO MA N EMPIRE
AD
395
19
6
-7
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ROMAN WARFARE
HRONOLO Y
This chart lists th e major military
Pachynus an d Spain eventually
events in Rome s history that ca n
Palinurus.
ended by th e
be securely dated. Entries in bold 249
Romans defeated in campaigns and peace
ar e
only
for
th e
reigns
of
emperors
naval
battle
at
settlement
of
who controlled the greater part of
Drepana.
Gracchus.
th e Empire. 241
Romans
wi n
final 192-189 Syrian War against
naval b at tl e o ff t he
th e Seleucid
Aegates Islands.
Antiochus
In .
753
Traditional
date
for 225
Invading Gallic
army
191
Antiochus invasion
foundation
of Rome
defeated at Telamon.
of Greece defeated
at
by Romulus. 223
Romans
campaign
Thermopylae.
509
Traditional
date
for
successfully against
190
Antiochus defeated
at
expulsion of Rome s tribes of
Cisalpine
Magnesia.
last king Tarquinius
Gaul. 189-188
Manlius Vulso defeats
Superbus.
218-201
Second Punic
War. Galatians.
496
Romans defeat the
218
Hannibal defeats
172-167
Third
Macedonian
Latin
League
at
th e
cavalry force
at
War.
battle of Lake
Ticinus
an d
then 168
Macedonians under
Regillus. smashes
two consular
Perseus defeated
at
396
Veii falls after ten- armies
at Trebia. Pydna.
year siege/blockade.
217
Consul
Flaminius
is 154-138
Lusitanian
War.
390
Gauls
rout
a
Roman ambushed at
Lake
149-146 Third
Punic War.
a rm y a t
th e River
Trasimene. 149-148
Fourth Macedonian
Allia
an d sack
Rome. 216
Romans suffer War.
343-341
First
Samnite
War.
massive
defeat at 146
Destruction
of
340-338
Latin revolt
defeated Cannae.
Carthage and
an d
Latin League
214-205
First
Macedonian
Corinth.
dissolved.
War. Romans ar e
143-133
Numantine
War.
326-304 Second Samnite
War.
forced
to come to 125-121
Ro
mans
defeat tribes
R oma n a rm y defeated
terms
with
Philip of of
Transalpine Gaul.
an d sent under
yoke
Macedon after
losing
113-105
Migrating tribes the
a t C audi ne
Forks
their
allies
in
Greece. Cimbri
an d Teutones
321 .
213-211
Romans take
Syracuse
defeat a succession of
298-290
Third Samnite
War.
after long
siege.
Roman armies
R om an s w in major 209
Scipio Africanus
culminating
i n t he
victory at Sentinum
captures Ne w
disaster
at
Arausio
295 .
Carthage. 105 .
283 A Gallic tribe the
208 Scipio wins a victory 112-106 ]ugurthine Wa r
Boii defeated at Lake
at Baecula.
begins with
Vadimo. 207
Hasdrubal brings humiliating Roman
280-275
Wa r with Pyrrhus army
into
Italy bu t is
surrender bu t finally
wh o
defeats
Romans defeated
at Metaurus.
vlon by
Marius.
at Heraclea 280 an d
206
Scipio wins decisive 102 Marius defeats
Asculum 279 , bu t is
victory in Spanish
Teutones at Aquae
finally beaten at
campaign at Ilipa. Sextiae.
Malventum.
204-203 Scipio invades Africa 101 Marius and Catulus
264-241
First Punic War. winning battle of th e defeat Cimbri at
260
Romans
wi n
naval Great Plains.
Vercellae.
victory off Mylae.
Hannibal recalled. 91-88 Th e Social War the
256
Major
Roman
naval 202 Scipio defeats
last great rebellion by
victory off Ecnomus. H an n ib al a t Z am a .
Rome s Italian allies is
256-255
Regulus invades 200-196 Second Macedonian defeate d a ft er a hard
Africa bu t after War. struggle.
initial successes is 197
Philip decisively
88
Sulla marches
on
defeated. beaten at
Rome.
255-253 Roman
fleets wrecked Cynoscephalae.
88-85 First Mithridatic
in
storms
off
197-179 Series of w ars in War.
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CHRONOLOGY
Sulla
storms
Athens
44-42
Caesar s assassination 12-7
Tiberius conquers
a n d t he n
defeats provokes a
further
Pannonia.
He an d
his
Mithridates much cycle
of
civil wa r
brother Drusus
larger armies at
between th e
campaIgn In
Chaeronea and
conspirators an d Germany.
Orchomenus. Caesar s
supporters
Sulla
returns
to
Italy le d by
Mark
Antony,
AD
an d wins civil w ar a t
later
joined by 4-5 Tiberius
completes
the battle
of
th e
Octavian Caesar s the
conquest of
Colline
Gate
outside nephew an d
adopted
Germany
as far as th e
Rome. son.
Elbe.
-82 Second Mithridatic
42
Brutus
an d Cassius
6- 9
Massive revolt in
War. defeated in
twin
Pannonia and
Sertorius continues
battles of Philippi.
Dalmatia suppressed
the civil
wa r
in 40-38 Parthians
invade
after hard struggle by
Spain.
Syria,
bu t
are defeated
Tiberius and
Third Mithridatic
by Ventidius at Mt
Germanicus.
War. Amanus
an d 9
German revolt led by
A
major
slave
Gindarus. Arminius
of
th e
rebellion led by 36
Antony
launches Cherusci massacres
Spartacus
disrupts major
offensive
three legions
under
Italy. Several Roman against the Parthians
Varus in th e
armies are smashed bu t
this flounders Teutonberg
Wald.
before he is finally
when he fails to take
10-11 Tiberius an d
defeated by Crassus.
Phraapsa
an d
he loses Germanicus
secure
Lucullus defeats m an y m en t o
disease the Rhine
frontier.
Tigranes of Armenia
an d starvation in th e 14
Legions on Rhine an d
an d captures his subsequent
retreat.
Danube
mutiny
after
capital
Tigranocerta.
31 Antony
defeated by death of
Augustus.
Lucullus defeats Octavian in naval 14-37
Principate
of
combined forces
of
battle at Actium.
Tiberius.
Tigranes an d
Octavian becomes
15-16
Germanicus
leads
Mithridates
at
effectively
th e
sole Rhine
armies against
Tigranocerta.
ruler
of
th e
Roman
th e
Germans and
Pompey clears the Empire.
buries
th e
remains
of
Mediterranean o f 31-30 Parthians
overrun
Varus army. He
p ir at es i n a b ri ef bu t
Armenia.
defeats Arminius at
highly organized 28-24
Final pacification
of
Indistaviso, bu t fails
campaIgn.
Spain completed by
to
achieve final
Pompey given Octavian an d
his victory.
extraordinary
commanders.
17-24 Revolt
of
Tacfarinas,
command
to
27
BC-AD
14
Principate
of
a
former
auxiliary, in
complete th e
w ar w it h
Augustus Octavian).
North Africa, which
Mithridates.
25
Successful
expedition
end s o nl y w hen
he is
Pompey captures is sent
against
killed.
Jerusalem.
Ethiopia in response 19
Arminius murdered
Caesar s conquest of to
raids on
Roman
by rival chieftains.
Gallia
Comata.
Egypt. 21
Revolt
of
Florus
an d
Crassus invades 20
Settlement
with
Sacrovir in
Gaul
Parthia bu t is
Parthia leads to th e
swiftly suppressed by
defeated an d killed at return of Roman
Rhine armies.
Carrhae.
prisoners an d 28 Th e Frisii, a
Major
Gallic rebellion captured
standards. Germanic
tribe east
of
led by Vercingetorix.
16-15
Campaigns to
th e Rhine
rebel
Civil Wa r between
conquer th e Alpine
against oppressive
Caesar an d Pompey.
tribes. taxation.
Caesar
wins v ictories 15
German tribes raid 37--41
Principate
of
Gaius
at
Pharsalus 48),
th e
Roman
provinces Caligula) .
Zela 47), Thapsus
an d defeat Lollius 40--44
Mauretania rebels
46 an d
Munda
45).
Urbicus. an d
is fully conquered
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ROMAN WARFARE
by Seutonius Paulinus armies nominate
their Dacia, invades
an d later Hosidius
commanders as Moesia and inflicts a
Geta. successor.
heavy defeat on its
41-54 Principate of 68 Emperor Galba
governor.
Claudius. murdered
by his
86
Domitian s
Praetorian
42 Scribonius,
the guardsmen
after
Prefect, Cornelius
governor
of Dalmatia
failing
to
meet their
Fuscus,
is
given
attempts a rebellion
demands for pay:
Hi s
command in Dacia,
against Claudius
bu t
successor,
Otho
is
bu t is defeated
and
commits
suicide
when
defeated by Vitellius
killed.
his legions fail
to
at th e
first
battle of
88
Another Roman army
support
him.
Cremona or
invades Dacia
an d
43
Claudius launches Bedriacum) .
defeats Decebalus at
invasion
of
Britain.
69
Supporters
of Tapae.
47
Corbulo suppresses
Vespasian defeat 89 Saturninus, governor
th e
Frisii an d defeats Vitellius a rm y a t
th e
of
Lower Germany,
an d kills the second battle of rebels against
Chaucian
Gannascus
Cremona.
Sarmatians
Domitian but is
a former auxiliary, an d Dacians raid
defeated. Domitian
wh o
ha d
been
raiding
across
the Danube.
makes peace
with
th e
Roman provinces
69-70
In northern Germany
Decebalus, paying
i n a fleet
of
small a Batavian nobleman
hi m
a subsidy
an d
ships.
an d former auxiliary providing technical
5
Caratacus defeated, prefect, Julius Civilis,
experts to strengthen
bu t
th e
Silures of
leads a rebellion to Dacia s fortresses.
southern
Wales
create a Gallic Sarmatian
Iazyges
continue
to resist.
empire .
He
is raid Pannonia.
54-68
Principate of Nero.
defeated by Petilius
92 Further
raids on
58-64 W ar w it h P ar thia over Cerealis.
Pannonia
prompt
Armenia. Corbulo 70-79 Principate of Domitian to
captures Artaxata
an d
Vespasian.
campaign
against the
Tigranocerta. 7 Titus captures Iazyges an d their
60-61
Boudicca, Queen
of Jerusalem after
a
long allies, the
th e Iceni, leads
SIege. Marcomanni an d
rebellion in Britain,
73-4 Masada the las t
Quadi.
creating widespread
stronghold
of
th e
96-8 Principate of Nerva.
devastation before she
Jewish rebels,
is
98-117
Principate
of
Trajan.
is defeated by taken.
101-2 Trajan s First Dacian
Suetonius Paulinus.
71-4
Petilius Cerealis
Wa r
defeats
62
Caesennius Paetus defeats th e Brigantes Decebalus
an d
surrounded
an d
of
northern
Britain.
removes the
surrenders to
th e 74-8
Julius Frontinus
favourable Domitianic
Parthians an d his defeats th e Silures of treaty:
army is
sent
under
th e South Wales. 105-6 Decebalus renews
war
yoke.
78-84
Julius Agricola
bu t
is defeated
an d
66-74
Th e Jewish rebellion.
advances
into commits
suicide.
66
Th e Syrian governor, Scotland, defeating a
Dacia
is
a nn ex ed as a
Cestius Gallus, leads large
tribal
army
at
province.
an expedition to Mons Graupius. His
113-17 Trajan s Parthian War
Jerusalem
bu t is
conquests
are largely
flounders when he
forced to retreat and abandoned when fails to take Hatra.
suffers heavily in
the troops
are withdrawn Revolts in recently
pursuit. to serve in th e wars on conquered territory
67
Vespasian
subdues the Danube. break ou t
before his
Galilee.
Josephus
79-81
Principate
of Titus.
death.
surrenders to
him.
81-96
Principate
of
115-17
Widespread rebellion
68-9 Year of Four Domitian.
by Jewish
Emperors.
Nero s
83
Domitian
campaigns
communities in
death prompts a civil
against the Chatti.
Egypt, Cyrene
an d
wa r as th e provincial
85
Decebalus, king of Cyprus.
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CHRONOLOGY
Principate
of
false report
of 232
Severus Alexander s
Hadrian
during
Marcus death but is offensive
against
the
which Trajan s defeated by loyal
Persians fails.
acquisitions in the troops.
234-5 Pannonian legions
East are abandoned. 178-80 Further
disturbances rebel under
Construction
of
on th e
Danube. Maximinus. Severus is
Hadrian s
Wall
180-92
Reign
of Commodus.
murdered.
begins.
c 182-5 Heavy fighting in
235-8
Reign
of
Maximinus
Th e
Jews revolt under
northern
Britain
who campaigns
th e Messianic leader,
eventually
ended
by successfully against
Bar Kochba, an d are
victories
of
Ulpius t he A la ma nni but
is
defeated
at
a heavy Marcellus.
murdered
by the
cost in
Roman
184
Final abandonment of
Praetorian
Guard.
casualties.
Antonine Wall. 238 44 Reign
of
Gordian
Ill.
Principate
of
193-7
Period
of
civil wa r
242
Successful
expedition
Antoninus Pius.
results from murder to drive Persians from
Rebellion in northern
of
Commodus. I t is Mesopotamia.
Britain. eventually wo n by
244
Gordian III
murdered
Antonine conquests
Septimius Severus by a conspiracy an d
in Scotland.
supported
by
the
replaced by Philip,
the
Construction
of Danubian armies.
Praetorian Prefect.
Antonine
Wall begun.
197-208
Reign
of
Severus.
244-9
Reign
of
Philip the
Rebellion in 198 Severus invades Arab.
Mauretania.
Parthia
an d
sacks
245-7
Gothic tribes
raid
150-54
Serious rebellion in
Ctesiphon.
Danubian
provinces.
northern Britain. 205
Hadrian s Wall
249 Decius is proclaimed
Antonine
Wall
restored after heavy emperor by the
abandoned.
Hadrian s raids by Caledonian
Danubian
armies an d
Wall reoccupied. tribes ha d overrun
defeats Philip near
160-63
Antonine
Wall
much of
northern
Verona. Goths under
reoccupied a nd t he n Britain.
Cniva
raid
Danubian
evacuated again.
208-11 Severusleadslarge
provinces.
Reign
of
Marcus
expedition against
249-51
Reign
of
Decius.
Aurelius.
the
Caledonians
bu t
251 Decius defeated an d
Parthians invade dies in Eboracum
killed by
Goths
at
Armenia. Lucius
York). Forum Trebonii.
Verus, Marcus 211-17 Caracalla s reign.
251-3 Reign
of
Gallus.
Augustus or co-ruler, 213 Caracalla
campaigns 252 Persians invade
sent east to oppose
o n th e
Rhine
frontier. Mesopotamia. Heavy
them.
They
are 217 Caracalla
prepares
barbarian raiding
defea
te d an d eastern
expedition
across
Rhine an d
Ctesiphon an d
bu t is murdered by a D anube. G ot hs pa id a
Seleucia sacked.
member
of
his Horse subsidy to withdraw.
Marcomanni and Guards near Carrhae.
253
Aemilianus rebels
at
Quadi
tw o
Suebic
217-18
Macrinus
reign.
He
is
head of Pannonian
tribes, cross
th e
defeated by Persians
and Moesian armies.
Danube in a series
of
at
Nisibis,
an d
then
Gallus
army deserts
raids. On e group
by
the
usurper
an d murders him.
reaches Aq uileia in
Elagabalus outside
Aemilianus
is
then
northern Th e
Antioch.
murdered
by his ow n
Iazyges raid the 218-22
Reign
of
Elagabalus. troops.
province of Dacia.
227
Ardashir
defeats
253-60
Reign
of
Valerian.
A series
of campaigns Parthian
king an d H is s on Gallienus
against the creates Sassanid
made Augustus.
Marcomanni Quadi
m o n r h ~
254
Marcomanni
launch
an d
their
Sarmatian
222-35 Reign
of
Severus
heavy raids into
allies.
Alexander.
Illyricum. Goths raid
Avidius Cassius,
th e
230
Persians invade
Thrace.
Shapur
I
of
governor
of
Syria, Mesopotamia and
Persia
captures
rebels on receiving a
besiege Nisibis.
Nisibis.
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ROMAN
W ARF ARE
256 Franks launch heavy
destroyed
an d
3 6
Constantius dies in
raids across Lower Egyptian revolt
York
an d
his son
Rhine. Gothic fleet suppressed.
Constantine is
raids coast
of
Asia
274 Tetricus rebels in
proclaimed emperor
Minor causing G au l a nd is defeated
by th e provincial
widespread
by Aurelian.
r ~
devastation an d 275 Aurelian is murdered 3 2
Constantine defeats
panIC.
by h is
ow n
officers. Maxentius
at
th e
258/9
Gallienus
defeats Tacitus
made emperor Milvian
Bridge
Franks.
by th e Senate.
outside
Rome.
26
Valerian s Persian 276 Tacitus defeats Alans 314-15 Constantine wins
expedition ends in bu t dies on campaign.
victories
at
Cibalis
disaster when he 276-82
Reign Probus. an d
Mardia
in civil
surrenders to Sharpur. He campaigns
wa r
with
Licinius.
Postumus proclaimed successfully on th e 322-3 Constantine
emperor in G au l
Rhine and Danube campaigns against
creating the
imp rium bu t is murdered by Sarmatians
an d
Goths
llicum with
a
mutinous soldiers
and on the Danube.
capital
at Trier which replaced by Carus
th e 323-4
Constantine decisively
endures
f or a d ec ad e.
Praetorian
Prefect. defeats Licinius
at
260-68 Reign Gallienus. 283-5 Carus
defeats Adrianople and
26 Odenathus of
Sarmatians in Chrysopolis.
Palmyra
made
ux Illyricum bu t dies 324-37
Reign Constantine
orientis
an d leads during
a successful as undisputed
successful wa r against offensive against emperor.
th e Persians.
Persia. Civil wa r 331-4 Constantine
267-8 Odenathus murdered.
eventually
wo n
by successfully
Hi s
power assumed
Diocletian
wh o
campaigns
against the
by his widow appoints
Maximian
Goths
an d
Zenobia
in th e
name
as his Caesar
an d Sarmatians.
of the ir s on
later as Augustus. 337
Imperial
power
Vallabathus.
284-305 Reign Diocletian divided between
268
Goths
raid
Thrace
which saw
the creation Constantine s
sons.
an d Greece. Th e
of th e e t r r c h ~
337-60
War w ith Persia.
Heruli sack Athens. 286 Maximian suppresses 338
Persians mount
Gallienus defeats th e
the Bagaudaen
unsuccessful siege of
Heruli
near th e River
disturbances in Ga ul Nisibis.
Nessus
bu t
is
which
ha d escalated 340-69
Severe
problems
in
murdered by h is
ow n from banditry to
Britain. Heavy raiding
officers.
full-scale revolt. by barbarians.
268-70
Reign Claudius
286-93
Maximian f ig ht s a 346 Persians
mount
Gothicus .
successful campaign
unsuccessful siege of
269 Claudius defeats against the Alamanni.
Nisibis.
Goths
in g rea t v ic to ry Cara us i us l ea ds a 348
Persians defeat
at
Naissus.
Zenobia
successful rebellion in
Constantius
at
captures Antioch. Britain bu t is
Singara.
27
Claudius dies of eventually murdered. 350-53 Persians again fail to
disease
an d
is
296-7
Diocletian
suppresses
take
Nisibis. Civil
war
succeeded by
usurpation in
Egypt. between Constantius
Aurelian. Dacia Constantius
regains
an d Magnentius.
abandoned.
Britain.
Galerius 356-7 ]ulian campaigns
270-75
Reign Aurelian. defeats th e Persians.
against the
Alamanni
270-71
Aurelian defeats 305-23
Period of civil wars winning a pitched
] uthungi a nd Vandals.
following the battle at Strasbourg.
Zenobia takes Egypt
abdication of
357-9
Constantius defeats
an d invades Asia Diocletian an d th e Quadi an d
Minor. Maximian.
Sarmatians who
ha d
272-3
Aurelian defeats
3 5
Constantius made
heavy raids into
Z e nobia a t Antioch campaigns against the Danubian
an d Emesa. Palmyra
Caledonians.
prOVInces.
4
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CHRONOLOGY
]ulian campaigns
380-82 Successful
operations
Persia. Persians
against
the
Franks.
against the Goths.
capture Amida,
bu t
Persians invade 383
Magnus
Maximus
this is returned
to
Mesopotamia and defeats Picts, but t he n
Romans as part
of
th e
take Amida by storm. rebels.
peace treat):
Th e Persians take
388 Theodosius defeats 526-32 Renewal of w ar w it h
Singara.
Germanic Magnus Maximus.
Persia.
tribes make deep raids
Valentinian is
528
Belisarius defeated
at
into Gau . Picts an d
undisputed western Minduos.
Scots
launch
heavy
emperor until his 530 Belisarius wins great
raids
into
Britain.
death 392 . victory at Dara.
]ulian campaigns
394 Theodosius
defeats
531
Belisarius defeated at
across the Rhine. rivals in costly
Callinicum.
Death
of
Constantius.
two-day battle at the 533-4 Belisarius defeats
] ulian Persian River Frigidus.
Vandals in Africa.
offensive ends in
395-400 Theodosius death
535-54 A tt e mpt m a de t o
disaster an d he is
prompts renewed civil
reconquer
Italy with
killed in a skirmish.
war. armies led by
] ovian agrees 398-400 Victories in
northern
Belisarius an d later
humiliating
peace Britain over Picts, N arses.
Rome
with Persia, ceding Scots an d Saxons.
captured an d
them
considerable
407 Army
in Britain raises
recaptured
several
territory including Constantine
to
the times. Narses defeats
Nisibis.
throne
an d
invades
t he G oths at Taginae
Valentinian
Gaul, fighting against 552 an d Vesuvius
campaigns against Vandals.
553 ,
an d
th e
Franks
Alamanni and
beyond
408
G oths unde r Alaric
at Casilinus 554 .
the Rhine against the
invade Italy
an d
Goths.
besiege Rome.
R om an a rm y unde r
409 Britain rebels against
the
omes
Constantine l l
Theodosius
restores
410
Alaric sacks Rome.
order in Britain. 415
Visigoths are sent by
Valentinian Constantius
to
Spain
campaigns against
the to fight against
Alamanni
while Vandals.
Valens defeats
the 418
Th e Visigoths are
Goths. settled by Constantius
Valentian formally in Aquitaine.
receives a group of
429
Vandals invade an d
Alamanni
i nt o t he
overrun Africa.
Empire. Rebellion in 451-3 Aetius turns
bac k t he
Mauretania
offensive
of
Attila s
suppressed by
H un s a t
Chalons
Theodosius.
Campus Mauriacus).
Valentinian dies of Attila
bribed
to
apoplexy while withdraw from Italy
haranguing some
an d
dies soon
Quadic chieftains. afterwards.
A party of Goths
454
Ostrogoths settle in
fleeing Hunnic
attacks Pannonia.
cross
the
D anube a nd
469-78
Visigoths overrun
defeat Romans near Spain.
Salices. 476 Last emperor of the
Alamanni attack West, Romulus
Raetia. Valens is Augustus, deposed by
defea
te d
an d killed Odovacer
wh o
creates
along
w it h m os t
of
the Ostrogothic
his army by the Goths kingdom
of
Ital):
at Adrianople. 502-6 Anastasian war with
15
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INTRODU TION
To
OVER OME
THE PROUD
W R
THIS MOS I P VEMENT dates
t o the
first
or
second century
D and depicts a group soldiers in either an historical
or
mythical scene Their
uniforms
are highly romanticized The
evidence for
the colour
oman
soldiers tunics is
i n o n l u s i v ~ bu t suggests
that
in most periods these were
w h i t ~ or off white as shown here
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ROMAN
WARFARE
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Roman legionaries
employ
the famous tortoise
testudo)
o r m t i o n ~
in an
attack
on a Dacian
stronghold Their long
rectangular shields were
overlapped to form a
continuous roof above their
heads
nly
the heaviest
missiles were capable of
penetrating a well formed
tortoise and we hear of one
incident where the defenders
toppled a heavy catapult
over the wall to crush the
roof of
shields
A R FA R E P LA YE D A major part throughout Rome s history creating an d
ma intaining a n empire which eventually
included
much
of
Europe, th e
Near
East an d
North
Africa Wa r
an d
politics were inseparably linked at Rome
an d
t he rig ht
to
exercise power in
peacetime
was
purchased
by
t he o bl ig at io n t o
provide
successful
leadership in
war
Th e
Latin
word imperator from
which we
derive emperor , means general an d even th e least military of emperors
paraded
th e martial successes achieved by their armies Th e willingness of
Roman
soldiers
to
fight each other made possible th e cycles
of
civil wars
that
caused the collapse
of th e Republican system of
government
in
th e
first century
BC
and prompted the
fragmentation of
i mp er ia l p ow er
in
th e
third
century
AD . In
spite
of
th e
importance of
warfare,
Roman
society gradually
became
largely demilitarized
The citizen militia recruited
from
th e property owners serving o ut o f d ut y t o the
state an d
not
for payor booty was replaced by a professional army drawn mainly
from the
poorest
e le me nt s i n society By t he se con d c en tu ry
AD
only a tiny
minority
of
soldiers even in
th e
citizen legions
ha d
been born in Italy For a while
t h e s enat ori al an d equestrian
officers wh o filled t he s en io r r an ks as
part of
a
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eer including
both
civil an d
military posts provided
a
link between
th e army
d the rest of society
bu t
this was largely severed
in
t he t hi rd
n t u r ~
After this
officers an d me n were career soldiers with aspirations clearly
distinct
from
lives
of
civilians in th e provinces
Roman warfare
was
characterized
by
great
ferocity
an d th e Roman pursuit
of
tory was relentless T acit us mak es a Caledonian
war
l ead er claim
that
th e
create
a
desolation
an d call
i t p ea ce .
The Romans had a pragmatic
ude towards atrocity an d massacre that viewed almost
an y
ac t as justifiable if
eased th e path
to
v i t o r ~
T he R om an
sack
of
a city which ha d failed
to
ender before th e first b att eri ng -ram t ou ched t he wall was deliberately made
t o d et er resistance elsewhere Rebellions in particular were suppressed
great
brutality
an d frequently involved
th e
mass
crucifixion
of
prisoners
or
ir violent deaths
on
the
sand of th e arena.
Bu t
against the destructiveness an d
of R om an w ar s m us t
be se t
their often
constructive results
The Romans
from manr
of
their
wars especially in
th e
period of conquest bu t their
a r m ak in g wa s never purely
p r e t o r ~
Defeated enemies were turned
into
allies
wh o
soon
provided
many loyal
soldiers
to
fight
the next
of
Rome s
wars Gradually some of t he ir f or me r enemies gained
citizenship
an d
might even
in
t im e g ai n
admission to
th e elite
of
th e
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The
Roman army
pursued
victory
with
ruthless
determination
Often
a
conflict was only ended with
the death or capture of a
charismatic
enemy
leader In
this scene the Dacian king
Decebalus slits his own
throat rather than be
captured
by
the
Roman
horseman riding towards
him By chance the
tombstone
of this man a
junior officer
named
Tiberius Claudius
Maximus has survived
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R O M A N WARFARE
wa s
not
a corruption
of
a fairer system; it was
th e
system an d was openly
accepted as a part of normal life
The
Romans
ar e
often
seen as a
methodical
an d highly practical people
whose feats of engineering allowed their
army
to operate more f f i i n t l ~ Roman
roads
perhaps
th e
most
famous
of
all their legacies provided direct well-
maintained
routes
along which the army
could
supply its garrisons
or
shift
reserves in all b ut th e w or st
of
weather
conditions.
They
were also deliberately
built on a monumental scale in obsessively
straight
lines to be a spectacular
statement
of power Th e bridges which at th e start of a campaign the army was
willing to build with great
labour
across wide rivers like the Rhine
an d
Danube
served
t he p ra ct ic al
purpose of a ll ow in g t he army to cross bu t were also
indicative of th e
Romans
ability to overcome
nature
i tse lf as well as any
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e
marching camp built at t he e nd
of
each
day s march
to
a standard
pattern
security for the night
to
t he s ol di er s and
their
baggage.
Its
highly
appearance
an d th e
construction of
a f resh
c am p a ft er
e ac h d ay s
vance were highly intimidating emphasizing the steady relentless advance
of
army:
T he R om an genius wa s t o co mbi ne th e p racti cal
with
th e
visually
that t he army s
actions
were often designed to overawe t he enemy
a display
of
massive
power
before they
actually reached
him.
E
D EV EL O PM EN T O F W A RF AR E
volume is a bout Roma n
warfare
bu t
t here are
many aspects which
it
cannot
pe to cover
in an y d et ail . I t
would
be impossible in
th e
space
available to
ide a detailed narrative of all t he w ar s f ou gh t by R om e f ro m t he foundation
of
th e city to th e
s ix th c en tu r y
AD .
Instead
I
have
tried to trace th e development
of
warfare
w i th in t he context of th e
evolution
of th e army
an d state or at least in the
case
of th e latter
those
aspects of politics an d society connected
with
th e
military:
The
nature of
th e
army why
and w ith w hat
objectives i t f ou gh t a war and
th e
way
in which it operated a re d is cu ss ed f or
each p er io d a nd
placed
in
th e
context
of th e
military
institutions
of
the main
opponents
faced
in e ac h period. This cannot ho pe to be
a
full
history
of
the R om an
army
since
many
aspects
such as its equipment career and
service patterns
pa y an d
daily routine i ts r ol e
in the administration
of
th e
provinces or
th e
layout of its forts
and
bases ca n
only
be dealt
with
very briefly: The bibliography lists
fo r
each chapter
modern
works that deal
with
th e
issues discussed
a nd o th er
aspects of th e
army
in
this
period.
The
list is
not
exhaustive
an d
ha s
been restricted to works
in
English since a full
list
of
works on
th e
Roman a rmy would be
truly
massive. Combined
with
th e
bibliographies
of
the works mentioned however
it should
p ro vide a starting point for
personal study
into
a ny m or e
specific topic. There is also a
section
listing th e main Greek
an d
Latin sources for th e
period discussing briefly their style reliability
an d
usefulness.
Most
ar e
available In
translation and
will
b e ess en ti al reading fo r a
deeper
understanding of Roman
warfare.
INTRODUCTION
he amphitheatre at
Merida
was capable of seating
around 15 000 spectators to
watch the gladiatorial fights
and beast hunts staged in its
arena This is
just
one of
hundreds of spectacular
monuments sti ll to be seen
on the sites
of
cities
throughout
the
oman
Empire
hey
are just a
small glimpse of the level of
prosperity and the
flourishing urban culture
that existed in the provinces
conquered and defended by
the oman army
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H PTER
ONE
~ = = ~
@ : . ~ : = = ~ : I
E RLY ROME
ND
THE ONQUEST
T LY
THESE
TWO
ONE
PL QUES from Praeneste are decorated
with pictures
o f
Italian hoplites. Each man wears a crested
helmet muscled cuirass probably in bronze greaves tunic
and
cloak. They each hold a spear
and
have a
round
shield
the heavy oplon
resting against their legs.
None
of
this
equipment would have been ou t
o f
place in the phalanxes
Classical Greece.
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ROMAN
WARFARE
EARLY R O M E
A N D
THE C O N Q U E S T O F
ITALY
When the omansbegan to
record their own history in
the later third century C
they had only the haziest
knowledge
of
their city s
origins. By this time the
story of omulusfounding
ome
after the murder
of
his
twin
brother
emus
was
the most common
but
no t
the only version
of
these
events.
26
T
HE ROM NS
OWN
MYTHS
concerning their
origins were
dominated
by tales
of wa r
tinged
with a
good
deal of
pure
s v g e r ~ Romulus an d Remus th e
twin
sons
of
th e
war
go d
Mars were suckled by a she-wolf an d as
adults
gathered
a warrior band which supported itself by raiding. Th e foundation of the
city wa s stained by
fratricide
when
Romulus
killed his brother in a fit of rage.
Throughout his life Romulus
remained the
heroic wa r leader justifying his right
to
rule
by his conspicuous courage
an d
prowess i n b at tl e.
The
majority
of
th e
tales of Rome s early years recounted heroism in war. It is impossible
no w
to
know j us t h ow m uc h i f any truth is c on ta in ed i n these stories. The Romans
themselves di d
no t
begin t o w ri te
history
until
th e
en d
of
th e
third
century
BC
an d
preserved
very little reliable
information concerning
earlier events.
By
that time
Rome
wa s
already
firmly
established
as
th e
dominant
power in
Italy
an d
ha d
begun
t o e nt er
t he w or ld
stage. The
warfare
which
formed
a major part of
he r
rise to this
position
is the subject of this chapter bu t i t is important
to
remember
ho w
poor
th e
sources for this period are.
Traditionally
Rome
wa s founded
in
753 BC although a rc ha eo lo gy h as
revealed traces
of
settlements n ea r w ha t w ou ld become the site of th e future city
f ro m t he b eg in ni ng of t he l ast mi ll en ni um
BC . The
merging
of
several
of
these
villages into a single settlement
that
could be cal led a city di d
not
occur until the
sixth century
BC . The
site is a good one
with
easily defensible hills ne xt t o a
natural crossing
place of th e
River
Tiber
a n d c om m an di ng
t rad it i on al t rad e
routes
into
central Italy
including th e
Via Salaria th e Salt
Road running from
the
c oa st . R om e wa s j us t
on e
of several
Latin
communities occupying
an
area of th e
coastal
plain west of
th e
Apennines the line of
hills w hich f or ms th e spine of
Sixth-century
Rome
ma y well have been th e largest of all th e
Latin
cities bu t i t is unclear whether i t was also the
most powerful.
The w ar s f ou gh t by early Rome
consisted
of
small scale raids
an d
cattle
rustling
with
perhaps
th e occasional ritualized battle. T h e armies were
warrior
bands
formed by
an
aristocrat his ki n
an d
d ep en da nt s. T h e
leaders
were
not
commanders
with formal powers bu t heroes wh o led by personal
example
fighting as
conspicuously
as possible in
advance of their followers. The leader
fought
for
personal glory th e followers ou t
of
loyalty to th e
le ad er w ho provided for them.
The
successful
leader
wa s
th e man who could protect
his
dependants from th e depredations o f o t her w arri or
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EARLY R OM E A ND TH E
CONQUEST
OF
ITALY
T
he seventh century
Chigi vase was one
of
very
few attempts
by
Greek
artists to represent hoplite
phalanxes in battle.
Men
are
shown
advancing to the
accompaniment
of
a flute
player towards a similarly
equipped enemy phalanx
coming towards them. Like
the later makers
of
the
ayeux
tapestry the vase
painters encountered the
problem
o f
depicting a
formation
which
was
both
wide and
deep in a
two-
dimensional
medium
Their
solution was the same to
show the figures one behind
the other closely
overlapping.
an d provide enough booty to satisfy his followers. T h is t yp e of warfare has
in
common
with
that described in Homer s
poems
and wa s
probably
valent in most
of
th e
barbarian
societies of western Europe at this period.
A
major
development came
with
th e adoption of t he h op li te phalanx
a bl y s om e t im e
in
t he s ix th n t u r ~ Hoplite warfare d ev el op ed i n early
h-century Greece
an d
may well have spread to Italy via t he G reek colonies
th e southern peninsula. A hoplite
was
a
spearman
heavily protected by a
helmet cuirass greaves an d a ci rcular
bronze-covered shield
feet
in diameter.
Hoplites fought as a group not as
individuals.
in a densely packed phalanx normally at l ea st e ig ht ranks deep
cou l d exp ect to drive b ac k m os t o pp os it io n. Individual weapon skills
less important for a
hoplite
than maintaining th e
cohesion
of
th e phalanx.
warfare required
little formal training or discipline bu t it demanded a
m il it ar y e th os . I t wa s
n o l on ge r
possible for
aristocratic warriors to range
a
battlefield
entering an d leaving combat as th e m ood to ok them
ou t only those opponents they considered worthy of
their attentions
an d
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ROMAN
WARFARE
This sandstone stele found
at ovilara
in Italy
an d
dating to
the sixth century
C
depicts warriors
fighting The simple figures
provide few details
o f
equipment bu t one
appears
to be wielding an
axe whilst
others have spears
with
their main concern the
acquisition of
personal
honour
Hoplites
depended
on
the men
on either
side
of them
staying
in position
in particular
on the man t o
their
right offering
some
protection to
their
vulnerable un shielded side
The
rise
of
the
hoplite
was associated with social change an d the rise of the
city state broadening participation in
combat
beyond
the
aristocracy and their
followers Hoplites were
drawn
from those able
to
afford the necessary
equipment and
as cities
developed and
prospered this came
to include
a
much
higher proportion of
the
population consisting
primarily
of
farmers Such
men
were expected to fight harder for the state since as
men
of property they had
an
interest in its preservation They
gained
increased political power within the city
earning these rights
through
their obligation to fight to protect the o m m u n i t ~
This was the ideal of the citizen soldier the
man
who fought
no t
for pay
booty or
glory
but o ut of
civic
The domination of
the
hop
l ite class by small farmers
gave hoplite
warfare
at least
in
Greece a
peculiar
rhythm of its
own
fitting in
with the agricultural year Prolonged campaigning
kept
a farmer away from his
fields when they most needed his attention so wars tended to consist
of
a single
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EARLY R OM E A ND
T H E C O NQ U ES T
OF ITALY
of battle between t wo p ha la nx es . Battles
we re u su al ly
provoked by a
devastation
of th e
enemy s
fields
which
inflicted little actual damage.
rituals of hoplite wa rfa re in
Greece were those of th e
state not
of th e
w a r l ea de r an d
his
warrior band. Th e c ommunity forme d
by
th e
class
was
th e dominant force
in politics
as
it was
th e
basis
of th e
army
Two
of our main
sources
for
this period
Livy
an d Dionysius attributed
a
reform
of
Rome s
political social an d military organization to Servius
us traditionally 579-534 BC .
Th e reform
was
linked
to
hoplite warfare an d
e
archaeological record suggests
that hoplite
equipment
was
adopted
in the
century
th e
tradition may
be
broadly accurate. The
Servian
constitution
th e
population into classes
based
on an assessment of
their
property
each
s providing itself with a specified set
of
equipment - a full
hoplite
panoply for
s I
to
jus t a sling for Class
This
system
provided the
basis of
th e omiti
th e voting assembly at which t he p eop le elected consuls an d declared
until
th e
en d
of th e
Republic so ou r
sources may
have
been
attempting
to
struct the original reform
from their knowledge of t he l at er
political system.
Comitia Centuriata me t on th e Campus
Martius
th e
Plain
of
Mars
outside
boundary
of th e
city where th e a rm y h ad always
mustered
since citizens were
ed fro m carry in g w eap on s
inside
th e
Its structure exemplified th e
ideal
citizen militia
me n
voting an d fighting
t og et he r i n t he s am e
units. By
t he l at e
th e
centuries in
th e
assembly were
not of
a
standard
size
bu t
i t seems
that originally they ha d
consisted o f a bo ut
a hundred men. The presence
t hr ee d is ti nc t
types of heavy infantry
wa s
probably
influenced
by th e
that t he l ater manipular
legion
fought
i n t hree
lines.
It
is unlikely
that
degree of tactical sophistication
was
present at such
an
early
s ta ge i n th e
y s development. More
p ro ba bl y t he o ri gi na l
Servian
reform
wa s
much
an d th e main d is ti ncti on w as b et ween t ho se
able
to equip
themselves as
lites
an d t he mo re n um er ous r em ain de r w ho took th e
field
only
as
light
or servants. Th e former were known as th e classis the re ma inde r infra
Th e
original
classis probably
consisted
of
Class
I
po ss ib ly in f or ty
o f a ro un d
a
hundred men which might suggest that
sixth-century
could
potentially
muster
a phalanx of
four
thousand
men
a no t impossible
re given
th e
size of
th e
city suggested by th e archaeological evidence. At some
date
as
th e
city
g re w i n
size Classes
and III
were
able
to afford heavier
an d were admitted
to the phalanx their twenty centuries increasing
number of hoplites to six thousand. This reconstruction
remains conjectural.
E REPUBLIC
expulsion
of th e
kings
fro m Rome
may well have
been
part of
a
wider
series
an d
social upheavals
that
occurred throughout late
sixth-century.
an d Etruria. A t the battle of
Lake
Regillus 496 BC t he a rm y of th e
g Republic faced a
Latin
army
traditionally including the supporters of th e
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ROM N W RF RE
Many o f the heroic tales
of
Rome s early history
recorded in
Livy
ma y have
their origins in the ballads
composed
to celebrate the
deeds
o f
the
old
aristocratic
families
These stories are
often highly dramatic
an d
unsurprisingly offered rich
material for Renaissance
art. This sixteenth century
painting depicts the duel
fought between champions
of
Rome
and Alba
Longa.
Each side fielded three
brothers bu t things initially
went badly for
th e
Romans
when tw o
o f
the three
Horiatii brothers were
killed by the
Alban
Curiatii.
However
the survivor
oratius retreated until his
three wounded opponents
ha d
split
u p a nd t he n
slew
each in turn. Returning to
Rome in triumph the
Roman champion
fell into a
rage
when
his ow n sister
wh o was betrothed to one
of
the
Curiatii refused to
celebrate his triumph.
oratius horrified his
fellow citizens by angrily
killingthe
girl.
°
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E RLY ROME ND THE O QUEST OF IT LY
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ROM N W RF R
his fifth century Italian
bronze depicts a warrior
holding a round hoplite
shield. He wears a crested
helmet
may
have greaves
and carries two spears one
apparently with a larger
head than the other. Greek
hoplites in the Classical
period only carried a single
spear
and used i t for
thrusting rather than
throwing. hecarrying
of
more than one spear implies
that at least one was
intended to be
thrown
here much evidence
from Italy to suggest
that
warfare did
not
solely
consist
of
phalanx battles
fought at
close quarters
even after the introduction
of
hoplite equipment.
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EARLY R OM E A ND TH E CONQUEST
OF ITALY
Tarquins
Livy
d Dionysius
both
considered
to
have been a battle between
although their accounts
e a distinctly heroic
q u l i t ~
The
Republic possessed a
hoplite
lanx and
did
fight
pitched
battles
t no t all its wars conformed to the rigid
of hoplite warfare in contemporary
The Roman cavalry seems to have
ed a
greater
role
than was the
case
th most Greek armies
although
on
least some occasions horsemen may
dismounted and joined the
Our sources
depict most of
campaigns be tween Rome and
neighbours
as little
more
than
such frequent raiding
anathema
to the hoplite
In
479
BC
Rome was
ed by small scale raiding
neighbouring
Veii.
The
of
the Fabii led by one
of their
number who was
the
consul in that year
the Senate and
offered
to wage the war against Veii as a private
prosecuted solely by themselves their retainers and dependants
themselves on the borders the 306 Fabii patrolled against Etruscan
and
in turn raided the
e n e m ~ They were ambushed and
wiped
ou t while
on
ttle raid only
one
Fabius surviving to
carry
on
the
family
name
If
the
episode
genuine
and it
is
possible
that
it was invented
by
l ater Roman writers
to
ide a heroic
incident
mirroring the
last
stand of the three hundred Spartans
Leonidas in
480
BC
then it appears
to
have more
in
common with the
of
the
aristocratic
warrior
bands
which
it is
thought
the hopli te
had superseded
However
the
lands of the Fabii
do appear to
have
situated on the
border with
Veii and i t may be signi fi cant that the Fabii
pear from the Fasti the official lists of magistrates
for
the
following
lve years.
A striking feature of this
incident
and many other
campaigns was the central
of
the acquisi tion
of
b o o t ~
This
seems
to
have
been
a
major
for Roman
soldiers
and disputes over
the distribution of
the spoils
re a common cause of dissent in the Many of
the
earliest recorded
This statuette ofa naked
warrior
wearing a pattern
of
helmet associated
with
the Villanovan culture of
northern and central Italy in
the ninth to seventh
centuries C he tall central
plate was probably intended
to a dd to the
w e r e r ~
s
apparent height andm ke
him
more intimidating to
opponents Extant examples
of such helmets are heavily
decorated with
m ny
rows
of
small bosses
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ROMAN WARFARE
treaties between Rome and other states included
clauses precisely
detailing the
entitlement to spoils
in
any conflict
Rome
possessed a
phalanx in
the
sixth an d
fifth centuries
BC
but most of her
military
activity consisted
of raiding or
reacting to enemy raids types
of
fighting
for which a
phalanx
was completely unsuited Conflict between Rome and her
neighbours
varied in scale
from
minor
theft
or
destruction of
property
to
a full-
scale pitched battle when
two
phalanxes confronted each other Warfare might be
waged by the whole
populace under
arms led by the elected
magistrates of the
state
or
just
by
individual
clans
or
families following
their
allegiance
to
the
r i s t o r ~
Rome
possessed
a college
of priests known
as the
f ti l s
who
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EARLY R OM E A ND
T H E C ON Q UE ST OF ITALY
oversaw
th e
justice
of i ~ p u t e s with
gro ups
o ut si de t he community: When
these
had decided
that a neighbour had committed
such
great .
offences against
Rome t hat
war
was
necessary a
representative
of
th e
colleg.e
w o ul d e nt er enemy
territory
an d
present
a list
of
grievances which
if
redress
was not
m ad e w it hi n thirty days would
r es ult i n
the de cla ra tion of war. If the enemy
failed to
make satisfactory recompense
then
wa r
w as f or ma ll y d ec la re d
by
th e
ritual of a fetial
hurling
a
spear into enemy
territory:
This
process
ha s
been
t ak en t o
signify
that t he R om an s ha d
a
very clear
idea
of the distinction
between
a state
of wa r an d
peace w i th t he ir n ei gh bo ur s
bu t
it
ma y
have more
to
do
with d ifferent t yp es of
hostility:
The
fetials
an d
th e
other similar
priestly
colleges
in
Latin and
Etruscan cities
seem to have
regulated
th e scale an d limits of war
between
t he ir c om mu ni ti es
deciding
when
provocation required a response a nd w h at
th e
size
of that
response
should be
and
c ontrolling the
escalation of
conflict
from private to state
level.
Anthropologists studying the warfare
of
primitive
peoples
in
more
r ec en t t im es
have
discovered
similar patterns where
distinct levels
of
fighting f ro m r it ua li ze d duelling through
raiding to
full-scale
battles oc cur de pe nding on
t he s it ua ti on . I t is i m po rt an t t o r em em be r h o w
sma ll sca le a ll of
Rome s military
activity
was in
this
period.
Her
own te rritorie s
and population
were no t
large and
th e
neighbours w hi ch she
raided
an d
was in
turn
raided
by
on
such
a
regular
basis were often less than a d ay s journey
It
is sobering to re me mbe r
that
th e city of Veii with
which
Rome fought
series of
wars
spanning a cen tu ry
was
situated
not
much more than
away:
Veii was
captured
in
396
after
a
long
siege
th e
first
time that t he Ro man s
paid
their
citizen soldiers. Veii s territory
was
annexed an d much of th e land
tled by Roman citizens. The warfare of th e late fifth an d fourth
centuries
increasingly bitter
an d t he c on se qu en ce s f or
th e
losers
much more
The
peoples
of
th e coastal plain were
under
great pressure from th e
population
of th e
Sabellian
tribes
of
th e A penn in es . In th e
420s
ese invaders
swept
through
th e
fertile
Campanian Plain
taking
C ap ua a nd
Th e Gallic sack
o f Rome
in
390 had
little long term
effect on the i t y ~ s growth
but lef t a deep scar on the
Roman
psyche. Later
tradition claimed
that
a
band
of defenders
had
held
out on
the Capitol
managing to repulse a Gallic
night attack when they were
woken
by
the
cackling of
the geese kept in u o ~ s
Temple However even in
this version
of
events the
Romans
were
still forced to
pay
a
heavy
ransom in gold
to
make
the Gauls go away
and the tale of the geese was
most
likely an invention to
add
~ o m e
heroic
e ~ e m e n t
to
an otherwise humiliating
episode.
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ROMAN
WARFARE
A bronze figurine
of
a
Samnite warrior who for
over a century fought
Rome, winning several
victories notably at the
Caudine Forks Though the
spear and shield are missing
both
the
w r r i o r ~
s helmet
and
disc cuirass are matched
by almost identical
examples from
3
6
Cumae. Further south another Sabellian people the
Lucanians drove i nt o t he
territories
of th e G reek coastal
cities, while
th e Samnites established
themselves in
central
G allic tribes pushed down from the north putting
particular pressure on
th e
northern
Etruscan cities. In
390
a raiding band of
Gauls
perhaps on
their
way to seek
mercenary service
in southern
Italy or Sicily, routed a
R om an a rm y on
t he b an ks
of th e
River Allia
outside
Rome.
The
Gauls sacked Rome forcing th e few defenders of th e
Capitol to bu y
their safety
with
a
colossal bribe of
gold.
W he n t he R om an s c om pl ai ne d that
t he G au ls
were using
crooked
weighing
scales
to enlarge
th e
agr eed sum the
Gallic leader
threw
his sword on
t o t he
scales with th e stern
words
ae Victis ,
W oe
to
th e defeated
This
is just on e
of
t he m yt hs
that grew
up
surrounding
th e Gallic sack.
Others
tales did mor e to salve Rome s
pride
such as th e
story of
th e
sacred
geese
of Juno Sospita w hose
cackling
warned
th e
defenders
of
th e
Capitol
of a Gallic att ack and
allowed
t hem to
defeat it , or th e exiled general Camillus
wh o
returned at th e eleventh hour to
crush
th e raiders just
as they were receiving their gold. In p ract ical t erms
th e
damage inflicted by
the G auls
was relatively small an d
soon
repaired, since they do no t seem to have stayed in the city for
any length of
time or
carried ou t an y systematic
destruction. However,
th e
trauma
of
th e
G allic sack le ft a
legacy of fear
a nd h atr ed o f
th e
northern
barbarians and
may i n
th e
s h or t t er m
have
increased
t he Ro mans sense
of
vulnerability:
The story of Rome s
early history is on e
of
steady, if
often slow, growth i n p ow er an d size. Th e earliest myths of
Rome s history
show
a willingness t o a bs or b outsiders
into
th e community, an at ti tu de quite unlike
that
of most Greek
city
st ate s w ho
were
highly jealous of th e
privileges
of
citizenship. Slaves,
most of whom at this period
were
wa r
captives, received full citizen rights
when
they gained
their
freedom. Some entire
Latin communities
were ab so rbed i n to
th e citizen body, while others received
mo re l imit ed rights of commerce with Roman citizens
without
gaining th e full
franchise. This produced a
steady
increase in th e available citizen manpower_and
fostered military success. Defeated enemy communities were turned
into
allies
wh o provided t ro op s t o serve R om e i n future campaigns. In some cases conquered
territory wa s
settled
with colonies composed of both
Romans
an d
Latins,
establishing cities which
no t
only helped
to
defend
gains,
bu t
also provided
an
additional source of
military
manpower
for th e
future. In this
way,
an d
also
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EARLY
R OM E A ND
T H E C O NQ U ES T
OF
ITALY
receiving a p or ti o n o f th e spoils
Rome s
allies shared
in
he r successes.
were no t e qu al p ar tn e rs b u t no r
we re th ey e ntir el y
unwilling. Latin
agai ns t Rome b ecame less an d less c om m on a nd seldom united more
a few communities. The
last
serious revolt occurred
in
th e 340s BC bu t
only
proportion
of
t he L at in
cities
took
part
an d
by t hi s
t ime Rome
ha d
become
so
that
he r eventual success was never in
doubt.
The steady growth
i n R om e s
military manpower gave h er g re at advantages
other
peoples
so that a s iz ea bl e f iel d a rm y n ee de d to consist of only a
of th e
available citizen manpower. Such an a rm y
could
afford to stay
th e field for a longer period without this causing catastrophic damage
to
th e
economy an d bringing on
famine.
This and th e
ability
to accept
losses than they ha d previously permitted Roman
warfare
to
become both
determined
an d more
decisive.
It also
began to
change
the army into
more sophisticated
than
a
simple
citizen militia.
The
word
legio
or
meant levy an d seems at first to have
been
a name for th e
entire
of th e
Roman people. At
some
stage
th e
single levy of six thousand heavy
was divided i nt o t wo separate legions presumably of half this size. This
ang e may have b een
associated
with th e fall of th e monarchy
providing each
of
e
two
annually elected consuls
of
th e Republic w it h a n army.
It
is doubtful that
e
full levy
w as cal led
out fo r most of th e
s ma ll r ai ds w hi ch
still f or me d t he
part of warfare.
Th e Republic also experimented w it h o th e r colleges of
senior
magistrates.
In
veral years
between three
an d
si x
tribunes
with
consular powers
were
elected
of th e consuls. This reform was primarily caused by the political disputes
th e
patrician
aristocracy an d th e increasingly wealthy plebeians wh o
th e rest of th e citizen b od y
bu t may also
have reflect ed a military
to fi eld a number of
smaller
forces instead of tw o
l ar ge a rm ie s. I n
of particularly fierce political dissension
or
military crisis a dictator wa s
exercising
supreme
authority for th e six-month duration of his office.
was a more effective method of f ie ld in g a si ng le c om b in ed a rm y than
tw o consuls
w it h e qu al
a ut ho ri ty t o
work
together. One
of
Rome s
cherished stories was
that of
Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus the
senator
f rom th e
p lo ug h t o
become
dictator an d save th e city when t he a rm y ha d
surrounded
an d
trapped by th e
Aequi.
Cincinnatus
raised another
levy
e fe at ed t he Ae qui
an d
rescued th e army r et ur ne d t o Rome to celebrate a
umph a nd resigned t he d ictat orsh ip after fifteen days t o r et urn to working his
It
was
th e
classic example of selfless
devotion to
th e
s ta te . I t
is a striking
of
the importa nce of
th e
heavy infantry
hoplites
that a
dictator wa s
t allowed
to
lead his
army
on h or se ba ck . H is
subordinate
th e m gister
or Master of Horse led th e cavalry while the dicta tor stayed w it h t he
n phalanx.
Th e
organization of the legions
started to
b ec om e m or e f or ma l i n t he s ec on d
of
th e
fourth century BC as wars tended to
consist
less often of raiding an d
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ROMAN
WARFARE
rundi ie
l rentum
rium
1
5
miles
Tarentinus
so
km
J
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o
I
6
q
<:
e
Tyrrhenian
... p
Cl - Sw N
\ = j
Rome in the late Republic
CD TemplumJovi Capitolini
o Comitium with Curia Hostilia
o
Basilica Aemilia
8
Tabularium
o
BasilicaJulia
e
Roman conquest o Italy
265 BC
Roman
territory in 298 BC
Cl
Samnite
League 298 BC
annexed
by Rome 263 BC
38
Roman
colonies
by 272 BC
under Roman
control
by 270 BC
I
Carthaginian possessions
260 BC
r
~ - - - - -
/
\
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Co{st Ca
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EARLY
R OM E A ND
T H E C ON QU E ST OF
ITALY
easingly frequently of larger
operations. Each
legion was commanded by si x
litary tribunes, elected by th e
people after
311 BC .
From
at lea st this date there
normally four
legions raise d in e ac h year, so that
th e
standard
consular
army
of tw o legions. Its internal organization
became
more important
an d
e c ru de t ac ti cs
of
th e
phalanx
were
replaced
by
t he mo re
flexible
manipular
th e
legion deploying
in
three lines
instead of one,
each
line
consisting of
independent units,
maniples
of tw o centuries. The
manipular
legion will
discussed
in detail in
t he n ex t
chapter.
Its
introduction ma y
well have
been
through
experience, fighting
in t he rough terrain
of
the Apennines
during
three
great Samnite wars 343-290 BC .
The conflict with
t he Samn it e confederation w as Rome s last grea t struggle
a n I ta li an o pp o ne nt .
In
321 BC th e Samnites inflicted a disaster on th e
t o r an k alongside
th e
Allia rout,
when
a R om an a rm y surrendered at th e
Forks.
Th e
Romans suffered the humiliation
of
being forced
to
walk
a yoke of spears, an
act symbolizing their
loss
of
warrior
status. This
feat was to be
th e last in
which
Rome accepted unfavourable peace terms an d
th e
loss of a war.
It
was five yea rs before she renewed
th e
struggle.
295 BC
th e
Romans achieved a
g reat v icto ry w hen
both
consuls
took th e field
a combined force of
four
legions.
During
th e b att le o ne of th e
consuls,
Decius
M us , m ad e a
formal
devotio
pledging
to sacrifice both
himself
d the
enemy armies to
M o th e r E ar th a nd t he g od s of t he U nd erw o rl d i n
return
r victory, before
plunging to
his
death
in
t he t hi ck of th e
I t wa s
an
action
father
s said
to
have
performed in battle against th e Latin
rebels
at
Veseris
in
BC . The behaviour of t he R o ma n a ri st oc ra cy still
showed
some
traces
of
mitive heroic culture.
y t he b eg in ni ng of th e
t hi rd c en tu ry
BC Rome was without
doubt
th e
ongest power in As
Rome
had developed
from
small settlements
to
a
great
ity posse ssing a large c itiz en population an d controlling a l ar ge t erri tor y, s o i ts
had changed from the ritual battles an d
minor
depredations
of
warrior
bands into th e
larger scale,
more concerted campaigns of
an
organized,
p ai d a nd
controlled
by
t he s tate. These armies
were
capable of
rcing states
to become permanent subordinate
allies
of
Rome
or, alternatively,
destroying
them.
Roman warfare
was capable of inflicting
fa r
m or e p er ma ne nt d am ag e o n a n
bu t while
it
ha d
become
more
destructive
we should never
ignore
th e
nature of Roman
war
making.
Rome s allies were
tied
to
he r
by very
bonds
an d
if he r r ule w as no t entirely benevolent, nor w as i t e nt ir el y
th e allies also benefiting f ro m f ut ur e successful
wars.
Each
was
tied
to
Rome
than to
each o th er. Th e
cohesiveness of t he n et wo rk of allies
by
Rome
around herself was to be demonstrated by
th e
succession of
conflicts
fought against
foreign powers
in the third c entury
BC .
Despite the
h eav y l os ses s uf fe re d by
Rome,
v ery f ew of he r allies
responded
to her
blandishments
an d defected.
T H E RO M A N CONQUEST
OF ITALY
Rome ha d gradually grown
in size from its earliest
history absorbing other
peoples into the population
bu t i t was only in the second
half of the fourth century
that her expansion began in
earnest
Then in less than a
hundred
years the
Romans
defeated the Samnites
Etruscans the Gallic tribes
south of the Po and finally
the peoples of southern
Italy Defeats were suffered
in all
of
these conflicts
but
the Romans always
persevered an d renewed the
struggle until they achieved
victory Some land was
confiscated from the
defeated peoples
and
used to
establish colonies
of
Roman
an d
Latin citizens which
acted as garrisons in each
area However in most
cases the conquered states
were absorbed into
Rome s
network o f allies
and
in
their turn provided soldiers
to f ight in Rome s next
round of conquests
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H PTER
TWO
~ ~ : ~ : = = : ~
@ : . ~ : = = ~ : l I - . - - - - -
THE
W RS
WITH
RTH GE
ND THE
HELLENISTI
KINGDOMS
THIS
PL TE FROM
MP NI is decorated with a picture of a war
elephant followed by a calf and
may show
one of the animals
brought by King Pyrrhus of Epirus when he fought against
Rome on
. behalf
of
the city for Tarentum. This was the first t ime that the
Romans had faced war elephants and the animals played a major
part in Pyrrhus victories. However they were liable to panic
stampeding in all directions and often caused as much damage to
their ow n side as the enemy. This animal is clearly an Indian
elephant and is crewed by a
mahout
or driver and two javelinmen in
the tower carried on the animals back. Notice the goad carried by
the mahout who in some cases was
equipped
with a hammer and a
chisel-like blade wnich he was supposed to drive into the animal s
spine if it began to panic. Hasdrubal the brother of annibalwas
credited with the invention of this device.
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R O M A N WARFARE
T
W A R S W I T H C A R T H A G E
A N D T H E HELLENISTIC K I N G D O M S
N
281
BC
TH
GR K
city
of
Tarentum
in
southern
Italy called
on
King Pyrrhus
of Epirus for assistance in its w ar w it h Rome. Pyrrhus was th e greatest soldier
of his day raised in
th e
hard school of
th e
decades of
warfare
which followed the
death of A lexand er t he G reat an d
th e
break-up of his short lived empire. He was
something
of a scientific soldier
producing
several works
of
military theory
bu t
in battle he led as
Alexander
ha d
done
charging
spear
in h an d a t
t he h ead
of his
elite cavalry.
When he
landed
i n I ta ly P yr rh us
brought with
him an army of
well-trained
professional
soldiers
pikemen
an d heavy cavalry
supported
by
war
elephants.
At first
things seemed
to go well b ut t he battles
Pyrrhus
wo n
were
at
t he p ri ce
of
heavy
casualties among
his soldiers
coi ni ng t he t erm
pyrrhic victory for
an y
success b ou gh t a t t oo high a price. Despite these
disasters
t he Ro mans formed
another
army
to
continue the
struggle
an d
finally wo n a
great victory
in 275
BC .
Th e Romans ha d faced a professional a rm y u nd er th e greatest
general
alive
an d e me rg ed v ic to ri ou s. W it hi n t he
space
of
a
century
Rome came
to d om inate
th e Mediterranean
world
winning
tw o
massive struggles with
th e Carthaginian Empire
an d
then shattering
the armies
of
the great kingdoms
of
th e
Hellenistic East. Th e Greek
historian
Polybius
wrote a
d et ai le d h is to ry t ry in g t o e xp la in ho w
this previously little-regarded
Italian city
ha d
so
suddenly
an d
dramatically burst on to th e
world
stage. For Polybius
tw o
factors
above all else were funda mental to
Rome s
success. The first was
her
well balanced political constitution which gave
h er t he
internal
stability that
all
Greek
city
states ha d tended to
lack.
The
second
was
he r fine military system a n i ns ti tu ti on that we ca n at last
describe with some confidence.
AW R L PH NT
The largest elephants used
by ancient armies were of
the Indian breed, since of
the Afr ican type, only the
smaller, forest elephants
responded to training. There
some
uncertainty
whether
the African breed, used by
the Carthaginians
and
Ptolemies, were
equipped
with a tower, although
Polybius account of
aphia
implies
that
they were.
4
2
T H E
R O M A N
ARMY
IN THE
MID
REPUBLIC
Th e
basic
unit of th e
R om an a rm y
wa s t he
legion which
wa s composed of
five
elements:
cavalry
light
infantry and
three
types of heavy infantry. The
most
prestigious were th e cavalry or
equites
recruited from
the
wealthiest citizens able
to afford a
horse
an d its trappings. Many
young aristocrats began their
political
career by making a name for themselves in
th e
cavalry.
They
were
equipped with
a
round
shield
helmet an d body
a rm ou r a nd a rm ed w it h a
sword
an d
on e
or
several javelins. Roman cavalry were
enthusiastic
an d brave bu t
better
at
making
a
charge on t he b at tl ef ie ld than patrolling or scouting.
The
most
serious
weakness of
th e
Roman cavalry wa s
that
there were no t very
many of
them. Each
legion
had o nl y t hr ee
hundred
horsemen
divided
into te n troops turmae) of
thirty
each commanded by three decurions.
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TH E
W RS
WITH
C RT H G E N D
THE HELLENISTIC KINGDOMS
The
heavy infantry like
the hopli te
phalanx
was
composed
of
all
those
tizens able to afford
the
panoply. Unlike
the phalanx they fought in three
lines membership of which was
determined not
by wealth but by age
d experience. The
youngest
soldiers
or
hastati formed the front line. Behind
came
the
principes men in
their
late twenties or
early thirties
the
age
idered by
the Romans to
be
the prime of
life
and
in
the rear
were
the older
triarii.
All wore a bronze
helmet and carried
a long semi cylindrical
shield constructed of plywood and covered with calfskin to give it an
mixture
of flexibility
and
resilience. The
wealthier
men
wore
a mail
or
le cuirass
but
some
made do with
a simple
bronze plate strapped
in place over
chest.
All
Roman infantrymen
were first
and foremost swordsmen and
by
the last
These
Roman
soldiers
on
the
first-century altar o f
Domitius
henobarbus
probably give a
good
indication of legionaries
uniform
in the late third and
second
centuries C for the
frieze seems to depict a
historical scene. Both wear
mail armour slightly different
bronze helmets
and
carry
long oval shields. The
man
on
the right clearly has a
pugio dagger on his left hip.
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ROMAN WARFARE
t
nl
quarter of the thi rd century at the latest,
this
sword was the famous gladius
hispaniensis or
Spanish sword.
With
a
blade
less than 60 centimetres
feet long,
the gladius was well
balanced
for both cutting and
thrusting,
and its
manufacture
from high-quality steel allowed it
to
preserve a wickedly
sharp
edge.
The
triarii
carried
a
long hopli te
spear,
but the other
lines
already used the
pilurn,
the
weapon which, with the g l d i u s ~ was to be the trademark
of
the Roman l e g i o n r ~
The
pilurn
had a wooden
shaft
about 120 centimetres
feet in length,
topped
by
a 60-90-centimetre
2-3-foot
narrow
iron
shank
leading
to
a short pyramidal
point,
which
with
all the weight of the
weapon
beh ind it
was
designed for
maximum armour penetration. The
long
narrow shank gave it
the
reach to cause
a
wound
after punching
through
a shield.
The
barbed
point
made it difficult to
withdraw from a shield, so that the
enemy was
forced to drop it. Modern
experiments
with
reconstructed pila have suggested a maximum
range
of about
30 metres
100 feet ,
bu t
an
effective
range
of about
half that.
Polybius tells us
that each
man
carried two pila, one significantly heavier than
the
other,
but
i t has
proved difficult
to
categorize the archaeological
remains
so p r e i s e l ~
Each
of
the three
lines was divided into
ten
maniples,
those
of
the
hastati
and
principes consisting of 120
to
160 men apiece, whereas the less numerous triarii
formed maniples
of s ixty men. In
battle formation, the triplex acies,
or maniples,
were deployed in a chequerboard or quincunx, the units
of
principes covering the
T PILUM
The heavy javelin or pilum
was the classic
weapon of
the
Roman
legionary for
over five centuries.
ll
the
weight
of
the
weapon
was
concentrated
behind
the
small, pyramid-shaped point,
giving
it
tremendous
penetrative power, although
this was
augmented
above
right in a later first-century
variation
by
the addition
of a round lead weight. The
iron head was designed
variously to bend or
break
on
impact,
making
it impossible
for the pilum to be thrown
back by
the enemy.
nother scene from the
henobarbus
altar
shows
a
senior officer,
most
probably
a military tribune.
e
has a
muscled cuirass
and
two
rows
of
fringed p t e r u g ~ s as
decoration over his tunic.
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TH E WARS WITH
CARTHAGE
AN D TH E H E L L E NI S T IC K I N G DO M S
PUGIO
The Roman dagger or pugio
was issued to legionaries
during the Republic and
early empire
bu t
seems to
have fallen
ou t
of
common
use during the second
century AD I t was worn on
the left hip its scabbard
either suspended from the
sword belt
or
when two
crossing belts were
worn
on
a separate one. A few
of
these blades are as long as
35 cm although most are
nearer
cm. Their
scabbards were
often
highly
decorated
and
were perhaps
private purchases.
SPATHA
The
Roman
cavalry
of
the
Principate were issued with
the longer
spatha.
Its design
was similar to the Pompeii
type gladius but
the blades
typically measured about
60 90
cm in length
and
3 4.5
cm in width. During
the third and fourth
centuries the spatha appears
to have been adopted by
most
if
no t
all
Roman
infantrymen.
P O M P E U TYPE GLADIUS
The parallel-edged gladius
gradually replaced the
earlier type during the
course
o f
the later first
century
AD
Blades vary in
length from 42 50 cm
and
in
width
from
4.2-5.5
cm.
This was a well-balanced
weapon as capable of
delivering a cut as a thrust.
But i t
was less the quality
of
their swords than their
quantity that
gave the
main
advantage to the Romans. In
Spanish or Gallic armies
only the chieftains
could
afford blades
o f
the quality
issued to every legionary.
M AINZ TYPE GLADIUS
gaps
between
th e
maniples of hastati
while th e
intervals
i n t he ir
ow n
l in e were
covered by th e
maniples of
th e triarii.
The
triarii provided the legion s ultimate
reserve
an d
s pe nt m os t
of
a battle waiting
at
th e rear k ne el in g b eh i nd t he ir
shields with
their
spears b raced against the ground. They o nly b ecame involved
if the
battle
was
particularly hard
fought
and t he R o ma n
proverb
I t s d ow n t o
th e triarii wa s u se d to describe
any desperate
situation. Th e maniple of tw o
centuries was
th e
lowest independent sub-unit
of
th e legion
bu t each
century still
carried its own standard
or
signum
an d
wa s led by a centurion.
Each
centurion
was backed up by two subordinates the signifer or standard-bearer
an d
th e
second-in-command
or
optio
wh o
s to od b eh in d t he r ea r r an k a nd k ep t t he m en
in formation. At least at
th e
beginning
of
this period
centurions
were elected by
the legions but
appointed their
subordinates. Th e senior
centurion
stood on th e
right
of th e
maniple.
Th e last element
of
th e
legion wa s
t he l ig ht
infantry
or
velites.
There
were
normally 1 200 of these
armed
with a small
round
shield a bundle
of
light
javelins
and
at
least by th e early second century a gladius. They were
recruited
from
th e
poorer citizens
in
t he s ta te an d also those of th e
higher
property
qualification
wh o were
no t
yet considered
ol d e no ug h t o join th e hastati.
The
velites do not seem to
have
b een d iv id ed into
a ny f or ma l u ni ts
and
f ou gh t i n
support
of
either
th e
heavy infantry or th e cavalry depending
on th e
situation.
This
s
the earlier form
of
the gladius hispaniensis the
sidearm
of
the Roman
legionary from the time o f
the Punic Wars. The blades
of surviving examples vary
from 40-50.5 cm in length
and have a width of
4.8 6
cm. The long tapering
point
varies in size from
9.6 20 cm
and was designed to
puncture armour. A few
longer Roman swords have
been found dating to the
second and first centuries
BC
but it s likely that these
were used by cavalrymen or
mounted officers.
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TH E
WARS WITH C AR T HA G E A ND TH E H E L L EN I S TI C K I N G DO M S
This
gave
th e Polybian
legion
a total of
4,200
infantry
and 300 c a v a l r ~ In
of
particular crisis
th e
number
of
infantry might be increased to .but
is was done without ever
varying
th e
number
of triarii. The
sixty
centurions
d t hi rt y
decurions
were overseen by six military
tribunes
tw o of whom
held
command
of
the
legion
at
anyone
time.
Th e tribunes
were elected, usually
o m y ou ng aristocrats in th e earliest stages
of a
political
career. A
co ns ul w as
given
a n a rm y of tw o
legions,
bu t
in
times
of
crisis this was increased
to
In
a dd it io n t o th e Roman legions, each a r my i nc lu de d a
similarly
sized
of allies. About
4-5,000 infantry
an d
900
cavalry
formed
an
ala
which
commanded by officers known as prefects
wh o
were invariably
R om an s. I n
a
consular
army
formed
with
the two alae on either
side of a
centre
of the
Roman
legions, so
that
they were usually referred
to
as
t he L eft
d Right alae. A special body of troops
th e
extraordinarii was detached from
an d placed
at
th e immediate disposal
of
th e consul.
Often
used
as
shock
in
an
advance these
formed t he v an gu ard
while in a
retreat they
brought
the rear.
Th e Roman army
in this
period
was a
curious mixture of
a citizen militia
an d
professional
force. In many ways it ha d much in c om m on w it h the c onsc ript
r ai se d in
E ur op e af ter th e French
Revolution.
All citizens
possessing
above a set level were eligible for service. They served for
th e
duration
of
conflict an d
then returned
to civilian life;
they
were obliged to serve
t he s ta te i n
is way for
up to sixteen campaigns. While enrolled in th e
army, citizens
were
an d
fed by
th e state an d
agreed
to subject
themselves
to
a very
harsh system
discipline,
binding
themselves at a
formal
parade by taking th e
solemn military
the
sacramentum
to
o be y t he
consuls. This discipline no t
only dealt
with
behaviour in battle bu t regulated
every
aspect
of
their
service life. Serious
imes, such as neglect
of guard
duty,
the ft from c omrade s or homosexual
acts,
ere punishable by death with lesser misdemeanours
resulting
in a flogging. I f a
unit
disgraced itself
i n b att le
it
was
liable to
decimation
th e
execution of
e
ma n in ten. The survivors lived on
in public
disgrace, forced t o c am p
outside
e
defences of
th e
m ai n c am p
an d
fed
on
barley,
not wheat.
All
t he m an y
legal
fences a
Roman
citizen possessed
ag ai n st t he arbitrary
exercise
of
power
by a
strate in
peacetime
he
lost
on
entering the r ~ M an y o f the institutions of
e l at er
professional army
already existed
by th e second centuty BC at th e very
Th e
army s
discipline was reflected
in
on e of its most
famous
practices,
th e
of
a
marching
camp
at
th e
en d of e ac h da y s m ar ch . P ol ybi us
at
g reat l en gt h t he p ro ced ure
for
marking
out
t he camp
always
built
to
t dimensions with a uniform plan of roads an d tent lines so t ~ a t it resembled
an
c i t ~ On e story claimed that
Pyrrhus
first realized that
he
was not facing
barbarians when
he saw a R om an a rm y c am pe d for
th e
night.
The draconian
discipline
fo rmed o nl y
part
of
th e picture.
The
soldiers were
from the sam e
citizen
body
that
elected
t he a rm y s
commanders.
There
to
have
been
a
strong
sense
of shared
duty
to th e s tat e a mo ng b ot h
Legionaries on the march
from a first-century relief
found in the legionary
fortress at Mainz
On
the
right
astandard bearer
or
possibly
the
centurion
s
second
in command the
optio who carried as a
badge of rank a staff
hastile topped by an
ornamental
knob. The shaft
of
this
hastile
was used to
dress the ranks
of
a
formation
and in battle
when the
optio
stood behind
the rear rank
of
the century
to force men back into place
i f
they tried to run.
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ROMAN WARFARE
This scene from the altar of
henobarbus
thought to
show a clerk preparing a list
of names either as a census
of oman citizens or as part
of the process of raising an
army Polybius describes the
levying of
the oman
legions occurring centrally a
tribune from each of the
four legions
formed
to
provide the consular armies
picking one man in turn
from
the crowd
of citizens
who
had
been ordered to
assemble However
it
is
uncertain
which
period this
passage describes
the
soldiers
and their commanders. The
ordinary
soldiers possessed a freedom
to
address
their commanders
which belied the
rigid
hierarchy
but
reflected
the
political
life of Rome Throughout
the
third century
there
is no evidence
for any widespread
a ttempts to
avoid military service
Military and
civilian
life overlapped for all classes Polybius was full of
praise
for
the encouragement
the Romans gave
to
their brave soldiers At the end of a campaign or
after
a
great
battle a parade
was
held by the
army at
which the
individuals who
had displayed conspicuous gallantry were decorated and
acclaimed
by
their
comrades. Decorations included
ornamental spears or
horse
trappings
while the
first man over the wall of an
enemy
fortress received a
gold
wreath
the
corona
muralis Highest of all
was
the corona civica the simple
laurel
crown awarded
for saving the life of
another
citizen
For
the rest of
their
lives
these men
were
allowed to wear their decorations during state festivals to
the
admiration
of
the
whole communit : For
the
aristocracy
such
acclaim
was
a
major
asset in a
political career
4
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T H E
WARS
W I T H
C A RT H AG E A N D
T H E H E LL E NI ST I C K I NG D OM S
Th e strict Roman discipline an d
the institutions
of apparent
professionalism
no t conceal
th e
fact that
Roman
armies were impermanent and
of very
q u l i t ~
The
longer a n a rm y served t he m or e efficient it became. Some of
legions enrolled during th e
Punic
wars served
fo r
decades an d reached th e
hest state
of
e f f i i e n ~
A n ext reme
case
was th e tw o
legions
formed
.from
th e
of
th e
disaster a t C an na e in
216
BC
wh o
served throughout
th e
rest of
conflict an d
fought
with great distinction at Zama
in
202.
Some
of these me n
re still on active service in M a ce do ni a a n d awaiting
discharge
more
than
nty years
after
their
original
enlisting. Yet
once
a n a rm y
was discharged
it s
umulated experience disappeared. Individual soldiers were likely to serve in
e army again bu t they would no t do so
in
t he s am e units.
Therefore
each time a
army
was raised
th e
process of training and disciplining
it
began afresh.
t ho ug h each
levy
included me n with
prior
experience this facilitated
th e
ning process
bu t di d
no t
m ak e i t
u n n e e s s r ~
A wise
commander
took
great
t o p re pa re his army
fo r
battle training them an d gradually giving them
fidence by providing minor victories. Ha nnibal won his
greatest
victories over
an armies that were
under-prepared
for battle.
Th e
temporary
nature of each
army
meant
that t hey l acked a cadre of technical experts the
trained
wh o
provided
th e siege
e ngi ne er s i n H el le ni st ic a rm ie s. I f
th e
ns failed to
take
a fo rt if ied cit y by
surprise assault
or treachery
they
were
t skilled
at
prosecuting a formal siege an d usually ha d
to
rely on starving
th e
into
submission.
H E ARMY
IN BATTLE
manipular legion was designed for fighting pitched battles. Its organization
lowed it
only
one forma tion the tripl x
cies
with t he t hr ee lines of heavy
supporting
each o th er t o place maximum pressure on
an
enemy to
th e
When a Roman a rmy was close
to
th e enemy th e legions marched i n t hree
allel columns th e h st ti
on
th e left th e principes
in
th e
centre
an d
th e tri rii
th e
right. To
deploy
i nt o t he b at tl e f o rm a ti on
these
columns
wheeled to
th e
to f or m t he
tripl x
cies Each
maniple
had
to
be
positioned
carefully
in
to
its
neighbours in
its
ow n
an d
th e
other
tw o
lines
to
ensure
that
th e
front
was
properly an d uniformly supported. Even w he n t he army
had
mped o nl y
a few
kilometres
f ro m the
enemy
it still formed
itself into
three
an d
marched
to
w it hi n o ne an d
a
half kilometres or
less
of th e enemy
an d then
at
th e point which would f or m t he left of t h e army s p os it io n
to
th e
r ig ht a nd m ar ch ed a lo ng t he a rm y s i nt en de d f ro nt to fo rm th e
cies
It was a
time-consuming
process even
in
an
experienced an d
well-
led army the whole column having
to
stop an d wait as each mani pl e reach ed
appointed position an d closed up from marching f orm atio n into battle
before
it could
move
forward again. Deploying
a
Roman
army took
an d
required
constant
supervision
from
th e tribunes.
If th e
enemy
then th e ar my s d ep lo yme nt wa s c ov er ed by th e cavalry
perhaps
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R OMAN WARFARE
supported
by
some
of
th e velites
or
extraordinarii.
More
often
tha n no t
th e
enemy
was
to o
busy
forming
his
o wn b at tl e
line
to po se mu ch of
a threat.
Hellenistic
an d
Carthaginian
armies
used a
similar
processional system
of
deployment to
the Romans forming the
army into
a
column with
each unit in the
order it would
take
in
the battle
line Since they normally massed their
infantry
in
a single deeper line
they
t en de d t o use a single column rather than
th e
Romans
three bu t
th e
process was equally
laborious.
Th e marching camp assisted in this process As
important
as
th e
formal an d
fixed positioning of th e tent lines were th e spaces between them containing paths
an d roadways Th e army
used
these
an d
th e intervallum the wide-open strip
of
land s ep ar at in g t he t en ts f ro m t he ramparts to
form
u p i nto
the columns
which
it
used
to deploy the position of t he t en t lines automatically placing th e maniples
in t he r ig ht order Each of th e three columns lef t via one of t he f ou r gates th e
cavalry often using the remaining exit If th e army
ha d
deployed into battle order
5°
H ST TUS
OR PRINCEPS
This reconstruction shows
a legionary from the first or
second line of a legion in
the third or second century
C He carries one of his
two
pila and has a gladius
at his belt. A poor man he
wears a bronze pectoral
instead of a mail shirt
a bronze montefortino
helmet and carries an
oval semi cylindrical
body
shield.
TRI RIUS
This veteran soldier from
the third line
of
the third-
century Clegion replaces
the pilum with a long spear.
He wears a mail shirt made
from linked rings a type of
armour which the Romans
probably copied from the
Gauls. It was flexible but
heavy and he wears a bel t to
relieve some of the burden
which otherwise rested
entirely on
his shoulders.
VELES
The light infantry
of
the
third to second century C
legion were recruited from
the poorer citizens and those
too young to join the
hastati. This man carries a
bundle of light javelins a
round shield and has a
gladius
at his belt.
Velites
wore pieces of animal skins
usually wolfskins over their
helmets allowing their
officers to recognize them.
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TH E
WARS
W I T H
C AR TH AG E A ND
T H E H E LL E NI ST IC K IN G DO M S
t
no t
fought
then
it wa s able
to
retire
to the cam p
i n o rd er , e ac h
of
th e three
of
th e
army
beginning
with
th e triarii in
th e rear
forming
a column an d
back
to its tents
T he c he qu er bo ar d f or ma ti on
used
by th e
Roman
legions ha s often been
an d
few
scholars
have
been willing to
believe
that
th e maniples
fought
with
such wide gaps between them. If they
ha d done so then
no t
a
charging
enemy especially a mob of h o wl in g G aul s, have
swept
r ou gh t he ga ps
in
th e line of hastati outflanking each of th e maniples an d
them in
an
i ns tant ? It h as con vent io nall y b een assumed that, while th e
mans may have advanced with
th e m an ip le s in t he quincunx t hey fo rmed
an
l ine before they
reached the
n ~
Advancing
with intervals
between
a rm y s u ni ts
is more
obviously
intelligible Even on a
perfectly
flat parade
it very diff icul t for a unit
to
m ar ch i n a perfectly straight line
an d
an y
venness will
drastically
increase
the likelihood
of
veering
to one
side
or
th e
CENTURY AD
man wears an iron
ial Gallic helmet
and
e famous lorica segmenrara
armour
of soft
mpered iron plates
signed to absorb a blow.
t
all legionaries during the
incipate were issued with
s cuirass; harder to make
maintain than mail it
ve excellent protection was
and slightly lighter.
AUXILIARY INFANTRYMAN,
FIRST CENTURY AD
This
man
wears what
appears to have been the
most common uniform for
these units.
e
has a bronze
helmet probably a simpler
version of the current
legionary style a mail
cuirass gladius flat oval
shield and wields a javelin.
Such
men
fought in close
order in
much
the same
way
the legionaries.
LATE
ROMAN
INFANTRYMAN
This fourth century soldier
wears an Intercisa pattern
helmet
of
much cruder
manufacture than his earlier
predecessors. Scale
or
armour was worn where
available. The spear was
sometimes
supplemented
by
darts plumbarae) fastened
in the
hollow
of
the shield.
The longer sparha was
now
worn on the left hip.
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ROMAN WARFARE
AUXILIARY CAVALRYMAN
FIRST TO
SECOND
CENTURY AD
The non-citizen cavalry
regiments or alae of the
Principate were amongst the
most prestigious units in the
army. Highly trained and
disciplined they provided
the Imperial army with the
effective cavalry force which
its Republican predecessor
had often 1acked. The four
horned saddle can be seen
here. s
the rider sat down
his weight caused the horns
to close around and grip his
thighs allowing him to lean
to either side without losing
his seat. Cavalrymen wore
bronze or iron helmets
often completely covering
their ears to protect against
blows from the side in a
confused melee. They
usually wore scale or mail
armour and carried oval or
hexagonal shields.
52
r r 4 e .
. other. th.ere are no t significant
gaps
between
units
\ .: . ac:=;;;; advanCIng on a parallel course then they ru n th e
risk
of
colliding
with
each other disordering
b ot h a nd
maki ng i t
difficult
for
their
officers to control
them.
None of
our
ancient sources imply that th e quincunx
was
only
intended for approaching th e enemy an d that
t he g ap s
between th e maniples were filled just before contact. I n f ac t
for
the Romans to
have
halted an d changed formation
just in
front of th e
enemy
would
seem
a dangerous practice.
It
is
often
forgotten
that all of Rome s opponents must have ha d gaps
in
their ow n
lines to allow
these
to move. We a re
told
explicitly t ha t a t
Trebia an d
M ag ne si a t he C ar th ag in ia n a nd Seleucid
light
infantry
respectively were able
to
advance past f ig ht a
skirmish
in front of an d
then retire t hr o ug h t he
g ap s in their
ow n
main
infantry line. Polybius
tells us that
Pyrrhus mixed
clearly distinct units of his ow n pikemen an d
Tarentine
infantry
in the lines of th e m ai n
phalanx
while at Cannae
Hannibal s
front
line alternated
units of Spanish
an d Gallic infantry: The size of
these
units is unc le ar bu t Polybius
employs
on e of t he w or ds
he
a ls o uses for
maniple
an d which
was applied
by
later a uthors to th e
cohort
of th e
Principate.
This
m ak es i t
likely that we
are d eal in g
with detac hme nts of several hundred
men
an d
almost
certainly
less
than
a thousand. Th e smallest independent
unit
in
th e
Hellenistic
military manuals wa s th e
syntagma
of
256
men
which possessed
its own standard commander and musician. At
Magnesia
Antiochus left intervals
each
holding two elephants
between
t he t en 1 OOO-strong 32-rank deep blocks of
his phalanx.
Our sources
do not
suggest
that
t he R om an s u ni qu el y f or me d
a
battle line with
intervals in
it but
they
do
imply
that
the ga ps in
a Roman line
were wider than
was
normal.
One
reason why th e
quincunx
di d
not
risk disaster
was that the maniples of th e
line
behind
covered
th e
intervals in front. An e ne my
pa ssing through t he g ap s
between
th e hastati risked attack f ro m t he principes.
However
th e
whole
system
becomes
m uc h m or e
intelligible if it is c onside re d in
th e
light
of th e
nature
of
heavy
infantry combat.
Large-scale hand-to-hand combat
ha s
no t
been
a common feature of warfare
in
recent
centuries
an d
it
is
something that
is very hard for us
to
imagine. All
to o
often our mental
picture
of a c las h
between
sword- an d
spear-armed
lines owes
more to cinematic portrayals of spec ta cula r ba ttle scenes in w hi ch all
th e
pa rtic ipa nts rush
around fighting
frenzied
individual
due ls. In reality combat
seems to have
been
a lo t
more
tentative. Battles usually
lasted
for several
hours
an d t he b att le of P yd na i n 168 BC which
lasted
only an
hour
was considered an
exceptionally
brief
affair. Fo r
much of
this
tim e t he m ai n
lines
of
heavy
infantry
were in contact. Hand-to-hand
f ig ht in g w as
physica lly very
fatiguing
an d
emotionally stressful. Actual hand-to-hand fighting ca n
only
have lasted for very
short
periods an d
th e relatively
light casualties
suffered
in this stage of th e
fighting seem to
support
this.
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TH E WARS WITH CARTHAGE AN D TH E
H E L LE N I ST I C K I N GD O M S
Polybius Roman
legionaries advanced
noisily yelling their
war
cries and
ging their wea pons a gainst the ir shields. Most other infantry advanced in a
ilar fashion
t he a im
being to intimidate th e
enemy
by looking a nd sounding
Ideally this persuaded
th e enemy
that
he ha d no chance of
success
d
pu t
hi m to
flight
long
before
th e tw o
lines met. Somewhere
within
metres
th e
enemy t he R om an s t hr ew t he ir
pila
and t he b ar r ag e of heavy missiles
casualties
a nd f ur th er
reduced
th e
enemy s confidence.
The Roman
ha d a horizontal hand-grip an d i t w as i mp os si bl e
for
a man to use it in
an d a t
th e
s am e t ime gr ip a
pilurn in
his left hand. Therefore each Roman
must have thrown both
of
his
pila
before
h e r ea ch ed
th e enemy. The
of these miss iles was s o s ho rt t h at a ma n di d not have time to
throw
tw o
an d t he n d ra w his
s wo rd i f
he
was advancing
i nt o c om b at . T hi s means that
many pila
were
thrown outside
effective
range
o r t ha t
th e Romans
usually
their
advance
or
halted within
metres
of
th e
enemy. Such a
pause in th e
is
no t as imp laus ib le as it may at first seem. Th e ai m of th e advance
was
intimidate
th e
enemy
in to an early flight.
If
neither side managed
to
gain a
moral advantage over th e other
then
e ac h m ay have lost confidence
d been
reluctant
to close
immediately
w it h t he enemy.
Whether
or
not
th er e w as an i ni ti al check
most
armies with
a cultural
of close combat seem
n or ma ll y t o
have r es um ed t he advance and
th e
e ne my i n
th e first wav e of t he b at tl e. In th e resulting combat th e
HELMET
of
the
commonest
d e s i g n s ~
this
nze helmet offered good
otection from a downward
t. The cheek pieces
ected the face
without
curing the soldier s eyes
e rs A Roman soldier
eded good vision and
hearing i f he
s to function
s
part of a
lined unit.
COOLUS HELMET
This bronze
h e l m e t ~
popular
during the first century
was used well into the first
century D The reinforcing
peak gave greater strength to
the helmet
f r o n t ~ while the
neckguard gave
some
defence
against glancing blows
hitting the shoulders.
Roman
mail cuirasses were reinforced
at the shoulders to provide
further protection.
IMPERIAL GALLIC HELMET
These well-made iron helmets
had
deeper
and
wider neck
guards than earlier o n e s ~
that
gave more protection against
downward
cuts. Later this
pattern was developed to
reinforce the helmet top
with
two
iron ridges crossing over
the centre of the a
pattern seen clearly
on
the
reliefs
on
Trajan s
Column
and
the
damklissi
Metopes.
INTERCISA HELMET
A common design in the
later third
and
fourth
c e n t u r i e s ~ the
bowls
of these
crudely
made
helmets were
composed
of several pieces
- in this case
two halves
joined in the centre.
lthough
such designs
offered poorer protection to
the wearer most of the
Romans
opponents in the
west had
no helmets
at
all.
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R O M A N WARFARE
54
opposing f ro nt r an ks
hacked
t hr us t an d
stabbed
at
e ac h o th er th e
Romans
punching
at
t he e ne my
with
their shield bosses. W he n a n enemy was
knocked
down
or k il le d t he re w as a c ha nc e
to
step
into
his place
an d at tempt
to fig ht a way
into th e
enemy
formation.
More
often
than
no t
th e
ma n attempting t hi s was
himself killed, bu t if a few
men
m an ag ed t o w or k their way into th e enemy ranks
a nd b re ak
their
formation
t he n t he re wa s a real
chance that th e
enemy would
panic
an d flee. If
neither
sid e ach ieved this
after
a few minutes of fighting then
th e opposing lines drew back.
Separated
by
perhaps
as little as a few metres, th e
tw o lines then jeered an d glared at each other throwing any remaining missiles,
as
each at tempt ed t o build u p eno ug h energy
an d
confidence to step forward an d
renew
th e
struggle. Th e longer the
battle
went on th e
harder
i t b ec am e e ac h t im e
t o p ers uade
th e
line to close once mor e. Officers p layed a v ital role in urging on
their
m en t o sustain this effort. Centurions were elected f rom those with a record
for gallantry
an d
t he Ro man s
took
great
care
t o p rais e
an d r eward the soldiers
wh o
displayed individual boldness.
Compulsion
an d fear of
punishment
also ha d
a part to play in giving a unit th e s tamin a t o stay close to th e enem : Th e me n in
th e fron t rank t he o ne s wh o actually fought an d were in g reatest d an ger, ha d
to
stay
there
as
long
as
those in t he ran ks b eh in d
stayed in position since th e latter s
physical presence
made
escape impossible. A deeper formation gave a unit greater
staying power in combat by making it hard for most of t he m en to flee. So di d th e
presence
of optiones
the centurions senior subordinates behind
th e
rear rank
physically pushing
the m en b ac k
into
place.
The
longer
a
unit was
close
to
th e
enemy the
more
its formation an d cohesion dissolved. Me n increasingly followed
their instincts, th e bravest pushing to the front the most timid trying to slip away
to the rear, while t he majo rit y remai ned
somewhere
in th e middle. At a ny t im e
they
might
follow
t he examp le
of
t he t imid
an d th e
unit
dissolve
i nt o rou t
an d
this possibility
became greater
t he l on ger a u ni t d id
not
advance or seem
to
be
making progress.
Most
casualties
on
an ancient battlefield occurred when a unit
fled
from
combat. T h e ones
wh o
died first were those who were slowest in
turning
to
flee, so th e
men
in th e centre of a formation able
to
see little of
what
was going
on were always on th e verge of nervous panic.
Most
armies deployed with a sin gle main l ine, w hi ch as a r es ul t tended to be
deep an d
have great
staying
power
in
c om ba t. I n t he R om an
triplex ies more
than
half
of
the infantry
were
kept
in reserve an d were no t involved in th e initial
combat. Instead the
r ea r t wo
lines advanced in turn to join th e existing combat
at
later stages
of
t he b at tl e. Ideally, th e h st ti fought th e main enemy line to a
standstill
their discipline an d
th e leadership
of their centurions keeping
them
in
c on ta ct w i th
th e
enemy,
wh o
wa s probably
mo re n u merou s
an d in a deeper
formation. Then th e prin ipes advanced
into
th e combat zone, their freshness an d
enthusiasm urging th e whole Roman line to advance with a con fidence which the
enemy by that
time
might no t b e able
to match.
Th e skill
of
a
Roman commander
lay
in
committing
his
second an d third
lines
at t he r ig ht
t ime . I f
it
w as l ef t
to o
long
then th e h st ti
might
buckle under enemy pressure. Too s oo n a nd the value
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TH E WARS W I T H
CARTHAGE
AN D T H E H E LL E NI ST I C K I NG D OM S
adding
a fresh contingent of troop s to a combat might
be
lost
It was
eptionally rare for
t he Romans to withdraw an
entire line
an d
replace it
with
e from behind Usually t he t ro o ps
in
t he r ea r l ines were fed i nt o t he
c om b at t o
the troops
already engaged
In this context th e triplex acies offered a more effective use of an ar my s
Th e intervals between
maniples
were necessary to allow fresh t roo p s t o
th e
struggle W he n c o mb a t
between
lines
was
so
t en ta ti ve t he re w as l it tl e
that
an enemy would stream through th e
gaps
an d
swamp
th e
whole
line
Pydna th e
Macedonian
phalanx advanced to o fa r
a nd t oo
fast
a nd b eg an t o
e ak u p
into its constituent units
Eventually
th e Romans were able t o e xp lo it
individual centurions leading parties
of
men to infiltrate th e
p ha l an x a n d
ack t he helpless p ik em en f ro m t he flanks
This
only
happened
a ft er t he tw o
ha d charged each o th er a nd
fought
a
long
hand-to-hand combat. Even then
only h ap pe ne d t hr ou g h th e bold leadership of
individuals.
Th e ancient
ttlefield was a f ar m or e o pe n p la ce
than
is often imagined.
H E FIRST
PUNIC W A R AND NAVAL
WARFARE
was th e gre at m ercantile em pir e
of
th e we ster n
Mediterranean.
iginally a
Phoenician
colony its
language
culture
an d
religion remained
ntially Semitic
bu t
it
ha d long
been
on
th e
fringes
of
th e
Greek
world
Greek
theorists admired its balanced
constitution
which gave it th e
internal
itical stability which most city states lacked By
t he t hi rd
century
Carthage
The reconstruction of the
trireme t h r e e ~ ) nd its sea
trials greatly increased our
understanding of ancient
warships The trireme
proved capable of m king
knots in short bursts nd
could maintain a steady
knots for hours on e n d ~
despite the use
o f
modern
rowers unused to the ancient
techniques
nd
oars th t
were too heavy Under sail it
also reached speeds
of
k n o t s ~ ut wind power
was too uncertain to be used
in battle since ancient
warships needed to
manoeuvre quickly to close
with
the
enemy
to ram
or
board By the time of the
First Punic ar triremes
h d been replaced
y
quinqueremes
f i v e s ~ )
as the
standard
type
of
warship
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ROMAN WARFARE
/
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O E N
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Rusaddir
TL NTI
km
r
I
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d o min ated mo st of North Africa and
a
large part of th e southern
coastline
of
Spain. Like most city states, Carthage w as jealous of th e
rights
granted
to
its
citizens an d
h ad n ot extended
these
to the
vast majority
of
the subject an d allied
p eo pl es i n he r territories. Carthaginian citizen s were few
in
n um be r a nd
only
obliged
to
perform
military
service in th e face
of
a t hr ea t t o
th e
city itself.
Therefore Carthage relied on hiring armies of mercenaries whenever it needed to
fight a war on
land. The
city s wealth wa s
based
o n m aritim e tr ad e a nd th e
greatest permanent expense
was t he main tenan ce
of th e
vast fleet
c re at ed t o
protect t his. Ships
were
mass produced in
their
hundreds;
archaeological
excavation
of
th e site
of
a wrecked
Punic
galley revealed that its
timbers
ha d been
shaped and num bered
before
construction, each piece presumably
being
p rod u ced t o a
standard plan.
T hi s g reat fleet was
housed
i n t he h ug e a rt if ic ia l harbour
constructed
in
Carthage
itself
and other smaller
ports
throughout
Carthage s
territories.
I ts c re ws w er e
paid and many
of
th e city s poorest citizens
received a
s te ad y i nc om e f ro m r eg ul ar
service in
th e fleet. On e
of
the reasons for Carthage s
political stability was
that
its poorer elements were
provided
with a livelihood
in
this
The
First Punic W ar b eg an when both Rome
an d Carthage answered
a call for assistance
from
d iffe re nt f ac ti ons within the same Sicilian
c o m m u n i t ~
Throughout th e
r esulting twenty
three-year conflict t he fight ing was
to focus
overwhelmingly on
Sicily as each side attacked
t he o th er s allies
and
strongholds
on
th e island.
Although
t he re w as
much land fighting, this was
overwhelmingly a naval war, an d all
th e
decisive
moves
occurred
at
sea. Rome s first military
expedition outside
th e
Italian peninsula
wa s
also
to be he r first large-scale experience
of wa r at
sea.
T he g re at
naval
battles
of
Greek
history ha d
been f ought principally
by
triremes,
galleys with
three banks of oar s w ith a single rower to each oar.
By t he t hi rd c en tu ry
t he t ri re me
a
three ha d
been outclassed
by
the quinquereme
a fiv e ), bu t
th e precise
nature
of
th is s hi p r em ai ns o bs cur e.
Clearly it
ha d something,
probably rowers,
at
a
ratio of five to three compared to the
trireme,
bu t
it
is
no t
clear
ho w
these were deployed.
There
were
tw o
basic
tactical
options
fo r
all sizes
of
ancient
warships. Either they
attempted
to
grapple
w it h a n
T H E PUNIC W A R S
The Punic Wars were fought
on a larger scale than almost
any
other conflicts
of
Classical Antiquity.
The First Punic War
265-241 BC began
accidentally. It was
primarily a naval war
with
each side employing fleets
of
hundreds
of
quinqueremes.
lthoughthe navy had been
created almost from nothing
during the war it proved
highly effective winning all
but one of the major battles
and its main losses were
caused by the weather.
The Second Punic War
218-202
BC was caused
by
the a r t h a g i n i a n s ~
dissatisfaction
with
the
Peace Treaty of
241
BC
and
o m e ~ s overbearing attitude.
The war saw Roman armies
operating throughout Italy
but also in Sicily Spain
Macedonia and Africa.
The Third Punic War
149-146 BC developed
from Roman fears that
Carthage was once again
becoming a strong power. It
ended in the total
destruction
of
the
Carthaginian State.
56
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T HE
WARS
W I T H
C AR TH A GE A N D
T H E
HELLENISTIC
KINGDOMS
controlled
by
Rome
Roman gains by
201
Carthaginian gains by
218
Scipio s
campaign
218-210
Roman campaign
against
Macedonia
216-211 BC
movements
of Carthaginian
fleet 215-209
Hannibal s campaign
216-203
BC
Hasdrubal s campaign
208-207 BC
controlled
by
Carthage
before
265
Mago s campaign
205-203
BC
X site of battle
Charax
•
D
D
o
D
Second War: 218-201
Punic Wars
264-146 BC
First War: 264-241
-,-
/
Leptis Magna
.
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Yl-d.-S -
vi
Cartenna Saldae
• J
ship
a nd b oa rd it relying on the
crew s
numbers or
fighting
quality to
p tu re t he s hi p i n
melee or
t hey t ri ed
to
ra m
th e
enemy
an d pierce his
hull or
e ar o ff his o ar s. Although galleys were usually fitted with a m as t a nd sail th e
was to o u ncert ai n an
agent
of
m ot io n t o allow t he m t o fight
w hen t hey
di d
t
possess missile
weapons capable
of
inflicting
serious
harm on
th e
n ~
depended on
a
ship s
rowers
an d
galleys
were
effectively constructed
these.
In proportion
to
their
size galleys
carried f ar l ar ge r
crews than
sailing ships an d
nearly
all
of th es e m en
were rowers.
S pa ce w as h ig hl y
ed especially so on a
quinquereme
which
despite their
40 per
cent
increase
crew do not seem to have
b ee n m uc h l ar ge r
than triremes.
Th e weight
of th e
provided
much of a gal ley s ballast, making
i t unw is e
for an y great
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ROMAN
WARFARE
This marble relief from
Praeneste
probably
dates
to
the
first
century
BC an d
shows a
Roman
warship
w it h a t least two and
possibly three banks o f
oars Towers
which
provided raised
platforms
for observation an d missile
fire were usually a feature
o f larger ships suggesting
that this
ma y
be a six or
even larger On board are
marines with a variety o f
shield devices
one
which
appears to be a trident held
by a hand.
number of them to
leave
their seats at
the same
time
There was also very l it tle
space
available on a ship to carry provisions of
food
and water The result was
tha t not
only was travel by sea uncomfortable but very long continuous journeys
were simply impossible A voyage
of
more
than
a few days between friendly ports
was risky:
If
possible the galley was
beached
each
night and the
crew allowed to
rest
bu t th is was
only practical when the shore
was not
hostile
Most
naval
battles throughout history
have
tended to occur
relatively close to the shore
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THE
W RS WITH RTH GE ND
THE
HELLENISTI KINGDOMS
ely as a result of the real difficulty fleets had in locating each other in the vast
of ocean. In the ancient world thi s was an absolute necessity simply
the fleets could
no t
risk moving too far f rom the shore. Sicily provided
ideal theatre for a naval conflict because its numerous anchorages were within
ical range
of
the fleets
operating from home
bases in Italy
and
North
Africa.
Geography and the might of the arthaginian navy meant
that
the conflict
likely to be dominated by sea power
but
at the beginning of the
war
Rome
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ROMAN
WARFARE
60
wa s
not
a n av al p ower, largely b ecau se she
ha d
never needed to be in th e past. She
ma y have possessed a
small
number
of
ships, an d
some
of
h er I ta li an
allies
certainly
had
t heir o wn
navies, bu t they
could
not have
hoped
to form a serio us
rival to
th e
Punic fleet, especially since
it
is possible that no
state
in Italy a t t ha t
time
possessed
any quinqueremes.
When
i n 2 61 -2 60
BC
t he Roman s
decided
to
build
a hundred
quinqueremes,
Polybius claims that they copied
the
design of a
Carthaginian ship which
had
ru n aground an d been captured earlier in
th e
war.
Th e story is
one example
of
t he p ri de t he Roman s
took in their ability to copy the
b es t w eap on s
an d
tactics of their enemies, bu t m ay s ti ll b e g en ui ne . P ol yb ius
states that they trained t he s hi ps crews while th e fleet was under construction,
building tiered benches
on
land to practise rowing. Yet even with this training, the
n ew R om an fleet lacked th e experience
an d
skill
of
th e well-drilled Carthaginian
crews an d
th e
naval wa r
di d
n o t s ta rt well for
th e
Romans. Th e fleet s
commander
wa s
surprised
in h a rb o ur a nd all
th e
seventeen ships
w it h h im
were
captured
by a
Punic
squadron.
The
tactics of ramming
required
skilful handling
of
a ship an d
the
Romans
ma y have realized
that
they could
no t
match
their
opponents i n this, as from th e
beginning
of
th e wa r they were to rely on boarding
th e
e n e m ~ With t hi s i n mind
they
designed
th e Crow corvus , a boarding
ramp
fitted with a spike w hic h
stuck fast in an opponent s deck, locking th e t wo ships together. Once grappled
in this way no
a mo un t o f
skill
on
th e
part of
the Carthaginian crew
could
break
their ship free
an d
t he R om an legionaries swarmed across the bridge an d settled
th e
affair
w i th t heir
ferocity
in
hand-to-hand
combat.
Th e
new
device was tested
when the massed
fleets
clashed
off Mylae
in
north-eastern Sicily, 130
Carthaginian s hi ps f ac in g a slightly
smaller
number of Roman ones. Th e
Carthaginian
admiral,
commanding
th e
fleet in a shi p t ha t h ad once belonged to
Pyrrhus,
was
confident
in
his crews superiority
an d
attacked g g r s s i v l ~ Th e
Carthaginians did not realize th e purpose
of
the
corvi u nt il t he y b eg an to drop,
th e be ak s spe ar ing into their decks
an d
g rap pl in g t h em fast. Thirty ships,
including th e flagship, were captured by t he Ro man infantry, wh o flooded over the
ramps. Attempts to swing
r ou nd a nd
o ut fl an k t he Roman s were foiled w he n t he
Romans
turned
to face or swung their corvi round t o d ro p over either side of th e
ship. The
battle
was a total success for
t he R om an s w it h
between
thirty
an d fifty
ships
captured
by
t he e nd
of
th e
The prows rostrata of these prizes were
cu t
of f
an d sent to
decorate the
Speaker s platform
in
R om e, w hi ch i n time gave it a
n ew n ame.
In 25 6 BC t he R om an s r ep ea te d th ei r success at t he b at tl e
of
Ecnomus,
at
w hic h e ac h
side p rob abl y mu st ered well over 200 ships Polybius gives
th e
Carthaginian
strength as 350 an d th e Roman as 330 which, if
correct,
would
make
this
on e of t he l argest naval battles in history .
The
Carthaginians ha d
found no
counter
to th e corvi, bu t in t he n ex t y ears few y ears t he w eath er d ealt
Rome
a series
of
severe b lo ws
wh en t hr ee
fleets w er e
wrecked in
storms.
Hundreds of ships were
lost
an d
the drowned numbered
tens of thousands. Poor
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TH E WARS WITH CARTHAGE AN D TH E H E L L EN I S TI C K I N G DO M S
n seamanship
may have b een to blame, bu t
it
is also possible that
th e corvi s
made
t he s hi ps
less seaworthy.
Then
at
Drepana in
249 BC t he R om an s
their only d ef ea t i n a fleet action, a disaster blamed on impiety when th e
sul, Publius Claudius Pulcher, ignored th e unfavourable auspices.
W he n t he
ens refused
to
ea t an d
s o s ig nify d iv in e fav ou r ,
he
is
said to
have
hurled
over
the
side,
proclaiming
that i f t he y would no t
eat,
then
they
would drink.
Roman disasters an d Carthaginian exhaustion
brought
a lull, bu t in 242
BC
w ar was d eci ded at sea when the Roma ns,
having risked
the c rea tion of
fleet,
s mash ed t he l as t Pun ic
fleet n ea r t he Aegates Islands. In th e
peace
treaty
Carthage
gave up both her fleet an d all he r
ions in Sicily.
WARFARE AGAINST CARTHAGE
AND
E
H E LL E NI S TI C W O R L D
army was still ess en tially a citizen militia, bu t all t he g re at
powers
th e
Mediterranean
world
relied almost entirely
on
professional
soldiers.
In
case
of
Carthage these were mercenaries
hired in contingents
from Africa an d
ope, so that Pun ic armies were u su ally a
polyglot
of nationalities. Hannibal s
i nclu ded u ni ts
of spearmen
fighting in
a phalanx
an d
heavy cavalry from
wild
Numidian light cavalry
riding bareback,
an d
horse
an d
f oo t f ro m t he
of
Spain. To th ese h e later added Gallic warriors from northern Italy an d
p s s uch as Bruttians,
Campanians
an d Samnites from Rome s disaffected
s. Such
armies
were difficult
to control,
bu t
the longer they
served
together
r the s ame Carthaginian officers t he more efficient they became. Th e nucleus
Hannibal s army were
th e
troops t ha t h ad
fought
a series of hard campaigns
in
under his ow n an d his father s c om ma nd , a nd
this
long
experience,
with his genius an d
th e
skill of his officers, t ur n ed t he m i nt o th e highly
army
he
took into Italy. This
wa s
a force
capable
of
s uch d iffi cu lt
as th e
night
march
that
secretly
put
t he m i nt o a mb us h p os it io ns at
Trasimene in
217 BC .
Each Carthaginian army wa s a
separate
entity that
up a command
structure
a ro un d, a nd owed loyalty to, a particular
or
sometimes
h is family.
Each
national
contingent ma y
have
the relationship
in
a different way, pe rha ps owing loyalty to a great
wh o
rewarded them or simply t o t he p ay ma st er w ho
provided
fo r them.
ies raised at different times under different
leaders
di d not co-operate well,
it h as been pointed o ut t ha t
each
of
t he t hree
lin es d ep lo yed b y Hannibal at
was
formed
by troops
raised
separately.
Th e
first lin e
consisted
of troops
nally raised by
Hannibal s
brother Mago,
the second of contingents
raised
in
ica for th e defence of
Carthage,
an d th e
third
was
composed of
th e veterans
t he I ta li an campaign. While Hannibal spoke to his v et eran s i n
person,
he
ered their
ow n
officers
to speak to th e other tw o
lines. In
th e battle
itself
th e
an d second lines di d
not
co-operate well, Polybius even claiming that fighting
ou t between them
at
on e stage.
This portrait
bust
from
Capua has sometimes been
identified as Hannibal Barca
near the
end of
his life
although in fact we have no
certain likenesses of the
great commander. Hannibal
was only in his mid twenties
when he invaded Italy
but
possessed long experience of
campaigning in Spain under
his father Hamilcar and
brother-in-law Hasdrubal.
The
epitome
of the ideal
Hellenistic general
annibal was able to
control and inspire the
many different nationalities
o f
soldiers serving in his
army. Time after time he
was able to surprise his
oman
opponents always
doing the unexpected. e
remained undefeated in a
major
action until Zama in
C
6r
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R O M A N WARFARE
HANNIBAL S CAMPAIGNS
I N I TA LY
The
march of
Hannibafs
army from Spain to Italy in
218 was
one
o f
the
epics
of
Ancient
History
Between
218 216
Hannibal won
an
unbroken
series of
victories
at
Ticinus Trebia
Trasimene
and
Cannae
Somehow
the
Romans
absorbed
their appalling
losses
and continued
the
war
when any other
contemporary
state
would
have accepted peace
terms
at
this point
After
Cannae
much of
southern
Italy
defected to Hannibal who
was forced to fight
to
protect his
new
allies
Although never able to
defeat
Hannibal
in battle
the Romans
gradually
used
their superior
numbers
to
defeat his allies In 207
Hannibals brother brought
a fresh
army
to Italy
but
it
was a sign of
the
experience
the Romans had gained
since
218
that i t was
rapidly cornered by a
superior force
and
destroyed In 203
Hannibal was finally
recalled to defend Carthage
from the Roman invaders
and led his unbeaten army
from Italy The next year he
suffered his only defeat in a
pitched battle at Zama
bringing the war to an end
62
The
armies
raised by
M ace do n a nd
th e Seleucid
Empire
were far more
homogenous
being
r ec ru it ed p ri ma ri ly f ro m
Macedonian
citizens
or their
descendants
settled
throughout
th e
conquests of A lexander the G reat.
Th e king
still
fought
at th e head of his aristocratic cavalry as Philip an d
Alexander
ha d
done sharing the
dangers
with his army an d so j us ti fy in g his p la ce i n soc iet y i n
th e
best
warrior tradition. Th e me n were well-trained disciplined professionals
organized
into
units
with
a c le ar ly
defined command
structure controlled by
officers w it h g oo d technical knowledge of soldiering. Hellenistic armies were in
many ways more efficient
than
Roman armies bu t they were also more fragile.
Trained soldiers were difficult to replace
from
th e limited resources available to
each
kingdom and
very high losses
to
th e
army
might
not
be m ad e g oo d for a
g en er at io n. A lt ho ug h Carthage usually had th e resources to hire more
mercenaries it
took
a long time to give these the cohesion necessary to create an
effective
Th e
Romans were unique among
ancient
states in
maintaining
th e
principle of
a citizen militia
b u t t u rn i ng
it into a for ce capable
of standing up
to
a modern
professional
r ~ Roman citizens
accep ted t he
burden of a harsh
military discipline
an d
service in many cases f or th e
d u ra ti on o f
a war during
which
time
they
were t ra in ed t o a high level
of
f f i i n ~ Polybius claimed
that
th e
t ot al n um b er of Roman
citizens
an d
allies liable
to
military service
at th e
outbreak
of
th e Second Punic Wa r was
more
than
700 000. E ven if this claimed
total is to o large th e r eal f igur e w as certainly considerable an d allowed Rome to
end ure t he app al li ng casualties inflicted
on
he r by
Hannibal an d
still raise
more
legions as she had been able to
cope
with the equally terr ible losses suffered at
sea during th e
First
Punic War.
N o
o th er c on te mp or ar y st at e c oul d have
weathered such disasters
an d
still gone
on
to win the conflict.
Th e art of war in
th e
third
century
ha d
largely
been cr eated
in th e endemic
warfare
between
t he k in gd om s
created w hen A lexand er s
empire fragmented.
These conflicts wefe fought between very similar professional armies which were
highly skilled
but
could not
afford
heavy casualties.
The
objective was to gain
victory
a t m in im um
cost
an d
e ve n h ea vy l os se s
to
th e
opposition
were to be
avoided since it w as
better
to
capture
enemy soldiers an d recruit them than to kill
them. A wa r was wo n w he n t he e ne my
could
be persuaded that he ha d
nothing
to
gain
from
fighting
on
an d
so
wa s
willing
to
come
to
terms.
Most
conflicts were
ended
by
negotiation
once
on e
side
had
gained a
clear advantage.
A complex
system evolved in which
quite
minor details such as
th e
amount p ai d t o r an so m
prisoners clearly indicated which side
had
been victorious an d by ho w great a
margin.
More
seriously
losing
a
wa r usually meant
giving up te rrito ry a nd
perhaps
paying
an
indemnity
bu t
wars were fought
to weaken not
destroy
th e
enemy an d a struggle to th e death
would
have been in
no
one s interest. An enemy
was persuaded to concede defeat by putting pressure on hi m by raiding his fields
or
capturing his cities but more
than
anything else a victory in a pitched battle
wa s
th e best
way
to wi n
a war.
Professional
armies
were as
much intended
for
f ig ht in g b ig battles as t he h op li te
p halan x h ad
been being merely more
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Sulcis
TH E WARS WITH CARTHAGE
AN D
TH E
H E L L EN I S TI C K I N G DO M S
Hannibal s campaigns in Italy
218 203
BC
Hannibal s campaign
Hasdrubal s campaign
Mago s
campaign
major interventions of
arthaginian fleet
Scipio s campaign
site
of
battle
siege
oman territory
arthaginian territory
N
km
L a J
I I
0
miles
i st icat ed i n
t he ir a pp ro ac h. Th e theoretical literature on th e skills of
ralship which
began
to be
written
at this
t ime w as
overwhelmingly
concerned
h ow
an d
when
to
fight a battle. Strategy as it
would
be understood today
yed little part in t he w ar s of this period. Generals ma noe uvred to create th e
favourable
opportunity to defeat th e enemy
field army: A
battle was to be
ght whenever a commander was
confident
that
he would win
an d
needed
no
purpose.
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ROMAN WARFARE
64
Battles f ought between armies produced by th e same military doctrines were
uncertain
affairs, and an indecisive result with heavy casualties on each side was
useless an d d amagi ng t o
both
parties.
These conditions
produced a very tentative
style of fighting. Armies tended to move rapidly t o c on fr on t each other since
d ef ea ti ng t he e ne my
army
wa s t he ir m ai n f un cti on
bu t
then
became
very
cautious camping
only
a few
kilometres
apart f or d ay s or even weeks without
fighting. Often each side
marched out an d
deployed in
battle formation
every day
th e
tw o lines within a few hundred metres
of
each other , yet neither was willing
to advance
th e
fin al short
distance
an d
forc e a
battle. Frequent skirmishes
an d
single combats were fought between detachments of cavalry an d light infantry,
an d victories in these
helped
to
develop a f eeling
of superiority
over
th e
enem :
The
general s task was to raise his a rm y t o th e highest pitch of confidence before
exposing
it to
battle.
Military
manuals encouraged a
commander
to seek every
advantage however slight, ranging
f rom ensuring that
his army fought with full
stomachs
against an enemy
wh o
wa s
hungry,
o r t ha t th e
opposition fought
with
t he s un in their eyes. Such factors di d
no t
in themselves determine
the outcome
of
a battle but each additional
advantage
gave an army another edge over th e
opposition. There were times
during th e latter
stages
of
th e
First Punic
War in
Sicily when
th e
rival armies w atched each other for months on end only moving
t heir p os it io ns w hen
they ran
ou t
of
food. Professional armies unlike hoplites,
di d not have to return to gath er th e h ar ve st s o t he re w as no limit to t he t im e
spent manoeuvring if
neither
side saw th e chance
of
a favourable battle.
The
Romans
h ad t ur ne d
their citizen militia into a forc e capable of facing
professional armies bu t
Polybius still saw them as rather
old-fashioned
in
their
straightforward
an d
o pe n a pp ro ac h to warfare. They expected battles to be
almost
as
simple
as th e
ol d
hoplite clashes,
an d showed
a willingness to fight
immediately even if the conditions were
not
ideal. Both Pyrrhus an d Hannibal
outclassed
th e first
Roman
commanders
sent against t he m a nd
brought
them
to
battle
at
th e
time an d
place of t heir o wn choosing. Hannibal s great victories of
218-216 BC
were
fought on o p en g rou n d
which favoured his numerically
superior
cavalry an d exploited th e varying attributes
of
his
infantry
contingents
with
great
skill , especially at Cannae. One
reason
for
th e
poor
showing
of
Roman
commanders
was
that
they
found
themselves
in
charge
of
fa r larger
armies
than
most
would
have experienced previousl : To confront Hannibal t he t wo consuls
co mb i ned t h ei r
armies
mustering
four
legions
in
218
BC an d
a massive total
of
e ig ht i n 216 BC. It ha d been very rare for both consuls to unite their forces in the
past an d
this was reflected in th e
d ho
command
structure
adopted whereby th e
tw o
me n
commanded on alternate days. This
combined
with the great numbers
of
troops
involved,
tended to
mak e t hei r
movements
erratic
a nd r at he r
clums :
Polybius r epresents Hannibal s victories as g re at ly e as ed by this divided
command which produced
fiercely divided councils, although
it
is possible
that
t he se p as sa ge s a re i nf lu en ce d
by his desire
t o e xo ne ra te th e
ancestors
of
his
patron
Scipio Aemilianus
from
responsibility for these disasters.
Although
often
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TH E
WARS WITH C AR TH A GE A ND
TH E
H E L L EN I S TI C K I N GD O M S
by more skilful opponents Roman
armIes
were stil l tough
wh o continued
fighting
long after m ost
other
armies would have
eded defeat In
part
this was a
result of th e
harsh
military
discipline
which
icted such severe penalties
on
soldiers wh o fled even f ro m t he
most
desperate
Th e survivors
of
Cannae were formed into tw o legions that were exiled
Italy an d
sent
to fight for th e duration of th e war
in
Sicily an d Africa Th e
triplex acies
contributed
to
th e
resilience of Roman legions even
in
defeat
their
forma tion de pth
and providing
reserve troops throughout th e line
far lower than
th e
massive casualties
Hannibal
inflicted
on t he armies
destroyed
at
Trebia
Trasimene
an d Cannae his o wn men suffered heavily as
Romans fought to th e last Th e casualties Pyrrhus
suffered
i n d efeat in g th e
ans became proverbial
Realizing that no Roman army
was
yet
capable
of defeating Hannibal
in
on e Roman commander
Quintus Fabius Maximus inaugurated a
policy
avoiding battle altogether
earning
himself th e n ick nam e t he Delayer
R om an a rm y s had ow ed th e movements of Hannibal s army
ich was unable to feed itself by foraging o ff t he land
if
i t d id no t keep moving
ving it an d
harassing isolated detachments
bu t
never
risking
a battle
in
save
th e most
favourable circumstances
Th e
fields
of th e Romans an d
allies were raided cities taken by surprise an d some
of
Rome s allies
to th e enemy bu t Hannibal failed in over a decade of operations to
ict so much damage that t he R om an s were forced to admit
defeat.
Fabius
icy was logical fully
i n k eepi ng
w i th t he m il it ar y science of th e
period
an d
tely successful
bu t
i t was unpopular with
t he Romans
an d
more than
on e
his subordinates rejected
caution
an d
attacked
Hannibal only
to
receive a
re handling Th e Roman
instinct
was sti ll for immediate open confrontation
The dusty plain of Cannae
today is peaceful and it is
very hard to imagine the
carnage of 2
August
216
when over
50 000
men were
killed in an area
of
only a
few square miles. The white
buildings
on
the horizon
mark
the most probable
location for Hannibafs
camp. In the
middle
distance the line of trees
and
bushes
mark
the
modern
line of the River
Aufidius but the course of
the river in 216
is
unknown
OVERLEAF:
CANNAE
Hannibafs victory at
Cannae was his greatest
achievement. In an open
plain he encircled and
destroyed a numerically
superior Roman army
killing nearly 50 000
men
and capturing around
20 000 more for the loss of
5 700 of his own men. It
is
now
uncertain on which
bank
of
the River
Aufidius
the battle was fought. This
map shows the
modern
course of the river.
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The remaining Roman cavalry are
driven from the field
[ heCarthaginian centre comes under
intense pressure from th legions and
forced back. Hannibal e n o ~ g e s
t hemin per on a n d p ut s up. a hard
t before they withdraw. Th e
Romans surge into the gap finally
created
t
Punic line reserve
ma iples being committed
to support the apparent success
The Roman formation loses its order
asa crowd
of
men packs forward into
the enemy centre. ManigJes merge
into one hu crowd. Hannibal now
orders hisAfrican inIantr:y t o t u rn
inwards
and
advance against the
Roman flanks
TH E W RS WITH C RTH GE
ND
TH E
H E L L EN I S TI C K I N G DO M S
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ROMA
WARFARE
Hannibal draws
up his
army
into battle formation:
elephants the f r ont two
lines
of
less experienced
troops and
his veterans at
the r e ar with
Numidian
cavalry
on t he
wings
Scipio s army also drawn up in thre e
l ine The
maniples are not
in
the usual
2
chequerboard formation
bu t
behind
those in the line ahead creating lanes
through the Roman army
ZAMA
tZama Hannibal was
faced
with
a well trained
Roman
army under
the
command
of the
highly
gifted Scipio. The result
was a slogging match far
less tactically subtle
than
his
earlier battles.
Outnumbered
in cavalry Hannibal
attempted
to
wear down
the
Roman infantry first
with
a
charge from his large force
of elephants then
by
forming
his foot
into
three
lines keeping his Italian
veterans in reserve. Scipio
negated each of these
threats in turn and the battle
was finally decided
by
the
return of the Roman cavalry.
68
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TH E
WARS WITH C AR TH A GE A N D
TH E
H E L L EN I S TI C K I N GD O M S
Th e legions pushing forward begin
to wear y. At this critical moment
the Roman cavalry return to th e
battle attacking the Carthaginians
f ro m t he rear Fo r
Hannibal
and
his veterans it
w as t he e nd
T h e R o ma n legions advance
an d
the Hastati drive back the first
Carthaginian line With the
support of the Principe they then
defeat the second line Hannibal s
veterans remain in position and
Scipio
reforms
his
inf antry into
a
single phalanx before
advancing
against them
Th e
Roman
cavalry then advance
chasing
Hannibal s
less numerous
force f ro m t he field
with
th e enemy an d this di d
produce
s om e g re at successes against
other
Carthaginian
commanders an d t he I ta li an states an d
Ga ll ic tr ibe s wh ic h
ha d
defected
t o H an ni ba l. As th e
wa r
progressed the
R om an a rm y
an d
its commanders
b ecame mo re
an d
more
experienced. The greatest of this ne w
generation of
commanders
was
Publius Cornelius Scipio wh o
would
earn
himself t he n am e
Africanus.
Commanding th e
R om an a rm y
in
Spain from 9
onwards Scipio displayed all the skills of an army
commander
i n t he H el leni st ic
tradition
utterly outmanoeuvring
his
T he elephant attack fails when
the animals are driven back
by maniples or pass harmlessly
through the lanes in t he R o m an
army
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ROMAN WARFARE
Philip
V of
Macedon- s
concern with the
growth
of
oman influence on the
Illyrian coast led
him
to
make an alliance with
Hannibal during the Second
Punic War an aggressive act
which the
omans
never
forgave.
lthough
their first
expedition
to Macedonia
achieved little it was only a
short time after the
conclusion
of
peace
with
Carthage
that
the omans
decided to send another
army.
t
Cynoscephalae in
197 C the omans under
Flaminius destroyed Philip- s
Macedonia n regulars.
Carthaginian opponent
at Ilipa, before going
on
to
lead
t he R om an invasion of
Africa which brought
about th e
recall of Hannibal
from
Italy an d his first an d
final
defeat
in a pitched battle a t Z am a in 202
BC .
Rome s involvement in the Hellenistic world led directly
on
f ro m t he Second
Punic War. Philip of Ma ce don ha d allied himself with Carthage
during
Rome s
darkest
hour
when
Hannibal
wa s rampaging
through
Italy, an d the Romans were
quick
to remember this
after
Carthage s defeat, declaring wa r in 200 BC despite
initial popular resistance to
s ta rt in g a no th er w ar
so s oo n. R om e
had
fielded
massive armies in
th e
struggle with
Carthage
bu t
most
of these were demobilized
an d th e armies
which
f ou gh t i n th e east
reverted
to th e traditional size
of
tw o
legions
p lu s t wo
allied alae under
th e
command
of
a consul.
These
armies were
conventional
in
size,
but
no t
in
the men who composed them. All
had
served
through
t he b it ter struggle
with
Carthage serving f ar m or e years against tougher
opposition than an y
earlier
generation of
Romans.
These
armies along
with
those of Scipio i n t he l at er years of th e Punic War, were th e best ever produced by
th e
Republican
city militia. Officers
an d
me n all knew their
jo b
through
long
experience.
Th e heavy casualties of th e war
w i th H a nn ib al
ha d
res ul ted i n
th e
Senate being replenished
by
men cho sen
because of
conspicuous military service,
lowering
th e age bu t increasing th e
experience
of
th e
body
w hi ch p ro vi de d t he a rm y s s en io r officers.
Roman
armies
of th e early second century BC w er e a s well
trained
an d disciplined an d
at
least as eff icient as an y of th e professional
armies
they faced. Their tactical system was, however, very different.
H el leni st ic armi es were based around th e heavy infantry of th e
phalanx. T he p ha la nx
was
no longer composed of
hoplites
bu t of
pikemen me n wielding t he t wo -h an de d sarissa s pe ar , w hi ch
sometimes
reached
a
length of
6.4
metres 2
feet .
Phalanxes formed at least
eight
ranks
deep,
an d
often deeper, th e Seleucids at Magn es ia i n 190
BC
deploying in thirty
tw o
ranks. Such
depth
gave th e phalanx
tremendous staying
power
in combat
an d th e hedge of spearpoints five of which
projected
in front of each ma n in t he
first
rank
m ad e i t very difficult for an e ne my t o f ig ht hi s wa y in f ro m t he f ro nt
The long pikes themselves also tended to keep
t he ran ks
in place an d
make
su ch a
phalanx less subject
to
the degeneration of cohesion an d f or ma ti on t o which
most
units
were
subject
in combat. A phalanx
was
very hard for
th e
enemy to
break bu t it wa s more likely
to
wi n a melee by its s ta yi ng power
than
its
actual
fighting qualities.
It
w as also dif ficult f or
it
to move over
anything
bu t
th e
flattest
terrain without
losing
its order.
In Alexander s
army th e
p h al an x h ad
only ever
been intended
t o p in
t h e enemy
an d
subject hi m
to
a steady pressur e, th e decisive
c ha rge b ein g
a lway s d el ive re d by th e v l r ~ By th e early s ec on d c en tu ry
Hellenistic armies were
not
capable
of
fielding the numbers of cavalry seen in the
armies of Philip an d Alexander; good hor ses, just as
much
as citizen manpower,
were always in
short
As a re sul t they
had
come to rely more an d more on
th e
phalanx
to
wi n
the battle
a task f or w hich
it
ha d never r eally been suited. To
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TH E WARS WITH
CARTHAGE AND
TH E
HELLENISTIC KINGDOMS
This terracotta statuette
depicts an Indian elephant
in the service of one of the
Hellenistic kingdoms. A
tower carried
on
the
animal s back
but
no
crewman visible in it. The
elephant itself rather than
the crew, was the main
weapon trampling
down
the
enemy
ranks and, as
here, grasping soldiers
with
its trunk The crew added to
the force of the attack
by
throwing missiles,
but
their
main
role was to protect the
elephant from enemy light
infantrymen, whose missiles
might wound or panic it .
Polybius description
of
the
battle
of
Raphia in
217
BC
claims that elephants fought
each other
by
butting their
heads together and pushing.
Once unbalanced
and
its
trunk pushed aside, the
opposing elephant
would
be
gored by the victors tusks.
it and gain
an
edge in wars
often
fought
against
nearly identical
monarchs experimented with gimmick weapons
such
as scythed
and war elephants The
chariots
were rarely effective while the
elephants
did
win
some spectacular
successes were very
much
a
two edged sword
g inclined to panic
and
trample
both
armies indiscriminately:
Hellenistic armies
formed
with virtually all
their
units
in
a single line
centred
und the
deepest possible infantry phalanx. They were commanded by a king
ose role it was to charge
at
the head of his cavalry in the
manner
of Alexander
commander fighting
in
this way could no t have hoped to control t roops kept
in
he
would have
been
able to see only what
was
happening and
the troops immediately
around
him. The
aim of a
commander was to
loy his army in such a way as
to
pu t steady pressure on the whole enemy line
leading in person an irresistible hammer blow at a single point. The
system of
deploying
the legions
in three
lines ensured
that
much of the
was
k ept in
reserve
At
both Cynoscephalae
in
197
BC and
Magnesia
in
BC the Roman line was broken
at
one point but the situation was restored by
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ROMAN WARFARE
Th e Army of Lucius Scipio
turmae
cavalry
Latin
3 Roman legion
Roman legion
5
Latin
peltasts 3 000
7 cavalry 3 000
fresh
troops
from th e rear lines Interestingly in
both
cases the reserves were
brought
up by a relatively
junior Roman
officer acting on his own initiative an
indication
of
the high quality of the Roman officer corps at this
period
Once the
Romans created a breakthrough in the
enemy
line reserve troops were available
to
exploit the
gap
bu t their
Hellenistic
opponents lacked
both the
reserve
troops
and
the
command structure to control
them
The manipular legion was flexible
while
the
phalanx was not and this proved
the
decisive
factor
in a clash between
the two especially at Cynoscephalae an d
Pydna
both of which
occurred
accidentally
and
were
disorganized
affairs
Another distinction
between
the two
armies
was that while the Romans had
adopted
the
Th e Army of Antiochus
Dahae
cavalry 1 200
light infantry 4 700
2
argyraspides infantry 10 000
cataphracts cavalry 3 000
agema cavalry 1 000
regia cavalry 1 000
cataphracts
cavalry 3 000
Galatian
cavalry 2 500
Galatians 1 500
Tarentines
cavalry 500
Phalangites 16 000
Seleucid chariots
7
Galatians 1 500
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TH E WARS
WITH CARTHAGE AN D TH E H E L L EN I S TI C K I N G DO M S
battle of Magnesia was
ught after nearly
two
of cautious
the rival
attempted
to gain an
omans
gradually camped further
and further forward and
deployed their battle line so
close to the Seleucids that
ntiochus
the Great was
forced to fight The oman
armies which fought against
Antiochus attacks with agema
an d
cataphr acts and br eaks
through
the
Roman legion He leads
the
cavalry
on
to
the Roman
camp
bu t is
checked by the Roman guards left
outside the cam p. A tribune Lepidus
m anages to r e-f orm enough of the
routed legion to drive h im b a ck
Th e
Seleucid
chariots attack
bu t
are
driven
off
by missile fire
They
retreat causing some
disorder
to
their own forces T h e R o ma n
cavalry advance
an d
drive the Syrian
cavalry t o t he r ea r
the Hellenistic
kingdoms
in
the early second century
were exceptionally
experienced well trained
and
led
by
men who
had
learned their trade in the
hard school of the war with
Hannibal
T h e R o ma n
infantry
closes
w i th t h e
phalanx and its
supporting
3 elephants dr iving back the Seleucid
skirmishes Although
under
pressure the phalanx stands firm
However confusion is caused in the
phalanx
w h en s o me
of
the elephants
p an ic a nd w he n t he
Roman cavalry
r etur n and
attack its flanks
and
rear
This combined
with
the pressure
f ro m t h e legions is too m u ch a n d
Antiochus centre dissolves the rout
73
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R O M A N WARFARE
74
organization an d discipline of a
modern
civilized army they still fought with
great s v g e r ~ Alexander s
me n
ha d
been as ferocious as this in
their
campaigns
against
th e
Persians bu t
th e
conflicts between the culturally an d militarily similar
armies of his Successors
had
made Hellenistic warfare
rather
more genteel
At
Cy no sceph alae t he d efeated
Macedonian
pikemen
stood
h ol di ng t heir pikes
upright to signify their surrender bu t were c ut d ow n by th e legionaries Only
after someone
ha d
explained w ha t t he gesture m ea nt t o th e Roman commander
wa s
he able
with
some difficulty
to
e nd the
massacre. The
Romans
fought
to
destroy
th e
enemy a rm y a nd e nd its capacity ever to fight them again
It was a very different
culture
to
th e
Hellenistic
expectation that
wars should
be ended
by negotiation
to
avoid unnecessary bloodshed
o n b oth
sides
Both
Pyrrhus a nd H a nn ib al m ad e several attempts to
open
peace negotiations with the
Romans after they
ha d
defeated them in battle an d were surprised at the Romans
refusal to
consider a treaty:
T he M ac ed on ia n a nd
Seleucid
kings
similarly
sent
t h ei r h erald s to t he R om an s
on
numerous occasions hoping to end conflict
through
d i p l o m ~
The
Roman negotiating position was always th e same: a
demand for th e other
side
to
concede
total
defeat regardless
of
t he c ur re nt
military
situation. For
th e
Romans w ar was a life or death struggle which could
only en d in on e
of
tw o ways
Th e
f irst was for
th e
enemy to cease to be a threat
either because
he
had
become a
subordinate
ally
of Rome or because he ha d
ceased to exist as a political e n t i t ~ The only alternative was for Rome herself to
be
destroyed
but
t hi s w as something that neither Carthage
nor an y
other
state
possessed
th e
resources to
achieve N ot
only that bu t it
is unlikely
that an y
commander produced
by
th e
Hellenistic
tradition
would
ever have considered this
as
an
option.
By his
ow n understanding of w ar H a nn ib a l wo n
th e
Second Punic
Wa r
at
Cannae but the
Romans
were following a different set of rules an d when they did
not admit
d ef ea t t he re wa s l it tl e more
that
he c ould
do
to force them.
Th e
Romans d id
no t
f ight for th e
limited
gains
other states expected f rom v i t o r ~
A
d efeat ed enemy wa s turn ed into
an
ally wh o
not
only pre se nted no thr ea t to
Rome bu t
actively
supported
h er w ar s elsewhere
The
army
t he y s en t a ga in st
Philip
V in
was fed by grain
supplied
by
th e
recently
defeated Carthage
an d
P hi li p i n
turn
a id ed t he R om an
force
which fought
against the
Seleucids
Rome
di d
not
tolerate a f or me r e ne my
existing
as a ny th in g m or e
than
a clearly
subordinate
The
kingdom of Macedonia wa s
dismembered
in 168 an d
Carthage
destroyed in 146
BC
s im pl y b ec au se t he y
had
begun to show signs of
renewed
independence an d a ga in a ss um ed t he
role
of
potential enemies
Wh y
did th e R om an s
adopt
such a n u nc om pr om is in g a tt it ud e t o warfare?
Their great resources of military manpower which allowed t he m t o e nd ur e the
appalling losses of
the Punic
wars explains
to
a
great extent
ho w they were able
t o m ai nt ai n their resolve Rome s internal political stability an d
th e
strength of
the confederation of
allies she
created
around
herself were also vital factors
Th e
disaster
at
th e
Caudine
Forks
in
321
BC wa s
the last time
that Rome
accepted
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TH E WARS WITH CARTHAGE AND
TH E
HELLENISTIC KINGDOMS
a ce as
the
clear
loser in
a war.
The
fourth century BC
struggle against the
hill
peoples of
Central
Italy was
certainly b itt er a nd
may
have
ouraged the
Romans to
think
of war as a struggle for their very existence.
h Pyrrhus
and Hannibal
with their armies marching
through Italy
equally
to
threaten Rome
itself and
one
of
the reasons
for
the
aggressive
policy
Macedonia and the Seleucids was the fear that their powerful navies gave
em the potential
to land an army
on the
Italian
peninsula . Whatever the
ons for it Rome s attitude to
warfare
was a major factor in her success in this
and throughout the rest of her s t o r ~ When
wars
were decided as soon as
e side
admitted
defeat it was very difficult for
any state
to beat a
people
who
re never willing to concede this.
The
om n
city of
Carthage was built
on
top of
the Punic city destroyed in
146 C so th t very few
remains
of
the latter are
visible today A few sections
of Punic Carthage have
been uncovered
by
archaeologists nd attest to
the wealth of the city
particularly in the period
immediately before the final
war with Rome
75
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CH PTER THREE
- - - ~ . ~ : ~ : = = : ~ 4 . ~ . ~ : = = ~ : r J - . - - - - -
WORLD CONQUEST
BC D
w LEGION RIES
depicted on a first century relief from
the
prin ipi or
headquarters building in the fortress at
Mainz. The man on the right stands in the classic fighting
posture
of
the
oman
soldier crouching to gain as
much
protection as possible from his s utum ready to deliver an
underarm thrust from his
short
sword. The
men
wear a
version
of
the Imperial Gallic helmet
but
it
not
clear
whether any body armour shown
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ROMAN WARFARE
W O R L D
C O N Q U E S T
B C - A D
P
OL
YBIUS
CLAIMS
THAT
Scipio f ~ i c n u s told his troops before
t he b at tl e
of
Zam a that th ey wer e f ig ht in g no t just
to
defeat
Carthage but for
th e
domination
of
th e world. In P olybius ow n lifetime Rome ha d become th e
greatest power
in
the Mediterranean. A century
an d
a half later
when
th e great
period of e xpansion e nded with th e d ea th o f Augustus
th e
Empire s frontiers lay
on
t he A tl an ti c coast t h e Rhi ne an d
Danube
in Europe
an d
the Euphrates
i n t he
East.
Apart from
a few
later additions the
basic
shape
which
t he R om an
Empire
was
to
maintain for over four centuries
ha d
already been established. This chapter
w il l t el l th e
story
of these
vast
conquests. It will
also
describe ho w th e citizen
militia of th e Republic changed into a professional army
of
long-service soldiers
recruited from
th e
marginal
elements of
s o c i e t ~
Before
considering
how the Romans
created this
vast
Empire it
is worth
This auxiliary infantryman from another
of
the
ainz
reliefs carries an oval shield
and
at least two javelins in his
left hand whilst brandishing another in his right
Throughout her history
ome
relied heavily
on
soldiers
who
were not
oman
citizens
who
usually made up at
least
half
of
any
force
\
\
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WORLD
CONQUEST
202
BC AD
14
using to discuss why they d id so
For
a
long
time it was believed
that the
were no t willing imperialists bu t had been drawn
on
to fight wa r after
ar to
defend
themselves
an d
their allies against real
or
imagined threats.
This
ew was most popular at
the
beginning of the twentieth century
when
the great
opean empires still held sway over
most of
the g lobe
an d
the rule
an d
influence of the civilized over the uncivilized
was
accepted as an
good thing It was attractive when emphasizing the benefits of
Roman
to view the acquisition of their Empire as accidental
rather
than
t ivated by a blatant desire for power
and
wealth In the last few decades when
e
memories
of
empire
seem so distant a generation of
scholars
for whom
rialism is associated
not
with progress
but with
exploitation
and
repression
indigenous cultures
have adopted a far more
hostile
attitu de to Rom an
They have claimed
that Roman society
was geared towards
annual
warfare
and concentrated in
part icular on
the requirement
of
the
tocracy for
military
adventures
ROMAN EMPIRE AD 14
The century
up
to the
death of
ugustus
saw the
most rapid and continuous
expansion in Rome s
history. A of
gifted
commanders at the head
of
the
new
professional legions
carved
out
fresh provinces in
Europe frica and the East.
uring these years
Roman
soldiers crossed the Rhine
and Euphrates reached
the
Elbe explored the deserts
south
of Egypt
pushed
around the shores
of
the
Black Sea and landed in
Britain.
•
number of
legions
deployed by
province
Roman provinces in 8
provinces
a dd ed b y Caesar s
death
44
provinces
added
by Augustus
death AD
14
\
i
2 miles
I
\
I
o 2
km
i
o
main road
main base
for
Imperial
Navy
_ >
D
D
79
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ROMAN
WARFARE
80
Th e m en w ho governed Rome s provinces
an d
commanded he r
armies
were
senators following a well-defined
career pattern known
as th e u sus onorum
which
involved a mixture of civilian and military
posts.
Wa r
an d
politics were
inseparably linked
at
Rome. Politicians
di d not advocate
specific policies
or
belong t o a ny th in g
resembling
modern
political parties bu t w er e elected to
magistracies largely
on their
ow n an d their family s reputation; th e system
favoured t he m em be rs of th e ol d aristocratic families w ho c ou ld b oa st o f
th e
great achievements
of
their ancestors.
Th e
numbers in each college of magistrates
declined in proportion with its seniority an d o nl y a s ma ll
minority
of the Senate s
300 members could ever hope
to
hold on e of th e tw o annual consulships.
Competition
wa s fierce
t o gain
election
a nd t he n
even m or e i nt en se t o achieve
distinction during a man s
year
of office so that
he
r et ur ne d t o
a ss um e t he
influential
place
i n th e Senate
befitting
his great reputation.
Th e
greatest prestige
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WORLD CONQUEST 202 BC AD
14
e from military success
and
a magistrate who had held supreme
command
in
victorious war won the right
to
celebrate a
triumph
riding in a chariot
through
to the acclamation of the
whole
city: Even the men who had achieved this
vied
with
each
other
to stage the
most
spectacular
triumph or to
build
e greatest monument
and
s tage the most
lavish
games to commemorate
it
Scipio Asiaticus Manlius Vulso and Aemilius Paullus all of whom
d
fought
successful
wars in
the
Hellenist ic eas t were each credi ted with
ging a triumph that was
greater than any
that
had preceded
it
Each
one ha d
to stave off
political
attacks from rivals who did not wish t hem to receive
e honour
A provincial governor usually had
only
a single campaigning
season in
which
fight a successful war before
he was
replaced by ano ther man equally
bit ious for a
military
adventure
Many
arrived
in
their province impoverished
In a
triumph
the successful
commander
rode in a four-
horse chariot his face
painted red
and
dressed like
the statue
of
Jupiter
Optimus
Maximus
To
celebrate a
triumph
was the
highest
ambition of most
senators adding
not
only to
his own glory bu t that
of
his family A slave
stood
behind
the general holding
the
laurel wreath above his
head
and whispering
reminders that he was a
mortal even
though
he wore
the
regalia
of
a god
Under the Principate only
members of the
Imperial
family were allowed to
celebrate a
triumph
as in
this relief the Emperor
Vespasian 5 son Titus
commemorates
his capture
of
Jerusalem in
AD 70
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ROMAN WARFARE
Vast numbers
of
slaves were
taken during Rome s wars of
expansion
the profits from
their sale going primarily to
the army commanders.
uringhis Gallic
campaigns Caesar sold
hundreds of
thousands
of
captives into slavery and
was able not
only
to
payoff
his enormous debts but
amass a vast fortune. These
naked captives chained
together
at
the neck are
from another of the Mainz
Reliefs. They are probably
Germans
or
perhaps Celts
since their spiky hair may
indicate
the
latter s practice
of washing it in lime.
by
an
expensive election
campaign and
needing a quick profit
Th e
booty of a
victory was
considerable
especially
in
the r icher east and
there
were always
captives
to
sell
into
slavery
Returning to Rome the
successful
commander
displayed his prest ige in the size
and splendour of
his house in Rome and his
servile household
and
invested in vast rural estates
worked
by a labour force of
slaves Competition for
status
among
the
Roman aristocracy
demanded
frequent
warfare
and
it is not surprising
that
some
Roman
generals
provoked
a war for
their personal glory Gnaeus Manlius Vulso arrived to take over the army in Asia
after the
victory at
Magnesia Having
vainly
tried
to provoke Antiochus to break
the
peace and
restart the war
in 189 BC
he launched an unprovoked attack
on
the
Galatians three Celtic tribes who
had
settled in Asia
Minor
a century before
On
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WORLD
CONQUEST 20 2 BC-AD
14
return to
Ita ly he was c riticize d for fighting a
war without th e
approval
of th e
an d People of
Rome
an d only narrowly escaped condemnation after
biliz ing a ll his friends
an d
relatives a m on g t he
s en at or s. I n t hi s
view Roman
ansion was
th e
result of a never-e nding sea rc h for fre sh peoples to
defeat an d
in
order to s up pl y t he a ri st oc ra cy s
demand
fo r wealth
and
glory,
and
a
constant supply
of
th e
slaves
on which th e
economy of
Italy ha d
ome based.
There
were blatant examples of such triumph hunting but its extent should
t be exaggerated. Some provinces offered
plenty
of opportunities fo r f ig ht in g a
aign which
could
be
presented
as
being in
Rome s interest.
The
frequency of
warfare against
Spanish, Thracian
an d
Gallic tribe s led to a law
being
stipulating th at at least 5,000 opponents needed to
have
b ee n k ill ed i n
for the victorious commander to
be
e li gi bl e f or a triumph. ~ w e v e r th e
of
t he R om an a ri st oc ra cy d id
no t
always
lead
t o c on st an t
annual
wa r
an d
some
consuls seem to have made little
effort
to secure themselves a
c omma nd. Compe tition
among
senators
sometimes had th e
effect
of
expansion.
The Roman constitution
was
based
around
th e
principle
that
on e
element
in th e state and c er ta in ly n o single politician should hold
whelming power.
Magistracies
were held
fo r
only a year, and there
wa s
at least
on e
colleague
of equal rank. While politicians
were
eager
to add
their
own reputation
the y were even
more
keen to prevent rivals
fro m g ai ni ng
o
much influence.
There
is
much truth in
this
picture
of
senators
as
inherently
aggressive,
b ut i t
far to o simplistic as a n e xpla na tion for Roman
imperialism.
Rome
ma y
have
ared geared
t o c on st an t a nn ua l
warfare
but
i n f ac t
th e
intensity
of Roman
r making an d expansion varied i m m e n s e l ~
There were periods of several
d uri ng t he
second
century Cwhen
very few
wars
were fought, an d
then
on a
small
scale, an d much of t he g re at t er ri to ri al e xp an si on o cc ur re d in
intense bursts. The
Romans
were no t
unusual
in fighting
frequent
wars, bu t
relentless
quality
of
their
wa r making
was
distinc tive . As we have see n
in the
st c ha pter, a
Roman
wa r
c ou ld only e nd wh en t he e ne my
ceased
to
be a
threat
eit her b een absorbed
as a
subordinate
ally
or
destroyed
as a
political
If this outcome was no t fully achieved in a single war, then further conflicts
almost
inevitable until
th e
Romans ha d achieved their aim.
The
Ro man s p ro vo ked
th e Third
Punic
Wa r
149-146
C
an d utterly
Carthage
w he n t he y
felt
that she was starting
to
re-emerge
as an
power,
having
finally
paid o ff t he i nd em ni ty of th e Secon d Pu ni c
ar. A defeated
enemy
di d no t necessarily
need
to be annexed
a nd t ur n ed
into a
vi nce. I n f ac t t he R om an s were reluctant to
establish
ne w provinces and
rease the
number
of overseas
garrisons supplied
by
their
citizen a r m ~ After
th e
Macedonian
War,
th e kingdom s power wa s curbed
bu t
it retained
it s
ndence. Following
th e
Third
Wa r th e kingdom
was
dissolved
an d
replaced
four self-governing regions.
It
wa s
only
when
these
regional governments
ha d
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ROMAN
WARFARE
Caesar s route withdate
X
site of battle
major Gallic settlement
major ritish hill fort
•
major Roman city
failed
to
cope with th e invasion
of
the pretender Andriscus an d t he Fou rt h Wa r
that
the R om an
province
of
Macedonia
wa s
created. Nor
were th e
Romans
always swift to
exploit
th e resources
of their
provinces an d it was several decades
after
th e
creation
of
t h ei r Spani sh
provinces that they
began
to
derive
much
benefit f ro m t he
area s mineral
wealth.
Roman expansion was
a
complex p ro ce ss w hi ch
varied
i n i nt en si ty an d
nature.
If on e characteristic typifies
t he Roman s
an d especially th e senators at
this period
it
was
their supreme
self-confidence. Roman senators ha d long come
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WOR LD CONQUEST
202
BC-AD 14
consider themselves
the equal of an y
foreign king. Their atti tude
wa s
reflected
the
confrontation
between
th e Roman
embassy,
headed
by
th e
ex-consul
Gaius
ilius Laenas, an d Antiochus IV of Syria
in
167 BC . When th e Seleucids invaded
pt, Rome di d no t
send
an army to
defend
he r ally,
bu t only
a
small
group of
When
Antiochus
politely offered his
hand
to Popilius,
th e
Roman
thrust
a
tablet
containing
th e Senate s ultimatum into
it. The
king
with
a
demand
for his immediate withdrawal
from Egypt said that he
discuss th e m at te r w it h his advisers before giving a The impatient
pilius used
th e
p oi nt o f his
staff
t o d ra w in th e dust enclosing Antiochus
in
a
a nd d em an di ng a n answer before he stepped o ut o f it. The astonished king
epted the
terms without question. Th e
R om an a tt it ud e t o foreign powers
was
high-handed
frequently reverting to
th e
use
or
threat
of
force.
ITALY
225 BC t he l as t g re at Gallic r ai d i nt o c en tr al
I ta ly w as
trapped between
tw o
armies an d destroyed. For
th e next
fifty years
th e
Romans
assumed the
against
th e
C el ti c t ri be s of that
area
o f n or th er n Italy known
as
salpine Gau . Hannibal s arrival encouraged renewed hostility, an d
on e
officer, H am il ca r c o nt in ue d t o l ea d t he tr ib es a ga in st R om e
fo r
veral years after
t he S ec on d Punic
War, until
he was killed
in b at tl e. The
i n C is al pi ne
Gaul
only
a few
hundred
kilometres from
Rome was
supervised
by
th e Senate which committed considerable resources of
to th e subjugation of th e area.
Battles f ou gh t a ga in st t he
Gallic
tribes
were
in m an y ways similar to those
against
Carthaginian or Hellenistic opponents. There were
the same
a n d r it ua l challenges before a battle
each
side reluctant
to risk
combat
il every possible
advantage had been gained. Normally
th e
Roman generals
classed Gallic l ea de rs i n t hi s t en ta ti ve manoeuvring much as Hannibal
ha d
th e first R om an s s en t a ga in st h im . T ri ba l a rm ie s
were
clumsy and it
as difficult for their
leaders
t o m an oe uv re
them
during a battle.
They were
of
tw o
elements:
th e
warrior bands
supported
by
each
nobleman
an d
e
mass
of th e ordinary tribesmen. Noblemen displayed
their
status
by th e
an d fame of th e warriors who lived at their expense
u nd er a n
obligation
fight for them. These ba nds were semi-permanent and provided a well
an d
highly motivated nucleus to any
Gallic
r ~
They
were fa r
by th e
mass of ordinary
warriors composed
of
all free tribesmen
e to equip themselves,
an d
loosely grouped by family
an d clan relationships.
llic leaders
fought at th e
head
of their
followers,
inspiring them
by their
prowess. Tactics were simple an d relied on a headlong charge by a
eaming mass of warriors. Th e first charge of a
Gallic
army
wa s
a dreadful
b ut t he R om an s
believed
that
if
they
could
withstand
this onslaught then
e
Gauls
would
steadily tire and
become
vulnerable. Classical
literature
claims
the
barbarians
were
poorly conditioned an d
easily tired by
strenuous
activity
CAESAR S
C AMPAIGNS IN
GAUL
Benefiting from a political
alliance with Pompey and
Crassus, ]ulius Caesar was
able to secure an
extraordinary five- later
extended to ten-) year
command of the two Callic
provinces and Illyria. Early
interventions in Callia
omata hairy Caul , the
area outside the Roman
province) against the
migrat ing Helveti i an the
ermanwar leader
Ariovistus, led on to further
conflicts
with
more distant
tribes, till Caesar s legions
had
subdued the whole area.
To attract public attention
at Rome Caesar staged two
expeditions to the
mysterious island of Britain.
He
was to face two
major
rebellions, one in the winter
of 54-53
amongst the
Belgic tribes and another a
year later uniting much of
aul underthe leadership of
Vercingetorix. Caesar left
aula rich
man
his wealth
mostly derived from the
hundreds
of
thousands of
captives sold into slavery, at
the head of an efficient and
fanatically loyal
army
willing to fight against his
political opponents.
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ROM N W RF RE
aesar drives the 90 000 strong
army of Gauls
into
the hilltop
fortress of Alesia He then builds
siege walls of contravallination and
circumvallation
of about
14miles in
circumference
A huge Gallic relief army comes to
the rescue of Vercingetorix
SIEGE OF LESI
In
Vercingetorix
ttempted
to starve Caesars
rmy
into submission
refusing to join battle
nd
trying to
ut them off
from
supplies Caesar pursued the
retreating Gallic army
eventually cornering
them
in
the hill town of Alesia
There he fenced the
enemy
in
with twin
lines
of
fortification repulsing the
massive relieving
rmy
sent
to save the Gallic leader
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WORLD CONQUEST 20 2 BC-AD 14
ntually unable to
out Vercingetorix
one version
ng his arms
t
Caesar s
nd then sitting
down
ely waiting to be led
Caesar
having collected food
and
supplies continues
to
besiege Alesia
whilst fighting off relief
attempts
by Gauls Fierce fighting ensues as
the Romans repulse the defenders
trying
to
break
ou t
a n d t he relieving
army trying t o b re a k in
Th e
heaviest
attacks
are o n t he
vulnerable camp D On the final
day s fighting Caesar leads his
reserves in person to smash the
Gallic
attack
Driven
t o t he
edge of
starvation
Vercingetorix eventually
surrenders to Caesar
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ROMAN
WARFARE
OPPOSITE:
The Via
ppia
connecting Rome with
Capua and the Campanian
plain was built in
312 C
under the orders
of
the
n s o ~ ppiusClaudius
Caecus.
n
important
aspect
of Romes
absorption
of
conquered territory was
to construct roads linking
new
colonies to
Rome
and
increasingly to each other.
Built on a monumental
scale Roman roads
combined practical utility
with visually impressive
statements of power.
Vercingetorix was a
chieftain of the
rverniwho
managed to unite most
of
the tribes
of
Gaul
and
lead
them
in a massive rebellion
against Caesar in 52
C
Forced to surrender
at
the
siege
of
Alesia he was
imprisoned and eventually
suffered the fate of many
enemy leaders being ritually
strangled in Caesar s Gallic
triumph.
an d
h ea t. B ut p ro ba bl y t he m ai n r ea so n why t he Romans were likely to
wi n
a
prolonged
combat
was their trip ex acies formation
that
allowed
them to
reinforce
threatened parts of
th e line.
Individually
th e R om an s were better
equipped a nd a rm o ur ed
than
t he majo ri ty of Celtic warriors but there is little
indication
of
the great superiority
w hich Caesar s
troops
in the first century BC
would display against similar
Gallic
opponents. Gallic
a rm ie s d id
successfully
ambush Roman columns on the march for instance destroying most of the army
commanded
by th e praetor Lucius Postumius
in
216 BC
bu t
this was only possible
when th e Gauls
h ad h ad
enough time to
muster
their whole army along the likely
route
of
th e
Roman advance. Mustering a Gallic a rm y a nd
then
deploying it for
battle was a slow
procedure
an d
it
is
notable that
very often tribes were unable
to
form a n ar my until th e
Romans
ha d attacked their territory ravaged their fields
a nd t he n begun to withdraw.
On e
heavy def eat in
battle
was usually enough to force a Hellenistic monarch
to
s ee k t er ms .
Each
Gallic
tribe
was
separate an d had to
be
defeated
in turn.
A victory over a neighbouring
t ri be m ig ht
overawe
other
peoples bu t it di d
not
in i tself force them to
capitulate.
When
every free m al e i n t he t ri be was able
to
f ight as a
warrior battle
casualties
were easier
to
absorb
than
among
professional armies. N ot only that but th e tribes themselves were
divided into clans an d
factions.
Most included a
number
of
powerful
chieftains
or
sub-kings on e
of
whom might be
recognized as
th e
monarch of th e whole tribe. Each leader headed
a
faction
w it hi n t he
tribe
which
would
grow
or
decline
depending
on his achievements an d t he n um be rs
of
w ar ri or s w ho m he
at tract ed t o an y
expedition
varied according
to
his reputation. A
peace
negotiated
with a tribe
di d no t
guarantee the acceptance of
all i ts members.
Warfare
p layed a
central
role in Gallic s o i t ~
Leaders
needed wealth t o s up po rt their band of
followers an d
th e
most
common
way
of
gaining this was by r aiding. Raids an d
counter-raids figured heavily in
th e
campaigns in Cisalpine Gau .
A favourite target for th e Celts were th e colonies which th e
Romans
ha d settled
north of
th e
Po
an d
these were frequently beleaguered
an d
sometimes
sacked.
Th e settlement of large
numbers
of citizens
in
colonies in Cisalpine Gaul was
an u nu su al feature
of
Roman imperialism at this period. Their presence was an
added source of friction with
th e
Gauls an d Ligurians as
th e
settlers pressed for
m or e l an d a nd divided up confiscated
tribal
territory
into
regular squares by the
Roman process
of
cent uri at io n. T h ey emph as ized
th e
permanence
of
Roman
occupation as
di d
th e
roads
that were
constructed.
Earlier Roman
roads
ha d
always begun
at
Rome itself linking th e city directly to a n ew a re a
of
settlement.
In 187 BC th e Via A em il ia wa s constructed
con necti ng t he
tw o colonies of
Arminum an d
Placentia
th e
first
Ro man ro ad
designed
to
be excessively straight.
A straight l ine may be
th e
shortest distance between two points bu t i t is seldom
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WORLD
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14
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ROMAN WARFARE
the easiest rout ,and a road stretching
straight
f rom one horizon to the next was
a powerful
statement
of control over conquered t e r r i t o r ~ It was also, in
that
characteristically
Roman
way
of combining the
impressive
and
the
practical,
a
valuable means of strategic movement.
The
process
of
consolidating and
organizing
the province continued
throughout the
century, converting individual
settlements
linked
to Rome into
a coherent unit.
At the same
time,
the Romans
attitude towards their Empire as a whole
began
to change, and it gradually began
to
assume a greater air of permanence. At first
each
province was viewed as
distinct
and individually
connected
to
R om e. I n
171 BC, at
the
beginning of the
Third Macedonian
War,
both
consuls
had
hoped to be given command against
Perseus,
and
the
unsuccessful man had been
sent
with an
army
to
the
frontier
with Illyria to protect colonists in the area.
This
man, Cassius Longinus, decided
on
his own initiative
to
march his army overland to Macedonia. By chance
the
Senate heard of
his expedition
and
w er e able
to
send a commission to
restrain
him. On the one hand this is just another example
of
the
Roman
aristocracy s lust
for glory affecting their behaviour in the provinces, but it also shows
that
the
Romans were
beginning
to
conceive
of
their
provinces
as
being linked
to each
other g e o g r p h i c l l ~ In the las t decades of
the
century,
the Romans
mounted a
series
of campaigns
to defeat
the
tribes
of
southern Gaul, creating the province of
Transalpine
Gaul modern
Provence
to provide
a secure
land
rou te to
their
Spanish provinces. Gradually a coherent empire began to emerge f rom a
collection
of
individual conquered peoples.
SPAIN
After the Second Punic War
Rome
maintained a permanent military presence in
Spain to ensure that
a
second Hannibal could no t
use
it
as a base for an invasion
of Spain was populated by three main groups: the Lusitanians in the west,
Iberians
in the
south and east and
the Celtiberians in
the
north. Tribal groupings
were
looser
than
in
Gaul and each small fortified town was
effectively
independent. Divisions were common within communities and leaders tended to
enjoy power for
only
as long as they were militarily successful.
There
were no real
equivalents
to
the kings
of
Gallic tribes. There were many
misunderstandings
as
the Romans attempted to negotiate with authorities whom
they
believed
spoke
for
an
entire community,
only
to discover
that
this w as
not
so. On one occasion a
Roman commander
was attacked
and
his baggage plundered by warriors
from
a
tribe with which he
had
just concluded a t r e t ~ Soon afterwards a contingent of
cavalry from the
same tribe
arrived to serve as auxiliaries in his army as
had
been
agreed in
the
t r e t ~ The confused
Romans held them responsible for
the raid
and
had
them pu t in chains. Spanish society was difficult to understand for men who
only s er ve d f or one
year in
the provinces.
The
fragmentation of social
and
political structures in Spain had been
exacerbated by decades
of warfare
as first
the Carthaginians and then
the
Romans had
fought
to
establish
their power
in t he
r egion. A
growing population worsened the situation, particularly
as a c areer of
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WORLD
CONQUEST
20 2
BC-AD 14
y service with Cartha ge was no
longer
available to landless
young
men
Raiding an d
banditry
became more frequent.
Continual wa rfa re hinde re d
in turn e ncoura ge d more c ommunities to
supple me nt their
ng by raiding others. Groups of
landless
me n banded together to raid the
communities. The
motivation
for this activity was
brutally
If a community
was
perceived
to be
w eak it w ould
be
attacked
if
then
it
would
be avoided
or alliance
sought
with
it
Raid provoked
t o m ai nt ai n a continuous cycle of plundering
which
might easily
into
formal battles.
The Romans
attempted
t o c o ns tr u ct a network of
ed peoples
to create
stability in
their Spanish
provinces To preserve this
they
to prevent or
avenge
a ny r aid s on their
allies
Failure
to do
so
or
a
n defeat
however
small
e ncoura ge d more wide spre ad a tta c ks and allied
to
defect
One
solution was
to resettle
th e landless
warriors elsewhere
The Romans
done something similar with th e Ligurians a mountain people of north-west
who possessed
an even more dispa ra te and fragmented political structure
t he S pa ni ar ds . L ar ge
numbers
of Ligurians
ha d
been
forcibly
deported
on fertile
land
elsewhere
in
Italy
a nd t ur ne d
into
stable an d peaceful
ers In 150
th e
governor
o f F ur th er
Spain
Servius Sulpicius Galba
th e
surrender of a band of
Lusitanians an d
promised
to provide
them
plots of
land
in
a fert ile a rea
Th e Lusitanians had been
plundering
th e
province for several years inflicting several
defeats
on
Roman forces
by th e
previous governor an d
forced
to
accept
peace
th e
tribes
ha d
t o r ai di ng after
his departure
excu si ng t hi s breach
of a treaty by
that poverty forced
t he m t o a tt ac k their
neighbours.
Galba disarmed th e
t he m a nd their families into
three
groups an d then ordered his
to
massacre
them all
On
his r et ur n t o
Rome Galba wa s
prosecuted
fo r
k in g fai th
with
th e Lusitanians bu t wa s
acquitted
after mobilizing
his
tions in
th e
Senate
and
in
a
desperate
gesture
bringing
his
weeping
children
the court
in
an effort to invoke
t he p it y
of th e Galba went on to
become
of
t he mo st famou s
orators
of
his day bu t never
again
c omma nde d a n
r ~
ilar atrocity had been
committed
in
th e
other
Spanish
province a few years
re when the praetor Lucullus ha d launched
an
unprovoked
attack
on
a
tribe
epted their
surrender
a nd t he n
mas sacred t hem. T hese
were both
examples
of
behaviour at its
worst
yet
t he t wo
commanders evaded
prosecution.
Such
dents lend
support to th e
idea
of the Romans
as
brutal
imperialists individual
rnors seeking ou t vulnerable foreign peoples to
butcher
for
th e
l oo t a n d
l o r ~
are also indications
of th e frustration
felt by many Roma n c ommanders at
apparent
impossibility
of winning
a
permanent v icto ry i n
Spain
The
events
he n ex t
decades were
to
reinforce this
opinion.
On e
of th e
few survivors of Galba s massacre
was
a Lusitanian
named
wh o
was soon to
emerge
as a n inspira tional
leader an d
a
skilled
defeating
or
evading all
th e Roman
forces
s en t again st h im. He
is an
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R O M A N WARFARE
King ]ugurtha
of Numidia
waged a long war against
the
Romans
between
2
and
6
C
humiliating
them
in
when
he forced
a Roman army to surrender
and pass under the yoke. s
a young man he had
commanded an auxiliary
contingent with great
distinction at the siege
of
Numantia
encouraging a
Roman belief
that
their
most dangerous opponents
were men
whom
they
themselves had taught
how
to fight. Eventually one of
]ugurtha s allies was
persuaded to betray him to
the
Romans and
he was
taken prisoner ending the
war.
example
of th type
of chari smati c l ead er w ho o ften ap peared
after t ~ n t l
stages of Roman
conquest
had destroyed
traditional
power structures in an area
Other
examples would include Vercingetorix in G au l a nd Arminius in Germany
b oth o f whom
were able to
lead
very large
armies
drawn
from
confederations of
tribes
The
basis
of
their power was personal
an d
t en ded t o collapse as soon as
th e
leader disappeared f rom
th e scene Viriathus was
murdered
by a treacherous
subordinate wh o hoped for rew ard from Rome. The Emperor Tiberius would
later refuse an offer made by a
German chieftain
to
assassinate Arminius
bu t
only
because successful Ro man camp ai gn s had checked
t he l at ter s
power an d
removed an y threat he posed. In other circumstances when
th e
continuance of a
conflict rested solely
on
th e perseverance
of
a single leader
the Romans arr anged
t he t re ac he ro us c ap tu re
o f J ug ur th a
of
Numidia
in 106
BC
or mounted
attacks
with
th e primary
objective
of
killing
th e
enemy
commander.
Encouraged by Viriathus successes another rebellion against Rome
ha d developed
in
northern Spain
centred
around
th e
city
of Numantia.
Large
bu t poorly
led
an d
unprepared
Roman armies
advanced against the
rebels
an d
suffered disaster An army commanded by Gaius
Hostilius
Mancinus wa s surrounded
by the Celtiberians
an d
forced t o s urrend er in
137
BC
t he Romans accepting peace on equal t er ms t o t he N um an ti ne s. T he
Senate refused
to
ratify
the treaty and sent back Mancinus naked
an d in chains
to the Numantines wh o refused to receive him. The Romans elected Scipio
Aemilianus
th e
man
wh o
had destroyed Carthage
to a second
consulship
an d
gave
hi m
th e
command i n S pa in .
Scipio
carefully
ret rain ed t he
troops
in
th e
province
an d added to the men
he
had brought with
him leading
a n arm y of
sixty thousand
m en a gain st
th e
N umantines.
Despite
his
g re at n um er ic al
superiority he refused to face th e eight thousand Numantines in battle so great
was th e advantage in morale they
had gained
over
the
Roman troops. Instead he
blockaded Numantia building a wall strengthened by forts t o s u rro un d the city
After a
long
struggle in which
the starving
defenders are alleged to have resorted
to cannibalism
th e
Numantines
surrendered
an d
th e city
w as d es tr oy ed i n
BC .
The
fall
o f N um an ti a
m ark ed th e e nd
of
intensive campaigning in Spain
although
the peninsula
was
not
fully pacified for
more than
a century
T H E RISE OF
THE
PROFESSIONAL ARMY
The second
half
of
th e
second century BC was a s or ry c ha pt er i n Roman military
history
Viriathus an d
th e
Numantines
humiliated successive Roman armies in
Spain an d
t he o nly
major defeat of
th e
Macedonian wars
occurred
in
149
BC
when a motley army of Thracians led by a p re te nd er t o t he throne defeated a
Roman force
an d
killed th e
praetor in
command. Rome
ha d
provoked
th e
Third
Punic Wa r
o ut o f
fear
that
Carthage was rebuilding her strength bu t the opening
of t he c am p ai gn
i n Af ri ca
saw b ad ly t rai ned
an d
poorly led Roman soldiers
suffering
on e disaster after another. The Romans
eventually
wo n
all
of
these
conflicts an d
th e
utter destruction
of
Carthage in 146 BC
conformed
to the trend
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WORLD
CONQUEST
20 2
BC-AD 14
R om an w ar far e b ec om in g simultaneously more
an d less successful.
Th e
atrocities committed
a in
in the
150s have
already b een mentioned
it is probable that
Polybius
description of th e
of th e
Roman
sack of
a city where no t
only
bu t even
dogs
were
slaughtered an d
was most
typical of
this
p er io d. T hi s
city was a product of frustration at
th e
difficulty
complete
victory an d fear produced by
unexpected defeats.
Nearly every
campaign
in
th e
rest
of th e century
owed the
same
pattern
of
early disasters before a
longed effort
brought
v t o r ~ T he w ar w it h
th e
king Jugurtha
112-106 C
r es ul te d i n
ndals as troops deserted
en masse
an d
were
found
to be
either
incompetent or
been
bribed
by
th e n ~
The first
Roma n a rmy
to the
war
surrendered an d
suffered
th e
of
being
sent under the yoke. Th e
Germanic
tribes
of
th e
Cimbri
an d
threatened Italy
itself
after they had
shed a series of Roman armies
sent against
them. Th e casualties
at
Arausio in
Cwere on
t he s ame
scale as
those
at Cannae with allegedly eighty thousand
falling. Alarm
at th e
prospect
of
a repeat of th e
G al li c s ack caused such
that
for
th e last time in th eir hi sto ry th e R om an s
performed a
human
burying
alive a
Greek
an d a Gallic m an an d w om an
in
th e
forum.
A major
factor
in
t hese d is as ters w as
Roman overconfidence. The
defeat
of
kingdoms of the Hellenistic world the
conquest of
Cisalpine
Gaul
an d th e
up to Grac chus se ttleme nt
in
Spain
were
all
fought
by
armies an d
raised
in
th e h ar d
school
of th e
w ar w it h H an ni ba l.
The intense
of th e
first
q ua rt er o f
t he c en tu ry
wa s
fo llowed by a relatively
eful twenty-five years
broken
only by
th e Third
Macedonian War.
Gradually
collected experience of the generation of th e
Second Punic
Wa r
was
lost. A
generation
grew
up
wh o ha d forgotten
that
th e
earlier
successes were th e
of
careful preparation
an d training and
assumed
that victory c ame
as a
of
course
simply
b ec au se t he y
were
Roman.
Fewer
of th e ordinary
rs were veterans an d many of their inexperienced officers either thought
it was unnecessary or
di d no t
know
ho w
to turn t he m i nt o effective units. If
had served
in other campaigns t hey w ere
as likely to have
experienced
eats as victories. Many of th e successes of Viriathus
an d
th e Numantines were
n
over
more numerous
Roman
forces.
The
changing
situation
placed
a
great
strain on th e
m il it ia s ys te m
as
garrisons needed
to
be
maintained
in
many of th e
overseas provinces.
The Gallic hill town of
Roquepertuse was sacked by
the
Romans
in the 120s C
It included this important
shrine built in stone like the
Greek temples of nearby
Massilia but decorated
with
severed heads set into niches
in the wall Head hunting
was practised
by many
of
the peoples of Iron ge
Europe but was especially
important to the Gauls
whose
religion invested the
head with great importance
A similar shrine has been
excavated at the nearby
town of Entremont also
taken by the Romans in this
period during the creation
of
the province
of
Gallia
Narbonensis modern day
Provence
93
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ROM N W RF RE
BELOW This statue of a
young clean-shaven
nd
short-haired Gallic warrior
found t Vacheres in France
represents one of the best
equipped
members
of
a
tribal
w r
band.
e
carries
an oval shield has a long
slashing sword on his right
hip nd wears a coat
o f
m il
armour.
RIGHT This battle scene
from the Arch o f Orange
commemor tes the defeat of
one o f the occasional Gallic
rebellions
th t
occurred in
the seventy years after
Caesar s conquest. Probably
dating to the reign of
Tiberius
it
provides an
excellent p i ~ t i o n of the
equipment worn by
legionaries nd auxiliary
cavalrymen in the early
first century D
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CONQUEST 2 2 BC AD
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R O M A N WARFARE
The
ol d ideal
of
th e citizen farmer, w ho o wn ed eno ug h
property
to equip himself
as a soldier
an d
served for a campaigning season before returning to till his fields,
was
under
threat.
Such a
ma n
faced ruination i f he was unable t o t en d his
land
for
a
decade
of service in a legion
in
Spain. In
th e
latter part of
th e
second century
Romans believed that th e numbers of citizens
owning
e no ug h l an d
to
qualify
them for military service was dwindling. Increasingly large stretches of Italy ha d
been swallowed
up
by
great
estates or latifundia ,
owned
by aristocrats enriched
by Roman expansion an d worked by
gangs
of
slaves captured
in
foreign wars.
Scholarly opinion
remains
divided over th e real extent of this
problem
some
claiming that free
yeoman
farmers were flourishing i n s om e p ar ts o f Italy,
bu t
i t is
clear that
t he Romans
believed
their
previously inexhaustible supply of military
manpower wa s under threat. Even if the number
of
potential recruits h ad n ot
fallen by that much
th e
numerous setbacks suffered by Roman armies may well
have created
th e
impression that
their
quality had declined.
Traditionally, Marius the general
wh o
w on the w ar w ith Jugurtha an d then
defeated
the Cimbri has
been credited with converting
th e
Roman army from a
militia raised through universal
conscription
into a professional army recruited
from volunteers. Certainly, before leaving to take command of the
army
in Africa,
Marius
appealed
for volunteers from
the
class known as th e capite censi citizens
who did not possess enough
property
to make them liable to service in th e
legions .
More
recently, scholars have i nt er pr et ed t he
change
as occurring
gradually, pointing to earlier measures to reduce t he mi ni mum qualification for
service an d equip soldiers at t he s tate s expense. T he re d o appear to have been
A
Roman
copy of a
Hellenistic original the
Dying aul one of the
finest pieces of Classical art
symbolizing both
the
splendour of barbarian
races
and
their inevitable
defeat by civilization. The
long moustache and the
limed
hair
combed
up to
create
an
intimidating spiky
effect are common in
literary descriptions of
Celts as the heroic nudity.
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WORLD
CONQUEST
20 2
BC-AD
14
97
This coin commemorates
the oman victory in the
Social War 90-88 BC the
last great rebellion by the
Italian allies or socii. It was
a fierce struggle fought
between similarly equipped
and trained armies which
the omans won as
much by
conciliation as military
force.
Marius introduced the eagle
aquila)
as
the most
important standard of the
legion. Initially silver most
were later gilded. he eagle
symbolized the pride and
corporate identity of the
increasingly permanent
legions
o f
the professional
army.
men wh o viewed
military
ser vice as a
career
before these changes. Livy tells
f
one such professional soldier, Spurius Ligustinus,
wh o
first enrolled
e army in 200 BC an d
ha d
served twenty-two years i n G re ec e
an d
n bef or e his re-enlistment for th e
Third Ma c edonia n
War. Highly
Ligustinus
ha d
ser ved all
bu t
tw o years as a centurion,
increasingly
senior
posts,
culminating in t ha t o f primus pilus.
pattern of
service would
no t
have been much
out
of p la ce i n
th e
of t he E mp ir e, an d in fa ct Livy
presents
his
career
in a style
similar to th e memorial inscriptions
that
were beginning
popular with soldiers in th e late first century
BC .
Ligustinus is
sented as
th e
ideal
farmer
soldier, since Livy takes care to
p oi nt o u t t ha t
ill
f ar med the
plot
of
land he
ha d
been lef t by his f ather, w here his w if e
ha d
e h im
six sons an d tw o
daughters.
What
is
interesting
is that t hi s s ma ll
ng was not of sufficient size to have rendered hi m liable to military service
an d
that
his army service
had
been voluntary. How
common such
semi-
essionals were is impossible to estimate,
no r
ca n we k no w w heth er mo st such
were to be
found
among
th e
centurionate
rather than th e r an k a nd
file.
Although we
cannot
precisely t ra ce t he
process of
chang e, t he
character of
army ha d changed irrevocably by th e first
century
BC .
The soldiers were
no w
mainly f ro m th e landless p oo r, m en for whom military service wa s a
rather
than
a
temporary
interlude in their
normal
o ccu p at io n . A ft er t he
al War , w hich saw t he l as t g re at
rebellion
of some of
Rome s
Italian allies,
citizenship was e xt en de d t o m uc h
of
the Italian peninsula.
The
ol d
alae
an d all Italians were
now recruited
into
th e
legions.
e legions became
more
permanent,
an d
b eg an t o develop a
i nc t i dent ity, a process acceler ated by
Marius
of th e five standards
of
a legion a boar, a
, a
horse,
an eagle
an d
a minotaur
with
a s in gl e
er eagle. All the old distinctions based
on
an d age were swept
w y
Th e cavalry
velites disappeared an d all legionaries were
heavy infantry a rm ed w it h th e pilum
an d
wearing mail armour, a b ro nze h elmet
an d
ying a long, oval shield.
The
main
tactical
sub-unit
the legion was
now the
cohort instead of th e
Each of a legion s te n cohorts
consisted
me n divided into thr ee maniples, each
of
centuries of eighty me n
commanded
by a
Th e
six tribunes w er e st il l t he se ni or
permanently
a tt ac he d t o
a unit,
bu t
it bec ame
common for
on e
of
th e a rm y c om ma nd er s
often
a senior
subordinate
or
legatus
to
be
in
effective
Th e origins of
th e cohort
ar e
obscure.
Polybius
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R O M A N WARFARE
O n e c o h or t comprising
of six centuries (480 men)
,
,,
RIGHT:
The backbone of the
professional army were the
long service centurions, like
these
on
the second-century
monument
at Adamklissi
In undress
uniform
without
armour
or
helmets, they wear
their swords on the left hip,
unlike ordinary legionaries
who
wore
them on
the right.
A LEGION
OF T E N C O HO R TS
The basic tactical
unit of
professional legions was the
cohort, each with a paper
strength of 480
men
ten
of
these replacing the thirty
maniples
of
the earlier legion.
It
unclear
how
large the
intervals were between units.
A depth
of
si x ranks seems to
the
most common
formation
for the cohort,
and
since lines
three deep
and
columns
marching six abreast are also
recorded, the Roman r y ~ s
drill was probably based
on
1nultiples
of
three, although
depths
of
four, eight
and
ten are also recorded.- . ,.
t ··
~ ~ ~ b l ~
1
tt t
- --
One centur y compr ising of
six ranks of
thirteen men plus one centurion in
f ro n t a n d a n o p ti o
(the centurion s second
in-command behind the
rear
rank
8 men)
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WORLD
CONQUEST
202
BC AD 14
t ions the term twice both
in
connection with Scipio s army
in Spain
in the
ond Punic War and in an
ambiguous
passage maybe implying
that
it consisted
three maniples as was later to be the case. Livy uses the term anachronistically
t we do know
that
allied contingents were usually called cohorts although we
not know their size
or
internal structure. It is possible
that
a
cohort
was a term
any
unit
smaller.
than
a legion but
larger than
a maniple.
The cohort
appears
have been adopted on an
d
hoc basis by
the
legions in Spain during
the second
BC. Muc h of
the campaigning in Spain
was on
a relatively small scale
each community
might have
to
be defeated in
tu rn . The old
lines
of the
legion were
no t
effective tactical units for independent
operations. The
its
own
command
structure
and with
men
used to
working
together
y well have fulfilled a need for forces smaller
than
a legion.
The new legion was more flexible
in
every respect
than
i ts predecessor . I ts
formation was in the
triplex acies with
the cohorts deployed
in
the
pattern but it could as effectively deploy into one two
or
four lines.
e
uniformly equipped
and
sized
cohorts could
be
deployed anywhere
unlike
maniples which
had
been restricted to f ixed positions. I t w as
much
e as ie r fo r a
CIVIL
WARS
o m ~ s greatest period of
exp nsion coincided with
nd
was intim tely linked to
a series o f violent civil wars
as various successful
comm nders
vied for
supremacy These
campaigns were fought no t
just in Italy but all round
the Mediterranean Caesar
failed as dictator to establish
a perm nent peace
nd
it
was
only after nother
thirteen years
o f w r th t
his nephew
nd dopted
son
ct vi n m n ged to bring
a lasting peace from civil
w r
to
the exh usted
Empire
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ROMAN WARFARE
co mm an der to control an d
pass
orders to ten cohorts
each
with
the ir own
commanders
than
i t was to do the same with thirty maniples Roman armies had
always
become
more efficient through long service training and experience of
success but the greater permanence of the new legions made it easier to preserve
this
accumulated experience With professionalization Roman
armies began
to
show far greater ability in
the
more technical
aspects of
warfare Caesar could
call f rom the ranks of his legions men able to design and build bridges or ships
an d
engineers
to
prosecute a siege
The
average efficiency of Roman
armies
greatly increased
an d
campaigns were less often delayed when experienced
legions
had to
be
discharged an d
replaced by newly raised units
There was a major disadvantage to the
new
system The professional soldier
PHARSALUS
PHASE
I
Enipeus
SYRIAN 0
LEGIONS
o
LUCIUS
DOMITIUS
AHENOBARBUS
CILICIAN
LEGION
Z
AND
SPANISH
COHORTS
CAVALRY
GNAEUS
DOMITIUS
CALVINUS
PUBLIUS SULLA
CAESAR
Battle of Pharsalus: Phase 1
IX
Our sources for the battle of
Pharsalus in are
remarkably good and
although vague about the
exact location
of
the
battlefield allow us to
represent the armies down
to the level of the individual
cohorts. Pompey s legions
were stronger but less
experienced than Caesars.
e
ordered his cohorts to
deploy ten deep
and await
the
enemy
charge at the halt
hoping t o k ee p his raw
soldiers in a dense
formation and prevent them
from running away. Pompey
was relying upon his
numerically superior cavalry
to outflank the
enemy
right
and roll
up
Caesar s line.
Caesars cohorts covered
much
the same
frontage as
their opponents so were
probably formed five or six
ranks deep. Realizing the
threat to his right flank
Caesar took one
cohort
from the third line
of
each
legion and formed them into
a fourth line angled back
and concealed behind his
cavalry.
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WORLD CONQUEST 202 BC AD 14
recru it ed f rom the
poor and
had no source of livelihood once he was
from the army. The
Senate refused
to take
responsibility
for
lized soldiers
and
made no provision for them or their families since by
t he a rm ie s were sti ll
supposed
to be filled with
men
of property serving ou t
duty.
The army
ceased
to
represent
the whole Roman people under arms and
came more
and more separate f rom the rest of society their loyalty
focusing
on their legion than
on
Rome Soldiers came
to
depend
on
their
to
provide
t hem with a plot of land on discharge Charismatic
nerals such as Sulla Pompey and Caesar created
armies far
more loyal to their
than
they were to the state. This added
an
increasingly
violent
dimension
Rome s competitive politics. The professional
armies
w ere as often se t to fight
other legions as they were against the foreign enemies of Rome.
Battle
of
Pharsalus: Phase 2 and 3
VIII
MARKANTONY
GNAEUS
DOMITIUS
CALVINUS
PUBLIUS SULLA
Enipeus
CILICIAN LEGION
- - - - - AND SPANISH COHORTS
o
o
/
PHARSALUS:
PHASES 2
AND
3
Labienus led ompeys
massed cavalry against
Caesar s right wing
and
soon put
the
enemy
horsemen to flight.
However in the process the
recently raised Pompeian
squadrons lost their order
and
merged into
one
great
mass. Suddenly Caesars
fourth line advanced from
behind
the
main army and
charged the milling mass
of
cavalry stampeding them to
the
re r
Elsewhere the
main
lines
had
clashed in a fierce
struggle Caesars superbly
disciplined men
stopping
to
re-form when they realized
that
the Pompeian foot were
not
advancing to
meet them
and
that
they had begun
their charge too early.
s
the
fourth line swung
round
to
threaten the left f lank of the
Pompeian legions
and
Caesar committed his third
line to
add impetus
to th e
main
assault Pompey s
army collapsed.
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ROM W RF R
The willingness
and
skill
with which the professional
legions undertook
major
works of engineering was
one
of
the most remarkable
features of the Roman army.
uring his campaigns
Caesar was able to draw
from the ranks
of
his army
men able to construct great
systems
of
fortifications
build and
repair ships
and
bridge the River Rhine.
Trajan s olumn
pays
particular attention t o the
technical skills
of
the citizen
legionaries and unlike the
non-citizen auxiliaries
more
often
depicts them
working
than fighting. Here
legionaries construct a fort
working in their armour and
with
weapons
stacked
nearby in the proper
manner.
2
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WORLD CONQUEST
2 2
BC AD 14
1°3
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R O M A N WARFARE
Sextus Pompey
c.
66-36
BC
fought a civil
war
against
Octavian
as his father
Pompey the
Great
and
elder
brother
had
fought against
]ulius Caesar. He controlled
a
strong
fleet based in Sicily
and
Sardinia
but
was finally
defeated
by
grippa
at
Naupactus
in
36
BC
1° 4
T H E G R E A T CONQUESTS
During
t he s econ d cen tu ry t he p ro fi ts of empire
h ad n ot been evenly distributed
an d
th e
ga p between
th e
richest an d poorest
senators
steadily widened. Frequent
military
setbacks
encouraged the
appointment
of th e ablest commanders to take
charge for
th e
dura tion of a conflict. Marius was given
the
command in Africa by
popular
demand
an d
then
elected
to
five successive consulships
t o c om ba t
th e
Cimbri. Such continuity of com ma nd
w as mil it aril y
sound and had been
employed at times of crisis in the
past
n ot ab ly t he S ec on d
Punic
War bu t it
struck
at th e
very heart of
th e
Roman
political
system which required all power
to
be
temporary.
Such p ro lo ng ed c om ma nd s brought
massive
profits
to
th e
commander
r ai si ng h im f ar
above
his peers in th e Senate. Competition in
th e
Senate became
focused
on
a small group of
th e
foremost politicians
wh o
no w
expected
to be given such
wide-ranging
commands as
a right regardless of whether a military crisis threatened
th e
Empire. When Sulla earned
the dubious
distinction of
b ei ng t he first
man
to march his legions against R om e i n
88 BC
it was because he ha d b een rep laced
by his rival
Marius
in th e
command
of th e
major
wa r a ga in st t he
kingdom of
Pontus.
Civil
w ars en co uraged
even
more
exceptional
careers
among those who supported
the
winning side. W hi le t he an nu al rep lacement
of
provincial
governors may
have encouraged
frequent campaigns
this
lack
of
continuity
h ad n ot
encouraged wide-scale planned
expansion. Th e
powerful
generals
in the
first
century
BC
secured t he c on tr ol of large provinces
an d
armies
for
periods of
several years giving themselves far
more
scope
for conquest.
C ae sa r s o wn
accounts of
his
campaigns
give us
an
invaluable
picture
of
th e
Roman a rm y o n
campaign
in this
p erio d. Caes ar d id little t o re for m th e army bu t raised the
t ro op s u n de r his
command
to th e peak of efficiency. Th e
booty f ro m t he Gallic campaigns was lavishly distributed among the soldiers an d
conspicuous service
w as rew ard ed
by decorations a nd r ap id p ro mo ti on .
Newly
raised legions were provided
with
a valuable cadre of experienced centurions
promoted
from
junior
g rades i n v et eran
units.
Caesar trained
his
men h ard b ut
also flattered them fostering their pride in themselves an d their unit.
He
created
an
especially close
b o nd w it h
th e veteran Tenth Legion habitually placing them
on
t he rig ht
of his line
th e
position of most honour an d
leading
them in person.
When
this legion
worn
ou t by long service
in
foreign
an d
civil wars threatened
to mutiny Caesar restored o rder w ith a single word
addressing
them as
Quirites
civilians
no t
soldiers. A highly active commander Caesar took care to
prepare
his
campaigns
scrupulously involving himself in
many
of
th e
details
bu t
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WOR LD
CONQUEST
20 2
BC-AD
14
operations began he
pursued
his objectives
with
unremitting boldness
sting to his
troops an d
his own improvisational genius
a nd g oo d
luck
to
cope
any crisis. Modern commentators have criticized Caesar for his recklessness,
to make adequate preparations for his l an di ng s i n Britain or invading
edonia against much stronger
opposition during
th e civil war,
bu t
this is
to
th e doctrine of th e
Roman
arm .
R o ma n c o mm a nd er s
were
bold
in
their
actions an d if a
R om an a rm y d id not
seek to seize
th e
and
ac t aggressively,
then
i t w as u su al ly a sign
that
things were going
y badl .
The
boldness
of
Caesar s campaigns
was
no t markedly greater than
of many Roman commanders
an d
certainly
no
from the cam paigns
of
Lucullus
or
Pompe .
a e s a r ~ behaviour
as a
commander
w as t yp ic al ly
an although in his own accounts
of
his campaigns he
careful to sh ow that he
was
better than anyone else at
erything. Before his battles we find
t he s am e c au ti ou s
to
gain every slight advantage that we have
en from
the third century
onwards. This
was
particularly
in t he b at tl es of th e civil
wa r
w he n he was careful
to
ow his reluctance to shed t he b lo od of fellow citizens.
a battle Caesar rode
around
close b eh in d t he f ro nt
of his arm . From this position he encouraged his men
their behaviour
an d
rewarded
or punished them
He also ha d a close view of
th e
c om b at a nd
ld gauge ho w
th e
fighting was going, j ud gi ng f ro m t he
of
confidence
of
each side
a nd the
noise they
de. Using this information he c ou ld s en d a message
to
troops
in
reserve, or go
in
person to lead the m up to
loit a success
or
relieve a part
of
th e line that was
under
This
was
th e normal way o f c om ma nd in g a
army,
practised from at
least
th e en d of t he t hi rd
BC
into late antiquity. A
good
general needed to
ge where an d w he n t he crisis of a b at tl e w ou ld o cc ur
d move to that part
of
th e line. By Caesar s day each legion was controlled by a
ior officer, usually a legate;
larger
armies were divided into a
centre
and
tw o
gs, each led by a senior subordinate
wh o commanded that
sector in
t he s am e
e as the commander-in-chief. These men were trusted to use their initiative if a
occurred when the
general was
involved elsewhere on th e field.
so close
to the
fighting was a
dangerous
practice
exposing the
to missiles
an d
being
singled
out
fo r
t he a tt ac ks of especially
bold
emies. However, it
di d
allow a
commander
to have
fa r more
influence
on th e
of
the battle
than
a general w ho f ou gh t i n
person
in th e front rank or on e
o
surveyed t he a ct io n f ro m a safe location far in th e rear. That th e Romans
veloped a military system which
placed
such
demands
on
th e
commander
Mithridates VI
of
Pontus
120-60 BC waged a series
of
wars
with
the
Romans
in
an effort to drive them from
Asia and Greece. Sulla
Lucullus and Pompey all
campaigned against him
winning spectacular
victories over the numerous
bu t poorly motivated Pontic
armies. He eventually
committed
suicide.
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R OMAN WARFARE
This coin was struck by
Caesar during his
dictatorship when victory in
the Civil War had left him
master
of the Empire.
Perhaps the greatest and
certainly the
most
successful
Roman general
of
any
period Caesar was also a
gifted writer
whose
War
Commentaries on
the
campaigns in au l
and
the
Civil War provide
by
far
the
most detailed accounts of
the Roman army on
campaign.
More
skilled
at
coping with a crisis than
day-ta-day politics Caesar
was assassinated by a
conspiracy consisting
primarily
of men
he
had
pardoned.
6
disproves th e
traditional
view
that
m os t R om an generals were
amateurs of
limited
i l i t ~ Th e
knowledge
that
their
commander
s ha re d m an y
of
the
risks of
combat
helped
to inspire legionaries.
Caesar s
own account of the
critical situation at Sambre in 57
BC
well reflects his style
of
command:
After addressing
Legio X , C ae sa r h ur ri ed t o
t he r ig ht
wing where
he
saw his me n hard
pressed,
an d t he s ta nd ar ds of L egi o XI I
clustered in on e place an d the soldiers so crowded together that it
impeded
their
fighting. All
the centurions
in
th e
f ou rt h c o ho rt h ad
fallen th e
signifer wa s
dead
an d
his standard captured;
in the
remaining cohorts every centurion
wa s
either de ad
or
wounded,
including th e primus pilus Sextus ]ulius Baculus an exceptionally brave
man,
wh o wa s
exhausted by his many
serious
w ou nd s a nd
could no
l on ge r s ta nd ; t he
other soldiers were tired an d
some
in
th e
rear giving
up
th e fight were withdrawing o ut of missile range; th e enemy were edging
closer u p t he slope in front
and
pressing
hard
on.both flanks.
He
saw
that
the situation
was critical and that t he re w as
no
other
reserve available
took a
shield
from a man
in
the re ar r ank s -
he
ha d
come without
his
ow n - a dv an ce d i nt o t he f ro nt line an d called on th e
centurions
by
name,
encouraged th e soldiers
and
ordered the line
to
advance
an d
th e units to
extend, so
that they
could
employ
their
swords more
e s i l ~
Hi s
arrival
brought
hope to the
soldiers an d refreshed
their spirits every ma n
w an ti ng t o d o his
b es t i n
th e sight of h is g en er al even i n s uc h a d es pe ra te
situation. Th e e ne my s a dv an ce
wa s
delayed for a while. Bellum
Gallicum
2.25.
It is worth noting
that
Caesar, although he ha d moved into th e front line
does no t
bother
to tell us whether o r no t he
actually
fought hand-to-hand. What
h e d oe s
stress is
that he
exposed
himself
t o d an ge r
in
order
more
effectively
to
do
his jo b
of
encouraging his centurions
an d soldiers an d reorganizing their
battle line.
Th e
general s jo b was to lead and control his army no t inspire them
with his
personal
prowess,
like th e warrior aristocrats of early
Rome
or
Alexander the G reat, who
consciously
emulated
t he b eh av io ur of
Homeric
heroes.
Virtus wa s
the word
used to describe
t he m il it ar y
virtues
which a
Roman
senator
wa s
e xp ec te d t o display
because
of his birth an d
upbringing.
Virtus included the practical ability
to
lead an d c on tr ol a n army th e physical
courage needed to
perform this role
moving around
close
behind the battle
line
an d t he m or al c ou ra ge never to a dm it the possibility
of
defeat. Caesar
portrays
himself as n ev er doubting his ultimate success doing his best to extricate his
a rm y f ro m an y crisis so that it
was
best fitted
to
renew an y struggle. Even in his
rare
d ef ea ts h e
never
despaired, bu t di q
his
best to disengage
his
army from
disaster
an d
p re pa re t o fight again at a later time. This
w as t he
ideal
behaviour
for a Roman commander.
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e famous Prima Porta
of ugustus depicts
m as a commander In fact
was no t an especially able
often
in poor
and
relied on
more gifted
nates such as grippa
members o f his
n
family he central motif on
breastplate shows a Parthian
one
of
the
e gles
lost
r ssus or Antony a diplomatic
than military
success
H E LAST P HA SE O F R O M A N EXPANSION
vil wars were lost
an d
wo n in th e provinces
surrounding
th e
it
wa s
o nl y p os si bl e
for peace to be
by creating a secure regime in Rome itself
failed to
do
this
an d wa s
stabbed
to d eath
in a
of the Senate Only
after
another period of civil
r d id his
adopted
s on O ctavi an at last create a stable
Octavian who
was
l at er t o
be granted
th e
name
gustus by
th e
Senate
created
th e system known as th e
in
which he wa s
emperor
an d
monarch in
all
t name
an d
reorganized
both th e army
an d
th e
ovinces Real power passed to
the
emperor bu t
the
Senate
provided
th e
governors
wh o
ra n
the Empire an d
armies in
th e
field Attempting to disassociate
f ro m t he O ct av ia n w ho ha d
risen
t o p ow er
through
oody civil war
Augustus m ad e g re at
play of having
tored peace
t o th e
state bu t while he ha d ended civil
r his reign saw
constant
warfare
an d
expansion
foreign enemies Roman
politicians
ha d
needed
m il it ar y g lo ry
an d
Augustus
wh o
r tr ay ed him se lf as the greatest of Rome s
the
prestige of
vanquishing great
reign enemies
During his Prin ci pat e A ug us tu s co mp let e
th e
final
of Spain Gaul an d Illyria an d
suppressed
Egypt an d Syria were all pacified
d settled in a process w hi ch ass imil at ed an d
gested the vast conquests of
th e
previous n t u r ~
last tribes of th e Alps wh o still resisted
rule
an d
raided traffic
through
t he p as ses
re finally
absorbed.
In
th e
west his armies
WORLD CONQUEST 20 2 BC-AD 14
1° 7
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ROMAN WARFARE
ABOVE: Marcus Vipsanius
Agrippa 63-12 BC
was
Octavian s close friend
and
political associate
eventually
marrying
his
daughter ]ulia. Of obscure
family
he
proved to
be a
r08
RIGHT: Tiberius was
the son
from an earlier marriage of
Augustus- wife Livia who on
reaching
adulthood
was
given
command
in a series
major wars
by the
Emperor
and proved to
be a
highly successful
commander. A rigid
disciplinarian he
campaigned
in
the
Balkans
and
across
the
Rhine and
later after a self-imposed
exile suppressed the
massive Pannonian
Rebellion
D
6-9
and
helped
to
restore
the
situation
in
Germany
after the
disaster in
D
very efficient
military and
naval
commander
who
contributed more than
anyone
else
to
Octavian s
victories
over Sextus
Pompey
and
Mark
Antony.
LEFT: The
younger brother
of Tiberius and father of
the Emperor
Claudius
Drusus campaigned
extensively in Illyria and in
Germany where he
conquered most of
the
territory
up to the Elbe. He
said to have
hoped
to win
the
right to dedicate spol
opima by
killing an
enemy
commander with
his
own
hand
spending much time
pursuing variuos Germanic
Kings around the battlefield.
He died in
BC from injuries
suffered in a riding accident.
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WORLD
CONQUEST
2 2
BC AD 14
is cameo has the
Tiberius
throned in power in the
ntre with his aged
mother Livia to his left.
They are surrounded
by
other members
of
the
imperial family whilst
beneath them crouch
representatives of the
m ny nations vanquished
by om n military might.
Tiberius
ended
the
expansionist policies of
Augustus allegedly on the
latter s advice.
1°9
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ROM N W RF R
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WORLD CONQUEST 20 2 BC-AD 14
through th e
Balkans
taking
th e
boundary of th e
Empire
to th e Danube.
ha d
been
careful to
portray
th e Rhine as th e dividing line between th e
tribes
wh o
were fit to be absorbed
and th e
savage
shifting
hordes of
wh o
were not.
Augustus
armies pushed on to th e Elbe explored th e
coast
an d
formed a ne w p ro vi nc e i n Germany: Augustus served on few
these
campaigns
in
person
b ut m os t
of
th e major
campaigns
were
fought
by
of his family
such
as his ol d friend an d son-in-law Agrippa his
Tiberius
an d
Drusus
an d
his
grandson
Germanicus. By th e en d
of
th e
century
n o o ne f ro m o ut si de t he I mp er ia l
family wa s pe rmitted to celebrate
triumph.
T hi ng s b eg an
to
go
wrong in
the la st dec ad e
of
Augustus life. In
AD
6
e
recently c onque re d Pa nnonia n provinces e ru pte d i nto rebellion.
Large
of
troops were needed to s up pres s t he rising: Tiberius at on e point
m ma nd ed a n a rm y of te n legions
bu t
chose
to
divide his s treng th b ecau se h e
lt this was to o big an arm y t o c on tr ol effectively:
Casualties
were so great an d
itary service so
unpopular
in war-weary
Italy
that
Augustus
had
recourse
to
e d es perate meas ure of
freeing slaves
an d
f or mi ng t he m i nt o special
units
to
to
the front . I t took nearly three years to put down th e rebellion an d almost
soon as this wa s c om pl et ed n ew s a rr iv ed of a d is as te r i n Germany: The
Publius
Quinctilius
Varus
related
by m ar ri ag e t o A gr ip pa ha d
been
with
establishing
th e administration of th e ne w province. Varus
wa s
of the beginnings of
an
uprising
but
di d not realize
that
its leader
Arminius
a
chieftain
of th e
Cherusci
w ho c om ma nd ed a contingent of
xiliaries in his ow n army: Varus reacted as an y R o ma n w ou ld have
d on e t o
a
of
rebellion mustering all available
t ro op s a nd
marching immediately
to
n fro nt t he
rebels. Hi s forces were no t supplied
or
prepared for a ful l sca le
an d
his columns were encumbered by t he s ol di er s families an d
unwieldy baggage
train
bu t Varus hoped that a
show of
force
would
convince
e
rebels to surrender. He had carried ou t a similar o pe ra ti on w it h m uch
ccess in th e year
BC when as governor of Syria he ha d marc he d into
Judaea
d
quelled
t he d is ord er o l l o w i ~
th e death
of
Herod th e
Great.
This
t im e he
d his three legions into a carefu lly p re pa re d a mb us h. Arminius wh o ha d
to the rebels early in th e campaign led the German tribesmen in a
of
ambushes
as
Varus
clumsy c ol um n m ad e its way along a narrow
t hr ou gh t he difficult terrain of th e Teutonburg
W al d. U nabl e
to
deploy
d force the enemy to fight
an o pen
battle
th e
Romans were w h it tl ed d ow n .
di d
what .no R om an c om ma nd er s ho ul d have done
he
despaired
his ow n life. Hi s army
was
massacred almost
to
a man. Th e disaster in
r ma ny m ar ke d t he e nd of t he g re at
period
of
Roman
expansion
although
it
s no t its main cause.
Over
th e next
decade
several Roman armies
crossed
e
Rhine
an d exacted a bloody revenge for th e d<estruction of Varus three
bu t
there was never a
concerted
attempt
to
recreate a German province
to
e east of
the
river.
This memorial
commemorates
a centurion
who
was kil led in the
Teutonberg Wald in 9.
The inscription reads,
Marcus Caelius, son of
Titus,
member of
the
Lemonian voting tribe, from
Bononia
modern
Bologna ,
senior centurion of
the
Eighteenth Legion, years
of
age.
He
fell in the Varian
war.
If
found, his bones may
be interred here. His
brother, Publius Caelius, son
of Titus, of the
Lemonian
voting tribe, set this up.
Tacitus claimed that
captured tribunes and senior
centurions were sacrificed
by
the German tribesmen.
Caelius is depicted carrying
the
vitis
the vine
staff
symbolizing his rank, and
wearing his decorations
on
a
leather harness. On his head
he wears the wreath of the
corona
civica the highest
of
all decorations, given for
saving the life of a fellow
citizen. Flanking
him
are the
busts
of
two of his
freedmen, who presumably
were killed with
him
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H PTER FOUR
ONTROLLING
THE WORLD
THE
TOMBSTONE OF
TITUS
FLAVIUS BASS
us
an
auxiliary
cavalryman
in
the ala oricorum wh o died
at
the
age
after twenty six years service. Bassus is depicted in the
classic posture cavalry tombstones in
the
early Empire
galloping his horse
over
a
cowering and
frequently
naked
barbarian. He wears a long sleeved tunic much like the
Gallic
warrior from
Vacheres
armour and
a
decorated
helmet.
the left stands
his servant
or groom
carrying two
more spears to re arm his master.
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R O M A N WARFARE
C O N T R O L L I N G T H E W O R L D AD 4 93
Trajans
Column
was the
centrepiece of
the
great
Forum complex the
Emperor built with the
spoils of his conquest
o f
Dacia. Around the drum
runs a series of reliefs telling
the story of Trajan s two
Dacian Wars D1 1 2
and
105 6 in stylized but
remarkably detailed images.
T
HE
YING UGUSTUS
supposedly
advised his successor Tiberius to
maintain
t he E mp ir e s b ou nd ar ie s i n t he ir
current
position. Rebellions in Pannonia
a n d G er ma ny
ha d
shown that
a
p er io d o f
consolidation
wa s
needed
a ft er t he
decades of
conquest yet subsequent events revealed
that th e
massive
expansion
of
th e
previous
century
wa s never to be repeated.
Conquests
were made as w hen
Claudius launched
an invasion
of
Britain in
43
or
Trajan took Dacia in 101-6.
Other
annexations such as T rajan s in Mesopotamia
or
those of
Marcus
Aurelius
on
th e Danube were
abandoned
only whe n the e mp ero r died before t he new
territory
ha d been fully absorbed.
The
Empire was larger in th e early third
century
than
in 14 b ut t he
pace of
its expansion ha d massively diminished.
J
o ikm
miles
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C O N TR O L LI N G T H E
WORLD AD 14-193
Th e reason
fo r
this
was
no t primarily m l t r ~ Th e Roman Empire
was
not
to s top o nl y w he n i t r ea ch ed
enemies which
the a rm y co uld not
defeat.
leting the
conquest
of
th e German tribes or
defeating
Parthia was perfectly
considerable
resources in manpower an d th e
determination
to
a long
struggle until
victory
was
attained. The resources
ma y
have been
cking in AD
14
after t he
wars
of
previous decades
bu t this
was
not t o r em ai n
e for most of th e first an d
second
centuries AD . T h e m ai n
reason
for th e en d of
expansion
was political. Th e
c omma nders who ha d
led
armies
to
great
under
t he l at e
Republic ha d also been th e main leaders
in
th e civil
wars
had destroyed
the Republican system
of
government.
The e mpe ror c ould
t afford to allow other
senators freedom
to
conquer letting
them
gain
prestige
an d
th e
personal loyalty of
their
soldiers so that
t hey b ecame
dangerous
T he m aj or
wars
in
th e
latter
part
of
Augustus Principate ha d been fought
T H E R O M AN E M PI RE
AD
68
Following N ero s suicide in
68 the oman world was
plunged into turmoil as four
emperors
held
power in little
over a year. In this civil
war
the oman divided along
provincial lines supporting
the various candidates for
the throne. The eventual
winner
was Vespasian
supported
at first by the
legions in Syria and ]udaea
then Egypt and finally most
of
the anubian garrisons.
{
/
Roman Empire
lient state
Legionary base or
temporary station position
frontier of
the
Roman
Empire AD
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ROM N W RF RE
Trajan was one
of
the most
respected
of
omes
emperors nd the last to
devote so
much of
his reign
to expansion However his
eastern campaigns were left
incomplete t his death nd
his successor Hadrian
b ndoned
much of
the
newly conquered territory
rr
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C O N TR O L L IN G T H E WORLD
AD
14-193
family
members,
bu t few of
t he l at er empero rs
e njoyed suc h a
plentiful supply
relatives whose ability an d loyalty
could
be relied
upon. Emperors took
care
to
present
when
a
great
war, especially a wa r
of conquest,
was fought.
Claudius,
e since
birth
an d
d en ied any mil it ary
servi ce as a r es ul t, w as
eager
to achieve
glory after
his
unexpected elevation
to
th e throne,
an d
l au nc he d t he
of
Britain.
He joined t he ar my wh en it took t he m ai n t ri ba l centre at
an d accepted t he s ur re nd er of a crowd of
British kings,
even
he spent little more than a
w ee k i n
Britain before returning
to
Rome to
brate his triumph. More usually,
presiding
over a
great
conquest
required
th e
to
spend
a l on g p er io d away from
Rome and
many were no t
secure
ough in their
position
to
relish
th e
-prospect of this. The
system
of th e
di d no t
favour
widespread expansion.
H E
ARMY OF THE
PRINCIPATE
]ulio-Claudian elnperors c omplete d the process of converting th e
Roman
into
a
professional
force of
regular
soldiers.
I t wa s
very m uc h th e army of
e
emperor,
all
recruits
t ak in g a n oath the sacramentum of
allegiance to
th e
rather than th e
Senate an d
People of
R om e. R eg ul ar
parades an d
ations were
held
by all un it s to c omme morate festivals
associated
with
th e
m i l ~
Images
of the emperor,
imagines were
kept
with
th e
standards
symbolized th e
corporate
identity
of a
unit.
When
legionaries
were
they
received a bounty
an d
allotment of
l an d p ai d
for
through
th e
um Militare,
th e
military
treasury
established by Augustus
an d
controlled
t he e mp er or .
A rm y c om ma nd er s were now, with very few exceptions,
of th e emperor legati
possessed
of delegated
authority,
rather
magistrates
holding power
in
t he ir o wn n am e. D ec or at io ns for gallantry
re awarded
in the
n am e o f th e emperor even
if he
wa s
f ar f ro m
th e theatre of
Th e
legions, about
t hi rt y i n
number by
th e
early
second
century,
remained the
ncipal units
of
th e r ~
Their
paper
strength
was about
5,240, primarily
of
ten cohorts
of heavy
i n n t r ~ Each
legion
included
a l ar ge number
specialists,
such
as cl erks ,
engineers,
surveyors,
artillerymen,
weapons
an d
drill-masters, tent-makers an d leather-workers, an d craftsmen
d artisans
connected
with the manufacture an d
repair
of weapons an d armour.
gions were
no w
permanent, many lasting for well over three hundred years, an d
veloped a strong sense of
identity
reflected
in
their
individual
numbers an d
Thus we have L eg io
XI V
Gemina
Martia Victrix
T he T wi n , p ro ba bl y
of its
original formation
through
th e
amalgamation
of
tw o legions;
of
or
martial and Victorious
wer e t itl es granted by
Nero after
it s
role
in the defeat of Boudicca),
Legio V
Alaudae
Th e
Larks ),
gio VI
Ferrata T h e
Ironsides )
or
Legio
Traiana Fortis Trajan s o wn , t he
Soldiers ten ded t o
describe
the mselve s a s members of a particular
an d then as
part
of
th e legion,
suggesting
th e b on ds m os t i m po r ta n t t o
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ROMAN
WARFARE
uxiliary infantrymen
present
the
severed heads
of
Dacians to the
Emperor on
this scene from Trajan- s
Column
The
Romans had
outlawed
the practice
of
head-hunting, so
common
in Iron geEurope, within
the
Empire,
but
i t was
clearly still practised
by
some units in
the
army.
The
evidence suggests
that only
auxiliaries
took
such
trophies,
and
it is possible
that
it was associated
with
certain races such as Gauls
or Germans. In a sense these
men
are
behaving
as
if they
were warriors in a tribal
army, presenting the
trophies
of
their prowess to
the
Emperor
as
they would
to one of their own
chieftains, in anticipation
of
praise and reward.
rr 8
them. Legions were p ri maril y i nt en ded for
fighting big b at tl es b ut t he ir command
structure allowed them to function well as
garrisons
an d
administrators for a
wide
area
Detachments
or
vexillations were frequently
employed for duties
that
di d
not require
a full
legion an d these va rie d in
size from several
co ho rts t o a few men
The
Romans had always relied on foreign
t ro op s t o supplement the numbers of the citizen
legions These included allied troops as well as
th e followers
of
tribal war-leaders whose
loyalty wa s to their chief whether he fought
with
or against Rome
It
wa s particularly
common to
raise co nt in gent s from t he
a re a i n
which
th e
army was
campaigning both
because
it wa s
easy
to do
so
an d also
because such
troops were usually suited
to
the conditions of
local
warfare.
Caesar relied largely on Gallic
an d
German cavalry during the conquest of
Gaul but although effective in battle these
proved
poor
scouts since reconnaissance played
a
minor
role in tribal
warfare. Th e
early
Principate
saw the creation
of
th e
regular auxilia,
foreign troops
uniformed
an d
paid
by Rome
an d
trained
to
t he s ame s tand ard s
of
discipline as
th e
legions Th e
men
were long-service
professional
soldiers
like th e
legionaries an d
served in
units that
were
equally permanent. Unit
titles were usually taken
f ro m t he
ethnic
group or
t ri be fro m
which
it
was first raised Most auxilia served
far
f rom their
place
of
origin
an d little or no
effort
was t ak en t o dr aw
new
recruits
from
th e
original source Therefore
auxiliary
units t en ded t o become of mixed nationality
although long service in a province might cause o ne g ro up t o p re do mi na te . T he
language
of
c omma nd a nd
of
t he u ni t s administration was always Latin which
m ad e i t
relatively easy
t o abs orb
a
mixture of
nationalities in
a single regiment
Th e auxilia
were never grouped into units
of
similar size to
th e
legions Th e
infantry
were f or me d in
c oh or ts a nd
th e cavalry in similarly sized
alae.
Each
cohort or ala was
independent
with
its own commander
an
equestrian usually
holding
th e r an k o f
prefect
number of auxiliary
units were
often attached
to a
legion a nd prolonge d
service
together raised th e
efficiency
of such
forces
bu t
there
wa s no
standard
complement of auxilia permanently supporting every
legion The smaller size of auxiliary units made
i t m uc h
easier to shift
them
from
o ne a re a or province to another. The
mixed
cohorts cohortes equitatae) which
included both foot an d h or se in
a
ratio
of
about four to one
were especially
s ui te d t o garrison
an d
local policing activities
The auxilia provided
a
more
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CONTROLLING THE
WORLD
AD
4 93
LEFT:
Trajan rewards
auxiliary soldiers for their
bravery in a parade
at
the·
end
of
the First Dacian ar
One of the most important
aspects
of
a
Roman
o m m n d e r ~ s
role was to act
as a w it ne ss to his
s o l i r s ~
behaviour rewarding the
brave and punishing the
cowardly. The
Romans
were
especially keen to reward
acts
of
individual bravery
and
bravado even
if
these
had little practical value for
aggressive soldiers were
needed
if
the
army
was to
prevail in
hand to hand
combat. The brave were
given an extra share of the
booty
and promotion
Auxiliaries received
unit
battle honours rather than
individual decorations in
this period.
BOVE
In this scene
on
Trajan s
Column
the
sculptors emphasized the
diversity of the soldiers
of
the Roman army. Here we
have legionaries in segmented
armour and with
tile-shaped
shields fighting alongside
auxiliaries in mail and with
oval shields bare-chested
barbarian irregulars
and
archers in flowing robes from
the eastern provinces. The
different types of soldier are
heavily stylized on the
Column and some of
the
uniform
details may be
inaccurate
but
the picture
of
an army recruited from many
different races was essentially
true.
Most of
the figures
originally held bronze spears
now
lost which explains
why
so many appear to be waving
their clenched fists.
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ROMAN WARFARE
Medical orderlies at a field
dressing station
attend
to
casualties during a battle in
Dacia. The Roman armys
medical service was
probably more advanced
than that
of
any
army
until
the modern era and many
types of wounds could be
treated with a good chance
of
success.
s
in all conflicts
until the twentieth century,
the Roman army
is
likely to
have suffered f r greater
losses from disease than
enemy action. It is however,
exceptionally
r re
for
Roman as opposed to
enemy
casualties, to be
represented on a monument
and
this scene may allude to
an incident when Trajan had
some
of his
own
clothes cut
up to provide bandages for
his wounded soldiers.
2
flexible and
cheaper
supplement
to
legionary numbers. They also
supplied the army with some troop
types
in
which
the
l egions were
especially def icient
in particular
supplying large
numbers of
very
good
quality cavalry. Auxiliary
infantry
also
included units of
archers and
contingents
of
slingers but the
traditional view
that
auxiliary foot
were
lighter equipped and fought
in
looser order than the
legions is
mistaken. The typica l auxil ia ry
infantryman wore
scale
or
armour of
s imilar weigh t
to
the
legionary
CUlrass and a bronze
helmet, carried a flat oval shield and
was armed with
a
gladius
and
a
javelin
or
spear. This is
not the
equ ipment of
a
nimble
skirmisher.
There may have been a few cohorts
with lighter equipment
who
fought as skirmishers
but
we have
no
direct evidence
for this. The vast majority of auxiliary cohorts fought in close
order
in a way not
markedly
different
from
legionaries.
All soldiers enlisted for twenty-five years
the last
five
of
which were
spent
as
a
veteran with lighter
duties. Auxiliaries were granted Roman citizenship at
the
end of this period, although somet imes whole uni ts earned
this
distinction
prematurely as a
result of distinguished
service.
The
uni t kept
the
title
civium
Romanorum permanently even when all the
men who
enjoyed the grant had long
since departed. The vast majority
of
soldiers were volunteers conscription was
rarely imposed except when an allied tribe
or
kingdom was obliged by treaty to
supply a
set quo ta o f
men for
the
auxilia.
The army provided
a
soldier with
a
regular
if
not
especially lavish
salary paid
in
hard
coin
but
subject
to
various
deductions. His living conditions in barracks were cramped,
bu t
then so were
those of the urban poor
in
the
Roman world
and
soldiers
had the
advantage of
good medical support . His activities were closely
regulated and the
soldier was
subject
to a harsh, frequently brutal, and
sometimes
arbitrary system of
discipline. The centurion s vine-cane
vitis
was a badge
of
office but was
frequently used to
inflict
summary punishment. One centurion,
lynched during
the mutiny of the Danubian
legions
in AD
14 was
nicknamed Bring
me
another
cedo alteram
from his habit
of
beating a soldier s back
until
his
cane snapped
and
then
demanding
another. Desertion
w as always a
problem
in the professional
army
and
a frequent motive was the
wish
to avoid punishment. It was also
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C O N TR O L LI N G T H E WORLD AD 14-193
practice
fo r
centurions
an d
other officers to accept
bribes
to spare
from
unpleasant duties. Another
aspect
of
military
discipline was th e
on soldiers marrying an y existing marriage
being
annulled on
enlistment.
e m ai n r ea so n for this
was
a
reluctance
of the state to accept
financial
onsibility for soldiers
an d their
families.
It
is
quite clear
that
many soldiers
live i n s ta bl e relationships w it h w om en an d raised
children
their families
ng in the civilian settlements canabae
outside
forts or perhaps even inside th e
T he g ran t of
citizenship
to discharged
auxiliaries
included a
clause
this right to
any children which makes
it
clear that
th e ba n
was
not
idly enforced. Th e citizen
legionaries
found
it
much
harder
to gain official
an d citizenship for
their
children.
T he a rm y
di d
offer
th e
prospect o f p ro m ot io n
to increasingly
senior more
an d
better
paid
ranks
bu t
t he h ig h standard
of literacy essential for
of
these favoured
the better-educated
recruits. In
theory
i t w as p os si bl e f or
ordinary
soldier
to advance th ro ug h the lesser ranks
until he
became a
through
the centurionate
a nd h ol d
th e
r an k o f primus pilus,
senior
centurion
i n a l eg io n an d
then
be elevated to
the equestrian
o rd er a n d
made governor
of a minor
province o r c om m an d
a
c oh or t o f
the Prae torian
ard . But s uch a meteo ric rise was h ig hly unlikely though p os sible for a family
several generations;
more mod est adv an cemen t w as
common.
As important
talent
a nd e duc ation
in
determining
the fortunes
of
a c ar ee r w as influence.
ronage was all pervasive in Roman society
an d
letters of recommendation ar e
most common form of literature to
survive
from
n t i q u i t ~
A
letter from an
uential friend or family member greatly accelerated a career.
On
active service
so ldi er m ig ht d is ti ng ui sh h im se lf an d so come
to
th e attention
of
a
wh o could promote him
but
such
opportunities
were rare in
Many
auxiliaries came fro m
cultures
which
greatly
admired
warrior
virtues
wh o found service in th e Roma n a rmy attractive bu t th e legions tended to be
f ro m t he poorest elements of
Roman
s o i e t ~ As th e first century AD
an d
fewer Ital ian s j oi ned th e legions preferring instea d the
lucrative
more comfortable an d
safer
prospect
of
serving
i n t he Praetorian
o r o th er
paramilitary forces in R om e itself.
Recruits increasingly
came
the p ro vinces where there
ha d
b een a heavy settlement of veteran colonies
t here was also a smal l bu t significant number of me n
born
i n th e
camp
n
the illegitimate sons produced by soldiers illegal marriages. Th e rest of
the wealthier
classes wh o feared t he a rm y s
capacity
to plunge
state
into civil war
despised
soldiers as brutal
an d
The professional
of
th e
Principate lived
in
bases on th e fringes of th e Empire
each
by a civil settlement
which
provided most of it s
needs
an d after
many
legionaries settled in colonies
w it h o th er
soldiers.
The
degree
of
varied
f ro m p ro vi nc e
to
province
an d
i n d if fe re nt
p er io ds b u t i t
raged identification
with th e
s ol di ers u ni ts . In Pol yb iu s d ay
a
soldier
1 21
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R O M A N WARFARE
decorated for valour returned to Rome an d wore his awards during public
festivals
to th e admiration of th e
rest
of
societ) .
No w th e
army
formed
very much
its ow n
community
with its ow n
se t of distinctly
military values. Soldiers were
granted
status
in accordance with their
conformity
to these standards an d those
wh o were decorated or gained a reputation for martial virtue were respected
within
th e arm) .
Many
of
th e
minor distinctions in grade rank an d
title which
seem to have been
i m po r ta n t t o
soldiers may have been as incomprehensible
to
contemporary civilians as they are to us. Pride in themselves an d in their unit was
a
major factor
in making Roman soldiers willing to risk death
or
appalling
injur T
Th e
senior officers
of th e
army were still drawn
from
th e elite
of
th e
Roman
world
an d
served for comparatively
short
periods. It
ha s
been estimated
that
a
provincial
governor, legionary
legate tribune
or
auxiliary
prefect
served
on
average for three years in
an y
post but there was
much variation
in this
pattern.
Greater continuity was provided by t he cent urio ns
wh o
were career soldiers.
Traditionally
they
have
been
depicted as
the equivalent
of NCOs
in modern
armies
sergeant-majors
promoted out of
the ranks after long service,
wh o
offered the maturity and experience lacking in their
amateur
senior officers. It
is
true that we know
of
a number
of
individuals wh o were promoted to th e
cent u ri o nat e after
service as
ordinary
soldiers. Equally, we
k no w o f
a
similar
number
of
equestrians
wh o
chose to follow a career as legionary centurions
an d
were directly commissioned an d other
me n
who achieved th e rank after a period
in
municipal
government.
Most
centurions
seem
to
have achieved
th e
position
after service in some
of th e
junior ranks perhaps
on t he s ta ff of
th e
tribune or
legate
or
as on e
of
th e
prin ip les
in
th e
centur) . Patronage is likely to have played
a
greater
part
in their selection than abilit T Centurions required
a very high
s ta n da rd o f education an d
often
held
positions
of considerable
responsibility,
acting as regional representatives
of th e
civil power in the provinces,
or
in
political
or diplomatic
roles
on
th e frontiers. They
were
also
me n
of status
enjoying fa r higher pay
an d better
conditions
than ordinary
soldiers. Th e
majority
of
centurions were p rob abl y d raw n
from the more
p ro sp erou s an d
better-educated classes
of
Roman society whose existence is to o often ignored by
scholars a pt t o
divide society into
t he aristocratic
elite
a nd t he p oo r .
T R A I N I N G A N D T AC TI CS
Their
battle-drills are no different
f ro m t he
real
thing .. . I t w ould no t
be far f rom
th e truth
to call
their
drills bloodless battles,
their
battles bloody drills.
]osephus
p res en ted an idealized view
of th e
army s efficiency, bu t while th e
warriors of
many
different
peoples
were well
p ra ct is ed i n t he
use
of their personal
weapons,
o nl y t he R om ans t ra in ed
both
as
individuals an d
units.
A ccording to
th e later
mil it ary t heo ri s t Vegetius, th e first thing a
n ew r ec ru it
was taught was the
military pace: l earni ng h ow
to
march in step an d
keep his
p la ce i n f or ma ti on .
Personal
fitness received a
high
priority an d
there
were
regular route
marches
of
twenty Roman miles in five hours
at
th e normal pace an d twenty-four in the same
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C O NT R OL L IN G T H E
WORLD
AD 14-193
at
t he q ui ck
step
On some
marches
th e
recruits
pped to learn how to la y o u t
an d
construct a
camp They were
taught
how to use
personal we apons by practising thrusts
cuts
against
a
l.8-metre post
fixed
into th e
At first
they
used wooden swords and
er shields of twice th e weight of th e
normal
t o s tren gt hen t heir
arms On at least on e
asion these wooden practice swords were
d as batons by troops
quelling
a
riot.
r this they fenced w it h o th er recruits
tips
of
their
swords
covered with
pads to prevent serious injury
an d
whole units would fight mock
practised a complex series
of
ls involving movement in forma tion a nd
th e
of missiles culminating in th e
Hippaka
Gymnasia
or
cavalry
Training was
not
just
an
experience
for
recruits
a continual activity t o m ai nt ai n a unit s f f i i n ~ Often t he m an y d uties
required
th e
dispersal of a
unit hinde re d
its training bu t
good
officers
sure
that
t heir men
were well drilled
a nd t he ir weapons
well
maintained.
If
permitted
at
th e beginning of a campaign the n most generals exercised their
to bring them to the
peak of
f f i i n ~ A monument f ro m th e
base
of
Augusta at L am ba es is i n North A fr ic a r ec or ds a speech
made
by
to the army of th e
province
after it had performed several days
of
The e mpe ror displayed a detailed knowledge of th e units strength
an d
deployment as well as a
technical understanding of
t he m an oe uv re s
He noted that Legio Augusta ha d detached on e cohort for service
h the
proconsul of t he n ei gh bo ur in g
province
ha d
sent
a
vexillation of
cohort
p lus f ou r men fr om each
of
th e
other
centuries
to
reinforce
legion an d provided
many
small
detachments
to m an small outposts a nd
stations
while th e unit ha d recently moved its camp twice These factors
ht have restricted
th e
ability
of th e
legion t o t ra in as a
unit
bu t Hadrian
used
m to reinforce his praise for t he ir a ct ua l p er fo rm an ce . Similarly when
ressing the cavalry
of
a
cohors equitata
he commented
that it
was difficult for
h a un it t o p er fo rm satisfactorily i mm ed ia te ly a ft er a n ala with its larger
better equipment
an d
mounts ha d
pu t
on
a display before
expressing
praise for
their
achievement
Occasionally
Hadrian expressed
disapproval
of
ill for instance criticizing a cavalry
unit
for
mounting
a
charge
that
was
to o
an d uncontrolled bu t his speech overwhelmingly on e of
praise
for
th e
units
especially their officers
This first-century cavalry
parade
helmet
from Syria is
one o f the earliest examples
of
this type. Such lavishly
decorated armour and
fittings combined with
brightly coloured clothing
and standards added to th e
spectacle
of
the cavalry
games or
Hipparka
Gymnasia. Divided
into two
teams the horsemen
took
turns to throw blunt headed
javelins
at
the
other
side
hence the need to protect the
rider s face with a
metal
mask.
3
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ROMAN
WARFARE
The
tombstone of
the
auxiliary cavalryman
Vonatorix was found at
onn
and
dates to the first
half of the first century D
He wears scale armour
which appears to have been
almost as common s mail
and may have been popular
because it could be polished
to a high sheen lthough in
the
same basic posture as
Flavius Bassus
on
this
earlier
tombstone
Vonatorix
s no t
shown galloping over
a defeated barbarian
4
Discipline an d order
were e mp ha si ze d i n all
of
the a rm y s
manoeuvres
whether in training or on
campaign.
Gone were days when Roman columns
b lu nd ered alo n g
on
the march risking ambush from a ski lful o pp on en t. T he
army
of
th e Principate moved behind a screen
of
cavalry outposts supported by
detachments
o f i nf an tr y
including a high
p r op o rt io n o f
missile
armed troops.
Special units
of
cavalry
known
as
exploratores
were formed specifically
to
perform
th e role
of
reconnaissance If th e
enemy
were close then
th e
whole
army
might move
in
b att le fo rmati o n
each
unit in
place
an d ready to deploy f rom
march co lu mn i nt o a fighting line It was common to move with th e army formed
into a
large
hollow s qua re i f it wa s uncertain from which direction
th e
enemy
m ig ht a tt ac k. All
these
techniques
had developed
g radu al ly d u ri ng
th e lo ng
experience
of
frontier warfare
bu t
were perfected
in
th e first century
AD . Th e
creation of th e
regular
auxilia
provided
large numbers of w e l l t r ~ n e d cavalry
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C O N TR O L L IN G T H E
WORLD
AD
14-193
w ere
far
better suited to tasks
such
as scouting than many of th e allied
ingents, which
ha d
served with
Republican
armies,
ha d
ever been.
Th e greater
discipline
of the Imperial army
was
reflected
in
its
battle
tactics.
ybius day
legionaries advanced
noisily, b an gi ng t he ir w ea po ns a ga in st
r shields
an d shouting. From at
least
Caesar s
day,
Roma n infa ntry advanced
an d in silence.
Legionaries no w
carried
only on e pilum At
very short
probably within
15 metres
of th e
enemy,
they
threw
these
in
a single volley
charged. Only at· this moment
di d
they break th e silence an d yell their battle
In t hi s way t he y d eli vered a mas siv e
twin-shock
t o t he ir enemy:
th e
physical
of
a
barrage of
heavy
pil an d th e
moral
shock of the sudden screa ming
Th e
noisy advance
of th e
Polybian
legion
h ad n ot
been
that
different
to
w il d,
screaming
advance of a
Gallic
w ar b an d. A
s il en t adv an ce w as
more
an d
certainly
harder
to
achieve. Only a very
high standard
of
restrained me n from
releasing
their nervous tension
by instinctively
a nd r un nin g f or ward to
get
th e impending
clash
over with a tendency
broke up
the ir forma tion. A sl ower, steadier
advance
kept the ranks
d er , a ll ow ed
th e
officers to keep control over
th e
formation
an d ensured
th e
unit remaine d
a
dense
mass throughout th e
charge.
Such an
advance
unstoppable a nd there
was
a good chance
that
th e enemy would
be
en before
th e
charge
w en t h ome
or
after
a very
brief burst
of fighting. If this
not happe n t he n t he
resulting combat was
m uc h th e s am e
as
on e fought
by a
legion. R om an d oc tr in e e mp ha si zed individual
aggression
an d
ers were
taught
to
get c lose
t o t he ir
opponent
in
o rd er t o
use
t he ir s h or t
gl dii T he s ta nd ar d
drill
was
to
punch th e enemy in th e
face
with
shield-boss an d
then stab him
in
th e stomach. In an ideal
situation his
ha d a lrea dy lost his shield to a thrown pilum The Roman scutum was
heavy: weights of reconstructions have r an ge d f ro m 5.5 to 10 kilograms
an d a blow delivered with
th e
weight
of th e body behind th e
soldier s
h an d s to od a
good chance of overbalancing
an
opponent. T his might
always be possible a nd R om an soldiers were trained
to
deliver a
wide
range
an d
thrusts.
Crouc he d be hind a
scutum
most of th e
soldier s
tor so
well
protected an d t he d es ig n
of
t he h el me t
an d
all
types
of
cuirass
gave
protection to the head an d shoulders vulnerable t o d ow nw ar d cuts.
Roman infantry
helmets left
th e
face an d ears uncovered to allow me n
a r
orders an d see clearly what was
going
on
around them
so
that wounds
to
face were
common. Th e junior leaders of th e
Roman army, especially
th e
s, led aggressively, an d individual boldne ss by all ranks
was
encouraged
th e
lavish
reward
decoration
an d
promotion granted to those who
guished themselves. Discipline an d
unit pride
gave
t he Romans g reat
staying
r i n
combat
keeping
them in close c on ta ct w i th th e enemy, bu t
victories
wo n
by
th e
few
me n wh o
were
prepared
to
g o f ir st
an d
cu t
a
path
i nt o t he
r ~ n k s
Roman
generals
kept
close to
th e
fighting so
that they
were able to
r d s uc h m en .
They
were a lso
in
a
g oo d p osi ti on to g au ge ho w th e combat
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ROMAN
WARFARE
was going
an d
commit or le ad in reserve cohorts
o r d i n g l ~
The
legionary
cohort
was very
much
a
functional tactical u nit a nd was rare ly a focus of
especially strong l o y l t ~ Th e
cohort
was
almost
certainly
commanded
by
th e pilus prior,
its
senior
c entu ri on a lt ho ugh n o c on te mp or ar y source
explicitly states this There were few tactical options
available
to th e commander
of
a
cohort and
his
main
jo b
was to move
t he m en
under his command
as a body to wherever they were r eq ui re d t o be
He
then needed t o c on tr ol th e cohort s
advance
ensuring
that th e
volley
of pila an d
final running
charge were delivered o n o rd er a nd di d no t come as
a
spontaneous
outburst.
Once
in close
contact w ith
th e
enemy then
much
responsibility devolved on to
th e other
centurions
an d
th e principales in each
n t u r ~ Their
jo b
was to inspire the men to
organize an d lead
as many as possible in successive
rushes
f or wa rd u nt il t he
enemy had
been
routed.
After
that
the senior centurion once again needed to
BOVE The
Roman army
in
Lower
Moesia recorded its
role in the Dacian Wars in
several
monuments
at
Adamklissi in modern day
Romania, including these
reliefs or Metopes from the
Troepaeum Traiani. More
crudely carved than Trajan s
Column they give a
r
more accurate view
of
the
equipment actually
worn
on
campaign. This legionary
soldier wears mail, instead
of
the segmented armour,
has extra armour on his
right arm and greaves
strapped to his calves. He
is
punching his enemy in the
face with his shield boss and
then stabbing
him
in the
stomach with his sword, a
clear artistic representation
o f
the classic
Roman
fighting technique described
by our
literary sources.
6
RIGHT: The Metopes at
Adamklissi
clearly told a
story,
but
the original
sequence
is
unknown
s
are the details
o f
the
campaign itselt and it
is
no w
impossible to
reconstruct the narrative.
In this scene a legionary
is
ambushed by
an archer,
apparently naked, hidden
in a tree. In the foreground
lies a rotting corpse, its
stomach burst open and
face little more than a
skull, with a shield and
gladius beside it. Possibly
this represents the Romans
fighting a battle on the site
of
an earlier defeat, and
the dedication
o f
the altar
at Adamklissi to Mars
Vltor The Avenger )
may
support this,
but
it
is
impossible to reach a
definite conclusion.
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control over th e
whole cohort
to restore
a nd pr ep are his
tired me n to
move
an d
fight again as a unit In a large battle there
relatively little scope for independent action at
cohort
level
an d
th e centurions
commanding
f or me d part of
a
command
structure
which
t he l eg io na ry le ga te to control the five
me n
under his command more easily an d
ectly enabled
the commander-in-chief
to direct
whole force In a large battle
most
auxiliary
acted to all intents an d purposes like th e
tically sized legionary cohorts. However their
of a clear command
structure
above
th e
level
of
cohort made the m ha rde r to manoeuvre in
large
an d less easy to employ as reserves
iliaries were often
deployed
as t he a rm y s first
t he m or e easily controlled legionaries
act as supports;
alternatively
they might be
o ut o n
t he army s
flanks
Roman
infa ntry doctrine
stressed that it was
ays wise to advance to m ee t e ne my i nf ant ry
C O N T RO L L IN G T H E
WORLD
AD
14-193
LEFT The literary sources
stress that the Roman
soldier was taught to thrust
with his sword and easily
beat opponents who relied
on
slashing. In fact the
gladius was a well balanced
weapon ideally suited to
both cutting and thrusting
and soldiers were trained to
fence
and
deliver a range of
blows. Here a legionary
delivers a downward slash
against his kneeling
opponent He wears scale
armour the segmented arm
guard clearly visible. This
extra protection was to
defend against the
two-
handed sword or falx
of
an
enemy. This long scythe-
like weapon could inflict
appalling wounds severing
limbs before a
Roman
was
close enough to use his
short sword.
BOVE A legionary stabs
down to despatch his
opponent holding his
gladius like a dagger. At
least three distinct barbarian
peoples are represented on
the Troepeum Traiani and
opinion divided as to
whether they are Dacians or
allied peoples.
One
group
not shown fighting wear
long tunics and are probably
Sarmatians. The bare-
chested warriors fighting
with
the falces wear
trousers are bearded and
wear either tight skull caps
or have their hair tied into a
side knot a style associated
with
Germanic tribes such
as the Suebi. They are
probably a related tribe
known as the Bastarnae
who
were allied to the
Dacians.
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ROMAN
WARFARE
SInce a charge encouraged aggression whereas
passively
waiting to
receive a charge was dispiriting.
A sudden infantry charge could rout disordered or
stationary
cavalry
stampeding the
horses
but
i t was
normally wise for foot to meet cavalry at the hal t. A
cavalry charge was an immensely
intimidating
sight.
Scattered or dispersed
infantry
were helpless against
it since
most men would
flee
and
allow
the
horsemen
to
cut down with ease even
those
who
attempted to fight. Arrian descr ibes a
formation
designed to resis t a charge by the heavily armoured
horsemen of the Alans. Th e legionaries were
formed
eight
ranks deep the first
four armed with
the
pilurn
the remain der w ith a lighter javelin
probably the
lancea. Th e
front
rank held their pila
at
forty five degrees the but ts b raced against the
ground
so
that
they
presented
a dense row
of
points
to the
The
men in the next three ranks after
throwing
their
pila
braced themselves
against
the
men in front. The remaining legionaries threw their
lanceae
while a
n in th rank of foot archers
a
tenth
ABOVE: These legionaries
parade
without armour
or
helmets. They are carrying
pila with
spherical weights
mounted above the
handgrip a measure which
must
have increased the
penetrative powers
of
these
heavy missiles. Beneath their
tunics they wear tight
fighting breeches reaching
down to below the knee.
Modern imagination often
pictures Roman soldiers
invariably wearing clothes
suitable for a Mediterranean
climate but it clear that
uniforms were adapted to
cope with the local climate.
The Vindolanda tablets
make
frequent reference to
trousers underwear socks
and cloaks many of which
were privately purchased.
128
RIGHT: This Metope
shows
three
Roman
standard
bearers
two vexilla
or flags
flanking a wreathed
standard probably
originally topped by an
eagle. Standards were
physical expressions
of
a
units
corporate identity
and were treated with great
reverence. In a
permanent
camp they were
kept
in a
special shrine in the unit s
headquarters or
principia.
llsoldiers at
damklissi
are depicted as clean shaven
unlike the legionaries on
Trajans Column many of
whom have thick beards.
This scene like many
others
at damklissi has a nearly
identical companion
possibly to represent the
two legions garrisoning
Lower
Moesia.
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of horse archers
and artillery added to the
of
missiles. This heavy
weight
of missiles
have
br ou gh t down
a fair number
of
bu t even
those
who survived would not
been able to get into contact with
the
infantry
the ir horses
would instinctively refuse to
into such a seemingly solid object. Once the
rge was stopped
the
continual deluge of javelins
arrows
continued
to weaken them as they stood
otently a few metres from the infantry line until
were inevitably forced to
withdraw.
Such
olid formation deterred the cavalry from
by its very appearance while the
packed ranks prevented the Romans from
awa T Such a formation
was
only possible
h s ta ti onary troops especially since Arrian
ocated a so lid
infantry
line with
none of the
al intervals between the cohorts.
Cavalry were unable to hold ground and
between
horse
were very fluid fast moving
in which successful charges
spen t the ir
CONTROLLING THE
WORLD AD 14 193
LEFT
Each century included
a musician equipped with
the curved military trumpet
or
cornu
which were used
to convey simple orders.
When
a unit charged and
the men broke their silence
and yelled their battle cry
the trumpets blared
ou t
to
add to the noise and
intimidate the enemy. The
Jewish general Josephus
claimed that he ordered his
men to cover their ears to
blot
out
the terrifying noise
when they were awaiting a
Roman attack. The army
also employed a straight
trumpet
known
s the tuba
which apparently had a
different pitch and was used
to convey the orders
of
senior officers.
BOVE A Roman legionary
stands in a wagon and uses
his
pilum
s a spear to
thrust
down
at a barbarian.
The presence
o f
wagons and
women
and children with
the barbarians on the
Metopes has sometimes
been taken
s
an indication
that the story tells
of
an
attempted migration which
the Roman army met and
defeated. This
s
possible
but many
tribal armies were
accompanied by the
warriors families who
carried food for them
attended to their wounds
and watched the battle to
witness and judge their
behaviour. ne of the
scenes
on Trajan s
olumn
shows a battle raging
around barbarian wagons
and it s possible that this
refers to the same episode.
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C O NT R OL L IN G T H E
WORLD AD
14-193
in pursuit the horses becoming blown
an d
vulnerable to fresh enemy
The Romans were careful always to leave at least half of their available
valry in separate supporting lines
behind
th e main advance. Horses will refuse
charge
straight into
a n oncoming line of cavalry so
when
combats
occurred
it
s because
e it he r t he t wo
lines had
opened the ir
files
allowing
t hem t o
gallop
each othe r s formation
or
they ha d
halted
just before
contact at
point individuals would begin to w al k t heir mounts forward to get within
or spear s
reach
of th e n ~
In
th e latter
case
th e melee
wa s
likely
be
longer an d
more
bloody
than th e former. More often than not on e
or
th e
o th er t ur ne d a nd fled before
th e
chargers
came into contact.
Selected
were often d ep lo yed i n close s up po rt o f cavalry sometimes travelling
b at tl e by running
alongside
th e horsemen an d clinging to the horses manes.
infantry rarely i nt er mi ng le d w it hi n t he r an ks of a cavalry formation.
formed
dense
knots of infantry behind the m ain cav alry lin e.
a frien dly cav alry unit
was
forced t o r et re at
it
could
shelter an d re-form
h in d o ne of these
infantry
blocks th e
infantry
driving off any
pursuers
missiles.
AND PARTHIA
r nearly
three centuries a fte r their
first
c la sh i n
BC th e
Parthians were th e
t dangerous opponents t he Ro mans faced in t he e as te rn part of th e Empire.
Pa rthia n military
system
an d philosophy w as radi call y d ifferent f ro m th e
an d
their
army relied almost exclusively
on
v l r ~ There were Parthian
most of whom were
said
to have
been archers bu t t hey w ere
of
poor
an d receive ve ry l it tl e mention
in our
sources.
The
strength of th e
OPPOSITE: The pride of the
Roman cavalry were the
horsemen of the alae
but
more numerous were the
soldiers
of
the
mixed
infantry
and
cavalry
cohortes equitatae.
These
men were not as highly paid
or as well
mounted
as the
men
of
the alae but they
performed
much
of
the
army s day-ta-day patrolling
and
escort duties. In battle
the cavalry contingents of
several cohorts were
taken
from their parent units and
massed to fo rm one
composite force roughly
equivalent in size to an ala.
This scene from the olumn
shows Roman v l r y m ~ n
pursuing defeated Sarmatian
cataphracts. oth horses and
riders are depicted as
completely covered in a
mesh
of
metal
scales a
fanciful reconstruction of a
type of soldier which the
sculptor had perhaps never
seen. These heavy cavalry
evidently impressed the
Romans
for Hadrian formed
the first regular cataphract
unit in the Roman army and
others were created in later
years.
1 3
1
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ROMAN
WARFARE
P RT I N W RS
The
wars between Rome
and
Parthia
tended
to
focus
on
the
same
few border
regions
the
client
kingdom
of rmenia and
the
valleys
of the Euphrates
and
Tigris
Trajan
mounted
a massive
effort in a final attempt to
defeat
the
Parthians
and
led
his troops as far as the
Persian ul fHowever
rebellions began to
erupt
in
the land to his rear and it
was
whilst busy
suppressing
these
that
the
emperor
fell ill
and
died
Parthian army lay in its tw o types
of
cavalry th e heavily armoured cataphracts
an d th e
light horse-archers.
It was t he
latter
wh o most encapsulated the Parthian
military p l o s o p ~ Horse-archers
were
unarmoured and would
stage a
mounted
charge only as a last
resort
against an enemy
wh o
was already weakened. Instead
they
used their powerful composite bows to shoot d ow n t heir enemies an d th e
mobility
of
their swift hor ses to avoid c on ta ct a nd make themselves difficult
targets
for return
fire.
Firing
from a
moving
h or se d id
no t make
for
accurate
shooting
bu t
th e
objective was
to
pepper
the target
area with as
many
arrows as
possible so
that some
were bound to find a mark. Only w hen the enemy ha d been
weakened by this constant barrage would the cataphracts charge an d break them.
If th e enemy s strength an d determination seemed
u nd imin is hed t hen
the
Parthians withdrew an d continued to shadow their opponents
waiting for a more
favourable
o p p o r t u n t ~ The
Parthians would
certainly
flee if the situation was
unfavourable. Th e readiness with which
th e
Parthians fled b ut th en r ou nd ed on
•
captured town
• Roman
legionary
base
annexed
114
annexed 115
frontier of
Roman Empire
Parthian
Empire in 114
Roman provincial
capital
temporary
occupation by
Rome in
116
Trajan s campaigns
with datel
•
I
200
miles
\
\ \
200
km
I
/
/
..- I
=::
/
/
/
-
- /
/
/
/
\
\
- /
/
J
-
\
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C O N T RO L L IN G T H E
WORLD AD 14-193
y incautious pursuers always astonished the
R om an s. I t
made it very difficult
inflict a decisive defeat on them
in
battle since it
was
so
e as y f or
th e enemy
to escape In 36 BC Mark Antony s soldiers were dismayed to discover
a P ar th ia n r ou t a nd vigorous Roma n pursuit produce d
only
thirty de ad
an d
hty prisoners
When t he R om an s a nd P ar th ia ns first encountered each other
in
battle at
in BC both sides were overconfident
Th e
Romans ha d grown
used
to
aside th e
armies
of Armenia an d P on tu s w i th c o ns u mm a te ease The
p ar t o f th e Roman cavalry an d
light
infantry
rashly
pursued a
Parthian
separated from the main force were
surrounded
an d
Throughout
th e
rest of th e
day
t he s qu ar e f or me d by th e legions
under a heavy barrage of
arrows
t he P ar th ia ns
regularly replenishing
quivers
from
a
well-organized supply
of ammunition carried by th e
camel
Many
Romans
were
w ou nd ed b u t t he a rm y was
never
weakened to the
This terracotta statuette
shows a galloping Parthian
horse archer out to fire
his re curved composite
bow. Later Arabic manuals
advised
th t
the archer
should im to loose his
arrow when his horse was in
mid stride. Accuracy was to
be sacrificed to deluge the
target with
as
m ny
missiles
as possible before the archer
withdrew out of
range
of
ny return fire.
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ROMAN
WARFARE
The Arch
of
Septimius
Severus
commemor ted
his successful Parthian
expedition during which he
h d
sacked oth Ctesiphon
nd Seleucia The reliefs
showing
scenes from the
fighting are heavily eroded
ut seem to have followed
the style
of
the
column of
Marcus Aurelius which
sacrificed accuracy for
artistic convention
134
point where i t
could
be swept aside
by a
cataphract charge and the
situation
reached
something
of a stalemate However the Roman army and its
commander
lost
heart
and decided to withdraw abandoning
its wounded
The Parthians
ideally sui ted to harassing a retreating foe especially one who was mostly on
foot pursued with vigour and nearly all of the Roman army was slaughtered or
forced
to
surrender
the
legions losing
their
precious eagles
This
complete success
encouraged the Parthians to despise Roman armies especially since
the
force
at
Carrhae represented only part of
their strength
and had
been
expected
to delay
and no t
to defeat
the Their
attempted invasion of Syria
ended
in disaster
however when
on
two occasions Parthian armies dashed themselves to pieces
attacking uphill against confident legionaries supported
by slingers whose
missiles might give a
cataphract
concussion even if they did
not
penetrate
his armour
After
this both sides tr ea ted the opponent with caution and
Roman
armies march ing aga inst the
Parthians
made sure
that they
included
a good
proport ion of
cavalry
and
infantry armed with missile weapons
Even more
importantly they used
all
elements
of
the
army to support
each
other
the heavy
infantry to provide
solidity the archers
and
slingers to keep
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C O N TR O L L IN G T H E
WORLD
AD 14-193
e enemy
at
a distance bowmen
on
foot will usually outrange horse-archers -
d th e cavalry to mount carefully controlled counter-attacks. Th e Parthians
to their military doctrine would refuse to join battle with
such
a well-
force although
they
would attempt
to lure out an d i so la te f or
t ru cti on an y s mall detachments whose commanders
were over
bold.
Skilful
gen rals kept their subordinates under tightly control when campaigning
the Parthians.
Th e result was a stand off. Th e Ro mans co ul d not force
the mobile
Parthians
a decisive battle
an d th e
Pa rthia ns c ould
not prevent
a
well-prepared
an d
R om an a rm y
from march in g through
their territory.
Th e
Romans
Parthian
cities an d strongholds besieging an d
s to rm in g t he m o ne
by
\
T h e P ar th ia n
capital Ctesiphon
was
sacked several times. Th e
Parthians
t heir mo bi li ty to
attack
th e Romans supply lines or distrac t their
by
d ee p r ai ds into
Syria
or
t he k in gd om s
allied
to Rome. Antony s
asion failed
when
his
siege-train lagging
behind the m ain columns
an d
by tw o legions was
captured
in its entirety. In th e
resultant
retreat
was harassed by the Pa rthia ns an d
suffered
enormous losses m os tl y f ro m
-
t
J
. : ~ .
,
5
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ROMAN WARFARE
disease an d
shortage
of provisions. A wa r fought
under
Nero went very well for
t he R om an s u nt il o ne p oo rl y
le d army suffe re d a re ve rse was jostled
into
a
panicked flight
an d
surrendered the legionaries undergoing
th e
humiliation of
b ei ng s en t
under th e yoke.
An
invasion of Parthia was a massive
undertaking
requiring huge numbers
of
troops
to
m ak e t he
advancing armies
strong enough
both
t o d et er P ar th ia n attacks and to be able to besiege an d
t ak e t heir
cities.
In
addition more
soldiers were
needed to
protect
th e
lines of
communication
that s up pl ie d t he advancing forces
an d
to
defend
R om e s p ro vi nc es a ga in
Parthian
attacks.
All these troops
needed
to be fed an d supplied an d much
of t he c am pa ig ni ng a re a
wa s
no t productive enough
to allow
t he t ro op s to
support themselves by foraging an activity which anyway left small detachments
isolated
an d
vulnerable to t he m ob ile n ~
Th e size of
P ar th ia a nd
the
time-consuming task of taking strongholds one by o ne u nt il t he P ar th ia n king
was forced to
come
to
terms
made an invasion an undertaking of several years.
Only th e
emperor
h im se lf c ou ld
command such
an ent erpris e
without the
probability
of
creating a
dangerous
rival an d few felt inclined
to
spend long years
o n c am pa ig n in th e east. Ultimately
th e
scale of
th e
t as k a nd
th e
difficulty
of
finding
sufficient
manpower prevented
a
Roman conquest
of
Parthia and
conflicts
came instead
to focus on domination of
the kingdoms
betwe en the two
empires
notably Armenia.
The Ro man s i n it iat ed most of th e conflicts with Parthia save i n AD 155
when the
Parthian king
launched
an
unprovoked
invasion of
Armenia
an d
followed
on to
attack Syria. T he P ar th ia ns
lack
of skill in siege
warfare
meant
that
their
.invasions
tended to consist
of
large-scale raids.
Parthia
was
a lwa ys v ery
w eak i nt ern al ly
an d rarely
presented
a real
threat to the
stability
of
t he R om an east.
Theoretically
th e Arsacid
king
controlled sufficient
wealth
from
th e prosperous
Hellenistic
cities an d
t he p ro fi ts
of
the
major
trade
routes
t o m ai nt ai n his
dominance
over
th e
r i s t o r ~ In
practice the
great
noble
families ha d usurped many royal prerogatives an d provided
the
majority
of
troops for
th e
royal army
s up pl ie d i n c on ti ng en ts
on a feudal
basis.
In many
ways
it
wa s
not
in
t he i nt eres t
of
t he m on ar ch
for
the
military
followers of noblemen to be to o effective. Surenas
th e
successful commander
at
Carrhae
wa s
e xe cut ed bec ause t he k ing
feared
hi m
as a
potential
rival.
Therefore
th e
political
system prevented
th e
army
from becoming
to o effective.
T he c on ti nu al renewal of war with
th e
Parthians
has
been
interpreted
as
an indication that Roman imperialism
had
no t died with th e
Republic
an d
that th e dream o f w orld co nq u es t an d th e desire to emulate
Alexander
the
Great still
motivated
many
emperors.
Th e
underlying
cause
of
this hostility
is simpler
an d
was
du e to th e Roma n unde rsta nding
of
war wh ich we have
already
discussed. T he P ar th ia ns h ad
fought
an d humiliated
t he Roman s
an d
were
therefore
enemies.
Until they
ceased to b e perceived i n t hi s way by bein g
absorbed
as
subordinate
allies
or
conquered
as a province
then
renewal
of
hostilities was inevitable.
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C O N T RO L L IN G T H E
WORLD AD
14-193
X ROM N
diers were present
i n s ma ll
numbers
throughout
th e
Empire.
The army
wa s
called
upon
to perform a great range
of
duties t ha t h ad little
to do with
its
tary role largely because th e
Empire
lacked a sizeable civil service . Soldiers
supervising building work assisting state
officials
in such tasks
as
ta x
guarding
city
prisons regulating traffic through
cities or
acting
as
In th e Ne w Testament we find a
centurion
commanding th e
which carried out th e crucifixion of Christ an d tw o others: th e
sent to
t ak e t he
Apostle Paul to
Rome
an d
in
Galilee a centurion
wh o
d supervised the construction of a synagogue although t he l as t
man
may well
ve been f ro m t he army of the Herods organized
th e
R om an m od el
an d
l at er ab so rb ed i nto t he
As t hese
passages suggest
centurions
in
were
often encountered
as representatives
Roman authority at a
local
level.
Records
on
include appeals to
centurions
for protection
inst domestic violence an d robbery an d for them
investigate murders an d disappearances. Other
parties of soldiers were scattered to supply
e army s
needs manufacturing or
collecting
forage
or
animals
quarrying
fo r stone
d recruiting. There
are
very many
records
of
against
soldiers
accusations
o f b ru ta l
of
civilians an d illegal seizure of property
under th e guise of requisitioning. Soldiers
detached from t he ir u n it an d away from
certainly
seem to have
b ee n g ui lt y of
t hei r p ow er over civilians bu t our sources
e more likely to mention th e cases of
friction
than
peaceful
interaction
an d it is difficult to
estimate
e n at ure of th e majority of relations between
th e
an d
civilian
population.
Many legions or
large
vexillationes were positioned in or near t he g re at
of
th e
eastern
empire. The
greater
part
of the tw o legions f or mi ng t he
of Egypt
were
based
near
Alexandria with
th e
clear
intention of over-
ing this great political
centre.
Th e
army
w as f re qu en tl y c all ed in to
quell
in th e This de ployme nt ha s
le d
to th e suggestion
that
t he R om an
at least
i n s om e
provinces
was
p ri ma ri ly a n a rm y of occupation
whose
ro le w as
to
control t he s ub ject population. The depiction
of
th e
Roman
as a brutal oppressor is an attractive on e for a generation of
scholars
wh o
ew e mp ire s as
inherently wrong. When the army was called in
t o pu nis h
for failing to
p ay t ax es
or
flouting th e authority
of
th e governor s
sentatives it proved
brutally
efficient
at
burning villages an d crucifying large
Vespasian was the eventual
winner
in the Civil War
which followed
ro s
enforced suicide in 68.
Commander of the army in
]udaea he gained the support
of
most
of the eastern
provinces
of
the Empire
Under Vespasian and his
sons Titus and Domitian
many
of the
old
turf
forts
on the
Empires
frontiers
were rebuilt in stone
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ROM N W RF R
This relief from the rch of
itus shows
the
spoils
carried in his triumph
celebrating the capture
of
erusalem i tus had
assumed command
of
the
army
in udaea
after
Vespasian declared
himself
a candidate for the throne
exploits
are described
with a great degree
of
sycophancy by the historian
osephus
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CO TROLLING THE WORLD AD 4 93
9
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ROM N W RF R
h iege of erusalem
March SeptemberAD 7
..
breached
wall
Roman
advance
Jewish counter attack
siege wall dyke
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C O N T RO L L IN G T H E
WOR LD AD
14-193
to terrify th e rest into submission. Such action was relatively
rare
an d it
important to remember that t he a rm y d id not number more than
250-300 000
this period compared to th e
population
of th e Empire roughly estimated at 70
Th e
R om an a rm y
wa s no t large
e no ug h t o
have
ruled
purely through
force
an d
much
of th e
population
of
th e
provinces
benefited
fr om th e
of the
Empire. Th e wealthiest
g ai ne d R om an
citizenship
became
or
senators an d might follow t he m il it ar y
careers open
to
these
ses while local
aristocrats provided
many centurions for th e auxilia.
Nor w er e al l th e
outbreaks
of
violence
within
t he E mp ir e d ue t o h at re d
of
rule. One of th e m ost f re quen t causes of
rioting
in Alexandria wa s
ion between the Jewish
and
Gentile communities there
and
fighting between
e Samaritans an d Jews in Judaea was also common. Rivalry among
cities
or
political factions
within
a city occasionally spilt over
into
an d
disturbances.
Banditry
was
rife
in
some
areas
especially at
times of
omic hardship
but
even
when
this w as
in part motivated
by hatred of Rome
targets were more often
than
no t an
area s
civilian population. I t is impossible
tell at this d is ta nc e i n t im e whether rebels or bandits w er e able
to
f ind r ef uge
civilian communities because of general sympathy for their cause or fear
their violence. U nr es t i n
many
a re as w as not a
creation
of Roman rule bu t
from previous kingdoms
an d
empires or th e result
of
ethnic tension. Its
ief motivation was
more often
social an d economic rather than political.
T H E SIEGE OF JERUSALEM AD
The Romans attack the Third Wall
makinga breach after fifteen days
despite fierce resistance.
The
Jewish rebels abandon this
p art o f
the city allowing the Romans to
occupy it without fighting
The Romans camp ins ide the Third
Wall demolishing the houses over
a wide area.
Th e
defenders make
frequent sallies and heavy fighting
ensues.
The
Romans breachthe
Second Wall
but
their attacking
columns are defeated after an initial
success. The Wall falls permanently
four days later
Titus orders four siege ramps to be
constructed. Completed after
seventeen days these are
immediately destroyed by the
rebels. Titus orders the
construction of the line of
circumvallation. Tw o newramps
are then builtagains t theF ortres s
of Antonia.
Th e
defenders
countermining undermines their
fortifications which collapse
The
Romans are
now
able to
attack
the Great Temple. Several assaults
fail in weeks of heavy fighting.
Eventually the Romans break in
andthe Temple
burnt down.
This defeat takes the heart
o ut o f
the defenders
The Romans l u n ~ attacks from
the Temple into the Old City. After
eighteen days
of
preparation they
s torm the area around the former
palace of H erod the Great. The
rebels put up little resistance and
the siege over
In 66 the
main
outbreak
of the Jewish rebellion
occurred
at
Jerusalem and
received further
encouragement when
a
hastily raised
oman
army
commanded by
the Syrian
governor Cestius Callus
marched against the city
only to suffer heavy losses
and
retreat in disorder.
The
rebels were never
united
under
a single leader
bu t
were divided
into
various
factions
and often
fought
amongst themselves. By
nearly all of the rebel
strongholds had been taken
by the
omans
and only
Jerusalem remained as the
heart of the resistance.
Three leaders dominated
different parts of
the
city
and the bitter fighting
between their followers was
only ended when Titus and
.the oman army arrived
outside
the
city walls. s in
most
sieges in this period
much
fighting occurred
outside the fortifications. It
was a sign
of
the defender s
confidence that he was
willing to contest the
ground outside
the walls
forcing the attacking to fight
to control the
ground
approaching
the
walls a
necessary preliminary to
any siegeworks. The
omans
were surprised by
the active nature of the
Jewish defence of
Jerusalem.
Throughout
the
siege the defenders
continually sallied out to
attack the oman camps
and
siegeworks.
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ROM
W RF RE
RIGHT The
fortress
of
asada
was
built
near the
Dead Sea
by
erod the
Great as a
luxurious
place
of
refuge in an apparently
impregnable position In
when
Legio Fretensis
besieged the fortress it was
held
by Jewish extremists
known
as
the
Sicarii Deep
cisterns
and
vast storerooms
held
an
almost
inexhaustible
supply of
food
and
water so
the
Romans
decided
on
a
direct assault building a
huge ramp against
the
western side o f the hill
Faced
with
defeat the Sicarii
committed
suicide after
murdering their families
BOVE
The
Roman
ramp
still remains
at
the side
of
the
cliff
today Originally
the
top
was
surmounted by
a
wooden platform which
allowed the
battering ram
mounted
in a siege tower to
be
brought
against the wall
The
Roman army
was
determined
to suppress all
traces
of
rebellion
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CONTROLLING THE WORLD
AD
4 93
BELOW: The town
o f
Gamala on the Golan
Heights was taken by
Vespasian in 67
Excavations revealed a
breach in the wall created
by
the
Roman
ram and catapult
ABOVE: Legio X built a wall
o f
circumvallation
completely surrounding
Masada and preventing any
escape This an d the forts
built
on
or behind it were
made
from the local stone
and
are clearly visible today
s an aid to comfort the
soldiers built lo w walled
stones and bolts scattered
amongst the debris Again
the defenders relied
on
the
natural strength of their
town s
position only to find
that the
Romans
were no t
put off by
such obstacles In
cabins roofing these with
their leather tents laying
these ou t in rows by century
This
one of the largest
camps built close to the
base of the ramp In the top
left corner
a smaller
enclosure occupied
by
the
small detachment left on site
after the siege In this camp
the background the
northern tip o f the Sea of
Galilee Faintly visible in the
haze are the Horns of Hattin
where over a thousand years
later Saladin won his great
victory over the Crusaders
the men added a second
cubicle to their rooms
copying the double rooms
accommodating an eight-
man contubernium
in a
permanent garrison
4
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ROMAN
WARFARE
144
Rebellions that were
intended
t o t hr ow
off
Roman rule di d occur,
most
often
within a generation of an area s conquest as in G er many Gaul an d Britain. If
this outbreak
wa s defeated then
most areas
steadily b ecame abs o rb ed i nt o the
imperial culture
their
ari st ocraci es p ro fit in g fro m ass ociati on
with th e new
power.
Perhaps
t he m os t c on ti nu ou s resistance to Roman rule was fou nd in
]udaea
where sporadic uprisings
an d
banditry
exploded
into massed rebellion in
66-74 an d 133-5.
A wider rebellion of
Jewish
communities in E gypt Libya
an d
Cy pru s cau sed g reat
t u rmo il u n der
Trajan
115-17 . The Jews were exceptional
among th e
peoples
of
th e Roman east in ha ving a strong sense of national
identity
an d
culture which reached ba ck f ar ~ y o n d the Greek an d Roman
presence in th e area. Religion emphasized their distinctiveness
an d
prevented the
aristocracy
from
adopting careers in imperial service.
W he n a n uprising did occur,
th e
Roman reaction was always th e same. All the
troops which could be mustered
a t s ho rt
notice were formed i nt o a col umn and
sent
immediately
t o co nfron t
th e
perceived centre
of th e
rebellion.
It took
a great
n um be r o f vehicles, d r au g ht a nd
baggage animals
to supply a n a rm y for a long
campaign.
The
R om an ar my di d no t maintain such a large baggage t ra in o n a
permanent
basis, bu t requisitioned th e
transport
required once a wa r threatened,
a process
requiring
time. This
often
meant that numerically small an d poorly
supplied Roman c ol um ns l au nc he d a n i mm ed ia te offensive
again st t he
rebels.
Ideally, a show of force, even if it wa s a fas:ade,
regained
th e initiative an d
prevented
a rebellion from developing arid growing stronger.
Th e
willingness of
even greatly o u tn um b er ed R om an forces to attack
th e
enemy displayed a
contempt
for
them an d an
unwavering belief
i n t he
Romans
inevitable
v i t o r ~
It
wa s a gamble since th e Roman column was
only
capable
of
defeating relatively
weak opposition
an d
risked
disaster if
it encountered a well-prepared an d strong
n ~ Both
Boudicca in AD 60 an d
th e
Jewish rebels in 66 received a great boost
when
they wo n victories over
th e
first, poorly
prepared Roman
forces sent against
them.
If t he Romans failed t o c ru sh t he rebellion in its early stages, then th e next
army
sent
against the rising was
properly
prepared to f ight a major war.
One
g reat adv an tage
enjoyed by
th e
Roman army was its skill in siege
warfare.
Bot h t he
rebellion o f 6 6- 74 an d t he B ar Kochba revolt were
dominated
by sieges as
t he Roman s
systematically
s to rmed t he
Jewish
strongholds.
M os t o f
the technology of
siege
warfare ha d
been developed in
the
Hellenistic world when
i ts secrets ha d
been the
preserve of a relatively small group of professional
engineers often serving as mercenaries. Battering-rams
b reach ed t he
enemy
defences, artillery firing bolts
an d
s to nes s up pres sed t he defenders an d siege
towers
m ad e i t
easier for
t he att ack i ng p arti es
to reach
th e
walls. Th e legions
of
t h e Prin cip ate ha d
me n
well trained
in
constructing an d operating all of these
engines as part
of
their
standard
complement as well as
artillery
an d other
equipment much
of
it prefabricated for easier transportation.
Th e Romans
di d
relatively little
to
develop
th e
technical
side
of
siegecraft,
bu t
they
b ro ug ht a n
aggressive, relentless
quality
to this ty of warfare. Earlier Roman armies ha d
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CONTROLLING THE
WORLD AD 14 193
n forced to
blockade
a fortress and starve the
defenders
into submission
if
it
d n ot fallen t o an immediate surprise attack. Now they undertook massive
constructing ramps to bring their rams
an d
towers against the defences
a
breach
had
been created
infantry supported by artillery fire were sent
the
assault
Such attacks were always
difficult
and the s torming party
fered heavy casualties A successful
assault
left
the attackers
out o f
control; the
lting sack of a city was an
appalling
thing with
the men being massacred
an d
e
women raped and enslaved Roman law
denied any rights to defenders
who
to surrender before the first ram touched their wall and the horrific
These coins were
minted
by
the short lived independent
state created in Judaea by
the rebellion of Bar Kochba
in
133
prompted by
Hadrian 5 decision to built a
temple to Jupiter
on
Temple
ount
in Jerusalem.
Despite heavy casualties the
omans
suppressed the
rising. uch of the fighting
was small scale
with
the
omans
sending out small
raiding columns and
systematically storming the
numerous walled villages of
Judaea.
145
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R O M A N WARFARE
Maiden Castle was one of
the largest walled towns
of
the Durotriges a tribe living
in
modern day
Dorset. It
was
stormed
during the
Claudian conquest of
southern
Britain
by
Legio
ugusta
under
the
command
of the future
emperor Vespasian. Its three
circuit walls
and
intricate
gateways were intended to
allow
the sling armed
defenders to drive of{ an
.assault
bu t
failed utterly
against the engineering skill
of
the
Roman
army.
OPPOSITE:
The abataean
kingdom was one
of
the
wealthiest
of
the Client
States which were a
prominent feature on the
Roman frontiers especially
in the east. I ts capital at
etr is famous for its
spectacular civic buildings
and
tombs. It was
annexed
by Trajan who created the
new province of Arabia.
consequences
of
a Roman
assault
were
intended
to encourage an early surrender.
Throughout th e
siege
th e R om an s
took
every
opportunity to terrorize
th e
defenders captives taken during sallies being crucified
i n s ig ht
of
th e
walls or
their
severed heads f ired by artillery into
th e
cit : I t was common for th e Romans
to build a ditch an d wall
or
line of circumvallation around th e entire stronghold
preventing anyone
from
escaping
or supplies an d reinforcements
from
reaching
th e defenders. It also served as a reminder that while th e defenders may have
fenced themselves in for their own protection
the Romans
ha d now fenced them
in for their ultimate destruction.
T H E
FRONTIERS
The
greater part of th e
Roman
army especially i n th e we ste rn provinces was
b as ed i n t he f ro nt ie r zones. T he re h as been considerable debate over the role of
th e
army
i n t he se areas
an d
indeed of t he R om an c on ce pt
of
frontiers bu t it
very
important to note
that the Empire s frontiers did
no t represent
clear
geographical
limits
to
th e
army s
activit :
Th e
Romans were heavily involved both
diplomatically
an d
militarily
for
a
considerable distance beyond
th e
boundaries
of
th e provinces. Centurions attended tribal meetings
of
many
of th e
peoples
of
north-west
Europe.
Noblemen
thought
to be favourable
to
th e
Romans
were paid
large subsidies
allowing
t he m t o support
a bigger
b an d o f
followers
an d
increase
t he ir s ta tu s w it hi n t he tribe.
Ideally
this
d et er re d t he
tribes
from large-scale
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CONTROLLING
THE
WORLD AD 4 93
7
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ROMAN WARFARE
miles
i
uret n
...
ns
c a s a ~
aggression
and at
the very
least
it gave the Romans advance warning
of
its
likelihood. Warfare and
especially raiding played a
central
role in the society
of
many of the peoples outside the
frontiers
in Bri tain Germany and along the
Danube.
Status
within a
tribe
came from success in war and
attacks
against the
Roman
Empire
brought tremendous prestige
as well as the prospect of
considerable loot. Our sources usually
only
mention the very large raids by
thousands
of
warriors which penetrated deep into the peaceful provinces.
Most
barbarian military
activity was
on
a
smaller
scale; a nobleman
and
his
immediate
retainers plus as many other warriors as were attracted by his prestige probably
no
more
than
a few hundred men
in
total. Some
incursions
may have been even
smaller.
T here d id
not
need to be
any specific
motive for such attacks any more
than
there
needed to be a mot ive for the
constant
intertribal
raiding. Tacitus claimed that German tribes
liked
to m aintain a depopulated area
around
their
t er rit ory to deter enemies
by
this
symbol of
prowess
and t o
give more
warning of
approaching
raiders. In themselves such small scale incursions
did not threaten
the
stability
of the
Empire bu t
the danger if
they
went unchecked was that
a
perception of Roman vulnerabil ity would
encourage
an
escalation
in
the size
and number
of attacks.
The
number of Roman troops was very small
in relation to
the size
of
most
of
the
frontier
areas
which
they
occupied.
The
army lacked the
capacity
to
intercept every
raid. One
solution
might
have
been to conquer and incorporate
the
hostile tribes into
the
Empire. Domitian sought to
control the
Chatti
by
advancing
the frontier
and
building
a line
of
forts
in
their t r r t o r ~ However
conquest
required
large numbers of troops most
of
which
would then
be
t ied down
as
garrisons
and anyway expansion under
the Empire needed
to be carefully supervised by
the
emperor. Ideally
diplomatic activity reduced the hosti li ty
of
the
tribes bu t often this had to
be
combined with
military force. If the Romans cou ld no t s top the
raids
then they
cou ld ensure that the
tribes
responsible did not go
unpunished.
Fast moving
columns of troops stripped of unnecessary
baggage
an d
carrying only
enough
supplies for
the
duration of the
expedition
launched sudden
TH E
ROMAN EMPIRE IN
AD 4
The
Roman
Empire reached
its fullest
extent
under the
Severans Since the first
century
the emphasis
of
the
army
in Europe
had
shifted from the
Rhine
to
the Danubian frontier
and
there were
now
only four
legions in the
erman
provinces The vast majority
of
units continued to be
stationed in the frontier
provinces
with
the
exception
of
the Syrian
and
Egyptian legions
who
covered the great cities
of
the east There was also
now
a legion permanently
stationed outside
Rome
which
with
the addition
of
the Guard units provided
the Emperor with the basis
of
a powerful army
part
from
new
legions
and
the
troops stationed in Italy
nearly all legionaries were
by
this time
born
in the
provinces
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CONTROLLING THE
WORLD AD
14 193
on the t ribes burning their settlements destroying their crops and
nding up livestock Only a
small
area would feel the actual effects of
such
a
expedition bu t it demonstrated
that
t he Romans c ou ld
and
would
ish attacks
upon them with
appalling f r o i t ~
Mustering a
tribal
army
took
and
if
one did muster to confront the Romans it
was usually
only when they
withdrawing. A competently
handled Roman
force could expec t to
rcome significantly larger tribal armies so that often a defeat in battle was
ded to
punishment inflicted
In a sense
the
Romans ha d
joined in
the traditional
patterns
of intertribal
with
the distinction that
their attacks
were
on a more massive scale
Roman
Empire
ll J Client state
disputed
territory
in
northern ritain
Legionary
bases
in
AD
4
149
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ROMAN WARFARE
IS°
With their better organization and logistic support the Romans were also able to
attack at any
time
of the year usually with
the
benefit
of
surprise The flexibility
of the R oman
military
system allowed them to adapt to fighting
different
cultures If a people possessed a
strong
field army and a willingness
to
fight open
bat tles then the defeat of this force usually ensured their surrender If they
possessed
important political
an d
economic centres such as cities then these
were besieged and
captured A people who
refused
battle
or
lacked large
important settlements faced
attacks
on their villages their cattle and crops One
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C O NT R OL L IN G T H E
WORLD
AD
14-193
the most important symbols of wealth in Germanic society was cattle making
capture
a valuable way
of applying pressure on
tribal leaders
Th e
Romans
re aware of the respect accorded to
noblewomen
in German society an d as a
demanded
these as hostages. Punitive raids were at best temporary
to th e problem lasting only
as
long
as
th e fear they created
while
th e
of
burning villages ensured a legacy
of hatred
so
that each
ne w
added the Romans to th e list of a tribe s enemies Th e Romans needed
m ai nt ai n
an
appearance of overwhelming power since a ny p er c ep ti on of
More common than
unbroken boundaries such
ditches or walls were
systems
of
small outposts
like this watchtower on the
River Danube depicted on
Trajans olumn These
were used to pass signals
hence the
wooden
pyre
and
piles
of
straw ready to be
ignited Other similar
installations were built
along the line
of
road
systems policed
by
the army
for instance in Egypt
1 5
1
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ROMAN WARFARE
T H E FRONTIERS IN
NORTHERN BRITAIN
Archaeological records tell
us
that
a line
of
forts
running along a road
known
now
as the Stanegate was
replaced by a solid wall
under Hadrian. This was
later replaced by the more
northern ntonineWall
which was itself
abandoned
and
re-occupied before the
army
finally returned to
Hadrians Wall.
weakness such as t he r ed uc ti on i n size of a frontier garrison or even worse the
smallest
Roman defeat risked a r et ur n t o general o s t l t ~
Roman frontier zones were always based on good communications usually
by road
bu t also
along rivers
such
as the Rhine and Danube. Bases were
established
along th e
line
of
these
routes
allowing swift
concentration
of forces
A ux il iary forts
accommodating
single
cohorts or
alae were loc ated furthe r
forward with t he g reat
legionary
fortresses some distance to th e rear
the
en d
of th e first c en tu ry m os t of th e early tu rf a nd timber
forts
constructed by
th e
Romans were
being replaced
by more pe rma nent
stone
structures Th e garrisons
of
these forts were
no t static an d it
is
no w
clear
that detachments of
legionaries
an d auxiliaries were freely m ix ed i n the forward areas
Often
little more
than
a
unit s records an d
administrative
HQ were permanently in residence
at
their
base
v t e
Novantarum Prom.
Mull
of Galloway
chtuthil
XX
Valeria Victrix site
abandon
d-ily
90
Cargill 0
20kT
2
miles
Frontiers
of northern
Britain
First-fourth centuries AD
Stanegate
Roman w ll
Legionary
fortress
fort
fortlet
w lled town
queduct
Roman
name
doubtful
M a re
ino- l. a
Binchester
/
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C O NT R OL L IN G T H E WORLD AD 14 193
d th e b ul k
of
th e u ni t m ig ht be fa r afield In th e late first and early second
tury the concept of a line
of
bases l inked by a road was taken a s tage further
linear
barriers were constructed. Th e m os t f am ou s e xa mp le is Hadrian s
running across northern
Britain between
th e
Tyne
an d Solway bu t other
ear systems were
constructed
in North Africa an d covered
t he g ap
between
th e
Rhine
an d
Danube. Most of these structures were relatively simple
of ditches r am pa rt s a nd palisade walls l inking toge the r small
fortlets an d watchtowers
On
Hadrian s Wall
there
were small fortlets or
Roman mile an d tw o small turrets
in between.
M os t o f
these
lls were n ot t op pe d by walkways an d it is
no t
even
certain
i f this
wa s t he
case
Hadrian s Wall In some areas lines
of
small watchtowers were built
without
connecting wall
The mperorHadrian
presents a sacrificial cake or
popanum to the Goddess
Roma Hadrian
spent
much
of his reign touring the
provinces inspecting the
armies and reorganizing the
frontiers In several places
most
notably in northern
Britain he ordered the
construction of massive
linear boundaries
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ROM N W RF R
Hadrian s Wall crossing
Cawfield Crags in
Northumbria The wall was
constructed in several
phases and a series of
alterations made t o t he
original design.
Running
from the mouth
of
the Tyne
to the Cumbrian coast it
included small fortlets every
Roman mile and
two
turrets between each one.
The formula was applied
with some rigidity some
gateways opening out
on
to
almost sheer slopes. Initially
the western section was
built
of
turf and
timber
but
this was later replaced
with
stone. the south the
military zone was marked
by a wide ditch known
conventionally as the
Vallum. Later forts were
added to the line of the
wall in some cases as
at
Houseteads being built over
earlier turrets. The wall
allowed the
army
to control
all traffic passing through
the region which could only
cross it at guarded gateways.
It was also visually very
impressive.
lthough
the
wall has been intensively
studied for over a century
many
fundamental
questions remain
unanswered. We cannot be
certain
of
its original
height nor whether it
possessed a continuous
walkway allowing sentries
to pace along its length.
5
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CO TROLLING T HE WORLD AD 4 93
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ROM N W RF RE
S TO N E G T EW Y
The gateways
of
stone forts
or fortresses were always
impressive affairs and
defended
by
towers. A
recently discovered piece
of
graffiti from a Roman
outpost
in Egypt suggests
that there
may
often have
been four storeys instead of
the three shown here.
However it s important to
remember that the Roman
armys bases were not
primarily intended as
TIMBER
G TEW Y
Double gateways were the
most common
Roman
design for all four entrances
in the standard fort design
but some forts had only a
single gate as shown here.
The towers might be used to
mount
light artillery such as
the scorpion bolt-shooters.
At least one or more
v-shaped ditches offered
further protection. The
ditches have a rectangular
sectioned trench running
defensive sites did not
possess especially strong
fortifications and were not
built
on
formidable
positions. The
army
of
the
Principate normally
expected to defeat its
enemies in the open and
heavily outnumbered
garrisons
showed
a
willingness to come out
and fight more numerous
attackers.
through the
bottom
which
facilitated cleaning
out
spoil but also
might
trip
charging attackers.
Other
obstacles such as concealed
pits
with
sharpened stakes
in the centre known to th e
soldiers from their shape s
lilies were common These
layers o f defences would
take the momentum
out
of
an
enemy attack
before he
reached the walls
and
attempted to scale them.
This full-scale reconstruction
of a timber gateway was
built on the site
of
the
Roman
fort at Baginton
near Coventry. Until the later
part of the first century D
most
Roman bases were
defended
by turf and timber
fortifications like this an
extension of the same basic
design
s
the marching
camps built by the army on
campaign.
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C O NT R OL L IN G T H E
WORLD
AD
14-193
These great
fortified lines are barely mentioned le t alone explained
in
ou r
sources
Our understanding of
them is
based
almost exclusively on
their
remains an d it is not always possible to dedu ce th eir ex act
What is
obvious
is that
t hese w ere
not
fighting
platforms from
which
R om an s f ou gh t
of f th e barbarian h or de s w ho recklessly hurled themselves
n st t he b as ti on s
of civilization
Hadrian s
Wall from i ts f irs t inception
d gateways an d crossing points
at
every milecastle an d when initial plans
modified an d forts were constructed on th e line of th e wall itself then
these
to
th e
number of gateways Th e Wall
was
never intended
to restrict
th e
of
the Roman army
bu t
simply provided a secure base for its advance
Romans maintained permanent
outposts
beyond th e line of th e Wall an d
r problems
were dealt with by
mobile
operations even further afield
It
di d
The fort at ouseteads
on
Hadrian sWall one of the
most famous
oman
sites in
the world. This picture
shows
one
of
the granaries
or stores its floor raised on
the rows of wooden pillars
to keep the grain cool and
deter vermin. ll oman
bases
had
provision for the
storage of huge amounts of
food sometimes up to a
year s supply.
IS?
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ROMAN
WARFARE
This view shows the main
buildings in the centre
of
Houseteads fort. Closest
is
the comm nding officers
house
praetorium ,
built in
the classic Mediterranean
plan around a central
courtyard and including
underfloor heating for some
rooms.
n the higher
ground to the right is the
headquarters principia)
where the
units
standards
nd records were kept nd
its day-ta-day
administration carried out.
I f the background
is
the
hospital a feature
of
all
major bases.
allow
the Romans
to
control
movement
through
the area, since all crossing points
were guarded. We know that
there were restrictions placed
on
German tribesmen
crossing
the Rhine and
especially
on
their carrying
of
we ap ons . In this way it
did
much
to
prevent the small-scale raiding which formed the bulk
of
military
activity
on the
frontiers. Preventing
many
of these incursions discouraged an
escalation
of
hostility into larger-scale warfare. Linear boundaries were only
feasible in certain geographical conditions, but small outposts and watchtowers
served much the
same
purpose, creating the impression
that
a wide area was
under continuous surveillance
and
they helped to deter such activity: It is also
worth
bearing
in mind the physical impression created by th es e s tr uc tu re s.
A fortification
running
from one horizon to the other was a powerful statement
of Rome s might. Caesar tells us that some Gallic tribes cultivated thick hedge
lines matking the
borders
of
their
terri tory to deter r ai de rs . I n many areas
the Romans
took care to maintain an area bare of settlement for some distance
in advance of the frontier. Whether the Romans
intended
this or
not,
it likely
that
their frontier
systems were perceived as clear
demarcations
of
territory
by
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barbarian
tribes. This reinforces the idea
that
the Romans
had
joined in
i t as a massively stronger
participant the traditional pattern
of
intertribal
The
Roman army of the Principate was a relatively small but high quality
e most suited
to
mobile operations. Its military doctrine remained intensely
ressive even though the pace of conquest had been drastically reduced
and
it
increasingly deployed in semi permanent frontier zones. Measures were
to police small scale banditry raiding and violence
both
on the frontiers
within the provinces but the reaction
to
any major opposition was to assume
mediate offensive. Whatever the local situation the Roman army adapted
doctrine deployment and tactics to make the most of the advantages
njoyed over its less organized and skilled opponents. The frontiers were
static defences but bases for military and diplomatic activity reaching far
nd the provinces. The
Roman
military system was flexible n o ~ g h to
adapt
cal requirements
but
still
retained the
distinctively relentless
pursuit of
v i t o r ~
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H PTER IV
~ . ~ : ~ : = = = : = . : @ : . ~ : = = ~ i i t J .
RISIS
ND REFORM
C PTIVE R RI NS
implore the mercy of Emperor
Marcus Aurelius n intellectual
who
corresponded
with
the great philosophical schools in
thens and
wrote his own editationsMarcus Aurelius spent
much
of his reign campaigning against the Germanic
tribes
beyond
the Danube
e
planned to
add
extensive
new
provinces in the area of Bohemia
but
the project
was abandoned
on
his death
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R O M A N WARFARE
CRISIS
A N D
R E F O R M
H E M IDD LE OF TH E t hi rd c en tu ry
witnessed frequent
Roman defeats Germanic
tribesmen raided
deep into
th e
western provinces
of
th e Empire while most
of
th e
east
wa s overrun by t he Sas sani d Persians In 251 t he e mp er or
Decius was killed when his army was defeated by th e Goths.
In 260
t he emperor
Valerian an d his
army
surrendered
to the
Persians A short-lived independent
empire
in Gaul an d
another
in
t he E as t b as ed
around
th e kingdom of
Palmyra
threatened
to
f ra gm ent t he Empire. Endemic civil wars
s app ed th e arm y s s tre ng th
an d
weakened its capacity
to
fight foreign wars Some stability was achieved
under strong
emperors
such as Aurelian Diocletian an d
Constantine but
only af ter the a rm y s s tr uc tur e
an d
deployment ha d
been
greatly altered Nevertheless by th e early fifth century most
of
t he f ac to rs
which
would lead to the
collapse
of th e
w es te rn e mp ir e
were
alr eady in
place The
reasons
for
Rome s fall are both
complex
an d fiercely
debated
an d a full
discussion
of these would be out of place here bu t
it
is
important
to
c on si de r w he th er m il it ar y weakness
an d
ineff iciency played a
major role
in
this
process
Di d
th e
R om a n a rm y evolve to deal
more
effectively with a
changed
situation
or
was i t simply in decline?
Diocletian Gaius
~ r l i u s
Valerius Diocletianus was a
strong emperor
who
campaigned successfully
against the Persians and
usurpers in Egypt
and
Britain.
One of the Illyrian emperors,
he created the Tetrarchic
system in which he shared
rule with a colleague,
aximian andeach had a
deputy. Diocletian abdicated
in 305. During his reign many
army units were withdrawn
from the frontiers and
stationed inside the provinces,
the origins of the later
comitatenses and the army
seems to have markedly
increased in size.
r6 2
CIVIL WA RS
A N D U SU R PA T IO N S
It
is tempting to view civil conflicts as
aberrations campaigns
which distracted
th e
army
from
its primary role of defending
th e
Empire
bu t
which di d no t have a
profound effect on its structure
an d
deployment.
However civil wa r was a
common occurrence in t he l at er
Empire
an d accounted for
th e
greater n umber o f
pitched battles
fought
by Roman soldiers T h e s hape
of
th e
fourth-century
army
grew o ut of
long
years of
internal
conflict
Th e
emperors
of
th e
early Principate took great care
t o mai nt ai n
the loyalty
of
th e
army
an d
were largely successful in this aim There was nearly a century
between
Actium
an d
th e outbreak
of
widespread conflict at th e suicide o f Ne ro
in
AD
68
and an
even longer
period
before the great wars fol lowing the
assassination
of Commodus in 193 There were attempted rebel lions by
provincial governors
in
between these massive struggles b ut n on e gained much
momentum. Some
emperors met
violent ends bu t their
deaths
an d th e succession
were usually
decided
in Rome
The
Praetorian
G ua rd h ad
long played an active
ro le i n
politics
notably proclaiming Claudius emperor
following
t he m ur de r o f
Caligula an d
auctioning the Empire
to
th e
highest
bidder
after
th e
assassination
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CRISIS A ND R E FO RM
Pertinax
No emperor could
survive without a loyal
guard
an d
most
took care
treat
th e
Praetorians well:
they
enjoyed far b et te r co nd itio ns than th e
onaries serving for
o nl y s ix teen
years receiving
h ig he r p ay
an d
frequent
vish donatives Emperors like Galba
an d
Pertinax, wh o failed to satisfy th e
ardsmen s expectations
with
suitable rewards, m et swift
ends Since no
wished to give command of
t he o nl y
troops in
Rome
to a potential rival
e
Praetorians
were commanded
no t
by
senatorial
officers bu t by
equestrians.
an d th e succession remained focused
on
Rome,
bu t this b eg an t o change
owly as
emperors
such as
Trajan
an d Hadrian
s pe nt l on g periods
in th e
Marcus Aurelius fought for years against t he t ri be s
on
t he D an ub e,
on
camp aig n i n
180
Septimius
Severus
wh o
ha d
fought
a long civil war
d t he n led an army a ga in st t he Parthians, died in 211 at York
Eboracum)
here he was
wintering during
a
camp ai gn ag ai ns t t he Cal ed on ians .
More
than
emperors
held power briefly until th e accession of
Diocletian
in 284
an d
e were
many more u su rp ers w ho
failed to establish themselves an d d ie d i n
th e
wars were
c om mo n a nd
th e majority of emperors d ied v io len t
at th e
hands
of
their own
soldiers
Shapur
I was
the son and
successor to the founder
the
Sassanid dynastYJ
rdashir He campaigned
with great success against
the Romans
J
defeating and
killing the
emperor
Gordian
III in 244
and capturing
ura Europus in 255 In this
relief
from
Nagshe
Rostam
J
another emperor Valerian
J
is
shown
cowering in front
the
king
after
his defeat
and capture at Edessa in
260 One lurid tradition
claimed that after his
execution
J
Valerian s body
was stuffed and put on
display
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ROMAN
WARFARE
Lucius Septimius Severus
D145-211
was
the
eventual
winner
of a series
of civil wars defeating his
last rival Clodius
lbinus
the
governor
of
Britain in
197 He mounted a highly
successful Parthian
expedition and spent
the
last three years
of
his life in
a major
war
against the
Caledonian tribes in
northern
Britain dying
of
natural causes in York
Severus granted Roman
soldiers the right to make
legal recognized marriages
As emperors spent more time with
th e
armies in th e provinces, so these began
to behave in a similar way t o the
guard. Th e
situation was worsened by changing
patterns
in th e appointment
of
th e
senior
officers
of
th e army: The tradition
began
to
change
w hereby Rome s
armies
were commanded by
senators
who
interspersed periods
of
military service with civil appointments. Th e presence of
th e
emperor with th e army
encouraged
especially lavish rewards for th e men who
distinguished themselves In his
campaigns.
An
increasing number
of
equestrian officers were elevated
to
th e
Senate
went
on to
hold
even greater military
responsibility: Marcus Aurelius promoted a prefect of an
ala Marcus Valerius Maximus, giving
hi m
senatorial
rank an d
making him
legate of six legions in succession,
b ec au se h e
had
killed with his ow n
hand
a king
of
a
Germanic
tribe, the
Naristae. Th e future
emperor
Pertinax is said to have failed to gain a commission as a
legionary
centurion,
but, having accepted the prefecture
of an
auxiliary
cohort
instead,
served with such
distinction in equestrian posts
that
he became a senator.
Severus r ai se d t hr ee
ne w
legions I-Ill Parthica),
bu t
entrusted
their
command
t o equ est ri an prefects rather
than
senatorial legates. Through
th e
third century th e
number
of
senior
army
positions
held by senators
gradually declined.
Fa r
more opportunities lay o pe n t o
equestrians, especially those w ho campaigned under the
emperor himself.
The
equestrian officers w ho d om in at ed t he t hi rd
century arm y were in
many
respects professional
soldiers, o win g t he ir a dva nc em ent purely to
their
military
record
an d th e favour
of
th e emperor. The successful me n were career
soldiers
wh o
served with th e
army
continuously
an d
di d no t
hold
civil offices. It
w as u su al ly t he se me n
an d
no t th e ordinary soldiers wh o p lo tt ed to m ur de r a n
e mp er or a nd n o mi na te d a usurper from their gr ou p. It is possible, bu t by
no
m ea ns c er ta in ,
that
the r ap id
p ro mo ti on a nd
great
responsibilities given
to
eq uest rian s w h o d is ti ng ui sh ed themselves increased th e
quality
of
th e
senior
officers of th e R om an army: The
distancing
of prominent
senators
from the
c om ma nd o f
armies ma y
at
first have been i nt end ed t o prevent potential rivals
from g ai ni ng
support
in th e army: In t he l on g term it had th e effect of
making
usurpations
more
common.
Long
service with th e army allowed this ne w breed of
professional officers to develop
strong
bonds with the junior officers an d soldiers.
A senator
hoping
to
g ai n t he
Imperial
throne
needed
to
be confident of
at
least a
fair degree
o f s up p or t
an d acceptance within
th e
Senate if he was t o s ta nd much
chance of
a successful reign even
after
he
ha d
achieved
military
success. In
practice
this r educed
th e
n um be r o f potential rivals to a relatively small group,
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those
able to achieve
command of on e
of th e large military provinces
e emperor s frequent
absence
f ro m R om e distanc ed him f ro m t he p ol it ic al
of
Senate
an d
capital moving th e
c ou r t t o
th e r ~ Since popularity
with
e
soldiers an d especially their officers
was
all that wa s
necessary
to
reach
th e
it b ecame far easier for usurpers
to
mount a successful challenge
Once
ha d a tta ine d
power
then this depended on th e continued s up po rt o f their
n
forces an d
on
having greater military strength than an y
other
rival Several
t he m os t
successful
emperors
of
t he s econ d
half of th e century
c am e f ro m
a
group of Illyrian officers a number of
whom
proved
very able Internal
had
led to losses
an d
defeats
on
all
frontiers
of the Empire
a nd further
internal rebellions Each emperor
was
required
to
campaign
with
tle break since he could rarely afford to
entrust
th e
command
of a
ma jor a rmy
a
potential
rival When
th e
emperor chose t o o p erate for
any length
of
time
in
e theatre of operations there was a
great
danger that
othe r pa rts
of th e Empire
that their ow n difficulties were being neglected would create a rival
CRISIS
AN D
R E F O R M
Diocletian
often
credited
with strengthening the
Empire after the chaos of
the
mi d
third century but in
fact the Tetrarchic system
only really functioned
effectively during his reign
Later it simply provided a
framework for advancement
amongst those aspiring to
imperial power Civil wars
started to break out within a
short t ime
of
his ·retirement
and his ow n fellow
ugustus
Maximian who
had
also abdicated tried to
resume power to aid his son
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R O M A N WARFARE
onstantine the Great
D
2 8 5 3 3 7 ~
the first
emperor
to embrace h r i s t i n i t y ~ was
proclaimed emperor
by
the
army when o n s t n t i u s ~ his
f t h e ~
died in 306 Defeating
his rivals Maxentius and
Licinius was his greatest
military h i e v e m e n t ~ bu t
only in 324 did the l t t e r ~ s
death leave
him
sole
emperor e completed the
re organization of the army
into comitatenses
and
limitanei.
r6 6
A measure of
stability
wa s created by on e
of
th e
Illyrian
emperors
Diocletian who gradually developed a system
of
dividing t he i mp erial power
known
as th e Tetrarchy: This was
not
entirely
without
precedent: for instance
Marcus Aurelius
ha d
ruled jointly with Lucius Verus until the latter s death. In its
evolved f or m t he re were t wo s en io r e mp er or s each
known
as Augustus who
ruled
the eastern an d western provinces respectively assisted by a
junior
colleague
or
Caesar. D io cl et ia n b ec am e A ug us tu s i n t he e as t
an d
chose
another
Illyrian
officer
Maximian
as his
colleague
in the west.
The
s ys te m w as designed to
provide
eno ug h co mmand ers t o
deal
with
several crises simultaneously
but
by nominating
th e Caesares
as successors
to
their senior
colleagues to
prevent
civil wa r by
providing
for the
a mb it io ns o f all
me n
with armies. However th e
system collapsed
almost
as
soon
as Diocletian
an d
Maximian w en t in to
voluntary retirement
in
305 in
the
main because it failed
to
make
prOVISIon for
members
of
th e
Imperial
family
wh o
were no t appointed
to
the
Tetrarchy: The principle of divided power
did la st for
much
of
th e
fourth century
apart f ro m t he period from 324 37 when
Constantine managed to achieve sole
power but usurpations and civil wa r
c on ti nu ed t o be common. It is frequently
forgotten that Constantine
the
most
successful emperor
of
the period spent half
of
his reign as a usurper.
The
different grades
of
Caesar an d Augustus an d the acknowledgement of
th e east-west division allowed ambitious generals to
progress in stages to ultimate power bu t also left greater
potential for compromise between rivals.
The
s tr at eg y in
civil wars was invariably simple. Unless a
compromise
was reached such as
th e recognition
of th e rival as a
junior
Caesar
or as Augustus in
th e
othe r half of
th e
Empire
then
th e conflict only ended
with
th e
d ea th o f
on e
of
th e
rivals.
Both
sides
gathered
as large an
army
as they could
an d sought ou t a battlefield encounter. Such a clash was only delayed as each side
s ou gh t t o fight
th e
battle
in the
most favourable circumstances or attempted
to
persuade
th e
rival army to defect. It is
only
in civil
wars
that we hear o f the
cautious
jockeying for
position
before a
battle
which was such a feature of earlier
warfare. Fighting a similarly
trained
an d
equipped
enemy denied the Romans the
advantages they
normally
enjoyed i n w ar s
against
foreign
opponents
an d placed
great emphasis
on mobilizing
greater numbers
of
troops. Civil wars drew a high
proportion
of
t he a rm y s s tr en gt h away f rom the defence an d control of
the
provInces.
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HE LATE ROMAN ARMY
were several significant changes
made to the structure of the Roman army
th e
third
and
fourth
centuries. While
the
overall number
of troops
under
had
probably
increased,
the
size of
individual
units, especially
the
legions,
By
the end
of
the third century there
were
more
than
sixty
legions
in
that seem
to
have ha d a theoretical
strength of
about a thousand
men
per cent of
their
earlier size. In 212 Caracalla
had
extended Roman citizenship
the greater
part
of
the
Empire s
population
removing
much
of
the distinction
een citizen and
non citizen
troops.
The
new
of cavalry titled vexillationes and the old alae
d infantry
cohorts seem to have
mustered
five to si x hundred men apiece. Th e
and
training of legions
an d
auxiliary
seems
to
have
been virtually identical
ting as close-order troops in the batt le line.
In
th ird cen tu ry the rectangular scutum and the
pilum
became
less common
and
were
laced by oval or round shields and lighter spears
ch as t he lancea Som e units a lso
carried
as
many
five
lead weighted
darts plumbatae or
slotted into the
hollows
of their
Reconstructions
have suggested
that these
d a
range
of about
30-65 metres 99-215
feet),
than
double
tha t of
a
pilum
and significantly
than
most
javelins. Most
units seem
to have
scale or mail a rmour and iron
helmets i f
ese were available. The
tactics
of later
Roman
were less aggressive than
those
of
the
early
and in
some
ways
more
akin to
those
of
Polybian predecessors.
Ammianus describes
infantry
raising the
barritus, a Germanic
r c ry w hi ch steadily
increased
in
volume
in or der to build up their own
idence before
they entered
hand to hand combat.
The
single volley
of
pila
rown just
before contact was
replaced
by a much longer barrage of darts
and
frequently
arrows f ir ed by
archers
in close
support.
Th e charge of
an infantry
was sometimes
met
at
the halt
sacrificing
the moral
lift given
an
advance to
ensure
that
the
stationary Roman line remained
in
good order
d delivered the greatest possible number of missiles. However, faced
with
the
archers of
the
Persian
armies it
was
more
common to sacrifice order
d advance at a run
minimizing
the t ime spent in an
exchange
of missiles
in
ich the enemy
would probably
prove superior.
It is
possible that
the
average
unit
in
the later
army
did
not have
the
discipline
to advance slowly an d
in
silence, waiting until very close range before
CRISIS AND REFORM
The emperor CaracaLla was
the
eldest
son of
Septimius
Severus In
212
he extended
Roman citizenship to most
of
the population
of the
Empire
On
campaign he
lived the life
of
a simple
soldier allegedly grinding
his
own
ration
of
grain into
{lour with a handmiLl He
was stabbed to death by one
of
his
own
cavalry
o d y g u r d ~
or
singulares.
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ROMAN WARFARE
r
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livering a single volley of pila an d
charging
into contact. The
shock
tactics of
e
early
Principate
were
probably
a
more
effective way
of producing
a decisive
sult in
an infantry
clash an d
winning
a
pitched
battle. However as we shall see
e
fighting of
pitched
battles ha d ceased to be
th e
main concern of th e Roman
by
th e fourth
century:
The
5 OOO strong
legion
ha d
been designed
for
bi g
commander
controlling
a sizeable
section
of th e line
and
supplying
its for each of
th e
multiple supporting lines of
th e
army s formation.
The
later
m y m ainta ine d the
t ra di ti on al R om an
emphasis on th e
use of reserves
i nt o m or e
than
on e
line as a matter of
course. The smaller
size of its
mean t t hat while each formed an effective part of an y line
they
ha d
little
of operating
in mutual
support
an d
lacked
a
command
structure to
cilitate the use of reserves. In
the
defeat at
Adrianople
o ne u ni t of Batavi
placed
reserve could
not
be f ou nd w he n i t was needed.
It
has
o ft en b een claimed
that
cavalry
assumed
a
greater importance in the
army; although it
has
proved difficult to
t race any
specific changes.
In
part
is view derived
from
a
misunderstanding of th e great
importance
of th e
horsemen
of
the
Principate.
Although
a slight
change
is possible
there
n o g oo d
evidence for a significant increase in th e
proportion
of horsemen
an d
e ideal as in earlier
periods
was to have a
balanced army composed of
both
foot
d
horse
the latter
always in a minority: The numbe r of heavily armoured units
an d clibanarii di d increase especially in the e astern a rmy
which
ha d to
face
th e
equally heavily armoured cavalry
of th e
Persians. However
vast
majority
of Roman cavalry
continued
to be trained to fight with missiles
mount a charge an d the specialist shock cavalry were
not
more numerous
than
units of specialist light
horsemen.
On e of the
most
significant changes in
the structure
of th e
later
army was th e
sion between
th e
troops
of
th e
field armies
th e comitatenses
an d
t he t roo p s
t o the bo rde r
areas
the
limitanei.
This development occurred gradually
d was
not
completed or perhaps officially sanctioned until Constantine.
Fo r
of
t he P ri nc ip at e t he Roman
army
had been distributed mainly in the
provinces with few
troops
being stationed in
the interior of th e
Empire.
stationed one of his newly
raised
legions Legio Parthica near Rome
combined with
his
enlarged Praetorian
Guard
provided
a force
of
about
t ho us an d i nf an tr y a nd tw o
thousand
cavalry
at
his immediate
disposal.
nus seems to have concentrated legionary vexillations an d elite cavalry units
the approaches
to
northern
Italy:
Diocletian a nd M a xi m ia n
gathered
high
ality units
into
their
comitatenses
including
some elite Pannonian legions
t ho ug h t he size
of
these forces wa s no t as great as the fourth-c entury field
mies. Traditionally it was
assumed that
this
trend towards
troop
concentrations
thin the
Empire supplied a need for strategic reserves allowing
th e
e mpe ror to
with hostile incursions
which
could
no
longer
be
stopped by
th e
troops
ployed as a c or do n a ro u nd
th e
frontier. This view is no t
supported
by
th e
ence. Severus
came
to
power
after a long civil war an d his
need
for personal
C RI SI S A N D REFORM
This detail of
the
rch
of
Galerius at Salonika
shows
a battle scene from his
campaign
against
the
Persians at
the
end
of
the
third century.
The
Roman
troops
are
depicted
wearing
scale
armour and
carrying
round or oval shields. They
carry vexilla flags
and the
snake like draco standards
J
where a multi coloured
fabric tube
streamed
ou t
behind
a
bronze animal
head
J
l ike a
modern wind-
sock.
On
Trajan J Column
these standards were carried
by the
enemYJ
but we
hear of
their use by the Roman
cavalry as early as
Hadrian
s
reign.
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R OM A WARFARE
Hunting scenes
ike
these
mosaics from the ImperiaL
Villa at Piazza rmerinain
ici y are a
common
feature
of
the art
of
Late
ntiquity
They
frequentLy
show
soLdiers without
armour
and bareheaded bu t
carrying thetr shieLds
Hunting was popuLar with
army officers from
the
ear y
Empire onwards
s ec ur it y w as probably
th e
main
reason for t he c re at io n
of an
army in
Gallienus had
lost
most o f t he e as te rn an d
western provinces
of
th e Empire
hence
th e
need
for loyal troops to protect th e a re as whi ch h e di d control. T he
tetrarchs similarly needed t o main t ai n their rule by military force although they
returned the vast majority of t ro op s t o t he frontiers. Constantine victor in a civil
w ar and
insecure for
at least
th e first
half of
his reign created t he large field
armies. The comitatenses
p ro vi ded t he emperor s u lt imate g uaran tee
of
power
protecting him against
political
rivals. His control
of
such a n a rm y increased the
likelihood
of
his
support i n p ro vi nc es e ag er to
be
protected
by concentrated
forces
positioned
to deal with their local problems. All these forces from Severus
Italian tr oo ps t o th e fully developed field armies did p ro vi de t he basis for
17 °
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rmies whenever
the
emperor decided to w ge foreign war or had
retrieve major disaster somewhere in the Empire. The field armies g ve the
or personal security
and
the bility
to
w ge
war
when
required but
proved
much
two edged
sword An emperor could not
afford
to le ve
of troops
where it
might
be
suborned
by riv l
He
needed to
keep
control over
the
comitatenses, but this close contact with
the troops
made it
to
ensure
their o y t ~
The field
armies
were responsible for
the
murder of
emperors
and
the elev tion
of
their repl cements
The
limitanei were
the troops
lloc ted to
the
command of
the
officers duces
who
controlled the
regions into which the Empire w s now divided They
most certainly no t local milit ia
of farmer
soldiers s has often been
CRISIS
AN D
REFORM
The decorated tunics worn
by these men white or off
white
with
darker colour
circular patches
and
borders,
were standard military dress
in Late Antiquity. Poor
evidence for the colour of
oman uniformssuggests
that white or off-white was
the most likely shade,
with
officers probably wearing
brighter white clothing, or
possibly red.
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ROM N W RF RE
I
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RISIS
ND
REFORM
The Arch
of
Constantine
was erected in
Rome
in
3 5 bu t made use of
many
sculptures from
earlier monuments These
scenes
show
Marcus
Aurelius
making
a speech to
a parade of soldiers and in
the right hand frame
performing a sacrifice
on
the army s behalf
Much
of
the equipment depicted
would not
have been
familiar to onstantines
soldiers for instance the
segmented
armour
which
had fallen ou t of use in the
early third century. It
unclear whether the reuse
of so
much
material on
Constantine s
monument
was simply a measure of
economy
or a desire to
legitimize his rule by
association
with
the military
glories of the past.
73
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ROMAN WARFARE
The Roman fort at Qasr
Bsheir in Jordan dates to the
reign Diocletian. Its
desolate location prevented
the
theft
of
its
stone
for
reuse in more recent
buildings and ensured its
remarkable preservation.
Even the inscription
recording its construction by
the governor
of
Arabia in
292-305 remains in place
over its gateway.
Like
most
Late Roman bases i t is very
small, covering only 0.3
hectares
and
providing
stabling for sixty nine
mounts
bu t has formidable
defences. Walls are higher
than in the early Empire and
the corner towers
no w
project in front
o f
the walls,
to p r ~ v i enfilade fire
against
any
attackers. The
term fort far more
appropriate for these sites
than the large barracks o f
the earlier period.
174
claimed
bu t units of the regula r Roman r ~ The
limitanei
carried
out
duties ranging from internal security
the po li cing
of
roads defence against banditry
and
raiding as well as support for officials such as ta x
collectors
an d
magistrates.
The
commanders
of
the
limitanei were
powerful
men in the
day to day
life
of
the
provinces.
They
fulfilled all
the
duties which ha d tended
to
devolve on
any
Roman unit s ta tioned
in one
locality fo r
any length
of
time
since
the beginning of the
Principate.
Usually
the uni t
occupied several
posts within the
region
and
frequently
was
b roken up
to provide
many
small
detachments.
The limitanei were
used
to oppose small-
scale
enemy threats
an d
might
also be added to a field
army operating in
the
area;
they
seem to have
performed
well in both roles. Units detached to a field army for a
long
period
assumed the grade
of pseudocomitatenses.
The field armies were mobile
in the
sense that unlike
the limitanei,
they
were no t
tied
to a particular frontier
region which would suffer
in their
absence. Their removal
from th e
frontiers
an d
concentration usually
in
or
near
cities in theory meant that they were no t called upon to
perform everyday policing
an d
administrative duties.
Their mobility and availability as strategic reserves should
no t be exaggerated.
The
speed of a f ie ld army was never
faster
than
that
of
a marching infantryman. An even
greater restriction
on
their actions was the need to supply
a f orce en route
to and
in the campaigning area. Major
foreign expeditions took
at
least a year s
preparation
before they could be launched.
Constantine appointed
two senior subordinates the magister equitum
an d
the
magister peditum,
and
under
these were
counts comites
who might
command
smaller detachments.
In 350
there
were
three
major field armies
in Gaul
Illyricum and
the
east but by
the end
of
the century
smaller forces ha d been
created
in Africa
Britain
Spain on
the Upper
and Lower Danube and Thrace.
This
was
in
part
a result of
the
inability of the
larger
field
armies
to deal
with
problems
arising
simultaneously
in different provinces but was also a reflectio n
of
the trend towards decentralization
of authority in
the
late Empire.
The soldiers of
the later
army
remained
long-service professionals although
various forms
of conscription
became more
common methods of
recruitment
than
voluntary
enlistment. Sons of soldiers were forced to serve in the
army and
local landlords were obliged to
supply
a set
quota of
men. Military service was
no t always
popular and
there were frequent attempts to avo id it not l ea st by
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CRISIS ND
REFORM
who were reluctant to see their
labour
force reduced However once in
e
a rmy men seem to have adapted to a military career Our
sources
make
mention of desertion but
this
had always
been
a problem
for
the
army
and it is impossible to
gauge whether
or
no t the situation had
Under the Princ ipa te the supply of recruits seems
to
have been
to maintain
the
professional army which
only
grew slowly from the size
by Augustus Levies
often occurred
before
major wars to bring
existing
units
to
strength
but
it was difficult to raise large
numbers of whole units
at
short
During the Pannonian and German crises ugustushad recourse to
7
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R O M A N WARFARE
These scenes from the Arch
of Constantine show the
mixture
of reused
and
new
material
employed
in its
construction. In the
middle
a long scene showing
fourth century soldiers
attacking a walled city.
They
carry large oval shields and
wield spears. In Late
ntiquitythe
old
taboo
against
showing
Roman
dead
on
monuments was
abandoned and
Constantine
was
happy
to represent the
enemy rout in his victory
over the Roman army
o f
his
rival
axentius at
the
Milvian Bridge in
3 2
recruiting units of freed slaves while
Marcus
Aurelius
empl oy ed u ni ts
of
former
gladiators
in his
Danubian
campaigns. The professional army
simply di d
no t
possess
th e
great
reserves of manpower of t he o ld citizen militia
The expansion of th e army in the fourth century
co mb in ed w ith a probable decline
in
th e
Empire s
population m ad e i t even harder for l at er emp erors t o raise
large numbers of troops
q u k l ~
The
units of th e field armies were graded as either
palatini or comitatenses
th e
former
being
t he m or e
senior
There wa s a lso
a
complex
system
of
seniority
between
i nd iv id ual u ni ts
as well as
u ni ts ti tl ed
seniores an d
iuniores p res umabl y t he
result
of th e division of some
units
at
an unk now n date. The units
of
th e auxilia
palatina
g ain ed s o me p romi nen ce
an d
a high reputation
for effectiveness in the
fourth
e n t u r ~ Raised under
Diocletian
a nd Constantine these
u ni ts d o
not
seem to
have
differed that significantly
in
their
recruitment
or
t rain in g fro m t he
auxilia of
th e
Principate.
Some
of
these
units an d other p ar ts o f
th e
army were recruited wholly or
in
part from barbarians f ro m o ut si de t he Empire.
Many
recruits c am e f rom t he laeti groups of barbarians settled
on
land w i th in t he Empire b ut i t seems
that
most
of
these
di d no t serve in distinct units. By th e l at te r h al f of th e
f ou rt h c en tu ry
i ncreas in g n u mb ers
of
senior officers
a pp ea r w it h barbarian
frequently
Germanic names.
O n e G er ma n
king Vadomarius
ruler of
th e Brisiavi
an
Alamannic
people
wa s arrested by th e Ro mans
after
leading raids into th e
Empire.
He
later became a dux in
t he east ern army holding several responsible commands
an d
fighting
with
some distinction f or R om e.
The
use
of
such foreign troops
had
a long
an d
distinguished history
i n t he R om an
Th e
third century
had
seen
th e
officer
corps dominated
by members
of
t he aris to cracy
of
th e
Danubian provinces wh o
either were
or
became as a
result
of their military service Roman citizens an d
equestrians. Usually
both
officers an d
me n
were absorbed
into th e p at te rn o f service
normal
to the Roman army
There is lit tle evidence
to
suggest that t he q uali ty
of
th e
army wa s
affected by t he r ec ru it me nt
of
barbarians.
Officers
in
particular
were
usually
employed away from
their
place of origin bu t
most
of
th e
foreign recruits seem
to
have been
h ap py t o f ig ht f or R om e
even
against their
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CRISIS
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ROM N W RF RE
THE TTLE
OF
STR S OURG
In
357
the Caesar ]ulian led
an army of 13 000 men
against a confederation
of
the Alamanni allegedly
numbering 35 000 men
under the leadership of two
kings Chnodomar and
Serapio As in the past
the
Roman army naturally
deployed in more than one
line and fed in reserves as
the situation required Its
discipline and
command
structure gave the Roman
army great advantages over
the Germanic tribal forces
bu t
even so
the
battle was
hard fought
4
5
6
7
®
Romans
suspicious
of ambush
in the
broken
ground The
Roman left
flank commanded by Seveus halts
Remainder ofRoman
line advances
and Germans advance to meet them
Roman cavalry and German cavalry
engage heavily. Fight sways
one
way
then
the
other
Roman cavalry
panic
whilst re forming
and
flee towards
the
second line
of
the Roman
infantry
The infantry remain steady in the
face of this panic. The cavalry begin
to rally behind the formed infantry.
The process aided by
J
ulian who
arrives
presumably with
his 200
bodyguard cavalry
Continued
German
pressure
on the
first
Roman
line.
Th e
Batavi
and the
Regii
are
sentforward
reinforce
the veteran Coenuti and Bracchiati in
the
front ranks
A
group
of
Germans
led by several
of
their kings surge
forward to
break the
stalemate in
the
centre.
They penetrate
the Roman
first line
and
advance against the Primani in
the centre of the second line. This
Legion remains firm
Gradual Roman pressure
along
the
whole
line causes the
lamanni to
collapse. They suffer heavy losses in
the
pursuit. 243
Romans
are killed
Defeated Roman cavalry re forming
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people The a doption of
th e
Germanic war cry
th e
b rritus by
at
least
some
infantry may have
been
a
result of
th e
influx of Germanic recruits.
ually it may have
been adopted
by t he R om an s
because they
were aware
that
Germans found
it
intimidating.
Until large contingents of
barbarians
began
serve in
distinct units
under
t he ir o wn l ea der s t he re d oe s
not
a pp ea r t o
have
an y
r ed uc ti on i n t he a rm y s
fighting ability
as a result
of
its
recruitment
A ND T HE W ES TE RN
EMPIRE
ditionally it ha s been assumed
that
Germanic society changed
in
the sec ond
d t hi rd centuries th e small individual tribes coalescing to f or m g re at tribal
that posed a far greater threat to th e security of th e Empire When
e groups came under pressure from peoples migrating from further east th e
CRISIS
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ROMAN WARFARE
8
Roman
Empire
wa s
unable
to s u st ain t hei r onsla ught a nd collapsed Th e
long
series of w ars f ought by Marcus Aurelius
against the
Marcomanni a nd Q ua di
s up po se d t o have
fores hado wed t he emerg en ce
of pow erf ul peoples like
th e
Alamanni
an d
the
Franks
who
were to ravage
Gaul
in
the third n t u r ~
This view
is
at
best
an
exaggeration. Tribal peoples
ha d long
displayed a tendency
to
unite
under a
strong charismatic
leader bu t such
developments
rarely outlived this
m an . A rm in iu s
had led a
confederation
of
t ri bes again st
R om e u nt il he was
assassinated by rival
n ob lemen. Pri or t o
this he had defeated
Maroboduus
king
of
th e
Marcomanni
wh o ha d created
a strong
power
base by
adding
subject
tribes
to his
own people.
In
neither
case
di d
a similarly
s tr on g l ea de r a pp ea r t o
unite
these
tribes
for well over a
n t u r ~ M ost o f t he t ri ba l
peoples of
Europe
seem to have existed in a continuous cycle
of
unification
an d
fragmentation. It
possible
that
th e presence of t he Ro man
Empire
did encourage t he t rend towards
unification.
The
payment of subsidies
an d
t he s up pl y
of
large quantities
of
prestige goods allowed noblemen to build u p t he ir following an d strengthen their
p os it io n w it hi n t he tribe Ro man att acks upon a tribe may also have encouraged
support
for leaders wh o fought successfully
against
Rome However any change
was on e of degree
an d
di d
not
affect the fundamental nature
of
tribal
s o i t ~
Most aspects
of
Germanic society especially t heir mil it ary
institutions
changed very little
from
th e first to t he fo urth centuries Even peoples such as the
Alamanni Franks
an d
Goths were usually disunited each
geographical
unit of
settlements the
clan
or canton
being
ruled by its chie f
or
sub-king.
At
some
periods a single nobleman might be
acknowledged
as
leader
of several
neighbouring clans Armies continued to consist
of
a smal l permanent element
th e warriors comites supported by
each
nobleman an d
th e
mass of
warriors
composed of all free
me n
able to
equip
themselves It is difficult to estimate the
scale of
tribal
armies with an y precision In 357
two Alamannic
kings wh o were
supported by other
sub-kings
an d chieftains are credited with a force of thirty
five thousand
me n
composed of the ir ow n war
bands
warriors
f rom th eir
c an to ns a nd
s om e m er ce na ri es f ro m o ut si de t he
tribe.
It
is doubtful
whether
Germanic
armies were ever able
t o m us te r m or e m en
than this in
on e
place
an d
even
this
size wa s
exceptionally
uncommon. We ar e told that
on e
of
the
tw o
leaders
of
this
army
ha d
tw o hundred
warriors
in his
immediate
following or
comit tus bu t
this
was probably
unusually large
T he most common threat
presented
by
th e
Germanic peoples was no t
invasion by large
armies
bu t small-scale raiding. The
R om an s c on ti nu ed t o
employ many of the techniques
discussed
in t he l as t c ha pt er to
deal
with
this
joining in th e
patterns of intertribal
warfare
bu t
on
a
larger
scale Active
diplomacy wa s
c ombine d with
military action. Roma n ga rrison commanders
entertained
t rib al l eaders to feasts
an d
gave them gifts
of
money
an d
prestige
goods emulating the methods by which powerful
noblemen
displayed their power
in barbarian s o i t ~ A t f or ma l n eg ot ia ti on s with tribal leaders t he R om an s
paraded
t he ir m il it ar y m ig ht t h e emperor receiving th e envoys on a podium
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by the serried ranks of his splendidly equipped soldiers. Occasionally
massive attack
was
de spa tc hed a ga inst a people perceived
to be
especially
burnt
an d
th e population massacred or enslaved.
Sometimes
ns advanced from different directions to increase the e le ment of
surprise
d
hinder any
organized opposition.
Some
expeditions
were
prepared
by feats
of
ineering such as the bridging of t he Rh in e or Danube displaying both
Rome s
a nd h er willingness to
employ
massive force a ga in st h er enemies. If th e
on
the western
frontiers seemed
w orse i n
t he t hi rd a nd f ou rt h
centuries
is was more because of Rome s internal weakness than a r es ul t of
an
increased
threat. Raiding
grew in scale an d
intensity when Rome s frontiers
were
to be vulnerable du e to h er g ar ri so ns being
drawn
off to fight in
rminable civil wars. Successful raids by
on e people encouraged
other tribes to
p ro cess w hi ch
occurred without any need
fo r
triba l unifica tion or
conspiracies . Rome
relied
on
maintaining an au ra
of
overwhelming
an d invincibility to overawe he r triba l neighbours.
Whenever this
shattered
by defeats th e Romans ha d to fight very hard to re-establish it.
On e role of th e
limit nei
was to cope with small-scale raids an d
their
distribution in
vulnerable areas
helped
t he m t o
accomplish
this
task.
n y R om an forts of t he l at er E mp ir e w er e v er y small bu t they allowed
th e
m y t o maintain
a visi bl e p re se nc e over a l ar ge a re a. A
recent study
by
H.
Elton
that t he reaso n why our sources never mention raids by fewer than
four
m en wa s
that
they
were
usually stopped
by th e
border troops. Larger
took time to
muster
during
which
th e R om an s h op ed t o h ea r
of
the threat.
was difficult to intercept a l arg e raid as
it
attacked. Th e frontier was to o long
d
the
number
of
Roman troops
to o small to prevent these incursions;
there
was
evitably a delay
between
t he R om an s receiving a rep ort of an attac k a nd th e
of
a force of
comit tenses
to deal
with
it. A raid tende d to become more
in proportion
to its success. As t he w ar
band
gathered booty its
speed
movement was reduced. If th e warriors chose to ravage a w id e a re a they were
to split
up into
smaller an d more vulnerable
p ar ti es . M o bi le c ol um ns
largely f ro m t he comit tenses moved swiftly to inte rce pt the ra ide rs as
y withdrew.
The
R om an s a im ed
to
surprise
a nd a mb us h
th e
barbarians
if
slaughtering
t he m w it h m in im um loss to themselves.
Much
of th e
fighting
in th e
west was
on a very small scale. The main
iculty for
t he Romans
was
locating the ofte n
small
groups of raiders an d
then
proa ching them undetected. T his r eq uired g reat skill from the Romans
parties and a high level of initiative an d ability from the Roman
d ow n t o
th e
m os t j un io r levels.
In
366 th e
scouts sent
by
Jovian
a
gister equitum
located
a group of Alamanni resting by a river
aft er t he s ack
of
villas. Jovian s
troops approached concealed from
view
in
a wooded valley
prised the Germans
as
some
were
drinking
an d
others
dyeing
their
hair
red
d destroyed them in a sudden attack. If th e barbarians were well prepared
or in
good position then t he R om an s m ig ht h es it at e
before attacking them
i r e t l ~
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ROMAN
WARFARE
fulian the
postate
332---63
was
noted
for his attempt to
replace Christianity with his
own
version of Sun worship
He had
campaigned with
great success against the
Franks
and lamanni
in
aul
as a Caesar Later he
launched a massive Persian
expedition bringing
together one of the largest
armies employed
in a
foreign war during the
sixth
century
He
was killed
during a confused skirmish
and
the campaign
ended
in
defeat
J ul ian s pent t wo months blockading a
p ar ty o f
six hundred
Franks
wh o ha d
o ccu pi ed t w o
derelict Roman forts in
th e
winter of 357. When t he F ra nk s finally surrendered they
were
con scri pt ed i nt o t he Ro man army
an d sent
to
the east.
It
is interesting that this party is said to have decided
to
stay
for
th e
winter in Gaul
because
since
Julian
was to o pre-
occupied
fighting
t he A la m an ni
they
believed that they
would
be able
t o l oo t
the
surrounding
area unmolested.
In nearly every case
tribal attacks
were no t
intended to
seize territory bu t t o g at he r b oo ty a nd retire. Sometimes the
approach of a Roman force wa s e no ug h t o
p ers uad e t he
raiders
to
leave without a ny a ct ua l fighting. During
th e
third century most
towns in the Empire acquired
fortifications
something that
had
rarely
been
seen as
necessary in t he p as t. When raids
were
r ep or te d a nd th e
local troops unable to cope with
them the
practice was for
th e population to
retire
to fortified s tron gh ol ds t ak in g
moveable
goods animals
an d
food
with
them.
Th e
Germans possessed little knowledge
of
siegecraft an d were
u su al ly u nabl e
to feed themselves for
th e
d ur at io n o f a
prolonged blockade. Cities were sometimes surprised an d
stormed by direct assault especially
i f t he ir
defenders were
few or
alternatively
surrendered
w he n t he y d es pa ir ed
of
relief.
Letting raiders
retire without suffering
an y
defeat did
little t o d et er
future attacks.
Allowing
raiders
to
ran ge far
into
th e
provinces
before
they
were
a tt ac ke d d id
not
represent
a
deliberate policy of
defence
in
depth but
an
acceptance of the army s
inability
to prevent such
incursions. Despite this acceptance
Roman operations
were
still dominated by th e aggressive
response
to incursions hunting down even the
smallest
bands an d
defeating
them i n d et ai l.
In
this small scale
w ar fa re t he
Romans
enjoyed considerable
advantages. Their organized system of logistics
allowed
t he m t o
feed an d
maintain
a force in
th e
field at
any t ime
of year unlike
t hei r t rib al o pp o nen ts . German
raiders
relied on
surprise
an d speed for success
bu t it is s tr ik in g h ow o ft en t he R om an s used these very qualities to defeat them.
Th e
preferred
Roman
tactics
were
those
of
concealment
rapid
movement
an d
ambush. High quality disciplined regular soldiers were
more
effective at this low
level of
warfare
than
the tribesmen
whose
cultural
tradition was
to
f ight in this
A
tribal
band of even a few hundred let
alone
a few thousand
warriors
was
an unwieldy body difficult
to manoeuvre with
skill.
The
military doctrine
of
t he l at e
Roman army seems to have become geared
for this low level warfare. The
Romans
displayed a
marked
reluctance
to confront
th e German
t ri be s i n
o pe n b at tl e
if this
could possibly be avoided.
This
is in
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c ontrast to
th e
army
of th e early Principate which even though it was
to adapt
to
lower
level
warfare usually
seized an y opportunity to face th e
e my in b at tl e. As we have seen th e unit structure of th e earlier army especially
legion of five
thousand
was well suited to pitched battle
but
by th e fourth
th e army
was
structured around much smaller
basic units. Blocks
of
five
men were no longer useful sub-units
in
field armies which were tending
b ec om e quite
small. Julian le d thirteen thousand me n
at
Strasbourg
and
it
ms unlikely that Valens ha d m uc h m or e than twenty thousand
at
Adrianople.
se were
both
very respectable armies fo r th e period
an d
it is likely that
most
aigning was
carried
out
by
significantly
smaller forces. Relatively
small
of four to s ix u nits
between
field armies seem to have ha d
considerable
nificance. For most opera tions
p la nn ed t o
h ar as s G e rm a ni c
raiders small
of a few thousand were
fa r
more
suited
to th e
task being faster
an d easier
control.
On
those
occasions
when th e
tribes
did muster
a l ar ge
army it might
ve necessary to face them
in
open
battle.
The fourth-century
army
w on f ar
battles than it
lost
bu t
th e consequences of defeat were drea dful. Hea vy
to well-trained
manpower
were
to
be avoided since such
t ro op s c ou ld
ly be replaced
i n t he i mmedi at e
future bu t
fa r
more significant
was
th e
blow
Roman prestige. Rome s relations w it h h er t ri ba l neighbours were based upon
an
aura
of invincibility
a nd n ot hi ng weakened this
more than a
feat in battle.
Th e later army lacked th e ability
an d
the confidence of th e earlier
a rm y w i th
to p itched battles but it
is
important
to
place this judgement in
The fourth-century
army
was
still significantly more effective in
battles than
its
tribal
opponents. Whe n
large
forces were
sent
to ravage
territory of
hostile tribes
th e object
was
now to create as much devastation
d t er ro r as possible
t o p er su ad e
th e tribes to come
to
terms
not
to provoke
i nt o
a pitc he d battle
i n wh ic h
their forces could
be destroyed.
The later
specialized
in fighting
lower scale conflict b ec au se t hi s w as th e t as k m os t
required of
it. This
represented
th e
best
way
of
employing its
high
m an po we r t o defeat th e enemy
at
m inim um cost to themselves an d
e s prestige.
Defeat in
a
small encounter di d
not
thre a te n the stability
of
a
although
a series
of
defeats
might
do so.
It
is difficult t o k no w
when
this
sition occurred between
a n a rm y that actively sought pitched
battles
an d
on e
was reluctant to fight. Our sources for th e second
a nd t hi rd
cen tu ries are s o
r that an y
gradual
change cannot b e traced. It is p os sible that
the frequent
use
legionary vexillations rather than full legions suggests that mu ch w arfare
was
on a s ma ll scale even i n
th e
early
Principate.
PERSIA
AND
T HE E AS T
e Parthians
ha d
never
posed
a real
t hr ea t t o Rome s control
of
Syria
n or h ad
Roman s p ro ved ab le to amass
th e
resources and unde rta ke the massive
effort
conquering Parthia.
Conflicts
between th e
tw o
powers ha d tended
to focus
on
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ROM W RF R
Palmyra was a desert
kingdom
which flourished
within
the Empire from its
position astride the
main
trade route
with
the Orient
Here the triad
of
main
Palmyran deities are shown
wearing lamellar
armour
and
with swords at their
belts In the chaos produced
by Shapur sinvasion
Palmyra became the leader
of
the eastern provinces in
the effort to repel the
invaders
fter
the death
of
its King Odenathus
wh o
operated as a general
of
the
Roman
army his
widow
Zenobia
led a briefly
successful attempt to create
a
new
eastern empire based
on Palmyra Syria and much
of
Egypt
and
Asia were
overrun and
i t was
not
until
the emperor Aurelian
defeated the Palmyrans in
at ntioch and Emesa
that the rebellion was
suppressed
Zenobia
was
captured
and
led in
urelians
triumph living
ou t the remainder of her life
in exile near Rome
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ROMAN
WARFARE
This silver drachma bears
the head of Ardashir I c.
209--42 the founder of the
Sassanid dynasty A sub-
king
of
the Parthian
monarch he defeated and
killed rtabanus
the last
Arsacid king in 224.
e
later fought with Rome over
and
twice captured the
border city of Hatra The
Sassanid Empire was to
prove a more formidable
opponent
than
the Parthian
Empire it supplanted
lthough its invasions still
tended to take the form
of
massive raids
the
Sassanids
were to display far greater
skill in siegecraft than their
predecessors
186
domination of
th e
areas between their frontiers
especially th e
kingdom
of Armenia.
Trajan s
conquests In
Mesopotamia had
been
abandoned by or soon
after
his
dea th. At the
en d
of t he s ec on d c en tu ry
AD
Severus created
a permanent province of Mesopotamia
maintaining
a permanent
Roman
presence east
of th e Euphrates.
In
224 t he l as t Arsacid king
Artabanus
w as d efeated
an d
deposed
by a
rebellion led by t he S as sa ni d Ardashir.
Th e
S as sa ni d m on ar ch y wa s stronger
than
its
Parthian predecessor bu t still faced
th e
problem of controlling a disparate collection of
royal
lands
city
states
sub-kingdoms an d
powerful noble families.
The
Sassanid
army was composed of royal
troops and
mercenaries
as well as feudal
contingents supplied by th e noblemen. Like the
Parthians its main strength lay
in
its cavalry the cataphracts an d horse-archers.
Although
heavily
a rm ou re d a nd eq uip ped w it h
lances for a massed charge
Sassanid cataphracts often displayed a preference for using
their
bows to deluge
t he enemy
with
arrows
an d
w ear h i m
down g r d u l l ~ The standard
of
individual
training
in horsemanship archery
an d
use of personal weapons was very high
b ut the level of training at unit level probably varied c o n s i d e r l ~ On several
o cc as io ns t he
caution and good order
of th e
Persian
cavalry especially in
pursuing a b eat en enemy or rallying quickly after a mounted charge was noted
by Roman sources. Persian
armies
tended to
deploy
in
three distinct
bodies th e
centre an d
tw o wings
an d
o ft en made use
of
reserve lines. Rarely would all three
parts
of
th e
army attack
simultaneously
an d
often some
sections
would
advance
an d
then feign retreat
to
draw incautious pursuers
on
to
th e
well-formed reserves.
To their cavalry th e Sassanids added Indian
elephants
carrying towers
containing
bow men o n their backs. Elephants intimidated th e
enemy
by
their
size an d
frightened horses by their appearance
an d
smell. Somet imes t hey creat ed p an ic
an d
disorder in th e
enemy
ranks making an opening which
might
be exploited
but
they
were
vulnerable
to missile fire an d of less use
ag ai ns t s tead y t ro op s.
Numerous infantry accompanied the
armies
in th e field providing more archers
an d spearmen bu t their
quality was
universally
described
as very low. Peasants
impressed
for service with
th e
king
th e
i nfant ry ad ded t o the spectacle created by
th e
Persian
army but were not capable of standing up t o g oo d
enemy
infantry
and at best
provided
rallying points for
th e c v l r ~
One
of th e
most significant
differences b etw een t he Persi an
a n d P ar th i an
armies wa s t he f ar g re at er ability
displayed by the former
in
siegecraft.
Improved
logistical organization allowed
th e Persians
to
supply a
static
force for th e
dura tion of
a siege. Their armies also
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C RI SI S N D REFORM
Frontier in th e East
Second an d th ird centuries D
Persian raids
Julian s
invasion of Persia AD 36
Palmyran invasions
/
Eastern border of Roman Empire
AD
3
D Kingdom
of Palmyra AD 26 72
o
major
trade route
i I
o
5
miles
/
\
\ \
\
\
J
\
_
\
\
\
\
\
I
E STERN FRONTIER
long struggle between
and Sassanid Persia
focused around the
of
the border
sses like Dara Nisibis
and Dura Europus.
g these bases each
raided the
others
with
soldiers recruited from
bian tribes. The loss
of
these fortresses
was a
major
disaster for
either side greatly affecting
the balance
of
power.
On
the occasions that the
Romans
launched a
major
expedition against Persia it
tended to follow
much
the
same route
down
the
Euphrates
or
Tigris as
Trajan
or
Severus
had taken
on
their Parthian
expeditions. A more serious
threat to the stability
of
the
Roman east came during the
Palmyran rebellion
of
262 73 when Queen
Zenobia
s armies overran
Syria and much of Egypt
and
siaMinor. This was
finally suppressed
by
urelian
who
followed up
his victories
at Immae and
Emesa with the siege
and
capture
of
Palmyra
itself
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ROM N W RF R
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CRISIS
ND
REFORM
The synagogue at Dura
Europus was richly
decorated
with
murals
showing ld Testament
scenes. The figures are
depicted in contemporary
third-century costume the
Israelite warriors dressed
as
Roman
soldiers. Scenes
include the crossing of the
Jordan and
on
the far right
of this picture the battle of
Ebenezer Samuel 4 The
warriors depicted wear iron
scale armour haved long
hexagonal shields decorated
with horizontal bars and
carry swords. Probably from
a desire to
show
the men s
faces
none
wear helmets .
but a group next to t he
rk
of the Covenant have scale
coifs covering their heads.
lso
shown are
unarmoured
and
shieldless cavalrymen
thrusting long lances
underarm. Wall paintings
from other buildings at
Dura
showed
its garrison
Cohors
XX Palmyrenorum
parading to witness a
sacrifice.
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ROMAN
WARFARE
included the engineers required
to
construct and operate siege towers rams and
catapults and displayed
a
willingness to
accept the
casualties
inevitable
in
the
storming
of
strong fortifications.
Th e Sassanids claimed to be the successors to the Acheamanid
Persia the
empire
that had
been overrun in a few ye ars by
the
savage
onslaught of
Alexander
the
Great. As such their propaganda laid claim to all the old realms of the Persian
Empire extending
up
to
the coast
of
Asia
Minor.
They reinstated
the dominance
of
the o ld religion
of
Persia Zoroastrianism the influence of which sometimes
gave the ir wars a strongly religious q u l i t ~
The
Sassanids have often been
p er ce iv ed as a far more dangerous enemy to Rome than the Parthians had ever
uins
of
the
frontier city of
ura u r p u s ~ captured by
hapur
in about and
never reoccupied Traces
have been discovered
of
the
final s i e g e ~ including a
tunnel dug by the Persians to
undermJne
the
city wall
The omans
dug
a counter-
mine to attack bu t the
whole
thing
o l l p s e d ~
trapping attackers
and
defenders alike
been. However
the
Persians
had
as little success as
the Parthians
in
maintaining
a
long term presence west of the Euphrates in Cappadocia or
Syria.
The
invasions which
penetrated deep
into the Roman East reta ined the characte r o f
large scale raids.
The
Sassanid kings were rarely secure enough in
their
own
realms
to
permit
a concerted effort
of
conquest.
Their
main objective was
to
dominate the areas
on
the fringes of the two empires and in particular to drive
back the Roman presence in Mesopotamia
and
Arabia.
This could
be achieved by
direct attack
on
the Roman strongholds in this
area
or by threats to Rome s
provinces
or military
victories which
allowed the Persians
to
gain favourable
treaties
with
Rome.
The
campaigns
between Rome and
Persia came
to
be
dominated
by
the
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CRISIS
A ND R EF OR M
fortresses places like
Nisibis
Amida
and
Dura Europos. Well
fortified
garrisoned they were difficult for
either
side t o c ap tu re
without
large forces
considerable effort As in
th e
west
raiding became
th e most
common
activity
both
sides
Both
sides
began
to
enlist th e nomadic tribes of t he a re a
th e
employing the ir mobility
a nd p re da to ry
talents to raid th e
other s
Only
in major expeditions
were battles
between
the two sides at all
an d even then
th e
Persian objective was ofte n to mount a display of force to
favourable negotiations Large royal
armies with the ir
full
complements of
a nd infa ntry
moved
in
a
rather
stately
fashion presenting
an
image of
t force bu t
lacking th e
flexibility of smaller predominantly cavalry armies
ersi n siege line
final breakthrough
initial
ersi n attacks
repulsed
Tw o Gallic legions
mount
a night-
time sally and create havoc in the
Persian camp before they are
repulsed
On e
of
the citizens of
Amida
deserts
t o t he enemy
He
leads a group
of
seventy Persians through a secret
entrance to
take
control of a wal l
tower during the night
Th e
next
d ay t h e Persians renew the
assault
The twenty
archers attempt
t o s h oo t
down
the Romans on the
wall nearby
However
the
Romans
contain the assault and bringing up
five catapaults recapture the tower
Initial Persian approach.
Grumbate
king
of
the Chionitae
approaches
summon the city
surrender
The Romans fire a scorpion
at
him
and kill his son
It becomes a m a tt e r o f h o n ou r for
the Persians t o t ak e t h e city
Siege
of
Amida
AD 359
3
Initial Persian
attacks
pressed
fiercely but without success
Disease begins to weaken the
defenders
Persians press
the
assault making
extensive use
of
siege engines
The
Persian king himself takes part
in the attacks
T h e R o ma n s
bui lda
5
mound behind the wall to raise its
height However this collapses and
the spoil forms a
ramp
in front
of
the wall Th e Persians s wa r m u p
this r a mp a n d the city falls
created a route directly into
the city. The Persian
willingness and ability to
prosecute a siege and accept
the high casualties likely in a
direct assault made them a
far
more
dangerous
opponent than their
Parthian predecessors.
Nevertheless most Persian
sieges notably the repeated
attacks on
isibis
ended
in
failure. In this period the
advantage usually lay with
the
defenders.
changed little from
the
third
century C take a c it y
by
assault the attacker had to
f ind a
way
over
through or
under its fortifications. Each
of these methods could be
countered
by measures
taken by the defending
garrison. mida actually fell
when
a
mound
constructed
by the omans to lay
artillery fire
down
on to the
workers building the
approaching Persian siege
ramp collapsed and
the spoil
OF AMIDA
historian mmianus
ellinus was a staff
with the garrison
of
a nd l ef t a vivid
and
account
of
the siege
the city s fall. B y the
th century the oman
found itself more
the defender than
acker in siege
and had
oped the skills of
nce to a high art . Yet in
respects the technology
ge warfare
had
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ROMAN WARFARE
Persian
doctrine
stressed that
b at tl es s ho u ld
only
be ri ske d
when the
army
enjoyed great advantages
of
position and numbers.
R om an a tt ac ks on
th e
Persians
were
more
determined
an d
conformed
to
their
traditional
view
of
warfare as a life-and-death struggle. Julian
amassed
sixty-five
thousand
me n for the two a rm ie s w hi ch comprised his invasion of
Persia
probably
th e
largest Roman
force ever seen in th e
fourth e n t u r ~
A
co mp et ent ly h and l ed Ro man force composed
of
reliable i nfant ry an d cavalry
could usually
defeat
significantly
larger
Persian armies
bu t
it proved difficult
to
g ai n m uc h
advantage
from
such successes.
Th e
Persians like
the Parthians
before
them usually struck
at
t he Ro man s lines
of
communication
or
r ai de d i nt o t he
eastern provinces to draw
th e
invaders
off.
Julian
inflicted several battlefield
defeats
on
th e Persians bu t his most
important
successes c am e f ro m t he c ap tu re
of
forts and cities. Several Roman a rm ie s i n t he
third
an d fourth centuries pressed
on into Babylonia sacking
Ctesiphon the old
seat of th e
Arsacids an d still
an
important centre. Yet th e total defeat
of
Persia was a ma ssi ve undertaking
requiring
huge
resources
of
manpower an d
logistic
s u pp o rt a nd
involving
long
years
of
bitter
campaigning.
Julian s
expedition
f ail ed b ec au se h e wa s u na bl e to
supply
hi s v as t As a result
of
this balance
of
power conflict continued to
consist
principally
of
s po ra di c r ai di ng f ro m t he
border
fortresses. Control
of
these allowed domination
of
th e area an d
Ammianus
was incensed when Julian s
successor Jovian
eager
to extricate himself
f ro m t he failed
eastern enterprise
abandoned Nisibis
Singara an d
territories
on
th e border.
DISASTER
AT
ADRIANOPLE
In 378 t he eas tern emperor Valens fell
along
with
many of
his officers an d two
thirds
of
his army fighting against a
Gothic
a rm y a t Adrianople. It was a major
disaster
bu t
its
consequences
should
no t
be exaggerated.
Th e
defeat was largely
th e result
of
Valens mistakes an d
not o f
t he a rm y s inefficiency although i t may
have reflected
the unpreparedness of
th e
fourth-century army
for operating in
large
n um be rs. Af te r th e b at tl e t he R om an s reverted to the low-level
harassing
operations i n wh ic h t he f ou rt h- ce nt ur y a rm y excelled an d by 382 th e Goths
accepted
peace terms an d
provided
troops
for the R om an a rm y
in subsequent
years.
Adrianople
was
a
setback
an d
a significant blow
to
Rome s prestige
bu t
it
was not an indication of
a de cl in e i n
quality of th e A t t he
en d
of
the
fourth
century
it
was unlikely
that anyone could
have
imagined that th e
Empire would
ever cease. C er ta in ly t he t ri ba l p eo pl es w hi ch forced their way through th e
f ro nt ie rs i n th e west di d not
ai m
to destroy Roman
power
bu t
to create a
favourable place for themselves
w ithin the
Roman system.
Potentially th e army of the late E mpir e w as as eff icient a f ighting force as any
earlier Roman Its professionalism discipline
training
an d
good
equipment
supported by a well-organized logistical system gave th e Roman army significant
advantages over
an y
opponent.
Well led a
Roman army
was able
to
defeat larger
enemy forces.
N ot
all units
of
the army
reached
th e
highest
standards
of
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an d
confidence in
t he f ou rt h
century
but
this
ha d also
been
true
in
ier centuries. It took long years of successful c a mpa igning to raise troops
e peak
of
f f i i n ~
Th e
fourth-century army lacked some of th e flexibility
hting different scales of warfare
t h at h ad
marked the army of th e Principate.
celled in lower level
operations but
its
unit
a nd c om ma nd
structure was
suited to
large
battles. This
was
a reflection
of
th e raids and skirmishing
were th e most
common
types o f c om ba t experienced by th e late
Roman
ier. A reluctance
to
escalate a conflict
an d
reach a swift decis ion by defeating
enemy in
battle
was a
mark ed chang e fro m
earlier practices. Roman
warfare
something of th e relentless quality
which
ha d d is ti ng ui sh ed i t at
r periods. Far m ore conflicts ended i n t re at ie s that di d not give Rome
v i t o r ~
However while th e l at er a rm y ha d t he p ot en ti al t o
be
very efficient
it was
to
fulfil this
potential
less often. I ts
command structure
was heavily divided
l levels f ro m th e i mp er ia l p ow er d ow nw ar ds .
This made it
difficult
to
operations
on
an
Empire-wide
basis. The
limit nei
were
tied
to
ct regions
which
suffered if
they
were removed
an d
even th e
comit tenses
became
divided
into increasingly numerous regional field armies.
large
number of u es an d
comites an d
th e
division between civil and
administration
often
made
i t u nclear
wh o
was responsible
fo r dealing
problems
on
th e
frontiers
an d slowed th e process of mustering and
an
E mp er or s f ou nd themselves having personally
to
direct
small scale
operations
as
the only
way
of
ensuring
that
something
pened. Frequent civil wars
th e
only conflicts
in
which
battles
were common
d the strength
of
t he a rm y in costly campaigns while denuding the frontiers
an d
allowing external threats
to
grow. Th e only
guarantee
of power
th e
army bu t
th e
closer a nd mo re im med iate link
b etw een s ol di ers
emperors only increased
th e
chance of usurpation. The weakness of
central
ority encouraged the development of regional power which could only
be
by the presence of troops. There were probably more soldiers
under
in
t he l at e E mp ir e
but
it
wa s fa r h ar de r t o a ma ss a rm ie s of more than
thousand an d dangerous to
involve
them in
conflict for
to o
long in a ny
area. Expediency especially
during
civil wars
e nc ou ra ge d e mp er or s t o
recruits wherever
they
could be found an d
s om et im es l ed
to
unwise
to tribes.
T h e Roman
Empire
di d
not
fall quickly despite all these internal weaknesses.
strength derived f ro m t he successful
absorption
of so many
peoples an d
prosperity
which
it
h ad b ro ug ht t o
the provinces was
still
great.
A dd ed t o
t he e xt er na l t hr ea ts i t faced were always sporadic disunited an d
weak.
cal divisions weakened th e
Roman
army
but
i t still p ro ved capab le of
ning most of t he w ar s
it was cal led
u po n to
fight. Civil
wars sapped Rome s
ary strength bu t
their
f requency was a direct resul t of
th e
failure of
central
ity to control
the
r ~
CRISIS
AN D
REFORM
193
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CH PTER SIX
- - - ~ . ~ : - : - - : = = : , , - - . ~ _ . : = = = : P + I _ . - - - -
COLL PSE
THE
WEST
RECOVERY IN
THE E ST
THE ROMANS H LW YS relied upon recently defeated
enemies to provide the
next
generation
o f
Roman soldiers
Barbarian tribesmen were recruited to employ their ferocity
against the Empire s foes this frenzied scene from Trajan
s
Column an auxiliary infantryman fights on whilst holding
the severed head
of
a previous Dacian
victim
by the hair
between his teeth The use barbarian soldiers was
nothing
new in Late Antiquity
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ROMAN WARFARE
COLLAPSE IN THE WEST,
RECOVERY IN THE EAST
I
N
418
A
GROUP
BASED
around the Gothic
tribes
which
had
destroyed
Valens
army was set tled by treaty on land
which
was to become the Visigothic
kingdom
of Aquitaine.
For
the first
time, but
no t the last, the western
emperor
acknowledged the existence of a king within the provinces, who supplied troops
fighting
under their own
leaders and not as part of the regular arm}:
The
term
foeder ti increasingly came to b e u se d f or s ol di er s f ig ht in g
for Rome
under this
WESTERN
DIVISION
EASTERN DIVISION
Britanniae
Africa
Dacia
Pontica
Valemia
Mauretania Caesariensis
Moesia I
Bithynia
Britannia
Mauretania Sitifensis
Dacia Ripensis
Honorias
Flavia Caesariensis
Numidia
Praevalitana
Paphlagonia
Britannia
Africa
Dardania
He1enopontus
Maxima Caesariensis
Byzacena
Dacia Mediterranea
Pomus
Polemoniacus
Galliae
Tripolitania
Macedonia
Galatia
SOo
Lugdunensis III
Italia
Epirus
Nova j
Armenia
I
Lugdunensis II
Alpes
Cottiae
Macedonia
Galatia Salutaris
Belgica II
Aemilia
Epirus Vetus
Cappadocia
Germania II
Raetia I
Thessalia
®
Cappadocia I
l l
LugdunensisSenonia
Raetia
Achaea
®
Armenia
O C e J v l I C
v
Lugdunensis I
Liguria
Creta
Oriens
j
Be1gica I
Venetia et
Histria
Thraciae
Isauria
Germania I
j
Flaminia et
Picenum
Moesia
II
Cilicia I
Maxima
Sequanorum
Suburbicaria
Scythia
Cilicia
Septum Provinciae
Corsica
Thracia
Euphratensis
Aquitanica
Sardinia
Haemimontus
Mesopotamia
Aquitanica I
Tuscia
et Umbria
Rhodope
Syria
Novem Populi
Valeria
Europa
j
Osrhoene
arbonensis I
Picenum
Suburbicarium
Asiania
Cyprus
Viennensis
Roma
He1lespontus
Syria SaJutaris
Narbonensis
IJ
j
Campania
Phrygia
Pacatiana
®
Phoenice
j
Alpes
Maritimae
Samnium
Phrygia
Salutaris
®
Phoenice Libanensis
Hispaniae
Bruttii et Lucania
Asia
®
Palaestina
Gallaecia
®
Apulia et Calabria
Lydia
®
Arabia
Carthaginiensis
®
Sicilia
Pisidia
@
Palaestina I
T arraconensis
Pannonia to c
4 0 ;
j
Lycaonia
I
Palaestina Salutaris
Lusitania
Illyricum after c
4 0
Caria
Aegyptus
Baetica
Noricum Ripense
Pamphylia
Libya Superior
Noricum Meditterraneum
®
Insulae
Libya Inferior
nsulae
Balearum
j
Pannonia I
®
ingitania Lycia
Aegyptus
Valeria
Augustamnica
Savia
Arcadia
\ km
annonia
I
I
Thebais
miles
j
Dalmatia
19
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COLLAPSE
IN
TH E
WEST
RECOVERY
IN
TH E
EAST
of
arrangement
rather than as a genera l term for foreign recruits
in regular
The Goths ha d proved too strong to destroy but
they
were also a tempting
of recruits for emperors starved
of
readily
available military manpower
ey had sometimes fought against Rome
bu t
more often
on
her behal f in
both
and
civil
wars although the distinction between the two
was
often
ur red; they were also
sent
against the
Vandals in Spain
another group of
who
had
established
themselves within the Empire Isolated in an
en alien
environment
and commanded by a series of strong war leaders who
erated both within
and
outside the hierarchy
of
the Roman army the Visigoths
d
become more united
than most
tribal peoples
There
is a fierce debate over
THE ROMAN
EMPIRE
IN
AD 418
The oman
mpire in
418 was divided into
many small provinces
and
regions any
of
the
army
units listed for each
command
may
have existed
only in theory
or
been mere
skeletons
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ROMAN
WARFARE
A coin
nd
medallion
ommemor ting the
reconquests
of
Justinian I
c.
483-565). Through
able generals such as
Belisarius
nd
N arses the
emperor ttempted to
restore his uthority in
Africa
nd
Italy
whether
their experiences after crossing
th e
Danube created or merely accelerated
this process.
Later
in the
c en tu ry o t he r
peoples
emulated
th e
Visigoths
in
establishing
k in gd oms w it hi n t he provinces, either by force or t r e t ~ In 9 th e Vandals took
Africa,
denying
th e
western
emperor
access
to
its large revenue
an d
rich recruiting
grounds.
Later
Franks
an d Burgundians
s et tl ed i n
Gaul while
the Ostrogoths
overran In
th e
short
term
some
of these
groups
were used to
b ol st er an
emperor s power,
bu t
in the longer
term
they
promoted
th e fin al collapse of
central
u t h o r i t ~
The
western
emperors were no longer able to enforce their will
or g ua ra nt ee p ro te ct io n t o th e provinces still loy al to them which in turn
encouraged
freq uen t l ocal
usurpations. The infrastructure t o s up po rt a l ar ge ,
well-trained
army, an d
t o c on tr ol
an d
s up pl y i t
in
th e
field was
no
longer there.
Some h ig h -q ual it y u ni ts still existed
an d
displayed their skill in th e low-level
warfare i n wh ic h th e l at er a rm y
excelled,
bu t th e n um be r o f
such
troops
was
dwindling. Th e army which Aetiu s led to
blunt the onslaught
of Attila s Huns at
Chalons
was largely
composed
of foederati The western
empire
fell when central
authority collapsed, an d in its place emerged numerous smaller states based on a
mixture
of
ba rba ria n a nd Roman institutions whose power an d prosperity were
dwarfed by comparison with
t he Rome
of even a
century
before.
In
the east the
emperors
p ow er r em ai ne d s tr on g.
The
culturally
more
coherent densely
p op ul at ed a nd
p ros p ero us east ern p ro vi nc es w er e a bl e to
maintain a la rg e
an d
efficient This preserved th e
balance
of power on th e
frontier with Persia.
I n t he s ix th c en tu ry t he
last real attempt at regaining the lost
provinces in
th e
west was made when
Justinian sent
armies
under
gifted generals
such
as B el is ar iu s an d
Narses
to
de st roy t he
Vandals
in
Africa an d
the
Ostrogothic kingdom in A l th o ug h t h e camp ai gn s were successful, in the
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COL L APSE IN
TH E
WEST RECOVERY IN
T HE
EAST
term
it
proved
impossible
for
th e
R om an s t o r etain c on tr ol of the old
around
the Mediterranean.
Th e
Empire s
resources were sufficient for
defence
bu t
utterly
inadequate
for overseas
conquest.
T he a rm y of t he s ix th century
represented
the c ulmination of many
of
th e
nds already observed
in the army
of
late
n t i q u i t ~ Many
soldiers were
under
an d
included
o n the Imperial army s strength
but
forces in th e field
were
m large. Belisarius landed
in
Africa with
only
sixteen thousand
men
an d his
expeditionary
force to Italy numbered half that total.
Armies
of twenty five
or
more were exceptionally rare. A late sixth-century military manual
rice s Strategikon
discussed
armies of five to fifteen thousand men
bu t
early viewed forces towards th e lower en d of this scale as th e
norm and
believed
thousand men to be
an
unusually large force.
The
basic unit consisted of
o to
five hundred
me n
led by a
tribune
several
of these
c ombining to
form
a
commanded
by a
dux
in battle.
The
larger armies
often
proved difficult for
commanders
to
control
before a nd during a
battle
an d several defeats were
on
undisciplined
tr oo ps w ho ha d forced their
general
to
risk
battle
In
a pitched bat tle th e t ra di ti on al R om an emp hasi s on using
serves still dominated military doctrine although it
wa s
rare for th e whole
to be divided into several lines of
roughly
equal size
an d
composition.
The
fourth-century theorist Vegetius ha d recommended
avoidance
of battle
the circumstances were very favourable indeed
but
th e author of th e
was even more cautious
an d
advocated it only as a last resort.
Theory
s reflected in practice
with th e
conflicts
of
this
period tending to
be
long bu t
cluding very few mas sed act io ns .
Campaigns
in both
east
an d west were
by
raids skirmishes
an d sieges.
In
th e
wars
with Persia t he b or de r
continued
to play a dominant role as bases
from
which
mobile columns
out
to
plunder
enemy t e r r i t o r ~ It
is unlikely
that
either side ever
thought in
o f total victory realizing that
they no
longer
possessed
th e
necessary
The
Persians
main objective
was
o fte n t o ex act a sizeable payment
om the
Roman s i n
return for peace
money
which
helped
th e
Sassanid
monarch
m ai nt ai n his position
an d
defend a gainst a tta c ks by th e Huns from the
to the north. The control
of
th e border
fortresses
remained
of
central
an d th e Roman decision to
build
a ne w stronghold
a t D ar a
directly
Persian controlled Nisibis
was
viewed as a provocative act.
Th e
division b et ween t he limit nei an d omit tenses remained
although
of
th e
latter
became
permanently garrisoned
in frontier
strongholds
an d
y have differed little
f rom t he
border
troops. Units
of foederati
in the
eastern
were little different
f ro m t he
ordinary comitatenses
being
p ai d a nd fed by
e state an d serving u nd er Ro man appointed officers. T he m ai n
distinction was
they included a
higher
proportion of barbarian recruits. The
best element
of
eld armies was
often
provided by
th e
bucellarii
who although they
took
an
oath
loyalty
to
th e
emperor
were effectively t he h ou se ho ld
troops
of t he s en io r
A successful
leader
such as Belisarius amassed several
thousand
of
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ROM
W RF R
The great
aqueduct
supplying the Roman colony
at
Caesarea
on the
coast
]udaea. Originally
built by
erod
the Great the
aqueduct
was restored
an d
substantially
widened by
a
vexillation
of
Legio
Fretensis during the reign
of
Trajan.
The
inscription
recording this
work
is still
situ
on
one
o f
the
arches.
Some
of the
finest engineers
in
the
Empire were
numbered amongst
the
ranks
of
the legions
and
they
were often called in to
undertake or
supervise
building projects. However
in the late Empire
the
resources and willingness to
undertake such major works
were less
common Running
parallel
with the Roman
aqueduct
the
line of the
subterranean Byzantine
aqueduct. This was a
reasonably effective way o f
supplying u ater to
the
city
bu t far less visually
spectacular.
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COLL PSE IN TH E
WEST
RECOVERY IN TH E E ST
2
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ROMAN WARFARE
This fragment of a frieze
now in the Louvre probably
dates to the reign of Marcus
Aurelius
and shows oman
soldiers attacking a
barbarian village Punitive
expeditions in which
houses were burnt cattle
confiscated and slaves taken
were standard practice for
the
oman army
of most
periods
these soldiers an d
t ra in ed t he m t o
a high level
of
efficiency
The bucellarii
also
included a
pool of
officers wh o might be employed
t o c om m an d
army units
addition there
were allied
contingents most commonly
Arabs
or
Saraceni in the
wars
with Persia These
fought
both w ith the field
armies
an d
independently
when hired to raid t he emperor s
enemies
Th e
strength of t he s ix th -c en tu ry a rm y was undoubtedly its cavalry Th e
majority
were equipped
equally
for
shock action
or for fighting
from
a distance
These horsemen
wielded lance
or
bo w
as the situation demanded but
although
th e
riders
were heavily armoured their
horses
do no t seem to have been
protected. The
trategikon
e mp ha si ze d t he need for cavalry to charge in a
disciplined
manner
always maintain a reserve
of
fresh
troops
an d be careful no t
to be d ra wn i nt o a ra sh pursuit .
Bucellarii
were normally cavalry an d by
their
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COLLAPSE
IN THE
WEST RECOVERY
IN TH E
EAST
ure horsemen were more suited
than
foot soldiers to the raids
and
ambushes
dominated the warfare of
this
period. The sixth century cavalryman
was
r more
likely to experience combat than his infantry counterpart.
In
a l arg e
action
a
well balanced
mix of horse and foot
was
still the
ideal
but
the
an infantry
of
this
period ha d
a very
poor
reputation. In
part
thi s was
a
of
their inexperience
bu t
they
often
seem
to have
lacked discipline and
ars es used dismounted
cavalrymen
to
provide
a r eliable
centre
to his
line at Taginae. At Dara Belisarius protected his foot behind specially
ditches. Roman infantry almost invariably fought in a def ensive r ole
o vi di ng a s ol id b as e for
the
cavalry to rally
behind.
They did not
advance
to
enemy foot
bu t relied on a barrage of missiles javelins and especially
to win the combat. All units now included
an
element of
archers
and
it
as cla ime d that Roman bows
shot
more powerfully than their Persian
The f ron t ranks
of
a
formation wore
armour and
carried large
shields and long
spears
bu t some of the ra nks to the rear carr ied bows.
fantry formations might be as
deep
as sixteen ranks. Such deep formations
it difficult for soldiers to flee but also reduced their practical contribution
the fighting an d were another indication of
the unreliability
of
the
Roman
soldier. The
tr tegikon
recorded
drill commands given
in
Latin to an army
almost exclusively spoke Greek. There were other survivals of the traditional
military system many of which would endure until the tenth century but
aggressive sword armed legionary was now a
distant
o r ~
HE
END
OF THE EMPIRE
e collapse of central authority
in
the west had encouraged the trend towards
reasingly small-scale warfare. Local warlords
and landowners who
based
r power on
the
number of a rmed retainers
they controlled
flourished. One of
e reasons why
archaeologists
have found so few traces of the devastation
wrought
by barbarian invaders is
that most
of these moved in
latively small
bands
whose
depredations
affected only a smal l a rea . The
of political
power ensured
that
there
were
seldom
enough soldiers
ioned in
one area
or concentrated
in
field forces free to range throughout the
to oppose successfully all the groups of invaders or overawe the tribes
had been settled inside the Empire.
The basic pattern that
warfare
would
assume
for
the
thousand years at
ast in Europe ha d alr eady been set
in
the
late
Roman
period.
Medieval warfare
characterized by raids
an d
skirmishes frequently revolving around the
of
fortified strongholds. The
pitched bat tle
was a r elatively
rare
and
the
idea of
the
decisive
battle
ha d
lost the central
place w hi ch i t
d
occupied in
earlier antiquity: Vegetius the fourth century military theorist
o had been one
of
the first Roman authors to advocate the avoidance of battle
highly popular
throughout
the
Middle
Ages. The Byzantine
army
and preserved many of
the
traditions of
the professional
Roman army
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R O M A N WARFARE
he oman amphitheatre
a t the colony of
Sarmizegethusa Vlpia
founded by Trajan as the
capital
of
the new Dacian
province
he
area was
abandoned
in the third
century bu t in the f if th
century some local warlord
converted the arena into a
fortified position
bu t in th e west no kingdom possessed t he s tro ng central authority
or
th e wealth
t o s up po rt
a l ar ge
permanent
army
of
uniformed drilled
an d
disciplined soldiers.
There
ha d
been a close
relationship
between the ar my a nd political life from
very early
on
in
Rome s
history when
political
rights were g ran t ed t o
those
able
to equip
themselves
to
fight
in
th e main battle
line.
Under th e
Principate
when
th e
emperors ha d
taken
care
to
ensure
that
th e
army
was personally loyal its
senior
commanders had still been drawn
from
th e
ranks
of Rome s
r i s t o r ~
In
t he t hi rd c en tu ry this connection
ha d
been broken an d t he army s generals were
career
soldiers
serving
p er m an en tl y w i th th e army an d
o wi ng t heir
progress
entirely to Imperial favour. Gradually the hatred a nd f ear w hich th e prosperous
literate classes ha d always felt towards the professional
soldier w as
extended to
his officers.
The
a rm y n ow m ad e an d main tain ed an emperor in his position an d
th e wishes of even th e
wealthiest
sections
of
th e rest
of
society counted for little.
There w as little to check th e regionalism of troops stationed for
long
per iods in
on e
area
an d
often recrui ted t here as well since th e generals were n o l on ge r
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COLLAPSE
IN T H E WEST RECOVERY IN T HE
EAST
rving for a short tour no r
drawn from
a
central
pool
without
regional ties. Civil
r
after
civil w ar sa pped the
Empire s
strength a nd f ur th er e nc ou ra ge d t he
of
local powers w ho c ou ld offer
protection to
a reg io n.
Morale obviously ha s ha d massive significance throughout military history
t
this was especially
t ru e w he n b at tl es
were
decided
by
massed hand-to-hand
On e
defeat often prompted another since troops
who
ha d lost
their
could
rarely s ta nd u p
to
th e pressures of close combat no matter ho w
erior their training organization
or
tactics were to those
of
th e enemy. The
of restoring soldiers belief
in
th e possibility of success after a series of
eats was demonstrated by conflicts as separated
i n t im e
as th e Numantine wa r
d
th e
early sixth-century campaigns with Persia.
It was not
just
this
tactical
ension which suffered from a series
of
defeats. At a strategic level
th e
Romans
on
th e domination
of their neighbours
securing
th e
Empire s frontiers
overawing
th e peoples
outside
by
creating
an impression of
rwhelming might. Defeats seriously weakened this of
Roman
strength
a nd m ean t that
th e
Romans had
to
fight very
hard
to recreate it. F ro m t he m id dl e of t he t hi rd
century onwards the Romans were n ev er able to
restore
th e
situation
fully a
trend wh ich was
marked by th e abandonment
of
th e relentless
pursuit of
total victory
that
ha d
been
th e
traditional
hallmark of Roman
military practice.
Th e insecurity of
t he l at er e mp er or s
made this
attitude impractical.
Th e western empire di d not fall no r d id t he
ea st e nd ur e beca use
of
th e
results of
a few
decisive battles. The external threats to Rome
were unconcerted
an d sporadic an d
no t enough
in
themselves to have destroyed th e Empire. Th e
professional
Roman army wa s capable
of
defeating
an y
of
th e
opponents faced in
Late
Antiquity
as
long
as
it wa s
given
th e
resources
of men an d material
to do
so. Th e failure of th e
Rom an state to
control the professional army
an d
in
particular its
officer
corps steadily
destroyed
t he c en tr al p ow er that controlled the
infrastructure
necessary
fo r th e
army
to
function. The institutions
of
th e
Roman
army
g ra du al ly d is ap pe ar ed
in a process
lasting
centuries bu t th e idea of
th e
professional army
w ou ld l at er
have a
great
i mp ac t o n
th e
rise
of
modern w ar fa re i n t he
Europe
of th e
sixteenth
an d seventeenth centuries.
OVERLEAF:
The buildings
outside the late first century
fort at Vindolanda in
orthumbri
included
wh t
s
believed to be a
mansio
or
way station used to
ccommod te import nt
travellers. In the foreground
s the small bath house
provided for these men.
Bath houses especially in
civilian settlements and
villas were one of the first
things to fall into disrepair
in late Antiquity. The
technical knowledge to
build
nd
maintain these
was no longer s widespread
s it h d been
mongst
the
rmy of the Principate.
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ROM N W RF R
6
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COLL PSE I TH E WEST RECOVERY IN TH E E ST
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R O M A N WARFARE
C O N C L U S I O N
Hadrian s Wall remains one
of the most visually
impressive monuments left
by the Roman army
although only in places is it
visible
on
the ground. This
Milecastle
39 west
of
ouseteads fort in the
central section running
along some o f the most
spectacular scenery. ike
many of the fortlets
and
turrets on Hadrian s Wall it
not built on the best site
for observation but at its
regular interval. The slope
to th e
north
was probably
too steep ever to have been
used by wheeled vehicles
bu t even so a gate was built
opening out onto it
according to the standard
design. any
of
these
superfluous gateways were
blocked
or
made narrower
in later rebuildings.
8
T
HE ROM N RMY
changed the
world
creating
an
E mp ir e t he legacy of which is
s till felt M uc h o f Europe employs a l eg al
system
based
on Roman la w
and
speaks
languages derived from
or
heavily influenced by
Latin.
Th e dominance of th e West in the
last
few
c en tu ri es e xt en de d both languages and
legal
systems
throughout
most of th e globe.
Until
th e
last few generations Greek an d
Latin
languages
and literature lay at th e
heart
of western
education
an d
cultural life.
The idea
of
th e
R om an a rm y
an d
th e
power
of th e
Roman
Empire long epitomised splendour
an d m j e s t ~ Napoleon g av e h is
regiments
eagles
as their standards included velites
in
his Guard
an d
dressed
hi s
heavy cavalry in
classically
inspired helmets.
The
armies
of
Russia an d
Prussia both bore eagles on
their
flags an d th e
names
of
t he ir r ul er s Ts ar an d Kaiser
were
derived
from
Caesar.
Even t he n as cen t U ni ted
States cho se
th e
eagle fo r its s ta n da rd a n d drew
on
Roman
models
f or i ts
political institutions.
Physical
remains of th e
Roman
army ar e
dotte d throughout
Europe North
Africa an d
th e
Near East. It is impossible to stand on th e siege
ramp at M asada and not marvel at th e skill an d
determination of
th e
m en w ho
built
such a thing
in
that
appalling landscape simply
to prove that
no fortress was impregnable to them. At th e
other
en d of th e Empire the remains
o f H a dr ia n s Wall
i mp ress i n
a
different
way from their sense of scale solidity
an d permanence. M an y o f th e finds from
these
sites
are
very human -
gaming
dice
remains of meals s uch
as
oyster
shells
t he s up erbl y
preserved shoes from
Vindolanda
and famously
th e
communal
latrine at
Houseteads.
The
in scr ip ti on s f ou nd in
th e
forts and settlements of the area reveal a very
cosmopolitan community
soldier an d
civilian
mixed worshipping
gods
from
all
over
th e
known world. Yet however many races were
r ec ru it ed i nt o t he r an ks
of
th e
army t he y w er e
at
least
pa rtially a bsorbe d
into its uniform c ul tu re . I n t he
garrisons a t M as ad a a nd Vindolanda two unknown Roman soldiers idly scrawled
a line from Virgil s Epic
th e
Aenied on a p ie ce of papyrus a nd a wooden
writing
tablet r s p t i v l ~
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C OL LA PS E I N
T HE WEST
RECOVERY
IN TH E
EAST
Several facto rs exp lain t he R om an a rm y s l on g success: discipline training
equipment an d well organized logistic support were all important
factors
t o th er armies ha d
these
without
achieving
as much. The R o ma n m il it ar y
tem was characterized by its
f l x i i l i t ~ Th e same
basic
structure could adapt
local conditions
an d defeat
very
different
opponents.
In
tim e t he R om an s
ame as adept
at
raids
an d
ambushes as any irregular tribesmen yet preserved
superiority in m asse d battle. The Romans always fought aggressively
eth er i n o p en b at tl e or on a smaller scale ever a ssuming the offensive and
ing to
dominate
th e n ~ This
combined with
their
refusal t o a dm it
defeat
d
their
willingness to
accept
heavy losses m ad e t he R om an a rm y
extremely
to beat. Yet ultimately much depended on th e Romans ability
to
absorb
to
turn
th e enemies of today into th e Roman soldiers of tomorrow.
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TABLES
ApPENDICES
ApPENDIX
A : THE CAREER
PATTERN CURSUS
HONORUM
OF ROMAN
SENATORS
IN THE
SECOND CENTURY BC Chapter
Minimum
Age
Magistracy Number
Responsibilities
Ten years military service in cavalry
or
on the staff
of
a relative/family
friend needed to qualify for political office. In practice this rule may
not
have been rigidly enforced.
30 Quaestor
8-12
36
Aedile 4
39 Praetor
6
42
Consul
2
Censor 2 every
5 years
Financial administration at Rome and in the provinces; acted as second in
command to governors.
No
military responsibility;
but
administrative role at Rome;
an
optional
post.
Judicial function
at
Rome;
commanded
provinces
not
allocated to
consuls; usually controlled one legion
allies,
but
occasionally larger
forces.
Most senior executive officers of state; governed larger provinces
and
given command in all major wars; usually controlled two legions two
allied
alae.
No
actual military
command, but
most prestigious magistracy reserved
for most distinguished ex-consuls.
Al l magistracies apart from the censorship were held for a single year. All members
of
a magisterial college held equal power.
The numbers
quaestors and praetors gradually increased as further provinces were added to the empire. However
until
the
very
end
of
the Republic
there were
only
ever
two
consuls per year.
ApPENDIX
B: THE
LEGION
OF
THE
EARLY
PRINCIPATE
Chapter 4
OC - Legatus Legionis Senatorial officer serving for three years .
2ic - Tribunus Laticlavius Senatorial offcier
serving
for
three
years .
3ic -
Praefectus Castrorum
Experienced officer, usually
former
primus
pilus .
Staff including: five
Tribuni
Angusticlavii equestrian officers serving for
three years,
who
have already
commanded an
auxiliary cohort
and
may go on
to command
an ala .
First
Cohort
- 800 men in five centuries of 160 each, commanded by five centurions ranked in order of seniority:
primus pilus; princeps; princeps posterior; hastatus; hastatus posterior
Nine other cohorts
- 480
men
in six centuries
of
a
centurion,
optio
signifer and tesserarius
plus eighty men.
The
centurions ranked
in
order
of
seniority:
pilus prior; pilus posterior; princeps prior; princeps posterior; hastatus prior; hastatus posterior
The ranks of the
cohorts included
many specialists
and HQ
personnel who spent
much of their
time
on
detached
Other
units
included:
The Cavalry - 120 men whose internal organization and command structure is unclear.
The Veterans - men who had served twenty years. They may have formed a separate unit or formed part of
the
first cohort.
Artillery - Vegetius claims
that
each
cohort
operated a large
stone-throwing
engine, whilst each
century
crewed
a light bolt-shooter. The amount
of artillery
employed by a legion probably varied
according
to
the
situation.
2
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TABLES
SIZE
AND STRUCTURE OF AUXILIARY UNITS -
FIRST
TO EARLY
CENTURY
AD Chapter
it title
ors Quingenaria Peditata
ors Quingenaria Equitata
ors Milliaria Peditata
ors Milliaria Equitata
a Quingenaria
a Milliaria
Infantry centuries
480 6
480
6
800 10
800 10
None
None
Cavalry
turmae
None
120
4
None
240 8
512 16
768 24
ngenary units were normally commanded
by
a prefect. Milliary units
and units
of Roman citizens were commanded
by
ACTUAL STRENGTH RETURNS
FOR
THREE
QUINGENARY
COHORTS SHOWING VARIATION FROM THEORET ICAL STRENGTH
te Unit Infantry Horse Total 1 Total 2
Cohors
Hispanorum
veterana 417 119
536
546
6 Cohors
Augusta Lusitanorum
363
114 477
505
3-16 Cohors
Apanenorum
334 100 434 457
1 is
without officers
or
supernumeraries. Total
2
includes officers and
in the
case of
the second two
cohorts small
of camel-riders
dromedarii employed
for patrolling in desert regions.
The
totals all three
cohorts included
a
number
of officers
and men absent on
detached
duties.
E: STRENGTH RETURN
OF
OHORS I TUNGRORUM
C. AD
92-7
is table shows the wide dispersal of and
range
of duties performed by a Roman garrison Tab. Vind. 154 .
May, total number
of
First Cohort of
Tungrians,
commanded by the Prefect ]ulius Verecundus, 752,
uding 6 centurions. From these are absent:
of the governor singulares legati - 46
the office of Ferox possibly a
legionary
legate -
unreadable
Coria
Corbridge - 337 including 2 centurions
London - 1 centurion
readable - 6 including 1 centurion
readable - 9 including 1
centurion
dable - 11
?unreadable - 1
readable - 45
tal absentees - 456 including 5
centurions
e remainder,
present
with
the
unit - 296 including 1 centurion - from these:
-15
6
fering from eye
inflammation
- 10
31
ainder, fit for duty - 265 including 1 centurion
milliarYJ the
cohort
appears to have
had only six
centuries.
The
high
proportion
men
J
and
especially five
ou t
of
centurions
J
can
only
have made i t difficult for the
cohort to
train
and
dril l as a
unit
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GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY
Dates in brackets give
an
approximate indication of period.
ala
1
Term
used under
th e
Republic for
the contingents of
Italian allies, roughly equivalent in size to a Roman legion. Th e
n ame me an t w i n g a nd derived f ro m t he standard formation of
a
consular
a rmy t h at p laced tw o legions in th e centre
w it h a n
aLa
on either
flank late
f o ur th to s econ d centu ry
BC). 2
Term
used
for th e
cavalry
units of the Imperial
auxilia.
These
were
either
512 or 768 strong and commanded by a p re fe ct or tribune
respectively first
to th ir d centu ry
AD).
aquilifer:
Th e standard-bearer who carried
th e legion s standard
aquila , a silver,
later
gold,
statuette of an
eagle first
century BC
to th ir d centu ry
AD).
auctoritas: Th e
informal
reputation or prestige of a
Roman
politician which
determined
his influence in
th e
Senate an d was
greatly
a dd ed t o
by h is
military
achievements third
to
first
cen
tury
BC).
auxilia: Troops recruited
from
non-citizens, th e auxilia of th e
Principate provided a valuable source
of extra manpower
for
th e
Roman
a rmy , a s we ll a s
th e
vast
majority of
its cavalry.
They
were no t organized into legion-sized units, b u t in to cohorts and
alae first to third
century
AD).
ballista: A
two-armed, torsion
catapult capable
of
firing bolts
or
stones with
con sid erab le accurac)T.
These
were
built
in various
sizes an d mo st o f ten used in sieges third century
BC
t o s ix th
cen
tury
AD).
beneficiarius: A
grade of junior
officer usually recruited
from
experienced rankers who performed
a
range of policing an d
administrative roles o ften d etached f r om th eir units first t o t hi rd
cen tury
AD).
bucellarii: Th e
household troops
p a id a n d sup p ort ed by
particular
commanders, although nominally
loyal
t o t he
emperor. Th e bucellarii were usually high-quality
cavalr T.
Th e
name
derives from bucellatum, th e
army s hard-tack
biscuit, an d
emphasized the
commander s
obligation to
feed an d provide for
his
m en f ou rt h t o s ix th c en tu ry
AD).
cantabrian r id e: A d ri ll practised by th e R o man cavalry during
which men r od e in turn towards a target, wheeling
to
th e r igh t at
short
range
an d
then riding
parallel, keeping
their
shields
towards the
target.
Th e object
was to
maintain
a
continual
barrage of missiles at a single point i n t he e ne my line, weakening
an
enemy before launching a charg e s wo rd in
hand.
Similar
tactics were employed by cavalry, especially horse-archers,
of
many n atio ns
first
to s ixth centu ry
AD).
cataphract: Close order, heavily armoured cavalrymen whose
main
tactic was the s ho ck charge. Often th e horses were also
protected
by
armour.
Their normal
weapon
was
the two-handed
lance,
th e
contus,
b u t s o me catap hr acts carr ied
b ow s a s w el l.
These troops were more common i n t he e as te rn empire.
centurion: Important grade of officers i n t he
Roman
army for
most of
its history,
centurions
originally commanded a
century
of 60-80
men.
U nd er th e P rin cipate many
served for very
long
periods an d provided
an
element of permanence in the otherwise
short-term officer corps of th e legion. Th e
most
senior
centurion
of a l eg io n w as
th e
primus
piLus
a post
of
enormous
status
held
only
f or a sin gl e y ea r f ir st
century BC to th ir d centu ry
AD).
century centuria : Th e basic sub-unit of th e R o man army, th e
century was commanded by a centurion
an d
usually consisted
of
sixty,
later
eighty, me n late fourth century BC to third century
AD).
cheiroballista:
A version of the s co rp ion mo un ted o n a
mule-drawn cart to increase mobility first century
BC
to sixth
century
AD).
clibanarius clibanarii : A heavily armoured cavalryman, it is
unclear whether o r n ot these were identical to cataph racts, b u t it
is possible that th e
term
was applied t o t he heaviest troops. Th e
name derived from a nickname meaning bread-oven .
cohort
cohors : Originally th e
name
given
to
the contingents
which f or med the Allied
Alae
u n der the Republic, the co ho r t
b ecame th e basic tactical unit of th e army by the en d of th e
second
century
BC. It usually consisted of
480
m en i n s ix
centuries, bu t t he re w er e a lso l ar ge r u ni ts
of 800
in five
or
ten
centuries second century
BC
to th ir d centur y AD).
comes: Officers of th e later R o man army, ranking below the
magistri militum late third
to
sixth century AD).
comitatenses: Units included in th e regional forces no t tied
to
specific
frontier
provinces fourth
to s ix th centur y AD).
consul: Th e year s tw o consuls were th e senior elected
magistrates of th e
Roman
Republic,
an d
held
command
in
important
campaigns. Sometimes th e Senate extended their
p ow er af ter th eir
year
of
office, in which case they were
known
as proconsuls.
contubernium contubernia : Term applied t o t he groups of
eight
men w ho s hared
a
tent
an d messed
together
third century
BC to th ir d centu ry
AD).
contus or kontos : Th e long, two-handed thrusting spear
elnployed by
Parthian,
Persian,
Sarmatian, and
later Roman
cataphracts
first
century BC to
sixth
century AD).
cornicularius: A
grade of
clerks included
on th e
administrative
staff of several officers in th e legion first to th ir d centur y AD).
cuneus: 1 Term u se d fo r a
formation
in ten ded to b reak th ro ug h
an en emy
line by
co ncentr ating th e mo ral an d
physical shock
of
a c ha rg e
at
a single
p o in t. I t
may have been
triangular
in shape
or
alternatively a deep, narrow-fronted column.
2
Term used for
cavalry units o f u nk no w n size third
to f o ur th
century AD).
decurion: Cavalry officer
who
originally
commanded
ten men.
Under the Principate
a
decurion
led a turma
of
about
thirty
horsemen first to thir d centur y AD).
dictator: I n t im es of extreme crisis a
dictator
was appointed for a
six-month period during
which he exercised supreme civil
an d
military
power.
Later
v ic to rs i n civil w ar s, suc h as Sul la
an d
]ulius Caesar, used th e t it le a s a ba si s f or more permanent power
fifth to first century BC).
dux: Officers
of
th e
later R o man ar my
late
th ir d to
sixth
cen
tury
AD).
x duces limitis: Commanders of all troops limitanei within
on e
of th e regions
into
which the frontier provinces of the later
empire was divided late
third
to
sixth century
AD).
equites singulares: Th e
term
used for
the bodyguard
cavalry
a tt ac he d t o t he s ta ff of provincial governors under the
Principate. These units seem
to
have been about
500
strong and
were recruited
f ro m m en
seconded from
th e
auxiliary alae first
to th ir d centu ry AD).
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first three centuries of
th e
Principate, these provided an elite
y force to support th e
Praetorian Guard. They
were
cruited from the pick of
the troopers
in
th e
provincial alae,
an d
oyed very favourable service conditions an d
good
chances
of
first
to
third
century
AD).
Allied
barbarians
obliged
to
provide military service to
emperor.
They
usually served in
th eir o w n
units an d
under
their
own commanders
who usually held
man rank. As time went on these
became
increasingly
from units
of
the regular army, especially in th e
st fourth
to
sixth
century
AD).
A sword,
gladius
is conventionally used
to
describe th e
dius hispaniensis,
th e
short Spanish sword which
s the standard Roman
sidearm
until well into
th e
third
AD. Th e
weapon could
be used for cutting, bu t was
intended
for thrusting third
century BC
t o t hi rd
AD).
A spear. I t
has
proved difficult to associate
th e
hasta
or th e
firmly
with
a particular size or
shape
o f w ea po n
covered in
th e
archaeological record fifth
century BC
to
sixth
AD).
hastati .
Th e
first line
of
heavy infantry in
th e
publican legion, recruited from younger
me n
late fo urt h t o
century
BC).
Gymnasia: Th e cavalry games which displayed th e
of
the alae
of th e
Principate.
Intended
as a spectacle
th e
opers were dressed in
bright colours
an d wore highly
armour
first
to th ir d centu ry
AD).
The standard-bearer
who carried
th e imago
a standard with a
bust of th e
emperor first
to
third
tury
AD).
Soldiers exempt
from
ordinary fatigues, usually as a
of possessing special skills first to
third
century AD).
Th e
power
of
military
command
held by
magistrates
d
pro-magistrates during their t er m o f office third century
BC
third
century
AD).
Term applied to
groups
of barbarians settled by
th e
on
land
in
th e
provinces under
the obligation of
viding recruits for th e army; These rarely served in distinct
of th eir o w n
fourth
t o s ix th
century AD).
legati : A subordinate officer
wh o
held delegated
rather
than
exercising
p ow er in
his ow n right. Legati
re chosen by a magistrate rather than elected third to first
BC). 1 Legatus augusti pro praetore:
This
title was
to the governors of th e military provinces under
th e
cipate, who
commanded
as representatives
of th e
emperor
st to third
century
AD).
2
Legatus legionis:
Th e title given to
commanders under
the Principate
first t o t hi rd
tury
AD).
legio : Originally a term
meaning
levy,
th e
legions
ame the main
unit
of th e R oma n a rmy for much of its history;
er the Republic
an d
Principate they were large,
infantry,
formations
of around four to five
men,
bu t
by late
antiquity
most seem
to
have
dwindled
a strength o f a b ou t o ne t ho usan d.
Th e
grade of
troops commanded by
th e
duces limitis,
military commanders of th e various regions, usually on
th e
into
which
th e
provinces of
th e later
empire were
ided fourth to s ixth centu ry
AD).
A corselet
or
breastplate.
Three
types
of
armour were
t common. 1 Lorica hamata or ring-mail armour was
bably copied from
th e
Gauls.
It
offered good protection
an d
GLOSSARY
was relatively simple,
if t ime co ns u min g,
to
manufacture.
Its
main
disadvantage was its great weight, which primarily rested
on
the shoulders,
although
th e militar y
belt helped to
transfer
some
of
this
burden to
th e hips third
century
BC
to
sixth
century
AD).
2
Lorica squamata or scale armour was less flexible an d
offered poorer
protection than
mail. It seems
to
have been
popular for m os t o f
th e
army s history, perhaps in part because it
could
be
polished
into
a high sheen
an d made
th e w ear er
look
impressive third century
BC
to
sixth
century AD). 3 Lorica
segmentata
is th e name invented by modern scholars
to
describe
th e
banded armour so often
associated
with
th e
Romans. It
offered good protection
an d
its design helped
to
spread its
weight
more
evenly than mail, bu t was
complex
to manufacture
a n d p ron e
to damage, which may
explain
its eventual
abandonment first t o t hi rd c en tu ry AD).
magister equitum: 1 Second-in-command to
the Republican
dictator,
th e
M aster of Horse
traditionally
commanded th e
cavalry, since
th e dictator
was
forbidden
to r ide a
horse
fifth to
first century BC).
2
Title given to
senior
officers of th e later
Imperial
army,
e qu al i n
sta tu s t o magistri peditum
fourth
to
sixth
century
AD).
magister militum: Title given to
th e s en ior
officers of th e
later
Imperial
army fourth to
sixth
century AD).
magister peditum: Title given to
senior
officers
of th e later
Imperial army fourth to
sixth
century AD).
maniple manipulus :
Th e
basic tactical unit of
the Republican
legion,
th e manip le
consisted of tw o centuries. It was
commanded
by
th e
centurion of th e
right hand
senior century
if he was
present
late fo urt h t o
second
century BC).
mattiobarbuli: Heavy,
lead-weighted
darts, often
carried
clipped
into
th e
hollow of a shield. Also known as plumbatae third to
sixth
century AD).
military tribune tribunus militum : Six
military
tribunes were
elected
or
appointed to
each
Republican
legion,
on e pair
of
these
me n
holding command at
anyone
time. U nd e r t he Principate
each legion
ha d
on e senior, senatorial tribune tribunus
laticlavius
wh o
wore a
wide
purple sash an d five
equestrians
tribunii angusticlavii
w h o w or e
a
narrow purple
sash , first to
third century AD). Military auxiliary cohorts and alae, or those
with special
status,
were
commanded
by equestrian officers
called
tribunes who
performed an identical role to
auxiliary
prefects. Some regiments of
th e later army
were also
commanded by tribunes.
numerus: A vague
term
meaning simply unit
or band,
numerus
was
th e
title given t o m an y units of irregulars
from
a common
ethnic background
employed for
frontier
patrolling
f ro m t he
second century AD onwards.
It
was also applied to
some
units of
cavalry
i n t he l at er
army;
onager: A one-armed torsion catapult designed to lo b stones. It
was
simpler in
construction than
t he t wo armed
ballistae,
bu t
heavier, less mobile, an d no t as accurate. Th e basic design was to
be followed by
th e
Medieval
mangonel
third
to
sixth
century
AD).
pt
optiones : Second-in-command of a century,
th e
rank was
symbolized by
th e
carrying
of
th e hastile, a
shaft
t ip pe d w i th a n
ornamental knob first t o t hi rd c en tu ry AD).
ovatio: A lesser
form
of
th e triumph,
in an ovation
th e
general
rode
through
th e
city on horseback rather than in a chariot fifth
century
BC to
first century AD).
palatini: Units of higher sta tu s a n d prestige than
th e
comitatenses,
th e
palatini also formed
part
of
th e
field
armies
of
late antiquity fourth to sixth century AD).
pilum:
Th e
heavy javelin which was
th e standard
equipment of
2 1
3
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GLOSSARY
the Roman legionary
for
much
of Rome s
history
third
century
BC to third century AD .
plumbatae:
see
mattiobarbuli.
praefectus castrorum: Third in
command of
a legion
during the
Principate, h e w as an experienced officer who was u su ally a
former
primus pilus first
to third century AD .
Praepositus: Unit commander of
the later
army, equivalent to a
tribune
third
to sixth century
AD .
praetor: Praetors
were
annually
elected
magistrates who
governed the less important provinces and fought Rome s smaller
wars.
Praetorian Guard:
The
military bodyguard of the emperors of
the Principate, the Praetorians
received
higher pay and
donatives
and enjoyed
far better
service
conditions than the
legions. For
most
of
their history
they were
formed into cohorts commanded
by
tribunes and the
whole
corps commanded
by
two Praetorian
Prefects. No
emperor could
afford
to
alienate his
guardsmen
who represented the
main
military force in Rome or Ital):
They
were
disbanded
by
Constantine in
312
after supporting
his rival
Maxentius
first
to third century AD .
prefect
praefectus : Equestrian commander of an auxiliary
cohort or
ala first
to third century AD .
princeps principes : The second line of heavy
infantry
in the
Republican
legion,
recruited f rom men
in
the prime of
life late
fourth to
second
century
BC .
principales: The three
subordinate
officers
of the
century,
the
optio, signifer
and
tesserarius first
to third century AD .
pseudocomitatenses. The grade given to units of limitanei who
had become attached to the
field
armies fourth to sixth century
AD .
quaestor: Magistrates
whose duties were
primarily
financial,
quaestors acted
as
deputies to consular
governors
and often
held
subordinate
military
commands.
quincunx:
The
chequerboard formation
u se d by
the Republican
legion in which
the
three lines were deployed
with
wide intervals
between the maniples, the gaps being covered by the maniples of
the next
line.
There has
been
much debate
over
the
precise
nature
of
this system, but i t is c le ar
that
it gave
the Roman
legions far
greater
flexibility
than the
Hellenistic
p l nx
late
fourth to
second century BC .
schola: The units of
guard
cavalry of the later
Roman
arm): The
schoLae
provided many senior commanders from among their
number
third
to
sixth
century AD .
scorpion: The
light
bolt-shooting ballista
employed by
the
Roman army both
in
the
field
and
in sieges.
They
possessed a
long
r an ge , a s we ll a s great accuracy and the ability
to penetrate
any form of armour
first
century BC to sixth century AD .
scutum:
A shield,
particularly the
heavy,
legionary
shield.
This
was semi-cylindrical
and
usually
either
oval
or
rectangular.
It
was h eld by a sin gle, tra nsve rse
handgrip behind the central
boss,
although additional straps
were used
to
support its weight
on the march
third
century BC to third century AD .
signifer: The
standard-bearer who carried the
standard signum
of the centur):
Under
the Principate they administered the men s
pay and
savings
accounts
first to
third century AD .
Socii: The Italian allies
of the
Republic,
the
socii formed alae
which were
normally equal in
number
or more numerous than
the Roman troops
in
an
arm): After
the
Social
War
90-88
BC)
and the general extension of citizenship to
most
of the Italian
peninsula the
socii
disappeared and
all
Italians
were
recruited
into the
legions late
fourth
to
second century
BC .
spatha: The long
sword
used
by
the
cavalry
of the Principate and
21
4
eventually
adopted
by
most of
the
later
arm):
It
was well
balanced
for both
cutting and thrusting
first
to
sixth century
AD .
spolia opima: The highest
honour
which a
triumphing
general
could claim was the r ight to dedicate spolia opim in the Temple
of Jupiter
Optimus
Maximus on the Capitol.
The
right could
only be
gained
by killing the enemy general in single
combat and
was
celebrated on
j us t a
handful of
occasions.
tesserarius:
Third-in-command of
a century,
the
tesserarius
traditionally was responsible for
commanding
the sentries.
The
name
derived
from the
tessera,
the
tablet
on
which
the
night s
password
was
distributed through
the
camp
first
to
third
cen
tury
AD .
testudo:
The famous tortoise formation
in which
Roman
legionaries overlapped their long shields to provide protection
to
the front,
sides
and
overhead. It was
most commonly
u se d to
approach
enemy fortifications
and
allow the legionaries
to
undermine them
third century BC
to
third century AD .
triarius triarii :
The third
and
senior
line
of
heavy
infantry
in
the
Republican legion, recruited from veteran soldiers late
fourth to second century BC .
triumph: The great celebration granted
by
the
Senate
to
a
successful general took the form of a procession along the Sacra
Via,
the ceremonial main road of
Rome, displaying the spoils
and captives
of
his victory
and culminated
in the ritual execution
of the captured enemy
leader.
The commander
r od e in a c ha riot,
dressed like
the statues of
Jupiter, a slave
holding
a laurel
wreath
of Victory over his head. The slave was supposed to whisper to
the
general,
reminding him that
h e was
mortal. Under
the
Principate
only
members
of
the
Imperial family received
triumphs,
but other commanders
were
granted
the insignia
of
a
triumph ornamenta triumphalia fifth
century BC to fourth
century AD .
turm
turmae :
The
basic
sub-unit of the Roman
cavalry for
much of
its history, a
turm
consisted of
around thirty
men.
Under the Principate i t w as
commanded
by a decurion late
fourth century BC to third century AD .
Urban
cohorts:
The
paramilitary
police force established by
Augustus in
Rome and
a few
other
key cities, for instance
guarding the
Imperial
mint at
Lyon.
They
were organized
into
cohorts commanded
by tribunes
under
the overall direction
of
the Urban
Prefect first
to third century AD .
veles velites : The light
infantry of
the Republican legion,
recruited from the poor or those
too
young
to
fight as heavy
infantr):
It
is
unclear whether
they were identical
to or
superseded the rorarii, another
term
applied to light infantrymen
in the Republican
legion late
fourth to second century BC .
vexillation
vexillatio :
1
A
detachment operating
independently, a vexillation
might
consist
of anything
f ro m a few
men
to several
thousand and could
be
drawn from
several units.
The use
of
these
temporary
formations designed for a specific
role
or
operation
gave
the Roman army
considerable flexibility
first to
third century AD .
2 Many cavalry units
of
the later
Field Armies were
known
as vexillations. They appear to have
b ee n sim ilar in size
to the o ld
alae fourth
to sixth century
AD .
vexillum: A
square
flag
mounted
crosswise
on
a p ol e, t he
vexillum was u se d
to
mark
a general s
position and
was a lso the
standard
carried
by a
detachment
of
troops
first
to third
century AD .
vigi es The paramilitary
fire-brigade established by Augustus in
Rome,
the
vigiles
were
organized into cohorts , but not equipped
with
weap ons first
to third century AD .
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B IOGR APHIES
A ND P RI MA RY
SOURCES
A N D PRIMARY
SOURCES
BIOGRAPHIES
G U ST US G A IU S J U LI U S
CAESAR
OCTAVIANUS)
B C -AD
14
nephew a nd a dopt ed s on , h e b ec am e R om e s
emperor
following th e defeat of his last rival,
Antony,
at Actium
in
31 BC . During
his r eign h e
ided over
t he l as t
intensive period of Roman
Not
an able soldier himself, he
ha d the
of appointing capable
subordinates,
notably his
Agrippa, an d later younger family members.
I SARI US A D 505-565)
Eastern Roman general of
considerable
ability,
ecially gifted in
the
use
of
cavalry, Belisarius
notable
successes
on th e
Persian
frontier
an d
Africa an d Hi s success e arne d him t he e nm it y
the
Emperor Justinian.
S J ULI US
CAESAR c 100--44 BC )
bably Rome s most successful general, he
Gaul 58-50), twice bridging t he Rhi ne an d
g expeditions
to
Britain. Th e decision of his
Pompey, to side with his political enemies,
to the Civil Wa r 49-5 BC),
during
which
he wo n
at
Pharsalus,
Thapsus an d
Munda.
himself life
dictator, Caesar
was
murdered
a con sp ir acy led by
Brutus an d
Cassius.
I
AD
285-337)
e first
Christian
Emperor, Constantine spent nearly
his reign as a usurper, before establishing
himself
sole ruler.
Hi s
greatest military successes occurred in
l wars,
notably the
defeat of
Maxentius at th e
lvian Bridge in 312.
D O M I T IU S C O R B U LO
D. AD 67)
e o f th e most famous Roman commanders of th e
AD, wh o
famously
remarked on
th e lack of
of Imperial Governors to wage wa r c ompa re d
their Republican counterparts. A
strict
linarian, he fought in Ge rm a ny a nd
Armenia.
s reputation
was such that
Nero
ordered
hi m
to
s uicide as a potential rival.
LI CI NI US CRASSUS 115-53 BC)
skilled politician, Crassus w as als o an able
wh o systematically destroyed th e slave
mies led by Spartacus 71 BC).
Later
h e l ed the
of Parthia, bu t
a series of mistakes led to his
a nd d ea th a t C ar rh ae 53
BC).
GAIUS AURELIUS
VALERIUS
DIOC L E T IANUS
AD
245-313)
Diocletian
was
the creator
of th e
Tetrarchic
system,
dividing
the
empire
i nt o a n e as te rn
an d
western
half,
each r uled
by
an
Augustus an d his
deputy
or Caesar.
M uc h o f his
career
was spent
in
fighting
domestic
rivals, bu t he also
fought
a successful Persian War.
QUI NT US FABIUS M A X IM U S C U N C T A TO R c 275-203 BC )
Fabius was renowned as th e ma n wh o saved
Rome
by
delaying, avoiding direct confrontation with
Hannibal s victorious
Elected d ictator at
th e
age
of 58 i n 217, he
held
th e
consulship three
times during
th e Second Punic Wa r
an d exercised a great influence
on
Roman
strategy
fo r over a
decade.
HANNI B AL BARCA
c
247-188 BC )
Hannibal
was the personification of th e ideal
Hellenistic general. Throughout his campaign
he
dazzled his opponents at th e strategic an d tactical
levels,
repeatedly
achieving the apparently impossible.
A leader of genius, he w as able to inspire his ow n
senior
officers as much as
th e various
races
wh o fought
in t he ranks of his His ultimate
defeat
in t he w ar
with R om e h as more
to
d o w it h th e R om an s
relentless
determination than his ow n failings.
GAIUS
MAR I US
c 157-87
BC )
Traditionally believed
to
be th e ma n wh o converted the
citizen militia
into
a
professional
army,
he
was a
strict
disciplinarian
an d an able commander. However, his
career
was unorthodox and after victories over
Ju gu rth a an d the migrating Cimbri, Marius was on e of
th e
leaders
in Rom e s
first Civil War.
NARSES
AD
478-573)
An
imperial eunuch
wh o was given
military
command
l at e i n life,
N
arses achieved several successes in Italy
when
he
first supported and
then replaced
Belisarius,
winning victories at
Taginae
in 552 and
Casilinium
in
553. He
made
more effective use of
infantry
than
Belisarius, using them t o s up po rt his c v l r ~
GNAEUS
POMPEIUS M A G N U S 106--48 BC )
Pompey s career was extremely unorthodox, commanding
armies in Sicily, Africa an d Spain
under
S ulla, whilst still a
private citizen. He
completed the
defeat of
Mithridates
66-63 BC), bu t political failures led to his alliance with
Crassus an d
Caesar
the first
triumvirate).
After
Crassus
death,
this broke
down
an d led to th e Civil
Wa r
in which
Pompey was defeated at Pharsalus
48
BC) an d later
murdered
in Egypt.
2 1
5
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B I OG R A PH I ES A N D P RI M AR Y
S OUR C E S
PUBLIUS CORNELIUS S C I PI O A F R IC A N U S 236 c. 184
BC)
Th e greatest Roman commander
of
th e
Second
Punic
War, he evicted the Carthaginians f rom
Spain an d
finally
defeated
H a nn ib al a t Z am a.
After th e wa r he fought in
Gaul
an d
under
his
brother s
command against Antiochus. An
inspirational leader, his well-trained legions
allowed
hi m
to experiment with variations on
traditional
Roman
tactics.
PUBLIUS CORNELIUS S C I PI O A E M IL I A NU S 185-129
BC)
A skilled commander, Scipio
wa s
th e adopted
grandson of Africanus.
After distinguished
service
in
Spain an d
th e first years
of
th e
Third Punic
War,
he was given
th e
command in Africa an d presided
over th e
destruction
of Carthage i n 146
BC.
In
133 BC he
captured the
Celtiberian
stronghold
of
Numantia.
LUCIUS SEPTIMI US
S EV ER US A D 145-211)
Th e eventual victor
of
th e Civil Wa r
that
followed
Commodus
murder,
Severus s pent m uch
of
his reign
on campaign. He led a highly successful expedition
against Parthia
an d established
a ne w province in
Mesopotamia. He d ie d i n Eboracum York) in
northern Britain, having
s pent the
last three years
fighting th e
Caledonian
tribes.
PUBLIUS CORNELIUS
SULLA
138-78
BC)
Initially
an associate
of
Marius,
Sulla
turned
against
h im w he n t he l at te r t ri ed to r ob h im
of
th e command
against Mithridates
of
Pontus, an d became the first
Roman
general to
march on Rome 88
BC .
After
defeating
th e
Pontic
invasion
of
Greece
86-4
BC , Sulla
returned
an d defeated his
Roman
rivals
with
great
bloodshed 83-2 BC .
Appointing
himself dictator, he
later retired to a life of debauchery an d died
soon
afterwards.
MAR C US
ULPIUS
T R AJ ANUS AD 52-117)
Adopted by th e aged Emperor Nerva, Trajan ascended
to the throne
in
AD 98. During his campaigns he
conquer ed D acia after tw o fierce wars AD 101-2,
105-6). He died during
his massive
Parthian
expedition
113-7) an d
many of
his
eastern
gains were abandoned
by his successor, Hadrian.
T I T US FLAV IU S V ESPA SIA N U S A D 9-79)
Vespasian commanded Legio Augusta
during
th e
invasion
of
Britain an d wa s later s ent to suppress th e
rebellion in Judaea.
In
th e Civil Wa r
that
began after
N ero s death, he gained support of all the Eastern
armies
an d
eventually
defeated
all his rivals,
later
proving to
be
on e of
the better
emperors.
I
P R I M A R Y SOURCES
C H A P T E R
1
Diodorus Siculus c 30s
BC
wrote a universal
history
in
Greek, part
of
which covering th e period
486-302
ha s
survived an d includes some details of Roman s t o r ~
Dionysius
of
Halicarnassus
late first
century
BC
was
a Greek scholar
working
in Rome who
produced
a
History o f Rome which survives for t he p er io d t o 443
BC.
L iv y 59 BC-AD 17) produced a Latin history of Rome
From the Foundation o f the City ab urbe condita in
142 books, m ost of which have been lost. Th e first
te n
books cover t he p er io d u p t o 293 BC. Fiercely
patriotic,
Livy s
military descriptions
ca n be unreliable.
Plutarch c
AD 4 6- 12 0) w as a Greek Biographer who
produced
a series of Parallel Lives pairing notable
Greek an d
Roman
figures. He is only ever as good as
these sources, many of which no longer survive. For
this period we have Lives of Romulus Coriolanus, an d
Camillus.
C HAP T E R
Appian
c AD 95 c.
170) was an Alexandrian
Greek
writing
i n R om e
under Antoninus Pius. Books survive
from
his Roman History covering th e Punic,
Macedonian and Syrian Wars.
Livy - Books 20-30 cover th e Second Punic War, whilst
31-45
deal
with
th e years up to 167 BC.
Plutarch - Lives of Pyrrhus, Fabius
Maximus
Marcellus, Flamininus, an d Aemilius Paullus.
Polybius c
203 c.
120
BC
served
against the Romans
in
th e
Third
Macedonian W ar
after which he went as
hostage to Rome w he re h e became a close associate
of
Scipio Aemilianus. Originally covering 264-146
BC,
he
is
th e best source
for
Roman warfare in
this
period, bu t
unfortunately much of his w or k has been lost.
C H A P T E R
3
Appian provides detailed accounts of th e
campaigns
in
Spain an d the Mithridatic Wars.
Th e
four books of
The Civil Wars
provide th e
only
continuous
account of
th e series
of
conflicts which caused the fall of th e
Republic.
Caesar
c 100-44 BC
wrote
Commentaries which,
with
the additional books w ritten by some of his
officers, cover the operations in Gaul 58-51
BC
an d
th e Civil Wa r 49-45
BC .
Skilfully written pieces of
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these
remain
an invaluable
portr ait of
army on campaign.
106--43
C
was a famous orator, statesman,
d prolific author,
bu t
saw very little military service.
s
posthumously published
Letters to Atticus
an d
tters to his Friends
include
accounts
of
his
minor
in Cilicia
in 51-50. Letters to his Friends 10.
contains Sulpicius
Galba s
eye-witness
account of
Battle of Forum Gallorum in 43.
tarch -
Lives
of
Marius Sulla Sertorius Pompey
Antony Brutus an d Lucullus.
86-34
C
served under
Caesar
in Gaul,
bu t
s later forced from
public
life following a scandal
his governorship of Africa a nd t urne d
to
h i s t o r ~
Hi s
Jugurthine War
an d
Catilinarian
survive alon g w ith
fragments of
his
Roman
4
ian born c. AD 90 was
governor
of Ca ppa doc ia
H a dri an a nd p ro du ce d t wo b ri ef w or ks i n G re ek
with th e army s training
an d
tactics, th e
concerning
cavalry training
an d
th e
Battle
der against the Alans
describing operations
in
o
Cassius c AD
163-c.
235) was a
Roman
senator
o m t he Greek Eas t w ho
produced
a
Roman
History
ra n u p
to
his ow n times. Large sections of th e
rk, including all of th e late first
an d second
AD ,
survive only in
later
epitomes.
AD 40-103) governed
r i t ~ i n
in
AD
74-78
d later produced a b oo k o f
Strategems
describing
o ys u se d by commanders of th e
p as t t o
gain v i t o r ~
born c. 37)
was a
Jewish
general
o fought
against Rome
in
AD 66-7,
before
an d changing sides. Hi s
Jewish War
vides by f ar the mos t d etailed acco un t of th e first
army
on
campaign. However, he tends to
ggerate his ow n deeds
an d those of
his patron,
e Emperor
Titus.
uclo-Hyginus second century AD ) is th e name
ntionally given
to
th e
unknown
author of On
the
o f
camps.
born
c.
AD
69
was a
palace
official
at
Rome
o wrote Biographies
of
Rome s rulers
from Caesar
Domitian.
BIOGRAPHIES
A N D P RI MA RY
SOURCES
Tacitus born c. AD
56) wa s a
Roman senator
wh o
wrote
a
biography of
his father-in-law,
Agricola
who
campaigned in Britain from
AD
77 to 84), an d an
ethnographic work, the
Germania
describing
th e
tribes
of
Germany, with s ome mention
of
their
military practices. Substantial fragments of
The
Histories
an d
The
Annals
give
much
detail
of
th e
period
AD
14-70. Tacitus was
more
interested in
politics
than
war,
bu t
does provide
good accounts of
many conflicts.
Vegetius late fourth/very early fifth century AD )
produce d a n Epitome of Military Science arguing
for
revival of
traditional military
drill
an d training.
It
contains many interesting comments about
th e earlier
army, bu t it is often difficult
to
know which period
he
is
referring
to an d whether
he
reflects th e
theory or
actual
practice.
C H A P T E R S
Ammianus Marcellinus c AD 330 c. 395)
wa s a
Roman
officer
fr om t he G re ek E as t w ho
served in
th e
army i n t he m id dl e of th e fourth
n t u r ~
The surviving
books
of his Latin History deal
with
th e years 353-378.
Ammianus
narrative provides us
with
a h ig hl y detailed
picture of th e
l at er Roma n a rmy
in operation.
Herodian
died
c.
AD
250)
wa s a
senator wh o
produced
a
history
of
th e
Roman
emperors from
AD
180-238.
Although often unreliable or vague, Herodian is ou r
fullest
source
f or t hi s period.
Th e Historia Augusta
probably late
fourth century) is
a collection
of biographies of most of the emperors
from
Hadrian
to Carinus a nd N ume ria n, a lmost
cer tain ly th e w o rk of a s in gl e author. Its reliability is
highly questionable.
Th e Notitia Dignitatum c
AD
395) is
an
illustrated
manuscript listing th e officers
of
th e
later
army,
th e
units
they
commanded, and
their
stations.
A valuable
source,
it presents many problems of interpretation.
CHAP T E R 6
Maurice s Strategikon trans G.
T. Dennis
Philadelphia,
1988)) is a sixth-century
Military Manual describing in
detail
th e
format ion a nd
tactics
to
be
employed
by
Byzantine
armies.
Procopius mid sixth century) w as a civil servant who
served
on
th e s taf f of Belisarius for several
campaigns.
He wrote The
Wars
a n a cc ount of
the campaigns of
Justinian s
reign
to 550/1, including
conflicts
with th e
Persians, Vandals
a nd G ot hs , a nd th e Secret History.
2 1
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FURT HE R
READING
F UR TH ER R EA D IN G
G E N E R A L
Th e literature on th e
Roman
army is truly vast, much
of
i t tucked away in
academic journals
inaccessible
to
th e
general reader.
Th e
works
listed here will
allow th e interested reader to begin a dee pe r s tudy i nto t he subject.
Good
general works are L. Keppie,
The Making
of
the Roman
rmy
London,
1984)
on the
Republican
a rm y a nd G. Webster,
The
Roman
Imperial
rmy London, 1985: repr. w ith updated bibliography Oklahoma, 1998) for the
Empire. Also useful are H. Parker,
The
Roman
Legions
(Oxford, 1928), Y Le
Bohec,
The Imperial
Roman rmy NewYork, 1994), and]. Peddie,
The
Roman
War Machine
(Gloucester, 1994),
although
no t all of th e latter s conclusions are
widely accepted. A little d at ed a nd r at he r t oo dogmatic, H. Delbriick, (trans
]. Renfroe),
History
of
the
r t of
War
within
the framework
of
Political History
vols 1- 2 (Westport, 1975) still contains much
of
interest. Well illustrated, more
general works include
General
Sir
John
Hackett (ed.),
Warfare in the
ncient
World
London, 1989),
a nd].
Warry,
Warfare in the Classical World
(London,
1980).
A. Goldsworthy,
The
Roman
rmy
at
WaG 1
BC-AD
2
(Oxford, 1996)
contains a detailed analysis on operational practices an d t he na ture of
battle
in
th e
Late Republic an d Early empire. H. Elton,
Warfare in Roman
Europe;
AD
35 425
Oxford,
1996) is an excellent an d
wide ranging study
of
the
Later
Roman r ~ More specific studies include ]. Roth,
The Logistics
of
the Roman
Imperial
rmy
at War
(264 BC-AD 235) (Leiden, 1999), an d N. Austin
B Rankov,
Exploratio: Military
and
Political Intelligence in the
Roman
World
from the Second Punic War to the Batt le
of
Adrianople
(London, 1995).
Military equipment
is covered only briefly in this
work,
bu t there are a
number
of
excellent
books
on
th e
subject,
notably
M.
Bishop
an d
]. Coul st on,
Roman
Military quipment
London, 1993), Connolly,
Greece
and
Rome at War
London,
1981), a nd H. Russell
Robinson,
The
rmour of
Imperial
Rome
London, 1975). Recent research in this field is regularly published in the
Journal
of Roman
Military quipment Studies.
C H A P T E R
I
A
good
recent survey
of
Rome s early history is
T
Cornell,
The Beginnings of
Rome. Italy
and Rome
from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars
c. 1 264 BC
London, 1995).
There
are few books dedicated to th e military history of this
period,
bu t notable articles include E. Rawson, T he
Literary
Sources for the
Pre-
Marian
Roman
Army ,
Papers of the British School at
Rome
39 (1971), 13-31,
an d L. Rawlings, Condottieri and Clansmen: Early Italian Warfare an d the
State. ,
in
K
Hopwood,
Organized Crime in the
ncient
World
(Swansea, 1999).
C H A P T E R
There
are
ma ny w orks on
this
period and
in particular the Punic Wars,
of
which
th e best are ]. Lazenby,
The First Punic War
London, 1996) an d
Hannibal s War
(Warminster, 1978). Several interesting articles are included in T
Cornell,
B
Rankov,
Sabin,
The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal
I
CS
London,
1996).
Also notable are F Adcock,
The
Roman r t of
War under the Republic
Cambridge Mass., 1940), W Rogers,
Greek and
Roman
Naval Warfare
(Annapolis,
1937),]. Thiel,
Studies
on
the History
of Roman
Sea-Power in
Republican
Times
Amsterdam,
1946),
an d B
Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army.
Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns
Cambridge, 1976).
21 8
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3
contributions o n R om an imperialism are to be found in E. Badian,
man Imperialism in the Late Republic
(Oxford, 1968), S
Dyson, The Creation
f
the
Roman
Frontier
(Princeton, 1985), W
Harris, War
and
Imperialism in
Rome
327-70
(Oxford, 1976),
M.
Hopkins, Conquerors
and
Slaves
ridge, 1978), an d J. Rich an d G. Shipley (edd.), War
and
Society in the
an World (London, 1993). Also of great interest are
Brunt, Italian
225 BC D 14 (Oxford, 1971), J. Fuller, ]ulius Caesar:
Man
Soldier
Tyrant (London, 1965), E. Gabba Republican
Rome
the Army and the Allies
ford, 1976), N. Rosenstein
Imperatores Victi. Military Defeat
and
Aristocratic
petition in the
Middle and
Late Republic (Berkeley, 1990), an d
F
Smith,
rvice in the Post-Marian
Roman
Army (Manchester, 1958).
4
Cheesman, The
Auxilia of
the Roman Imperial Army (Oxford, 1914),
Dixon Southern,
The
Roman
Cavalry
(London, 1992), an d A. Johnson,
Forts
(London, 1983) all cover aspects of
t he a rm y
in this
period.
Campbell,
The Emperor
and
the
Roman
Army
Oxford,
1984) is
good on th e
itical role of th e Daily life is
dealt
with in R. Als ton, Soldier and Society
Roman Egypt (London, 1995), R. Davies, Service in the
Roman
Army
urgh, 1989), an d G. Watson, The Roman Soldier (London, 1969). J.
Mann,
ionary Recruitment and Veteran Settlement during the Principate (London,
83) remains a fine study of recruitment.
Th e Empire s frontiers a nd t he vexed question
o f G ra nd
Strategy are covered
E
Luttwak,
The Grand Strategy
of
the
Roman
Empire (New York, 1976),
Ferrill, Roman Imperial Grand Strategy Ne wYork, 1991), an d B Isaac, The
of Empire. The Roman Army in the East (Oxford, 1992).
D
Kennedy an d
Riley, Rome s Desert Frontier from the Air (London, 1990) offers spectacular
of
many
Roman outposts,
whilst a
good introduction to th e
copious
on
Hadrian s
Wall is D Breeze an d B
Dobson,
Hadrians
Wall
(London,
H.
M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (Oxford, 1964) still
contains
a wealth of
ation concerning Late n t i q u i t ~
Southern
K.
Dixon,
The Late Roman
(London, 1996) is a
handy introduction,
bu t no t always reliable, whilst
Ferrill, The
allof
the
Roman
Empire: The Military Explanation (London,
86) offers
on e
interpretation
of
th e military
problems of Late n t i q u i t ~
Coello, Unit Sizes in the Late
Roman
Army BAR S645 Oxford, 1996) presents
e meagre evidence for
unit
size, as does W Treadgold ,
Byzantium and
its
Army
(Stansford, 1995).
On
Roman
foreign policy see
D
Braund, Rome and
the Friendly King
don, 1984),
T
Burns,
Barbarians
within
the Gates
of
Rome: A Study
of
Military Policy and the Barbarians CA
375-425
D (Indiana, 1994),
Heather, Goths and Romans
332-489
(Oxford, 1991), M. Dodgeon S Lieu,
Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars 226-363 (London, 1991), an d
Lee, Information and Frontiers (Cambridge, 1993).
6
Blockley, East
Roman
Foreign Policy (Leeds, 1992) is useful. C. Fauber, Narses:
of
the Goths (Gloucester, 1990) is an accessible account
of
this
career. G. Greatrex,
Rome
and
Persia
at War 502-532 (Leeds, 1998)
a first rate s tudy of a single war, also containing
much
of
more
general interest.
F U RT H ER R E A DI N G
2 1
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INDEX
IN X
Figures in italic refer to
captions
Achaemanid Persians, 190
Adrianople battle of
AD
378 , 169,
183, 192
Aequi, 37
Aetius, 198
Africa, 56, 65, 70, 92 104 107, 174,
198, 199
Agrippa Marcus
Vipsanius,
104 107
108
111
Alamanni
178, 180, 181, 182
Alans, 128
Alba Longa 30
Alesia, siege of 52
BC ,
86-7
Alexander the Great
42, 62, 70, 71, 74,
106, 136, 190
Alexandria
137, 141
Alps, 107
Amida 191, 191
Ammianus
Marcellinus, 167 191 192
217
Andriscus, 84
Antiochus
the
Great King of Syria,
52 82 73
Antiochus
King of Syria, 85
Antonine
Wall, 152
Antony, Mark
107 108
133, 135-6
Apennines, 39
Appian 216
aqueducts 200 1
Aquitaine
196
Arabia
190
Arausio, battle of 105
BC , 93
Arch of Constantine
Rome
172-3
176-7
Arch
of
Galerius,
Salonika
168
Arch of Septimius Severus,
Rome
134-5
Arch of Titus Rome, 138-9
archers,
128-9 132 133 134-5
167,
186 203
Ardashir
I, King
of the
Persians, 163,
186 186
Ariovistus, 85
aristocracy, 42, 80, 82, 90, 96
Armenia 133, 136, 186
Arminius
92 111 180
armour 50 51
auxiliary troops
120
cavalry, 42, 52, 131
helmets , 32, 33, 53, 76, 123, 125
hoplites, 24, 27, 32
infan
try, 43
late Roman army, 167
legionaries, 43
scale armour 124, 127
shields,
18 32
53, 125, 167
army, Hellenistic, 62,
70-74
army,
Roman:
citizen militia, 18, 21, 28-9 37, 47,
62 64 96-7
demobilization 101, 117
discipline, 47-9 65, 120, 124, 125
early Rome,
26-39
ferocity, 19, 93
foreign
troops
118-20 119
hoplites, 24, 27-33 27, 32
late Roman army, 167-79 192-3
living
conditions 120-22
loyalty,
117-18
162
organization
21-3 37-9 42-9 97-
100 98 105-6 117-22
patronage 21-2 121, 122
professional army,
92-101 117
promotion 121, 122
recruits, 18-19 47 48 62 96-7
120-21 174-9
193, 197
training
49, 122-4
uniforms, 16 43 171
see also
battles; cavalry;
formations;
infantry;
legions
army, Sassanid, 186
Arrian 128-9
217
Arsacids, 186, 192
Artabanus King, 186 186
Attila, 198
Augusta
Emerita 21
Augustus Gaius Julius Caesar
Octavianus , Emperor, 21, 78, 99,
104 107 11 107 109 114 115 17
175-6 215
Aurelian, Emperor, 162, 184,
187
Aurelius,
Marcus
114, 134,
160 163
164 166 172-3 176 180
auxilia auxiliary units ,
118-21
127,
176
Babylonia, 192
baggage
trains
144
Baginton, 156
Bar Kochb.a revolt AD 133 , 144, 145
barbarians
36,
85-90
112, 127, 129,
148 157 160 176 179 83 194 202
203
Bassus, Titus Flavius, 112
Bastarnae
127
battles:
early Rome,
28-9
length, 52
naval,
56-61
tactics, 49-55 64 125-31 126-7
see also formations n individual
battles
Belgic tribes, 85
Belisarius, 198, 198, 199-202, 203, 215
booty, 33-4 82, 104, 182
Boudicca, 117, 144
bridges, 20 21 22, 181
Brisiavi, 176
Britain, 85 105 115-17 144 146 148
152 153 153 174
bucellarii 199 203
Burgundians, 198
Byzantine army,
203-4
Caecus, Appius Claudius, 88
Caelius, Marcus 111
Caesar, Gaius Julius, 82, 84 86-7 88
99 100 100 1 101 102 104 6 106
107 111 118 158 215 216
Caesarea,
200 1
Caledonians
163, 164
Caligula, Emperor, 162
Camillus, 36
camps
23, 47,
50-51 123 143
Cannae battle
of 216
BC ,
49, 52, 64,
65 65 66-7 74 93
Cappadocia
190
Caracalla Emperor, 167, 167
Carrhae battle
of
53 BC , 133-4
Carthage
42, 50 52
55-70
56-7 63
74 75 78 83 85 90-91 92-3
casualties, 54,
120
Caudine Forks,
battle
of
321
BC , 74-5
cavalry, 42, 94-5 97 112 130
armour
123, 124, 131
auxiliary units, 52 118, 120
battle
of Pharsalus,
100 1
early Roman army, 33, 37
exploratores
124 5
late Roman army, 169 202-3
numbers
42, 47
Parthian 131-3
133
Sassanid, 186
tactics, 49-50 64, 70, 128, 129-31
training, 123
weapons, 45
Celtiberians, 90, 92
Celts, 82-3 82
85-8
centurions
45, 47, 54, 98 104 111
122, 126-7 137
Chalons battle
of AD
451 , 198
chariots,
71 80 81 81
Chatti 148
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rboard formation see
quincunx
111
igi vase, 27
ar, 178
st, 137
ero, 217
mbri, 93, 96, 104
innatus, Lucius Quinctius, 37
salpine Gaul, 85, 88-90, 93
izen militia,
18,21,28-9,37,47,62,
64,96-7
zenship, Roman, 120, 121, 141, 167
states, 28, 42
il wars, 18, 99, 104, 105,
106 107
115,115,162,166,181,193,197,205
udius, Emperor, 114, 117, 162
us, Pulcher, Publius,
61
dius Albinus, 164
ts, 97-100, 98 100 117 118
126-7
onies, 36, 88-90
169, 170-71, 176, 181,
193, 199
tia Centuriata 29
26-7,
105-6, 115, 117,
164,204-5
us, Emperor, 162
munications, 22, 88-90, 152
cription, 120, 174
stantine the Great, 162, 166, 166,
169,170,174,176,176,215
antius, Emperor, 166
83
nsuls, 37, 47, 64, 80, 83, 104
bulo, Gnaeus Domitius, 215
Marcus
Licinius, 85, 107, 215
iphon, 134, 135, 192
iatii brothers, 30
honorum 8
scephalae, battle of 197
BC
70
1-2,
74
rus, 144
n Wars AD
101-2 an d
105-6 ,
114,114,118-20,126,194
River,
22,111,148,151,
152,
153, 163, 174, 176, 181, 198
199, 203
alus, King
of
the Dacians, 19
cius, Emperor, 162
48,104,111,117,119,122
rions, 47
tion, 120, 175
tors, 37
Cassius, 217
cletian, Emperor, 162, 162, 163,
165,166,169,174,176,215
Siculus, 216
Dionysius of
Halicarnassus,
29, 33, 216
diplomacy, 74, 180-81
discipline,
47-9,
65, 120, 124, 125
Domitian, Emperor, 137, 148
Drepana, battle of
249
BC 61
Drusus, 108 111
Dura
Europos,
188 9 190 191
Durotriges, 146
Dying
Gaul,
96
Ecnomus,
battle of
256
BC
60
Egypt, 85, 107, 137-41, 144
elephants, 40 42, 42, 71, 71, 186, 191
Elton,
H. ,
181
emperors, 18, 115-17,
162-6,
193,204
see also individual emperors
empire, 78-111,78-9,114-17,115,
148-9,196-7
engineering, 22,
21-2,
102-3,
181,
200 1
equestrian
officers, 163, 164
equites
cavalry , 42
Etruscans, 33, 35
extraordinarii 47, 50
Fabii clan, 33
Fabius Maximus, Quintus,
Cunctator ,
65, 215
festivals, 117, 122
fetiales priests , 34-5
field armies, 169-71, 174, 176, 193,
199,202
Flaminius, 70 8
foederati 196-7,
198, 199
foreign
t roops, 176- 9
formations:
late Roman army, 203
phalanxes,
27-8, 27, 39, 70-71
quincunx 44-5, 51-2,
99
testudo
tortoise , 18
triplex acies
49-52,
54-5, 65, 88, 99
fortresses, 142, 145, 146, 152, 156, 191,
199,208
forts, 102 3 143, 148, 152, 152, 153,
154,156-9,157,174-5,181,182,
206 9 208
Franks, 180, 182, 198
frontiers,
146-59,148-59,181,187,
193,205
Frontinus, 217
Galatians,
82-3
Galba,
Servius Sulpicius, 91
Galba,
Emperor, 163
galleys,
56-8
Gallic tribes see Gaul
Gallienus, 169, 170
Gamala,
143
garrisons, 93,137,148,152-3,181
INDEX
gateways, forts, 156, 208 9
Gaul
an d
Gallic tribes, 107, 174
battles with Romans,
85-8,
94-5
Caesar s
campaigns in
Gaul,
84, 104,
111
cavalry in Roman army, 118
Cisalpine
Gaul , 85-8,
93
Dying
Gaul,
96
Franks in, 180, 182, 198
frontiers, 158
head-hunting,
93
rebellions, 144, 162
Roman colonies, 88
sack
of
Rome, 35, 36,
93
siege
of
Alesia, 86-7
Transalpine
Gaul,
90
tribes, 88
Vercingetorix, 85, 86-7, 88, 92
warriors,
94
Germanicus,
111
Germany and Germanic tribes, 148,
179-83
battle
of Strasbourg,
178-9
cavalry in Roman army, 118
raids
against
Romans, 162, 176,
180-82
rebellions, 114, 144
recruits in
Roman
army, 176, 179
Roman
campaigns
against, 111, 115,
151, 164,
182-3
Roman control
of, 158
wa r
cries, 179
warriors,
127
gladius
sword , 44, 45, 97, 120, 125,
127
Gordian Ill, Emperor, 163
Goths,
162, 180, 192,
196-7
Gracchus, 93
Greece,27,28-9,42
Hadrian,
Emperor, 116, 123, 131, 145,
152,153,163
Hadrian s
Wall, 152-5,157-8,157,208,
208 9
Hamilcar,
85
hand-ta-hand
fighting, 52
Hannibal
Barca, 49, 52, 61, 61, 63, 64,
65-9,66-9,70,74,75,85,90,93,215
Hasdrubal,41
hastati soldiers , 43, 44-5, 49, 50 51
52,54
head-hunting,
93, 118
Hellenistic
kingdoms,
42, 50, 62,
70-75,93,144
helmets, 32, 33, 53, 76, 123, 125
Helvetii, 85
Herod
the
Great, 142 200
Herodian, 217
H istoria Augusta 217
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INDEX
Homer, 27
hoplites, 24, 27-33, 27, 32
Horatii brothers, 30
Horatius, 30
Houseteads, 157, 158-9, 208
Huns, 198, 199
hunting, 170
Iberians, 90
Illyria, 85, 90, 107
Illyrian officers, 165-6
Illyricum, 174
imperialism,
78-111,78-9,114-17,
115,148-9
infantry:
armour and
weapons,
43-4, 4 3 ~
50 51 53 78
auxiliary
troops,
118, 118-19, 120
heavy infantry, 42,
43-5
late
Roman
army, 203
light infantry, 42,
45-7
Sassanid, 186
tactics, 53, 127-9,
167-9
see also
formations
Italy:
Ostrogoths,
198, 199
Roman
conquest,
35-7, 38,85-90
javelins, 44, 44, 53, 78, 128, 128, 129,
167
Jerusalem, 145
siege
of AD 70 ,81,
138-41
Jews,
141,141,142,
144
Josephus, 122,129,138,217
Jovian, Emperor, 181, 192
Judaea,
141, 144,145
Jugurtha,
King of
Numidia,
92, 92, 93,
96
Julian the Apostate, Emperor, 178, 182,
182, 183, 192
Justinian I, Emperor, 198, 198
Labienus,
Lake Regillus, battle of 496BC , 29-33
Lake Trasimene,
battle
of
217
BC ,
61,
65
legionaries,
50-51
76,94-5, 117, 119,
125,126,127,128
legions:
armour, 43
in battles, 49-55
formations, 99-100
cohorts, 97-100, 98,126-7
garrisons, 137
organization,
37-9,
42-9,117-18
size, 117, 167, 169
see also
army
Leonidas, 33
Libya, 144
Licinius, Emperor, 166
Ligurians, 88, 91
Ligustinus, Spurius, 97
limitanei 169, 171-4, 181, 193, 199
linear barriers, 152, 153-8, 154-5
Livia, 109
Livy,
29, 30 33, 97, 99, 216
Longinus, Cassius, 90
Lucanians, 36
Lucullus, 91, 105
Lusitanians, 90,
91-2
~ a c e d o n i a 5 5 6 2 7 0 7 4 75,83-4,
105
~ a c e d o n i a n
Wars, 92
Second 200-196 BC , 83
Third
172-167 BC , 83,90,93,97
Fourth
149-148 BC , 84
magistrates, 80-81, 83, 117
~ a g n e s i a battle
of
190BC , 52, 70,
71-2,72-3
~ a g o 6
~ a i d e n Castle, 146
~ a n c i n u s Gaius Hostilius, 92
maniples,
44-5,
49,51-2,55,97,
99-100
marching camps, 23, 47,
50-51,
123
~ a r c o m a n n i 180
~ a r i u s Gaius, 96, 97, 104, 215
~ a r o b o d u u s King
of
th e
~ a r c o m a n n i 180
marriage, 121
~ a s a d a 1 4 2 - 3 2 0 8
massacres, 19,91,93,111,145-6
Maurice s Strategikon 199,202,203,
217
~ a x e n t i u s Emperor, 166, 176
~ a x i m i a n Emperor, 162, 165, 166, 169
~ a x i m u s ~ a r c u s Valerius, 164
medical service,
120
mercenaries, 56, 62, 144
~ e r i d a
20-23
~ e s o p o t a m i a 114, 186, 190
~ i l v i a n Bridge, battle of AD 312), 176
~ i t h r i d a t e s
VI, King
of
Pontus, 105
monuments, 80 81 81 110 126
~ u s Publius Decius, 39
~ y l a e battle of, 60
myths, 26, 36
Nabataeans, 146
Napoleon
I, Emperor, 208
Naristae, 164
Narses,
198,198,203,215
naval battles, 56-61
Nero, Emperor, 115, 117, 136, 137, 162
Nisibis, 191, 192, 199
Notitia
Dignitatum 217
Numantia,
92, 92, 93, 205
Numidians, 92,
93
Octavian see Augustus
Odenathus, King, 184
Ostrogoths, 198
Palmyra, 162, 184-5, 187
Pannonian legions, 169
Pannonian
Rebellion
AD
6-9 ,
108
111, 114, 175-6
Parthians, 115,
131-6,132,
163,164,
183-6, 190, 192
patronage, 21-2,
121, 122
Paul, St, 137
Paullus, Aemilius, 81
Perseus, King of ~ a c e d o n 90
Persians, 162, 167, 168, 183-92, 186,
187,198,199,202,205
Pertinax, Emperor, 163, 164
Petra, 147
phalanxes,
27-8,
27,39,70-71
Pharsalus, battle of
48 BC , 100-1
Philip II, King of ~ a c e d o n 62, 70
Philip
King
of
~ a c e d o n 70,
70
74
pikemen, Hellenistic armies, 70, 74
pilum
javelin), 44, 44, 53, 97, 125, 128,
128,129,167
Plutarch, 216
politicians, 80-83, 104
Polybius,
42,42,
44,
47,48,
48,
52,53,
60,61,62,64,71,78,93,97-9,
121-2,216
Pompey Gnaeus Pompeius ~ a g n u s
85 100 1 101 104 105 215
Pompey, Sextus,
104 108
Pontus, 104, 133
Popilius Laenas, Gaius, 85
Postumius, Lucius, 88
Praeneste, 24
Praetorian Guard, 6, 121, 162-3, 169
priests,
34-5
Principate, 52,107,115-17,118,121,
124,144,156,159,169,175,183,
193,204
principes
soldiers), 43,44-5, 49,52,54
Procopius, 217
provinces, 90, 93, 121, 137-41, 146,
164,196-7
provincial governors, 81-3, 104, 107,
121, 122, 162
Pseudo-Hyginus, 217
pugio
daggers, 43, 45
P unic W ars, 45, 49
First 265-241 BC , 56-61, 56-7, 62,
64
Second 218-202 BC , 56-7, 62,
64-70,74,83,90,93,99,104
Third
149-146
BC ,
56-7,83,
92-3
Pydna, battle of 168
BC ,
52, 55, 72
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hus, King
of
Epirus, 41, 42, 47, 52,
60 64 65 74 75
Bsheir, 174-5
formation, 44-5 51-2 99
nqueremes, 56, 57, 60
ds, 34, 35, 88 91 148 151 158 180
soms, 62
ia, battle
of
217
BC , 71
19 37 94-5 97 111 114
4, 162
18-19 47 48 62 96-7
0-21, 174-9, 193, 197
29-39 115
River, 22 111 152 153, 158,
ds, 22, 88-90 89 151, 152, 153
s centre of power, 163
ndation of, 26
llic sack, 35, 36
and Remus, 26, 26
llian tribes,
35-6
bre, battle
of
57 BC , 106
nites, 36, 36, 39, 61
egethusa Ulpia,
204 5
sanid Persians, 162, 163, 183-92,
io, Publius Cornelius, Africanus,
io Aemilianus, Publius Cornelius,
io Asiaticus,
81
shield), 125, 167
ucid Empire, 52, 62,
70 73 74 75
ate, 80, 83,
85 90 91 92
101, 104,
07, 117, 164-5
80-81 81
83, 84-5, 104, 106,
15, 164
pio, 178
vius Tullius, 29
rus, Emperor, 134-5, 163, 164, 164,
69-70 186 216
pur I, King of the Persians, 163,
84 190
18 32 53, 125, 167
ps, 55, 56-8
58-9
arii, 142
ily, 56, 59, 61, 64, 65
e warfare, 49, 86-7 140-43, 144-6,
82 186-90 190-91
ara, 192
slaves, 36, 81 82 82 83 85 96 111
176
Social War 90-88
BC ,
97, 9 7
soldiers
see
army; cavalry; centurions;
infantry; legionaries
Spain, 83 84 90-92 93 96 99 107,
174, 197
Sparta 33
spear s, 32, 70
standard-bearers 45, 46
standards 97, 97,
117 128 208
Strasbourg, battle
of
AD
357 178-9
183
Suebi 127
Suetonius 217
Sulla, Publius Cornelius, 101, 104, 216
Surenas, 136
swords, 43-4 45, 123
Syria, 107, 111 123 134, 135, 136, 190
Tacitus, 19, 111, 148 217
Taginae, battle of, 203
Tarentum 41, 42 , 52
Tarquins, 33
testudo
tortoise) formation 18
Tetrarchy, 162, 165, 166
Teutones, 93
Thrace
92 174
Tiberius, Emperor, 92 108 1 9 111
114
Titus Emperor, 81, 137, 138-9 141,
216
tortoise formation 18
training, 49, 122-4
Trajan, Emperor, 114, 114, 116 117
118 20 132 146 163 186 204 216
Trajan s
Column
Rome,
102 3 114
118 119 131 150 51 169 194
Transalpine Gaul 90
treaties, 74, 193
Trebia, battle
of
218
BC ,
52, 65
triarii
soldiers), 43,44-5 47, 49, 5
51
t ri bunes, 37, 39, 44, 47, 97,111
triplex acies
formation 49-52 54-5
65 88 99
triremes, 55,
56-8
triumphs 80 81 81, 83
trumpets 129
uniforms, 16, 43, 171
usurpers, 163, 164-6 193
Vadomarius 176
Valens, Emperor, 183, 192, 196
Valerian, Emperor, 162, 163
Vandals, 197, 198
Varus, Publius Quinctilius, 111
Vegetius, 122, 199, 203, 217
Veii, 33, 35
INDEX
ve/ites
light infantry), 45, 50, 50, 97
Vercingetorix, 85, 86-7 88 92
Verus, Lucius, 166
Vespasian, Emperor, 115, 137, 138, 143,
146
Via Appi a, 89
Villanovan culture, 33
Vindolanda, 206 7 2 8
Virgil,208
Viriathus, 91-2 93
Visigoths, 196-8
Vonatorix 124
Vulso,
Gnaeus Manlius
81,
82-3
war cries, 167, 179
warships, 55,
56-8
58-9
watch-towers, 150 51 153, 158
weapons:
auxiliary troops 120
late
Roman
army, 167
pi um javelin), 44, 44, 53,97 125
pugio
daggers, 43, 45
spears, 32, 70
swords,
43-4
45, 123
training, 123
Zama battle
of
202
BC ,
49, 61, 68-9
70, 78
Zenobia
Queen 184, 187
Zoroastrianism 190
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http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/30394334-roman-warfarepdf 224/225
PICTURE
CREDITS
PICTURE CREDITS
E.T. Archive pp.
2 3 16
24, 28, 32, 40 102 3 123 124 172 3 177. Ancient
Art
Architecture Collection pp.
6 20 1 36 43 44 46 48 55 70 71 75 78 82
88 92 93 94 left) 96 97 bottom) 104 105 112 133 145 146 158 9 163 167
184 5 186. Adrian
Goldsworthy
pp.
18 19 22 65 98 118 119 120 12 6 127
128, 129, 131, 142 left), 143 right) 156 194 204 209. A.K.G. pp.
26 27 61
76,
106 107 108
left)
109 110 130 137 150 1 153 162 164 166 182 188 9 202.
Corbis
pp.
30 1:
G.Dagli Orti; 58 9 Archivo Iconografico; 94 5 Nik Wheeler;
147 Alan Towse; 160Museo del Palazzo dei Conservatori, Rome; 190
Dean
Conger; 200-1
Richard
Nowitz;
206 7
Patrick Ward. Sonia Halliday
Photographs pp. 33, 89, 108 top bottom) 114 116 142 3 154 5 157 165
168 170 171 175 198.
Werner
Forman
pp. 34, 80 1 97 top) 134 5 138 9.
The
author would like to thank the Museo Tropaeum Traini at Adamklissi
Archaeological Museum
of
Constansa for their
kind
permission to
photograph
the images
reproduced on
pp. 126-9.
Drawings
on
the title
page and
on pages 42, 44, 45,
50 51
52, 53, 98, 156 are
Peter Smith and
Malcolm Swanston of
Arcadia Editions Ltd.
ENDPAPER: A first second century
mosaic from
Rome
showing a small galley patrolling the
Nile. The
Roman
navy
receives far less attention than the legions
but
its fleets were a major
factor in allowing Rome to conquer
and
control such a large empire.
.