30394334-roman-warfare.pdf

8/20/2019 30394334-Roman-Warfare.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/30394334-roman-warfarepdf 1/225



ROM N W RF R

~ ~ F = ;



ROM N

W RF R

drian

oldsworthy

General ditor o n Keegan

SSELL



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book h as b ee n a p le as ur e to

write

and I should like to

thank

all

the

friends

and

family

who

read and commented

on

the

various drafts

notably

lan

Haynes

ian Deeks and especially

lan Hughes.

The lat ter

took part along

with

Glyn

Quigley in a highly

stimulating

series

of

seminars

on

the Second Punic War run

j oi nt ly by

Louis

Rawlings

and

myself

as

part

of the Cardi ff University

MA

rogramme in

1996-7.

Several of

the ideas in

the

second

chapter were derived

rom

the

discussions in these

s es si on s. I have f ol lo we d Louis

ideas

on

early

oman warfare

extensively

in the first chapter.

Similarly

in

chapter

5

I have

rawn much inspiration from

Hugh Elton s

splendid

Warfare in

oman

urope

and it is appropriate for me to acknowledge

my

debt to both

of

them.

However

he views e xpre ssed here a re m y

own

and

not

necessarily

shared

by

either

scholar.

would

a lso like to express

my

thanks

to

the team at Cassell

and

especially

enny Gardiner for all

their

work on

the

volume and to Malcolm Swanston for

is splendid

maps

and illustrations.

DRIAN GOLDSWORTHY

en rth



CONTENTS

5 CRISIS AND

REFORM

The

army of

the

Principate;

Training and tactics;

Rome and Parthia; axRomana The

frontiers

3

Civil

wars

and

usurpations;

The

late Roman army;

Barbarians

and

the

western

Empire; Sassanid Persia

and

th e east; Disaster at Adrianople

6

CONTROLLING THE WORLD

AD 14 193

9 5

22 4

22

2

5

2 8

2

2 2

The end of the western army; Conclusion

T LES

GLOSS RY

IOGR PHIES ND

M IN

SOURCES

FURTHER RE DING

INDEX

PICTURE

CREDITS

6

COLLAPSE IN THE WEST

RECOVERY IN THE EAST

CKNOWLEDGEMENTS

5

MAP LIST

CHRONOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

T o

OVERCOME THE

PROUD IN WAR

7

EARLY

ROME AND THE

CONQUEST

OF ITALY

The

Republic

25

THE

WARS

WITH CARTHAGE

AND THE HELLENISTIC

KINGDOMS

The Roman army

in

t he mid Republic; The

army in batt le; The first

Punic

wa r

and

naval

warfare; Land

warfare

against Carthage and

th e

Hellenistic world

4

WORLD CONQUEST

BC AD

Northern

Italy; Spain;

The

rise of

the

professional

army;

The great

conquests;

The

last

phase

of

Roman expansion

77



K Y

T

M PS

Political colours

oman

mpire

dependent state

unless otherwise

indic ted

Symbols

on map

X b ttle

fort

o siege

ame

style

P RTHI N

MPIR

Thrace

S R TlONS

independent state

province

major trib l group

Geographical symbols

urban area

oman road

defensive line

river

seasonal river

canal

border

Military movements

tt ck

retre t



M A P LIST

I T H E

RO MA N

C ON QU ES T O F I TA LY 265 BC ;

3

8

RO ME

IN

TH E LATE

REPUBLIC

3

8

2 T H E

PUNIC

W A RS 264 146 BC

5

6

-7

3·

HANNIBAL S CAMPAIGNS

I N I TA LY 218 203 BC

63

4·

CANNAE

66-7

5·

ZA MA

68 9

6 MAGNESIA

7

2

-3

7·

T H E

R O M AN E M PI R E

AD 14

7

8

-9

8

CAESAR S

CAMPAIGNS IN

GAUL 58 50 BC

84

9·

SIEGE

OF

ALESIA

86-7

10 CIVIL W A RS

9

8

-9

11

PHARSALUS: PHASES

I

2 AN D 3

100 1

12 T H E

RO MA N

EMPIRE AD

68

114-

1

5

13·

P ARTHIAN

W A RS

13

2

14·

T H E SIEGE

OF

JERUSALEM

AD

70

14°

IS ·

T H E RO MA N EMPIRE IN

AD

214

14

8

-9

16

T H E

F RON T IE RS I N

NORTHERN BRITAIN

15

2

17·

T H E BATTLE O F S T RA S BO U RG

17

8

-9

18

RO ME S EASTERN

FRONTIER

18

7

19·

SIEGE OF A M ID A

19

1

2

T H E

RO MA N EMPIRE

AD

395

19

6

-7



ROMAN WARFARE

HRONOLO Y

This chart lists th e major military

Pachynus an d Spain eventually

events in Rome s history that ca n

Palinurus.

ended by th e

be securely dated. Entries in bold 249

Romans defeated in campaigns and peace

ar e

only

for

th e

reigns

of

emperors

naval

battle

at

settlement

of

who controlled the greater part of

Drepana.

Gracchus.

th e Empire. 241

Romans

wi n

final 192-189 Syrian War against

naval b at tl e o ff t he

th e Seleucid

Aegates Islands.

Antiochus

In .

753

Traditional

date

for 225

Invading Gallic

army

191

Antiochus invasion

foundation

of Rome

defeated at Telamon.

of Greece defeated

at

by Romulus. 223

Romans

campaign

Thermopylae.

509

Traditional

date

for

successfully against

190

Antiochus defeated

at

expulsion of Rome s tribes of

Cisalpine

Magnesia.

last king Tarquinius

Gaul. 189-188

Manlius Vulso defeats

Superbus.

218-201

Second Punic

War. Galatians.

496

Romans defeat the

218

Hannibal defeats

172-167

Third

Macedonian

Latin

League

at

th e

cavalry force

at

War.

battle of Lake

Ticinus

an d

then 168

Macedonians under

Regillus. smashes

two consular

Perseus defeated

at

396

Veii falls after ten- armies

at Trebia. Pydna.

year siege/blockade.

217

Consul

Flaminius

is 154-138

Lusitanian

War.

390

Gauls

rout

a

Roman ambushed at

Lake

149-146 Third

Punic War.

a rm y a t

th e River

Trasimene. 149-148

Fourth Macedonian

Allia

an d sack

Rome. 216

Romans suffer War.

343-341

First

Samnite

War.

massive

defeat at 146

Destruction

of

340-338

Latin revolt

defeated Cannae.

Carthage and

an d

Latin League

214-205

First

Macedonian

Corinth.

dissolved.

War. Romans ar e

143-133

Numantine

War.

326-304 Second Samnite

War.

forced

to come to 125-121

Ro

mans

defeat tribes

R oma n a rm y defeated

terms

with

Philip of of

Transalpine Gaul.

an d sent under

yoke

Macedon after

losing

113-105

Migrating tribes the

a t C audi ne

Forks

their

allies

in

Greece. Cimbri

an d Teutones

321 .

213-211

Romans take

Syracuse

defeat a succession of

298-290

Third Samnite

War.

after long

siege.

Roman armies

R om an s w in major 209

Scipio Africanus

culminating

i n t he

victory at Sentinum

captures Ne w

disaster

at

Arausio

295 .

Carthage. 105 .

283 A Gallic tribe the

208 Scipio wins a victory 112-106 ]ugurthine Wa r

Boii defeated at Lake

at Baecula.

begins with

Vadimo. 207

Hasdrubal brings humiliating Roman

280-275

Wa r with Pyrrhus army

into

Italy bu t is

surrender bu t finally

wh o

defeats

Romans defeated

at Metaurus.

vlon by

Marius.

at Heraclea 280 an d

206

Scipio wins decisive 102 Marius defeats

Asculum 279 , bu t is

victory in Spanish

Teutones at Aquae

finally beaten at

campaign at Ilipa. Sextiae.

Malventum.

204-203 Scipio invades Africa 101 Marius and Catulus

264-241

First Punic War. winning battle of th e defeat Cimbri at

260

Romans

wi n

naval Great Plains.

Vercellae.

victory off Mylae.

Hannibal recalled. 91-88 Th e Social War the

256

Major

Roman

naval 202 Scipio defeats

last great rebellion by

victory off Ecnomus. H an n ib al a t Z am a .

Rome s Italian allies is

256-255

Regulus invades 200-196 Second Macedonian defeate d a ft er a hard

Africa bu t after War. struggle.

initial successes is 197

Philip decisively

88

Sulla marches

on

defeated. beaten at

Rome.

255-253 Roman

fleets wrecked Cynoscephalae.

88-85 First Mithridatic

in

storms

off

197-179 Series of w ars in War.



CHRONOLOGY

Sulla

storms

Athens

44-42

Caesar s assassination 12-7

Tiberius conquers

a n d t he n

defeats provokes a

further

Pannonia.

He an d

his

Mithridates much cycle

of

civil wa r

brother Drusus

larger armies at

between th e

campaIgn In

Chaeronea and

conspirators an d Germany.

Orchomenus. Caesar s

supporters

Sulla

returns

to

Italy le d by

Mark

Antony,

AD

an d wins civil w ar a t

later

joined by 4-5 Tiberius

completes

the battle

of

th e

Octavian Caesar s the

conquest of

Colline

Gate

outside nephew an d

adopted

Germany

as far as th e

Rome. son.

Elbe.

-82 Second Mithridatic

42

Brutus

an d Cassius

6- 9

Massive revolt in

War. defeated in

twin

Pannonia and

Sertorius continues

battles of Philippi.

Dalmatia suppressed

the civil

wa r

in 40-38 Parthians

invade

after hard struggle by

Spain.

Syria,

bu t

are defeated

Tiberius and

Third Mithridatic

by Ventidius at Mt

Germanicus.

War. Amanus

an d 9

German revolt led by

A

major

slave

Gindarus. Arminius

of

th e

rebellion led by 36

Antony

launches Cherusci massacres

Spartacus

disrupts major

offensive

three legions

under

Italy. Several Roman against the Parthians

Varus in th e

armies are smashed bu t

this flounders Teutonberg

Wald.

before he is finally

when he fails to take

10-11 Tiberius an d

defeated by Crassus.

Phraapsa

an d

he loses Germanicus

secure

Lucullus defeats m an y m en t o

disease the Rhine

frontier.

Tigranes of Armenia

an d starvation in th e 14

Legions on Rhine an d

an d captures his subsequent

retreat.

Danube

mutiny

after

capital

Tigranocerta.

31 Antony

defeated by death of

Augustus.

Lucullus defeats Octavian in naval 14-37

Principate

of

combined forces

of

battle at Actium.

Tiberius.

Tigranes an d

Octavian becomes

15-16

Germanicus

leads

Mithridates

at

effectively

th e

sole Rhine

armies against

Tigranocerta.

ruler

of

th e

Roman

th e

Germans and

Pompey clears the Empire.

buries

th e

remains

of

Mediterranean o f 31-30 Parthians

overrun

Varus army. He

p ir at es i n a b ri ef bu t

Armenia.

defeats Arminius at

highly organized 28-24

Final pacification

of

Indistaviso, bu t fails

campaIgn.

Spain completed by

to

achieve final

Pompey given Octavian an d

his victory.

extraordinary

commanders.

17-24 Revolt

of

Tacfarinas,

command

to

27

BC-AD

14

Principate

of

a

former

auxiliary, in

complete th e

w ar w it h

Augustus Octavian).

North Africa, which

Mithridates.

25

Successful

expedition

end s o nl y w hen

he is

Pompey captures is sent

against

killed.

Jerusalem.

Ethiopia in response 19

Arminius murdered

Caesar s conquest of to

raids on

Roman

by rival chieftains.

Gallia

Comata.

Egypt. 21

Revolt

of

Florus

an d

Crassus invades 20

Settlement

with

Sacrovir in

Gaul

Parthia bu t is

Parthia leads to th e

swiftly suppressed by

defeated an d killed at return of Roman

Rhine armies.

Carrhae.

prisoners an d 28 Th e Frisii, a

Major

Gallic rebellion captured

standards. Germanic

tribe east

of

led by Vercingetorix.

16-15

Campaigns to

th e Rhine

rebel

Civil Wa r between

conquer th e Alpine

against oppressive

Caesar an d Pompey.

tribes. taxation.

Caesar

wins v ictories 15

German tribes raid 37--41

Principate

of

Gaius

at

Pharsalus 48),

th e

Roman

provinces Caligula) .

Zela 47), Thapsus

an d defeat Lollius 40--44

Mauretania rebels

46 an d

Munda

45).

Urbicus. an d

is fully conquered



ROMAN WARFARE

by Seutonius Paulinus armies nominate

their Dacia, invades

an d later Hosidius

commanders as Moesia and inflicts a

Geta. successor.

heavy defeat on its

41-54 Principate of 68 Emperor Galba

governor.

Claudius. murdered

by his

86

Domitian s

Praetorian

42 Scribonius,

the guardsmen

after

Prefect, Cornelius

governor

of Dalmatia

failing

to

meet their

Fuscus,

is

given

attempts a rebellion

demands for pay:

Hi s

command in Dacia,

against Claudius

bu t

successor,

Otho

is

bu t is defeated

and

commits

suicide

when

defeated by Vitellius

killed.

his legions fail

to

at th e

first

battle of

88

Another Roman army

support

him.

Cremona or

invades Dacia

an d

43

Claudius launches Bedriacum) .

defeats Decebalus at

invasion

of

Britain.

69

Supporters

of Tapae.

47

Corbulo suppresses

Vespasian defeat 89 Saturninus, governor

th e

Frisii an d defeats Vitellius a rm y a t

th e

of

Lower Germany,

an d kills the second battle of rebels against

Chaucian

Gannascus

Cremona.

Sarmatians

Domitian but is

a former auxiliary, an d Dacians raid

defeated. Domitian

wh o

ha d

been

raiding

across

the Danube.

makes peace

with

th e

Roman provinces

69-70

In northern Germany

Decebalus, paying

i n a fleet

of

small a Batavian nobleman

hi m

a subsidy

an d

ships.

an d former auxiliary providing technical

5

Caratacus defeated, prefect, Julius Civilis,

experts to strengthen

bu t

th e

Silures of

leads a rebellion to Dacia s fortresses.

southern

Wales

create a Gallic Sarmatian

Iazyges

continue

to resist.

empire .

He

is raid Pannonia.

54-68

Principate of Nero.

defeated by Petilius

92 Further

raids on

58-64 W ar w it h P ar thia over Cerealis.

Pannonia

prompt

Armenia. Corbulo 70-79 Principate of Domitian to

captures Artaxata

an d

Vespasian.

campaign

against the

Tigranocerta. 7 Titus captures Iazyges an d their

60-61

Boudicca, Queen

of Jerusalem after

a

long allies, the

th e Iceni, leads

SIege. Marcomanni an d

rebellion in Britain,

73-4 Masada the las t

Quadi.

creating widespread

stronghold

of

th e

96-8 Principate of Nerva.

devastation before she

Jewish rebels,

is

98-117

Principate

of

Trajan.

is defeated by taken.

101-2 Trajan s First Dacian

Suetonius Paulinus.

71-4

Petilius Cerealis

Wa r

defeats

62

Caesennius Paetus defeats th e Brigantes Decebalus

an d

surrounded

an d

of

northern

Britain.

removes the

surrenders to

th e 74-8

Julius Frontinus

favourable Domitianic

Parthians an d his defeats th e Silures of treaty:

army is

sent

under

th e South Wales. 105-6 Decebalus renews

war

yoke.

78-84

Julius Agricola

bu t

is defeated

an d

66-74

Th e Jewish rebellion.

advances

into commits

suicide.

66

Th e Syrian governor, Scotland, defeating a

Dacia

is

a nn ex ed as a

Cestius Gallus, leads large

tribal

army

at

province.

an expedition to Mons Graupius. His

113-17 Trajan s Parthian War

Jerusalem

bu t is

conquests

are largely

flounders when he

forced to retreat and abandoned when fails to take Hatra.

suffers heavily in

the troops

are withdrawn Revolts in recently

pursuit. to serve in th e wars on conquered territory

67

Vespasian

subdues the Danube. break ou t

before his

Galilee.

Josephus

79-81

Principate

of Titus.

death.

surrenders to

him.

81-96

Principate

of

115-17

Widespread rebellion

68-9 Year of Four Domitian.

by Jewish

Emperors.

Nero s

83

Domitian

campaigns

communities in

death prompts a civil

against the Chatti.

Egypt, Cyrene

an d

wa r as th e provincial

85

Decebalus, king of Cyprus.



CHRONOLOGY

Principate

of

false report

of 232

Severus Alexander s

Hadrian

during

Marcus death but is offensive

against

the

which Trajan s defeated by loyal

Persians fails.

acquisitions in the troops.

234-5 Pannonian legions

East are abandoned. 178-80 Further

disturbances rebel under

Construction

of

on th e

Danube. Maximinus. Severus is

Hadrian s

Wall

180-92

Reign

of Commodus.

murdered.

begins.

c 182-5 Heavy fighting in

235-8

Reign

of

Maximinus

Th e

Jews revolt under

northern

Britain

who campaigns

th e Messianic leader,

eventually

ended

by successfully against

Bar Kochba, an d are

victories

of

Ulpius t he A la ma nni but

is

defeated

at

a heavy Marcellus.

murdered

by the

cost in

Roman

184

Final abandonment of

Praetorian

Guard.

casualties.

Antonine Wall. 238 44 Reign

of

Gordian

Ill.

Principate

of

193-7

Period

of

civil wa r

242

Successful

expedition

Antoninus Pius.

results from murder to drive Persians from

Rebellion in northern

of

Commodus. I t is Mesopotamia.

Britain. eventually wo n by

244

Gordian III

murdered

Antonine conquests

Septimius Severus by a conspiracy an d

in Scotland.

supported

by

the

replaced by Philip,

the

Construction

of Danubian armies.

Praetorian Prefect.

Antonine

Wall begun.

197-208

Reign

of

Severus.

244-9

Reign

of

Philip the

Rebellion in 198 Severus invades Arab.

Mauretania.

Parthia

an d

sacks

245-7

Gothic tribes

raid

150-54

Serious rebellion in

Ctesiphon.

Danubian

provinces.

northern Britain. 205

Hadrian s Wall

249 Decius is proclaimed

Antonine

Wall

restored after heavy emperor by the

abandoned.

Hadrian s raids by Caledonian

Danubian

armies an d

Wall reoccupied. tribes ha d overrun

defeats Philip near

160-63

Antonine

Wall

much of

northern

Verona. Goths under

reoccupied a nd t he n Britain.

Cniva

raid

Danubian

evacuated again.

208-11 Severusleadslarge

provinces.

Reign

of

Marcus

expedition against

249-51

Reign

of

Decius.

Aurelius.

the

Caledonians

bu t

251 Decius defeated an d

Parthians invade dies in Eboracum

killed by

Goths

at

Armenia. Lucius

York). Forum Trebonii.

Verus, Marcus 211-17 Caracalla s reign.

251-3 Reign

of

Gallus.

Augustus or co-ruler, 213 Caracalla

campaigns 252 Persians invade

sent east to oppose

o n th e

Rhine

frontier. Mesopotamia. Heavy

them.

They

are 217 Caracalla

prepares

barbarian raiding

defea

te d an d eastern

expedition

across

Rhine an d

Ctesiphon an d

bu t is murdered by a D anube. G ot hs pa id a

Seleucia sacked.

member

of

his Horse subsidy to withdraw.

Marcomanni and Guards near Carrhae.

253

Aemilianus rebels

at

Quadi

tw o

Suebic

217-18

Macrinus

reign.

He

is

head of Pannonian

tribes, cross

th e

defeated by Persians

and Moesian armies.

Danube in a series

of

at

Nisibis,

an d

then

Gallus

army deserts

raids. On e group

by

the

usurper

an d murders him.

reaches Aq uileia in

Elagabalus outside

Aemilianus

is

then

northern Th e

Antioch.

murdered

by his ow n

Iazyges raid the 218-22

Reign

of

Elagabalus. troops.

province of Dacia.

227

Ardashir

defeats

253-60

Reign

of

Valerian.

A series

of campaigns Parthian

king an d H is s on Gallienus

against the creates Sassanid

made Augustus.

Marcomanni Quadi

m o n r h ~

254

Marcomanni

launch

an d

their

Sarmatian

222-35 Reign

of

Severus

heavy raids into

allies.

Alexander.

Illyricum. Goths raid

Avidius Cassius,

th e

230

Persians invade

Thrace.

Shapur

I

of

governor

of

Syria, Mesopotamia and

Persia

captures

rebels on receiving a

besiege Nisibis.

Nisibis.

13



ROMAN

W ARF ARE

256 Franks launch heavy

destroyed

an d

3 6

Constantius dies in

raids across Lower Egyptian revolt

York

an d

his son

Rhine. Gothic fleet suppressed.

Constantine is

raids coast

of

Asia

274 Tetricus rebels in

proclaimed emperor

Minor causing G au l a nd is defeated

by th e provincial

widespread

by Aurelian.

r ~

devastation an d 275 Aurelian is murdered 3 2

Constantine defeats

panIC.

by h is

ow n

officers. Maxentius

at

th e

258/9

Gallienus

defeats Tacitus

made emperor Milvian

Bridge

Franks.

by th e Senate.

outside

Rome.

26

Valerian s Persian 276 Tacitus defeats Alans 314-15 Constantine wins

expedition ends in bu t dies on campaign.

victories

at

Cibalis

disaster when he 276-82

Reign Probus. an d

Mardia

in civil

surrenders to Sharpur. He campaigns

wa r

with

Licinius.

Postumus proclaimed successfully on th e 322-3 Constantine

emperor in G au l

Rhine and Danube campaigns against

creating the

imp rium bu t is murdered by Sarmatians

an d

Goths

llicum with

a

mutinous soldiers

and on the Danube.

capital

at Trier which replaced by Carus

th e 323-4

Constantine decisively

endures

f or a d ec ad e.

Praetorian

Prefect. defeats Licinius

at

260-68 Reign Gallienus. 283-5 Carus

defeats Adrianople and

26 Odenathus of

Sarmatians in Chrysopolis.

Palmyra

made

ux Illyricum bu t dies 324-37

Reign Constantine

orientis

an d leads during

a successful as undisputed

successful wa r against offensive against emperor.

th e Persians.

Persia. Civil wa r 331-4 Constantine

267-8 Odenathus murdered.

eventually

wo n

by successfully

Hi s

power assumed

Diocletian

wh o

campaigns

against the

by his widow appoints

Maximian

Goths

an d

Zenobia

in th e

name

as his Caesar

an d Sarmatians.

of the ir s on

later as Augustus. 337

Imperial

power

Vallabathus.

284-305 Reign Diocletian divided between

268

Goths

raid

Thrace

which saw

the creation Constantine s

sons.

an d Greece. Th e

of th e e t r r c h ~

337-60

War w ith Persia.

Heruli sack Athens. 286 Maximian suppresses 338

Persians mount

Gallienus defeats th e

the Bagaudaen

unsuccessful siege of

Heruli

near th e River

disturbances in Ga ul Nisibis.

Nessus

bu t

is

which

ha d escalated 340-69

Severe

problems

in

murdered by h is

ow n from banditry to

Britain. Heavy raiding

officers.

full-scale revolt. by barbarians.

268-70

Reign Claudius

286-93

Maximian f ig ht s a 346 Persians

mount

Gothicus .

successful campaign

unsuccessful siege of

269 Claudius defeats against the Alamanni.

Nisibis.

Goths

in g rea t v ic to ry Cara us i us l ea ds a 348

Persians defeat

at

Naissus.

Zenobia

successful rebellion in

Constantius

at

captures Antioch. Britain bu t is

Singara.

27

Claudius dies of eventually murdered. 350-53 Persians again fail to

disease

an d

is

296-7

Diocletian

suppresses

take

Nisibis. Civil

war

succeeded by

usurpation in

Egypt. between Constantius

Aurelian. Dacia Constantius

regains

an d Magnentius.

abandoned.

Britain.

Galerius 356-7 ]ulian campaigns

270-75

Reign Aurelian. defeats th e Persians.

against the

Alamanni

270-71

Aurelian defeats 305-23

Period of civil wars winning a pitched

] uthungi a nd Vandals.

following the battle at Strasbourg.

Zenobia takes Egypt

abdication of

357-9

Constantius defeats

an d invades Asia Diocletian an d th e Quadi an d

Minor. Maximian.

Sarmatians who

ha d

272-3

Aurelian defeats

3 5

Constantius made

heavy raids into

Z e nobia a t Antioch campaigns against the Danubian

an d Emesa. Palmyra

Caledonians.

prOVInces.

4



CHRONOLOGY

]ulian campaigns

380-82 Successful

operations

Persia. Persians

against

the

Franks.

against the Goths.

capture Amida,

bu t

Persians invade 383

Magnus

Maximus

this is returned

to

Mesopotamia and defeats Picts, but t he n

Romans as part

of

th e

take Amida by storm. rebels.

peace treat):

Th e Persians take

388 Theodosius defeats 526-32 Renewal of w ar w it h

Singara.

Germanic Magnus Maximus.

Persia.

tribes make deep raids

Valentinian is

528

Belisarius defeated

at

into Gau . Picts an d

undisputed western Minduos.

Scots

launch

heavy

emperor until his 530 Belisarius wins great

raids

into

Britain.

death 392 . victory at Dara.

]ulian campaigns

394 Theodosius

defeats

531

Belisarius defeated at

across the Rhine. rivals in costly

Callinicum.

Death

of

Constantius.

two-day battle at the 533-4 Belisarius defeats

] ulian Persian River Frigidus.

Vandals in Africa.

offensive ends in

395-400 Theodosius death

535-54 A tt e mpt m a de t o

disaster an d he is

prompts renewed civil

reconquer

Italy with

killed in a skirmish.

war. armies led by

] ovian agrees 398-400 Victories in

northern

Belisarius an d later

humiliating

peace Britain over Picts, N arses.

Rome

with Persia, ceding Scots an d Saxons.

captured an d

them

considerable

407 Army

in Britain raises

recaptured

several

territory including Constantine

to

the times. Narses defeats

Nisibis.

throne

an d

invades

t he G oths at Taginae

Valentinian

Gaul, fighting against 552 an d Vesuvius

campaigns against Vandals.

553 ,

an d

th e

Franks

Alamanni and

beyond

408

G oths unde r Alaric

at Casilinus 554 .

the Rhine against the

invade Italy

an d

Goths.

besiege Rome.

R om an a rm y unde r

409 Britain rebels against

the

omes

Constantine l l

Theodosius

restores

410

Alaric sacks Rome.

order in Britain. 415

Visigoths are sent by

Valentinian Constantius

to

Spain

campaigns against

the to fight against

Alamanni

while Vandals.

Valens defeats

the 418

Th e Visigoths are

Goths. settled by Constantius

Valentian formally in Aquitaine.

receives a group of

429

Vandals invade an d

Alamanni

i nt o t he

overrun Africa.

Empire. Rebellion in 451-3 Aetius turns

bac k t he

Mauretania

offensive

of

Attila s

suppressed by

H un s a t

Chalons

Theodosius.

Campus Mauriacus).

Valentinian dies of Attila

bribed

to

apoplexy while withdraw from Italy

haranguing some

an d

dies soon

Quadic chieftains. afterwards.

A party of Goths

454

Ostrogoths settle in

fleeing Hunnic

attacks Pannonia.

cross

the

D anube a nd

469-78

Visigoths overrun

defeat Romans near Spain.

Salices. 476 Last emperor of the

Alamanni attack West, Romulus

Raetia. Valens is Augustus, deposed by

defea

te d

an d killed Odovacer

wh o

creates

along

w it h m os t

of

the Ostrogothic

his army by the Goths kingdom

of

Ital):

at Adrianople. 502-6 Anastasian war with

15



INTRODU TION

To

OVER OME

THE PROUD

W R

THIS MOS I P VEMENT dates

t o the

first

or

second century

D and depicts a group soldiers in either an historical

or

mythical scene Their

uniforms

are highly romanticized The

evidence for

the colour

oman

soldiers tunics is

i n o n l u s i v ~ bu t suggests

that

in most periods these were

w h i t ~ or off white as shown here



ROMAN

WARFARE

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Roman legionaries

employ

the famous tortoise

testudo)

o r m t i o n ~

in an

attack

on a Dacian

stronghold Their long

rectangular shields were

overlapped to form a

continuous roof above their

heads

nly

the heaviest

missiles were capable of

penetrating a well formed

tortoise and we hear of one

incident where the defenders

toppled a heavy catapult

over the wall to crush the

roof of

shields

A R FA R E P LA YE D A major part throughout Rome s history creating an d

ma intaining a n empire which eventually

included

much

of

Europe, th e

Near

East an d

North

Africa Wa r

an d

politics were inseparably linked at Rome

an d

t he rig ht

to

exercise power in

peacetime

was

purchased

by

t he o bl ig at io n t o

provide

successful

leadership in

war

Th e

Latin

word imperator from

which we

derive emperor , means general an d even th e least military of emperors

paraded

th e martial successes achieved by their armies Th e willingness of

Roman

soldiers

to

fight each other made possible th e cycles

of

civil wars

that

caused the collapse

of th e Republican system of

government

in

th e

first century

BC

and prompted the

fragmentation of

i mp er ia l p ow er

in

th e

third

century

AD . In

spite

of

th e

importance of

warfare,

Roman

society gradually

became

largely demilitarized

The citizen militia recruited

from

th e property owners serving o ut o f d ut y t o the

state an d

not

for payor booty was replaced by a professional army drawn mainly

from the

poorest

e le me nt s i n society By t he se con d c en tu ry

AD

only a tiny

minority

of

soldiers even in

th e

citizen legions

ha d

been born in Italy For a while

t h e s enat ori al an d equestrian

officers wh o filled t he s en io r r an ks as

part of

a



eer including

both

civil an d

military posts provided

a

link between

th e army

d the rest of society

bu t

this was largely severed

in

t he t hi rd

n t u r ~

After this

officers an d me n were career soldiers with aspirations clearly

distinct

from

lives

of

civilians in th e provinces

Roman warfare

was

characterized

by

great

ferocity

an d th e Roman pursuit

of

tory was relentless T acit us mak es a Caledonian

war

l ead er claim

that

th e

create

a

desolation

an d call

i t p ea ce .

The Romans had a pragmatic

ude towards atrocity an d massacre that viewed almost

an y

ac t as justifiable if

eased th e path

to

v i t o r ~

T he R om an

sack

of

a city which ha d failed

to

ender before th e first b att eri ng -ram t ou ched t he wall was deliberately made

t o d et er resistance elsewhere Rebellions in particular were suppressed

great

brutality

an d frequently involved

th e

mass

crucifixion

of

prisoners

or

ir violent deaths

on

the

sand of th e arena.

Bu t

against the destructiveness an d

of R om an w ar s m us t

be se t

their often

constructive results

The Romans

from manr

of

their

wars especially in

th e

period of conquest bu t their

a r m ak in g wa s never purely

p r e t o r ~

Defeated enemies were turned

into

allies

wh o

soon

provided

many loyal

soldiers

to

fight

the next

of

Rome s

wars Gradually some of t he ir f or me r enemies gained

citizenship

an d

might even

in

t im e g ai n

admission to

th e elite

of

th e

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The

Roman army

pursued

victory

with

ruthless

determination

Often

a

conflict was only ended with

the death or capture of a

charismatic

enemy

leader In

this scene the Dacian king

Decebalus slits his own

throat rather than be

captured

by

the

Roman

horseman riding towards

him By chance the

tombstone

of this man a

junior officer

named

Tiberius Claudius

Maximus has survived



R O M A N WARFARE

wa s

not

a corruption

of

a fairer system; it was

th e

system an d was openly

accepted as a part of normal life

The

Romans

ar e

often

seen as a

methodical

an d highly practical people

whose feats of engineering allowed their

army

to operate more f f i i n t l ~ Roman

roads

perhaps

th e

most

famous

of

all their legacies provided direct well-

maintained

routes

along which the army

could

supply its garrisons

or

shift

reserves in all b ut th e w or st

of

weather

conditions.

They

were also deliberately

built on a monumental scale in obsessively

straight

lines to be a spectacular

statement

of power Th e bridges which at th e start of a campaign the army was

willing to build with great

labour

across wide rivers like the Rhine

an d

Danube

served

t he p ra ct ic al

purpose of a ll ow in g t he army to cross bu t were also

indicative of th e

Romans

ability to overcome

nature

i tse lf as well as any



e

marching camp built at t he e nd

of

each

day s march

to

a standard

pattern

security for the night

to

t he s ol di er s and

their

baggage.

Its

highly

appearance

an d th e

construction of

a f resh

c am p a ft er

e ac h d ay s

vance were highly intimidating emphasizing the steady relentless advance

of

army:

T he R om an genius wa s t o co mbi ne th e p racti cal

with

th e

visually

that t he army s

actions

were often designed to overawe t he enemy

a display

of

massive

power

before they

actually reached

him.

E

D EV EL O PM EN T O F W A RF AR E

volume is a bout Roma n

warfare

bu t

t here are

many aspects which

it

cannot

pe to cover

in an y d et ail . I t

would

be impossible in

th e

space

available to

ide a detailed narrative of all t he w ar s f ou gh t by R om e f ro m t he foundation

of

th e city to th e

s ix th c en tu r y

AD .

Instead

I

have

tried to trace th e development

of

warfare

w i th in t he context of th e

evolution

of th e army

an d state or at least in the

case

of th e latter

those

aspects of politics an d society connected

with

th e

military:

The

nature of

th e

army why

and w ith w hat

objectives i t f ou gh t a war and

th e

way

in which it operated a re d is cu ss ed f or

each p er io d a nd

placed

in

th e

context

of th e

military

institutions

of

the main

opponents

faced

in e ac h period. This cannot ho pe to be

a

full

history

of

the R om an

army

since

many

aspects

such as its equipment career and

service patterns

pa y an d

daily routine i ts r ol e

in the administration

of

th e

provinces or

th e

layout of its forts

and

bases ca n

only

be dealt

with

very briefly: The bibliography lists

fo r

each chapter

modern

works that deal

with

th e

issues discussed

a nd o th er

aspects of th e

army

in

this

period.

The

list is

not

exhaustive

an d

ha s

been restricted to works

in

English since a full

list

of

works on

th e

Roman a rmy would be

truly

massive. Combined

with

th e

bibliographies

of

the works mentioned however

it should

p ro vide a starting point for

personal study

into

a ny m or e

specific topic. There is also a

section

listing th e main Greek

an d

Latin sources for th e

period discussing briefly their style reliability

an d

usefulness.

Most

ar e

available In

translation and

will

b e ess en ti al reading fo r a

deeper

understanding of Roman

warfare.

INTRODUCTION

he amphitheatre at

Merida

was capable of seating

around 15 000 spectators to

watch the gladiatorial fights

and beast hunts staged in its

arena This is

just

one of

hundreds of spectacular

monuments sti ll to be seen

on the sites

of

cities

throughout

the

oman

Empire

hey

are just a

small glimpse of the level of

prosperity and the

flourishing urban culture

that existed in the provinces

conquered and defended by

the oman army



H PTER

ONE

~ = = ~

@ : . ~ : = = ~ : I

E RLY ROME

ND

THE ONQUEST

T LY

THESE

TWO

ONE

PL QUES from Praeneste are decorated

with pictures

o f

Italian hoplites. Each man wears a crested

helmet muscled cuirass probably in bronze greaves tunic

and

cloak. They each hold a spear

and

have a

round

shield

the heavy oplon

resting against their legs.

None

of

this

equipment would have been ou t

o f

place in the phalanxes

Classical Greece.



ROMAN

WARFARE

EARLY R O M E

A N D

THE C O N Q U E S T O F

ITALY

When the omansbegan to

record their own history in

the later third century C

they had only the haziest

knowledge

of

their city s

origins. By this time the

story of omulusfounding

ome

after the murder

of

his

twin

brother

emus

was

the most common

but

no t

the only version

of

these

events.

26

T

HE ROM NS

OWN

MYTHS

concerning their

origins were

dominated

by tales

of wa r

tinged

with a

good

deal of

pure

s v g e r ~ Romulus an d Remus th e

twin

sons

of

th e

war

go d

Mars were suckled by a she-wolf an d as

adults

gathered

a warrior band which supported itself by raiding. Th e foundation of the

city wa s stained by

fratricide

when

Romulus

killed his brother in a fit of rage.

Throughout his life Romulus

remained the

heroic wa r leader justifying his right

to

rule

by his conspicuous courage

an d

prowess i n b at tl e.

The

majority

of

th e

tales of Rome s early years recounted heroism in war. It is impossible

no w

to

know j us t h ow m uc h i f any truth is c on ta in ed i n these stories. The Romans

themselves di d

no t

begin t o w ri te

history

until

th e

en d

of

th e

third

century

BC

an d

preserved

very little reliable

information concerning

earlier events.

By

that time

Rome

wa s

already

firmly

established

as

th e

dominant

power in

Italy

an d

ha d

begun

t o e nt er

t he w or ld

stage. The

warfare

which

formed

a major part of

he r

rise to this

position

is the subject of this chapter bu t i t is important

to

remember

ho w

poor

th e

sources for this period are.

Traditionally

Rome

wa s founded

in

753 BC although a rc ha eo lo gy h as

revealed traces

of

settlements n ea r w ha t w ou ld become the site of th e future city

f ro m t he b eg in ni ng of t he l ast mi ll en ni um

BC . The

merging

of

several

of

these

villages into a single settlement

that

could be cal led a city di d

not

occur until the

sixth century

BC . The

site is a good one

with

easily defensible hills ne xt t o a

natural crossing

place of th e

River

Tiber

a n d c om m an di ng

t rad it i on al t rad e

routes

into

central Italy

including th e

Via Salaria th e Salt

Road running from

the

c oa st . R om e wa s j us t

on e

of several

Latin

communities occupying

an

area of th e

coastal

plain west of

th e

Apennines the line of

hills w hich f or ms th e spine of

Sixth-century

Rome

ma y well have been th e largest of all th e

Latin

cities bu t i t is unclear whether i t was also the

most powerful.

The w ar s f ou gh t by early Rome

consisted

of

small scale raids

an d

cattle

rustling

with

perhaps

th e occasional ritualized battle. T h e armies were

warrior

bands

formed by

an

aristocrat his ki n

an d

d ep en da nt s. T h e

leaders

were

not

commanders

with formal powers bu t heroes wh o led by personal

example

fighting as

conspicuously

as possible in

advance of their followers. The leader

fought

for

personal glory th e followers ou t

of

loyalty to th e

le ad er w ho provided for them.

The

successful

leader

wa s

th e man who could protect

his

dependants from th e depredations o f o t her w arri or



EARLY R OM E A ND TH E

CONQUEST

OF

ITALY

T

he seventh century

Chigi vase was one

of

very

few attempts

by

Greek

artists to represent hoplite

phalanxes in battle.

Men

are

shown

advancing to the

accompaniment

of

a flute

player towards a similarly

equipped enemy phalanx

coming towards them. Like

the later makers

of

the

ayeux

tapestry the vase

painters encountered the

problem

o f

depicting a

formation

which

was

both

wide and

deep in a

two-

dimensional

medium

Their

solution was the same to

show the figures one behind

the other closely

overlapping.

an d provide enough booty to satisfy his followers. T h is t yp e of warfare has

in

common

with

that described in Homer s

poems

and wa s

probably

valent in most

of

th e

barbarian

societies of western Europe at this period.

A

major

development came

with

th e adoption of t he h op li te phalanx

a bl y s om e t im e

in

t he s ix th n t u r ~ Hoplite warfare d ev el op ed i n early

h-century Greece

an d

may well have spread to Italy via t he G reek colonies

th e southern peninsula. A hoplite

was

a

spearman

heavily protected by a

helmet cuirass greaves an d a ci rcular

bronze-covered shield

feet

in diameter.

Hoplites fought as a group not as

individuals.

in a densely packed phalanx normally at l ea st e ig ht ranks deep

cou l d exp ect to drive b ac k m os t o pp os it io n. Individual weapon skills

less important for a

hoplite

than maintaining th e

cohesion

of

th e phalanx.

warfare required

little formal training or discipline bu t it demanded a

m il it ar y e th os . I t wa s

n o l on ge r

possible for

aristocratic warriors to range

a

battlefield

entering an d leaving combat as th e m ood to ok them

ou t only those opponents they considered worthy of

their attentions

an d



ROMAN

WARFARE

This sandstone stele found

at ovilara

in Italy

an d

dating to

the sixth century

C

depicts warriors

fighting The simple figures

provide few details

o f

equipment bu t one

appears

to be wielding an

axe whilst

others have spears

with

their main concern the

acquisition of

personal

honour

Hoplites

depended

on

the men

on either

side

of them

staying

in position

in particular

on the man t o

their

right offering

some

protection to

their

vulnerable un shielded side

The

rise

of

the

hoplite

was associated with social change an d the rise of the

city state broadening participation in

combat

beyond

the

aristocracy and their

followers Hoplites were

drawn

from those able

to

afford the necessary

equipment and

as cities

developed and

prospered this came

to include

a

much

higher proportion of

the

population consisting

primarily

of

farmers Such

men

were expected to fight harder for the state since as

men

of property they had

an

interest in its preservation They

gained

increased political power within the city

earning these rights

through

their obligation to fight to protect the o m m u n i t ~

This was the ideal of the citizen soldier the

man

who fought

no t

for pay

booty or

glory

but o ut of

civic

The domination of

the

hop

l ite class by small farmers

gave hoplite

warfare

at least

in

Greece a

peculiar

rhythm of its

own

fitting in

with the agricultural year Prolonged campaigning

kept

a farmer away from his

fields when they most needed his attention so wars tended to consist

of

a single

28



EARLY R OM E A ND

T H E C O NQ U ES T

OF ITALY

of battle between t wo p ha la nx es . Battles

we re u su al ly

provoked by a

devastation

of th e

enemy s

fields

which

inflicted little actual damage.

rituals of hoplite wa rfa re in

Greece were those of th e

state not

of th e

w a r l ea de r an d

his

warrior band. Th e c ommunity forme d

by

th e

class

was

th e dominant force

in politics

as

it was

th e

basis

of th e

army

Two

of our main

sources

for

this period

Livy

an d Dionysius attributed

a

reform

of

Rome s

political social an d military organization to Servius

us traditionally 579-534 BC .

Th e reform

was

linked

to

hoplite warfare an d

e

archaeological record suggests

that hoplite

equipment

was

adopted

in the

century

th e

tradition may

be

broadly accurate. The

Servian

constitution

th e

population into classes

based

on an assessment of

their

property

each

s providing itself with a specified set

of

equipment - a full

hoplite

panoply for

s I

to

jus t a sling for Class

This

system

provided the

basis of

th e omiti

th e voting assembly at which t he p eop le elected consuls an d declared

until

th e

en d

of th e

Republic so ou r

sources may

have

been

attempting

to

struct the original reform

from their knowledge of t he l at er

political system.

Comitia Centuriata me t on th e Campus

Martius

th e

Plain

of

Mars

outside

boundary

of th e

city where th e a rm y h ad always

mustered

since citizens were

ed fro m carry in g w eap on s

inside

th e

Its structure exemplified th e

ideal

citizen militia

me n

voting an d fighting

t og et he r i n t he s am e

units. By

t he l at e

th e

centuries in

th e

assembly were

not of

a

standard

size

bu t

i t seems

that originally they ha d

consisted o f a bo ut

a hundred men. The presence

t hr ee d is ti nc t

types of heavy infantry

wa s

probably

influenced

by th e

that t he l ater manipular

legion

fought

i n t hree

lines.

It

is unlikely

that

degree of tactical sophistication

was

present at such

an

early

s ta ge i n th e

y s development. More

p ro ba bl y t he o ri gi na l

Servian

reform

wa s

much

an d th e main d is ti ncti on w as b et ween t ho se

able

to equip

themselves as

lites

an d t he mo re n um er ous r em ain de r w ho took th e

field

only

as

light

or servants. Th e former were known as th e classis the re ma inde r infra

Th e

original

classis probably

consisted

of

Class

I

po ss ib ly in f or ty

o f a ro un d

a

hundred men which might suggest that

sixth-century

could

potentially

muster

a phalanx of

four

thousand

men

a no t impossible

re given

th e

size of

th e

city suggested by th e archaeological evidence. At some

date

as

th e

city

g re w i n

size Classes

and III

were

able

to afford heavier

an d were admitted

to the phalanx their twenty centuries increasing

number of hoplites to six thousand. This reconstruction

remains conjectural.

E REPUBLIC

expulsion

of th e

kings

fro m Rome

may well have

been

part of

a

wider

series

an d

social upheavals

that

occurred throughout late

sixth-century.

an d Etruria. A t the battle of

Lake

Regillus 496 BC t he a rm y of th e

g Republic faced a

Latin

army

traditionally including the supporters of th e



ROM N W RF RE

Many o f the heroic tales

of

Rome s early history

recorded in

Livy

ma y have

their origins in the ballads

composed

to celebrate the

deeds

o f

the

old

aristocratic

families

These stories are

often highly dramatic

an d

unsurprisingly offered rich

material for Renaissance

art. This sixteenth century

painting depicts the duel

fought between champions

of

Rome

and Alba

Longa.

Each side fielded three

brothers bu t things initially

went badly for

th e

Romans

when tw o

o f

the three

Horiatii brothers were

killed by the

Alban

Curiatii.

However

the survivor

oratius retreated until his

three wounded opponents

ha d

split

u p a nd t he n

slew

each in turn. Returning to

Rome in triumph the

Roman champion

fell into a

rage

when

his ow n sister

wh o was betrothed to one

of

the

Curiatii refused to

celebrate his triumph.

oratius horrified his

fellow citizens by angrily

killingthe

girl.

°



E RLY ROME ND THE O QUEST OF IT LY



ROM N W RF R

his fifth century Italian

bronze depicts a warrior

holding a round hoplite

shield. He wears a crested

helmet

may

have greaves

and carries two spears one

apparently with a larger

head than the other. Greek

hoplites in the Classical

period only carried a single

spear

and used i t for

thrusting rather than

throwing. hecarrying

of

more than one spear implies

that at least one was

intended to be

thrown

here much evidence

from Italy to suggest

that

warfare did

not

solely

consist

of

phalanx battles

fought at

close quarters

even after the introduction

of

hoplite equipment.



EARLY R OM E A ND TH E CONQUEST

OF ITALY

Tarquins

Livy

d Dionysius

both

considered

to

have been a battle between

although their accounts

e a distinctly heroic

q u l i t ~

The

Republic possessed a

hoplite

lanx and

did

fight

pitched

battles

t no t all its wars conformed to the rigid

of hoplite warfare in contemporary

The Roman cavalry seems to have

ed a

greater

role

than was the

case

th most Greek armies

although

on

least some occasions horsemen may

dismounted and joined the

Our sources

depict most of

campaigns be tween Rome and

neighbours

as little

more

than

such frequent raiding

anathema

to the hoplite

In

479

BC

Rome was

ed by small scale raiding

neighbouring

Veii.

The

of

the Fabii led by one

of their

number who was

the

consul in that year

the Senate and

offered

to wage the war against Veii as a private

prosecuted solely by themselves their retainers and dependants

themselves on the borders the 306 Fabii patrolled against Etruscan

and

in turn raided the

e n e m ~ They were ambushed and

wiped

ou t while

on

ttle raid only

one

Fabius surviving to

carry

on

the

family

name

If

the

episode

genuine

and it

is

possible

that

it was invented

by

l ater Roman writers

to

ide a heroic

incident

mirroring the

last

stand of the three hundred Spartans

Leonidas in

480

BC

then it appears

to

have more

in

common with the

of

the

aristocratic

warrior

bands

which

it is

thought

the hopli te

had superseded

However

the

lands of the Fabii

do appear to

have

situated on the

border with

Veii and i t may be signi fi cant that the Fabii

pear from the Fasti the official lists of magistrates

for

the

following

lve years.

A striking feature of this

incident

and many other

campaigns was the central

of

the acquisi tion

of

b o o t ~

This

seems

to

have

been

a

major

for Roman

soldiers

and disputes over

the distribution of

the spoils

re a common cause of dissent in the Many of

the

earliest recorded

This statuette ofa naked

warrior

wearing a pattern

of

helmet associated

with

the Villanovan culture of

northern and central Italy in

the ninth to seventh

centuries C he tall central

plate was probably intended

to a dd to the

w e r e r ~

s

apparent height andm ke

him

more intimidating to

opponents Extant examples

of such helmets are heavily

decorated with

m ny

rows

of

small bosses



ROMAN WARFARE

treaties between Rome and other states included

clauses precisely

detailing the

entitlement to spoils

in

any conflict

Rome

possessed a

phalanx in

the

sixth an d

fifth centuries

BC

but most of her

military

activity consisted

of raiding or

reacting to enemy raids types

of

fighting

for which a

phalanx

was completely unsuited Conflict between Rome and her

neighbours

varied in scale

from

minor

theft

or

destruction of

property

to

a full-

scale pitched battle when

two

phalanxes confronted each other Warfare might be

waged by the whole

populace under

arms led by the elected

magistrates of the

state

or

just

by

individual

clans

or

families following

their

allegiance

to

the

r i s t o r ~

Rome

possessed

a college

of priests known

as the

f ti l s

who

34



EARLY R OM E A ND

T H E C ON Q UE ST OF ITALY

oversaw

th e

justice

of i ~ p u t e s with

gro ups

o ut si de t he community: When

these

had decided

that a neighbour had committed

such

great .

offences against

Rome t hat

war

was

necessary a

representative

of

th e

colleg.e

w o ul d e nt er enemy

territory

an d

present

a list

of

grievances which

if

redress

was not

m ad e w it hi n thirty days would

r es ult i n

the de cla ra tion of war. If the enemy

failed to

make satisfactory recompense

then

wa r

w as f or ma ll y d ec la re d

by

th e

ritual of a fetial

hurling

a

spear into enemy

territory:

This

process

ha s

been

t ak en t o

signify

that t he R om an s ha d

a

very clear

idea

of the distinction

between

a state

of wa r an d

peace w i th t he ir n ei gh bo ur s

bu t

it

ma y

have more

to

do

with d ifferent t yp es of

hostility:

The

fetials

an d

th e

other similar

priestly

colleges

in

Latin and

Etruscan cities

seem to have

regulated

th e scale an d limits of war

between

t he ir c om mu ni ti es

deciding

when

provocation required a response a nd w h at

th e

size

of that

response

should be

and

c ontrolling the

escalation of

conflict

from private to state

level.

Anthropologists studying the warfare

of

primitive

peoples

in

more

r ec en t t im es

have

discovered

similar patterns where

distinct levels

of

fighting f ro m r it ua li ze d duelling through

raiding to

full-scale

battles oc cur de pe nding on

t he s it ua ti on . I t is i m po rt an t t o r em em be r h o w

sma ll sca le a ll of

Rome s military

activity

was in

this

period.

Her

own te rritorie s

and population

were no t

large and

th e

neighbours w hi ch she

raided

an d

was in

turn

raided

by

on

such

a

regular

basis were often less than a d ay s journey

It

is sobering to re me mbe r

that

th e city of Veii with

which

Rome fought

series of

wars

spanning a cen tu ry

was

situated

not

much more than

away:

Veii was

captured

in

396

after

a

long

siege

th e

first

time that t he Ro man s

paid

their

citizen soldiers. Veii s territory

was

annexed an d much of th e land

tled by Roman citizens. The warfare of th e late fifth an d fourth

centuries

increasingly bitter

an d t he c on se qu en ce s f or

th e

losers

much more

The

peoples

of

th e coastal plain were

under

great pressure from th e

population

of th e

Sabellian

tribes

of

th e A penn in es . In th e

420s

ese invaders

swept

through

th e

fertile

Campanian Plain

taking

C ap ua a nd

Th e Gallic sack

o f Rome

in

390 had

little long term

effect on the i t y ~ s growth

but lef t a deep scar on the

Roman

psyche. Later

tradition claimed

that

a

band

of defenders

had

held

out on

the Capitol

managing to repulse a Gallic

night attack when they were

woken

by

the

cackling of

the geese kept in u o ~ s

Temple However even in

this version

of

events the

Romans

were

still forced to

pay

a

heavy

ransom in gold

to

make

the Gauls go away

and the tale of the geese was

most

likely an invention to

add

~ o m e

heroic

e ~ e m e n t

to

an otherwise humiliating

episode.

35



ROMAN

WARFARE

A bronze figurine

of

a

Samnite warrior who for

over a century fought

Rome, winning several

victories notably at the

Caudine Forks Though the

spear and shield are missing

both

the

w r r i o r ~

s helmet

and

disc cuirass are matched

by almost identical

examples from

3

6

Cumae. Further south another Sabellian people the

Lucanians drove i nt o t he

territories

of th e G reek coastal

cities, while

th e Samnites established

themselves in

central

G allic tribes pushed down from the north putting

particular pressure on

th e

northern

Etruscan cities. In

390

a raiding band of

Gauls

perhaps on

their

way to seek

mercenary service

in southern

Italy or Sicily, routed a

R om an a rm y on

t he b an ks

of th e

River Allia

outside

Rome.

The

Gauls sacked Rome forcing th e few defenders of th e

Capitol to bu y

their safety

with

a

colossal bribe of

gold.

W he n t he R om an s c om pl ai ne d that

t he G au ls

were using

crooked

weighing

scales

to enlarge

th e

agr eed sum the

Gallic leader

threw

his sword on

t o t he

scales with th e stern

words

ae Victis ,

W oe

to

th e defeated

This

is just on e

of

t he m yt hs

that grew

up

surrounding

th e Gallic sack.

Others

tales did mor e to salve Rome s

pride

such as th e

story of

th e

sacred

geese

of Juno Sospita w hose

cackling

warned

th e

defenders

of

th e

Capitol

of a Gallic att ack and

allowed

t hem to

defeat it , or th e exiled general Camillus

wh o

returned at th e eleventh hour to

crush

th e raiders just

as they were receiving their gold. In p ract ical t erms

th e

damage inflicted by

the G auls

was relatively small an d

soon

repaired, since they do no t seem to have stayed in the city for

any length of

time or

carried ou t an y systematic

destruction. However,

th e

trauma

of

th e

G allic sack le ft a

legacy of fear

a nd h atr ed o f

th e

northern

barbarians and

may i n

th e

s h or t t er m

have

increased

t he Ro mans sense

of

vulnerability:

The story of Rome s

early history is on e

of

steady, if

often slow, growth i n p ow er an d size. Th e earliest myths of

Rome s history

show

a willingness t o a bs or b outsiders

into

th e community, an at ti tu de quite unlike

that

of most Greek

city

st ate s w ho

were

highly jealous of th e

privileges

of

citizenship. Slaves,

most of whom at this period

were

wa r

captives, received full citizen rights

when

they gained

their

freedom. Some entire

Latin communities

were ab so rbed i n to

th e citizen body, while others received

mo re l imit ed rights of commerce with Roman citizens

without

gaining th e full

franchise. This produced a

steady

increase in th e available citizen manpower_and

fostered military success. Defeated enemy communities were turned

into

allies

wh o provided t ro op s t o serve R om e i n future campaigns. In some cases conquered

territory wa s

settled

with colonies composed of both

Romans

an d

Latins,

establishing cities which

no t

only helped

to

defend

gains,

bu t

also provided

an

additional source of

military

manpower

for th e

future. In this

way,

an d

also



EARLY

R OM E A ND

T H E C O NQ U ES T

OF

ITALY

receiving a p or ti o n o f th e spoils

Rome s

allies shared

in

he r successes.

were no t e qu al p ar tn e rs b u t no r

we re th ey e ntir el y

unwilling. Latin

agai ns t Rome b ecame less an d less c om m on a nd seldom united more

a few communities. The

last

serious revolt occurred

in

th e 340s BC bu t

only

proportion

of

t he L at in

cities

took

part

an d

by t hi s

t ime Rome

ha d

become

so

that

he r eventual success was never in

doubt.

The steady growth

i n R om e s

military manpower gave h er g re at advantages

other

peoples

so that a s iz ea bl e f iel d a rm y n ee de d to consist of only a

of th e

available citizen manpower. Such an a rm y

could

afford to stay

th e field for a longer period without this causing catastrophic damage

to

th e

economy an d bringing on

famine.

This and th e

ability

to accept

losses than they ha d previously permitted Roman

warfare

to

become both

determined

an d more

decisive.

It also

began to

change

the army into

more sophisticated

than

a

simple

citizen militia.

The

word

legio

or

meant levy an d seems at first to have

been

a name for th e

entire

of th e

Roman people. At

some

stage

th e

single levy of six thousand heavy

was divided i nt o t wo separate legions presumably of half this size. This

ang e may have b een

associated

with th e fall of th e monarchy

providing each

of

e

two

annually elected consuls

of

th e Republic w it h a n army.

It

is doubtful that

e

full levy

w as cal led

out fo r most of th e

s ma ll r ai ds w hi ch

still f or me d t he

part of warfare.

Th e Republic also experimented w it h o th e r colleges of

senior

magistrates.

In

veral years

between three

an d

si x

tribunes

with

consular powers

were

elected

of th e consuls. This reform was primarily caused by the political disputes

th e

patrician

aristocracy an d th e increasingly wealthy plebeians wh o

th e rest of th e citizen b od y

bu t may also

have reflect ed a military

to fi eld a number of

smaller

forces instead of tw o

l ar ge a rm ie s. I n

of particularly fierce political dissension

or

military crisis a dictator wa s

exercising

supreme

authority for th e six-month duration of his office.

was a more effective method of f ie ld in g a si ng le c om b in ed a rm y than

tw o consuls

w it h e qu al

a ut ho ri ty t o

work

together. One

of

Rome s

cherished stories was

that of

Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus the

senator

f rom th e

p lo ug h t o

become

dictator an d save th e city when t he a rm y ha d

surrounded

an d

trapped by th e

Aequi.

Cincinnatus

raised another

levy

e fe at ed t he Ae qui

an d

rescued th e army r et ur ne d t o Rome to celebrate a

umph a nd resigned t he d ictat orsh ip after fifteen days t o r et urn to working his

It

was

th e

classic example of selfless

devotion to

th e

s ta te . I t

is a striking

of

the importa nce of

th e

heavy infantry

hoplites

that a

dictator wa s

t allowed

to

lead his

army

on h or se ba ck . H is

subordinate

th e m gister

or Master of Horse led th e cavalry while the dicta tor stayed w it h t he

n phalanx.

Th e

organization of the legions

started to

b ec om e m or e f or ma l i n t he s ec on d

of

th e

fourth century BC as wars tended to

consist

less often of raiding an d

37



ROMAN

WARFARE

rundi ie

l rentum

rium

1

5

miles

Tarentinus

so

km

J

r

o

I

6

q

<:

e

Tyrrhenian

... p

Cl - Sw N

\ = j

Rome in the late Republic

CD TemplumJovi Capitolini

o Comitium with Curia Hostilia

o

Basilica Aemilia

8

Tabularium

o

BasilicaJulia

e

Roman conquest o Italy

265 BC

Roman

territory in 298 BC

Cl

Samnite

League 298 BC

annexed

by Rome 263 BC

38

Roman

colonies

by 272 BC

under Roman

control

by 270 BC

I

Carthaginian possessions

260 BC

r

~ - - - - -

/

\

\

Co{st Ca

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

\

J

3

8



EARLY

R OM E A ND

T H E C ON QU E ST OF

ITALY

easingly frequently of larger

operations. Each

legion was commanded by si x

litary tribunes, elected by th e

people after

311 BC .

From

at lea st this date there

normally four

legions raise d in e ac h year, so that

th e

standard

consular

army

of tw o legions. Its internal organization

became

more important

an d

e c ru de t ac ti cs

of

th e

phalanx

were

replaced

by

t he mo re

flexible

manipular

th e

legion deploying

in

three lines

instead of one,

each

line

consisting of

independent units,

maniples

of tw o centuries. The

manipular

legion will

discussed

in detail in

t he n ex t

chapter.

Its

introduction ma y

well have

been

through

experience, fighting

in t he rough terrain

of

the Apennines

during

three

great Samnite wars 343-290 BC .

The conflict with

t he Samn it e confederation w as Rome s last grea t struggle

a n I ta li an o pp o ne nt .

In

321 BC th e Samnites inflicted a disaster on th e

t o r an k alongside

th e

Allia rout,

when

a R om an a rm y surrendered at th e

Forks.

Th e

Romans suffered the humiliation

of

being forced

to

walk

a yoke of spears, an

act symbolizing their

loss

of

warrior

status. This

feat was to be

th e last in

which

Rome accepted unfavourable peace terms an d

th e

loss of a war.

It

was five yea rs before she renewed

th e

struggle.

295 BC

th e

Romans achieved a

g reat v icto ry w hen

both

consuls

took th e field

a combined force of

four

legions.

During

th e b att le o ne of th e

consuls,

Decius

M us , m ad e a

formal

devotio

pledging

to sacrifice both

himself

d the

enemy armies to

M o th e r E ar th a nd t he g od s of t he U nd erw o rl d i n

return

r victory, before

plunging to

his

death

in

t he t hi ck of th e

I t wa s

an

action

father

s said

to

have

performed in battle against th e Latin

rebels

at

Veseris

in

BC . The behaviour of t he R o ma n a ri st oc ra cy still

showed

some

traces

of

mitive heroic culture.

y t he b eg in ni ng of th e

t hi rd c en tu ry

BC Rome was without

doubt

th e

ongest power in As

Rome

had developed

from

small settlements

to

a

great

ity posse ssing a large c itiz en population an d controlling a l ar ge t erri tor y, s o i ts

had changed from the ritual battles an d

minor

depredations

of

warrior

bands into th e

larger scale,

more concerted campaigns of

an

organized,

p ai d a nd

controlled

by

t he s tate. These armies

were

capable of

rcing states

to become permanent subordinate

allies

of

Rome

or, alternatively,

destroying

them.

Roman warfare

was capable of inflicting

fa r

m or e p er ma ne nt d am ag e o n a n

bu t while

it

ha d

become

more

destructive

we should never

ignore

th e

nature of Roman

war

making.

Rome s allies were

tied

to

he r

by very

bonds

an d

if he r r ule w as no t entirely benevolent, nor w as i t e nt ir el y

th e allies also benefiting f ro m f ut ur e successful

wars.

Each

was

tied

to

Rome

than to

each o th er. Th e

cohesiveness of t he n et wo rk of allies

by

Rome

around herself was to be demonstrated by

th e

succession of

conflicts

fought against

foreign powers

in the third c entury

BC .

Despite the

h eav y l os ses s uf fe re d by

Rome,

v ery f ew of he r allies

responded

to her

blandishments

an d defected.

T H E RO M A N CONQUEST

OF ITALY

Rome ha d gradually grown

in size from its earliest

history absorbing other

peoples into the population

bu t i t was only in the second

half of the fourth century

that her expansion began in

earnest

Then in less than a

hundred

years the

Romans

defeated the Samnites

Etruscans the Gallic tribes

south of the Po and finally

the peoples of southern

Italy Defeats were suffered

in all

of

these conflicts

but

the Romans always

persevered an d renewed the

struggle until they achieved

victory Some land was

confiscated from the

defeated peoples

and

used to

establish colonies

of

Roman

an d

Latin citizens which

acted as garrisons in each

area However in most

cases the conquered states

were absorbed into

Rome s

network o f allies

and

in

their turn provided soldiers

to f ight in Rome s next

round of conquests

39



H PTER

TWO

~ ~ : ~ : = = : ~

@ : . ~ : = = ~ : l I - . - - - - -

THE

W RS

WITH

RTH GE

ND THE

HELLENISTI

KINGDOMS

THIS

PL TE FROM

MP NI is decorated with a picture of a war

elephant followed by a calf and

may show

one of the animals

brought by King Pyrrhus of Epirus when he fought against

Rome on

. behalf

of

the city for Tarentum. This was the first t ime that the

Romans had faced war elephants and the animals played a major

part in Pyrrhus victories. However they were liable to panic

stampeding in all directions and often caused as much damage to

their ow n side as the enemy. This animal is clearly an Indian

elephant and is crewed by a

mahout

or driver and two javelinmen in

the tower carried on the animals back. Notice the goad carried by

the mahout who in some cases was

equipped

with a hammer and a

chisel-like blade wnich he was supposed to drive into the animal s

spine if it began to panic. Hasdrubal the brother of annibalwas

credited with the invention of this device.



R O M A N WARFARE

T

W A R S W I T H C A R T H A G E

A N D T H E HELLENISTIC K I N G D O M S

N

281

BC

TH

GR K

city

of

Tarentum

in

southern

Italy called

on

King Pyrrhus

of Epirus for assistance in its w ar w it h Rome. Pyrrhus was th e greatest soldier

of his day raised in

th e

hard school of

th e

decades of

warfare

which followed the

death of A lexand er t he G reat an d

th e

break-up of his short lived empire. He was

something

of a scientific soldier

producing

several works

of

military theory

bu t

in battle he led as

Alexander

ha d

done

charging

spear

in h an d a t

t he h ead

of his

elite cavalry.

When he

landed

i n I ta ly P yr rh us

brought with

him an army of

well-trained

professional

soldiers

pikemen

an d heavy cavalry

supported

by

war

elephants.

At first

things seemed

to go well b ut t he battles

Pyrrhus

wo n

were

at

t he p ri ce

of

heavy

casualties among

his soldiers

coi ni ng t he t erm

pyrrhic victory for

an y

success b ou gh t a t t oo high a price. Despite these

disasters

t he Ro mans formed

another

army

to

continue the

struggle

an d

finally wo n a

great victory

in 275

BC .

Th e Romans ha d faced a professional a rm y u nd er th e greatest

general

alive

an d e me rg ed v ic to ri ou s. W it hi n t he

space

of

a

century

Rome came

to d om inate

th e Mediterranean

world

winning

tw o

massive struggles with

th e Carthaginian Empire

an d

then shattering

the armies

of

the great kingdoms

of

th e

Hellenistic East. Th e Greek

historian

Polybius

wrote a

d et ai le d h is to ry t ry in g t o e xp la in ho w

this previously little-regarded

Italian city

ha d

so

suddenly

an d

dramatically burst on to th e

world

stage. For Polybius

tw o

factors

above all else were funda mental to

Rome s

success. The first was

her

well balanced political constitution which gave

h er t he

internal

stability that

all

Greek

city

states ha d tended to

lack.

The

second

was

he r fine military system a n i ns ti tu ti on that we ca n at last

describe with some confidence.

AW R L PH NT

The largest elephants used

by ancient armies were of

the Indian breed, since of

the Afr ican type, only the

smaller, forest elephants

responded to training. There

some

uncertainty

whether

the African breed, used by

the Carthaginians

and

Ptolemies, were

equipped

with a tower, although

Polybius account of

aphia

implies

that

they were.

4

2

T H E

R O M A N

ARMY

IN THE

MID

REPUBLIC

Th e

basic

unit of th e

R om an a rm y

wa s t he

legion which

wa s composed of

five

elements:

cavalry

light

infantry and

three

types of heavy infantry. The

most

prestigious were th e cavalry or

equites

recruited from

the

wealthiest citizens able

to afford a

horse

an d its trappings. Many

young aristocrats began their

political

career by making a name for themselves in

th e

cavalry.

They

were

equipped with

a

round

shield

helmet an d body

a rm ou r a nd a rm ed w it h a

sword

an d

on e

or

several javelins. Roman cavalry were

enthusiastic

an d brave bu t

better

at

making

a

charge on t he b at tl ef ie ld than patrolling or scouting.

The

most

serious

weakness of

th e

Roman cavalry wa s

that

there were no t very

many of

them. Each

legion

had o nl y t hr ee

hundred

horsemen

divided

into te n troops turmae) of

thirty

each commanded by three decurions.



TH E

W RS

WITH

C RT H G E N D

THE HELLENISTIC KINGDOMS

The

heavy infantry like

the hopli te

phalanx

was

composed

of

all

those

tizens able to afford

the

panoply. Unlike

the phalanx they fought in three

lines membership of which was

determined not

by wealth but by age

d experience. The

youngest

soldiers

or

hastati formed the front line. Behind

came

the

principes men in

their

late twenties or

early thirties

the

age

idered by

the Romans to

be

the prime of

life

and

in

the rear

were

the older

triarii.

All wore a bronze

helmet and carried

a long semi cylindrical

shield constructed of plywood and covered with calfskin to give it an

mixture

of flexibility

and

resilience. The

wealthier

men

wore

a mail

or

le cuirass

but

some

made do with

a simple

bronze plate strapped

in place over

chest.

All

Roman infantrymen

were first

and foremost swordsmen and

by

the last

These

Roman

soldiers

on

the

first-century altar o f

Domitius

henobarbus

probably give a

good

indication of legionaries

uniform

in the late third and

second

centuries C for the

frieze seems to depict a

historical scene. Both wear

mail armour slightly different

bronze helmets

and

carry

long oval shields. The

man

on

the right clearly has a

pugio dagger on his left hip.



ROMAN WARFARE

t

nl

quarter of the thi rd century at the latest,

this

sword was the famous gladius

hispaniensis or

Spanish sword.

With

a

blade

less than 60 centimetres

feet long,

the gladius was well

balanced

for both cutting and

thrusting,

and its

manufacture

from high-quality steel allowed it

to

preserve a wickedly

sharp

edge.

The

triarii

carried

a

long hopli te

spear,

but the other

lines

already used the

pilurn,

the

weapon which, with the g l d i u s ~ was to be the trademark

of

the Roman l e g i o n r ~

The

pilurn

had a wooden

shaft

about 120 centimetres

feet in length,

topped

by

a 60-90-centimetre

2-3-foot

narrow

iron

shank

leading

to

a short pyramidal

point,

which

with

all the weight of the

weapon

beh ind it

was

designed for

maximum armour penetration. The

long

narrow shank gave it

the

reach to cause

a

wound

after punching

through

a shield.

The

barbed

point

made it difficult to

withdraw from a shield, so that the

enemy was

forced to drop it. Modern

experiments

with

reconstructed pila have suggested a maximum

range

of about

30 metres

100 feet ,

bu t

an

effective

range

of about

half that.

Polybius tells us

that each

man

carried two pila, one significantly heavier than

the

other,

but

i t has

proved difficult

to

categorize the archaeological

remains

so p r e i s e l ~

Each

of

the three

lines was divided into

ten

maniples,

those

of

the

hastati

and

principes consisting of 120

to

160 men apiece, whereas the less numerous triarii

formed maniples

of s ixty men. In

battle formation, the triplex acies,

or maniples,

were deployed in a chequerboard or quincunx, the units

of

principes covering the

T PILUM

The heavy javelin or pilum

was the classic

weapon of

the

Roman

legionary for

over five centuries.

ll

the

weight

of

the

weapon

was

concentrated

behind

the

small, pyramid-shaped point,

giving

it

tremendous

penetrative power, although

this was

augmented

above

right in a later first-century

variation

by

the addition

of a round lead weight. The

iron head was designed

variously to bend or

break

on

impact,

making

it impossible

for the pilum to be thrown

back by

the enemy.

nother scene from the

henobarbus

altar

shows

a

senior officer,

most

probably

a military tribune.

e

has a

muscled cuirass

and

two

rows

of

fringed p t e r u g ~ s as

decoration over his tunic.

44



TH E WARS WITH

CARTHAGE

AN D TH E H E L L E NI S T IC K I N G DO M S

PUGIO

The Roman dagger or pugio

was issued to legionaries

during the Republic and

early empire

bu t

seems to

have fallen

ou t

of

common

use during the second

century AD I t was worn on

the left hip its scabbard

either suspended from the

sword belt

or

when two

crossing belts were

worn

on

a separate one. A few

of

these blades are as long as

35 cm although most are

nearer

cm. Their

scabbards were

often

highly

decorated

and

were perhaps

private purchases.

SPATHA

The

Roman

cavalry

of

the

Principate were issued with

the longer

spatha.

Its design

was similar to the Pompeii

type gladius but

the blades

typically measured about

60 90

cm in length

and

3 4.5

cm in width. During

the third and fourth

centuries the spatha appears

to have been adopted by

most

if

no t

all

Roman

infantrymen.

P O M P E U TYPE GLADIUS

The parallel-edged gladius

gradually replaced the

earlier type during the

course

o f

the later first

century

AD

Blades vary in

length from 42 50 cm

and

in

width

from

4.2-5.5

cm.

This was a well-balanced

weapon as capable of

delivering a cut as a thrust.

But i t

was less the quality

of

their swords than their

quantity that

gave the

main

advantage to the Romans. In

Spanish or Gallic armies

only the chieftains

could

afford blades

o f

the quality

issued to every legionary.

M AINZ TYPE GLADIUS

gaps

between

th e

maniples of hastati

while th e

intervals

i n t he ir

ow n

l in e were

covered by th e

maniples of

th e triarii.

The

triarii provided the legion s ultimate

reserve

an d

s pe nt m os t

of

a battle waiting

at

th e rear k ne el in g b eh i nd t he ir

shields with

their

spears b raced against the ground. They o nly b ecame involved

if the

battle

was

particularly hard

fought

and t he R o ma n

proverb

I t s d ow n t o

th e triarii wa s u se d to describe

any desperate

situation. Th e maniple of tw o

centuries was

th e

lowest independent sub-unit

of

th e legion

bu t each

century still

carried its own standard

or

signum

an d

wa s led by a centurion.

Each

centurion

was backed up by two subordinates the signifer or standard-bearer

an d

th e

second-in-command

or

optio

wh o

s to od b eh in d t he r ea r r an k a nd k ep t t he m en

in formation. At least at

th e

beginning

of

this period

centurions

were elected by

the legions but

appointed their

subordinates. Th e senior

centurion

stood on th e

right

of th e

maniple.

Th e last element

of

th e

legion wa s

t he l ig ht

infantry

or

velites.

There

were

normally 1 200 of these

armed

with a small

round

shield a bundle

of

light

javelins

and

at

least by th e early second century a gladius. They were

recruited

from

th e

poorer citizens

in

t he s ta te an d also those of th e

higher

property

qualification

wh o were

no t

yet considered

ol d e no ug h t o join th e hastati.

The

velites do not seem to

have

b een d iv id ed into

a ny f or ma l u ni ts

and

f ou gh t i n

support

of

either

th e

heavy infantry or th e cavalry depending

on th e

situation.

This

s

the earlier form

of

the gladius hispaniensis the

sidearm

of

the Roman

legionary from the time o f

the Punic Wars. The blades

of surviving examples vary

from 40-50.5 cm in length

and have a width of

4.8 6

cm. The long tapering

point

varies in size from

9.6 20 cm

and was designed to

puncture armour. A few

longer Roman swords have

been found dating to the

second and first centuries

BC

but it s likely that these

were used by cavalrymen or

mounted officers.

45



3V



TH E

WARS WITH C AR T HA G E A ND TH E H E L L EN I S TI C K I N G DO M S

This

gave

th e Polybian

legion

a total of

4,200

infantry

and 300 c a v a l r ~ In

of

particular crisis

th e

number

of

infantry might be increased to .but

is was done without ever

varying

th e

number

of triarii. The

sixty

centurions

d t hi rt y

decurions

were overseen by six military

tribunes

tw o of whom

held

command

of

the

legion

at

anyone

time.

Th e tribunes

were elected, usually

o m y ou ng aristocrats in th e earliest stages

of a

political

career. A

co ns ul w as

given

a n a rm y of tw o

legions,

bu t

in

times

of

crisis this was increased

to

In

a dd it io n t o th e Roman legions, each a r my i nc lu de d a

similarly

sized

of allies. About

4-5,000 infantry

an d

900

cavalry

formed

an

ala

which

commanded by officers known as prefects

wh o

were invariably

R om an s. I n

a

consular

army

formed

with

the two alae on either

side of a

centre

of the

Roman

legions, so

that

they were usually referred

to

as

t he L eft

d Right alae. A special body of troops

th e

extraordinarii was detached from

an d placed

at

th e immediate disposal

of

th e consul.

Often

used

as

shock

in

an

advance these

formed t he v an gu ard

while in a

retreat they

brought

the rear.

Th e Roman army

in this

period

was a

curious mixture of

a citizen militia

an d

professional

force. In many ways it ha d much in c om m on w it h the c onsc ript

r ai se d in

E ur op e af ter th e French

Revolution.

All citizens

possessing

above a set level were eligible for service. They served for

th e

duration

of

conflict an d

then returned

to civilian life;

they

were obliged to serve

t he s ta te i n

is way for

up to sixteen campaigns. While enrolled in th e

army, citizens

were

an d

fed by

th e state an d

agreed

to subject

themselves

to

a very

harsh system

discipline,

binding

themselves at a

formal

parade by taking th e

solemn military

the

sacramentum

to

o be y t he

consuls. This discipline no t

only dealt

with

behaviour in battle bu t regulated

every

aspect

of

their

service life. Serious

imes, such as neglect

of guard

duty,

the ft from c omrade s or homosexual

acts,

ere punishable by death with lesser misdemeanours

resulting

in a flogging. I f a

unit

disgraced itself

i n b att le

it

was

liable to

decimation

th e

execution of

e

ma n in ten. The survivors lived on

in public

disgrace, forced t o c am p

outside

e

defences of

th e

m ai n c am p

an d

fed

on

barley,

not wheat.

All

t he m an y

legal

fences a

Roman

citizen possessed

ag ai n st t he arbitrary

exercise

of

power

by a

strate in

peacetime

he

lost

on

entering the r ~ M an y o f the institutions of

e l at er

professional army

already existed

by th e second centuty BC at th e very

Th e

army s

discipline was reflected

in

on e of its most

famous

practices,

th e

of

a

marching

camp

at

th e

en d of e ac h da y s m ar ch . P ol ybi us

at

g reat l en gt h t he p ro ced ure

for

marking

out

t he camp

always

built

to

t dimensions with a uniform plan of roads an d tent lines so t ~ a t it resembled

an

c i t ~ On e story claimed that

Pyrrhus

first realized that

he

was not facing

barbarians when

he saw a R om an a rm y c am pe d for

th e

night.

The draconian

discipline

fo rmed o nl y

part

of

th e picture.

The

soldiers were

from the sam e

citizen

body

that

elected

t he a rm y s

commanders.

There

to

have

been

a

strong

sense

of shared

duty

to th e s tat e a mo ng b ot h

Legionaries on the march

from a first-century relief

found in the legionary

fortress at Mainz

On

the

right

astandard bearer

or

possibly

the

centurion

s

second

in command the

optio who carried as a

badge of rank a staff

hastile topped by an

ornamental

knob. The shaft

of

this

hastile

was used to

dress the ranks

of

a

formation

and in battle

when the

optio

stood behind

the rear rank

of

the century

to force men back into place

i f

they tried to run.



ROMAN WARFARE

This scene from the altar of

henobarbus

thought to

show a clerk preparing a list

of names either as a census

of oman citizens or as part

of the process of raising an

army Polybius describes the

levying of

the oman

legions occurring centrally a

tribune from each of the

four legions

formed

to

provide the consular armies

picking one man in turn

from

the crowd

of citizens

who

had

been ordered to

assemble However

it

is

uncertain

which

period this

passage describes

the

soldiers

and their commanders. The

ordinary

soldiers possessed a freedom

to

address

their commanders

which belied the

rigid

hierarchy

but

reflected

the

political

life of Rome Throughout

the

third century

there

is no evidence

for any widespread

a ttempts to

avoid military service

Military and

civilian

life overlapped for all classes Polybius was full of

praise

for

the encouragement

the Romans gave

to

their brave soldiers At the end of a campaign or

after

a

great

battle a parade

was

held by the

army at

which the

individuals who

had displayed conspicuous gallantry were decorated and

acclaimed

by

their

comrades. Decorations included

ornamental spears or

horse

trappings

while the

first man over the wall of an

enemy

fortress received a

gold

wreath

the

corona

muralis Highest of all

was

the corona civica the simple

laurel

crown awarded

for saving the life of

another

citizen

For

the rest of

their

lives

these men

were

allowed to wear their decorations during state festivals to

the

admiration

of

the

whole communit : For

the

aristocracy

such

acclaim

was

a

major

asset in a

political career

4

8



T H E

WARS

W I T H

C A RT H AG E A N D

T H E H E LL E NI ST I C K I NG D OM S

Th e strict Roman discipline an d

the institutions

of apparent

professionalism

no t conceal

th e

fact that

Roman

armies were impermanent and

of very

q u l i t ~

The

longer a n a rm y served t he m or e efficient it became. Some of

legions enrolled during th e

Punic

wars served

fo r

decades an d reached th e

hest state

of

e f f i i e n ~

A n ext reme

case

was th e tw o

legions

formed

.from

th e

of

th e

disaster a t C an na e in

216

BC

wh o

served throughout

th e

rest of

conflict an d

fought

with great distinction at Zama

in

202.

Some

of these me n

re still on active service in M a ce do ni a a n d awaiting

discharge

more

than

nty years

after

their

original

enlisting. Yet

once

a n a rm y

was discharged

it s

umulated experience disappeared. Individual soldiers were likely to serve in

e army again bu t they would no t do so

in

t he s am e units.

Therefore

each time a

army

was raised

th e

process of training and disciplining

it

began afresh.

t ho ug h each

levy

included me n with

prior

experience this facilitated

th e

ning process

bu t di d

no t

m ak e i t

u n n e e s s r ~

A wise

commander

took

great

t o p re pa re his army

fo r

battle training them an d gradually giving them

fidence by providing minor victories. Ha nnibal won his

greatest

victories over

an armies that were

under-prepared

for battle.

Th e

temporary

nature of each

army

meant

that t hey l acked a cadre of technical experts the

trained

wh o

provided

th e siege

e ngi ne er s i n H el le ni st ic a rm ie s. I f

th e

ns failed to

take

a fo rt if ied cit y by

surprise assault

or treachery

they

were

t skilled

at

prosecuting a formal siege an d usually ha d

to

rely on starving

th e

into

submission.

H E ARMY

IN BATTLE

manipular legion was designed for fighting pitched battles. Its organization

lowed it

only

one forma tion the tripl x

cies

with t he t hr ee lines of heavy

supporting

each o th er t o place maximum pressure on

an

enemy to

th e

When a Roman a rmy was close

to

th e enemy th e legions marched i n t hree

allel columns th e h st ti

on

th e left th e principes

in

th e

centre

an d

th e tri rii

th e

right. To

deploy

i nt o t he b at tl e f o rm a ti on

these

columns

wheeled to

th e

to f or m t he

tripl x

cies Each

maniple

had

to

be

positioned

carefully

in

to

its

neighbours in

its

ow n

an d

th e

other

tw o

lines

to

ensure

that

th e

front

was

properly an d uniformly supported. Even w he n t he army

had

mped o nl y

a few

kilometres

f ro m the

enemy

it still formed

itself into

three

an d

marched

to

w it hi n o ne an d

a

half kilometres or

less

of th e enemy

an d then

at

th e point which would f or m t he left of t h e army s p os it io n

to

th e

r ig ht a nd m ar ch ed a lo ng t he a rm y s i nt en de d f ro nt to fo rm th e

cies

It was a

time-consuming

process even

in

an

experienced an d

well-

led army the whole column having

to

stop an d wait as each mani pl e reach ed

appointed position an d closed up from marching f orm atio n into battle

before

it could

move

forward again. Deploying

a

Roman

army took

an d

required

constant

supervision

from

th e tribunes.

If th e

enemy

then th e ar my s d ep lo yme nt wa s c ov er ed by th e cavalry

perhaps

49



R OMAN WARFARE

supported

by

some

of

th e velites

or

extraordinarii.

More

often

tha n no t

th e

enemy

was

to o

busy

forming

his

o wn b at tl e

line

to po se mu ch of

a threat.

Hellenistic

an d

Carthaginian

armies

used a

similar

processional system

of

deployment to

the Romans forming the

army into

a

column with

each unit in the

order it would

take

in

the battle

line Since they normally massed their

infantry

in

a single deeper line

they

t en de d t o use a single column rather than

th e

Romans

three bu t

th e

process was equally

laborious.

Th e marching camp assisted in this process As

important

as

th e

formal an d

fixed positioning of th e tent lines were th e spaces between them containing paths

an d roadways Th e army

used

these

an d

th e intervallum the wide-open strip

of

land s ep ar at in g t he t en ts f ro m t he ramparts to

form

u p i nto

the columns

which

it

used

to deploy the position of t he t en t lines automatically placing th e maniples

in t he r ig ht order Each of th e three columns lef t via one of t he f ou r gates th e

cavalry often using the remaining exit If th e army

ha d

deployed into battle order

5°

H ST TUS

OR PRINCEPS

This reconstruction shows

a legionary from the first or

second line of a legion in

the third or second century

C He carries one of his

two

pila and has a gladius

at his belt. A poor man he

wears a bronze pectoral

instead of a mail shirt

a bronze montefortino

helmet and carries an

oval semi cylindrical

body

shield.

TRI RIUS

This veteran soldier from

the third line

of

the third-

century Clegion replaces

the pilum with a long spear.

He wears a mail shirt made

from linked rings a type of

armour which the Romans

probably copied from the

Gauls. It was flexible but

heavy and he wears a bel t to

relieve some of the burden

which otherwise rested

entirely on

his shoulders.

VELES

The light infantry

of

the

third to second century C

legion were recruited from

the poorer citizens and those

too young to join the

hastati. This man carries a

bundle of light javelins a

round shield and has a

gladius

at his belt.

Velites

wore pieces of animal skins

usually wolfskins over their

helmets allowing their

officers to recognize them.



TH E

WARS

W I T H

C AR TH AG E A ND

T H E H E LL E NI ST IC K IN G DO M S

t

no t

fought

then

it wa s able

to

retire

to the cam p

i n o rd er , e ac h

of

th e three

of

th e

army

beginning

with

th e triarii in

th e rear

forming

a column an d

back

to its tents

T he c he qu er bo ar d f or ma ti on

used

by th e

Roman

legions ha s often been

an d

few

scholars

have

been willing to

believe

that

th e maniples

fought

with

such wide gaps between them. If they

ha d done so then

no t

a

charging

enemy especially a mob of h o wl in g G aul s, have

swept

r ou gh t he ga ps

in

th e line of hastati outflanking each of th e maniples an d

them in

an

i ns tant ? It h as con vent io nall y b een assumed that, while th e

mans may have advanced with

th e m an ip le s in t he quincunx t hey fo rmed

an

l ine before they

reached the

n ~

Advancing

with intervals

between

a rm y s u ni ts

is more

obviously

intelligible Even on a

perfectly

flat parade

it very diff icul t for a unit

to

m ar ch i n a perfectly straight line

an d

an y

venness will

drastically

increase

the likelihood

of

veering

to one

side

or

th e

CENTURY AD

man wears an iron

ial Gallic helmet

and

e famous lorica segmenrara

armour

of soft

mpered iron plates

signed to absorb a blow.

t

all legionaries during the

incipate were issued with

s cuirass; harder to make

maintain than mail it

ve excellent protection was

and slightly lighter.

AUXILIARY INFANTRYMAN,

FIRST CENTURY AD

This

man

wears what

appears to have been the

most common uniform for

these units.

e

has a bronze

helmet probably a simpler

version of the current

legionary style a mail

cuirass gladius flat oval

shield and wields a javelin.

Such

men

fought in close

order in

much

the same

way

the legionaries.

LATE

ROMAN

INFANTRYMAN

This fourth century soldier

wears an Intercisa pattern

helmet

of

much cruder

manufacture than his earlier

predecessors. Scale

or

mail

armour was worn where

available. The spear was

sometimes

supplemented

by

darts plumbarae) fastened

in the

hollow

of

the shield.

The longer sparha was

now

worn on the left hip.



ROMAN WARFARE

AUXILIARY CAVALRYMAN

FIRST TO

SECOND

CENTURY AD

The non-citizen cavalry

regiments or alae of the

Principate were amongst the

most prestigious units in the

army. Highly trained and

disciplined they provided

the Imperial army with the

effective cavalry force which

its Republican predecessor

had often 1acked. The four

horned saddle can be seen

here. s

the rider sat down

his weight caused the horns

to close around and grip his

thighs allowing him to lean

to either side without losing

his seat. Cavalrymen wore

bronze or iron helmets

often completely covering

their ears to protect against

blows from the side in a

confused melee. They

usually wore scale or mail

armour and carried oval or

hexagonal shields.

52

r r 4 e .

. other. th.ere are no t significant

gaps

between

units

\ .: . ac:=;;;; advanCIng on a parallel course then they ru n th e

risk

of

colliding

with

each other disordering

b ot h a nd

maki ng i t

difficult

for

their

officers to control

them.

None of

our

ancient sources imply that th e quincunx

was

only

intended for approaching th e enemy an d that

t he g ap s

between th e maniples were filled just before contact. I n f ac t

for

the Romans to

have

halted an d changed formation

just in

front of th e

enemy

would

seem

a dangerous practice.

It

is

often

forgotten

that all of Rome s opponents must have ha d gaps

in

their ow n

lines to allow

these

to move. We a re

told

explicitly t ha t a t

Trebia an d

M ag ne si a t he C ar th ag in ia n a nd Seleucid

light

infantry

respectively were able

to

advance past f ig ht a

skirmish

in front of an d

then retire t hr o ug h t he

g ap s in their

ow n

main

infantry line. Polybius

tells us that

Pyrrhus mixed

clearly distinct units of his ow n pikemen an d

Tarentine

infantry

in the lines of th e m ai n

phalanx

while at Cannae

Hannibal s

front

line alternated

units of Spanish

an d Gallic infantry: The size of

these

units is unc le ar bu t Polybius

employs

on e of t he w or ds

he

a ls o uses for

maniple

an d which

was applied

by

later a uthors to th e

cohort

of th e

Principate.

This

m ak es i t

likely that we

are d eal in g

with detac hme nts of several hundred

men

an d

almost

certainly

less

than

a thousand. Th e smallest independent

unit

in

th e

Hellenistic

military manuals wa s th e

syntagma

of

256

men

which possessed

its own standard commander and musician. At

Magnesia

Antiochus left intervals

each

holding two elephants

between

t he t en 1 OOO-strong 32-rank deep blocks of

his phalanx.

Our sources

do not

suggest

that

t he R om an s u ni qu el y f or me d

a

battle line with

intervals in

it but

they

do

imply

that

the ga ps in

a Roman line

were wider than

was

normal.

One

reason why th e

quincunx

di d

not

risk disaster

was that the maniples of th e

line

behind

covered

th e

intervals in front. An e ne my

pa ssing through t he g ap s

between

th e hastati risked attack f ro m t he principes.

However

th e

whole

system

becomes

m uc h m or e

intelligible if it is c onside re d in

th e

light

of th e

nature

of

heavy

infantry combat.

Large-scale hand-to-hand combat

ha s

no t

been

a common feature of warfare

in

recent

centuries

an d

it

is

something that

is very hard for us

to

imagine. All

to o

often our mental

picture

of a c las h

between

sword- an d

spear-armed

lines owes

more to cinematic portrayals of spec ta cula r ba ttle scenes in w hi ch all

th e

pa rtic ipa nts rush

around fighting

frenzied

individual

due ls. In reality combat

seems to have

been

a lo t

more

tentative. Battles usually

lasted

for several

hours

an d t he b att le of P yd na i n 168 BC which

lasted

only an

hour

was considered an

exceptionally

brief

affair. Fo r

much of

this

tim e t he m ai n

lines

of

heavy

infantry

were in contact. Hand-to-hand

f ig ht in g w as

physica lly very

fatiguing

an d

emotionally stressful. Actual hand-to-hand fighting ca n

only

have lasted for very

short

periods an d

th e relatively

light casualties

suffered

in this stage of th e

fighting seem to

support

this.



TH E WARS WITH CARTHAGE AN D TH E

H E L LE N I ST I C K I N GD O M S

Polybius Roman

legionaries advanced

noisily yelling their

war

cries and

ging their wea pons a gainst the ir shields. Most other infantry advanced in a

ilar fashion

t he a im

being to intimidate th e

enemy

by looking a nd sounding

Ideally this persuaded

th e enemy

that

he ha d no chance of

success

d

pu t

hi m to

flight

long

before

th e tw o

lines met. Somewhere

within

metres

th e

enemy t he R om an s t hr ew t he ir

pila

and t he b ar r ag e of heavy missiles

casualties

a nd f ur th er

reduced

th e

enemy s confidence.

The Roman

ha d a horizontal hand-grip an d i t w as i mp os si bl e

for

a man to use it in

an d a t

th e

s am e t ime gr ip a

pilurn in

his left hand. Therefore each Roman

must have thrown both

of

his

pila

before

h e r ea ch ed

th e enemy. The

of these miss iles was s o s ho rt t h at a ma n di d not have time to

throw

tw o

an d t he n d ra w his

s wo rd i f

he

was advancing

i nt o c om b at . T hi s means that

many pila

were

thrown outside

effective

range

o r t ha t

th e Romans

usually

their

advance

or

halted within

metres

of

th e

enemy. Such a

pause in th e

is

no t as imp laus ib le as it may at first seem. Th e ai m of th e advance

was

intimidate

th e

enemy

in to an early flight.

If

neither side managed

to

gain a

moral advantage over th e other

then

e ac h m ay have lost confidence

d been

reluctant

to close

immediately

w it h t he enemy.

Whether

or

not

th er e w as an i ni ti al check

most

armies with

a cultural

of close combat seem

n or ma ll y t o

have r es um ed t he advance and

th e

e ne my i n

th e first wav e of t he b at tl e. In th e resulting combat th e

HELMET

of

the

commonest

d e s i g n s ~

this

nze helmet offered good

otection from a downward

t. The cheek pieces

ected the face

without

curing the soldier s eyes

e rs A Roman soldier

eded good vision and

hearing i f he

s to function

s

part of a

lined unit.

COOLUS HELMET

This bronze

h e l m e t ~

popular

during the first century

was used well into the first

century D The reinforcing

peak gave greater strength to

the helmet

f r o n t ~ while the

neckguard gave

some

defence

against glancing blows

hitting the shoulders.

Roman

mail cuirasses were reinforced

at the shoulders to provide

further protection.

IMPERIAL GALLIC HELMET

These well-made iron helmets

had

deeper

and

wider neck

guards than earlier o n e s ~

that

gave more protection against

downward

cuts. Later this

pattern was developed to

reinforce the helmet top

with

two

iron ridges crossing over

the centre of the a

pattern seen clearly

on

the

reliefs

on

Trajan s

Column

and

the

damklissi

Metopes.

INTERCISA HELMET

A common design in the

later third

and

fourth

c e n t u r i e s ~ the

bowls

of these

crudely

made

helmets were

composed

of several pieces

- in this case

two halves

joined in the centre.

lthough

such designs

offered poorer protection to

the wearer most of the

Romans

opponents in the

west had

no helmets

at

all.



R O M A N WARFARE

54

opposing f ro nt r an ks

hacked

t hr us t an d

stabbed

at

e ac h o th er th e

Romans

punching

at

t he e ne my

with

their shield bosses. W he n a n enemy was

knocked

down

or k il le d t he re w as a c ha nc e

to

step

into

his place

an d at tempt

to fig ht a way

into th e

enemy

formation.

More

often

than

no t

th e

ma n attempting t hi s was

himself killed, bu t if a few

men

m an ag ed t o w or k their way into th e enemy ranks

a nd b re ak

their

formation

t he n t he re wa s a real

chance that th e

enemy would

panic

an d flee. If

neither

sid e ach ieved this

after

a few minutes of fighting then

th e opposing lines drew back.

Separated

by

perhaps

as little as a few metres, th e

tw o lines then jeered an d glared at each other throwing any remaining missiles,

as

each at tempt ed t o build u p eno ug h energy

an d

confidence to step forward an d

renew

th e

struggle. Th e longer the

battle

went on th e

harder

i t b ec am e e ac h t im e

t o p ers uade

th e

line to close once mor e. Officers p layed a v ital role in urging on

their

m en t o sustain this effort. Centurions were elected f rom those with a record

for gallantry

an d

t he Ro man s

took

great

care

t o p rais e

an d r eward the soldiers

wh o

displayed individual boldness.

Compulsion

an d fear of

punishment

also ha d

a part to play in giving a unit th e s tamin a t o stay close to th e enem : Th e me n in

th e fron t rank t he o ne s wh o actually fought an d were in g reatest d an ger, ha d

to

stay

there

as

long

as

those in t he ran ks b eh in d

stayed in position since th e latter s

physical presence

made

escape impossible. A deeper formation gave a unit greater

staying power in combat by making it hard for most of t he m en to flee. So di d th e

presence

of optiones

the centurions senior subordinates behind

th e

rear rank

physically pushing

the m en b ac k

into

place.

The

longer

a

unit was

close

to

th e

enemy the

more

its formation an d cohesion dissolved. Me n increasingly followed

their instincts, th e bravest pushing to the front the most timid trying to slip away

to the rear, while t he majo rit y remai ned

somewhere

in th e middle. At a ny t im e

they

might

follow

t he examp le

of

t he t imid

an d th e

unit

dissolve

i nt o rou t

an d

this possibility

became greater

t he l on ger a u ni t d id

not

advance or seem

to

be

making progress.

Most

casualties

on

an ancient battlefield occurred when a unit

fled

from

combat. T h e ones

wh o

died first were those who were slowest in

turning

to

flee, so th e

men

in th e centre of a formation able

to

see little of

what

was going

on were always on th e verge of nervous panic.

Most

armies deployed with a sin gle main l ine, w hi ch as a r es ul t tended to be

deep an d

have great

staying

power

in

c om ba t. I n t he R om an

triplex ies more

than

half

of

the infantry

were

kept

in reserve an d were no t involved in th e initial

combat. Instead the

r ea r t wo

lines advanced in turn to join th e existing combat

at

later stages

of

t he b at tl e. Ideally, th e h st ti fought th e main enemy line to a

standstill

their discipline an d

th e leadership

of their centurions keeping

them

in

c on ta ct w i th

th e

enemy,

wh o

wa s probably

mo re n u merou s

an d in a deeper

formation. Then th e prin ipes advanced

into

th e combat zone, their freshness an d

enthusiasm urging th e whole Roman line to advance with a con fidence which the

enemy by that

time

might no t b e able

to match.

Th e skill

of

a

Roman commander

lay

in

committing

his

second an d third

lines

at t he r ig ht

t ime . I f

it

w as l ef t

to o

long

then th e h st ti

might

buckle under enemy pressure. Too s oo n a nd the value



TH E WARS W I T H

CARTHAGE

AN D T H E H E LL E NI ST I C K I NG D OM S

adding

a fresh contingent of troop s to a combat might

be

lost

It was

eptionally rare for

t he Romans to withdraw an

entire line

an d

replace it

with

e from behind Usually t he t ro o ps

in

t he r ea r l ines were fed i nt o t he

c om b at t o

the troops

already engaged

In this context th e triplex acies offered a more effective use of an ar my s

Th e intervals between

maniples

were necessary to allow fresh t roo p s t o

th e

struggle W he n c o mb a t

between

lines

was

so

t en ta ti ve t he re w as l it tl e

that

an enemy would stream through th e

gaps

an d

swamp

th e

whole

line

Pydna th e

Macedonian

phalanx advanced to o fa r

a nd t oo

fast

a nd b eg an t o

e ak u p

into its constituent units

Eventually

th e Romans were able t o e xp lo it

individual centurions leading parties

of

men to infiltrate th e

p ha l an x a n d

ack t he helpless p ik em en f ro m t he flanks

This

only

happened

a ft er t he tw o

ha d charged each o th er a nd

fought

a

long

hand-to-hand combat. Even then

only h ap pe ne d t hr ou g h th e bold leadership of

individuals.

Th e ancient

ttlefield was a f ar m or e o pe n p la ce

than

is often imagined.

H E FIRST

PUNIC W A R AND NAVAL

WARFARE

was th e gre at m ercantile em pir e

of

th e we ster n

Mediterranean.

iginally a

Phoenician

colony its

language

culture

an d

religion remained

ntially Semitic

bu t

it

ha d long

been

on

th e

fringes

of

th e

Greek

world

Greek

theorists admired its balanced

constitution

which gave it th e

internal

itical stability which most city states lacked By

t he t hi rd

century

Carthage

The reconstruction of the

trireme t h r e e ~ ) nd its sea

trials greatly increased our

understanding of ancient

warships The trireme

proved capable of m king

knots in short bursts nd

could maintain a steady

knots for hours on e n d ~

despite the use

o f

modern

rowers unused to the ancient

techniques

nd

oars th t

were too heavy Under sail it

also reached speeds

of

k n o t s ~ ut wind power

was too uncertain to be used

in battle since ancient

warships needed to

manoeuvre quickly to close

with

the

enemy

to ram

or

board By the time of the

First Punic ar triremes

h d been replaced

y

quinqueremes

f i v e s ~ )

as the

standard

type

of

warship



ROMAN WARFARE

/

/

\ /

\

I {

\

I

I

\

O E N

•

Rusaddir

TL NTI

km

r

I

j\

d o min ated mo st of North Africa and

a

large part of th e southern

coastline

of

Spain. Like most city states, Carthage w as jealous of th e

rights

granted

to

its

citizens an d

h ad n ot extended

these

to the

vast majority

of

the subject an d allied

p eo pl es i n he r territories. Carthaginian citizen s were few

in

n um be r a nd

only

obliged

to

perform

military

service in th e face

of

a t hr ea t t o

th e

city itself.

Therefore Carthage relied on hiring armies of mercenaries whenever it needed to

fight a war on

land. The

city s wealth wa s

based

o n m aritim e tr ad e a nd th e

greatest permanent expense

was t he main tenan ce

of th e

vast fleet

c re at ed t o

protect t his. Ships

were

mass produced in

their

hundreds;

archaeological

excavation

of

th e site

of

a wrecked

Punic

galley revealed that its

timbers

ha d been

shaped and num bered

before

construction, each piece presumably

being

p rod u ced t o a

standard plan.

T hi s g reat fleet was

housed

i n t he h ug e a rt if ic ia l harbour

constructed

in

Carthage

itself

and other smaller

ports

throughout

Carthage s

territories.

I ts c re ws w er e

paid and many

of

th e city s poorest citizens

received a

s te ad y i nc om e f ro m r eg ul ar

service in

th e fleet. On e

of

the reasons for Carthage s

political stability was

that

its poorer elements were

provided

with a livelihood

in

this

The

First Punic W ar b eg an when both Rome

an d Carthage answered

a call for assistance

from

d iffe re nt f ac ti ons within the same Sicilian

c o m m u n i t ~

Throughout th e

r esulting twenty

three-year conflict t he fight ing was

to focus

overwhelmingly on

Sicily as each side attacked

t he o th er s allies

and

strongholds

on

th e island.

Although

t he re w as

much land fighting, this was

overwhelmingly a naval war, an d all

th e

decisive

moves

occurred

at

sea. Rome s first military

expedition outside

th e

Italian peninsula

wa s

also

to be he r first large-scale experience

of wa r at

sea.

T he g re at

naval

battles

of

Greek

history ha d

been f ought principally

by

triremes,

galleys with

three banks of oar s w ith a single rower to each oar.

By t he t hi rd c en tu ry

t he t ri re me

a

three ha d

been outclassed

by

the quinquereme

a fiv e ), bu t

th e precise

nature

of

th is s hi p r em ai ns o bs cur e.

Clearly it

ha d something,

probably rowers,

at

a

ratio of five to three compared to the

trireme,

bu t

it

is

no t

clear

ho w

these were deployed.

There

were

tw o

basic

tactical

options

fo r

all sizes

of

ancient

warships. Either they

attempted

to

grapple

w it h a n

T H E PUNIC W A R S

The Punic Wars were fought

on a larger scale than almost

any

other conflicts

of

Classical Antiquity.

The First Punic War

265-241 BC began

accidentally. It was

primarily a naval war

with

each side employing fleets

of

hundreds

of

quinqueremes.

lthoughthe navy had been

created almost from nothing

during the war it proved

highly effective winning all

but one of the major battles

and its main losses were

caused by the weather.

The Second Punic War

218-202

BC was caused

by

the a r t h a g i n i a n s ~

dissatisfaction

with

the

Peace Treaty of

241

BC

and

o m e ~ s overbearing attitude.

The war saw Roman armies

operating throughout Italy

but also in Sicily Spain

Macedonia and Africa.

The Third Punic War

149-146 BC developed

from Roman fears that

Carthage was once again

becoming a strong power. It

ended in the total

destruction

of

the

Carthaginian State.

56



T HE

WARS

W I T H

C AR TH A GE A N D

T H E

HELLENISTIC

KINGDOMS

controlled

by

Rome

Roman gains by

201

Carthaginian gains by

218

Scipio s

campaign

218-210

Roman campaign

against

Macedonia

216-211 BC

movements

of Carthaginian

fleet 215-209

Hannibal s campaign

216-203

BC

Hasdrubal s campaign

208-207 BC

controlled

by

Carthage

before

265

Mago s campaign

205-203

BC

X site of battle

Charax

•

D

D

o

D

Second War: 218-201

Punic Wars

264-146 BC

First War: 264-241

-,-

/

Leptis Magna

.

{

e

1/

\

/

/

-;-/ i

I

,

/

/

/

d

\

m ) i

....... __

/

Yl-d.-S -

vi

Cartenna Saldae

• J

ship

a nd b oa rd it relying on the

crew s

numbers or

fighting

quality to

p tu re t he s hi p i n

melee or

t hey t ri ed

to

ra m

th e

enemy

an d pierce his

hull or

e ar o ff his o ar s. Although galleys were usually fitted with a m as t a nd sail th e

was to o u ncert ai n an

agent

of

m ot io n t o allow t he m t o fight

w hen t hey

di d

t

possess missile

weapons capable

of

inflicting

serious

harm on

th e

n ~

depended on

a

ship s

rowers

an d

galleys

were

effectively constructed

these.

In proportion

to

their

size galleys

carried f ar l ar ge r

crews than

sailing ships an d

nearly

all

of th es e m en

were rowers.

S pa ce w as h ig hl y

ed especially so on a

quinquereme

which

despite their

40 per

cent

increase

crew do not seem to have

b ee n m uc h l ar ge r

than triremes.

Th e weight

of th e

provided

much of a gal ley s ballast, making

i t unw is e

for an y great

57



ROMAN

WARFARE

This marble relief from

Praeneste

probably

dates

to

the

first

century

BC an d

shows a

Roman

warship

w it h a t least two and

possibly three banks o f

oars Towers

which

provided raised

platforms

for observation an d missile

fire were usually a feature

o f larger ships suggesting

that this

ma y

be a six or

even larger On board are

marines with a variety o f

shield devices

one

which

appears to be a trident held

by a hand.

number of them to

leave

their seats at

the same

time

There was also very l it tle

space

available on a ship to carry provisions of

food

and water The result was

tha t not

only was travel by sea uncomfortable but very long continuous journeys

were simply impossible A voyage

of

more

than

a few days between friendly ports

was risky:

If

possible the galley was

beached

each

night and the

crew allowed to

rest

bu t th is was

only practical when the shore

was not

hostile

Most

naval

battles throughout history

have

tended to occur

relatively close to the shore



THE

W RS WITH RTH GE ND

THE

HELLENISTI KINGDOMS

ely as a result of the real difficulty fleets had in locating each other in the vast

of ocean. In the ancient world thi s was an absolute necessity simply

the fleets could

no t

risk moving too far f rom the shore. Sicily provided

ideal theatre for a naval conflict because its numerous anchorages were within

ical range

of

the fleets

operating from home

bases in Italy

and

North

Africa.

Geography and the might of the arthaginian navy meant

that

the conflict

likely to be dominated by sea power

but

at the beginning of the

war

Rome

59



ROMAN

WARFARE

60

wa s

not

a n av al p ower, largely b ecau se she

ha d

never needed to be in th e past. She

ma y have possessed a

small

number

of

ships, an d

some

of

h er I ta li an

allies

certainly

had

t heir o wn

navies, bu t they

could

not have

hoped

to form a serio us

rival to

th e

Punic fleet, especially since

it

is possible that no

state

in Italy a t t ha t

time

possessed

any quinqueremes.

When

i n 2 61 -2 60

BC

t he Roman s

decided

to

build

a hundred

quinqueremes,

Polybius claims that they copied

the

design of a

Carthaginian ship which

had

ru n aground an d been captured earlier in

th e

war.

Th e story is

one example

of

t he p ri de t he Roman s

took in their ability to copy the

b es t w eap on s

an d

tactics of their enemies, bu t m ay s ti ll b e g en ui ne . P ol yb ius

states that they trained t he s hi ps crews while th e fleet was under construction,

building tiered benches

on

land to practise rowing. Yet even with this training, the

n ew R om an fleet lacked th e experience

an d

skill

of

th e well-drilled Carthaginian

crews an d

th e

naval wa r

di d

n o t s ta rt well for

th e

Romans. Th e fleet s

commander

wa s

surprised

in h a rb o ur a nd all

th e

seventeen ships

w it h h im

were

captured

by a

Punic

squadron.

The

tactics of ramming

required

skilful handling

of

a ship an d

the

Romans

ma y have realized

that

they could

no t

match

their

opponents i n this, as from th e

beginning

of

th e wa r they were to rely on boarding

th e

e n e m ~ With t hi s i n mind

they

designed

th e Crow corvus , a boarding

ramp

fitted with a spike w hic h

stuck fast in an opponent s deck, locking th e t wo ships together. Once grappled

in this way no

a mo un t o f

skill

on

th e

part of

the Carthaginian crew

could

break

their ship free

an d

t he R om an legionaries swarmed across the bridge an d settled

th e

affair

w i th t heir

ferocity

in

hand-to-hand

combat.

Th e

new

device was tested

when the massed

fleets

clashed

off Mylae

in

north-eastern Sicily, 130

Carthaginian s hi ps f ac in g a slightly

smaller

number of Roman ones. Th e

Carthaginian

admiral,

commanding

th e

fleet in a shi p t ha t h ad once belonged to

Pyrrhus,

was

confident

in

his crews superiority

an d

attacked g g r s s i v l ~ Th e

Carthaginians did not realize th e purpose

of

the

corvi u nt il t he y b eg an to drop,

th e be ak s spe ar ing into their decks

an d

g rap pl in g t h em fast. Thirty ships,

including th e flagship, were captured by t he Ro man infantry, wh o flooded over the

ramps. Attempts to swing

r ou nd a nd

o ut fl an k t he Roman s were foiled w he n t he

Romans

turned

to face or swung their corvi round t o d ro p over either side of th e

ship. The

battle

was a total success for

t he R om an s w it h

between

thirty

an d fifty

ships

captured

by

t he e nd

of

th e

The prows rostrata of these prizes were

cu t

of f

an d sent to

decorate the

Speaker s platform

in

R om e, w hi ch i n time gave it a

n ew n ame.

In 25 6 BC t he R om an s r ep ea te d th ei r success at t he b at tl e

of

Ecnomus,

at

w hic h e ac h

side p rob abl y mu st ered well over 200 ships Polybius gives

th e

Carthaginian

strength as 350 an d th e Roman as 330 which, if

correct,

would

make

this

on e of t he l argest naval battles in history .

The

Carthaginians ha d

found no

counter

to th e corvi, bu t in t he n ex t y ears few y ears t he w eath er d ealt

Rome

a series

of

severe b lo ws

wh en t hr ee

fleets w er e

wrecked in

storms.

Hundreds of ships were

lost

an d

the drowned numbered

tens of thousands. Poor



TH E WARS WITH CARTHAGE AN D TH E H E L L EN I S TI C K I N G DO M S

n seamanship

may have b een to blame, bu t

it

is also possible that

th e corvi s

made

t he s hi ps

less seaworthy.

Then

at

Drepana in

249 BC t he R om an s

their only d ef ea t i n a fleet action, a disaster blamed on impiety when th e

sul, Publius Claudius Pulcher, ignored th e unfavourable auspices.

W he n t he

ens refused

to

ea t an d

s o s ig nify d iv in e fav ou r ,

he

is

said to

have

hurled

over

the

side,

proclaiming

that i f t he y would no t

eat,

then

they

would drink.

Roman disasters an d Carthaginian exhaustion

brought

a lull, bu t in 242

BC

w ar was d eci ded at sea when the Roma ns,

having risked

the c rea tion of

fleet,

s mash ed t he l as t Pun ic

fleet n ea r t he Aegates Islands. In th e

peace

treaty

Carthage

gave up both her fleet an d all he r

ions in Sicily.

WARFARE AGAINST CARTHAGE

AND

E

H E LL E NI S TI C W O R L D

army was still ess en tially a citizen militia, bu t all t he g re at

powers

th e

Mediterranean

world

relied almost entirely

on

professional

soldiers.

In

case

of

Carthage these were mercenaries

hired in contingents

from Africa an d

ope, so that Pun ic armies were u su ally a

polyglot

of nationalities. Hannibal s

i nclu ded u ni ts

of spearmen

fighting in

a phalanx

an d

heavy cavalry from

wild

Numidian light cavalry

riding bareback,

an d

horse

an d

f oo t f ro m t he

of

Spain. To th ese h e later added Gallic warriors from northern Italy an d

p s s uch as Bruttians,

Campanians

an d Samnites from Rome s disaffected

s. Such

armies

were difficult

to control,

bu t

the longer they

served

together

r the s ame Carthaginian officers t he more efficient they became. Th e nucleus

Hannibal s army were

th e

troops t ha t h ad

fought

a series of hard campaigns

in

under his ow n an d his father s c om ma nd , a nd

this

long

experience,

with his genius an d

th e

skill of his officers, t ur n ed t he m i nt o th e highly

army

he

took into Italy. This

wa s

a force

capable

of

s uch d iffi cu lt

as th e

night

march

that

secretly

put

t he m i nt o a mb us h p os it io ns at

Trasimene in

217 BC .

Each Carthaginian army wa s a

separate

entity that

up a command

structure

a ro un d, a nd owed loyalty to, a particular

or

sometimes

h is family.

Each

national

contingent ma y

have

the relationship

in

a different way, pe rha ps owing loyalty to a great

wh o

rewarded them or simply t o t he p ay ma st er w ho

provided

fo r them.

ies raised at different times under different

leaders

di d not co-operate well,

it h as been pointed o ut t ha t

each

of

t he t hree

lin es d ep lo yed b y Hannibal at

was

formed

by troops

raised

separately.

Th e

first lin e

consisted

of troops

nally raised by

Hannibal s

brother Mago,

the second of contingents

raised

in

ica for th e defence of

Carthage,

an d th e

third

was

composed of

th e veterans

t he I ta li an campaign. While Hannibal spoke to his v et eran s i n

person,

he

ered their

ow n

officers

to speak to th e other tw o

lines. In

th e battle

itself

th e

an d second lines di d

not

co-operate well, Polybius even claiming that fighting

ou t between them

at

on e stage.

This portrait

bust

from

Capua has sometimes been

identified as Hannibal Barca

near the

end of

his life

although in fact we have no

certain likenesses of the

great commander. Hannibal

was only in his mid twenties

when he invaded Italy

but

possessed long experience of

campaigning in Spain under

his father Hamilcar and

brother-in-law Hasdrubal.

The

epitome

of the ideal

Hellenistic general

annibal was able to

control and inspire the

many different nationalities

o f

soldiers serving in his

army. Time after time he

was able to surprise his

oman

opponents always

doing the unexpected. e

remained undefeated in a

major

action until Zama in

C

6r



R O M A N WARFARE

HANNIBAL S CAMPAIGNS

I N I TA LY

The

march of

Hannibafs

army from Spain to Italy in

218 was

one

o f

the

epics

of

Ancient

History

Between

218 216

Hannibal won

an

unbroken

series of

victories

at

Ticinus Trebia

Trasimene

and

Cannae

Somehow

the

Romans

absorbed

their appalling

losses

and continued

the

war

when any other

contemporary

state

would

have accepted peace

terms

at

this point

After

Cannae

much of

southern

Italy

defected to Hannibal who

was forced to fight

to

protect his

new

allies

Although never able to

defeat

Hannibal

in battle

the Romans

gradually

used

their superior

numbers

to

defeat his allies In 207

Hannibals brother brought

a fresh

army

to Italy

but

it

was a sign of

the

experience

the Romans had gained

since

218

that i t was

rapidly cornered by a

superior force

and

destroyed In 203

Hannibal was finally

recalled to defend Carthage

from the Roman invaders

and led his unbeaten army

from Italy The next year he

suffered his only defeat in a

pitched battle at Zama

bringing the war to an end

62

The

armies

raised by

M ace do n a nd

th e Seleucid

Empire

were far more

homogenous

being

r ec ru it ed p ri ma ri ly f ro m

Macedonian

citizens

or their

descendants

settled

throughout

th e

conquests of A lexander the G reat.

Th e king

still

fought

at th e head of his aristocratic cavalry as Philip an d

Alexander

ha d

done sharing the

dangers

with his army an d so j us ti fy in g his p la ce i n soc iet y i n

th e

best

warrior tradition. Th e me n were well-trained disciplined professionals

organized

into

units

with

a c le ar ly

defined command

structure controlled by

officers w it h g oo d technical knowledge of soldiering. Hellenistic armies were in

many ways more efficient

than

Roman armies bu t they were also more fragile.

Trained soldiers were difficult to replace

from

th e limited resources available to

each

kingdom and

very high losses

to

th e

army

might

not

be m ad e g oo d for a

g en er at io n. A lt ho ug h Carthage usually had th e resources to hire more

mercenaries it

took

a long time to give these the cohesion necessary to create an

effective

Th e

Romans were unique among

ancient

states in

maintaining

th e

principle of

a citizen militia

b u t t u rn i ng

it into a for ce capable

of standing up

to

a modern

professional

r ~ Roman citizens

accep ted t he

burden of a harsh

military discipline

an d

service in many cases f or th e

d u ra ti on o f

a war during

which

time

they

were t ra in ed t o a high level

of

f f i i n ~ Polybius claimed

that

th e

t ot al n um b er of Roman

citizens

an d

allies liable

to

military service

at th e

outbreak

of

th e Second Punic Wa r was

more

than

700 000. E ven if this claimed

total is to o large th e r eal f igur e w as certainly considerable an d allowed Rome to

end ure t he app al li ng casualties inflicted

on

he r by

Hannibal an d

still raise

more

legions as she had been able to

cope

with the equally terr ible losses suffered at

sea during th e

First

Punic War.

N o

o th er c on te mp or ar y st at e c oul d have

weathered such disasters

an d

still gone

on

to win the conflict.

Th e art of war in

th e

third

century

ha d

largely

been cr eated

in th e endemic

warfare

between

t he k in gd om s

created w hen A lexand er s

empire fragmented.

These conflicts wefe fought between very similar professional armies which were

highly skilled

but

could not

afford

heavy casualties.

The

objective was to gain

victory

a t m in im um

cost

an d

e ve n h ea vy l os se s

to

th e

opposition

were to be

avoided since it w as

better

to

capture

enemy soldiers an d recruit them than to kill

them. A wa r was wo n w he n t he e ne my

could

be persuaded that he ha d

nothing

to

gain

from

fighting

on

an d

so

wa s

willing

to

come

to

terms.

Most

conflicts were

ended

by

negotiation

once

on e

side

had

gained a

clear advantage.

A complex

system evolved in which

quite

minor details such as

th e

amount p ai d t o r an so m

prisoners clearly indicated which side

had

been victorious an d by ho w great a

margin.

More

seriously

losing

a

wa r usually meant

giving up te rrito ry a nd

perhaps

paying

an

indemnity

bu t

wars were fought

to weaken not

destroy

th e

enemy an d a struggle to th e death

would

have been in

no

one s interest. An enemy

was persuaded to concede defeat by putting pressure on hi m by raiding his fields

or

capturing his cities but more

than

anything else a victory in a pitched battle

wa s

th e best

way

to wi n

a war.

Professional

armies

were as

much intended

for

f ig ht in g b ig battles as t he h op li te

p halan x h ad

been being merely more



Sulcis

TH E WARS WITH CARTHAGE

AN D

TH E

H E L L EN I S TI C K I N G DO M S

Hannibal s campaigns in Italy

218 203

BC

Hannibal s campaign

Hasdrubal s campaign

Mago s

campaign

major interventions of

arthaginian fleet

Scipio s campaign

site

of

battle

siege

oman territory

arthaginian territory

N

km

L a J

I I

0

miles

i st icat ed i n

t he ir a pp ro ac h. Th e theoretical literature on th e skills of

ralship which

began

to be

written

at this

t ime w as

overwhelmingly

concerned

h ow

an d

when

to

fight a battle. Strategy as it

would

be understood today

yed little part in t he w ar s of this period. Generals ma noe uvred to create th e

favourable

opportunity to defeat th e enemy

field army: A

battle was to be

ght whenever a commander was

confident

that

he would win

an d

needed

no

purpose.



ROMAN WARFARE

64

Battles f ought between armies produced by th e same military doctrines were

uncertain

affairs, and an indecisive result with heavy casualties on each side was

useless an d d amagi ng t o

both

parties.

These conditions

produced a very tentative

style of fighting. Armies tended to move rapidly t o c on fr on t each other since

d ef ea ti ng t he e ne my

army

wa s t he ir m ai n f un cti on

bu t

then

became

very

cautious camping

only

a few

kilometres

apart f or d ay s or even weeks without

fighting. Often each side

marched out an d

deployed in

battle formation

every day

th e

tw o lines within a few hundred metres

of

each other , yet neither was willing

to advance

th e

fin al short

distance

an d

forc e a

battle. Frequent skirmishes

an d

single combats were fought between detachments of cavalry an d light infantry,

an d victories in these

helped

to

develop a f eeling

of superiority

over

th e

enem :

The

general s task was to raise his a rm y t o th e highest pitch of confidence before

exposing

it to

battle.

Military

manuals encouraged a

commander

to seek every

advantage however slight, ranging

f rom ensuring that

his army fought with full

stomachs

against an enemy

wh o

wa s

hungry,

o r t ha t th e

opposition fought

with

t he s un in their eyes. Such factors di d

no t

in themselves determine

the outcome

of

a battle but each additional

advantage

gave an army another edge over th e

opposition. There were times

during th e latter

stages

of

th e

First Punic

War in

Sicily when

th e

rival armies w atched each other for months on end only moving

t heir p os it io ns w hen

they ran

ou t

of

food. Professional armies unlike hoplites,

di d not have to return to gath er th e h ar ve st s o t he re w as no limit to t he t im e

spent manoeuvring if

neither

side saw th e chance

of

a favourable battle.

The

Romans

h ad t ur ne d

their citizen militia into a forc e capable of facing

professional armies bu t

Polybius still saw them as rather

old-fashioned

in

their

straightforward

an d

o pe n a pp ro ac h to warfare. They expected battles to be

almost

as

simple

as th e

ol d

hoplite clashes,

an d showed

a willingness to fight

immediately even if the conditions were

not

ideal. Both Pyrrhus an d Hannibal

outclassed

th e first

Roman

commanders

sent against t he m a nd

brought

them

to

battle

at

th e

time an d

place of t heir o wn choosing. Hannibal s great victories of

218-216 BC

were

fought on o p en g rou n d

which favoured his numerically

superior

cavalry an d exploited th e varying attributes

of

his

infantry

contingents

with

great

skill , especially at Cannae. One

reason

for

th e

poor

showing

of

Roman

commanders

was

that

they

found

themselves

in

charge

of

fa r larger

armies

than

most

would

have experienced previousl : To confront Hannibal t he t wo consuls

co mb i ned t h ei r

armies

mustering

four

legions

in

218

BC an d

a massive total

of

e ig ht i n 216 BC. It ha d been very rare for both consuls to unite their forces in the

past an d

this was reflected in th e

d ho

command

structure

adopted whereby th e

tw o

me n

commanded on alternate days. This

combined

with the great numbers

of

troops

involved,

tended to

mak e t hei r

movements

erratic

a nd r at he r

clums :

Polybius r epresents Hannibal s victories as g re at ly e as ed by this divided

command which produced

fiercely divided councils, although

it

is possible

that

t he se p as sa ge s a re i nf lu en ce d

by his desire

t o e xo ne ra te th e

ancestors

of

his

patron

Scipio Aemilianus

from

responsibility for these disasters.

Although

often



TH E

WARS WITH C AR TH A GE A ND

TH E

H E L L EN I S TI C K I N GD O M S

by more skilful opponents Roman

armIes

were stil l tough

wh o continued

fighting

long after m ost

other

armies would have

eded defeat In

part

this was a

result of th e

harsh

military

discipline

which

icted such severe penalties

on

soldiers wh o fled even f ro m t he

most

desperate

Th e survivors

of

Cannae were formed into tw o legions that were exiled

Italy an d

sent

to fight for th e duration of th e war

in

Sicily an d Africa Th e

triplex acies

contributed

to

th e

resilience of Roman legions even

in

defeat

their

forma tion de pth

and providing

reserve troops throughout th e line

far lower than

th e

massive casualties

Hannibal

inflicted

on t he armies

destroyed

at

Trebia

Trasimene

an d Cannae his o wn men suffered heavily as

Romans fought to th e last Th e casualties Pyrrhus

suffered

i n d efeat in g th e

ans became proverbial

Realizing that no Roman army

was

yet

capable

of defeating Hannibal

in

on e Roman commander

Quintus Fabius Maximus inaugurated a

policy

avoiding battle altogether

earning

himself th e n ick nam e t he Delayer

R om an a rm y s had ow ed th e movements of Hannibal s army

ich was unable to feed itself by foraging o ff t he land

if

i t d id no t keep moving

ving it an d

harassing isolated detachments

bu t

never

risking

a battle

in

save

th e most

favourable circumstances

Th e

fields

of th e Romans an d

allies were raided cities taken by surprise an d some

of

Rome s allies

to th e enemy bu t Hannibal failed in over a decade of operations to

ict so much damage that t he R om an s were forced to admit

defeat.

Fabius

icy was logical fully

i n k eepi ng

w i th t he m il it ar y science of th e

period

an d

tely successful

bu t

i t was unpopular with

t he Romans

an d

more than

on e

his subordinates rejected

caution

an d

attacked

Hannibal only

to

receive a

re handling Th e Roman

instinct

was sti ll for immediate open confrontation

The dusty plain of Cannae

today is peaceful and it is

very hard to imagine the

carnage of 2

August

216

when over

50 000

men were

killed in an area

of

only a

few square miles. The white

buildings

on

the horizon

mark

the most probable

location for Hannibafs

camp. In the

middle

distance the line of trees

and

bushes

mark

the

modern

line of the River

Aufidius but the course of

the river in 216

is

unknown

OVERLEAF:

CANNAE

Hannibafs victory at

Cannae was his greatest

achievement. In an open

plain he encircled and

destroyed a numerically

superior Roman army

killing nearly 50 000

men

and capturing around

20 000 more for the loss of

5 700 of his own men. It

is

now

uncertain on which

bank

of

the River

Aufidius

the battle was fought. This

map shows the

modern

course of the river.



The remaining Roman cavalry are

driven from the field

[ heCarthaginian centre comes under

intense pressure from th legions and

forced back. Hannibal e n o ~ g e s

t hemin per on a n d p ut s up. a hard

t before they withdraw. Th e

Romans surge into the gap finally

created

t

Punic line reserve

ma iples being committed

to support the apparent success

The Roman formation loses its order

asa crowd

of

men packs forward into

the enemy centre. ManigJes merge

into one hu crowd. Hannibal now

orders hisAfrican inIantr:y t o t u rn

inwards

and

advance against the

Roman flanks

TH E W RS WITH C RTH GE

ND

TH E

H E L L EN I S TI C K I N G DO M S



ROMA

WARFARE

Hannibal draws

up his

army

into battle formation:

elephants the f r ont two

lines

of

less experienced

troops and

his veterans at

the r e ar with

Numidian

cavalry

on t he

wings

Scipio s army also drawn up in thre e

l ine The

maniples are not

in

the usual

2

chequerboard formation

bu t

behind

those in the line ahead creating lanes

through the Roman army

ZAMA

tZama Hannibal was

faced

with

a well trained

Roman

army under

the

command

of the

highly

gifted Scipio. The result

was a slogging match far

less tactically subtle

than

his

earlier battles.

Outnumbered

in cavalry Hannibal

attempted

to

wear down

the

Roman infantry first

with

a

charge from his large force

of elephants then

by

forming

his foot

into

three

lines keeping his Italian

veterans in reserve. Scipio

negated each of these

threats in turn and the battle

was finally decided

by

the

return of the Roman cavalry.

68



TH E

WARS WITH C AR TH A GE A N D

TH E

H E L L EN I S TI C K I N GD O M S

Th e legions pushing forward begin

to wear y. At this critical moment

the Roman cavalry return to th e

battle attacking the Carthaginians

f ro m t he rear Fo r

Hannibal

and

his veterans it

w as t he e nd

T h e R o ma n legions advance

an d

the Hastati drive back the first

Carthaginian line With the

support of the Principe they then

defeat the second line Hannibal s

veterans remain in position and

Scipio

reforms

his

inf antry into

a

single phalanx before

advancing

against them

Th e

Roman

cavalry then advance

chasing

Hannibal s

less numerous

force f ro m t he field

with

th e enemy an d this di d

produce

s om e g re at successes against

other

Carthaginian

commanders an d t he I ta li an states an d

Ga ll ic tr ibe s wh ic h

ha d

defected

t o H an ni ba l. As th e

wa r

progressed the

R om an a rm y

an d

its commanders

b ecame mo re

an d

more

experienced. The greatest of this ne w

generation of

commanders

was

Publius Cornelius Scipio wh o

would

earn

himself t he n am e

Africanus.

Commanding th e

R om an a rm y

in

Spain from 9

onwards Scipio displayed all the skills of an army

commander

i n t he H el leni st ic

tradition

utterly outmanoeuvring

his

T he elephant attack fails when

the animals are driven back

by maniples or pass harmlessly

through the lanes in t he R o m an

army



ROMAN WARFARE

Philip

V of

Macedon- s

concern with the

growth

of

oman influence on the

Illyrian coast led

him

to

make an alliance with

Hannibal during the Second

Punic War an aggressive act

which the

omans

never

forgave.

lthough

their first

expedition

to Macedonia

achieved little it was only a

short time after the

conclusion

of

peace

with

Carthage

that

the omans

decided to send another

army.

t

Cynoscephalae in

197 C the omans under

Flaminius destroyed Philip- s

Macedonia n regulars.

Carthaginian opponent

at Ilipa, before going

on

to

lead

t he R om an invasion of

Africa which brought

about th e

recall of Hannibal

from

Italy an d his first an d

final

defeat

in a pitched battle a t Z am a in 202

BC .

Rome s involvement in the Hellenistic world led directly

on

f ro m t he Second

Punic War. Philip of Ma ce don ha d allied himself with Carthage

during

Rome s

darkest

hour

when

Hannibal

wa s rampaging

through

Italy, an d the Romans were

quick

to remember this

after

Carthage s defeat, declaring wa r in 200 BC despite

initial popular resistance to

s ta rt in g a no th er w ar

so s oo n. R om e

had

fielded

massive armies in

th e

struggle with

Carthage

bu t

most

of these were demobilized

an d th e armies

which

f ou gh t i n th e east

reverted

to th e traditional size

of

tw o

legions

p lu s t wo

allied alae under

th e

command

of

a consul.

These

armies were

conventional

in

size,

but

no t

in

the men who composed them. All

had

served

through

t he b it ter struggle

with

Carthage serving f ar m or e years against tougher

opposition than an y

earlier

generation of

Romans.

These

armies along

with

those of Scipio i n t he l at er years of th e Punic War, were th e best ever produced by

th e

Republican

city militia. Officers

an d

me n all knew their

jo b

through

long

experience.

Th e heavy casualties of th e war

w i th H a nn ib al

ha d

res ul ted i n

th e

Senate being replenished

by

men cho sen

because of

conspicuous military service,

lowering

th e age bu t increasing th e

experience

of

th e

body

w hi ch p ro vi de d t he a rm y s s en io r officers.

Roman

armies

of th e early second century BC w er e a s well

trained

an d disciplined an d

at

least as eff icient as an y of th e professional

armies

they faced. Their tactical system was, however, very different.

H el leni st ic armi es were based around th e heavy infantry of th e

phalanx. T he p ha la nx

was

no longer composed of

hoplites

bu t of

pikemen me n wielding t he t wo -h an de d sarissa s pe ar , w hi ch

sometimes

reached

a

length of

6.4

metres 2

feet .

Phalanxes formed at least

eight

ranks

deep,

an d

often deeper, th e Seleucids at Magn es ia i n 190

BC

deploying in thirty

tw o

ranks. Such

depth

gave th e phalanx

tremendous staying

power

in combat

an d th e hedge of spearpoints five of which

projected

in front of each ma n in t he

first

rank

m ad e i t very difficult for an e ne my t o f ig ht hi s wa y in f ro m t he f ro nt

The long pikes themselves also tended to keep

t he ran ks

in place an d

make

su ch a

phalanx less subject

to

the degeneration of cohesion an d f or ma ti on t o which

most

units

were

subject

in combat. A phalanx

was

very hard for

th e

enemy to

break bu t it wa s more likely

to

wi n a melee by its s ta yi ng power

than

its

actual

fighting qualities.

It

w as also dif ficult f or

it

to move over

anything

bu t

th e

flattest

terrain without

losing

its order.

In Alexander s

army th e

p h al an x h ad

only ever

been intended

t o p in

t h e enemy

an d

subject hi m

to

a steady pressur e, th e decisive

c ha rge b ein g

a lway s d el ive re d by th e v l r ~ By th e early s ec on d c en tu ry

Hellenistic armies were

not

capable

of

fielding the numbers of cavalry seen in the

armies of Philip an d Alexander; good hor ses, just as

much

as citizen manpower,

were always in

short

As a re sul t they

had

come to rely more an d more on

th e

phalanx

to

wi n

the battle

a task f or w hich

it

ha d never r eally been suited. To



TH E WARS WITH

CARTHAGE AND

TH E

HELLENISTIC KINGDOMS

This terracotta statuette

depicts an Indian elephant

in the service of one of the

Hellenistic kingdoms. A

tower carried

on

the

animal s back

but

no

crewman visible in it. The

elephant itself rather than

the crew, was the main

weapon trampling

down

the

enemy

ranks and, as

here, grasping soldiers

with

its trunk The crew added to

the force of the attack

by

throwing missiles,

but

their

main

role was to protect the

elephant from enemy light

infantrymen, whose missiles

might wound or panic it .

Polybius description

of

the

battle

of

Raphia in

217

BC

claims that elephants fought

each other

by

butting their

heads together and pushing.

Once unbalanced

and

its

trunk pushed aside, the

opposing elephant

would

be

gored by the victors tusks.

it and gain

an

edge in wars

often

fought

against

nearly identical

monarchs experimented with gimmick weapons

such

as scythed

and war elephants The

chariots

were rarely effective while the

elephants

did

win

some spectacular

successes were very

much

a

two edged sword

g inclined to panic

and

trample

both

armies indiscriminately:

Hellenistic armies

formed

with virtually all

their

units

in

a single line

centred

und the

deepest possible infantry phalanx. They were commanded by a king

ose role it was to charge

at

the head of his cavalry in the

manner

of Alexander

commander fighting

in

this way could no t have hoped to control t roops kept

in

he

would have

been

able to see only what

was

happening and

the troops immediately

around

him. The

aim of a

commander was to

loy his army in such a way as

to

pu t steady pressure on the whole enemy line

leading in person an irresistible hammer blow at a single point. The

system of

deploying

the legions

in three

lines ensured

that

much of the

was

k ept in

reserve

At

both Cynoscephalae

in

197

BC and

Magnesia

in

BC the Roman line was broken

at

one point but the situation was restored by



ROMAN WARFARE

Th e Army of Lucius Scipio

turmae

cavalry

Latin

3 Roman legion

Roman legion

5

Latin

peltasts 3 000

7 cavalry 3 000

fresh

troops

from th e rear lines Interestingly in

both

cases the reserves were

brought

up by a relatively

junior Roman

officer acting on his own initiative an

indication

of

the high quality of the Roman officer corps at this

period

Once the

Romans created a breakthrough in the

enemy

line reserve troops were available

to

exploit the

gap

bu t their

Hellenistic

opponents lacked

both the

reserve

troops

and

the

command structure to control

them

The manipular legion was flexible

while

the

phalanx was not and this proved

the

decisive

factor

in a clash between

the two especially at Cynoscephalae an d

Pydna

both of which

occurred

accidentally

and

were

disorganized

affairs

Another distinction

between

the two

armies

was that while the Romans had

adopted

the

Th e Army of Antiochus

Dahae

cavalry 1 200

light infantry 4 700

2

argyraspides infantry 10 000

cataphracts cavalry 3 000

agema cavalry 1 000

regia cavalry 1 000

cataphracts

cavalry 3 000

Galatian

cavalry 2 500

Galatians 1 500

Tarentines

cavalry 500

Phalangites 16 000

Seleucid chariots

7

Galatians 1 500



TH E WARS

WITH CARTHAGE AN D TH E H E L L EN I S TI C K I N G DO M S

battle of Magnesia was

ught after nearly

two

of cautious

the rival

attempted

to gain an

omans

gradually camped further

and further forward and

deployed their battle line so

close to the Seleucids that

ntiochus

the Great was

forced to fight The oman

armies which fought against

Antiochus attacks with agema

an d

cataphr acts and br eaks

through

the

Roman legion He leads

the

cavalry

on

to

the Roman

camp

bu t is

checked by the Roman guards left

outside the cam p. A tribune Lepidus

m anages to r e-f orm enough of the

routed legion to drive h im b a ck

Th e

Seleucid

chariots attack

bu t

are

driven

off

by missile fire

They

retreat causing some

disorder

to

their own forces T h e R o ma n

cavalry advance

an d

drive the Syrian

cavalry t o t he r ea r

the Hellenistic

kingdoms

in

the early second century

were exceptionally

experienced well trained

and

led

by

men who

had

learned their trade in the

hard school of the war with

Hannibal

T h e R o ma n

infantry

closes

w i th t h e

phalanx and its

supporting

3 elephants dr iving back the Seleucid

skirmishes Although

under

pressure the phalanx stands firm

However confusion is caused in the

phalanx

w h en s o me

of

the elephants

p an ic a nd w he n t he

Roman cavalry

r etur n and

attack its flanks

and

rear

This combined

with

the pressure

f ro m t h e legions is too m u ch a n d

Antiochus centre dissolves the rout

73



R O M A N WARFARE

74

organization an d discipline of a

modern

civilized army they still fought with

great s v g e r ~ Alexander s

me n

ha d

been as ferocious as this in

their

campaigns

against

th e

Persians bu t

th e

conflicts between the culturally an d militarily similar

armies of his Successors

had

made Hellenistic warfare

rather

more genteel

At

Cy no sceph alae t he d efeated

Macedonian

pikemen

stood

h ol di ng t heir pikes

upright to signify their surrender bu t were c ut d ow n by th e legionaries Only

after someone

ha d

explained w ha t t he gesture m ea nt t o th e Roman commander

wa s

he able

with

some difficulty

to

e nd the

massacre. The

Romans

fought

to

destroy

th e

enemy a rm y a nd e nd its capacity ever to fight them again

It was a very different

culture

to

th e

Hellenistic

expectation that

wars should

be ended

by negotiation

to

avoid unnecessary bloodshed

o n b oth

sides

Both

Pyrrhus a nd H a nn ib al m ad e several attempts to

open

peace negotiations with the

Romans after they

ha d

defeated them in battle an d were surprised at the Romans

refusal to

consider a treaty:

T he M ac ed on ia n a nd

Seleucid

kings

similarly

sent

t h ei r h erald s to t he R om an s

on

numerous occasions hoping to end conflict

through

d i p l o m ~

The

Roman negotiating position was always th e same: a

demand for th e other

side

to

concede

total

defeat regardless

of

t he c ur re nt

military

situation. For

th e

Romans w ar was a life or death struggle which could

only en d in on e

of

tw o ways

Th e

f irst was for

th e

enemy to cease to be a threat

either because

he

had

become a

subordinate

ally

of Rome or because he ha d

ceased to exist as a political e n t i t ~ The only alternative was for Rome herself to

be

destroyed

but

t hi s w as something that neither Carthage

nor an y

other

state

possessed

th e

resources to

achieve N ot

only that bu t it

is unlikely

that an y

commander produced

by

th e

Hellenistic

tradition

would

ever have considered this

as

an

option.

By his

ow n understanding of w ar H a nn ib a l wo n

th e

Second Punic

Wa r

at

Cannae but the

Romans

were following a different set of rules an d when they did

not admit

d ef ea t t he re wa s l it tl e more

that

he c ould

do

to force them.

Th e

Romans d id

no t

f ight for th e

limited

gains

other states expected f rom v i t o r ~

A

d efeat ed enemy wa s turn ed into

an

ally wh o

not

only pre se nted no thr ea t to

Rome bu t

actively

supported

h er w ar s elsewhere

The

army

t he y s en t a ga in st

Philip

V in

was fed by grain

supplied

by

th e

recently

defeated Carthage

an d

P hi li p i n

turn

a id ed t he R om an

force

which fought

against the

Seleucids

Rome

di d

not

tolerate a f or me r e ne my

existing

as a ny th in g m or e

than

a clearly

subordinate

The

kingdom of Macedonia wa s

dismembered

in 168 an d

Carthage

destroyed in 146

BC

s im pl y b ec au se t he y

had

begun to show signs of

renewed

independence an d a ga in a ss um ed t he

role

of

potential enemies

Wh y

did th e R om an s

adopt

such a n u nc om pr om is in g a tt it ud e t o warfare?

Their great resources of military manpower which allowed t he m t o e nd ur e the

appalling losses of

the Punic

wars explains

to

a

great extent

ho w they were able

t o m ai nt ai n their resolve Rome s internal political stability an d

th e

strength of

the confederation of

allies she

created

around

herself were also vital factors

Th e

disaster

at

th e

Caudine

Forks

in

321

BC wa s

the last time

that Rome

accepted



TH E WARS WITH CARTHAGE AND

TH E

HELLENISTIC KINGDOMS

a ce as

the

clear

loser in

a war.

The

fourth century BC

struggle against the

hill

peoples of

Central

Italy was

certainly b itt er a nd

may

have

ouraged the

Romans to

think

of war as a struggle for their very existence.

h Pyrrhus

and Hannibal

with their armies marching

through Italy

equally

to

threaten Rome

itself and

one

of

the reasons

for

the

aggressive

policy

Macedonia and the Seleucids was the fear that their powerful navies gave

em the potential

to land an army

on the

Italian

peninsula . Whatever the

ons for it Rome s attitude to

warfare

was a major factor in her success in this

and throughout the rest of her s t o r ~ When

wars

were decided as soon as

e side

admitted

defeat it was very difficult for

any state

to beat a

people

who

re never willing to concede this.

The

om n

city of

Carthage was built

on

top of

the Punic city destroyed in

146 C so th t very few

remains

of

the latter are

visible today A few sections

of Punic Carthage have

been uncovered

by

archaeologists nd attest to

the wealth of the city

particularly in the period

immediately before the final

war with Rome

75



CH PTER THREE

- - - ~ . ~ : ~ : = = : ~ 4 . ~ . ~ : = = ~ : r J - . - - - - -

WORLD CONQUEST

BC D

w LEGION RIES

depicted on a first century relief from

the

prin ipi or

headquarters building in the fortress at

Mainz. The man on the right stands in the classic fighting

posture

of

the

oman

soldier crouching to gain as

much

protection as possible from his s utum ready to deliver an

underarm thrust from his

short

sword. The

men

wear a

version

of

the Imperial Gallic helmet

but

it

not

clear

whether any body armour shown



ROMAN WARFARE

W O R L D

C O N Q U E S T

B C - A D

P

OL

YBIUS

CLAIMS

THAT

Scipio f ~ i c n u s told his troops before

t he b at tl e

of

Zam a that th ey wer e f ig ht in g no t just

to

defeat

Carthage but for

th e

domination

of

th e world. In P olybius ow n lifetime Rome ha d become th e

greatest power

in

the Mediterranean. A century

an d

a half later

when

th e great

period of e xpansion e nded with th e d ea th o f Augustus

th e

Empire s frontiers lay

on

t he A tl an ti c coast t h e Rhi ne an d

Danube

in Europe

an d

the Euphrates

i n t he

East.

Apart from

a few

later additions the

basic

shape

which

t he R om an

Empire

was

to

maintain for over four centuries

ha d

already been established. This chapter

w il l t el l th e

story

of these

vast

conquests. It will

also

describe ho w th e citizen

militia of th e Republic changed into a professional army

of

long-service soldiers

recruited from

th e

marginal

elements of

s o c i e t ~

Before

considering

how the Romans

created this

vast

Empire it

is worth

This auxiliary infantryman from another

of

the

ainz

reliefs carries an oval shield

and

at least two javelins in his

left hand whilst brandishing another in his right

Throughout her history

ome

relied heavily

on

soldiers

who

were not

oman

citizens

who

usually made up at

least

half

of

any

force

\

\



WORLD

CONQUEST

202

BC AD

14

using to discuss why they d id so

For

a

long

time it was believed

that the

were no t willing imperialists bu t had been drawn

on

to fight wa r after

ar to

defend

themselves

an d

their allies against real

or

imagined threats.

This

ew was most popular at

the

beginning of the twentieth century

when

the great

opean empires still held sway over

most of

the g lobe

an d

the rule

an d

influence of the civilized over the uncivilized

was

accepted as an

good thing It was attractive when emphasizing the benefits of

Roman

to view the acquisition of their Empire as accidental

rather

than

t ivated by a blatant desire for power

and

wealth In the last few decades when

e

memories

of

empire

seem so distant a generation of

scholars

for whom

rialism is associated

not

with progress

but with

exploitation

and

repression

indigenous cultures

have adopted a far more

hostile

attitu de to Rom an

They have claimed

that Roman society

was geared towards

annual

warfare

and concentrated in

part icular on

the requirement

of

the

tocracy for

military

adventures

ROMAN EMPIRE AD 14

The century

up

to the

death of

ugustus

saw the

most rapid and continuous

expansion in Rome s

history. A of

gifted

commanders at the head

of

the

new

professional legions

carved

out

fresh provinces in

Europe frica and the East.

uring these years

Roman

soldiers crossed the Rhine

and Euphrates reached

the

Elbe explored the deserts

south

of Egypt

pushed

around the shores

of

the

Black Sea and landed in

Britain.

•

number of

legions

deployed by

province

Roman provinces in 8

provinces

a dd ed b y Caesar s

death

44

provinces

added

by Augustus

death AD

14

\

i

2 miles

I

\

I

o 2

km

i

o

main road

main base

for

Imperial

Navy

_ >

D

D

79



ROMAN

WARFARE

80

Th e m en w ho governed Rome s provinces

an d

commanded he r

armies

were

senators following a well-defined

career pattern known

as th e u sus onorum

which

involved a mixture of civilian and military

posts.

Wa r

an d

politics were

inseparably linked

at

Rome. Politicians

di d not advocate

specific policies

or

belong t o a ny th in g

resembling

modern

political parties bu t w er e elected to

magistracies largely

on their

ow n an d their family s reputation; th e system

favoured t he m em be rs of th e ol d aristocratic families w ho c ou ld b oa st o f

th e

great achievements

of

their ancestors.

Th e

numbers in each college of magistrates

declined in proportion with its seniority an d o nl y a s ma ll

minority

of the Senate s

300 members could ever hope

to

hold on e of th e tw o annual consulships.

Competition

wa s fierce

t o gain

election

a nd t he n

even m or e i nt en se t o achieve

distinction during a man s

year

of office so that

he

r et ur ne d t o

a ss um e t he

influential

place

i n th e Senate

befitting

his great reputation.

Th e

greatest prestige



WORLD CONQUEST 202 BC AD

14

e from military success

and

a magistrate who had held supreme

command

in

victorious war won the right

to

celebrate a

triumph

riding in a chariot

through

to the acclamation of the

whole

city: Even the men who had achieved this

vied

with

each

other

to stage the

most

spectacular

triumph or to

build

e greatest monument

and

s tage the most

lavish

games to commemorate

it

Scipio Asiaticus Manlius Vulso and Aemilius Paullus all of whom

d

fought

successful

wars in

the

Hellenist ic eas t were each credi ted with

ging a triumph that was

greater than any

that

had preceded

it

Each

one ha d

to stave off

political

attacks from rivals who did not wish t hem to receive

e honour

A provincial governor usually had

only

a single campaigning

season in

which

fight a successful war before

he was

replaced by ano ther man equally

bit ious for a

military

adventure

Many

arrived

in

their province impoverished

In a

triumph

the successful

commander

rode in a four-

horse chariot his face

painted red

and

dressed like

the statue

of

Jupiter

Optimus

Maximus

To

celebrate a

triumph

was the

highest

ambition of most

senators adding

not

only to

his own glory bu t that

of

his family A slave

stood

behind

the general holding

the

laurel wreath above his

head

and whispering

reminders that he was a

mortal even

though

he wore

the

regalia

of

a god

Under the Principate only

members of the

Imperial

family were allowed to

celebrate a

triumph

as in

this relief the Emperor

Vespasian 5 son Titus

commemorates

his capture

of

Jerusalem in

AD 70



ROMAN WARFARE

Vast numbers

of

slaves were

taken during Rome s wars of

expansion

the profits from

their sale going primarily to

the army commanders.

uringhis Gallic

campaigns Caesar sold

hundreds of

thousands

of

captives into slavery and

was able not

only

to

payoff

his enormous debts but

amass a vast fortune. These

naked captives chained

together

at

the neck are

from another of the Mainz

Reliefs. They are probably

Germans

or

perhaps Celts

since their spiky hair may

indicate

the

latter s practice

of washing it in lime.

by

an

expensive election

campaign and

needing a quick profit

Th e

booty of a

victory was

considerable

especially

in

the r icher east and

there

were always

captives

to

sell

into

slavery

Returning to Rome the

successful

commander

displayed his prest ige in the size

and splendour of

his house in Rome and his

servile household

and

invested in vast rural estates

worked

by a labour force of

slaves Competition for

status

among

the

Roman aristocracy

demanded

frequent

warfare

and

it is not surprising

that

some

Roman

generals

provoked

a war for

their personal glory Gnaeus Manlius Vulso arrived to take over the army in Asia

after the

victory at

Magnesia Having

vainly

tried

to provoke Antiochus to break

the

peace and

restart the war

in 189 BC

he launched an unprovoked attack

on

the

Galatians three Celtic tribes who

had

settled in Asia

Minor

a century before

On



WORLD

CONQUEST 20 2 BC-AD

14

return to

Ita ly he was c riticize d for fighting a

war without th e

approval

of th e

an d People of

Rome

an d only narrowly escaped condemnation after

biliz ing a ll his friends

an d

relatives a m on g t he

s en at or s. I n t hi s

view Roman

ansion was

th e

result of a never-e nding sea rc h for fre sh peoples to

defeat an d

in

order to s up pl y t he a ri st oc ra cy s

demand

fo r wealth

and

glory,

and

a

constant supply

of

th e

slaves

on which th e

economy of

Italy ha d

ome based.

There

were blatant examples of such triumph hunting but its extent should

t be exaggerated. Some provinces offered

plenty

of opportunities fo r f ig ht in g a

aign which

could

be

presented

as

being in

Rome s interest.

The

frequency of

warfare against

Spanish, Thracian

an d

Gallic tribe s led to a law

being

stipulating th at at least 5,000 opponents needed to

have

b ee n k ill ed i n

for the victorious commander to

be

e li gi bl e f or a triumph. ~ w e v e r th e

of

t he R om an a ri st oc ra cy d id

no t

always

lead

t o c on st an t

annual

wa r

an d

some

consuls seem to have made little

effort

to secure themselves a

c omma nd. Compe tition

among

senators

sometimes had th e

effect

of

expansion.

The Roman constitution

was

based

around

th e

principle

that

on e

element

in th e state and c er ta in ly n o single politician should hold

whelming power.

Magistracies

were held

fo r

only a year, and there

wa s

at least

on e

colleague

of equal rank. While politicians

were

eager

to add

their

own reputation

the y were even

more

keen to prevent rivals

fro m g ai ni ng

o

much influence.

There

is

much truth in

this

picture

of

senators

as

inherently

aggressive,

b ut i t

far to o simplistic as a n e xpla na tion for Roman

imperialism.

Rome

ma y

have

ared geared

t o c on st an t a nn ua l

warfare

but

i n f ac t

th e

intensity

of Roman

r making an d expansion varied i m m e n s e l ~

There were periods of several

d uri ng t he

second

century Cwhen

very few

wars

were fought, an d

then

on a

small

scale, an d much of t he g re at t er ri to ri al e xp an si on o cc ur re d in

intense bursts. The

Romans

were no t

unusual

in fighting

frequent

wars, bu t

relentless

quality

of

their

wa r making

was

distinc tive . As we have see n

in the

st c ha pter, a

Roman

wa r

c ou ld only e nd wh en t he e ne my

ceased

to

be a

threat

eit her b een absorbed

as a

subordinate

ally

or

destroyed

as a

political

If this outcome was no t fully achieved in a single war, then further conflicts

almost

inevitable until

th e

Romans ha d achieved their aim.

The

Ro man s p ro vo ked

th e Third

Punic

Wa r

149-146

C

an d utterly

Carthage

w he n t he y

felt

that she was starting

to

re-emerge

as an

power,

having

finally

paid o ff t he i nd em ni ty of th e Secon d Pu ni c

ar. A defeated

enemy

di d no t necessarily

need

to be annexed

a nd t ur n ed

into a

vi nce. I n f ac t t he R om an s were reluctant to

establish

ne w provinces and

rease the

number

of overseas

garrisons supplied

by

their

citizen a r m ~ After

th e

Macedonian

War,

th e kingdom s power wa s curbed

bu t

it retained

it s

ndence. Following

th e

Third

Wa r th e kingdom

was

dissolved

an d

replaced

four self-governing regions.

It

wa s

only

when

these

regional governments

ha d



ROMAN

WARFARE

Caesar s route withdate

X

site of battle

major Gallic settlement

major ritish hill fort

•

major Roman city

failed

to

cope with th e invasion

of

the pretender Andriscus an d t he Fou rt h Wa r

that

the R om an

province

of

Macedonia

wa s

created. Nor

were th e

Romans

always swift to

exploit

th e resources

of their

provinces an d it was several decades

after

th e

creation

of

t h ei r Spani sh

provinces that they

began

to

derive

much

benefit f ro m t he

area s mineral

wealth.

Roman expansion was

a

complex p ro ce ss w hi ch

varied

i n i nt en si ty an d

nature.

If on e characteristic typifies

t he Roman s

an d especially th e senators at

this period

it

was

their supreme

self-confidence. Roman senators ha d long come



WOR LD CONQUEST

202

BC-AD 14

consider themselves

the equal of an y

foreign king. Their atti tude

wa s

reflected

the

confrontation

between

th e Roman

embassy,

headed

by

th e

ex-consul

Gaius

ilius Laenas, an d Antiochus IV of Syria

in

167 BC . When th e Seleucids invaded

pt, Rome di d no t

send

an army to

defend

he r ally,

bu t only

a

small

group of

When

Antiochus

politely offered his

hand

to Popilius,

th e

Roman

thrust

a

tablet

containing

th e Senate s ultimatum into

it. The

king

with

a

demand

for his immediate withdrawal

from Egypt said that he

discuss th e m at te r w it h his advisers before giving a The impatient

pilius used

th e

p oi nt o f his

staff

t o d ra w in th e dust enclosing Antiochus

in

a

a nd d em an di ng a n answer before he stepped o ut o f it. The astonished king

epted the

terms without question. Th e

R om an a tt it ud e t o foreign powers

was

high-handed

frequently reverting to

th e

use

or

threat

of

force.

ITALY

225 BC t he l as t g re at Gallic r ai d i nt o c en tr al

I ta ly w as

trapped between

tw o

armies an d destroyed. For

th e next

fifty years

th e

Romans

assumed the

against

th e

C el ti c t ri be s of that

area

o f n or th er n Italy known

as

salpine Gau . Hannibal s arrival encouraged renewed hostility, an d

on e

officer, H am il ca r c o nt in ue d t o l ea d t he tr ib es a ga in st R om e

fo r

veral years after

t he S ec on d Punic

War, until

he was killed

in b at tl e. The

i n C is al pi ne

Gaul

only

a few

hundred

kilometres from

Rome was

supervised

by

th e Senate which committed considerable resources of

to th e subjugation of th e area.

Battles f ou gh t a ga in st t he

Gallic

tribes

were

in m an y ways similar to those

against

Carthaginian or Hellenistic opponents. There were

the same

a n d r it ua l challenges before a battle

each

side reluctant

to risk

combat

il every possible

advantage had been gained. Normally

th e

Roman generals

classed Gallic l ea de rs i n t hi s t en ta ti ve manoeuvring much as Hannibal

ha d

th e first R om an s s en t a ga in st h im . T ri ba l a rm ie s

were

clumsy and it

as difficult for their

leaders

t o m an oe uv re

them

during a battle.

They were

of

tw o

elements:

th e

warrior bands

supported

by

each

nobleman

an d

e

mass

of th e ordinary tribesmen. Noblemen displayed

their

status

by th e

an d fame of th e warriors who lived at their expense

u nd er a n

obligation

fight for them. These ba nds were semi-permanent and provided a well

an d

highly motivated nucleus to any

Gallic

r ~

They

were fa r

by th e

mass of ordinary

warriors composed

of

all free tribesmen

e to equip themselves,

an d

loosely grouped by family

an d clan relationships.

llic leaders

fought at th e

head

of their

followers,

inspiring them

by their

prowess. Tactics were simple an d relied on a headlong charge by a

eaming mass of warriors. Th e first charge of a

Gallic

army

wa s

a dreadful

b ut t he R om an s

believed

that

if

they

could

withstand

this onslaught then

e

Gauls

would

steadily tire and

become

vulnerable. Classical

literature

claims

the

barbarians

were

poorly conditioned an d

easily tired by

strenuous

activity

CAESAR S

C AMPAIGNS IN

GAUL

Benefiting from a political

alliance with Pompey and

Crassus, ]ulius Caesar was

able to secure an

extraordinary five- later

extended to ten-) year

command of the two Callic

provinces and Illyria. Early

interventions in Callia

omata hairy Caul , the

area outside the Roman

province) against the

migrat ing Helveti i an the

ermanwar leader

Ariovistus, led on to further

conflicts

with

more distant

tribes, till Caesar s legions

had

subdued the whole area.

To attract public attention

at Rome Caesar staged two

expeditions to the

mysterious island of Britain.

He

was to face two

major

rebellions, one in the winter

of 54-53

amongst the

Belgic tribes and another a

year later uniting much of

aul underthe leadership of

Vercingetorix. Caesar left

aula rich

man

his wealth

mostly derived from the

hundreds

of

thousands of

captives sold into slavery, at

the head of an efficient and

fanatically loyal

army

willing to fight against his

political opponents.



ROM N W RF RE

aesar drives the 90 000 strong

army of Gauls

into

the hilltop

fortress of Alesia He then builds

siege walls of contravallination and

circumvallation

of about

14miles in

circumference

A huge Gallic relief army comes to

the rescue of Vercingetorix

SIEGE OF LESI

In

Vercingetorix

ttempted

to starve Caesars

rmy

into submission

refusing to join battle

nd

trying to

ut them off

from

supplies Caesar pursued the

retreating Gallic army

eventually cornering

them

in

the hill town of Alesia

There he fenced the

enemy

in

with twin

lines

of

fortification repulsing the

massive relieving

rmy

sent

to save the Gallic leader

86



WORLD CONQUEST 20 2 BC-AD 14

ntually unable to

out Vercingetorix

one version

ng his arms

t

Caesar s

nd then sitting

down

ely waiting to be led

Caesar

having collected food

and

supplies continues

to

besiege Alesia

whilst fighting off relief

attempts

by Gauls Fierce fighting ensues as

the Romans repulse the defenders

trying

to

break

ou t

a n d t he relieving

army trying t o b re a k in

Th e

heaviest

attacks

are o n t he

vulnerable camp D On the final

day s fighting Caesar leads his

reserves in person to smash the

Gallic

attack

Driven

t o t he

edge of

starvation

Vercingetorix eventually

surrenders to Caesar



ROMAN

WARFARE

OPPOSITE:

The Via

ppia

connecting Rome with

Capua and the Campanian

plain was built in

312 C

under the orders

of

the

n s o ~ ppiusClaudius

Caecus.

n

important

aspect

of Romes

absorption

of

conquered territory was

to construct roads linking

new

colonies to

Rome

and

increasingly to each other.

Built on a monumental

scale Roman roads

combined practical utility

with visually impressive

statements of power.

Vercingetorix was a

chieftain of the

rverniwho

managed to unite most

of

the tribes

of

Gaul

and

lead

them

in a massive rebellion

against Caesar in 52

C

Forced to surrender

at

the

siege

of

Alesia he was

imprisoned and eventually

suffered the fate of many

enemy leaders being ritually

strangled in Caesar s Gallic

triumph.

an d

h ea t. B ut p ro ba bl y t he m ai n r ea so n why t he Romans were likely to

wi n

a

prolonged

combat

was their trip ex acies formation

that

allowed

them to

reinforce

threatened parts of

th e line.

Individually

th e R om an s were better

equipped a nd a rm o ur ed

than

t he majo ri ty of Celtic warriors but there is little

indication

of

the great superiority

w hich Caesar s

troops

in the first century BC

would display against similar

Gallic

opponents. Gallic

a rm ie s d id

successfully

ambush Roman columns on the march for instance destroying most of the army

commanded

by th e praetor Lucius Postumius

in

216 BC

bu t

this was only possible

when th e Gauls

h ad h ad

enough time to

muster

their whole army along the likely

route

of

th e

Roman advance. Mustering a Gallic a rm y a nd

then

deploying it for

battle was a slow

procedure

an d

it

is

notable that

very often tribes were unable

to

form a n ar my until th e

Romans

ha d attacked their territory ravaged their fields

a nd t he n begun to withdraw.

On e

heavy def eat in

battle

was usually enough to force a Hellenistic monarch

to

s ee k t er ms .

Each

Gallic

tribe

was

separate an d had to

be

defeated

in turn.

A victory over a neighbouring

t ri be m ig ht

overawe

other

peoples bu t it di d

not

in i tself force them to

capitulate.

When

every free m al e i n t he t ri be was able

to

f ight as a

warrior battle

casualties

were easier

to

absorb

than

among

professional armies. N ot only that but th e tribes themselves were

divided into clans an d

factions.

Most included a

number

of

powerful

chieftains

or

sub-kings on e

of

whom might be

recognized as

th e

monarch of th e whole tribe. Each leader headed

a

faction

w it hi n t he

tribe

which

would

grow

or

decline

depending

on his achievements an d t he n um be rs

of

w ar ri or s w ho m he

at tract ed t o an y

expedition

varied according

to

his reputation. A

peace

negotiated

with a tribe

di d no t

guarantee the acceptance of

all i ts members.

Warfare

p layed a

central

role in Gallic s o i t ~

Leaders

needed wealth t o s up po rt their band of

followers an d

th e

most

common

way

of

gaining this was by r aiding. Raids an d

counter-raids figured heavily in

th e

campaigns in Cisalpine Gau .

A favourite target for th e Celts were th e colonies which th e

Romans

ha d settled

north of

th e

Po

an d

these were frequently beleaguered

an d

sometimes

sacked.

Th e settlement of large

numbers

of citizens

in

colonies in Cisalpine Gaul was

an u nu su al feature

of

Roman imperialism at this period. Their presence was an

added source of friction with

th e

Gauls an d Ligurians as

th e

settlers pressed for

m or e l an d a nd divided up confiscated

tribal

territory

into

regular squares by the

Roman process

of

cent uri at io n. T h ey emph as ized

th e

permanence

of

Roman

occupation as

di d

th e

roads

that were

constructed.

Earlier Roman

roads

ha d

always begun

at

Rome itself linking th e city directly to a n ew a re a

of

settlement.

In 187 BC th e Via A em il ia wa s constructed

con necti ng t he

tw o colonies of

Arminum an d

Placentia

th e

first

Ro man ro ad

designed

to

be excessively straight.

A straight l ine may be

th e

shortest distance between two points bu t i t is seldom



WORLD

CONQUEST

2 2 BC AD

14



ROMAN WARFARE

the easiest rout ,and a road stretching

straight

f rom one horizon to the next was

a powerful

statement

of control over conquered t e r r i t o r ~ It was also, in

that

characteristically

Roman

way

of combining the

impressive

and

the

practical,

a

valuable means of strategic movement.

The

process

of

consolidating and

organizing

the province continued

throughout the

century, converting individual

settlements

linked

to Rome into

a coherent unit.

At the same

time,

the Romans

attitude towards their Empire as a whole

began

to change, and it gradually began

to

assume a greater air of permanence. At first

each

province was viewed as

distinct

and individually

connected

to

R om e. I n

171 BC, at

the

beginning of the

Third Macedonian

War,

both

consuls

had

hoped to be given command against

Perseus,

and

the

unsuccessful man had been

sent

with an

army

to

the

frontier

with Illyria to protect colonists in the area.

This

man, Cassius Longinus, decided

on

his own initiative

to

march his army overland to Macedonia. By chance

the

Senate heard of

his expedition

and

w er e able

to

send a commission to

restrain

him. On the one hand this is just another example

of

the

Roman

aristocracy s lust

for glory affecting their behaviour in the provinces, but it also shows

that

the

Romans were

beginning

to

conceive

of

their

provinces

as

being linked

to each

other g e o g r p h i c l l ~ In the las t decades of

the

century,

the Romans

mounted a

series

of campaigns

to defeat

the

tribes

of

southern Gaul, creating the province of

Transalpine

Gaul modern

Provence

to provide

a secure

land

rou te to

their

Spanish provinces. Gradually a coherent empire began to emerge f rom a

collection

of

individual conquered peoples.

SPAIN

After the Second Punic War

Rome

maintained a permanent military presence in

Spain to ensure that

a

second Hannibal could no t

use

it

as a base for an invasion

of Spain was populated by three main groups: the Lusitanians in the west,

Iberians

in the

south and east and

the Celtiberians in

the

north. Tribal groupings

were

looser

than

in

Gaul and each small fortified town was

effectively

independent. Divisions were common within communities and leaders tended to

enjoy power for

only

as long as they were militarily successful.

There

were no real

equivalents

to

the kings

of

Gallic tribes. There were many

misunderstandings

as

the Romans attempted to negotiate with authorities whom

they

believed

spoke

for

an

entire community,

only

to discover

that

this w as

not

so. On one occasion a

Roman commander

was attacked

and

his baggage plundered by warriors

from

a

tribe with which he

had

just concluded a t r e t ~ Soon afterwards a contingent of

cavalry from the

same tribe

arrived to serve as auxiliaries in his army as

had

been

agreed in

the

t r e t ~ The confused

Romans held them responsible for

the raid

and

had

them pu t in chains. Spanish society was difficult to understand for men who

only s er ve d f or one

year in

the provinces.

The

fragmentation of social

and

political structures in Spain had been

exacerbated by decades

of warfare

as first

the Carthaginians and then

the

Romans had

fought

to

establish

their power

in t he

r egion. A

growing population worsened the situation, particularly

as a c areer of



WORLD

CONQUEST

20 2

BC-AD 14

y service with Cartha ge was no

longer

available to landless

young

men

Raiding an d

banditry

became more frequent.

Continual wa rfa re hinde re d

in turn e ncoura ge d more c ommunities to

supple me nt their

ng by raiding others. Groups of

landless

me n banded together to raid the

communities. The

motivation

for this activity was

brutally

If a community

was

perceived

to be

w eak it w ould

be

attacked

if

then

it

would

be avoided

or alliance

sought

with

it

Raid provoked

t o m ai nt ai n a continuous cycle of plundering

which

might easily

into

formal battles.

The Romans

attempted

t o c o ns tr u ct a network of

ed peoples

to create

stability in

their Spanish

provinces To preserve this

they

to prevent or

avenge

a ny r aid s on their

allies

Failure

to do

so

or

a

n defeat

however

small

e ncoura ge d more wide spre ad a tta c ks and allied

to

defect

One

solution was

to resettle

th e landless

warriors elsewhere

The Romans

done something similar with th e Ligurians a mountain people of north-west

who possessed

an even more dispa ra te and fragmented political structure

t he S pa ni ar ds . L ar ge

numbers

of Ligurians

ha d

been

forcibly

deported

on fertile

land

elsewhere

in

Italy

a nd t ur ne d

into

stable an d peaceful

ers In 150

th e

governor

o f F ur th er

Spain

Servius Sulpicius Galba

th e

surrender of a band of

Lusitanians an d

promised

to provide

them

plots of

land

in

a fert ile a rea

Th e Lusitanians had been

plundering

th e

province for several years inflicting several

defeats

on

Roman forces

by th e

previous governor an d

forced

to

accept

peace

th e

tribes

ha d

t o r ai di ng after

his departure

excu si ng t hi s breach

of a treaty by

that poverty forced

t he m t o a tt ac k their

neighbours.

Galba disarmed th e

t he m a nd their families into

three

groups an d then ordered his

to

massacre

them all

On

his r et ur n t o

Rome Galba wa s

prosecuted

fo r

k in g fai th

with

th e Lusitanians bu t wa s

acquitted

after mobilizing

his

tions in

th e

Senate

and

in

a

desperate

gesture

bringing

his

weeping

children

the court

in

an effort to invoke

t he p it y

of th e Galba went on to

become

of

t he mo st famou s

orators

of

his day bu t never

again

c omma nde d a n

r ~

ilar atrocity had been

committed

in

th e

other

Spanish

province a few years

re when the praetor Lucullus ha d launched

an

unprovoked

attack

on

a

tribe

epted their

surrender

a nd t he n

mas sacred t hem. T hese

were both

examples

of

behaviour at its

worst

yet

t he t wo

commanders evaded

prosecution.

Such

dents lend

support to th e

idea

of the Romans

as

brutal

imperialists individual

rnors seeking ou t vulnerable foreign peoples to

butcher

for

th e

l oo t a n d

l o r ~

are also indications

of th e frustration

felt by many Roma n c ommanders at

apparent

impossibility

of winning

a

permanent v icto ry i n

Spain

The

events

he n ex t

decades were

to

reinforce this

opinion.

On e

of th e

few survivors of Galba s massacre

was

a Lusitanian

named

wh o

was soon to

emerge

as a n inspira tional

leader an d

a

skilled

defeating

or

evading all

th e Roman

forces

s en t again st h im. He

is an



R O M A N WARFARE

King ]ugurtha

of Numidia

waged a long war against

the

Romans

between

2

and

6

C

humiliating

them

in

when

he forced

a Roman army to surrender

and pass under the yoke. s

a young man he had

commanded an auxiliary

contingent with great

distinction at the siege

of

Numantia

encouraging a

Roman belief

that

their

most dangerous opponents

were men

whom

they

themselves had taught

how

to fight. Eventually one of

]ugurtha s allies was

persuaded to betray him to

the

Romans and

he was

taken prisoner ending the

war.

example

of th type

of chari smati c l ead er w ho o ften ap peared

after t ~ n t l

stages of Roman

conquest

had destroyed

traditional

power structures in an area

Other

examples would include Vercingetorix in G au l a nd Arminius in Germany

b oth o f whom

were able to

lead

very large

armies

drawn

from

confederations of

tribes

The

basis

of

their power was personal

an d

t en ded t o collapse as soon as

th e

leader disappeared f rom

th e scene Viriathus was

murdered

by a treacherous

subordinate wh o hoped for rew ard from Rome. The Emperor Tiberius would

later refuse an offer made by a

German chieftain

to

assassinate Arminius

bu t

only

because successful Ro man camp ai gn s had checked

t he l at ter s

power an d

removed an y threat he posed. In other circumstances when

th e

continuance of a

conflict rested solely

on

th e perseverance

of

a single leader

the Romans arr anged

t he t re ac he ro us c ap tu re

o f J ug ur th a

of

Numidia

in 106

BC

or mounted

attacks

with

th e primary

objective

of

killing

th e

enemy

commander.

Encouraged by Viriathus successes another rebellion against Rome

ha d developed

in

northern Spain

centred

around

th e

city

of Numantia.

Large

bu t poorly

led

an d

unprepared

Roman armies

advanced against the

rebels

an d

suffered disaster An army commanded by Gaius

Hostilius

Mancinus wa s surrounded

by the Celtiberians

an d

forced t o s urrend er in

137

BC

t he Romans accepting peace on equal t er ms t o t he N um an ti ne s. T he

Senate refused

to

ratify

the treaty and sent back Mancinus naked

an d in chains

to the Numantines wh o refused to receive him. The Romans elected Scipio

Aemilianus

th e

man

wh o

had destroyed Carthage

to a second

consulship

an d

gave

hi m

th e

command i n S pa in .

Scipio

carefully

ret rain ed t he

troops

in

th e

province

an d added to the men

he

had brought with

him leading

a n arm y of

sixty thousand

m en a gain st

th e

N umantines.

Despite

his

g re at n um er ic al

superiority he refused to face th e eight thousand Numantines in battle so great

was th e advantage in morale they

had gained

over

the

Roman troops. Instead he

blockaded Numantia building a wall strengthened by forts t o s u rro un d the city

After a

long

struggle in which

the starving

defenders are alleged to have resorted

to cannibalism

th e

Numantines

surrendered

an d

th e city

w as d es tr oy ed i n

BC .

The

fall

o f N um an ti a

m ark ed th e e nd

of

intensive campaigning in Spain

although

the peninsula

was

not

fully pacified for

more than

a century

T H E RISE OF

THE

PROFESSIONAL ARMY

The second

half

of

th e

second century BC was a s or ry c ha pt er i n Roman military

history

Viriathus an d

th e

Numantines

humiliated successive Roman armies in

Spain an d

t he o nly

major defeat of

th e

Macedonian wars

occurred

in

149

BC

when a motley army of Thracians led by a p re te nd er t o t he throne defeated a

Roman force

an d

killed th e

praetor in

command. Rome

ha d

provoked

th e

Third

Punic Wa r

o ut o f

fear

that

Carthage was rebuilding her strength bu t the opening

of t he c am p ai gn

i n Af ri ca

saw b ad ly t rai ned

an d

poorly led Roman soldiers

suffering

on e disaster after another. The Romans

eventually

wo n

all

of

these

conflicts an d

th e

utter destruction

of

Carthage in 146 BC

conformed

to the trend



WORLD

CONQUEST

20 2

BC-AD 14

R om an w ar far e b ec om in g simultaneously more

an d less successful.

Th e

atrocities committed

a in

in the

150s have

already b een mentioned

it is probable that

Polybius

description of th e

of th e

Roman

sack of

a city where no t

only

bu t even

dogs

were

slaughtered an d

was most

typical of

this

p er io d. T hi s

city was a product of frustration at

th e

difficulty

complete

victory an d fear produced by

unexpected defeats.

Nearly every

campaign

in

th e

rest

of th e century

owed the

same

pattern

of

early disasters before a

longed effort

brought

v t o r ~ T he w ar w it h

th e

king Jugurtha

112-106 C

r es ul te d i n

ndals as troops deserted

en masse

an d

were

found

to be

either

incompetent or

been

bribed

by

th e n ~

The first

Roma n a rmy

to the

war

surrendered an d

suffered

th e

of

being

sent under the yoke. Th e

Germanic

tribes

of

th e

Cimbri

an d

threatened Italy

itself

after they had

shed a series of Roman armies

sent against

them. Th e casualties

at

Arausio in

Cwere on

t he s ame

scale as

those

at Cannae with allegedly eighty thousand

falling. Alarm

at th e

prospect

of

a repeat of th e

G al li c s ack caused such

that

for

th e last time in th eir hi sto ry th e R om an s

performed a

human

burying

alive a

Greek

an d a Gallic m an an d w om an

in

th e

forum.

A major

factor

in

t hese d is as ters w as

Roman overconfidence. The

defeat

of

kingdoms of the Hellenistic world the

conquest of

Cisalpine

Gaul

an d th e

up to Grac chus se ttleme nt

in

Spain

were

all

fought

by

armies an d

raised

in

th e h ar d

school

of th e

w ar w it h H an ni ba l.

The intense

of th e

first

q ua rt er o f

t he c en tu ry

wa s

fo llowed by a relatively

eful twenty-five years

broken

only by

th e Third

Macedonian War.

Gradually

collected experience of the generation of th e

Second Punic

Wa r

was

lost. A

generation

grew

up

wh o ha d forgotten

that

th e

earlier

successes were th e

of

careful preparation

an d training and

assumed

that victory c ame

as a

of

course

simply

b ec au se t he y

were

Roman.

Fewer

of th e ordinary

rs were veterans an d many of their inexperienced officers either thought

it was unnecessary or

di d no t

know

ho w

to turn t he m i nt o effective units. If

had served

in other campaigns t hey w ere

as likely to have

experienced

eats as victories. Many of th e successes of Viriathus

an d

th e Numantines were

n

over

more numerous

Roman

forces.

The

changing

situation

placed

a

great

strain on th e

m il it ia s ys te m

as

garrisons needed

to

be

maintained

in

many of th e

overseas provinces.

The Gallic hill town of

Roquepertuse was sacked by

the

Romans

in the 120s C

It included this important

shrine built in stone like the

Greek temples of nearby

Massilia but decorated

with

severed heads set into niches

in the wall Head hunting

was practised

by many

of

the peoples of Iron ge

Europe but was especially

important to the Gauls

whose

religion invested the

head with great importance

A similar shrine has been

excavated at the nearby

town of Entremont also

taken by the Romans in this

period during the creation

of

the province

of

Gallia

Narbonensis modern day

Provence

93



ROM N W RF RE

BELOW This statue of a

young clean-shaven

nd

short-haired Gallic warrior

found t Vacheres in France

represents one of the best

equipped

members

of

a

tribal

w r

band.

e

carries

an oval shield has a long

slashing sword on his right

hip nd wears a coat

o f

m il

armour.

RIGHT This battle scene

from the Arch o f Orange

commemor tes the defeat of

one o f the occasional Gallic

rebellions

th t

occurred in

the seventy years after

Caesar s conquest. Probably

dating to the reign of

Tiberius

it

provides an

excellent p i ~ t i o n of the

equipment worn by

legionaries nd auxiliary

cavalrymen in the early

first century D



WORLD

CONQUEST 2 2 BC AD



R O M A N WARFARE

The

ol d ideal

of

th e citizen farmer, w ho o wn ed eno ug h

property

to equip himself

as a soldier

an d

served for a campaigning season before returning to till his fields,

was

under

threat.

Such a

ma n

faced ruination i f he was unable t o t en d his

land

for

a

decade

of service in a legion

in

Spain. In

th e

latter part of

th e

second century

Romans believed that th e numbers of citizens

owning

e no ug h l an d

to

qualify

them for military service was dwindling. Increasingly large stretches of Italy ha d

been swallowed

up

by

great

estates or latifundia ,

owned

by aristocrats enriched

by Roman expansion an d worked by

gangs

of

slaves captured

in

foreign wars.

Scholarly opinion

remains

divided over th e real extent of this

problem

some

claiming that free

yeoman

farmers were flourishing i n s om e p ar ts o f Italy,

bu t

i t is

clear that

t he Romans

believed

their

previously inexhaustible supply of military

manpower wa s under threat. Even if the number

of

potential recruits h ad n ot

fallen by that much

th e

numerous setbacks suffered by Roman armies may well

have created

th e

impression that

their

quality had declined.

Traditionally, Marius the general

wh o

w on the w ar w ith Jugurtha an d then

defeated

the Cimbri has

been credited with converting

th e

Roman army from a

militia raised through universal

conscription

into a professional army recruited

from volunteers. Certainly, before leaving to take command of the

army

in Africa,

Marius

appealed

for volunteers from

the

class known as th e capite censi citizens

who did not possess enough

property

to make them liable to service in th e

legions .

More

recently, scholars have i nt er pr et ed t he

change

as occurring

gradually, pointing to earlier measures to reduce t he mi ni mum qualification for

service an d equip soldiers at t he s tate s expense. T he re d o appear to have been

A

Roman

copy of a

Hellenistic original the

Dying aul one of the

finest pieces of Classical art

symbolizing both

the

splendour of barbarian

races

and

their inevitable

defeat by civilization. The

long moustache and the

limed

hair

combed

up to

create

an

intimidating spiky

effect are common in

literary descriptions of

Celts as the heroic nudity.



WORLD

CONQUEST

20 2

BC-AD

14

97

This coin commemorates

the oman victory in the

Social War 90-88 BC the

last great rebellion by the

Italian allies or socii. It was

a fierce struggle fought

between similarly equipped

and trained armies which

the omans won as

much by

conciliation as military

force.

Marius introduced the eagle

aquila)

as

the most

important standard of the

legion. Initially silver most

were later gilded. he eagle

symbolized the pride and

corporate identity of the

increasingly permanent

legions

o f

the professional

army.

men wh o viewed

military

ser vice as a

career

before these changes. Livy tells

f

one such professional soldier, Spurius Ligustinus,

wh o

first enrolled

e army in 200 BC an d

ha d

served twenty-two years i n G re ec e

an d

n bef or e his re-enlistment for th e

Third Ma c edonia n

War. Highly

Ligustinus

ha d

ser ved all

bu t

tw o years as a centurion,

increasingly

senior

posts,

culminating in t ha t o f primus pilus.

pattern of

service would

no t

have been much

out

of p la ce i n

th e

of t he E mp ir e, an d in fa ct Livy

presents

his

career

in a style

similar to th e memorial inscriptions

that

were beginning

popular with soldiers in th e late first century

BC .

Ligustinus is

sented as

th e

ideal

farmer

soldier, since Livy takes care to

p oi nt o u t t ha t

ill

f ar med the

plot

of

land he

ha d

been lef t by his f ather, w here his w if e

ha d

e h im

six sons an d tw o

daughters.

What

is

interesting

is that t hi s s ma ll

ng was not of sufficient size to have rendered hi m liable to military service

an d

that

his army service

had

been voluntary. How

common such

semi-

essionals were is impossible to estimate,

no r

ca n we k no w w heth er mo st such

were to be

found

among

th e

centurionate

rather than th e r an k a nd

file.

Although we

cannot

precisely t ra ce t he

process of

chang e, t he

character of

army ha d changed irrevocably by th e first

century

BC .

The soldiers were

no w

mainly f ro m th e landless p oo r, m en for whom military service wa s a

rather

than

a

temporary

interlude in their

normal

o ccu p at io n . A ft er t he

al War , w hich saw t he l as t g re at

rebellion

of some of

Rome s

Italian allies,

citizenship was e xt en de d t o m uc h

of

the Italian peninsula.

The

ol d

alae

an d all Italians were

now recruited

into

th e

legions.

e legions became

more

permanent,

an d

b eg an t o develop a

i nc t i dent ity, a process acceler ated by

Marius

of th e five standards

of

a legion a boar, a

, a

horse,

an eagle

an d

a minotaur

with

a s in gl e

er eagle. All the old distinctions based

on

an d age were swept

w y

Th e cavalry

velites disappeared an d all legionaries were

heavy infantry a rm ed w it h th e pilum

an d

wearing mail armour, a b ro nze h elmet

an d

ying a long, oval shield.

The

main

tactical

sub-unit

the legion was

now the

cohort instead of th e

Each of a legion s te n cohorts

consisted

me n divided into thr ee maniples, each

of

centuries of eighty me n

commanded

by a

Th e

six tribunes w er e st il l t he se ni or

permanently

a tt ac he d t o

a unit,

bu t

it bec ame

common for

on e

of

th e a rm y c om ma nd er s

often

a senior

subordinate

or

legatus

to

be

in

effective

Th e origins of

th e cohort

ar e

obscure.

Polybius



R O M A N WARFARE

O n e c o h or t comprising

of six centuries (480 men)

,

,,

RIGHT:

The backbone of the

professional army were the

long service centurions, like

these

on

the second-century

monument

at Adamklissi

In undress

uniform

without

armour

or

helmets, they wear

their swords on the left hip,

unlike ordinary legionaries

who

wore

them on

the right.

A LEGION

OF T E N C O HO R TS

The basic tactical

unit of

professional legions was the

cohort, each with a paper

strength of 480

men

ten

of

these replacing the thirty

maniples

of

the earlier legion.

It

unclear

how

large the

intervals were between units.

A depth

of

si x ranks seems to

the

most common

formation

for the cohort,

and

since lines

three deep

and

columns

marching six abreast are also

recorded, the Roman r y ~ s

drill was probably based

on

1nultiples

of

three, although

depths

of

four, eight

and

ten are also recorded.- . ,.

t ··

~ ~ ~ b l ~

1

tt t

- --

One centur y compr ising of

six ranks of

thirteen men plus one centurion in

f ro n t a n d a n o p ti o

(the centurion s second

in-command behind the

rear

rank

8 men)



WORLD

CONQUEST

202

BC AD 14

t ions the term twice both

in

connection with Scipio s army

in Spain

in the

ond Punic War and in an

ambiguous

passage maybe implying

that

it consisted

three maniples as was later to be the case. Livy uses the term anachronistically

t we do know

that

allied contingents were usually called cohorts although we

not know their size

or

internal structure. It is possible

that

a

cohort

was a term

any

unit

smaller.

than

a legion but

larger than

a maniple.

The cohort

appears

have been adopted on an

d

hoc basis by

the

legions in Spain during

the second

BC. Muc h of

the campaigning in Spain

was on

a relatively small scale

each community

might have

to

be defeated in

tu rn . The old

lines

of the

legion were

no t

effective tactical units for independent

operations. The

its

own

command

structure

and with

men

used to

working

together

y well have fulfilled a need for forces smaller

than

a legion.

The new legion was more flexible

in

every respect

than

i ts predecessor . I ts

formation was in the

triplex acies with

the cohorts deployed

in

the

pattern but it could as effectively deploy into one two

or

four lines.

e

uniformly equipped

and

sized

cohorts could

be

deployed anywhere

unlike

maniples which

had

been restricted to f ixed positions. I t w as

much

e as ie r fo r a

CIVIL

WARS

o m ~ s greatest period of

exp nsion coincided with

nd

was intim tely linked to

a series o f violent civil wars

as various successful

comm nders

vied for

supremacy These

campaigns were fought no t

just in Italy but all round

the Mediterranean Caesar

failed as dictator to establish

a perm nent peace

nd

it

was

only after nother

thirteen years

o f w r th t

his nephew

nd dopted

son

ct vi n m n ged to bring

a lasting peace from civil

w r

to

the exh usted

Empire

99



ROMAN WARFARE

co mm an der to control an d

pass

orders to ten cohorts

each

with

the ir own

commanders

than

i t was to do the same with thirty maniples Roman armies had

always

become

more efficient through long service training and experience of

success but the greater permanence of the new legions made it easier to preserve

this

accumulated experience With professionalization Roman

armies began

to

show far greater ability in

the

more technical

aspects of

warfare Caesar could

call f rom the ranks of his legions men able to design and build bridges or ships

an d

engineers

to

prosecute a siege

The

average efficiency of Roman

armies

greatly increased

an d

campaigns were less often delayed when experienced

legions

had to

be

discharged an d

replaced by newly raised units

There was a major disadvantage to the

new

system The professional soldier

PHARSALUS

PHASE

I

Enipeus

SYRIAN 0

LEGIONS

o

LUCIUS

DOMITIUS

AHENOBARBUS

CILICIAN

LEGION

Z

AND

SPANISH

COHORTS

CAVALRY

GNAEUS

DOMITIUS

CALVINUS

PUBLIUS SULLA

CAESAR

Battle of Pharsalus: Phase 1

IX

Our sources for the battle of

Pharsalus in are

remarkably good and

although vague about the

exact location

of

the

battlefield allow us to

represent the armies down

to the level of the individual

cohorts. Pompey s legions

were stronger but less

experienced than Caesars.

e

ordered his cohorts to

deploy ten deep

and await

the

enemy

charge at the halt

hoping t o k ee p his raw

soldiers in a dense

formation and prevent them

from running away. Pompey

was relying upon his

numerically superior cavalry

to outflank the

enemy

right

and roll

up

Caesar s line.

Caesars cohorts covered

much

the same

frontage as

their opponents so were

probably formed five or six

ranks deep. Realizing the

threat to his right flank

Caesar took one

cohort

from the third line

of

each

legion and formed them into

a fourth line angled back

and concealed behind his

cavalry.



WORLD CONQUEST 202 BC AD 14

recru it ed f rom the

poor and

had no source of livelihood once he was

from the army. The

Senate refused

to take

responsibility

for

lized soldiers

and

made no provision for them or their families since by

t he a rm ie s were sti ll

supposed

to be filled with

men

of property serving ou t

duty.

The army

ceased

to

represent

the whole Roman people under arms and

came more

and more separate f rom the rest of society their loyalty

focusing

on their legion than

on

Rome Soldiers came

to

depend

on

their

to

provide

t hem with a plot of land on discharge Charismatic

nerals such as Sulla Pompey and Caesar created

armies far

more loyal to their

than

they were to the state. This added

an

increasingly

violent

dimension

Rome s competitive politics. The professional

armies

w ere as often se t to fight

other legions as they were against the foreign enemies of Rome.

Battle

of

Pharsalus: Phase 2 and 3

VIII

MARKANTONY

GNAEUS

DOMITIUS

CALVINUS

PUBLIUS SULLA

Enipeus

CILICIAN LEGION

- - - - - AND SPANISH COHORTS

o

o

/

PHARSALUS:

PHASES 2

AND

3

Labienus led ompeys

massed cavalry against

Caesar s right wing

and

soon put

the

enemy

horsemen to flight.

However in the process the

recently raised Pompeian

squadrons lost their order

and

merged into

one

great

mass. Suddenly Caesars

fourth line advanced from

behind

the

main army and

charged the milling mass

of

cavalry stampeding them to

the

re r

Elsewhere the

main

lines

had

clashed in a fierce

struggle Caesars superbly

disciplined men

stopping

to

re-form when they realized

that

the Pompeian foot were

not

advancing to

meet them

and

that

they had begun

their charge too early.

s

the

fourth line swung

round

to

threaten the left f lank of the

Pompeian legions

and

Caesar committed his third

line to

add impetus

to th e

main

assault Pompey s

army collapsed.



ROM W RF R

The willingness

and

skill

with which the professional

legions undertook

major

works of engineering was

one

of

the most remarkable

features of the Roman army.

uring his campaigns

Caesar was able to draw

from the ranks

of

his army

men able to construct great

systems

of

fortifications

build and

repair ships

and

bridge the River Rhine.

Trajan s olumn

pays

particular attention t o the

technical skills

of

the citizen

legionaries and unlike the

non-citizen auxiliaries

more

often

depicts them

working

than fighting. Here

legionaries construct a fort

working in their armour and

with

weapons

stacked

nearby in the proper

manner.

2



WORLD CONQUEST

2 2

BC AD 14

1°3



R O M A N WARFARE

Sextus Pompey

c.

66-36

BC

fought a civil

war

against

Octavian

as his father

Pompey the

Great

and

elder

brother

had

fought against

]ulius Caesar. He controlled

a

strong

fleet based in Sicily

and

Sardinia

but

was finally

defeated

by

grippa

at

Naupactus

in

36

BC

1° 4

T H E G R E A T CONQUESTS

During

t he s econ d cen tu ry t he p ro fi ts of empire

h ad n ot been evenly distributed

an d

th e

ga p between

th e

richest an d poorest

senators

steadily widened. Frequent

military

setbacks

encouraged the

appointment

of th e ablest commanders to take

charge for

th e

dura tion of a conflict. Marius was given

the

command in Africa by

popular

demand

an d

then

elected

to

five successive consulships

t o c om ba t

th e

Cimbri. Such continuity of com ma nd

w as mil it aril y

sound and had been

employed at times of crisis in the

past

n ot ab ly t he S ec on d

Punic

War bu t it

struck

at th e

very heart of

th e

Roman

political

system which required all power

to

be

temporary.

Such p ro lo ng ed c om ma nd s brought

massive

profits

to

th e

commander

r ai si ng h im f ar

above

his peers in th e Senate. Competition in

th e

Senate became

focused

on

a small group of

th e

foremost politicians

wh o

no w

expected

to be given such

wide-ranging

commands as

a right regardless of whether a military crisis threatened

th e

Empire. When Sulla earned

the dubious

distinction of

b ei ng t he first

man

to march his legions against R om e i n

88 BC

it was because he ha d b een rep laced

by his rival

Marius

in th e

command

of th e

major

wa r a ga in st t he

kingdom of

Pontus.

Civil

w ars en co uraged

even

more

exceptional

careers

among those who supported

the

winning side. W hi le t he an nu al rep lacement

of

provincial

governors may

have encouraged

frequent campaigns

this

lack

of

continuity

h ad n ot

encouraged wide-scale planned

expansion. Th e

powerful

generals

in the

first

century

BC

secured t he c on tr ol of large provinces

an d

armies

for

periods of

several years giving themselves far

more

scope

for conquest.

C ae sa r s o wn

accounts of

his

campaigns

give us

an

invaluable

picture

of

th e

Roman a rm y o n

campaign

in this

p erio d. Caes ar d id little t o re for m th e army bu t raised the

t ro op s u n de r his

command

to th e peak of efficiency. Th e

booty f ro m t he Gallic campaigns was lavishly distributed among the soldiers an d

conspicuous service

w as rew ard ed

by decorations a nd r ap id p ro mo ti on .

Newly

raised legions were provided

with

a valuable cadre of experienced centurions

promoted

from

junior

g rades i n v et eran

units.

Caesar trained

his

men h ard b ut

also flattered them fostering their pride in themselves an d their unit.

He

created

an

especially close

b o nd w it h

th e veteran Tenth Legion habitually placing them

on

t he rig ht

of his line

th e

position of most honour an d

leading

them in person.

When

this legion

worn

ou t by long service

in

foreign

an d

civil wars threatened

to mutiny Caesar restored o rder w ith a single word

addressing

them as

Quirites

civilians

no t

soldiers. A highly active commander Caesar took care to

prepare

his

campaigns

scrupulously involving himself in

many

of

th e

details

bu t



WOR LD

CONQUEST

20 2

BC-AD

14

operations began he

pursued

his objectives

with

unremitting boldness

sting to his

troops an d

his own improvisational genius

a nd g oo d

luck

to

cope

any crisis. Modern commentators have criticized Caesar for his recklessness,

to make adequate preparations for his l an di ng s i n Britain or invading

edonia against much stronger

opposition during

th e civil war,

bu t

this is

to

th e doctrine of th e

Roman

arm .

R o ma n c o mm a nd er s

were

bold

in

their

actions an d if a

R om an a rm y d id not

seek to seize

th e

and

ac t aggressively,

then

i t w as u su al ly a sign

that

things were going

y badl .

The

boldness

of

Caesar s campaigns

was

no t markedly greater than

of many Roman commanders

an d

certainly

no

from the cam paigns

of

Lucullus

or

Pompe .

a e s a r ~ behaviour

as a

commander

w as t yp ic al ly

an although in his own accounts

of

his campaigns he

careful to sh ow that he

was

better than anyone else at

erything. Before his battles we find

t he s am e c au ti ou s

to

gain every slight advantage that we have

en from

the third century

onwards. This

was

particularly

in t he b at tl es of th e civil

wa r

w he n he was careful

to

ow his reluctance to shed t he b lo od of fellow citizens.

a battle Caesar rode

around

close b eh in d t he f ro nt

of his arm . From this position he encouraged his men

their behaviour

an d

rewarded

or punished them

He also ha d a close view of

th e

c om b at a nd

ld gauge ho w

th e

fighting was going, j ud gi ng f ro m t he

of

confidence

of

each side

a nd the

noise they

de. Using this information he c ou ld s en d a message

to

troops

in

reserve, or go

in

person to lead the m up to

loit a success

or

relieve a part

of

th e line that was

under

This

was

th e normal way o f c om ma nd in g a

army,

practised from at

least

th e en d of t he t hi rd

BC

into late antiquity. A

good

general needed to

ge where an d w he n t he crisis of a b at tl e w ou ld o cc ur

d move to that part

of

th e line. By Caesar s day each legion was controlled by a

ior officer, usually a legate;

larger

armies were divided into a

centre

and

tw o

gs, each led by a senior subordinate

wh o commanded that

sector in

t he s am e

e as the commander-in-chief. These men were trusted to use their initiative if a

occurred when the

general was

involved elsewhere on th e field.

so close

to the

fighting was a

dangerous

practice

exposing the

to missiles

an d

being

singled

out

fo r

t he a tt ac ks of especially

bold

emies. However, it

di d

allow a

commander

to have

fa r more

influence

on th e

of

the battle

than

a general w ho f ou gh t i n

person

in th e front rank or on e

o

surveyed t he a ct io n f ro m a safe location far in th e rear. That th e Romans

veloped a military system which

placed

such

demands

on

th e

commander

Mithridates VI

of

Pontus

120-60 BC waged a series

of

wars

with

the

Romans

in

an effort to drive them from

Asia and Greece. Sulla

Lucullus and Pompey all

campaigned against him

winning spectacular

victories over the numerous

bu t poorly motivated Pontic

armies. He eventually

committed

suicide.

r0 5



R OMAN WARFARE

This coin was struck by

Caesar during his

dictatorship when victory in

the Civil War had left him

master

of the Empire.

Perhaps the greatest and

certainly the

most

successful

Roman general

of

any

period Caesar was also a

gifted writer

whose

War

Commentaries on

the

campaigns in au l

and

the

Civil War provide

by

far

the

most detailed accounts of

the Roman army on

campaign.

More

skilled

at

coping with a crisis than

day-ta-day politics Caesar

was assassinated by a

conspiracy consisting

primarily

of men

he

had

pardoned.

6

disproves th e

traditional

view

that

m os t R om an generals were

amateurs of

limited

i l i t ~ Th e

knowledge

that

their

commander

s ha re d m an y

of

the

risks of

combat

helped

to inspire legionaries.

Caesar s

own account of the

critical situation at Sambre in 57

BC

well reflects his style

of

command:

After addressing

Legio X , C ae sa r h ur ri ed t o

t he r ig ht

wing where

he

saw his me n hard

pressed,

an d t he s ta nd ar ds of L egi o XI I

clustered in on e place an d the soldiers so crowded together that it

impeded

their

fighting. All

the centurions

in

th e

f ou rt h c o ho rt h ad

fallen th e

signifer wa s

dead

an d

his standard captured;

in the

remaining cohorts every centurion

wa s

either de ad

or

wounded,

including th e primus pilus Sextus ]ulius Baculus an exceptionally brave

man,

wh o wa s

exhausted by his many

serious

w ou nd s a nd

could no

l on ge r s ta nd ; t he

other soldiers were tired an d

some

in

th e

rear giving

up

th e fight were withdrawing o ut of missile range; th e enemy were edging

closer u p t he slope in front

and

pressing

hard

on.both flanks.

He

saw

that

the situation

was critical and that t he re w as

no

other

reserve available

took a

shield

from a man

in

the re ar r ank s -

he

ha d

come without

his

ow n - a dv an ce d i nt o t he f ro nt line an d called on th e

centurions

by

name,

encouraged th e soldiers

and

ordered the line

to

advance

an d

th e units to

extend, so

that they

could

employ

their

swords more

e s i l ~

Hi s

arrival

brought

hope to the

soldiers an d refreshed

their spirits every ma n

w an ti ng t o d o his

b es t i n

th e sight of h is g en er al even i n s uc h a d es pe ra te

situation. Th e e ne my s a dv an ce

wa s

delayed for a while. Bellum

Gallicum

2.25.

It is worth noting

that

Caesar, although he ha d moved into th e front line

does no t

bother

to tell us whether o r no t he

actually

fought hand-to-hand. What

h e d oe s

stress is

that he

exposed

himself

t o d an ge r

in

order

more

effectively

to

do

his jo b

of

encouraging his centurions

an d soldiers an d reorganizing their

battle line.

Th e

general s jo b was to lead and control his army no t inspire them

with his

personal

prowess,

like th e warrior aristocrats of early

Rome

or

Alexander the G reat, who

consciously

emulated

t he b eh av io ur of

Homeric

heroes.

Virtus wa s

the word

used to describe

t he m il it ar y

virtues

which a

Roman

senator

wa s

e xp ec te d t o display

because

of his birth an d

upbringing.

Virtus included the practical ability

to

lead an d c on tr ol a n army th e physical

courage needed to

perform this role

moving around

close

behind the battle

line

an d t he m or al c ou ra ge never to a dm it the possibility

of

defeat. Caesar

portrays

himself as n ev er doubting his ultimate success doing his best to extricate his

a rm y f ro m an y crisis so that it

was

best fitted

to

renew an y struggle. Even in his

rare

d ef ea ts h e

never

despaired, bu t di q

his

best to disengage

his

army from

disaster

an d

p re pa re t o fight again at a later time. This

w as t he

ideal

behaviour

for a Roman commander.



e famous Prima Porta

of ugustus depicts

m as a commander In fact

was no t an especially able

often

in poor

and

relied on

more gifted

nates such as grippa

members o f his

n

family he central motif on

breastplate shows a Parthian

one

of

the

e gles

lost

r ssus or Antony a diplomatic

than military

success

H E LAST P HA SE O F R O M A N EXPANSION

vil wars were lost

an d

wo n in th e provinces

surrounding

th e

it

wa s

o nl y p os si bl e

for peace to be

by creating a secure regime in Rome itself

failed to

do

this

an d wa s

stabbed

to d eath

in a

of the Senate Only

after

another period of civil

r d id his

adopted

s on O ctavi an at last create a stable

Octavian who

was

l at er t o

be granted

th e

name

gustus by

th e

Senate

created

th e system known as th e

in

which he wa s

emperor

an d

monarch in

all

t name

an d

reorganized

both th e army

an d

th e

ovinces Real power passed to

the

emperor bu t

the

Senate

provided

th e

governors

wh o

ra n

the Empire an d

armies in

th e

field Attempting to disassociate

f ro m t he O ct av ia n w ho ha d

risen

t o p ow er

through

oody civil war

Augustus m ad e g re at

play of having

tored peace

t o th e

state bu t while he ha d ended civil

r his reign saw

constant

warfare

an d

expansion

foreign enemies Roman

politicians

ha d

needed

m il it ar y g lo ry

an d

Augustus

wh o

r tr ay ed him se lf as the greatest of Rome s

the

prestige of

vanquishing great

reign enemies

During his Prin ci pat e A ug us tu s co mp let e

th e

final

of Spain Gaul an d Illyria an d

suppressed

Egypt an d Syria were all pacified

d settled in a process w hi ch ass imil at ed an d

gested the vast conquests of

th e

previous n t u r ~

last tribes of th e Alps wh o still resisted

rule

an d

raided traffic

through

t he p as ses

re finally

absorbed.

In

th e

west his armies


1° 7



ROMAN WARFARE

ABOVE: Marcus Vipsanius

Agrippa 63-12 BC

was

Octavian s close friend

and

political associate

eventually

marrying

his

daughter ]ulia. Of obscure

family

he

proved to

be a

r08

RIGHT: Tiberius was

the son

from an earlier marriage of

Augustus- wife Livia who on

reaching

adulthood

was

given

command

in a series

major wars

by the

Emperor

and proved to

be a

highly successful

commander. A rigid

disciplinarian he

campaigned

in

the

Balkans

and

across

the

Rhine and

later after a self-imposed

exile suppressed the

massive Pannonian

Rebellion

D

6-9

and

helped

to

restore

the

situation

in

Germany

after the

disaster in

D

very efficient

military and

naval

commander

who

contributed more than

anyone

else

to

Octavian s

victories

over Sextus

Pompey

and

Mark

Antony.

LEFT: The

younger brother

of Tiberius and father of

the Emperor

Claudius

Drusus campaigned

extensively in Illyria and in

Germany where he

conquered most of

the

territory

up to the Elbe. He

said to have

hoped

to win

the

right to dedicate spol

opima by

killing an

enemy

commander with

his

own

hand

spending much time

pursuing variuos Germanic

Kings around the battlefield.

He died in

BC from injuries

suffered in a riding accident.



WORLD

CONQUEST

2 2

BC AD 14

is cameo has the

Tiberius

throned in power in the

ntre with his aged

mother Livia to his left.

They are surrounded

by

other members

of

the

imperial family whilst

beneath them crouch

representatives of the

m ny nations vanquished

by om n military might.

Tiberius

ended

the

expansionist policies of

Augustus allegedly on the

latter s advice.

1°9



ROM N W RF R




through th e

Balkans

taking

th e

boundary of th e

Empire

to th e Danube.

ha d

been

careful to

portray

th e Rhine as th e dividing line between th e

tribes

wh o

were fit to be absorbed

and th e

savage

shifting

hordes of

wh o

were not.

Augustus

armies pushed on to th e Elbe explored th e

coast

an d

formed a ne w p ro vi nc e i n Germany: Augustus served on few

these

campaigns

in

person

b ut m os t

of

th e major

campaigns

were

fought

by

of his family

such

as his ol d friend an d son-in-law Agrippa his

Tiberius

an d

Drusus

an d

his

grandson

Germanicus. By th e en d

of

th e

century

n o o ne f ro m o ut si de t he I mp er ia l

family wa s pe rmitted to celebrate

triumph.

T hi ng s b eg an

to

go

wrong in

the la st dec ad e

of

Augustus life. In

AD

6

e

recently c onque re d Pa nnonia n provinces e ru pte d i nto rebellion.

Large

of

troops were needed to s up pres s t he rising: Tiberius at on e point

m ma nd ed a n a rm y of te n legions

bu t

chose

to

divide his s treng th b ecau se h e

lt this was to o big an arm y t o c on tr ol effectively:

Casualties

were so great an d

itary service so

unpopular

in war-weary

Italy

that

Augustus

had

recourse

to

e d es perate meas ure of

freeing slaves

an d

f or mi ng t he m i nt o special

units

to

to

the front . I t took nearly three years to put down th e rebellion an d almost

soon as this wa s c om pl et ed n ew s a rr iv ed of a d is as te r i n Germany: The

Publius

Quinctilius

Varus

related

by m ar ri ag e t o A gr ip pa ha d

been

with

establishing

th e administration of th e ne w province. Varus

wa s

of the beginnings of

an

uprising

but

di d not realize

that

its leader

Arminius

a

chieftain

of th e

Cherusci

w ho c om ma nd ed a contingent of

xiliaries in his ow n army: Varus reacted as an y R o ma n w ou ld have

d on e t o

a

of

rebellion mustering all available

t ro op s a nd

marching immediately

to

n fro nt t he

rebels. Hi s forces were no t supplied

or

prepared for a ful l sca le

an d

his columns were encumbered by t he s ol di er s families an d

unwieldy baggage

train

bu t Varus hoped that a

show of

force

would

convince

e

rebels to surrender. He had carried ou t a similar o pe ra ti on w it h m uch

ccess in th e year

BC when as governor of Syria he ha d marc he d into

Judaea

d

quelled

t he d is ord er o l l o w i ~

th e death

of

Herod th e

Great.

This

t im e he

d his three legions into a carefu lly p re pa re d a mb us h. Arminius wh o ha d

to the rebels early in th e campaign led the German tribesmen in a

of

ambushes

as

Varus

clumsy c ol um n m ad e its way along a narrow

t hr ou gh t he difficult terrain of th e Teutonburg

W al d. U nabl e

to

deploy

d force the enemy to fight

an o pen

battle

th e

Romans were w h it tl ed d ow n .

di d

what .no R om an c om ma nd er s ho ul d have done

he

despaired

his ow n life. Hi s army

was

massacred almost

to

a man. Th e disaster in

r ma ny m ar ke d t he e nd of t he g re at

period

of

Roman

expansion

although

it

s no t its main cause.

Over

th e next

decade

several Roman armies

crossed

e

Rhine

an d exacted a bloody revenge for th e d<estruction of Varus three

bu t

there was never a

concerted

attempt

to

recreate a German province

to

e east of

the

river.

This memorial

commemorates

a centurion

who

was kil led in the

Teutonberg Wald in 9.

The inscription reads,

Marcus Caelius, son of

Titus,

member of

the

Lemonian voting tribe, from

Bononia

modern

Bologna ,

senior centurion of

the

Eighteenth Legion, years

of

age.

He

fell in the Varian

war.

If

found, his bones may

be interred here. His

brother, Publius Caelius, son

of Titus, of the

Lemonian

voting tribe, set this up.

Tacitus claimed that

captured tribunes and senior

centurions were sacrificed

by

the German tribesmen.

Caelius is depicted carrying

the

vitis

the vine

staff

symbolizing his rank, and

wearing his decorations

on

a

leather harness. On his head

he wears the wreath of the

corona

civica the highest

of

all decorations, given for

saving the life of a fellow

citizen. Flanking

him

are the

busts

of

two of his

freedmen, who presumably

were killed with

him



H PTER FOUR

ONTROLLING

THE WORLD

THE

TOMBSTONE OF

TITUS

FLAVIUS BASS

us

an

auxiliary

cavalryman

in

the ala oricorum wh o died

at

the

age

after twenty six years service. Bassus is depicted in the

classic posture cavalry tombstones in

the

early Empire

galloping his horse

over

a

cowering and

frequently

naked

barbarian. He wears a long sleeved tunic much like the

Gallic

warrior from

Vacheres

mail

armour and

a

decorated

helmet.

the left stands

his servant

or groom

carrying two

more spears to re arm his master.



R O M A N WARFARE

C O N T R O L L I N G T H E W O R L D AD 4 93

Trajans

Column

was the

centrepiece of

the

great

Forum complex the

Emperor built with the

spoils of his conquest

o f

Dacia. Around the drum

runs a series of reliefs telling

the story of Trajan s two

Dacian Wars D1 1 2

and

105 6 in stylized but

remarkably detailed images.

T

HE

YING UGUSTUS

supposedly

advised his successor Tiberius to

maintain

t he E mp ir e s b ou nd ar ie s i n t he ir

current

position. Rebellions in Pannonia

a n d G er ma ny

ha d

shown that

a

p er io d o f

consolidation

wa s

needed

a ft er t he

decades of

conquest yet subsequent events revealed

that th e

massive

expansion

of

th e

previous

century

wa s never to be repeated.

Conquests

were made as w hen

Claudius launched

an invasion

of

Britain in

43

or

Trajan took Dacia in 101-6.

Other

annexations such as T rajan s in Mesopotamia

or

those of

Marcus

Aurelius

on

th e Danube were

abandoned

only whe n the e mp ero r died before t he new

territory

ha d been fully absorbed.

The

Empire was larger in th e early third

century

than

in 14 b ut t he

pace of

its expansion ha d massively diminished.

J

o ikm

miles



C O N TR O L LI N G T H E

WORLD AD 14-193

Th e reason

fo r

this

was

no t primarily m l t r ~ Th e Roman Empire

was

not

to s top o nl y w he n i t r ea ch ed

enemies which

the a rm y co uld not

defeat.

leting the

conquest

of

th e German tribes or

defeating

Parthia was perfectly

considerable

resources in manpower an d th e

determination

to

a long

struggle until

victory

was

attained. The resources

ma y

have been

cking in AD

14

after t he

wars

of

previous decades

bu t this

was

not t o r em ai n

e for most of th e first an d

second

centuries AD . T h e m ai n

reason

for th e en d of

expansion

was political. Th e

c omma nders who ha d

led

armies

to

great

under

t he l at e

Republic ha d also been th e main leaders

in

th e civil

wars

had destroyed

the Republican system

of

government.

The e mpe ror c ould

t afford to allow other

senators freedom

to

conquer letting

them

gain

prestige

an d

th e

personal loyalty of

their

soldiers so that

t hey b ecame

dangerous

T he m aj or

wars

in

th e

latter

part

of

Augustus Principate ha d been fought

T H E R O M AN E M PI RE

AD

68

Following N ero s suicide in

68 the oman world was

plunged into turmoil as four

emperors

held

power in little

over a year. In this civil

war

the oman divided along

provincial lines supporting

the various candidates for

the throne. The eventual

winner

was Vespasian

supported

at first by the

legions in Syria and ]udaea

then Egypt and finally most

of

the anubian garrisons.

{

/

Roman Empire

lient state

Legionary base or

temporary station position

frontier of

the

Roman

Empire AD



ROM N W RF RE

Trajan was one

of

the most

respected

of

omes

emperors nd the last to

devote so

much of

his reign

to expansion However his

eastern campaigns were left

incomplete t his death nd

his successor Hadrian

b ndoned

much of

the

newly conquered territory

rr



C O N TR O L L IN G T H E WORLD

AD

14-193

family

members,

bu t few of

t he l at er empero rs

e njoyed suc h a

plentiful supply

relatives whose ability an d loyalty

could

be relied

upon. Emperors took

care

to

present

when

a

great

war, especially a wa r

of conquest,

was fought.

Claudius,

e since

birth

an d

d en ied any mil it ary

servi ce as a r es ul t, w as

eager

to achieve

glory after

his

unexpected elevation

to

th e throne,

an d

l au nc he d t he

of

Britain.

He joined t he ar my wh en it took t he m ai n t ri ba l centre at

an d accepted t he s ur re nd er of a crowd of

British kings,

even

he spent little more than a

w ee k i n

Britain before returning

to

Rome to

brate his triumph. More usually,

presiding

over a

great

conquest

required

th e

to

spend

a l on g p er io d away from

Rome and

many were no t

secure

ough in their

position

to

relish

th e

-prospect of this. The

system

of th e

di d no t

favour

widespread expansion.

H E

ARMY OF THE

PRINCIPATE

]ulio-Claudian elnperors c omplete d the process of converting th e

Roman

into

a

professional

force of

regular

soldiers.

I t wa s

very m uc h th e army of

e

emperor,

all

recruits

t ak in g a n oath the sacramentum of

allegiance to

th e

rather than th e

Senate an d

People of

R om e. R eg ul ar

parades an d

ations were

held

by all un it s to c omme morate festivals

associated

with

th e

m i l ~

Images

of the emperor,

imagines were

kept

with

th e

standards

symbolized th e

corporate

identity

of a

unit.

When

legionaries

were

they

received a bounty

an d

allotment of

l an d p ai d

for

through

th e

um Militare,

th e

military

treasury

established by Augustus

an d

controlled

t he e mp er or .

A rm y c om ma nd er s were now, with very few exceptions,

of th e emperor legati

possessed

of delegated

authority,

rather

magistrates

holding power

in

t he ir o wn n am e. D ec or at io ns for gallantry

re awarded

in the

n am e o f th e emperor even

if he

wa s

f ar f ro m

th e theatre of

Th e

legions, about

t hi rt y i n

number by

th e

early

second

century,

remained the

ncipal units

of

th e r ~

Their

paper

strength

was about

5,240, primarily

of

ten cohorts

of heavy

i n n t r ~ Each

legion

included

a l ar ge number

specialists,

such

as cl erks ,

engineers,

surveyors,

artillerymen,

weapons

an d

drill-masters, tent-makers an d leather-workers, an d craftsmen

d artisans

connected

with the manufacture an d

repair

of weapons an d armour.

gions were

no w

permanent, many lasting for well over three hundred years, an d

veloped a strong sense of

identity

reflected

in

their

individual

numbers an d

Thus we have L eg io

XI V

Gemina

Martia Victrix

T he T wi n , p ro ba bl y

of its

original formation

through

th e

amalgamation

of

tw o legions;

of

or

martial and Victorious

wer e t itl es granted by

Nero after

it s

role

in the defeat of Boudicca),

Legio V

Alaudae

Th e

Larks ),

gio VI

Ferrata T h e

Ironsides )

or

Legio

Traiana Fortis Trajan s o wn , t he

Soldiers ten ded t o

describe

the mselve s a s members of a particular

an d then as

part

of

th e legion,

suggesting

th e b on ds m os t i m po r ta n t t o



ROMAN

WARFARE

uxiliary infantrymen

present

the

severed heads

of

Dacians to the

Emperor on

this scene from Trajan- s

Column

The

Romans had

outlawed

the practice

of

head-hunting, so

common

in Iron geEurope, within

the

Empire,

but

i t was

clearly still practised

by

some units in

the

army.

The

evidence suggests

that only

auxiliaries

took

such

trophies,

and

it is possible

that

it was associated

with

certain races such as Gauls

or Germans. In a sense these

men

are

behaving

as

if they

were warriors in a tribal

army, presenting the

trophies

of

their prowess to

the

Emperor

as

they would

to one of their own

chieftains, in anticipation

of

praise and reward.

rr 8

them. Legions were p ri maril y i nt en ded for

fighting big b at tl es b ut t he ir command

structure allowed them to function well as

garrisons

an d

administrators for a

wide

area

Detachments

or

vexillations were frequently

employed for duties

that

di d

not require

a full

legion an d these va rie d in

size from several

co ho rts t o a few men

The

Romans had always relied on foreign

t ro op s t o supplement the numbers of the citizen

legions These included allied troops as well as

th e followers

of

tribal war-leaders whose

loyalty wa s to their chief whether he fought

with

or against Rome

It

wa s particularly

common to

raise co nt in gent s from t he

a re a i n

which

th e

army was

campaigning both

because

it wa s

easy

to do

so

an d also

because such

troops were usually suited

to

the conditions of

local

warfare.

Caesar relied largely on Gallic

an d

German cavalry during the conquest of

Gaul but although effective in battle these

proved

poor

scouts since reconnaissance played

a

minor

role in tribal

warfare. Th e

early

Principate

saw the creation

of

th e

regular auxilia,

foreign troops

uniformed

an d

paid

by Rome

an d

trained

to

t he s ame s tand ard s

of

discipline as

th e

legions Th e

men

were long-service

professional

soldiers

like th e

legionaries an d

served in

units that

were

equally permanent. Unit

titles were usually taken

f ro m t he

ethnic

group or

t ri be fro m

which

it

was first raised Most auxilia served

far

f rom their

place

of

origin

an d little or no

effort

was t ak en t o dr aw

new

recruits

from

th e

original source Therefore

auxiliary

units t en ded t o become of mixed nationality

although long service in a province might cause o ne g ro up t o p re do mi na te . T he

language

of

c omma nd a nd

of

t he u ni t s administration was always Latin which

m ad e i t

relatively easy

t o abs orb

a

mixture of

nationalities in

a single regiment

Th e auxilia

were never grouped into units

of

similar size to

th e

legions Th e

infantry

were f or me d in

c oh or ts a nd

th e cavalry in similarly sized

alae.

Each

cohort or ala was

independent

with

its own commander

an

equestrian usually

holding

th e r an k o f

prefect

number of auxiliary

units were

often attached

to a

legion a nd prolonge d

service

together raised th e

efficiency

of such

forces

bu t

there

wa s no

standard

complement of auxilia permanently supporting every

legion The smaller size of auxiliary units made

i t m uc h

easier to shift

them

from

o ne a re a or province to another. The

mixed

cohorts cohortes equitatae) which

included both foot an d h or se in

a

ratio

of

about four to one

were especially

s ui te d t o garrison

an d

local policing activities

The auxilia provided

a

more



CONTROLLING THE

WORLD

AD

4 93

LEFT:

Trajan rewards

auxiliary soldiers for their

bravery in a parade

at

the·

end

of

the First Dacian ar

One of the most important

aspects

of

a

Roman

o m m n d e r ~ s

role was to act

as a w it ne ss to his

s o l i r s ~

behaviour rewarding the

brave and punishing the

cowardly. The

Romans

were

especially keen to reward

acts

of

individual bravery

and

bravado even

if

these

had little practical value for

aggressive soldiers were

needed

if

the

army

was to

prevail in

hand to hand

combat. The brave were

given an extra share of the

booty

and promotion

Auxiliaries received

unit

battle honours rather than

individual decorations in

this period.

BOVE

In this scene

on

Trajan s

Column

the

sculptors emphasized the

diversity of the soldiers

of

the Roman army. Here we

have legionaries in segmented

armour and with

tile-shaped

shields fighting alongside

auxiliaries in mail and with

oval shields bare-chested

barbarian irregulars

and

archers in flowing robes from

the eastern provinces. The

different types of soldier are

heavily stylized on the

Column and some of

the

uniform

details may be

inaccurate

but

the picture

of

an army recruited from many

different races was essentially

true.

Most of

the figures

originally held bronze spears

now

lost which explains

why

so many appear to be waving

their clenched fists.



ROMAN WARFARE

Medical orderlies at a field

dressing station

attend

to

casualties during a battle in

Dacia. The Roman armys

medical service was

probably more advanced

than that

of

any

army

until

the modern era and many

types of wounds could be

treated with a good chance

of

success.

s

in all conflicts

until the twentieth century,

the Roman army

is

likely to

have suffered f r greater

losses from disease than

enemy action. It is however,

exceptionally

r re

for

Roman as opposed to

enemy

casualties, to be

represented on a monument

and

this scene may allude to

an incident when Trajan had

some

of his

own

clothes cut

up to provide bandages for

his wounded soldiers.

2

flexible and

cheaper

supplement

to

legionary numbers. They also

supplied the army with some troop

types

in

which

the

l egions were

especially def icient

in particular

supplying large

numbers of

very

good

quality cavalry. Auxiliary

infantry

also

included units of

archers and

contingents

of

slingers but the

traditional view

that

auxiliary foot

were

lighter equipped and fought

in

looser order than the

legions is

mistaken. The typica l auxil ia ry

infantryman wore

scale

or

mail

armour of

s imilar weigh t

to

the

legionary

CUlrass and a bronze

helmet, carried a flat oval shield and

was armed with

a

gladius

and

a

javelin

or

spear. This is

not the

equ ipment of

a

nimble

skirmisher.

There may have been a few cohorts

with lighter equipment

who

fought as skirmishers

but

we have

no

direct evidence

for this. The vast majority of auxiliary cohorts fought in close

order

in a way not

markedly

different

from

legionaries.

All soldiers enlisted for twenty-five years

the last

five

of

which were

spent

as

a

veteran with lighter

duties. Auxiliaries were granted Roman citizenship at

the

end of this period, although somet imes whole uni ts earned

this

distinction

prematurely as a

result of distinguished

service.

The

uni t kept

the

title

civium

Romanorum permanently even when all the

men who

enjoyed the grant had long

since departed. The vast majority

of

soldiers were volunteers conscription was

rarely imposed except when an allied tribe

or

kingdom was obliged by treaty to

supply a

set quo ta o f

men for

the

auxilia.

The army provided

a

soldier with

a

regular

if

not

especially lavish

salary paid

in

hard

coin

but

subject

to

various

deductions. His living conditions in barracks were cramped,

bu t

then so were

those of the urban poor

in

the

Roman world

and

soldiers

had the

advantage of

good medical support . His activities were closely

regulated and the

soldier was

subject

to a harsh, frequently brutal, and

sometimes

arbitrary system of

discipline. The centurion s vine-cane

vitis

was a badge

of

office but was

frequently used to

inflict

summary punishment. One centurion,

lynched during

the mutiny of the Danubian

legions

in AD

14 was

nicknamed Bring

me

another

cedo alteram

from his habit

of

beating a soldier s back

until

his

cane snapped

and

then

demanding

another. Desertion

w as always a

problem

in the professional

army

and

a frequent motive was the

wish

to avoid punishment. It was also



C O N TR O L LI N G T H E WORLD AD 14-193

practice

fo r

centurions

an d

other officers to accept

bribes

to spare

from

unpleasant duties. Another

aspect

of

military

discipline was th e

on soldiers marrying an y existing marriage

being

annulled on

enlistment.

e m ai n r ea so n for this

was

a

reluctance

of the state to accept

financial

onsibility for soldiers

an d their

families.

It

is

quite clear

that

many soldiers

live i n s ta bl e relationships w it h w om en an d raised

children

their families

ng in the civilian settlements canabae

outside

forts or perhaps even inside th e

T he g ran t of

citizenship

to discharged

auxiliaries

included a

clause

this right to

any children which makes

it

clear that

th e ba n

was

not

idly enforced. Th e citizen

legionaries

found

it

much

harder

to gain official

an d citizenship for

their

children.

T he a rm y

di d

offer

th e

prospect o f p ro m ot io n

to increasingly

senior more

an d

better

paid

ranks

bu t

t he h ig h standard

of literacy essential for

of

these favoured

the better-educated

recruits. In

theory

i t w as p os si bl e f or

ordinary

soldier

to advance th ro ug h the lesser ranks

until he

became a

through

the centurionate

a nd h ol d

th e

r an k o f primus pilus,

senior

centurion

i n a l eg io n an d

then

be elevated to

the equestrian

o rd er a n d

made governor

of a minor

province o r c om m an d

a

c oh or t o f

the Prae torian

ard . But s uch a meteo ric rise was h ig hly unlikely though p os sible for a family

several generations;

more mod est adv an cemen t w as

common.

As important

talent

a nd e duc ation

in

determining

the fortunes

of

a c ar ee r w as influence.

ronage was all pervasive in Roman society

an d

letters of recommendation ar e

most common form of literature to

survive

from

n t i q u i t ~

A

letter from an

uential friend or family member greatly accelerated a career.

On

active service

so ldi er m ig ht d is ti ng ui sh h im se lf an d so come

to

th e attention

of

a

wh o could promote him

but

such

opportunities

were rare in

Many

auxiliaries came fro m

cultures

which

greatly

admired

warrior

virtues

wh o found service in th e Roma n a rmy attractive bu t th e legions tended to be

f ro m t he poorest elements of

Roman

s o i e t ~ As th e first century AD

an d

fewer Ital ian s j oi ned th e legions preferring instea d the

lucrative

more comfortable an d

safer

prospect

of

serving

i n t he Praetorian

o r o th er

paramilitary forces in R om e itself.

Recruits increasingly

came

the p ro vinces where there

ha d

b een a heavy settlement of veteran colonies

t here was also a smal l bu t significant number of me n

born

i n th e

camp

n

the illegitimate sons produced by soldiers illegal marriages. Th e rest of

the wealthier

classes wh o feared t he a rm y s

capacity

to plunge

state

into civil war

despised

soldiers as brutal

an d

The professional

of

th e

Principate lived

in

bases on th e fringes of th e Empire

each

by a civil settlement

which

provided most of it s

needs

an d after

many

legionaries settled in colonies

w it h o th er

soldiers.

The

degree

of

varied

f ro m p ro vi nc e

to

province

an d

i n d if fe re nt

p er io ds b u t i t

raged identification

with th e

s ol di ers u ni ts . In Pol yb iu s d ay

a

soldier

1 21



R O M A N WARFARE

decorated for valour returned to Rome an d wore his awards during public

festivals

to th e admiration of th e

rest

of

societ) .

No w th e

army

formed

very much

its ow n

community

with its ow n

se t of distinctly

military values. Soldiers were

granted

status

in accordance with their

conformity

to these standards an d those

wh o were decorated or gained a reputation for martial virtue were respected

within

th e arm) .

Many

of

th e

minor distinctions in grade rank an d

title which

seem to have been

i m po r ta n t t o

soldiers may have been as incomprehensible

to

contemporary civilians as they are to us. Pride in themselves an d in their unit was

a

major factor

in making Roman soldiers willing to risk death

or

appalling

injur T

Th e

senior officers

of th e

army were still drawn

from

th e elite

of

th e

Roman

world

an d

served for comparatively

short

periods. It

ha s

been estimated

that

a

provincial

governor, legionary

legate tribune

or

auxiliary

prefect

served

on

average for three years in

an y

post but there was

much variation

in this

pattern.

Greater continuity was provided by t he cent urio ns

wh o

were career soldiers.

Traditionally

they

have

been

depicted as

the equivalent

of NCOs

in modern

armies

sergeant-majors

promoted out of

the ranks after long service,

wh o

offered the maturity and experience lacking in their

amateur

senior officers. It

is

true that we know

of

a number

of

individuals wh o were promoted to th e

cent u ri o nat e after

service as

ordinary

soldiers. Equally, we

k no w o f

a

similar

number

of

equestrians

wh o

chose to follow a career as legionary centurions

an d

were directly commissioned an d other

me n

who achieved th e rank after a period

in

municipal

government.

Most

centurions

seem

to

have achieved

th e

position

after service in some

of th e

junior ranks perhaps

on t he s ta ff of

th e

tribune or

legate

or

as on e

of

th e

prin ip les

in

th e

centur) . Patronage is likely to have played

a

greater

part

in their selection than abilit T Centurions required

a very high

s ta n da rd o f education an d

often

held

positions

of considerable

responsibility,

acting as regional representatives

of th e

civil power in the provinces,

or

in

political

or diplomatic

roles

on

th e frontiers. They

were

also

me n

of status

enjoying fa r higher pay

an d better

conditions

than ordinary

soldiers. Th e

majority

of

centurions were p rob abl y d raw n

from the more

p ro sp erou s an d

better-educated classes

of

Roman society whose existence is to o often ignored by

scholars a pt t o

divide society into

t he aristocratic

elite

a nd t he p oo r .

T R A I N I N G A N D T AC TI CS

Their

battle-drills are no different

f ro m t he

real

thing .. . I t w ould no t

be far f rom

th e truth

to call

their

drills bloodless battles,

their

battles bloody drills.

]osephus

p res en ted an idealized view

of th e

army s efficiency, bu t while th e

warriors of

many

different

peoples

were well

p ra ct is ed i n t he

use

of their personal

weapons,

o nl y t he R om ans t ra in ed

both

as

individuals an d

units.

A ccording to

th e later

mil it ary t heo ri s t Vegetius, th e first thing a

n ew r ec ru it

was taught was the

military pace: l earni ng h ow

to

march in step an d

keep his

p la ce i n f or ma ti on .

Personal

fitness received a

high

priority an d

there

were

regular route

marches

of

twenty Roman miles in five hours

at

th e normal pace an d twenty-four in the same



C O NT R OL L IN G T H E

WORLD

AD 14-193

at

t he q ui ck

step

On some

marches

th e

recruits

pped to learn how to la y o u t

an d

construct a

camp They were

taught

how to use

personal we apons by practising thrusts

cuts

against

a

l.8-metre post

fixed

into th e

At first

they

used wooden swords and

er shields of twice th e weight of th e

normal

t o s tren gt hen t heir

arms On at least on e

asion these wooden practice swords were

d as batons by troops

quelling

a

riot.

r this they fenced w it h o th er recruits

tips

of

their

swords

covered with

pads to prevent serious injury

an d

whole units would fight mock

practised a complex series

of

ls involving movement in forma tion a nd

th e

of missiles culminating in th e

Hippaka

Gymnasia

or

cavalry

Training was

not

just

an

experience

for

recruits

a continual activity t o m ai nt ai n a unit s f f i i n ~ Often t he m an y d uties

required

th e

dispersal of a

unit hinde re d

its training bu t

good

officers

sure

that

t heir men

were well drilled

a nd t he ir weapons

well

maintained.

If

permitted

at

th e beginning of a campaign the n most generals exercised their

to bring them to the

peak of

f f i i n ~ A monument f ro m th e

base

of

Augusta at L am ba es is i n North A fr ic a r ec or ds a speech

made

by

to the army of th e

province

after it had performed several days

of

The e mpe ror displayed a detailed knowledge of th e units strength

an d

deployment as well as a

technical understanding of

t he m an oe uv re s

He noted that Legio Augusta ha d detached on e cohort for service

h the

proconsul of t he n ei gh bo ur in g

province

ha d

sent

a

vexillation of

cohort

p lus f ou r men fr om each

of

th e

other

centuries

to

reinforce

legion an d provided

many

small

detachments

to m an small outposts a nd

stations

while th e unit ha d recently moved its camp twice These factors

ht have restricted

th e

ability

of th e

legion t o t ra in as a

unit

bu t Hadrian

used

m to reinforce his praise for t he ir a ct ua l p er fo rm an ce . Similarly when

ressing the cavalry

of

a

cohors equitata

he commented

that it

was difficult for

h a un it t o p er fo rm satisfactorily i mm ed ia te ly a ft er a n ala with its larger

better equipment

an d

mounts ha d

pu t

on

a display before

expressing

praise for

their

achievement

Occasionally

Hadrian expressed

disapproval

of

ill for instance criticizing a cavalry

unit

for

mounting

a

charge

that

was

to o

an d uncontrolled bu t his speech overwhelmingly on e of

praise

for

th e

units

especially their officers

This first-century cavalry

parade

helmet

from Syria is

one o f the earliest examples

of

this type. Such lavishly

decorated armour and

fittings combined with

brightly coloured clothing

and standards added to th e

spectacle

of

the cavalry

games or

Hipparka

Gymnasia. Divided

into two

teams the horsemen

took

turns to throw blunt headed

javelins

at

the

other

side

hence the need to protect the

rider s face with a

metal

mask.

3



ROMAN

WARFARE

The

tombstone of

the

auxiliary cavalryman

Vonatorix was found at

onn

and

dates to the first

half of the first century D

He wears scale armour

which appears to have been

almost as common s mail

and may have been popular

because it could be polished

to a high sheen lthough in

the

same basic posture as

Flavius Bassus

on

this

earlier

tombstone

Vonatorix

s no t

shown galloping over

a defeated barbarian

4

Discipline an d order

were e mp ha si ze d i n all

of

the a rm y s

manoeuvres

whether in training or on

campaign.

Gone were days when Roman columns

b lu nd ered alo n g

on

the march risking ambush from a ski lful o pp on en t. T he

army

of

th e Principate moved behind a screen

of

cavalry outposts supported by

detachments

o f i nf an tr y

including a high

p r op o rt io n o f

missile

armed troops.

Special units

of

cavalry

known

as

exploratores

were formed specifically

to

perform

th e role

of

reconnaissance If th e

enemy

were close then

th e

whole

army

might move

in

b att le fo rmati o n

each

unit in

place

an d ready to deploy f rom

march co lu mn i nt o a fighting line It was common to move with th e army formed

into a

large

hollow s qua re i f it wa s uncertain from which direction

th e

enemy

m ig ht a tt ac k. All

these

techniques

had developed

g radu al ly d u ri ng

th e lo ng

experience

of

frontier warfare

bu t

were perfected

in

th e first century

AD . Th e

creation of th e

regular

auxilia

provided

large numbers of w e l l t r ~ n e d cavalry



C O N TR O L L IN G T H E

WORLD

AD

14-193

w ere

far

better suited to tasks

such

as scouting than many of th e allied

ingents, which

ha d

served with

Republican

armies,

ha d

ever been.

Th e greater

discipline

of the Imperial army

was

reflected

in

its

battle

tactics.

ybius day

legionaries advanced

noisily, b an gi ng t he ir w ea po ns a ga in st

r shields

an d shouting. From at

least

Caesar s

day,

Roma n infa ntry advanced

an d in silence.

Legionaries no w

carried

only on e pilum At

very short

probably within

15 metres

of th e

enemy,

they

threw

these

in

a single volley

charged. Only at· this moment

di d

they break th e silence an d yell their battle

In t hi s way t he y d eli vered a mas siv e

twin-shock

t o t he ir enemy:

th e

physical

of

a

barrage of

heavy

pil an d th e

moral

shock of the sudden screa ming

Th e

noisy advance

of th e

Polybian

legion

h ad n ot

been

that

different

to

w il d,

screaming

advance of a

Gallic

w ar b an d. A

s il en t adv an ce w as

more

an d

certainly

harder

to

achieve. Only a very

high standard

of

restrained me n from

releasing

their nervous tension

by instinctively

a nd r un nin g f or ward to

get

th e impending

clash

over with a tendency

broke up

the ir forma tion. A sl ower, steadier

advance

kept the ranks

d er , a ll ow ed

th e

officers to keep control over

th e

formation

an d ensured

th e

unit remaine d

a

dense

mass throughout th e

charge.

Such an

advance

unstoppable a nd there

was

a good chance

that

th e enemy would

be

en before

th e

charge

w en t h ome

or

after

a very

brief burst

of fighting. If this

not happe n t he n t he

resulting combat was

m uc h th e s am e

as

on e fought

by a

legion. R om an d oc tr in e e mp ha si zed individual

aggression

an d

ers were

taught

to

get c lose

t o t he ir

opponent

in

o rd er t o

use

t he ir s h or t

gl dii T he s ta nd ar d

drill

was

to

punch th e enemy in th e

face

with

shield-boss an d

then stab him

in

th e stomach. In an ideal

situation his

ha d a lrea dy lost his shield to a thrown pilum The Roman scutum was

heavy: weights of reconstructions have r an ge d f ro m 5.5 to 10 kilograms

an d a blow delivered with

th e

weight

of th e body behind th e

soldier s

h an d s to od a

good chance of overbalancing

an

opponent. T his might

always be possible a nd R om an soldiers were trained

to

deliver a

wide

range

an d

thrusts.

Crouc he d be hind a

scutum

most of th e

soldier s

tor so

well

protected an d t he d es ig n

of

t he h el me t

an d

all

types

of

cuirass

gave

protection to the head an d shoulders vulnerable t o d ow nw ar d cuts.

Roman infantry

helmets left

th e

face an d ears uncovered to allow me n

a r

orders an d see clearly what was

going

on

around them

so

that wounds

to

face were

common. Th e junior leaders of th e

Roman army, especially

th e

s, led aggressively, an d individual boldne ss by all ranks

was

encouraged

th e

lavish

reward

decoration

an d

promotion granted to those who

guished themselves. Discipline an d

unit pride

gave

t he Romans g reat

staying

r i n

combat

keeping

them in close c on ta ct w i th th e enemy, bu t

victories

wo n

by

th e

few

me n wh o

were

prepared

to

g o f ir st

an d

cu t

a

path

i nt o t he

r ~ n k s

Roman

generals

kept

close to

th e

fighting so

that they

were able to

r d s uc h m en .

They

were a lso

in

a

g oo d p osi ti on to g au ge ho w th e combat

5



ROMAN

WARFARE

was going

an d

commit or le ad in reserve cohorts

o r d i n g l ~

The

legionary

cohort

was very

much

a

functional tactical u nit a nd was rare ly a focus of

especially strong l o y l t ~ Th e

cohort

was

almost

certainly

commanded

by

th e pilus prior,

its

senior

c entu ri on a lt ho ugh n o c on te mp or ar y source

explicitly states this There were few tactical options

available

to th e commander

of

a

cohort and

his

main

jo b

was to move

t he m en

under his command

as a body to wherever they were r eq ui re d t o be

He

then needed t o c on tr ol th e cohort s

advance

ensuring

that th e

volley

of pila an d

final running

charge were delivered o n o rd er a nd di d no t come as

a

spontaneous

outburst.

Once

in close

contact w ith

th e

enemy then

much

responsibility devolved on to

th e other

centurions

an d

th e principales in each

n t u r ~ Their

jo b

was to inspire the men to

organize an d lead

as many as possible in successive

rushes

f or wa rd u nt il t he

enemy had

been

routed.

After

that

the senior centurion once again needed to

BOVE The

Roman army

in

Lower

Moesia recorded its

role in the Dacian Wars in

several

monuments

at

Adamklissi in modern day

Romania, including these

reliefs or Metopes from the

Troepaeum Traiani. More

crudely carved than Trajan s

Column they give a

r

more accurate view

of

the

equipment actually

worn

on

campaign. This legionary

soldier wears mail, instead

of

the segmented armour,

has extra armour on his

right arm and greaves

strapped to his calves. He

is

punching his enemy in the

face with his shield boss and

then stabbing

him

in the

stomach with his sword, a

clear artistic representation

o f

the classic

Roman

fighting technique described

by our

literary sources.

6

RIGHT: The Metopes at

Adamklissi

clearly told a

story,

but

the original

sequence

is

unknown

s

are the details

o f

the

campaign itselt and it

is

no w

impossible to

reconstruct the narrative.

In this scene a legionary

is

ambushed by

an archer,

apparently naked, hidden

in a tree. In the foreground

lies a rotting corpse, its

stomach burst open and

face little more than a

skull, with a shield and

gladius beside it. Possibly

this represents the Romans

fighting a battle on the site

of

an earlier defeat, and

the dedication

o f

the altar

at Adamklissi to Mars

Vltor The Avenger )

may

support this,

but

it

is

impossible to reach a

definite conclusion.



control over th e

whole cohort

to restore

a nd pr ep are his

tired me n to

move

an d

fight again as a unit In a large battle there

relatively little scope for independent action at

cohort

level

an d

th e centurions

commanding

f or me d part of

a

command

structure

which

t he l eg io na ry le ga te to control the five

me n

under his command more easily an d

ectly enabled

the commander-in-chief

to direct

whole force In a large battle

most

auxiliary

acted to all intents an d purposes like th e

tically sized legionary cohorts. However their

of a clear command

structure

above

th e

level

of

cohort made the m ha rde r to manoeuvre in

large

an d less easy to employ as reserves

iliaries were often

deployed

as t he a rm y s first

t he m or e easily controlled legionaries

act as supports;

alternatively

they might be

o ut o n

t he army s

flanks

Roman

infa ntry doctrine

stressed that it was

ays wise to advance to m ee t e ne my i nf ant ry

C O N T RO L L IN G T H E

WORLD

AD

14-193

LEFT The literary sources

stress that the Roman

soldier was taught to thrust

with his sword and easily

beat opponents who relied

on

slashing. In fact the

gladius was a well balanced

weapon ideally suited to

both cutting and thrusting

and soldiers were trained to

fence

and

deliver a range of

blows. Here a legionary

delivers a downward slash

against his kneeling

opponent He wears scale

armour the segmented arm

guard clearly visible. This

extra protection was to

defend against the

two-

handed sword or falx

of

an

enemy. This long scythe-

like weapon could inflict

appalling wounds severing

limbs before a

Roman

was

close enough to use his

short sword.

BOVE A legionary stabs

down to despatch his

opponent holding his

gladius like a dagger. At

least three distinct barbarian

peoples are represented on

the Troepeum Traiani and

opinion divided as to

whether they are Dacians or

allied peoples.

One

group

not shown fighting wear

long tunics and are probably

Sarmatians. The bare-

chested warriors fighting

with

the falces wear

trousers are bearded and

wear either tight skull caps

or have their hair tied into a

side knot a style associated

with

Germanic tribes such

as the Suebi. They are

probably a related tribe

known as the Bastarnae

who

were allied to the

Dacians.

7



ROMAN

WARFARE

SInce a charge encouraged aggression whereas

passively

waiting to

receive a charge was dispiriting.

A sudden infantry charge could rout disordered or

stationary

cavalry

stampeding the

horses

but

i t was

normally wise for foot to meet cavalry at the hal t. A

cavalry charge was an immensely

intimidating

sight.

Scattered or dispersed

infantry

were helpless against

it since

most men would

flee

and

allow

the

horsemen

to

cut down with ease even

those

who

attempted to fight. Arrian descr ibes a

formation

designed to resis t a charge by the heavily armoured

horsemen of the Alans. Th e legionaries were

formed

eight

ranks deep the first

four armed with

the

pilurn

the remain der w ith a lighter javelin

probably the

lancea. Th e

front

rank held their pila

at

forty five degrees the but ts b raced against the

ground

so

that

they

presented

a dense row

of

points

to the

The

men in the next three ranks after

throwing

their

pila

braced themselves

against

the

men in front. The remaining legionaries threw their

lanceae

while a

n in th rank of foot archers

a

tenth

ABOVE: These legionaries

parade

without armour

or

helmets. They are carrying

pila with

spherical weights

mounted above the

handgrip a measure which

must

have increased the

penetrative powers

of

these

heavy missiles. Beneath their

tunics they wear tight

fighting breeches reaching

down to below the knee.

Modern imagination often

pictures Roman soldiers

invariably wearing clothes

suitable for a Mediterranean

climate but it clear that

uniforms were adapted to

cope with the local climate.

The Vindolanda tablets

make

frequent reference to

trousers underwear socks

and cloaks many of which

were privately purchased.

128

RIGHT: This Metope

shows

three

Roman

standard

bearers

two vexilla

or flags

flanking a wreathed

standard probably

originally topped by an

eagle. Standards were

physical expressions

of

a

units

corporate identity

and were treated with great

reverence. In a

permanent

camp they were

kept

in a

special shrine in the unit s

headquarters or

principia.

llsoldiers at

damklissi

are depicted as clean shaven

unlike the legionaries on

Trajans Column many of

whom have thick beards.

This scene like many

others

at damklissi has a nearly

identical companion

possibly to represent the

two legions garrisoning

Lower

Moesia.



of horse archers

and artillery added to the

of

missiles. This heavy

weight

of missiles

have

br ou gh t down

a fair number

of

bu t even

those

who survived would not

been able to get into contact with

the

infantry

the ir horses

would instinctively refuse to

into such a seemingly solid object. Once the

rge was stopped

the

continual deluge of javelins

arrows

continued

to weaken them as they stood

otently a few metres from the infantry line until

were inevitably forced to

withdraw.

Such

olid formation deterred the cavalry from

by its very appearance while the

packed ranks prevented the Romans from

awa T Such a formation

was

only possible

h s ta ti onary troops especially since Arrian

ocated a so lid

infantry

line with

none of the

al intervals between the cohorts.

Cavalry were unable to hold ground and

between

horse

were very fluid fast moving

in which successful charges

spen t the ir

CONTROLLING THE

WORLD AD 14 193

LEFT

Each century included

a musician equipped with

the curved military trumpet

or

cornu

which were used

to convey simple orders.

When

a unit charged and

the men broke their silence

and yelled their battle cry

the trumpets blared

ou t

to

add to the noise and

intimidate the enemy. The

Jewish general Josephus

claimed that he ordered his

men to cover their ears to

blot

out

the terrifying noise

when they were awaiting a

Roman attack. The army

also employed a straight

trumpet

known

s the tuba

which apparently had a

different pitch and was used

to convey the orders

of

senior officers.

BOVE A Roman legionary

stands in a wagon and uses

his

pilum

s a spear to

thrust

down

at a barbarian.

The presence

o f

wagons and

women

and children with

the barbarians on the

Metopes has sometimes

been taken

s

an indication

that the story tells

of

an

attempted migration which

the Roman army met and

defeated. This

s

possible

but many

tribal armies were

accompanied by the

warriors families who

carried food for them

attended to their wounds

and watched the battle to

witness and judge their

behaviour. ne of the

scenes

on Trajan s

olumn

shows a battle raging

around barbarian wagons

and it s possible that this

refers to the same episode.

9



ROMAN WARFARE

°




WORLD AD

14-193

in pursuit the horses becoming blown

an d

vulnerable to fresh enemy

The Romans were careful always to leave at least half of their available

valry in separate supporting lines

behind

th e main advance. Horses will refuse

charge

straight into

a n oncoming line of cavalry so

when

combats

occurred

it

s because

e it he r t he t wo

lines had

opened the ir

files

allowing

t hem t o

gallop

each othe r s formation

or

they ha d

halted

just before

contact at

point individuals would begin to w al k t heir mounts forward to get within

or spear s

reach

of th e n ~

In

th e latter

case

th e melee

wa s

likely

be

longer an d

more

bloody

than th e former. More often than not on e

or

th e

o th er t ur ne d a nd fled before

th e

chargers

came into contact.

Selected

were often d ep lo yed i n close s up po rt o f cavalry sometimes travelling

b at tl e by running

alongside

th e horsemen an d clinging to the horses manes.

infantry rarely i nt er mi ng le d w it hi n t he r an ks of a cavalry formation.

formed

dense

knots of infantry behind the m ain cav alry lin e.

a frien dly cav alry unit

was

forced t o r et re at

it

could

shelter an d re-form

h in d o ne of these

infantry

blocks th e

infantry

driving off any

pursuers

missiles.

AND PARTHIA

r nearly

three centuries a fte r their

first

c la sh i n

BC th e

Parthians were th e

t dangerous opponents t he Ro mans faced in t he e as te rn part of th e Empire.

Pa rthia n military

system

an d philosophy w as radi call y d ifferent f ro m th e

an d

their

army relied almost exclusively

on

v l r ~ There were Parthian

most of whom were

said

to have

been archers bu t t hey w ere

of

poor

an d receive ve ry l it tl e mention

in our

sources.

The

strength of th e

OPPOSITE: The pride of the

Roman cavalry were the

horsemen of the alae

but

more numerous were the

soldiers

of

the

mixed

infantry

and

cavalry

cohortes equitatae.

These

men were not as highly paid

or as well

mounted

as the

men

of

the alae but they

performed

much

of

the

army s day-ta-day patrolling

and

escort duties. In battle

the cavalry contingents of

several cohorts were

taken

from their parent units and

massed to fo rm one

composite force roughly

equivalent in size to an ala.

This scene from the olumn

shows Roman v l r y m ~ n

pursuing defeated Sarmatian

cataphracts. oth horses and

riders are depicted as

completely covered in a

mesh

of

metal

scales a

fanciful reconstruction of a

type of soldier which the

sculptor had perhaps never

seen. These heavy cavalry

evidently impressed the

Romans

for Hadrian formed

the first regular cataphract

unit in the Roman army and

others were created in later

years.

1 3

1



ROMAN

WARFARE

P RT I N W RS

The

wars between Rome

and

Parthia

tended

to

focus

on

the

same

few border

regions

the

client

kingdom

of rmenia and

the

valleys

of the Euphrates

and

Tigris

Trajan

mounted

a massive

effort in a final attempt to

defeat

the

Parthians

and

led

his troops as far as the

Persian ul fHowever

rebellions began to

erupt

in

the land to his rear and it

was

whilst busy

suppressing

these

that

the

emperor

fell ill

and

died

Parthian army lay in its tw o types

of

cavalry th e heavily armoured cataphracts

an d th e

light horse-archers.

It was t he

latter

wh o most encapsulated the Parthian

military p l o s o p ~ Horse-archers

were

unarmoured and would

stage a

mounted

charge only as a last

resort

against an enemy

wh o

was already weakened. Instead

they

used their powerful composite bows to shoot d ow n t heir enemies an d th e

mobility

of

their swift hor ses to avoid c on ta ct a nd make themselves difficult

targets

for return

fire.

Firing

from a

moving

h or se d id

no t make

for

accurate

shooting

bu t

th e

objective was

to

pepper

the target

area with as

many

arrows as

possible so

that some

were bound to find a mark. Only w hen the enemy ha d been

weakened by this constant barrage would the cataphracts charge an d break them.

If th e enemy s strength an d determination seemed

u nd imin is hed t hen

the

Parthians withdrew an d continued to shadow their opponents

waiting for a more

favourable

o p p o r t u n t ~ The

Parthians would

certainly

flee if the situation was

unfavourable. Th e readiness with which

th e

Parthians fled b ut th en r ou nd ed on

•

captured town

• Roman

legionary

base

annexed

114

annexed 115

frontier of

Roman Empire

Parthian

Empire in 114

Roman provincial

capital

temporary

occupation by

Rome in

116

Trajan s campaigns

with datel

•

I

200

miles

\

\ \

200

km

I

/

/

..- I

=::

/

/

/

-

- /

/

/

/

\

\

- /

/

J

-

\




WORLD AD 14-193

y incautious pursuers always astonished the

R om an s. I t

made it very difficult

inflict a decisive defeat on them

in

battle since it

was

so

e as y f or

th e enemy

to escape In 36 BC Mark Antony s soldiers were dismayed to discover

a P ar th ia n r ou t a nd vigorous Roma n pursuit produce d

only

thirty de ad

an d

hty prisoners

When t he R om an s a nd P ar th ia ns first encountered each other

in

battle at

in BC both sides were overconfident

Th e

Romans ha d grown

used

to

aside th e

armies

of Armenia an d P on tu s w i th c o ns u mm a te ease The

p ar t o f th e Roman cavalry an d

light

infantry

rashly

pursued a

Parthian

separated from the main force were

surrounded

an d

Throughout

th e

rest of th e

day

t he s qu ar e f or me d by th e legions

under a heavy barrage of

arrows

t he P ar th ia ns

regularly replenishing

quivers

from

a

well-organized supply

of ammunition carried by th e

camel

Many

Romans

were

w ou nd ed b u t t he a rm y was

never

weakened to the

This terracotta statuette

shows a galloping Parthian

horse archer out to fire

his re curved composite

bow. Later Arabic manuals

advised

th t

the archer

should im to loose his

arrow when his horse was in

mid stride. Accuracy was to

be sacrificed to deluge the

target with

as

m ny

missiles

as possible before the archer

withdrew out of

range

of

ny return fire.

133



ROMAN

WARFARE

The Arch

of

Septimius

Severus

commemor ted

his successful Parthian

expedition during which he

h d

sacked oth Ctesiphon

nd Seleucia The reliefs

showing

scenes from the

fighting are heavily eroded

ut seem to have followed

the style

of

the

column of

Marcus Aurelius which

sacrificed accuracy for

artistic convention

134

point where i t

could

be swept aside

by a

cataphract charge and the

situation

reached

something

of a stalemate However the Roman army and its

commander

lost

heart

and decided to withdraw abandoning

its wounded

The Parthians

ideally sui ted to harassing a retreating foe especially one who was mostly on

foot pursued with vigour and nearly all of the Roman army was slaughtered or

forced

to

surrender

the

legions losing

their

precious eagles

This

complete success

encouraged the Parthians to despise Roman armies especially since

the

force

at

Carrhae represented only part of

their strength

and had

been

expected

to delay

and no t

to defeat

the Their

attempted invasion of Syria

ended

in disaster

however when

on

two occasions Parthian armies dashed themselves to pieces

attacking uphill against confident legionaries supported

by slingers whose

missiles might give a

cataphract

concussion even if they did

not

penetrate

his armour

After

this both sides tr ea ted the opponent with caution and

Roman

armies march ing aga inst the

Parthians

made sure

that they

included

a good

proport ion of

cavalry

and

infantry armed with missile weapons

Even more

importantly they used

all

elements

of

the

army to support

each

other

the heavy

infantry to provide

solidity the archers

and

slingers to keep



C O N TR O L L IN G T H E

WORLD

AD 14-193

e enemy

at

a distance bowmen

on

foot will usually outrange horse-archers -

d th e cavalry to mount carefully controlled counter-attacks. Th e Parthians

to their military doctrine would refuse to join battle with

such

a well-

force although

they

would attempt

to lure out an d i so la te f or

t ru cti on an y s mall detachments whose commanders

were over

bold.

Skilful

gen rals kept their subordinates under tightly control when campaigning

the Parthians.

Th e result was a stand off. Th e Ro mans co ul d not force

the mobile

Parthians

a decisive battle

an d th e

Pa rthia ns c ould

not prevent

a

well-prepared

an d

R om an a rm y

from march in g through

their territory.

Th e

Romans

Parthian

cities an d strongholds besieging an d

s to rm in g t he m o ne

by

\

T h e P ar th ia n

capital Ctesiphon

was

sacked several times. Th e

Parthians

t heir mo bi li ty to

attack

th e Romans supply lines or distrac t their

by

d ee p r ai ds into

Syria

or

t he k in gd om s

allied

to Rome. Antony s

asion failed

when

his

siege-train lagging

behind the m ain columns

an d

by tw o legions was

captured

in its entirety. In th e

resultant

retreat

was harassed by the Pa rthia ns an d

suffered

enormous losses m os tl y f ro m

-

t

J

. : ~ .

,

5



ROMAN WARFARE

disease an d

shortage

of provisions. A wa r fought

under

Nero went very well for

t he R om an s u nt il o ne p oo rl y

le d army suffe re d a re ve rse was jostled

into

a

panicked flight

an d

surrendered the legionaries undergoing

th e

humiliation of

b ei ng s en t

under th e yoke.

An

invasion of Parthia was a massive

undertaking

requiring huge numbers

of

troops

to

m ak e t he

advancing armies

strong enough

both

t o d et er P ar th ia n attacks and to be able to besiege an d

t ak e t heir

cities.

In

addition more

soldiers were

needed to

protect

th e

lines of

communication

that s up pl ie d t he advancing forces

an d

to

defend

R om e s p ro vi nc es a ga in

Parthian

attacks.

All these troops

needed

to be fed an d supplied an d much

of t he c am pa ig ni ng a re a

wa s

no t productive enough

to allow

t he t ro op s to

support themselves by foraging an activity which anyway left small detachments

isolated

an d

vulnerable to t he m ob ile n ~

Th e size of

P ar th ia a nd

the

time-consuming task of taking strongholds one by o ne u nt il t he P ar th ia n king

was forced to

come

to

terms

made an invasion an undertaking of several years.

Only th e

emperor

h im se lf c ou ld

command such

an ent erpris e

without the

probability

of

creating a

dangerous

rival an d few felt inclined

to

spend long years

o n c am pa ig n in th e east. Ultimately

th e

scale of

th e

t as k a nd

th e

difficulty

of

finding

sufficient

manpower prevented

a

Roman conquest

of

Parthia and

conflicts

came instead

to focus on domination of

the kingdoms

betwe en the two

empires

notably Armenia.

The Ro man s i n it iat ed most of th e conflicts with Parthia save i n AD 155

when the

Parthian king

launched

an

unprovoked

invasion of

Armenia

an d

followed

on to

attack Syria. T he P ar th ia ns

lack

of skill in siege

warfare

meant

that

their

.invasions

tended to consist

of

large-scale raids.

Parthia

was

a lwa ys v ery

w eak i nt ern al ly

an d rarely

presented

a real

threat to the

stability

of

t he R om an east.

Theoretically

th e Arsacid

king

controlled sufficient

wealth

from

th e prosperous

Hellenistic

cities an d

t he p ro fi ts

of

the

major

trade

routes

t o m ai nt ai n his

dominance

over

th e

r i s t o r ~ In

practice the

great

noble

families ha d usurped many royal prerogatives an d provided

the

majority

of

troops for

th e

royal army

s up pl ie d i n c on ti ng en ts

on a feudal

basis.

In many

ways

it

wa s

not

in

t he i nt eres t

of

t he m on ar ch

for

the

military

followers of noblemen to be to o effective. Surenas

th e

successful commander

at

Carrhae

wa s

e xe cut ed bec ause t he k ing

feared

hi m

as a

potential

rival.

Therefore

th e

political

system prevented

th e

army

from becoming

to o effective.

T he c on ti nu al renewal of war with

th e

Parthians

has

been

interpreted

as

an indication that Roman imperialism

had

no t died with th e

Republic

an d

that th e dream o f w orld co nq u es t an d th e desire to emulate

Alexander

the

Great still

motivated

many

emperors.

Th e

underlying

cause

of

this hostility

is simpler

an d

was

du e to th e Roma n unde rsta nding

of

war wh ich we have

already

discussed. T he P ar th ia ns h ad

fought

an d humiliated

t he Roman s

an d

were

therefore

enemies.

Until they

ceased to b e perceived i n t hi s way by bein g

absorbed

as

subordinate

allies

or

conquered

as a province

then

renewal

of

hostilities was inevitable.




WORLD AD

14-193

X ROM N

diers were present

i n s ma ll

numbers

throughout

th e

Empire.

The army

wa s

called

upon

to perform a great range

of

duties t ha t h ad little

to do with

its

tary role largely because th e

Empire

lacked a sizeable civil service . Soldiers

supervising building work assisting state

officials

in such tasks

as

ta x

guarding

city

prisons regulating traffic through

cities or

acting

as

In th e Ne w Testament we find a

centurion

commanding th e

which carried out th e crucifixion of Christ an d tw o others: th e

sent to

t ak e t he

Apostle Paul to

Rome

an d

in

Galilee a centurion

wh o

d supervised the construction of a synagogue although t he l as t

man

may well

ve been f ro m t he army of the Herods organized

th e

R om an m od el

an d

l at er ab so rb ed i nto t he

As t hese

passages suggest

centurions

in

were

often encountered

as representatives

Roman authority at a

local

level.

Records

on

include appeals to

centurions

for protection

inst domestic violence an d robbery an d for them

investigate murders an d disappearances. Other

parties of soldiers were scattered to supply

e army s

needs manufacturing or

collecting

forage

or

animals

quarrying

fo r stone

d recruiting. There

are

very many

records

of

against

soldiers

accusations

o f b ru ta l

of

civilians an d illegal seizure of property

under th e guise of requisitioning. Soldiers

detached from t he ir u n it an d away from

certainly

seem to have

b ee n g ui lt y of

t hei r p ow er over civilians bu t our sources

e more likely to mention th e cases of

friction

than

peaceful

interaction

an d it is difficult to

estimate

e n at ure of th e majority of relations between

th e

an d

civilian

population.

Many legions or

large

vexillationes were positioned in or near t he g re at

of

th e

eastern

empire. The

greater

part

of the tw o legions f or mi ng t he

of Egypt

were

based

near

Alexandria with

th e

clear

intention of over-

ing this great political

centre.

Th e

army

w as f re qu en tl y c all ed in to

quell

in th e This de ployme nt ha s

le d

to th e suggestion

that

t he R om an

at least

i n s om e

provinces

was

p ri ma ri ly a n a rm y of occupation

whose

ro le w as

to

control t he s ub ject population. The depiction

of

th e

Roman

as a brutal oppressor is an attractive on e for a generation of

scholars

wh o

ew e mp ire s as

inherently wrong. When the army was called in

t o pu nis h

for failing to

p ay t ax es

or

flouting th e authority

of

th e governor s

sentatives it proved

brutally

efficient

at

burning villages an d crucifying large

Vespasian was the eventual

winner

in the Civil War

which followed

ro s

enforced suicide in 68.

Commander of the army in

]udaea he gained the support

of

most

of the eastern

provinces

of

the Empire

Under Vespasian and his

sons Titus and Domitian

many

of the

old

turf

forts

on the

Empires

frontiers

were rebuilt in stone

137



ROM N W RF R

This relief from the rch of

itus shows

the

spoils

carried in his triumph

celebrating the capture

of

erusalem i tus had

assumed command

of

the

army

in udaea

after

Vespasian declared

himself

a candidate for the throne

exploits

are described

with a great degree

of

sycophancy by the historian

osephus



CO TROLLING THE WORLD AD 4 93

9



ROM N W RF R

h iege of erusalem

March SeptemberAD 7

..

breached

wall

Roman

advance

Jewish counter attack

siege wall dyke




WOR LD AD

14-193

to terrify th e rest into submission. Such action was relatively

rare

an d it

important to remember that t he a rm y d id not number more than

250-300 000

this period compared to th e

population

of th e Empire roughly estimated at 70

Th e

R om an a rm y

wa s no t large

e no ug h t o

have

ruled

purely through

force

an d

much

of th e

population

of

th e

provinces

benefited

fr om th e

of the

Empire. Th e wealthiest

g ai ne d R om an

citizenship

became

or

senators an d might follow t he m il it ar y

careers open

to

these

ses while local

aristocrats provided

many centurions for th e auxilia.

Nor w er e al l th e

outbreaks

of

violence

within

t he E mp ir e d ue t o h at re d

of

rule. One of th e m ost f re quen t causes of

rioting

in Alexandria wa s

ion between the Jewish

and

Gentile communities there

and

fighting between

e Samaritans an d Jews in Judaea was also common. Rivalry among

cities

or

political factions

within

a city occasionally spilt over

into

an d

disturbances.

Banditry

was

rife

in

some

areas

especially at

times of

omic hardship

but

even

when

this w as

in part motivated

by hatred of Rome

targets were more often

than

no t an

area s

civilian population. I t is impossible

tell at this d is ta nc e i n t im e whether rebels or bandits w er e able

to

f ind r ef uge

civilian communities because of general sympathy for their cause or fear

their violence. U nr es t i n

many

a re as w as not a

creation

of Roman rule bu t

from previous kingdoms

an d

empires or th e result

of

ethnic tension. Its

ief motivation was

more often

social an d economic rather than political.

T H E SIEGE OF JERUSALEM AD

The Romans attack the Third Wall

makinga breach after fifteen days

despite fierce resistance.

The

Jewish rebels abandon this

p art o f

the city allowing the Romans to

occupy it without fighting

The Romans camp ins ide the Third

Wall demolishing the houses over

a wide area.

Th e

defenders make

frequent sallies and heavy fighting

ensues.

The

Romans breachthe

Second Wall

but

their attacking

columns are defeated after an initial

success. The Wall falls permanently

four days later

Titus orders four siege ramps to be

constructed. Completed after

seventeen days these are

immediately destroyed by the

rebels. Titus orders the

construction of the line of

circumvallation. Tw o newramps

are then builtagains t theF ortres s

of Antonia.

Th e

defenders

countermining undermines their

fortifications which collapse

The

Romans are

now

able to

attack

the Great Temple. Several assaults

fail in weeks of heavy fighting.

Eventually the Romans break in

andthe Temple

burnt down.

This defeat takes the heart

o ut o f

the defenders

The Romans l u n ~ attacks from

the Temple into the Old City. After

eighteen days

of

preparation they

s torm the area around the former

palace of H erod the Great. The

rebels put up little resistance and

the siege over

In 66 the

main

outbreak

of the Jewish rebellion

occurred

at

Jerusalem and

received further

encouragement when

a

hastily raised

oman

army

commanded by

the Syrian

governor Cestius Callus

marched against the city

only to suffer heavy losses

and

retreat in disorder.

The

rebels were never

united

under

a single leader

bu t

were divided

into

various

factions

and often

fought

amongst themselves. By

nearly all of the rebel

strongholds had been taken

by the

omans

and only

Jerusalem remained as the

heart of the resistance.

Three leaders dominated

different parts of

the

city

and the bitter fighting

between their followers was

only ended when Titus and

.the oman army arrived

outside

the

city walls. s in

most

sieges in this period

much

fighting occurred

outside the fortifications. It

was a sign

of

the defender s

confidence that he was

willing to contest the

ground outside

the walls

forcing the attacking to fight

to control the

ground

approaching

the

walls a

necessary preliminary to

any siegeworks. The

omans

were surprised by

the active nature of the

Jewish defence of

Jerusalem.

Throughout

the

siege the defenders

continually sallied out to

attack the oman camps

and

siegeworks.



ROM

W RF RE

RIGHT The

fortress

of

asada

was

built

near the

Dead Sea

by

erod the

Great as a

luxurious

place

of

refuge in an apparently

impregnable position In

when

Legio Fretensis

besieged the fortress it was

held

by Jewish extremists

known

as

the

Sicarii Deep

cisterns

and

vast storerooms

held

an

almost

inexhaustible

supply of

food

and

water so

the

Romans

decided

on

a

direct assault building a

huge ramp against

the

western side o f the hill

Faced

with

defeat the Sicarii

committed

suicide after

murdering their families

BOVE

The

Roman

ramp

still remains

at

the side

of

the

cliff

today Originally

the

top

was

surmounted by

a

wooden platform which

allowed the

battering ram

mounted

in a siege tower to

be

brought

against the wall

The

Roman army

was

determined

to suppress all

traces

of

rebellion



CONTROLLING THE WORLD

AD

4 93

BELOW: The town

o f

Gamala on the Golan

Heights was taken by

Vespasian in 67

Excavations revealed a

breach in the wall created

by

the

Roman

ram and catapult

ABOVE: Legio X built a wall

o f

circumvallation

completely surrounding

Masada and preventing any

escape This an d the forts

built

on

or behind it were

made

from the local stone

and

are clearly visible today

s an aid to comfort the

soldiers built lo w walled

stones and bolts scattered

amongst the debris Again

the defenders relied

on

the

natural strength of their

town s

position only to find

that the

Romans

were no t

put off by

such obstacles In

cabins roofing these with

their leather tents laying

these ou t in rows by century

This

one of the largest

camps built close to the

base of the ramp In the top

left corner

a smaller

enclosure occupied

by

the

small detachment left on site

after the siege In this camp

the background the

northern tip o f the Sea of

Galilee Faintly visible in the

haze are the Horns of Hattin

where over a thousand years

later Saladin won his great

victory over the Crusaders

the men added a second

cubicle to their rooms

copying the double rooms

accommodating an eight-

man contubernium

in a

permanent garrison

4



ROMAN

WARFARE

144

Rebellions that were

intended

t o t hr ow

off

Roman rule di d occur,

most

often

within a generation of an area s conquest as in G er many Gaul an d Britain. If

this outbreak

wa s defeated then

most areas

steadily b ecame abs o rb ed i nt o the

imperial culture

their

ari st ocraci es p ro fit in g fro m ass ociati on

with th e new

power.

Perhaps

t he m os t c on ti nu ou s resistance to Roman rule was fou nd in

]udaea

where sporadic uprisings

an d

banditry

exploded

into massed rebellion in

66-74 an d 133-5.

A wider rebellion of

Jewish

communities in E gypt Libya

an d

Cy pru s cau sed g reat

t u rmo il u n der

Trajan

115-17 . The Jews were exceptional

among th e

peoples

of

th e Roman east in ha ving a strong sense of national

identity

an d

culture which reached ba ck f ar ~ y o n d the Greek an d Roman

presence in th e area. Religion emphasized their distinctiveness

an d

prevented the

aristocracy

from

adopting careers in imperial service.

W he n a n uprising did occur,

th e

Roman reaction was always th e same. All the

troops which could be mustered

a t s ho rt

notice were formed i nt o a col umn and

sent

immediately

t o co nfron t

th e

perceived centre

of th e

rebellion.

It took

a great

n um be r o f vehicles, d r au g ht a nd

baggage animals

to supply a n a rm y for a long

campaign.

The

R om an ar my di d no t maintain such a large baggage t ra in o n a

permanent

basis, bu t requisitioned th e

transport

required once a wa r threatened,

a process

requiring

time. This

often

meant that numerically small an d poorly

supplied Roman c ol um ns l au nc he d a n i mm ed ia te offensive

again st t he

rebels.

Ideally, a show of force, even if it wa s a fas:ade,

regained

th e initiative an d

prevented

a rebellion from developing arid growing stronger.

Th e

willingness of

even greatly o u tn um b er ed R om an forces to attack

th e

enemy displayed a

contempt

for

them an d an

unwavering belief

i n t he

Romans

inevitable

v i t o r ~

It

wa s a gamble since th e Roman column was

only

capable

of

defeating relatively

weak opposition

an d

risked

disaster if

it encountered a well-prepared an d strong

n ~ Both

Boudicca in AD 60 an d

th e

Jewish rebels in 66 received a great boost

when

they wo n victories over

th e

first, poorly

prepared Roman

forces sent against

them.

If t he Romans failed t o c ru sh t he rebellion in its early stages, then th e next

army

sent

against the rising was

properly

prepared to f ight a major war.

One

g reat adv an tage

enjoyed by

th e

Roman army was its skill in siege

warfare.

Bot h t he

rebellion o f 6 6- 74 an d t he B ar Kochba revolt were

dominated

by sieges as

t he Roman s

systematically

s to rmed t he

Jewish

strongholds.

M os t o f

the technology of

siege

warfare ha d

been developed in

the

Hellenistic world when

i ts secrets ha d

been the

preserve of a relatively small group of professional

engineers often serving as mercenaries. Battering-rams

b reach ed t he

enemy

defences, artillery firing bolts

an d

s to nes s up pres sed t he defenders an d siege

towers

m ad e i t

easier for

t he att ack i ng p arti es

to reach

th e

walls. Th e legions

of

t h e Prin cip ate ha d

me n

well trained

in

constructing an d operating all of these

engines as part

of

their

standard

complement as well as

artillery

an d other

equipment much

of

it prefabricated for easier transportation.

Th e Romans

di d

relatively little

to

develop

th e

technical

side

of

siegecraft,

bu t

they

b ro ug ht a n

aggressive, relentless

quality

to this ty of warfare. Earlier Roman armies ha d



CONTROLLING THE

WORLD AD 14 193

n forced to

blockade

a fortress and starve the

defenders

into submission

if

it

d n ot fallen t o an immediate surprise attack. Now they undertook massive

constructing ramps to bring their rams

an d

towers against the defences

a

breach

had

been created

infantry supported by artillery fire were sent

the

assault

Such attacks were always

difficult

and the s torming party

fered heavy casualties A successful

assault

left

the attackers

out o f

control; the

lting sack of a city was an

appalling

thing with

the men being massacred

an d

e

women raped and enslaved Roman law

denied any rights to defenders

who

to surrender before the first ram touched their wall and the horrific

These coins were

minted

by

the short lived independent

state created in Judaea by

the rebellion of Bar Kochba

in

133

prompted by

Hadrian 5 decision to built a

temple to Jupiter

on

Temple

ount

in Jerusalem.

Despite heavy casualties the

omans

suppressed the

rising. uch of the fighting

was small scale

with

the

omans

sending out small

raiding columns and

systematically storming the

numerous walled villages of

Judaea.

145



R O M A N WARFARE

Maiden Castle was one of

the largest walled towns

of

the Durotriges a tribe living

in

modern day

Dorset. It

was

stormed

during the

Claudian conquest of

southern

Britain

by

Legio

ugusta

under

the

command

of the future

emperor Vespasian. Its three

circuit walls

and

intricate

gateways were intended to

allow

the sling armed

defenders to drive of{ an

.assault

bu t

failed utterly

against the engineering skill

of

the

Roman

army.

OPPOSITE:

The abataean

kingdom was one

of

the

wealthiest

of

the Client

States which were a

prominent feature on the

Roman frontiers especially

in the east. I ts capital at

etr is famous for its

spectacular civic buildings

and

tombs. It was

annexed

by Trajan who created the

new province of Arabia.

consequences

of

a Roman

assault

were

intended

to encourage an early surrender.

Throughout th e

siege

th e R om an s

took

every

opportunity to terrorize

th e

defenders captives taken during sallies being crucified

i n s ig ht

of

th e

walls or

their

severed heads f ired by artillery into

th e

cit : I t was common for th e Romans

to build a ditch an d wall

or

line of circumvallation around th e entire stronghold

preventing anyone

from

escaping

or supplies an d reinforcements

from

reaching

th e defenders. It also served as a reminder that while th e defenders may have

fenced themselves in for their own protection

the Romans

ha d now fenced them

in for their ultimate destruction.

T H E

FRONTIERS

The

greater part of th e

Roman

army especially i n th e we ste rn provinces was

b as ed i n t he f ro nt ie r zones. T he re h as been considerable debate over the role of

th e

army

i n t he se areas

an d

indeed of t he R om an c on ce pt

of

frontiers bu t it

very

important to note

that the Empire s frontiers did

no t represent

clear

geographical

limits

to

th e

army s

activit :

Th e

Romans were heavily involved both

diplomatically

an d

militarily

for

a

considerable distance beyond

th e

boundaries

of

th e provinces. Centurions attended tribal meetings

of

many

of th e

peoples

of

north-west

Europe.

Noblemen

thought

to be favourable

to

th e

Romans

were paid

large subsidies

allowing

t he m t o support

a bigger

b an d o f

followers

an d

increase

t he ir s ta tu s w it hi n t he tribe.

Ideally

this

d et er re d t he

tribes

from large-scale



CONTROLLING

THE

WORLD AD 4 93

7



ROMAN WARFARE

miles

i

uret n

...

ns

c a s a ~

aggression

and at

the very

least

it gave the Romans advance warning

of

its

likelihood. Warfare and

especially raiding played a

central

role in the society

of

many of the peoples outside the

frontiers

in Bri tain Germany and along the

Danube.

Status

within a

tribe

came from success in war and

attacks

against the

Roman

Empire

brought tremendous prestige

as well as the prospect of

considerable loot. Our sources usually

only

mention the very large raids by

thousands

of

warriors which penetrated deep into the peaceful provinces.

Most

barbarian military

activity was

on

a

smaller

scale; a nobleman

and

his

immediate

retainers plus as many other warriors as were attracted by his prestige probably

no

more

than

a few hundred men

in

total. Some

incursions

may have been even

smaller.

T here d id

not

need to be

any specific

motive for such attacks any more

than

there

needed to be a mot ive for the

constant

intertribal

raiding. Tacitus claimed that German tribes

liked

to m aintain a depopulated area

around

their

t er rit ory to deter enemies

by

this

symbol of

prowess

and t o

give more

warning of

approaching

raiders. In themselves such small scale incursions

did not threaten

the

stability

of the

Empire bu t

the danger if

they

went unchecked was that

a

perception of Roman vulnerabil ity would

encourage

an

escalation

in

the size

and number

of attacks.

The

number of Roman troops was very small

in relation to

the size

of

most

of

the

frontier

areas

which

they

occupied.

The

army lacked the

capacity

to

intercept every

raid. One

solution

might

have

been to conquer and incorporate

the

hostile tribes into

the

Empire. Domitian sought to

control the

Chatti

by

advancing

the frontier

and

building

a line

of

forts

in

their t r r t o r ~ However

conquest

required

large numbers of troops most

of

which

would then

be

t ied down

as

garrisons

and anyway expansion under

the Empire needed

to be carefully supervised by

the

emperor. Ideally

diplomatic activity reduced the hosti li ty

of

the

tribes bu t often this had to

be

combined with

military force. If the Romans cou ld no t s top the

raids

then they

cou ld ensure that the

tribes

responsible did not go

unpunished.

Fast moving

columns of troops stripped of unnecessary

baggage

an d

carrying only

enough

supplies for

the

duration of the

expedition

launched sudden

TH E

ROMAN EMPIRE IN

AD 4

The

Roman

Empire reached

its fullest

extent

under the

Severans Since the first

century

the emphasis

of

the

army

in Europe

had

shifted from the

Rhine

to

the Danubian frontier

and

there were

now

only four

legions in the

erman

provinces The vast majority

of

units continued to be

stationed in the frontier

provinces

with

the

exception

of

the Syrian

and

Egyptian legions

who

covered the great cities

of

the east There was also

now

a legion permanently

stationed outside

Rome

which

with

the addition

of

the Guard units provided

the Emperor with the basis

of

a powerful army

part

from

new

legions

and

the

troops stationed in Italy

nearly all legionaries were

by

this time

born

in the

provinces



CONTROLLING THE

WORLD AD

14 193

on the t ribes burning their settlements destroying their crops and

nding up livestock Only a

small

area would feel the actual effects of

such

a

expedition bu t it demonstrated

that

t he Romans c ou ld

and

would

ish attacks

upon them with

appalling f r o i t ~

Mustering a

tribal

army

took

and

if

one did muster to confront the Romans it

was usually

only when they

withdrawing. A competently

handled Roman

force could expec t to

rcome significantly larger tribal armies so that often a defeat in battle was

ded to

punishment inflicted

In a sense

the

Romans ha d

joined in

the traditional

patterns

of intertribal

with

the distinction that

their attacks

were

on a more massive scale

Roman

Empire

ll J Client state

disputed

territory

in

northern ritain

Legionary

bases

in

AD

4

149



ROMAN WARFARE

IS°

With their better organization and logistic support the Romans were also able to

attack at any

time

of the year usually with

the

benefit

of

surprise The flexibility

of the R oman

military

system allowed them to adapt to fighting

different

cultures If a people possessed a

strong

field army and a willingness

to

fight open

bat tles then the defeat of this force usually ensured their surrender If they

possessed

important political

an d

economic centres such as cities then these

were besieged and

captured A people who

refused

battle

or

lacked large

important settlements faced

attacks

on their villages their cattle and crops One




WORLD

AD

14-193

the most important symbols of wealth in Germanic society was cattle making

capture

a valuable way

of applying pressure on

tribal leaders

Th e

Romans

re aware of the respect accorded to

noblewomen

in German society an d as a

demanded

these as hostages. Punitive raids were at best temporary

to th e problem lasting only

as

long

as

th e fear they created

while

th e

of

burning villages ensured a legacy

of hatred

so

that each

ne w

added the Romans to th e list of a tribe s enemies Th e Romans needed

m ai nt ai n

an

appearance of overwhelming power since a ny p er c ep ti on of

More common than

unbroken boundaries such

ditches or walls were

systems

of

small outposts

like this watchtower on the

River Danube depicted on

Trajans olumn These

were used to pass signals

hence the

wooden

pyre

and

piles

of

straw ready to be

ignited Other similar

installations were built

along the line

of

road

systems policed

by

the army

for instance in Egypt

1 5

1



ROMAN WARFARE

T H E FRONTIERS IN

NORTHERN BRITAIN

Archaeological records tell

us

that

a line

of

forts

running along a road

known

now

as the Stanegate was

replaced by a solid wall

under Hadrian. This was

later replaced by the more

northern ntonineWall

which was itself

abandoned

and

re-occupied before the

army

finally returned to

Hadrians Wall.

weakness such as t he r ed uc ti on i n size of a frontier garrison or even worse the

smallest

Roman defeat risked a r et ur n t o general o s t l t ~

Roman frontier zones were always based on good communications usually

by road

bu t also

along rivers

such

as the Rhine and Danube. Bases were

established

along th e

line

of

these

routes

allowing swift

concentration

of forces

A ux il iary forts

accommodating

single

cohorts or

alae were loc ated furthe r

forward with t he g reat

legionary

fortresses some distance to th e rear

the

en d

of th e first c en tu ry m os t of th e early tu rf a nd timber

forts

constructed by

th e

Romans were

being replaced

by more pe rma nent

stone

structures Th e garrisons

of

these forts were

no t static an d it

is

no w

clear

that detachments of

legionaries

an d auxiliaries were freely m ix ed i n the forward areas

Often

little more

than

a

unit s records an d

administrative

HQ were permanently in residence

at

their

base

v t e

Novantarum Prom.

Mull

of Galloway

chtuthil

XX

Valeria Victrix site

abandon

d-ily

90

Cargill 0

20kT

2

miles

Frontiers

of northern

Britain

First-fourth centuries AD

Stanegate

Roman w ll

Legionary

fortress

fort

fortlet

w lled town

queduct

Roman

name

doubtful

M a re

ino- l. a

Binchester

/



C O NT R OL L IN G T H E WORLD AD 14 193

d th e b ul k

of

th e u ni t m ig ht be fa r afield In th e late first and early second

tury the concept of a line

of

bases l inked by a road was taken a s tage further

linear

barriers were constructed. Th e m os t f am ou s e xa mp le is Hadrian s

running across northern

Britain between

th e

Tyne

an d Solway bu t other

ear systems were

constructed

in North Africa an d covered

t he g ap

between

th e

Rhine

an d

Danube. Most of these structures were relatively simple

of ditches r am pa rt s a nd palisade walls l inking toge the r small

fortlets an d watchtowers

On

Hadrian s Wall

there

were small fortlets or

Roman mile an d tw o small turrets

in between.

M os t o f

these

lls were n ot t op pe d by walkways an d it is

no t

even

certain

i f this

wa s t he

case

Hadrian s Wall In some areas lines

of

small watchtowers were built

without

connecting wall

The mperorHadrian

presents a sacrificial cake or

popanum to the Goddess

Roma Hadrian

spent

much

of his reign touring the

provinces inspecting the

armies and reorganizing the

frontiers In several places

most

notably in northern

Britain he ordered the

construction of massive

linear boundaries

5



ROM N W RF R

Hadrian s Wall crossing

Cawfield Crags in

Northumbria The wall was

constructed in several

phases and a series of

alterations made t o t he

original design.

Running

from the mouth

of

the Tyne

to the Cumbrian coast it

included small fortlets every

Roman mile and

two

turrets between each one.

The formula was applied

with some rigidity some

gateways opening out

on

to

almost sheer slopes. Initially

the western section was

built

of

turf and

timber

but

this was later replaced

with

stone. the south the

military zone was marked

by a wide ditch known

conventionally as the

Vallum. Later forts were

added to the line of the

wall in some cases as

at

Houseteads being built over

earlier turrets. The wall

allowed the

army

to control

all traffic passing through

the region which could only

cross it at guarded gateways.

It was also visually very

impressive.

lthough

the

wall has been intensively

studied for over a century

many

fundamental

questions remain

unanswered. We cannot be

certain

of

its original

height nor whether it

possessed a continuous

walkway allowing sentries

to pace along its length.

5



CO TROLLING T HE WORLD AD 4 93



ROM N W RF RE

S TO N E G T EW Y

The gateways

of

stone forts

or fortresses were always

impressive affairs and

defended

by

towers. A

recently discovered piece

of

graffiti from a Roman

outpost

in Egypt suggests

that there

may

often have

been four storeys instead of

the three shown here.

However it s important to

remember that the Roman

armys bases were not

primarily intended as

TIMBER

G TEW Y

Double gateways were the

most common

Roman

design for all four entrances

in the standard fort design

but some forts had only a

single gate as shown here.

The towers might be used to

mount

light artillery such as

the scorpion bolt-shooters.

At least one or more

v-shaped ditches offered

further protection. The

ditches have a rectangular

sectioned trench running

defensive sites did not

possess especially strong

fortifications and were not

built

on

formidable

positions. The

army

of

the

Principate normally

expected to defeat its

enemies in the open and

heavily outnumbered

garrisons

showed

a

willingness to come out

and fight more numerous

attackers.

through the

bottom

which

facilitated cleaning

out

spoil but also

might

trip

charging attackers.

Other

obstacles such as concealed

pits

with

sharpened stakes

in the centre known to th e

soldiers from their shape s

lilies were common These

layers o f defences would

take the momentum

out

of

an

enemy attack

before he

reached the walls

and

attempted to scale them.

This full-scale reconstruction

of a timber gateway was

built on the site

of

the

Roman

fort at Baginton

near Coventry. Until the later

part of the first century D

most

Roman bases were

defended

by turf and timber

fortifications like this an

extension of the same basic

design

s

the marching

camps built by the army on

campaign.




WORLD

AD

14-193

These great

fortified lines are barely mentioned le t alone explained

in

ou r

sources

Our understanding of

them is

based

almost exclusively on

their

remains an d it is not always possible to dedu ce th eir ex act

What is

obvious

is that

t hese w ere

not

fighting

platforms from

which

R om an s f ou gh t

of f th e barbarian h or de s w ho recklessly hurled themselves

n st t he b as ti on s

of civilization

Hadrian s

Wall from i ts f irs t inception

d gateways an d crossing points

at

every milecastle an d when initial plans

modified an d forts were constructed on th e line of th e wall itself then

these

to

th e

number of gateways Th e Wall

was

never intended

to restrict

th e

of

the Roman army

bu t

simply provided a secure base for its advance

Romans maintained permanent

outposts

beyond th e line of th e Wall an d

r problems

were dealt with by

mobile

operations even further afield

It

di d

The fort at ouseteads

on

Hadrian sWall one of the

most famous

oman

sites in

the world. This picture

shows

one

of

the granaries

or stores its floor raised on

the rows of wooden pillars

to keep the grain cool and

deter vermin. ll oman

bases

had

provision for the

storage of huge amounts of

food sometimes up to a

year s supply.

IS?



ROMAN

WARFARE

This view shows the main

buildings in the centre

of

Houseteads fort. Closest

is

the comm nding officers

house

praetorium ,

built in

the classic Mediterranean

plan around a central

courtyard and including

underfloor heating for some

rooms.

n the higher

ground to the right is the

headquarters principia)

where the

units

standards

nd records were kept nd

its day-ta-day

administration carried out.

I f the background

is

the

hospital a feature

of

all

major bases.

allow

the Romans

to

control

movement

through

the area, since all crossing points

were guarded. We know that

there were restrictions placed

on

German tribesmen

crossing

the Rhine and

especially

on

their carrying

of

we ap ons . In this way it

did

much

to

prevent the small-scale raiding which formed the bulk

of

military

activity

on the

frontiers. Preventing

many

of these incursions discouraged an

escalation

of

hostility into larger-scale warfare. Linear boundaries were only

feasible in certain geographical conditions, but small outposts and watchtowers

served much the

same

purpose, creating the impression

that

a wide area was

under continuous surveillance

and

they helped to deter such activity: It is also

worth

bearing

in mind the physical impression created by th es e s tr uc tu re s.

A fortification

running

from one horizon to the other was a powerful statement

of Rome s might. Caesar tells us that some Gallic tribes cultivated thick hedge

lines matking the

borders

of

their

terri tory to deter r ai de rs . I n many areas

the Romans

took care to maintain an area bare of settlement for some distance

in advance of the frontier. Whether the Romans

intended

this or

not,

it likely

that

their frontier

systems were perceived as clear

demarcations

of

territory

by



barbarian

tribes. This reinforces the idea

that

the Romans

had

joined in

i t as a massively stronger

participant the traditional pattern

of

intertribal

The

Roman army of the Principate was a relatively small but high quality

e most suited

to

mobile operations. Its military doctrine remained intensely

ressive even though the pace of conquest had been drastically reduced

and

it

increasingly deployed in semi permanent frontier zones. Measures were

to police small scale banditry raiding and violence

both

on the frontiers

within the provinces but the reaction

to

any major opposition was to assume

mediate offensive. Whatever the local situation the Roman army adapted

doctrine deployment and tactics to make the most of the advantages

njoyed over its less organized and skilled opponents. The frontiers were

static defences but bases for military and diplomatic activity reaching far

nd the provinces. The

Roman

military system was flexible n o ~ g h to

adapt

cal requirements

but

still

retained the

distinctively relentless

pursuit of

v i t o r ~



H PTER IV

~ . ~ : ~ : = = = : = . : @ : . ~ : = = ~ i i t J .

RISIS

ND REFORM

C PTIVE R RI NS

implore the mercy of Emperor

Marcus Aurelius n intellectual

who

corresponded

with

the great philosophical schools in

thens and

wrote his own editationsMarcus Aurelius spent

much

of his reign campaigning against the Germanic

tribes

beyond

the Danube

e

planned to

add

extensive

new

provinces in the area of Bohemia

but

the project

was abandoned

on

his death



R O M A N WARFARE

CRISIS

A N D

R E F O R M

H E M IDD LE OF TH E t hi rd c en tu ry

witnessed frequent

Roman defeats Germanic

tribesmen raided

deep into

th e

western provinces

of

th e Empire while most

of

th e

east

wa s overrun by t he Sas sani d Persians In 251 t he e mp er or

Decius was killed when his army was defeated by th e Goths.

In 260

t he emperor

Valerian an d his

army

surrendered

to the

Persians A short-lived independent

empire

in Gaul an d

another

in

t he E as t b as ed

around

th e kingdom of

Palmyra

threatened

to

f ra gm ent t he Empire. Endemic civil wars

s app ed th e arm y s s tre ng th

an d

weakened its capacity

to

fight foreign wars Some stability was achieved

under strong

emperors

such as Aurelian Diocletian an d

Constantine but

only af ter the a rm y s s tr uc tur e

an d

deployment ha d

been

greatly altered Nevertheless by th e early fifth century most

of

t he f ac to rs

which

would lead to the

collapse

of th e

w es te rn e mp ir e

were

alr eady in

place The

reasons

for

Rome s fall are both

complex

an d fiercely

debated

an d a full

discussion

of these would be out of place here bu t

it

is

important

to

c on si de r w he th er m il it ar y weakness

an d

ineff iciency played a

major role

in

this

process

Di d

th e

R om a n a rm y evolve to deal

more

effectively with a

changed

situation

or

was i t simply in decline?

Diocletian Gaius

~ r l i u s

Valerius Diocletianus was a

strong emperor

who

campaigned successfully

against the Persians and

usurpers in Egypt

and

Britain.

One of the Illyrian emperors,

he created the Tetrarchic

system in which he shared

rule with a colleague,

aximian andeach had a

deputy. Diocletian abdicated

in 305. During his reign many

army units were withdrawn

from the frontiers and

stationed inside the provinces,

the origins of the later

comitatenses and the army

seems to have markedly

increased in size.

r6 2

CIVIL WA RS

A N D U SU R PA T IO N S

It

is tempting to view civil conflicts as

aberrations campaigns

which distracted

th e

army

from

its primary role of defending

th e

Empire

bu t

which di d no t have a

profound effect on its structure

an d

deployment.

However civil wa r was a

common occurrence in t he l at er

Empire

an d accounted for

th e

greater n umber o f

pitched battles

fought

by Roman soldiers T h e s hape

of

th e

fourth-century

army

grew o ut of

long

years of

internal

conflict

Th e

emperors

of

th e

early Principate took great care

t o mai nt ai n

the loyalty

of

th e

army

an d

were largely successful in this aim There was nearly a century

between

Actium

an d

th e outbreak

of

widespread conflict at th e suicide o f Ne ro

in

AD

68

and an

even longer

period

before the great wars fol lowing the

assassination

of Commodus in 193 There were attempted rebel lions by

provincial governors

in

between these massive struggles b ut n on e gained much

momentum. Some

emperors met

violent ends bu t their

deaths

an d th e succession

were usually

decided

in Rome

The

Praetorian

G ua rd h ad

long played an active

ro le i n

politics

notably proclaiming Claudius emperor

following

t he m ur de r o f

Caligula an d

auctioning the Empire

to

th e

highest

bidder

after

th e

assassination



CRISIS A ND R E FO RM

Pertinax

No emperor could

survive without a loyal

guard

an d

most

took care

treat

th e

Praetorians well:

they

enjoyed far b et te r co nd itio ns than th e

onaries serving for

o nl y s ix teen

years receiving

h ig he r p ay

an d

frequent

vish donatives Emperors like Galba

an d

Pertinax, wh o failed to satisfy th e

ardsmen s expectations

with

suitable rewards, m et swift

ends Since no

wished to give command of

t he o nl y

troops in

Rome

to a potential rival

e

Praetorians

were commanded

no t

by

senatorial

officers bu t by

equestrians.

an d th e succession remained focused

on

Rome,

bu t this b eg an t o change

owly as

emperors

such as

Trajan

an d Hadrian

s pe nt l on g periods

in th e

Marcus Aurelius fought for years against t he t ri be s

on

t he D an ub e,

on

camp aig n i n

180

Septimius

Severus

wh o

ha d

fought

a long civil war

d t he n led an army a ga in st t he Parthians, died in 211 at York

Eboracum)

here he was

wintering during

a

camp ai gn ag ai ns t t he Cal ed on ians .

More

than

emperors

held power briefly until th e accession of

Diocletian

in 284

an d

e were

many more u su rp ers w ho

failed to establish themselves an d d ie d i n

th e

wars were

c om mo n a nd

th e majority of emperors d ied v io len t

at th e

hands

of

their own

soldiers

Shapur

I was

the son and

successor to the founder

the

Sassanid dynastYJ

rdashir He campaigned

with great success against

the Romans

J

defeating and

killing the

emperor

Gordian

III in 244

and capturing

ura Europus in 255 In this

relief

from

Nagshe

Rostam

J

another emperor Valerian

J

is

shown

cowering in front

the

king

after

his defeat

and capture at Edessa in

260 One lurid tradition

claimed that after his

execution

J

Valerian s body

was stuffed and put on

display



ROMAN

WARFARE

Lucius Septimius Severus

D145-211

was

the

eventual

winner

of a series

of civil wars defeating his

last rival Clodius

lbinus

the

governor

of

Britain in

197 He mounted a highly

successful Parthian

expedition and spent

the

last three years

of

his life in

a major

war

against the

Caledonian tribes in

northern

Britain dying

of

natural causes in York

Severus granted Roman

soldiers the right to make

legal recognized marriages

As emperors spent more time with

th e

armies in th e provinces, so these began

to behave in a similar way t o the

guard. Th e

situation was worsened by changing

patterns

in th e appointment

of

th e

senior

officers

of

th e army: The tradition

began

to

change

w hereby Rome s

armies

were commanded by

senators

who

interspersed periods

of

military service with civil appointments. Th e presence of

th e

emperor with th e army

encouraged

especially lavish rewards for th e men who

distinguished themselves In his

campaigns.

An

increasing number

of

equestrian officers were elevated

to

th e

Senate

went

on to

hold

even greater military

responsibility: Marcus Aurelius promoted a prefect of an

ala Marcus Valerius Maximus, giving

hi m

senatorial

rank an d

making him

legate of six legions in succession,

b ec au se h e

had

killed with his ow n

hand

a king

of

a

Germanic

tribe, the

Naristae. Th e future

emperor

Pertinax is said to have failed to gain a commission as a

legionary

centurion,

but, having accepted the prefecture

of an

auxiliary

cohort

instead,

served with such

distinction in equestrian posts

that

he became a senator.

Severus r ai se d t hr ee

ne w

legions I-Ill Parthica),

bu t

entrusted

their

command

t o equ est ri an prefects rather

than

senatorial legates. Through

th e

third century th e

number

of

senior

army

positions

held by senators

gradually declined.

Fa r

more opportunities lay o pe n t o

equestrians, especially those w ho campaigned under the

emperor himself.

The

equestrian officers w ho d om in at ed t he t hi rd

century arm y were in

many

respects professional

soldiers, o win g t he ir a dva nc em ent purely to

their

military

record

an d th e favour

of

th e emperor. The successful me n were career

soldiers

wh o

served with th e

army

continuously

an d

di d no t

hold

civil offices. It

w as u su al ly t he se me n

an d

no t th e ordinary soldiers wh o p lo tt ed to m ur de r a n

e mp er or a nd n o mi na te d a usurper from their gr ou p. It is possible, bu t by

no

m ea ns c er ta in ,

that

the r ap id

p ro mo ti on a nd

great

responsibilities given

to

eq uest rian s w h o d is ti ng ui sh ed themselves increased th e

quality

of

th e

senior

officers of th e R om an army: The

distancing

of prominent

senators

from the

c om ma nd o f

armies ma y

at

first have been i nt end ed t o prevent potential rivals

from g ai ni ng

support

in th e army: In t he l on g term it had th e effect of

making

usurpations

more

common.

Long

service with th e army allowed this ne w breed of

professional officers to develop

strong

bonds with the junior officers an d soldiers.

A senator

hoping

to

g ai n t he

Imperial

throne

needed

to

be confident of

at

least a

fair degree

o f s up p or t

an d acceptance within

th e

Senate if he was t o s ta nd much

chance of

a successful reign even

after

he

ha d

achieved

military

success. In

practice

this r educed

th e

n um be r o f potential rivals to a relatively small group,



those

able to achieve

command of on e

of th e large military provinces

e emperor s frequent

absence

f ro m R om e distanc ed him f ro m t he p ol it ic al

of

Senate

an d

capital moving th e

c ou r t t o

th e r ~ Since popularity

with

e

soldiers an d especially their officers

was

all that wa s

necessary

to

reach

th e

it b ecame far easier for usurpers

to

mount a successful challenge

Once

ha d a tta ine d

power

then this depended on th e continued s up po rt o f their

n

forces an d

on

having greater military strength than an y

other

rival Several

t he m os t

successful

emperors

of

t he s econ d

half of th e century

c am e f ro m

a

group of Illyrian officers a number of

whom

proved

very able Internal

had

led to losses

an d

defeats

on

all

frontiers

of the Empire

a nd further

internal rebellions Each emperor

was

required

to

campaign

with

tle break since he could rarely afford to

entrust

th e

command

of a

ma jor a rmy

a

potential

rival When

th e

emperor chose t o o p erate for

any length

of

time

in

e theatre of operations there was a

great

danger that

othe r pa rts

of th e Empire

that their ow n difficulties were being neglected would create a rival

CRISIS

AN D

R E F O R M

Diocletian

often

credited

with strengthening the

Empire after the chaos of

the

mi d

third century but in

fact the Tetrarchic system

only really functioned

effectively during his reign

Later it simply provided a

framework for advancement

amongst those aspiring to

imperial power Civil wars

started to break out within a

short t ime

of

his ·retirement

and his ow n fellow

ugustus

Maximian who

had

also abdicated tried to

resume power to aid his son



R O M A N WARFARE

onstantine the Great

D

2 8 5 3 3 7 ~

the first

emperor

to embrace h r i s t i n i t y ~ was

proclaimed emperor

by

the

army when o n s t n t i u s ~ his

f t h e ~

died in 306 Defeating

his rivals Maxentius and

Licinius was his greatest

military h i e v e m e n t ~ bu t

only in 324 did the l t t e r ~ s

death leave

him

sole

emperor e completed the

re organization of the army

into comitatenses

and

limitanei.

r6 6

A measure of

stability

wa s created by on e

of

th e

Illyrian

emperors

Diocletian who gradually developed a system

of

dividing t he i mp erial power

known

as th e Tetrarchy: This was

not

entirely

without

precedent: for instance

Marcus Aurelius

ha d

ruled jointly with Lucius Verus until the latter s death. In its

evolved f or m t he re were t wo s en io r e mp er or s each

known

as Augustus who

ruled

the eastern an d western provinces respectively assisted by a

junior

colleague

or

Caesar. D io cl et ia n b ec am e A ug us tu s i n t he e as t

an d

chose

another

Illyrian

officer

Maximian

as his

colleague

in the west.

The

s ys te m w as designed to

provide

eno ug h co mmand ers t o

deal

with

several crises simultaneously

but

by nominating

th e Caesares

as successors

to

their senior

colleagues to

prevent

civil wa r by

providing

for the

a mb it io ns o f all

me n

with armies. However th e

system collapsed

almost

as

soon

as Diocletian

an d

Maximian w en t in to

voluntary retirement

in

305 in

the

main because it failed

to

make

prOVISIon for

members

of

th e

Imperial

family

wh o

were no t appointed

to

the

Tetrarchy: The principle of divided power

did la st for

much

of

th e

fourth century

apart f ro m t he period from 324 37 when

Constantine managed to achieve sole

power but usurpations and civil wa r

c on ti nu ed t o be common. It is frequently

forgotten that Constantine

the

most

successful emperor

of

the period spent half

of

his reign as a usurper.

The

different grades

of

Caesar an d Augustus an d the acknowledgement of

th e east-west division allowed ambitious generals to

progress in stages to ultimate power bu t also left greater

potential for compromise between rivals.

The

s tr at eg y in

civil wars was invariably simple. Unless a

compromise

was reached such as

th e recognition

of th e rival as a

junior

Caesar

or as Augustus in

th e

othe r half of

th e

Empire

then

th e conflict only ended

with

th e

d ea th o f

on e

of

th e

rivals.

Both

sides

gathered

as large an

army

as they could

an d sought ou t a battlefield encounter. Such a clash was only delayed as each side

s ou gh t t o fight

th e

battle

in the

most favourable circumstances or attempted

to

persuade

th e

rival army to defect. It is

only

in civil

wars

that we hear o f the

cautious

jockeying for

position

before a

battle

which was such a feature of earlier

warfare. Fighting a similarly

trained

an d

equipped

enemy denied the Romans the

advantages they

normally

enjoyed i n w ar s

against

foreign

opponents

an d placed

great emphasis

on mobilizing

greater numbers

of

troops. Civil wars drew a high

proportion

of

t he a rm y s s tr en gt h away f rom the defence an d control of

the

provInces.



HE LATE ROMAN ARMY

were several significant changes

made to the structure of the Roman army

th e

third

and

fourth

centuries. While

the

overall number

of troops

under

had

probably

increased,

the

size of

individual

units, especially

the

legions,

By

the end

of

the third century there

were

more

than

sixty

legions

in

that seem

to

have ha d a theoretical

strength of

about a thousand

men

per cent of

their

earlier size. In 212 Caracalla

had

extended Roman citizenship

the greater

part

of

the

Empire s

population

removing

much

of

the distinction

een citizen and

non citizen

troops.

The

new

of cavalry titled vexillationes and the old alae

d infantry

cohorts seem to have

mustered

five to si x hundred men apiece. Th e

and

training of legions

an d

auxiliary

seems

to

have

been virtually identical

ting as close-order troops in the batt le line.

In

th ird cen tu ry the rectangular scutum and the

pilum

became

less common

and

were

laced by oval or round shields and lighter spears

ch as t he lancea Som e units a lso

carried

as

many

five

lead weighted

darts plumbatae or

slotted into the

hollows

of their

Reconstructions

have suggested

that these

d a

range

of about

30-65 metres 99-215

feet),

than

double

tha t of

a

pilum

and significantly

than

most

javelins. Most

units seem

to have

scale or mail a rmour and iron

helmets i f

ese were available. The

tactics

of later

Roman

were less aggressive than

those

of

the

early

and in

some

ways

more

akin to

those

of

Polybian predecessors.

Ammianus describes

infantry

raising the

barritus, a Germanic

r c ry w hi ch steadily

increased

in

volume

in or der to build up their own

idence before

they entered

hand to hand combat.

The

single volley

of

pila

rown just

before contact was

replaced

by a much longer barrage of darts

and

frequently

arrows f ir ed by

archers

in close

support.

Th e charge of

an infantry

was sometimes

met

at

the halt

sacrificing

the moral

lift given

an

advance to

ensure

that

the

stationary Roman line remained

in

good order

d delivered the greatest possible number of missiles. However, faced

with

the

archers of

the

Persian

armies it

was

more

common to sacrifice order

d advance at a run

minimizing

the t ime spent in an

exchange

of missiles

in

ich the enemy

would probably

prove superior.

It is

possible that

the

average

unit

in

the later

army

did

not have

the

discipline

to advance slowly an d

in

silence, waiting until very close range before

CRISIS AND REFORM

The emperor CaracaLla was

the

eldest

son of

Septimius

Severus In

212

he extended

Roman citizenship to most

of

the population

of the

Empire

On

campaign he

lived the life

of

a simple

soldier allegedly grinding

his

own

ration

of

grain into

{lour with a handmiLl He

was stabbed to death by one

of

his

own

cavalry

o d y g u r d ~

or

singulares.



ROMAN WARFARE

r



livering a single volley of pila an d

charging

into contact. The

shock

tactics of

e

early

Principate

were

probably

a

more

effective way

of producing

a decisive

sult in

an infantry

clash an d

winning

a

pitched

battle. However as we shall see

e

fighting of

pitched

battles ha d ceased to be

th e

main concern of th e Roman

by

th e fourth

century:

The

5 OOO strong

legion

ha d

been designed

for

bi g

commander

controlling

a sizeable

section

of th e line

and

supplying

its for each of

th e

multiple supporting lines of

th e

army s formation.

The

later

m y m ainta ine d the

t ra di ti on al R om an

emphasis on th e

use of reserves

i nt o m or e

than

on e

line as a matter of

course. The smaller

size of its

mean t t hat while each formed an effective part of an y line

they

ha d

little

of operating

in mutual

support

an d

lacked

a

command

structure to

cilitate the use of reserves. In

the

defeat at

Adrianople

o ne u ni t of Batavi

placed

reserve could

not

be f ou nd w he n i t was needed.

It

has

o ft en b een claimed

that

cavalry

assumed

a

greater importance in the

army; although it

has

proved difficult to

t race any

specific changes.

In

part

is view derived

from

a

misunderstanding of th e great

importance

of th e

horsemen

of

the

Principate.

Although

a slight

change

is possible

there

n o g oo d

evidence for a significant increase in th e

proportion

of horsemen

an d

e ideal as in earlier

periods

was to have a

balanced army composed of

both

foot

d

horse

the latter

always in a minority: The numbe r of heavily armoured units

an d clibanarii di d increase especially in the e astern a rmy

which

ha d to

face

th e

equally heavily armoured cavalry

of th e

Persians. However

vast

majority

of Roman cavalry

continued

to be trained to fight with missiles

mount a charge an d the specialist shock cavalry were

not

more numerous

than

units of specialist light

horsemen.

On e of the

most

significant changes in

the structure

of th e

later

army was th e

sion between

th e

troops

of

th e

field armies

th e comitatenses

an d

t he t roo p s

t o the bo rde r

areas

the

limitanei.

This development occurred gradually

d was

not

completed or perhaps officially sanctioned until Constantine.

Fo r

of

t he P ri nc ip at e t he Roman

army

had been distributed mainly in the

provinces with few

troops

being stationed in

the interior of th e

Empire.

stationed one of his newly

raised

legions Legio Parthica near Rome

combined with

his

enlarged Praetorian

Guard

provided

a force

of

about

t ho us an d i nf an tr y a nd tw o

thousand

cavalry

at

his immediate

disposal.

nus seems to have concentrated legionary vexillations an d elite cavalry units

the approaches

to

northern

Italy:

Diocletian a nd M a xi m ia n

gathered

high

ality units

into

their

comitatenses

including

some elite Pannonian legions

t ho ug h t he size

of

these forces wa s no t as great as the fourth-c entury field

mies. Traditionally it was

assumed that

this

trend towards

troop

concentrations

thin the

Empire supplied a need for strategic reserves allowing

th e

e mpe ror to

with hostile incursions

which

could

no

longer

be

stopped by

th e

troops

ployed as a c or do n a ro u nd

th e

frontier. This view is no t

supported

by

th e

ence. Severus

came

to

power

after a long civil war an d his

need

for personal

C RI SI S A N D REFORM

This detail of

the

rch

of

Galerius at Salonika

shows

a battle scene from his

campaign

against

the

Persians at

the

end

of

the

third century.

The

Roman

troops

are

depicted

wearing

scale

armour and

carrying

round or oval shields. They

carry vexilla flags

and the

snake like draco standards

J

where a multi coloured

fabric tube

streamed

ou t

behind

a

bronze animal

head

J

l ike a

modern wind-

sock.

On

Trajan J Column

these standards were carried

by the

enemYJ

but we

hear of

their use by the Roman

cavalry as early as

Hadrian

s

reign.



R OM A WARFARE

Hunting scenes

ike

these

mosaics from the ImperiaL

Villa at Piazza rmerinain

ici y are a

common

feature

of

the art

of

Late

ntiquity

They

frequentLy

show

soLdiers without

armour

and bareheaded bu t

carrying thetr shieLds

Hunting was popuLar with

army officers from

the

ear y

Empire onwards

s ec ur it y w as probably

th e

main

reason for t he c re at io n

of an

army in

Gallienus had

lost

most o f t he e as te rn an d

western provinces

of

th e Empire

hence

th e

need

for loyal troops to protect th e a re as whi ch h e di d control. T he

tetrarchs similarly needed t o main t ai n their rule by military force although they

returned the vast majority of t ro op s t o t he frontiers. Constantine victor in a civil

w ar and

insecure for

at least

th e first

half of

his reign created t he large field

armies. The comitatenses

p ro vi ded t he emperor s u lt imate g uaran tee

of

power

protecting him against

political

rivals. His control

of

such a n a rm y increased the

likelihood

of

his

support i n p ro vi nc es e ag er to

be

protected

by concentrated

forces

positioned

to deal with their local problems. All these forces from Severus

Italian tr oo ps t o th e fully developed field armies did p ro vi de t he basis for

17 °



rmies whenever

the

emperor decided to w ge foreign war or had

retrieve major disaster somewhere in the Empire. The field armies g ve the

or personal security

and

the bility

to

w ge

war

when

required but

proved

much

two edged

sword An emperor could not

afford

to le ve

of troops

where it

might

be

suborned

by riv l

He

needed to

keep

control over

the

comitatenses, but this close contact with

the troops

made it

to

ensure

their o y t ~

The field

armies

were responsible for

the

murder of

emperors

and

the elev tion

of

their repl cements

The

limitanei were

the troops

lloc ted to

the

command of

the

officers duces

who

controlled the

regions into which the Empire w s now divided They

most certainly no t local milit ia

of farmer

soldiers s has often been

CRISIS

AN D

REFORM

The decorated tunics worn

by these men white or off

white

with

darker colour

circular patches

and

borders,

were standard military dress

in Late Antiquity. Poor

evidence for the colour of

oman uniformssuggests

that white or off-white was

the most likely shade,

with

officers probably wearing

brighter white clothing, or

possibly red.



ROM N W RF RE

I



RISIS

ND

REFORM

The Arch

of

Constantine

was erected in

Rome

in

3 5 bu t made use of

many

sculptures from

earlier monuments These

scenes

show

Marcus

Aurelius

making

a speech to

a parade of soldiers and in

the right hand frame

performing a sacrifice

on

the army s behalf

Much

of

the equipment depicted

would not

have been

familiar to onstantines

soldiers for instance the

segmented

armour

which

had fallen ou t of use in the

early third century. It

unclear whether the reuse

of so

much

material on

Constantine s

monument

was simply a measure of

economy

or a desire to

legitimize his rule by

association

with

the military

glories of the past.

73



ROMAN WARFARE

The Roman fort at Qasr

Bsheir in Jordan dates to the

reign Diocletian. Its

desolate location prevented

the

theft

of

its

stone

for

reuse in more recent

buildings and ensured its

remarkable preservation.

Even the inscription

recording its construction by

the governor

of

Arabia in

292-305 remains in place

over its gateway.

Like

most

Late Roman bases i t is very

small, covering only 0.3

hectares

and

providing

stabling for sixty nine

mounts

bu t has formidable

defences. Walls are higher

than in the early Empire and

the corner towers

no w

project in front

o f

the walls,

to p r ~ v i enfilade fire

against

any

attackers. The

term fort far more

appropriate for these sites

than the large barracks o f

the earlier period.

174

claimed

bu t units of the regula r Roman r ~ The

limitanei

carried

out

duties ranging from internal security

the po li cing

of

roads defence against banditry

and

raiding as well as support for officials such as ta x

collectors

an d

magistrates.

The

commanders

of

the

limitanei were

powerful

men in the

day to day

life

of

the

provinces.

They

fulfilled all

the

duties which ha d tended

to

devolve on

any

Roman unit s ta tioned

in one

locality fo r

any length

of

time

since

the beginning of the

Principate.

Usually

the uni t

occupied several

posts within the

region

and

frequently

was

b roken up

to provide

many

small

detachments.

The limitanei were

used

to oppose small-

scale

enemy threats

an d

might

also be added to a field

army operating in

the

area;

they

seem to have

performed

well in both roles. Units detached to a field army for a

long

period

assumed the grade

of pseudocomitatenses.

The field armies were mobile

in the

sense that unlike

the limitanei,

they

were no t

tied

to a particular frontier

region which would suffer

in their

absence. Their removal

from th e

frontiers

an d

concentration usually

in

or

near

cities in theory meant that they were no t called upon to

perform everyday policing

an d

administrative duties.

Their mobility and availability as strategic reserves should

no t be exaggerated.

The

speed of a f ie ld army was never

faster

than

that

of

a marching infantryman. An even

greater restriction

on

their actions was the need to supply

a f orce en route

to and

in the campaigning area. Major

foreign expeditions took

at

least a year s

preparation

before they could be launched.

Constantine appointed

two senior subordinates the magister equitum

an d

the

magister peditum,

and

under

these were

counts comites

who might

command

smaller detachments.

In 350

there

were

three

major field armies

in Gaul

Illyricum and

the

east but by

the end

of

the century

smaller forces ha d been

created

in Africa

Britain

Spain on

the Upper

and Lower Danube and Thrace.

This

was

in

part

a result of

the

inability of the

larger

field

armies

to deal

with

problems

arising

simultaneously

in different provinces but was also a reflectio n

of

the trend towards decentralization

of authority in

the

late Empire.

The soldiers of

the later

army

remained

long-service professionals although

various forms

of conscription

became more

common methods of

recruitment

than

voluntary

enlistment. Sons of soldiers were forced to serve in the

army and

local landlords were obliged to

supply

a set

quota of

men. Military service was

no t always

popular and

there were frequent attempts to avo id it not l ea st by



CRISIS ND

REFORM

who were reluctant to see their

labour

force reduced However once in

e

a rmy men seem to have adapted to a military career Our

sources

make

mention of desertion but

this

had always

been

a problem

for

the

army

and it is impossible to

gauge whether

or

no t the situation had

Under the Princ ipa te the supply of recruits seems

to

have been

to maintain

the

professional army which

only

grew slowly from the size

by Augustus Levies

often occurred

before

major wars to bring

existing

units

to

strength

but

it was difficult to raise large

numbers of whole units

at

short

During the Pannonian and German crises ugustushad recourse to

7



R O M A N WARFARE

These scenes from the Arch

of Constantine show the

mixture

of reused

and

new

material

employed

in its

construction. In the

middle

a long scene showing

fourth century soldiers

attacking a walled city.

They

carry large oval shields and

wield spears. In Late

ntiquitythe

old

taboo

against

showing

Roman

dead

on

monuments was

abandoned and

Constantine

was

happy

to represent the

enemy rout in his victory

over the Roman army

o f

his

rival

axentius at

the

Milvian Bridge in

3 2

recruiting units of freed slaves while

Marcus

Aurelius

empl oy ed u ni ts

of

former

gladiators

in his

Danubian

campaigns. The professional army

simply di d

no t

possess

th e

great

reserves of manpower of t he o ld citizen militia

The expansion of th e army in the fourth century

co mb in ed w ith a probable decline

in

th e

Empire s

population m ad e i t even harder for l at er emp erors t o raise

large numbers of troops

q u k l ~

The

units of th e field armies were graded as either

palatini or comitatenses

th e

former

being

t he m or e

senior

There wa s a lso

a

complex

system

of

seniority

between

i nd iv id ual u ni ts

as well as

u ni ts ti tl ed

seniores an d

iuniores p res umabl y t he

result

of th e division of some

units

at

an unk now n date. The units

of

th e auxilia

palatina

g ain ed s o me p romi nen ce

an d

a high reputation

for effectiveness in the

fourth

e n t u r ~ Raised under

Diocletian

a nd Constantine these

u ni ts d o

not

seem to

have

differed that significantly

in

their

recruitment

or

t rain in g fro m t he

auxilia of

th e

Principate.

Some

of

these

units an d other p ar ts o f

th e

army were recruited wholly or

in

part from barbarians f ro m o ut si de t he Empire.

Many

recruits c am e f rom t he laeti groups of barbarians settled

on

land w i th in t he Empire b ut i t seems

that

most

of

these

di d no t serve in distinct units. By th e l at te r h al f of th e

f ou rt h c en tu ry

i ncreas in g n u mb ers

of

senior officers

a pp ea r w it h barbarian

frequently

Germanic names.

O n e G er ma n

king Vadomarius

ruler of

th e Brisiavi

an

Alamannic

people

wa s arrested by th e Ro mans

after

leading raids into th e

Empire.

He

later became a dux in

t he east ern army holding several responsible commands

an d

fighting

with

some distinction f or R om e.

The

use

of

such foreign troops

had

a long

an d

distinguished history

i n t he R om an

Th e

third century

had

seen

th e

officer

corps dominated

by members

of

t he aris to cracy

of

th e

Danubian provinces wh o

either were

or

became as a

result

of their military service Roman citizens an d

equestrians. Usually

both

officers an d

me n

were absorbed

into th e p at te rn o f service

normal

to the Roman army

There is lit tle evidence

to

suggest that t he q uali ty

of

th e

army wa s

affected by t he r ec ru it me nt

of

barbarians.

Officers

in

particular

were

usually

employed away from

their

place of origin bu t

most

of

th e

foreign recruits seem

to

have been

h ap py t o f ig ht f or R om e

even

against their



CRISIS

AND

REFORM



ROM N W RF RE

THE TTLE

OF

STR S OURG

In

357

the Caesar ]ulian led

an army of 13 000 men

against a confederation

of

the Alamanni allegedly

numbering 35 000 men

under the leadership of two

kings Chnodomar and

Serapio As in the past

the

Roman army naturally

deployed in more than one

line and fed in reserves as

the situation required Its

discipline and

command

structure gave the Roman

army great advantages over

the Germanic tribal forces

bu t

even so

the

battle was

hard fought

4

5

6

7

®

Romans

suspicious

of ambush

in the

broken

ground The

Roman left

flank commanded by Seveus halts

Remainder ofRoman

line advances

and Germans advance to meet them

Roman cavalry and German cavalry

engage heavily. Fight sways

one

way

then

the

other

Roman cavalry

panic

whilst re forming

and

flee towards

the

second line

of

the Roman

infantry

The infantry remain steady in the

face of this panic. The cavalry begin

to rally behind the formed infantry.

The process aided by

J

ulian who

arrives

presumably with

his 200

bodyguard cavalry

Continued

German

pressure

on the

first

Roman

line.

Th e

Batavi

and the

Regii

are

sentforward

reinforce

the veteran Coenuti and Bracchiati in

the

front ranks

A

group

of

Germans

led by several

of

their kings surge

forward to

break the

stalemate in

the

centre.

They penetrate

the Roman

first line

and

advance against the Primani in

the centre of the second line. This

Legion remains firm

Gradual Roman pressure

along

the

whole

line causes the

lamanni to

collapse. They suffer heavy losses in

the

pursuit. 243

Romans

are killed

Defeated Roman cavalry re forming



people The a doption of

th e

Germanic war cry

th e

b rritus by

at

least

some

infantry may have

been

a

result of

th e

influx of Germanic recruits.

ually it may have

been adopted

by t he R om an s

because they

were aware

that

Germans found

it

intimidating.

Until large contingents of

barbarians

began

serve in

distinct units

under

t he ir o wn l ea der s t he re d oe s

not

a pp ea r t o

have

an y

r ed uc ti on i n t he a rm y s

fighting ability

as a result

of

its

recruitment

A ND T HE W ES TE RN

EMPIRE

ditionally it ha s been assumed

that

Germanic society changed

in

the sec ond

d t hi rd centuries th e small individual tribes coalescing to f or m g re at tribal

that posed a far greater threat to th e security of th e Empire When

e groups came under pressure from peoples migrating from further east th e

CRISIS

AN D

REFORM

179



ROMAN WARFARE

8

Roman

Empire

wa s

unable

to s u st ain t hei r onsla ught a nd collapsed Th e

long

series of w ars f ought by Marcus Aurelius

against the

Marcomanni a nd Q ua di

s up po se d t o have

fores hado wed t he emerg en ce

of pow erf ul peoples like

th e

Alamanni

an d

the

Franks

who

were to ravage

Gaul

in

the third n t u r ~

This view

is

at

best

an

exaggeration. Tribal peoples

ha d long

displayed a tendency

to

unite

under a

strong charismatic

leader bu t such

developments

rarely outlived this

m an . A rm in iu s

had led a

confederation

of

t ri bes again st

R om e u nt il he was

assassinated by rival

n ob lemen. Pri or t o

this he had defeated

Maroboduus

king

of

th e

Marcomanni

wh o ha d created

a strong

power

base by

adding

subject

tribes

to his

own people.

In

neither

case

di d

a similarly

s tr on g l ea de r a pp ea r t o

unite

these

tribes

for well over a

n t u r ~ M ost o f t he t ri ba l

peoples of

Europe

seem to have existed in a continuous cycle

of

unification

an d

fragmentation. It

possible

that

th e presence of t he Ro man

Empire

did encourage t he t rend towards

unification.

The

payment of subsidies

an d

t he s up pl y

of

large quantities

of

prestige goods allowed noblemen to build u p t he ir following an d strengthen their

p os it io n w it hi n t he tribe Ro man att acks upon a tribe may also have encouraged

support

for leaders wh o fought successfully

against

Rome However any change

was on e of degree

an d

di d

not

affect the fundamental nature

of

tribal

s o i t ~

Most aspects

of

Germanic society especially t heir mil it ary

institutions

changed very little

from

th e first to t he fo urth centuries Even peoples such as the

Alamanni Franks

an d

Goths were usually disunited each

geographical

unit of

settlements the

clan

or canton

being

ruled by its chie f

or

sub-king.

At

some

periods a single nobleman might be

acknowledged

as

leader

of several

neighbouring clans Armies continued to consist

of

a smal l permanent element

th e warriors comites supported by

each

nobleman an d

th e

mass of

warriors

composed of all free

me n

able to

equip

themselves It is difficult to estimate the

scale of

tribal

armies with an y precision In 357

two Alamannic

kings wh o were

supported by other

sub-kings

an d chieftains are credited with a force of thirty

five thousand

me n

composed of the ir ow n war

bands

warriors

f rom th eir

c an to ns a nd

s om e m er ce na ri es f ro m o ut si de t he

tribe.

It

is doubtful

whether

Germanic

armies were ever able

t o m us te r m or e m en

than this in

on e

place

an d

even

this

size wa s

exceptionally

uncommon. We ar e told that

on e

of

the

tw o

leaders

of

this

army

ha d

tw o hundred

warriors

in his

immediate

following or

comit tus bu t

this

was probably

unusually large

T he most common threat

presented

by

th e

Germanic peoples was no t

invasion by large

armies

bu t small-scale raiding. The

R om an s c on ti nu ed t o

employ many of the techniques

discussed

in t he l as t c ha pt er to

deal

with

this

joining in th e

patterns of intertribal

warfare

bu t

on

a

larger

scale Active

diplomacy wa s

c ombine d with

military action. Roma n ga rrison commanders

entertained

t rib al l eaders to feasts

an d

gave them gifts

of

money

an d

prestige

goods emulating the methods by which powerful

noblemen

displayed their power

in barbarian s o i t ~ A t f or ma l n eg ot ia ti on s with tribal leaders t he R om an s

paraded

t he ir m il it ar y m ig ht t h e emperor receiving th e envoys on a podium



by the serried ranks of his splendidly equipped soldiers. Occasionally

massive attack

was

de spa tc hed a ga inst a people perceived

to be

especially

burnt

an d

th e population massacred or enslaved.

Sometimes

ns advanced from different directions to increase the e le ment of

surprise

d

hinder any

organized opposition.

Some

expeditions

were

prepared

by feats

of

ineering such as the bridging of t he Rh in e or Danube displaying both

Rome s

a nd h er willingness to

employ

massive force a ga in st h er enemies. If th e

on

the western

frontiers seemed

w orse i n

t he t hi rd a nd f ou rt h

centuries

is was more because of Rome s internal weakness than a r es ul t of

an

increased

threat. Raiding

grew in scale an d

intensity when Rome s frontiers

were

to be vulnerable du e to h er g ar ri so ns being

drawn

off to fight in

rminable civil wars. Successful raids by

on e people encouraged

other tribes to

p ro cess w hi ch

occurred without any need

fo r

triba l unifica tion or

conspiracies . Rome

relied

on

maintaining an au ra

of

overwhelming

an d invincibility to overawe he r triba l neighbours.

Whenever this

shattered

by defeats th e Romans ha d to fight very hard to re-establish it.

On e role of th e

limit nei

was to cope with small-scale raids an d

their

distribution in

vulnerable areas

helped

t he m t o

accomplish

this

task.

n y R om an forts of t he l at er E mp ir e w er e v er y small bu t they allowed

th e

m y t o maintain

a visi bl e p re se nc e over a l ar ge a re a. A

recent study

by

H.

Elton

that t he reaso n why our sources never mention raids by fewer than

four

m en wa s

that

they

were

usually stopped

by th e

border troops. Larger

took time to

muster

during

which

th e R om an s h op ed t o h ea r

of

the threat.

was difficult to intercept a l arg e raid as

it

attacked. Th e frontier was to o long

d

the

number

of

Roman troops

to o small to prevent these incursions;

there

was

evitably a delay

between

t he R om an s receiving a rep ort of an attac k a nd th e

of

a force of

comit tenses

to deal

with

it. A raid tende d to become more

in proportion

to its success. As t he w ar

band

gathered booty its

speed

movement was reduced. If th e warriors chose to ravage a w id e a re a they were

to split

up into

smaller an d more vulnerable

p ar ti es . M o bi le c ol um ns

largely f ro m t he comit tenses moved swiftly to inte rce pt the ra ide rs as

y withdrew.

The

R om an s a im ed

to

surprise

a nd a mb us h

th e

barbarians

if

slaughtering

t he m w it h m in im um loss to themselves.

Much

of th e

fighting

in th e

west was

on a very small scale. The main

iculty for

t he Romans

was

locating the ofte n

small

groups of raiders an d

then

proa ching them undetected. T his r eq uired g reat skill from the Romans

parties and a high level of initiative an d ability from the Roman

d ow n t o

th e

m os t j un io r levels.

In

366 th e

scouts sent

by

Jovian

a

gister equitum

located

a group of Alamanni resting by a river

aft er t he s ack

of

villas. Jovian s

troops approached concealed from

view

in

a wooded valley

prised the Germans

as

some

were

drinking

an d

others

dyeing

their

hair

red

d destroyed them in a sudden attack. If th e barbarians were well prepared

or in

good position then t he R om an s m ig ht h es it at e

before attacking them

i r e t l ~

CRISIS

AN D

REFORM



ROMAN

WARFARE

fulian the

postate

332---63

was

noted

for his attempt to

replace Christianity with his

own

version of Sun worship

He had

campaigned with

great success against the

Franks

and lamanni

in

aul

as a Caesar Later he

launched a massive Persian

expedition bringing

together one of the largest

armies employed

in a

foreign war during the

sixth

century

He

was killed

during a confused skirmish

and

the campaign

ended

in

defeat

J ul ian s pent t wo months blockading a

p ar ty o f

six hundred

Franks

wh o ha d

o ccu pi ed t w o

derelict Roman forts in

th e

winter of 357. When t he F ra nk s finally surrendered they

were

con scri pt ed i nt o t he Ro man army

an d sent

to

the east.

It

is interesting that this party is said to have decided

to

stay

for

th e

winter in Gaul

because

since

Julian

was to o pre-

occupied

fighting

t he A la m an ni

they

believed that they

would

be able

t o l oo t

the

surrounding

area unmolested.

In nearly every case

tribal attacks

were no t

intended to

seize territory bu t t o g at he r b oo ty a nd retire. Sometimes the

approach of a Roman force wa s e no ug h t o

p ers uad e t he

raiders

to

leave without a ny a ct ua l fighting. During

th e

third century most

towns in the Empire acquired

fortifications

something that

had

rarely

been

seen as

necessary in t he p as t. When raids

were

r ep or te d a nd th e

local troops unable to cope with

them the

practice was for

th e population to

retire

to fortified s tron gh ol ds t ak in g

moveable

goods animals

an d

food

with

them.

Th e

Germans possessed little knowledge

of

siegecraft an d were

u su al ly u nabl e

to feed themselves for

th e

d ur at io n o f a

prolonged blockade. Cities were sometimes surprised an d

stormed by direct assault especially

i f t he ir

defenders were

few or

alternatively

surrendered

w he n t he y d es pa ir ed

of

relief.

Letting raiders

retire without suffering

an y

defeat did

little t o d et er

future attacks.

Allowing

raiders

to

ran ge far

into

th e

provinces

before

they

were

a tt ac ke d d id

not

represent

a

deliberate policy of

defence

in

depth but

an

acceptance of the army s

inability

to prevent such

incursions. Despite this acceptance

Roman operations

were

still dominated by th e aggressive

response

to incursions hunting down even the

smallest

bands an d

defeating

them i n d et ai l.

In

this small scale

w ar fa re t he

Romans

enjoyed considerable

advantages. Their organized system of logistics

allowed

t he m t o

feed an d

maintain

a force in

th e

field at

any t ime

of year unlike

t hei r t rib al o pp o nen ts . German

raiders

relied on

surprise

an d speed for success

bu t it is s tr ik in g h ow o ft en t he R om an s used these very qualities to defeat them.

Th e

preferred

Roman

tactics

were

those

of

concealment

rapid

movement

an d

ambush. High quality disciplined regular soldiers were

more

effective at this low

level of

warfare

than

the tribesmen

whose

cultural

tradition was

to

f ight in this

A

tribal

band of even a few hundred let

alone

a few thousand

warriors

was

an unwieldy body difficult

to manoeuvre with

skill.

The

military doctrine

of

t he l at e

Roman army seems to have become geared

for this low level warfare. The

Romans

displayed a

marked

reluctance

to confront

th e German

t ri be s i n

o pe n b at tl e

if this

could possibly be avoided.

This

is in



c ontrast to

th e

army

of th e early Principate which even though it was

to adapt

to

lower

level

warfare usually

seized an y opportunity to face th e

e my in b at tl e. As we have seen th e unit structure of th e earlier army especially

legion of five

thousand

was well suited to pitched battle

but

by th e fourth

th e army

was

structured around much smaller

basic units. Blocks

of

five

men were no longer useful sub-units

in

field armies which were tending

b ec om e quite

small. Julian le d thirteen thousand me n

at

Strasbourg

and

it

ms unlikely that Valens ha d m uc h m or e than twenty thousand

at

Adrianople.

se were

both

very respectable armies fo r th e period

an d

it is likely that

most

aigning was

carried

out

by

significantly

smaller forces. Relatively

small

of four to s ix u nits

between

field armies seem to have ha d

considerable

nificance. For most opera tions

p la nn ed t o

h ar as s G e rm a ni c

raiders small

of a few thousand were

fa r

more

suited

to th e

task being faster

an d easier

control.

On

those

occasions

when th e

tribes

did muster

a l ar ge

army it might

ve necessary to face them

in

open

battle.

The fourth-century

army

w on f ar

battles than it

lost

bu t

th e consequences of defeat were drea dful. Hea vy

to well-trained

manpower

were

to

be avoided since such

t ro op s c ou ld

ly be replaced

i n t he i mmedi at e

future bu t

fa r

more significant

was

th e

blow

Roman prestige. Rome s relations w it h h er t ri ba l neighbours were based upon

an

aura

of invincibility

a nd n ot hi ng weakened this

more than a

feat in battle.

Th e later army lacked th e ability

an d

the confidence of th e earlier

a rm y w i th

to p itched battles but it

is

important

to

place this judgement in

The fourth-century

army

was

still significantly more effective in

battles than

its

tribal

opponents. Whe n

large

forces were

sent

to ravage

territory of

hostile tribes

th e object

was

now to create as much devastation

d t er ro r as possible

t o p er su ad e

th e tribes to come

to

terms

not

to provoke

i nt o

a pitc he d battle

i n wh ic h

their forces could

be destroyed.

The later

specialized

in fighting

lower scale conflict b ec au se t hi s w as th e t as k m os t

required of

it. This

represented

th e

best

way

of

employing its

high

m an po we r t o defeat th e enemy

at

m inim um cost to themselves an d

e s prestige.

Defeat in

a

small encounter di d

not

thre a te n the stability

of

a

although

a series

of

defeats

might

do so.

It

is difficult t o k no w

when

this

sition occurred between

a n a rm y that actively sought pitched

battles

an d

on e

was reluctant to fight. Our sources for th e second

a nd t hi rd

cen tu ries are s o

r that an y

gradual

change cannot b e traced. It is p os sible that

the frequent

use

legionary vexillations rather than full legions suggests that mu ch w arfare

was

on a s ma ll scale even i n

th e

early

Principate.

PERSIA

AND

T HE E AS T

e Parthians

ha d

never

posed

a real

t hr ea t t o Rome s control

of

Syria

n or h ad

Roman s p ro ved ab le to amass

th e

resources and unde rta ke the massive

effort

conquering Parthia.

Conflicts

between th e

tw o

powers ha d tended

to focus

on

CRISIS

AN D REFORM



ROM W RF R

Palmyra was a desert

kingdom

which flourished

within

the Empire from its

position astride the

main

trade route

with

the Orient

Here the triad

of

main

Palmyran deities are shown

wearing lamellar

armour

and

with swords at their

belts In the chaos produced

by Shapur sinvasion

Palmyra became the leader

of

the eastern provinces in

the effort to repel the

invaders

fter

the death

of

its King Odenathus

wh o

operated as a general

of

the

Roman

army his

widow

Zenobia

led a briefly

successful attempt to create

a

new

eastern empire based

on Palmyra Syria and much

of

Egypt

and

Asia were

overrun and

i t was

not

until

the emperor Aurelian

defeated the Palmyrans in

at ntioch and Emesa

that the rebellion was

suppressed

Zenobia

was

captured

and

led in

urelians

triumph living

ou t the remainder of her life

in exile near Rome



RISIS

R FORM

r



ROMAN

WARFARE

This silver drachma bears

the head of Ardashir I c.

209--42 the founder of the

Sassanid dynasty A sub-

king

of

the Parthian

monarch he defeated and

killed rtabanus

the last

Arsacid king in 224.

e

later fought with Rome over

and

twice captured the

border city of Hatra The

Sassanid Empire was to

prove a more formidable

opponent

than

the Parthian

Empire it supplanted

lthough its invasions still

tended to take the form

of

massive raids

the

Sassanids

were to display far greater

skill in siegecraft than their

predecessors

186

domination of

th e

areas between their frontiers

especially th e

kingdom

of Armenia.

Trajan s

conquests In

Mesopotamia had

been

abandoned by or soon

after

his

dea th. At the

en d

of t he s ec on d c en tu ry

AD

Severus created

a permanent province of Mesopotamia

maintaining

a permanent

Roman

presence east

of th e Euphrates.

In

224 t he l as t Arsacid king

Artabanus

w as d efeated

an d

deposed

by a

rebellion led by t he S as sa ni d Ardashir.

Th e

S as sa ni d m on ar ch y wa s stronger

than

its

Parthian predecessor bu t still faced

th e

problem of controlling a disparate collection of

royal

lands

city

states

sub-kingdoms an d

powerful noble families.

The

Sassanid

army was composed of royal

troops and

mercenaries

as well as feudal

contingents supplied by th e noblemen. Like the

Parthians its main strength lay

in

its cavalry the cataphracts an d horse-archers.

Although

heavily

a rm ou re d a nd eq uip ped w it h

lances for a massed charge

Sassanid cataphracts often displayed a preference for using

their

bows to deluge

t he enemy

with

arrows

an d

w ear h i m

down g r d u l l ~ The standard

of

individual

training

in horsemanship archery

an d

use of personal weapons was very high

b ut the level of training at unit level probably varied c o n s i d e r l ~ On several

o cc as io ns t he

caution and good order

of th e

Persian

cavalry especially in

pursuing a b eat en enemy or rallying quickly after a mounted charge was noted

by Roman sources. Persian

armies

tended to

deploy

in

three distinct

bodies th e

centre an d

tw o wings

an d

o ft en made use

of

reserve lines. Rarely would all three

parts

of

th e

army attack

simultaneously

an d

often some

sections

would

advance

an d

then feign retreat

to

draw incautious pursuers

on

to

th e

well-formed reserves.

To their cavalry th e Sassanids added Indian

elephants

carrying towers

containing

bow men o n their backs. Elephants intimidated th e

enemy

by

their

size an d

frightened horses by their appearance

an d

smell. Somet imes t hey creat ed p an ic

an d

disorder in th e

enemy

ranks making an opening which

might

be exploited

but

they

were

vulnerable

to missile fire an d of less use

ag ai ns t s tead y t ro op s.

Numerous infantry accompanied the

armies

in th e field providing more archers

an d spearmen bu t their

quality was

universally

described

as very low. Peasants

impressed

for service with

th e

king

th e

i nfant ry ad ded t o the spectacle created by

th e

Persian

army but were not capable of standing up t o g oo d

enemy

infantry

and at best

provided

rallying points for

th e c v l r ~

One

of th e

most significant

differences b etw een t he Persi an

a n d P ar th i an

armies wa s t he f ar g re at er ability

displayed by the former

in

siegecraft.

Improved

logistical organization allowed

th e Persians

to

supply a

static

force for th e

dura tion of

a siege. Their armies also



C RI SI S N D REFORM

Frontier in th e East

Second an d th ird centuries D

Persian raids

Julian s

invasion of Persia AD 36

Palmyran invasions

/

Eastern border of Roman Empire

AD

3

D Kingdom

of Palmyra AD 26 72

o

major

trade route

i I

o

5

miles

/

\

\ \

\

\

J

\

_

\

\

\

\

\

I

E STERN FRONTIER

long struggle between

and Sassanid Persia

focused around the

of

the border

sses like Dara Nisibis

and Dura Europus.

g these bases each

raided the

others

with

soldiers recruited from

bian tribes. The loss

of

these fortresses

was a

major

disaster for

either side greatly affecting

the balance

of

power.

On

the occasions that the

Romans

launched a

major

expedition against Persia it

tended to follow

much

the

same route

down

the

Euphrates

or

Tigris as

Trajan

or

Severus

had taken

on

their Parthian

expeditions. A more serious

threat to the stability

of

the

Roman east came during the

Palmyran rebellion

of

262 73 when Queen

Zenobia

s armies overran

Syria and much of Egypt

and

siaMinor. This was

finally suppressed

by

urelian

who

followed up

his victories

at Immae and

Emesa with the siege

and

capture

of

Palmyra

itself



ROM N W RF R



CRISIS

ND

REFORM

The synagogue at Dura

Europus was richly

decorated

with

murals

showing ld Testament

scenes. The figures are

depicted in contemporary

third-century costume the

Israelite warriors dressed

as

Roman

soldiers. Scenes

include the crossing of the

Jordan and

on

the far right

of this picture the battle of

Ebenezer Samuel 4 The

warriors depicted wear iron

scale armour haved long

hexagonal shields decorated

with horizontal bars and

carry swords. Probably from

a desire to

show

the men s

faces

none

wear helmets .

but a group next to t he

rk

of the Covenant have scale

coifs covering their heads.

lso

shown are

unarmoured

and

shieldless cavalrymen

thrusting long lances

underarm. Wall paintings

from other buildings at

Dura

showed

its garrison

Cohors

XX Palmyrenorum

parading to witness a

sacrifice.



ROMAN

WARFARE

included the engineers required

to

construct and operate siege towers rams and

catapults and displayed

a

willingness to

accept the

casualties

inevitable

in

the

storming

of

strong fortifications.

Th e Sassanids claimed to be the successors to the Acheamanid

Persia the

empire

that had

been overrun in a few ye ars by

the

savage

onslaught of

Alexander

the

Great. As such their propaganda laid claim to all the old realms of the Persian

Empire extending

up

to

the coast

of

Asia

Minor.

They reinstated

the dominance

of

the o ld religion

of

Persia Zoroastrianism the influence of which sometimes

gave the ir wars a strongly religious q u l i t ~

The

Sassanids have often been

p er ce iv ed as a far more dangerous enemy to Rome than the Parthians had ever

uins

of

the

frontier city of

ura u r p u s ~ captured by

hapur

in about and

never reoccupied Traces

have been discovered

of

the

final s i e g e ~ including a

tunnel dug by the Persians to

undermJne

the

city wall

The omans

dug

a counter-

mine to attack bu t the

whole

thing

o l l p s e d ~

trapping attackers

and

defenders alike

been. However

the

Persians

had

as little success as

the Parthians

in

maintaining

a

long term presence west of the Euphrates in Cappadocia or

Syria.

The

invasions which

penetrated deep

into the Roman East reta ined the characte r o f

large scale raids.

The

Sassanid kings were rarely secure enough in

their

own

realms

to

permit

a concerted effort

of

conquest.

Their

main objective was

to

dominate the areas

on

the fringes of the two empires and in particular to drive

back the Roman presence in Mesopotamia

and

Arabia.

This could

be achieved by

direct attack

on

the Roman strongholds in this

area

or by threats to Rome s

provinces

or military

victories which

allowed the Persians

to

gain favourable

treaties

with

Rome.

The

campaigns

between Rome and

Persia came

to

be

dominated

by

the



CRISIS

A ND R EF OR M

fortresses places like

Nisibis

Amida

and

Dura Europos. Well

fortified

garrisoned they were difficult for

either

side t o c ap tu re

without

large forces

considerable effort As in

th e

west

raiding became

th e most

common

activity

both

sides

Both

sides

began

to

enlist th e nomadic tribes of t he a re a

th e

employing the ir mobility

a nd p re da to ry

talents to raid th e

other s

Only

in major expeditions

were battles

between

the two sides at all

an d even then

th e

Persian objective was ofte n to mount a display of force to

favourable negotiations Large royal

armies with the ir

full

complements of

a nd infa ntry

moved

in

a

rather

stately

fashion presenting

an

image of

t force bu t

lacking th e

flexibility of smaller predominantly cavalry armies

ersi n siege line

final breakthrough

initial

ersi n attacks

repulsed

Tw o Gallic legions

mount

a night-

time sally and create havoc in the

Persian camp before they are

repulsed

On e

of

the citizens of

Amida

deserts

t o t he enemy

He

leads a group

of

seventy Persians through a secret

entrance to

take

control of a wal l

tower during the night

Th e

next

d ay t h e Persians renew the

assault

The twenty

archers attempt

t o s h oo t

down

the Romans on the

wall nearby

However

the

Romans

contain the assault and bringing up

five catapaults recapture the tower

Initial Persian approach.

Grumbate

king

of

the Chionitae

approaches

summon the city

surrender

The Romans fire a scorpion

at

him

and kill his son

It becomes a m a tt e r o f h o n ou r for

the Persians t o t ak e t h e city

Siege

of

Amida

AD 359

3

Initial Persian

attacks

pressed

fiercely but without success

Disease begins to weaken the

defenders

Persians press

the

assault making

extensive use

of

siege engines

The

Persian king himself takes part

in the attacks

T h e R o ma n s

bui lda

5

mound behind the wall to raise its

height However this collapses and

the spoil forms a

ramp

in front

of

the wall Th e Persians s wa r m u p

this r a mp a n d the city falls

created a route directly into

the city. The Persian

willingness and ability to

prosecute a siege and accept

the high casualties likely in a

direct assault made them a

far

more

dangerous

opponent than their

Parthian predecessors.

Nevertheless most Persian

sieges notably the repeated

attacks on

isibis

ended

in

failure. In this period the

advantage usually lay with

the

defenders.

changed little from

the

third

century C take a c it y

by

assault the attacker had to

f ind a

way

over

through or

under its fortifications. Each

of these methods could be

countered

by measures

taken by the defending

garrison. mida actually fell

when

a

mound

constructed

by the omans to lay

artillery fire

down

on to the

workers building the

approaching Persian siege

ramp collapsed and

the spoil

OF AMIDA

historian mmianus

ellinus was a staff

with the garrison

of

a nd l ef t a vivid

and

account

of

the siege

the city s fall. B y the

th century the oman

found itself more

the defender than

acker in siege

and had

oped the skills of

nce to a high art . Yet in

respects the technology

ge warfare

had



ROMAN WARFARE

Persian

doctrine

stressed that

b at tl es s ho u ld

only

be ri ske d

when the

army

enjoyed great advantages

of

position and numbers.

R om an a tt ac ks on

th e

Persians

were

more

determined

an d

conformed

to

their

traditional

view

of

warfare as a life-and-death struggle. Julian

amassed

sixty-five

thousand

me n for the two a rm ie s w hi ch comprised his invasion of

Persia

probably

th e

largest Roman

force ever seen in th e

fourth e n t u r ~

A

co mp et ent ly h and l ed Ro man force composed

of

reliable i nfant ry an d cavalry

could usually

defeat

significantly

larger

Persian armies

bu t

it proved difficult

to

g ai n m uc h

advantage

from

such successes.

Th e

Persians like

the Parthians

before

them usually struck

at

t he Ro man s lines

of

communication

or

r ai de d i nt o t he

eastern provinces to draw

th e

invaders

off.

Julian

inflicted several battlefield

defeats

on

th e Persians bu t his most

important

successes c am e f ro m t he c ap tu re

of

forts and cities. Several Roman a rm ie s i n t he

third

an d fourth centuries pressed

on into Babylonia sacking

Ctesiphon the old

seat of th e

Arsacids an d still

an

important centre. Yet th e total defeat

of

Persia was a ma ssi ve undertaking

requiring

huge

resources

of

manpower an d

logistic

s u pp o rt a nd

involving

long

years

of

bitter

campaigning.

Julian s

expedition

f ail ed b ec au se h e wa s u na bl e to

supply

hi s v as t As a result

of

this balance

of

power conflict continued to

consist

principally

of

s po ra di c r ai di ng f ro m t he

border

fortresses. Control

of

these allowed domination

of

th e area an d

Ammianus

was incensed when Julian s

successor Jovian

eager

to extricate himself

f ro m t he failed

eastern enterprise

abandoned Nisibis

Singara an d

territories

on

th e border.

DISASTER

AT

ADRIANOPLE

In 378 t he eas tern emperor Valens fell

along

with

many of

his officers an d two

thirds

of

his army fighting against a

Gothic

a rm y a t Adrianople. It was a major

disaster

bu t

its

consequences

should

no t

be exaggerated.

Th e

defeat was largely

th e result

of

Valens mistakes an d

not o f

t he a rm y s inefficiency although i t may

have reflected

the unpreparedness of

th e

fourth-century army

for operating in

large

n um be rs. Af te r th e b at tl e t he R om an s reverted to the low-level

harassing

operations i n wh ic h t he f ou rt h- ce nt ur y a rm y excelled an d by 382 th e Goths

accepted

peace terms an d

provided

troops

for the R om an a rm y

in subsequent

years.

Adrianople

was

a

setback

an d

a significant blow

to

Rome s prestige

bu t

it

was not an indication of

a de cl in e i n

quality of th e A t t he

en d

of

the

fourth

century

it

was unlikely

that anyone could

have

imagined that th e

Empire would

ever cease. C er ta in ly t he t ri ba l p eo pl es w hi ch forced their way through th e

f ro nt ie rs i n th e west di d not

ai m

to destroy Roman

power

bu t

to create a

favourable place for themselves

w ithin the

Roman system.

Potentially th e army of the late E mpir e w as as eff icient a f ighting force as any

earlier Roman Its professionalism discipline

training

an d

good

equipment

supported by a well-organized logistical system gave th e Roman army significant

advantages over

an y

opponent.

Well led a

Roman army

was able

to

defeat larger

enemy forces.

N ot

all units

of

the army

reached

th e

highest

standards

of



an d

confidence in

t he f ou rt h

century

but

this

ha d also

been

true

in

ier centuries. It took long years of successful c a mpa igning to raise troops

e peak

of

f f i i n ~

Th e

fourth-century army lacked some of th e flexibility

hting different scales of warfare

t h at h ad

marked the army of th e Principate.

celled in lower level

operations but

its

unit

a nd c om ma nd

structure was

suited to

large

battles. This

was

a reflection

of

th e raids and skirmishing

were th e most

common

types o f c om ba t experienced by th e late

Roman

ier. A reluctance

to

escalate a conflict

an d

reach a swift decis ion by defeating

enemy in

battle

was a

mark ed chang e fro m

earlier practices. Roman

warfare

something of th e relentless quality

which

ha d d is ti ng ui sh ed i t at

r periods. Far m ore conflicts ended i n t re at ie s that di d not give Rome

v i t o r ~

However while th e l at er a rm y ha d t he p ot en ti al t o

be

very efficient

it was

to

fulfil this

potential

less often. I ts

command structure

was heavily divided

l levels f ro m th e i mp er ia l p ow er d ow nw ar ds .

This made it

difficult

to

operations

on

an

Empire-wide

basis. The

limit nei

were

tied

to

ct regions

which

suffered if

they

were removed

an d

even th e

comit tenses

became

divided

into increasingly numerous regional field armies.

large

number of u es an d

comites an d

th e

division between civil and

administration

often

made

i t u nclear

wh o

was responsible

fo r dealing

problems

on

th e

frontiers

an d slowed th e process of mustering and

an

E mp er or s f ou nd themselves having personally

to

direct

small scale

operations

as

the only

way

of

ensuring

that

something

pened. Frequent civil wars

th e

only conflicts

in

which

battles

were common

d the strength

of

t he a rm y in costly campaigns while denuding the frontiers

an d

allowing external threats

to

grow. Th e only

guarantee

of power

th e

army bu t

th e

closer a nd mo re im med iate link

b etw een s ol di ers

emperors only increased

th e

chance of usurpation. The weakness of

central

ority encouraged the development of regional power which could only

be

by the presence of troops. There were probably more soldiers

under

in

t he l at e E mp ir e

but

it

wa s fa r h ar de r t o a ma ss a rm ie s of more than

thousand an d dangerous to

involve

them in

conflict for

to o

long in a ny

area. Expediency especially

during

civil wars

e nc ou ra ge d e mp er or s t o

recruits wherever

they

could be found an d

s om et im es l ed

to

unwise

to tribes.

T h e Roman

Empire

di d

not

fall quickly despite all these internal weaknesses.

strength derived f ro m t he successful

absorption

of so many

peoples an d

prosperity

which

it

h ad b ro ug ht t o

the provinces was

still

great.

A dd ed t o

t he e xt er na l t hr ea ts i t faced were always sporadic disunited an d

weak.

cal divisions weakened th e

Roman

army

but

i t still p ro ved capab le of

ning most of t he w ar s

it was cal led

u po n to

fight. Civil

wars sapped Rome s

ary strength bu t

their

f requency was a direct resul t of

th e

failure of

central

ity to control

the

r ~

CRISIS

AN D

REFORM

193



CH PTER SIX

- - - ~ . ~ : - : - - : = = : , , - - . ~ _ . : = = = : P + I _ . - - - -

COLL PSE

THE

WEST

RECOVERY IN

THE E ST

THE ROMANS H LW YS relied upon recently defeated

enemies to provide the

next

generation

o f

Roman soldiers

Barbarian tribesmen were recruited to employ their ferocity

against the Empire s foes this frenzied scene from Trajan

s

Column an auxiliary infantryman fights on whilst holding

the severed head

of

a previous Dacian

victim

by the hair

between his teeth The use barbarian soldiers was

nothing

new in Late Antiquity



ROMAN WARFARE

COLLAPSE IN THE WEST,

RECOVERY IN THE EAST

I

N

418

A

GROUP

BASED

around the Gothic

tribes

which

had

destroyed

Valens

army was set tled by treaty on land

which

was to become the Visigothic

kingdom

of Aquitaine.

For

the first

time, but

no t the last, the western

emperor

acknowledged the existence of a king within the provinces, who supplied troops

fighting

under their own

leaders and not as part of the regular arm}:

The

term

foeder ti increasingly came to b e u se d f or s ol di er s f ig ht in g

for Rome

under this

WESTERN

DIVISION

EASTERN DIVISION

Britanniae

Africa

Dacia

Pontica

Valemia

Mauretania Caesariensis

Moesia I

Bithynia

Britannia

Mauretania Sitifensis

Dacia Ripensis

Honorias

Flavia Caesariensis

Numidia

Praevalitana

Paphlagonia

Britannia

Africa

Dardania

He1enopontus

Maxima Caesariensis

Byzacena

Dacia Mediterranea

Pomus

Polemoniacus

Galliae

Tripolitania

Macedonia

Galatia

SOo

Lugdunensis III

Italia

Epirus

Nova j

Armenia

I

Lugdunensis II

Alpes

Cottiae

Macedonia

Galatia Salutaris

Belgica II

Aemilia

Epirus Vetus

Cappadocia

Germania II

Raetia I

Thessalia

®

Cappadocia I

l l

LugdunensisSenonia

Raetia

Achaea

®

Armenia

O C e J v l I C

v

Lugdunensis I

Liguria

Creta

Oriens

j

Be1gica I

Venetia et

Histria

Thraciae

Isauria

Germania I

j

Flaminia et

Picenum

Moesia

II

Cilicia I

Maxima

Sequanorum

Suburbicaria

Scythia

Cilicia

Septum Provinciae

Corsica

Thracia

Euphratensis

Aquitanica

Sardinia

Haemimontus

Mesopotamia

Aquitanica I

Tuscia

et Umbria

Rhodope

Syria

Novem Populi

Valeria

Europa

j

Osrhoene

arbonensis I

Picenum

Suburbicarium

Asiania

Cyprus

Viennensis

Roma

He1lespontus

Syria SaJutaris

Narbonensis

IJ

j

Campania

Phrygia

Pacatiana

®

Phoenice

j

Alpes

Maritimae

Samnium

Phrygia

Salutaris

®

Phoenice Libanensis

Hispaniae

Bruttii et Lucania

Asia

®

Palaestina

Gallaecia

®

Apulia et Calabria

Lydia

®

Arabia

Carthaginiensis

®

Sicilia

Pisidia

@

Palaestina I

T arraconensis

Pannonia to c

4 0 ;

j

Lycaonia

I

Palaestina Salutaris

Lusitania

Illyricum after c

4 0

Caria

Aegyptus

Baetica

Noricum Ripense

Pamphylia

Libya Superior

Noricum Meditterraneum

®

Insulae

Libya Inferior

nsulae

Balearum

j

Pannonia I

®

ingitania Lycia

Aegyptus

Valeria

Augustamnica

Savia

Arcadia

\ km

annonia

I

I

Thebais

miles

j

Dalmatia

19



COLLAPSE

IN

TH E

WEST

RECOVERY

IN

TH E

EAST

of

arrangement

rather than as a genera l term for foreign recruits

in regular

The Goths ha d proved too strong to destroy but

they

were also a tempting

of recruits for emperors starved

of

readily

available military manpower

ey had sometimes fought against Rome

bu t

more often

on

her behal f in

both

and

civil

wars although the distinction between the two

was

often

ur red; they were also

sent

against the

Vandals in Spain

another group of

who

had

established

themselves within the Empire Isolated in an

en alien

environment

and commanded by a series of strong war leaders who

erated both within

and

outside the hierarchy

of

the Roman army the Visigoths

d

become more united

than most

tribal peoples

There

is a fierce debate over

THE ROMAN

EMPIRE

IN

AD 418

The oman

mpire in

418 was divided into

many small provinces

and

regions any

of

the

army

units listed for each

command

may

have existed

only in theory

or

been mere

skeletons

197



ROMAN

WARFARE

A coin

nd

medallion

ommemor ting the

reconquests

of

Justinian I

c.

483-565). Through

able generals such as

Belisarius

nd

N arses the

emperor ttempted to

restore his uthority in

Africa

nd

Italy

whether

their experiences after crossing

th e

Danube created or merely accelerated

this process.

Later

in the

c en tu ry o t he r

peoples

emulated

th e

Visigoths

in

establishing

k in gd oms w it hi n t he provinces, either by force or t r e t ~ In 9 th e Vandals took

Africa,

denying

th e

western

emperor

access

to

its large revenue

an d

rich recruiting

grounds.

Later

Franks

an d Burgundians

s et tl ed i n

Gaul while

the Ostrogoths

overran In

th e

short

term

some

of these

groups

were used to

b ol st er an

emperor s power,

bu t

in the longer

term

they

promoted

th e fin al collapse of

central

u t h o r i t ~

The

western

emperors were no longer able to enforce their will

or g ua ra nt ee p ro te ct io n t o th e provinces still loy al to them which in turn

encouraged

freq uen t l ocal

usurpations. The infrastructure t o s up po rt a l ar ge ,

well-trained

army, an d

t o c on tr ol

an d

s up pl y i t

in

th e

field was

no

longer there.

Some h ig h -q ual it y u ni ts still existed

an d

displayed their skill in th e low-level

warfare i n wh ic h th e l at er a rm y

excelled,

bu t th e n um be r o f

such

troops

was

dwindling. Th e army which Aetiu s led to

blunt the onslaught

of Attila s Huns at

Chalons

was largely

composed

of foederati The western

empire

fell when central

authority collapsed, an d in its place emerged numerous smaller states based on a

mixture

of

ba rba ria n a nd Roman institutions whose power an d prosperity were

dwarfed by comparison with

t he Rome

of even a

century

before.

In

the east the

emperors

p ow er r em ai ne d s tr on g.

The

culturally

more

coherent densely

p op ul at ed a nd

p ros p ero us east ern p ro vi nc es w er e a bl e to

maintain a la rg e

an d

efficient This preserved th e

balance

of power on th e

frontier with Persia.

I n t he s ix th c en tu ry t he

last real attempt at regaining the lost

provinces in

th e

west was made when

Justinian sent

armies

under

gifted generals

such

as B el is ar iu s an d

Narses

to

de st roy t he

Vandals

in

Africa an d

the

Ostrogothic kingdom in A l th o ug h t h e camp ai gn s were successful, in the



COL L APSE IN

TH E

WEST RECOVERY IN

T HE

EAST

term

it

proved

impossible

for

th e

R om an s t o r etain c on tr ol of the old

around

the Mediterranean.

Th e

Empire s

resources were sufficient for

defence

bu t

utterly

inadequate

for overseas

conquest.

T he a rm y of t he s ix th century

represented

the c ulmination of many

of

th e

nds already observed

in the army

of

late

n t i q u i t ~ Many

soldiers were

under

an d

included

o n the Imperial army s strength

but

forces in th e field

were

m large. Belisarius landed

in

Africa with

only

sixteen thousand

men

an d his

expeditionary

force to Italy numbered half that total.

Armies

of twenty five

or

more were exceptionally rare. A late sixth-century military manual

rice s Strategikon

discussed

armies of five to fifteen thousand men

bu t

early viewed forces towards th e lower en d of this scale as th e

norm and

believed

thousand men to be

an

unusually large force.

The

basic unit consisted of

o to

five hundred

me n

led by a

tribune

several

of these

c ombining to

form

a

commanded

by a

dux

in battle.

The

larger armies

often

proved difficult for

commanders

to

control

before a nd during a

battle

an d several defeats were

on

undisciplined

tr oo ps w ho ha d forced their

general

to

risk

battle

In

a pitched bat tle th e t ra di ti on al R om an emp hasi s on using

serves still dominated military doctrine although it

wa s

rare for th e whole

to be divided into several lines of

roughly

equal size

an d

composition.

The

fourth-century theorist Vegetius ha d recommended

avoidance

of battle

the circumstances were very favourable indeed

but

th e author of th e

was even more cautious

an d

advocated it only as a last resort.

Theory

s reflected in practice

with th e

conflicts

of

this

period tending to

be

long bu t

cluding very few mas sed act io ns .

Campaigns

in both

east

an d west were

by

raids skirmishes

an d sieges.

In

th e

wars

with Persia t he b or de r

continued

to play a dominant role as bases

from

which

mobile columns

out

to

plunder

enemy t e r r i t o r ~ It

is unlikely

that

either side ever

thought in

o f total victory realizing that

they no

longer

possessed

th e

necessary

The

Persians

main objective

was

o fte n t o ex act a sizeable payment

om the

Roman s i n

return for peace

money

which

helped

th e

Sassanid

monarch

m ai nt ai n his position

an d

defend a gainst a tta c ks by th e Huns from the

to the north. The control

of

th e border

fortresses

remained

of

central

an d th e Roman decision to

build

a ne w stronghold

a t D ar a

directly

Persian controlled Nisibis

was

viewed as a provocative act.

Th e

division b et ween t he limit nei an d omit tenses remained

although

of

th e

latter

became

permanently garrisoned

in frontier

strongholds

an d

y have differed little

f rom t he

border

troops. Units

of foederati

in the

eastern

were little different

f ro m t he

ordinary comitatenses

being

p ai d a nd fed by

e state an d serving u nd er Ro man appointed officers. T he m ai n

distinction was

they included a

higher

proportion of barbarian recruits. The

best element

of

eld armies was

often

provided by

th e

bucellarii

who although they

took

an

oath

loyalty

to

th e

emperor

were effectively t he h ou se ho ld

troops

of t he s en io r

A successful

leader

such as Belisarius amassed several

thousand

of

199



ROM

W RF R

The great

aqueduct

supplying the Roman colony

at

Caesarea

on the

coast

]udaea. Originally

built by

erod

the Great the

aqueduct

was restored

an d

substantially

widened by

a

vexillation

of

Legio

Fretensis during the reign

of

Trajan.

The

inscription

recording this

work

is still

situ

on

one

o f

the

arches.

Some

of the

finest engineers

in

the

Empire were

numbered amongst

the

ranks

of

the legions

and

they

were often called in to

undertake or

supervise

building projects. However

in the late Empire

the

resources and willingness to

undertake such major works

were less

common Running

parallel

with the Roman

aqueduct

the

line of the

subterranean Byzantine

aqueduct. This was a

reasonably effective way o f

supplying u ater to

the

city

bu t far less visually

spectacular.



COLL PSE IN TH E

WEST

RECOVERY IN TH E E ST

2



ROMAN WARFARE

This fragment of a frieze

now in the Louvre probably

dates to the reign of Marcus

Aurelius

and shows oman

soldiers attacking a

barbarian village Punitive

expeditions in which

houses were burnt cattle

confiscated and slaves taken

were standard practice for

the

oman army

of most

periods

these soldiers an d

t ra in ed t he m t o

a high level

of

efficiency

The bucellarii

also

included a

pool of

officers wh o might be employed

t o c om m an d

army units

addition there

were allied

contingents most commonly

Arabs

or

Saraceni in the

wars

with Persia These

fought

both w ith the field

armies

an d

independently

when hired to raid t he emperor s

enemies

Th e

strength of t he s ix th -c en tu ry a rm y was undoubtedly its cavalry Th e

majority

were equipped

equally

for

shock action

or for fighting

from

a distance

These horsemen

wielded lance

or

bo w

as the situation demanded but

although

th e

riders

were heavily armoured their

horses

do no t seem to have been

protected. The

trategikon

e mp ha si ze d t he need for cavalry to charge in a

disciplined

manner

always maintain a reserve

of

fresh

troops

an d be careful no t

to be d ra wn i nt o a ra sh pursuit .

Bucellarii

were normally cavalry an d by

their



COLLAPSE

IN THE

WEST RECOVERY

IN TH E

EAST

ure horsemen were more suited

than

foot soldiers to the raids

and

ambushes

dominated the warfare of

this

period. The sixth century cavalryman

was

r more

likely to experience combat than his infantry counterpart.

In

a l arg e

action

a

well balanced

mix of horse and foot

was

still the

ideal

but

the

an infantry

of

this

period ha d

a very

poor

reputation. In

part

thi s was

a

of

their inexperience

bu t

they

often

seem

to have

lacked discipline and

ars es used dismounted

cavalrymen

to

provide

a r eliable

centre

to his

line at Taginae. At Dara Belisarius protected his foot behind specially

ditches. Roman infantry almost invariably fought in a def ensive r ole

o vi di ng a s ol id b as e for

the

cavalry to rally

behind.

They did not

advance

to

enemy foot

bu t relied on a barrage of missiles javelins and especially

to win the combat. All units now included

an

element of

archers

and

it

as cla ime d that Roman bows

shot

more powerfully than their Persian

The f ron t ranks

of

a

formation wore

armour and

carried large

shields and long

spears

bu t some of the ra nks to the rear carr ied bows.

fantry formations might be as

deep

as sixteen ranks. Such deep formations

it difficult for soldiers to flee but also reduced their practical contribution

the fighting an d were another indication of

the unreliability

of

the

Roman

soldier. The

tr tegikon

recorded

drill commands given

in

Latin to an army

almost exclusively spoke Greek. There were other survivals of the traditional

military system many of which would endure until the tenth century but

aggressive sword armed legionary was now a

distant

o r ~

HE

END

OF THE EMPIRE

e collapse of central authority

in

the west had encouraged the trend towards

reasingly small-scale warfare. Local warlords

and landowners who

based

r power on

the

number of a rmed retainers

they controlled

flourished. One of

e reasons why

archaeologists

have found so few traces of the devastation

wrought

by barbarian invaders is

that most

of these moved in

latively small

bands

whose

depredations

affected only a smal l a rea . The

of political

power ensured

that

there

were

seldom

enough soldiers

ioned in

one area

or concentrated

in

field forces free to range throughout the

to oppose successfully all the groups of invaders or overawe the tribes

had been settled inside the Empire.

The basic pattern that

warfare

would

assume

for

the

thousand years at

ast in Europe ha d alr eady been set

in

the

late

Roman

period.

Medieval warfare

characterized by raids

an d

skirmishes frequently revolving around the

of

fortified strongholds. The

pitched bat tle

was a r elatively

rare

and

the

idea of

the

decisive

battle

ha d

lost the central

place w hi ch i t

d

occupied in

earlier antiquity: Vegetius the fourth century military theorist

o had been one

of

the first Roman authors to advocate the avoidance of battle

highly popular

throughout

the

Middle

Ages. The Byzantine

army

and preserved many of

the

traditions of

the professional

Roman army

2°3



R O M A N WARFARE

he oman amphitheatre

a t the colony of

Sarmizegethusa Vlpia

founded by Trajan as the

capital

of

the new Dacian

province

he

area was

abandoned

in the third

century bu t in the f if th

century some local warlord

converted the arena into a

fortified position

bu t in th e west no kingdom possessed t he s tro ng central authority

or

th e wealth

t o s up po rt

a l ar ge

permanent

army

of

uniformed drilled

an d

disciplined soldiers.

There

ha d

been a close

relationship

between the ar my a nd political life from

very early

on

in

Rome s

history when

political

rights were g ran t ed t o

those

able

to equip

themselves

to

fight

in

th e main battle

line.

Under th e

Principate

when

th e

emperors ha d

taken

care

to

ensure

that

th e

army

was personally loyal its

senior

commanders had still been drawn

from

th e

ranks

of Rome s

r i s t o r ~

In

t he t hi rd c en tu ry this connection

ha d

been broken an d t he army s generals were

career

soldiers

serving

p er m an en tl y w i th th e army an d

o wi ng t heir

progress

entirely to Imperial favour. Gradually the hatred a nd f ear w hich th e prosperous

literate classes ha d always felt towards the professional

soldier w as

extended to

his officers.

The

a rm y n ow m ad e an d main tain ed an emperor in his position an d

th e wishes of even th e

wealthiest

sections

of

th e rest

of

society counted for little.

There w as little to check th e regionalism of troops stationed for

long

per iods in

on e

area

an d

often recrui ted t here as well since th e generals were n o l on ge r

2°4



COLLAPSE

IN T H E WEST RECOVERY IN T HE

EAST

rving for a short tour no r

drawn from

a

central

pool

without

regional ties. Civil

r

after

civil w ar sa pped the

Empire s

strength a nd f ur th er e nc ou ra ge d t he

of

local powers w ho c ou ld offer

protection to

a reg io n.

Morale obviously ha s ha d massive significance throughout military history

t

this was especially

t ru e w he n b at tl es

were

decided

by

massed hand-to-hand

On e

defeat often prompted another since troops

who

ha d lost

their

could

rarely s ta nd u p

to

th e pressures of close combat no matter ho w

erior their training organization

or

tactics were to those

of

th e enemy. The

of restoring soldiers belief

in

th e possibility of success after a series of

eats was demonstrated by conflicts as separated

i n t im e

as th e Numantine wa r

d

th e

early sixth-century campaigns with Persia.

It was not

just

this

tactical

ension which suffered from a series

of

defeats. At a strategic level

th e

Romans

on

th e domination

of their neighbours

securing

th e

Empire s frontiers

overawing

th e peoples

outside

by

creating

an impression of

rwhelming might. Defeats seriously weakened this of

Roman

strength

a nd m ean t that

th e

Romans had

to

fight very

hard

to recreate it. F ro m t he m id dl e of t he t hi rd

century onwards the Romans were n ev er able to

restore

th e

situation

fully a

trend wh ich was

marked by th e abandonment

of

th e relentless

pursuit of

total victory

that

ha d

been

th e

traditional

hallmark of Roman

military practice.

Th e insecurity of

t he l at er e mp er or s

made this

attitude impractical.

Th e western empire di d not fall no r d id t he

ea st e nd ur e beca use

of

th e

results of

a few

decisive battles. The external threats to Rome

were unconcerted

an d sporadic an d

no t enough

in

themselves to have destroyed th e Empire. Th e

professional

Roman army wa s capable

of

defeating

an y

of

th e

opponents faced in

Late

Antiquity

as

long

as

it wa s

given

th e

resources

of men an d material

to do

so. Th e failure of th e

Rom an state to

control the professional army

an d

in

particular its

officer

corps steadily

destroyed

t he c en tr al p ow er that controlled the

infrastructure

necessary

fo r th e

army

to

function. The institutions

of

th e

Roman

army

g ra du al ly d is ap pe ar ed

in a process

lasting

centuries bu t th e idea of

th e

professional army

w ou ld l at er

have a

great

i mp ac t o n

th e

rise

of

modern w ar fa re i n t he

Europe

of th e

sixteenth

an d seventeenth centuries.

OVERLEAF:

The buildings

outside the late first century

fort at Vindolanda in

orthumbri

included

wh t

s

believed to be a

mansio

or

way station used to

ccommod te import nt

travellers. In the foreground

s the small bath house

provided for these men.

Bath houses especially in

civilian settlements and

villas were one of the first

things to fall into disrepair

in late Antiquity. The

technical knowledge to

build

nd

maintain these

was no longer s widespread

s it h d been

mongst

the

rmy of the Principate.

2°5



ROM N W RF R

6



COLL PSE I TH E WEST RECOVERY IN TH E E ST

°



R O M A N WARFARE

C O N C L U S I O N

Hadrian s Wall remains one

of the most visually

impressive monuments left

by the Roman army

although only in places is it

visible

on

the ground. This

Milecastle

39 west

of

ouseteads fort in the

central section running

along some o f the most

spectacular scenery. ike

many of the fortlets

and

turrets on Hadrian s Wall it

not built on the best site

for observation but at its

regular interval. The slope

to th e

north

was probably

too steep ever to have been

used by wheeled vehicles

bu t even so a gate was built

opening out onto it

according to the standard

design. any

of

these

superfluous gateways were

blocked

or

made narrower

in later rebuildings.

8

T

HE ROM N RMY

changed the

world

creating

an

E mp ir e t he legacy of which is

s till felt M uc h o f Europe employs a l eg al

system

based

on Roman la w

and

speaks

languages derived from

or

heavily influenced by

Latin.

Th e dominance of th e West in the

last

few

c en tu ri es e xt en de d both languages and

legal

systems

throughout

most of th e globe.

Until

th e

last few generations Greek an d

Latin

languages

and literature lay at th e

heart

of western

education

an d

cultural life.

The idea

of

th e

R om an a rm y

an d

th e

power

of th e

Roman

Empire long epitomised splendour

an d m j e s t ~ Napoleon g av e h is

regiments

eagles

as their standards included velites

in

his Guard

an d

dressed

hi s

heavy cavalry in

classically

inspired helmets.

The

armies

of

Russia an d

Prussia both bore eagles on

their

flags an d th e

names

of

t he ir r ul er s Ts ar an d Kaiser

were

derived

from

Caesar.

Even t he n as cen t U ni ted

States cho se

th e

eagle fo r its s ta n da rd a n d drew

on

Roman

models

f or i ts

political institutions.

Physical

remains of th e

Roman

army ar e

dotte d throughout

Europe North

Africa an d

th e

Near East. It is impossible to stand on th e siege

ramp at M asada and not marvel at th e skill an d

determination of

th e

m en w ho

built

such a thing

in

that

appalling landscape simply

to prove that

no fortress was impregnable to them. At th e

other

en d of th e Empire the remains

o f H a dr ia n s Wall

i mp ress i n

a

different

way from their sense of scale solidity

an d permanence. M an y o f th e finds from

these

sites

are

very human -

gaming

dice

remains of meals s uch

as

oyster

shells

t he s up erbl y

preserved shoes from

Vindolanda

and famously

th e

communal

latrine at

Houseteads.

The

in scr ip ti on s f ou nd in

th e

forts and settlements of the area reveal a very

cosmopolitan community

soldier an d

civilian

mixed worshipping

gods

from

all

over

th e

known world. Yet however many races were

r ec ru it ed i nt o t he r an ks

of

th e

army t he y w er e

at

least

pa rtially a bsorbe d

into its uniform c ul tu re . I n t he

garrisons a t M as ad a a nd Vindolanda two unknown Roman soldiers idly scrawled

a line from Virgil s Epic

th e

Aenied on a p ie ce of papyrus a nd a wooden

writing

tablet r s p t i v l ~



C OL LA PS E I N

T HE WEST

RECOVERY

IN TH E

EAST

Several facto rs exp lain t he R om an a rm y s l on g success: discipline training

equipment an d well organized logistic support were all important

factors

t o th er armies ha d

these

without

achieving

as much. The R o ma n m il it ar y

tem was characterized by its

f l x i i l i t ~ Th e same

basic

structure could adapt

local conditions

an d defeat

very

different

opponents.

In

tim e t he R om an s

ame as adept

at

raids

an d

ambushes as any irregular tribesmen yet preserved

superiority in m asse d battle. The Romans always fought aggressively

eth er i n o p en b at tl e or on a smaller scale ever a ssuming the offensive and

ing to

dominate

th e n ~ This

combined with

their

refusal t o a dm it

defeat

d

their

willingness to

accept

heavy losses m ad e t he R om an a rm y

extremely

to beat. Yet ultimately much depended on th e Romans ability

to

absorb

to

turn

th e enemies of today into th e Roman soldiers of tomorrow.

2°9



TABLES

ApPENDICES

ApPENDIX

A : THE CAREER

PATTERN CURSUS

HONORUM

OF ROMAN

SENATORS

IN THE

SECOND CENTURY BC Chapter

Minimum

Age

Magistracy Number

Responsibilities

Ten years military service in cavalry

or

on the staff

of

a relative/family

friend needed to qualify for political office. In practice this rule may

not

have been rigidly enforced.

30 Quaestor

8-12

36

Aedile 4

39 Praetor

6

42

Consul

2

Censor 2 every

5 years

Financial administration at Rome and in the provinces; acted as second in

command to governors.

No

military responsibility;

but

administrative role at Rome;

an

optional

post.

Judicial function

at

Rome;

commanded

provinces

not

allocated to

consuls; usually controlled one legion

allies,

but

occasionally larger

forces.

Most senior executive officers of state; governed larger provinces

and

given command in all major wars; usually controlled two legions two

allied

alae.

No

actual military

command, but

most prestigious magistracy reserved

for most distinguished ex-consuls.

Al l magistracies apart from the censorship were held for a single year. All members

of

a magisterial college held equal power.

The numbers

quaestors and praetors gradually increased as further provinces were added to the empire. However

until

the

very

end

of

the Republic

there were

only

ever

two

consuls per year.

ApPENDIX

B: THE

LEGION

OF

THE

EARLY

PRINCIPATE

Chapter 4

OC - Legatus Legionis Senatorial officer serving for three years .

2ic - Tribunus Laticlavius Senatorial offcier

serving

for

three

years .

3ic -

Praefectus Castrorum

Experienced officer, usually

former

primus

pilus .

Staff including: five

Tribuni

Angusticlavii equestrian officers serving for

three years,

who

have already

commanded an

auxiliary cohort

and

may go on

to command

an ala .

First

Cohort

- 800 men in five centuries of 160 each, commanded by five centurions ranked in order of seniority:

primus pilus; princeps; princeps posterior; hastatus; hastatus posterior

Nine other cohorts

- 480

men

in six centuries

of

a

centurion,

optio

signifer and tesserarius

plus eighty men.

The

centurions ranked

in

order

of

seniority:

pilus prior; pilus posterior; princeps prior; princeps posterior; hastatus prior; hastatus posterior

The ranks of the

cohorts included

many specialists

and HQ

personnel who spent

much of their

time

on

detached

Other

units

included:

The Cavalry - 120 men whose internal organization and command structure is unclear.

The Veterans - men who had served twenty years. They may have formed a separate unit or formed part of

the

first cohort.

Artillery - Vegetius claims

that

each

cohort

operated a large

stone-throwing

engine, whilst each

century

crewed

a light bolt-shooter. The amount

of artillery

employed by a legion probably varied

according

to

the

situation.

2



TABLES

SIZE

AND STRUCTURE OF AUXILIARY UNITS -

FIRST

TO EARLY

CENTURY

AD Chapter

it title

ors Quingenaria Peditata

ors Quingenaria Equitata

ors Milliaria Peditata

ors Milliaria Equitata

a Quingenaria

a Milliaria

Infantry centuries

480 6

480

6

800 10

800 10

None

None

Cavalry

turmae

None

120

4

None

240 8

512 16

768 24

ngenary units were normally commanded

by

a prefect. Milliary units

and units

of Roman citizens were commanded

by

ACTUAL STRENGTH RETURNS

FOR

THREE

QUINGENARY

COHORTS SHOWING VARIATION FROM THEORET ICAL STRENGTH

te Unit Infantry Horse Total 1 Total 2

Cohors

Hispanorum

veterana 417 119

536

546

6 Cohors

Augusta Lusitanorum

363

114 477

505

3-16 Cohors

Apanenorum

334 100 434 457

1 is

without officers

or

supernumeraries. Total

2

includes officers and

in the

case of

the second two

cohorts small

of camel-riders

dromedarii employed

for patrolling in desert regions.

The

totals all three

cohorts included

a

number

of officers

and men absent on

detached

duties.

E: STRENGTH RETURN

OF

OHORS I TUNGRORUM

C. AD

92-7

is table shows the wide dispersal of and

range

of duties performed by a Roman garrison Tab. Vind. 154 .

May, total number

of

First Cohort of

Tungrians,

commanded by the Prefect ]ulius Verecundus, 752,

uding 6 centurions. From these are absent:

of the governor singulares legati - 46

the office of Ferox possibly a

legionary

legate -

unreadable

Coria

Corbridge - 337 including 2 centurions

London - 1 centurion

readable - 6 including 1 centurion

readable - 9 including 1

centurion

dable - 11

?unreadable - 1

readable - 45

tal absentees - 456 including 5

centurions

e remainder,

present

with

the

unit - 296 including 1 centurion - from these:

-15

6

fering from eye

inflammation

- 10

31

ainder, fit for duty - 265 including 1 centurion

milliarYJ the

cohort

appears to have

had only six

centuries.

The

high

proportion

men

J

and

especially five

ou t

of

centurions

J

can

only

have made i t difficult for the

cohort to

train

and

dril l as a

unit

211



GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

Dates in brackets give

an

approximate indication of period.

ala

1

Term

used under

th e

Republic for

the contingents of

Italian allies, roughly equivalent in size to a Roman legion. Th e

n ame me an t w i n g a nd derived f ro m t he standard formation of

a

consular

a rmy t h at p laced tw o legions in th e centre

w it h a n

aLa

on either

flank late

f o ur th to s econ d centu ry

BC). 2

Term

used

for th e

cavalry

units of the Imperial

auxilia.

These

were

either

512 or 768 strong and commanded by a p re fe ct or tribune

respectively first

to th ir d centu ry

AD).

aquilifer:

Th e standard-bearer who carried

th e legion s standard

aquila , a silver,

later

gold,

statuette of an

eagle first

century BC

to th ir d centu ry

AD).

auctoritas: Th e

informal

reputation or prestige of a

Roman

politician which

determined

his influence in

th e

Senate an d was

greatly

a dd ed t o

by h is

military

achievements third

to

first

cen

tury

BC).

auxilia: Troops recruited

from

non-citizens, th e auxilia of th e

Principate provided a valuable source

of extra manpower

for

th e

Roman

a rmy , a s we ll a s

th e

vast

majority of

its cavalry.

They

were no t organized into legion-sized units, b u t in to cohorts and

alae first to third

century

AD).

ballista: A

two-armed, torsion

catapult capable

of

firing bolts

or

stones with

con sid erab le accurac)T.

These

were

built

in various

sizes an d mo st o f ten used in sieges third century

BC

t o s ix th

cen

tury

AD).

beneficiarius: A

grade of junior

officer usually recruited

from

experienced rankers who performed

a

range of policing an d

administrative roles o ften d etached f r om th eir units first t o t hi rd

cen tury

AD).

bucellarii: Th e

household troops

p a id a n d sup p ort ed by

particular

commanders, although nominally

loyal

t o t he

emperor. Th e bucellarii were usually high-quality

cavalr T.

Th e

name

derives from bucellatum, th e

army s hard-tack

biscuit, an d

emphasized the

commander s

obligation to

feed an d provide for

his

m en f ou rt h t o s ix th c en tu ry

AD).

cantabrian r id e: A d ri ll practised by th e R o man cavalry during

which men r od e in turn towards a target, wheeling

to

th e r igh t at

short

range

an d

then riding

parallel, keeping

their

shields

towards the

target.

Th e object

was to

maintain

a

continual

barrage of missiles at a single point i n t he e ne my line, weakening

an

enemy before launching a charg e s wo rd in

hand.

Similar

tactics were employed by cavalry, especially horse-archers,

of

many n atio ns

first

to s ixth centu ry

AD).

cataphract: Close order, heavily armoured cavalrymen whose

main

tactic was the s ho ck charge. Often th e horses were also

protected

by

armour.

Their normal

weapon

was

the two-handed

lance,

th e

contus,

b u t s o me catap hr acts carr ied

b ow s a s w el l.

These troops were more common i n t he e as te rn empire.

centurion: Important grade of officers i n t he

Roman

army for

most of

its history,

centurions

originally commanded a

century

of 60-80

men.

U nd er th e P rin cipate many

served for very

long

periods an d provided

an

element of permanence in the otherwise

short-term officer corps of th e legion. Th e

most

senior

centurion

of a l eg io n w as

th e

primus

piLus

a post

of

enormous

status

held

only

f or a sin gl e y ea r f ir st

century BC to th ir d centu ry

AD).

century centuria : Th e basic sub-unit of th e R o man army, th e

century was commanded by a centurion

an d

usually consisted

of

sixty,

later

eighty, me n late fourth century BC to third century

AD).

cheiroballista:

A version of the s co rp ion mo un ted o n a

mule-drawn cart to increase mobility first century

BC

to sixth

century

AD).

clibanarius clibanarii : A heavily armoured cavalryman, it is

unclear whether o r n ot these were identical to cataph racts, b u t it

is possible that th e

term

was applied t o t he heaviest troops. Th e

name derived from a nickname meaning bread-oven .

cohort

cohors : Originally th e

name

given

to

the contingents

which f or med the Allied

Alae

u n der the Republic, the co ho r t

b ecame th e basic tactical unit of th e army by the en d of th e

second

century

BC. It usually consisted of

480

m en i n s ix

centuries, bu t t he re w er e a lso l ar ge r u ni ts

of 800

in five

or

ten

centuries second century

BC

to th ir d centur y AD).

comes: Officers of th e later R o man army, ranking below the

magistri militum late third

to

sixth century AD).

comitatenses: Units included in th e regional forces no t tied

to

specific

frontier

provinces fourth

to s ix th centur y AD).

consul: Th e year s tw o consuls were th e senior elected

magistrates of th e

Roman

Republic,

an d

held

command

in

important

campaigns. Sometimes th e Senate extended their

p ow er af ter th eir

year

of

office, in which case they were

known

as proconsuls.

contubernium contubernia : Term applied t o t he groups of

eight

men w ho s hared

a

tent

an d messed

together

third century

BC to th ir d centu ry

AD).

contus or kontos : Th e long, two-handed thrusting spear

elnployed by

Parthian,

Persian,

Sarmatian, and

later Roman

cataphracts

first

century BC to

sixth

century AD).

cornicularius: A

grade of

clerks included

on th e

administrative

staff of several officers in th e legion first to th ir d centur y AD).

cuneus: 1 Term u se d fo r a

formation

in ten ded to b reak th ro ug h

an en emy

line by

co ncentr ating th e mo ral an d

physical shock

of

a c ha rg e

at

a single

p o in t. I t

may have been

triangular

in shape

or

alternatively a deep, narrow-fronted column.

2

Term used for

cavalry units o f u nk no w n size third

to f o ur th

century AD).

decurion: Cavalry officer

who

originally

commanded

ten men.

Under the Principate

a

decurion

led a turma

of

about

thirty

horsemen first to thir d centur y AD).

dictator: I n t im es of extreme crisis a

dictator

was appointed for a

six-month period during

which he exercised supreme civil

an d

military

power.

Later

v ic to rs i n civil w ar s, suc h as Sul la

an d

]ulius Caesar, used th e t it le a s a ba si s f or more permanent power

fifth to first century BC).

dux: Officers

of

th e

later R o man ar my

late

th ir d to

sixth

cen

tury

AD).

x duces limitis: Commanders of all troops limitanei within

on e

of th e regions

into

which the frontier provinces of the later

empire was divided late

third

to

sixth century

AD).

equites singulares: Th e

term

used for

the bodyguard

cavalry

a tt ac he d t o t he s ta ff of provincial governors under the

Principate. These units seem

to

have been about

500

strong and

were recruited

f ro m m en

seconded from

th e

auxiliary alae first

to th ir d centu ry AD).

equites singulares augusti: Th e emperor s own horse guards for



first three centuries of

th e

Principate, these provided an elite

y force to support th e

Praetorian Guard. They

were

cruited from the pick of

the troopers

in

th e

provincial alae,

an d

oyed very favourable service conditions an d

good

chances

of

first

to

third

century

AD).

Allied

barbarians

obliged

to

provide military service to

emperor.

They

usually served in

th eir o w n

units an d

under

their

own commanders

who usually held

man rank. As time went on these

became

increasingly

from units

of

the regular army, especially in th e

st fourth

to

sixth

century

AD).

A sword,

gladius

is conventionally used

to

describe th e

dius hispaniensis,

th e

short Spanish sword which

s the standard Roman

sidearm

until well into

th e

third

AD. Th e

weapon could

be used for cutting, bu t was

intended

for thrusting third

century BC

t o t hi rd

AD).

A spear. I t

has

proved difficult to associate

th e

hasta

or th e

firmly

with

a particular size or

shape

o f w ea po n

covered in

th e

archaeological record fifth

century BC

to

sixth

AD).

hastati .

Th e

first line

of

heavy infantry in

th e

publican legion, recruited from younger

me n

late fo urt h t o

century

BC).

Gymnasia: Th e cavalry games which displayed th e

of

the alae

of th e

Principate.

Intended

as a spectacle

th e

opers were dressed in

bright colours

an d wore highly

armour

first

to th ir d centu ry

AD).

The standard-bearer

who carried

th e imago

a standard with a

bust of th e

emperor first

to

third

tury

AD).

Soldiers exempt

from

ordinary fatigues, usually as a

of possessing special skills first to

third

century AD).

Th e

power

of

military

command

held by

magistrates

d

pro-magistrates during their t er m o f office third century

BC

third

century

AD).

Term applied to

groups

of barbarians settled by

th e

on

land

in

th e

provinces under

the obligation of

viding recruits for th e army; These rarely served in distinct

of th eir o w n

fourth

t o s ix th

century AD).

legati : A subordinate officer

wh o

held delegated

rather

than

exercising

p ow er in

his ow n right. Legati

re chosen by a magistrate rather than elected third to first

BC). 1 Legatus augusti pro praetore:

This

title was

to the governors of th e military provinces under

th e

cipate, who

commanded

as representatives

of th e

emperor

st to third

century

AD).

2

Legatus legionis:

Th e title given to

commanders under

the Principate

first t o t hi rd

tury

AD).

legio : Originally a term

meaning

levy,

th e

legions

ame the main

unit

of th e R oma n a rmy for much of its history;

er the Republic

an d

Principate they were large,

infantry,

formations

of around four to five

men,

bu t

by late

antiquity

most seem

to

have

dwindled

a strength o f a b ou t o ne t ho usan d.

Th e

grade of

troops commanded by

th e

duces limitis,

military commanders of th e various regions, usually on

th e

into

which

th e

provinces of

th e later

empire were

ided fourth to s ixth centu ry

AD).

A corselet

or

breastplate.

Three

types

of

armour were

t common. 1 Lorica hamata or ring-mail armour was

bably copied from

th e

Gauls.

It

offered good protection

an d

GLOSSARY

was relatively simple,

if t ime co ns u min g,

to

manufacture.

Its

main

disadvantage was its great weight, which primarily rested

on

the shoulders,

although

th e militar y

belt helped to

transfer

some

of

this

burden to

th e hips third

century

BC

to

sixth

century

AD).

2

Lorica squamata or scale armour was less flexible an d

offered poorer

protection than

mail. It seems

to

have been

popular for m os t o f

th e

army s history, perhaps in part because it

could

be

polished

into

a high sheen

an d made

th e w ear er

look

impressive third century

BC

to

sixth

century AD). 3 Lorica

segmentata

is th e name invented by modern scholars

to

describe

th e

banded armour so often

associated

with

th e

Romans. It

offered good protection

an d

its design helped

to

spread its

weight

more

evenly than mail, bu t was

complex

to manufacture

a n d p ron e

to damage, which may

explain

its eventual

abandonment first t o t hi rd c en tu ry AD).

magister equitum: 1 Second-in-command to

the Republican

dictator,

th e

M aster of Horse

traditionally

commanded th e

cavalry, since

th e dictator

was

forbidden

to r ide a

horse

fifth to

first century BC).

2

Title given to

senior

officers of th e later

Imperial

army,

e qu al i n

sta tu s t o magistri peditum

fourth

to

sixth

century

AD).

magister militum: Title given to

th e s en ior

officers of th e

later

Imperial

army fourth to

sixth

century AD).

magister peditum: Title given to

senior

officers

of th e later

Imperial army fourth to

sixth

century AD).

maniple manipulus :

Th e

basic tactical unit of

the Republican

legion,

th e manip le

consisted of tw o centuries. It was

commanded

by

th e

centurion of th e

right hand

senior century

if he was

present

late fo urt h t o

second

century BC).

mattiobarbuli: Heavy,

lead-weighted

darts, often

carried

clipped

into

th e

hollow of a shield. Also known as plumbatae third to

sixth

century AD).

military tribune tribunus militum : Six

military

tribunes were

elected

or

appointed to

each

Republican

legion,

on e pair

of

these

me n

holding command at

anyone

time. U nd e r t he Principate

each legion

ha d

on e senior, senatorial tribune tribunus

laticlavius

wh o

wore a

wide

purple sash an d five

equestrians

tribunii angusticlavii

w h o w or e

a

narrow purple

sash , first to

third century AD). Military auxiliary cohorts and alae, or those

with special

status,

were

commanded

by equestrian officers

called

tribunes who

performed an identical role to

auxiliary

prefects. Some regiments of

th e later army

were also

commanded by tribunes.

numerus: A vague

term

meaning simply unit

or band,

numerus

was

th e

title given t o m an y units of irregulars

from

a common

ethnic background

employed for

frontier

patrolling

f ro m t he

second century AD onwards.

It

was also applied to

some

units of

cavalry

i n t he l at er

army;

onager: A one-armed torsion catapult designed to lo b stones. It

was

simpler in

construction than

t he t wo armed

ballistae,

bu t

heavier, less mobile, an d no t as accurate. Th e basic design was to

be followed by

th e

Medieval

mangonel

third

to

sixth

century

AD).

pt

optiones : Second-in-command of a century,

th e

rank was

symbolized by

th e

carrying

of

th e hastile, a

shaft

t ip pe d w i th a n

ornamental knob first t o t hi rd c en tu ry AD).

ovatio: A lesser

form

of

th e triumph,

in an ovation

th e

general

rode

through

th e

city on horseback rather than in a chariot fifth

century

BC to

first century AD).

palatini: Units of higher sta tu s a n d prestige than

th e

comitatenses,

th e

palatini also formed

part

of

th e

field

armies

of

late antiquity fourth to sixth century AD).

pilum:

Th e

heavy javelin which was

th e standard

equipment of

2 1

3



GLOSSARY

the Roman legionary

for

much

of Rome s

history

third

century

BC to third century AD .

plumbatae:

see

mattiobarbuli.

praefectus castrorum: Third in

command of

a legion

during the

Principate, h e w as an experienced officer who was u su ally a

former

primus pilus first

to third century AD .

Praepositus: Unit commander of

the later

army, equivalent to a

tribune

third

to sixth century

AD .

praetor: Praetors

were

annually

elected

magistrates who

governed the less important provinces and fought Rome s smaller

wars.

Praetorian Guard:

The

military bodyguard of the emperors of

the Principate, the Praetorians

received

higher pay and

donatives

and enjoyed

far better

service

conditions than the

legions. For

most

of

their history

they were

formed into cohorts commanded

by

tribunes and the

whole

corps commanded

by

two Praetorian

Prefects. No

emperor could

afford

to

alienate his

guardsmen

who represented the

main

military force in Rome or Ital):

They

were

disbanded

by

Constantine in

312

after supporting

his rival

Maxentius

first


prefect

praefectus : Equestrian commander of an auxiliary

cohort or

ala first


princeps principes : The second line of heavy

infantry

in the

Republican

legion,

recruited f rom men

in

the prime of

life late

fourth to

second

century

BC .

principales: The three

subordinate

officers

of the

century,

the

optio, signifer

and

tesserarius first


pseudocomitatenses. The grade given to units of limitanei who

had become attached to the

field

armies fourth to sixth century

AD .

quaestor: Magistrates

whose duties were

primarily

financial,

quaestors acted

as

deputies to consular

governors

and often

held

subordinate

military

commands.

quincunx:

The

chequerboard formation

u se d by

the Republican

legion in which

the

three lines were deployed

with

wide intervals

between the maniples, the gaps being covered by the maniples of

the next

line.

There has

been

much debate

over

the

precise

nature

of

this system, but i t is c le ar

that

it gave

the Roman

legions far

greater

flexibility

than the

Hellenistic

p l nx

late

fourth to

second century BC .

schola: The units of

guard

cavalry of the later

Roman

arm): The

schoLae

provided many senior commanders from among their

number

third

to

sixth

century AD .

scorpion: The

light

bolt-shooting ballista

employed by

the

Roman army both

in

the

field

and

in sieges.

They

possessed a

long

r an ge , a s we ll a s great accuracy and the ability

to penetrate

any form of armour

first

century BC to sixth century AD .

scutum:

A shield,

particularly the

heavy,

legionary

shield.

This

was semi-cylindrical

and

usually

either

oval

or

rectangular.

It

was h eld by a sin gle, tra nsve rse

handgrip behind the central

boss,

although additional straps

were used

to

support its weight

on the march

third

century BC to third century AD .

signifer: The

standard-bearer who carried the

standard signum

of the centur):

Under

the Principate they administered the men s

pay and

savings

accounts

first to

third century AD .

Socii: The Italian allies

of the

Republic,

the

socii formed alae

which were

normally equal in

number

or more numerous than

the Roman troops

in

an

arm): After

the

Social

War

90-88

BC)

and the general extension of citizenship to

most

of the Italian

peninsula the

socii

disappeared and

all

Italians

were

recruited

into the

legions late

fourth

to

second century

BC .

spatha: The long

sword

used

by

the

cavalry

of the Principate and

21

4

eventually

adopted

by

most of

the

later

arm):

It

was well

balanced

for both

cutting and thrusting

first

to

sixth century

AD .

spolia opima: The highest

honour

which a

triumphing

general

could claim was the r ight to dedicate spolia opim in the Temple

of Jupiter

Optimus

Maximus on the Capitol.

The

right could

only be

gained

by killing the enemy general in single

combat and

was

celebrated on

j us t a

handful of

occasions.

tesserarius:

Third-in-command of

a century,

the

tesserarius

traditionally was responsible for

commanding

the sentries.

The

name

derived

from the

tessera,

the

tablet

on

which

the

night s

password

was

distributed through

the

camp

first

to

third

cen

tury

AD .

testudo:

The famous tortoise formation

in which

Roman

legionaries overlapped their long shields to provide protection

to

the front,

sides

and

overhead. It was

most commonly

u se d to

approach

enemy fortifications

and

allow the legionaries

to

undermine them

third century BC

to

third century AD .

triarius triarii :

The third

and

senior

line

of

heavy

infantry

in

the

Republican legion, recruited from veteran soldiers late

fourth to second century BC .

triumph: The great celebration granted

by

the

Senate

to

a

successful general took the form of a procession along the Sacra

Via,

the ceremonial main road of

Rome, displaying the spoils

and captives

of

his victory

and culminated

in the ritual execution

of the captured enemy

leader.

The commander

r od e in a c ha riot,

dressed like

the statues of

Jupiter, a slave

holding

a laurel

wreath

of Victory over his head. The slave was supposed to whisper to

the

general,

reminding him that

h e was

mortal. Under

the

Principate

only

members

of

the

Imperial family received

triumphs,

but other commanders

were

granted

the insignia

of

a

triumph ornamenta triumphalia fifth

century BC to fourth

century AD .

turm

turmae :

The

basic

sub-unit of the Roman

cavalry for

much of

its history, a

turm

consisted of

around thirty

men.

Under the Principate i t w as

commanded

by a decurion late

fourth century BC to third century AD .

Urban

cohorts:

The

paramilitary

police force established by

Augustus in

Rome and

a few

other

key cities, for instance

guarding the

Imperial

mint at

Lyon.

They

were organized

into

cohorts commanded

by tribunes

under

the overall direction

of

the Urban

Prefect first


veles velites : The light

infantry of

the Republican legion,

recruited from the poor or those

too

young

to

fight as heavy

infantr):

It

is

unclear whether

they were identical

to or

superseded the rorarii, another

term

applied to light infantrymen

in the Republican

legion late

fourth to second century BC .

vexillation

vexillatio :

1

A

detachment operating

independently, a vexillation

might

consist

of anything

f ro m a few

men

to several

thousand and could

be

drawn from

several units.

The use

of

these

temporary

formations designed for a specific

role

or

operation

gave

the Roman army

considerable flexibility

first to

third century AD .

2 Many cavalry units

of

the later

Field Armies were

known

as vexillations. They appear to have

b ee n sim ilar in size

to the o ld

alae fourth

to sixth century

AD .

vexillum: A

square

flag

mounted

crosswise

on

a p ol e, t he

vexillum was u se d

to

mark

a general s

position and

was a lso the

standard

carried

by a

detachment

of

troops

first

to third

century AD .

vigi es The paramilitary

fire-brigade established by Augustus in

Rome,

the

vigiles

were

organized into cohorts , but not equipped

with

weap ons first




B IOGR APHIES

A ND P RI MA RY

SOURCES

A N D PRIMARY

SOURCES

BIOGRAPHIES

G U ST US G A IU S J U LI U S

CAESAR

OCTAVIANUS)

B C -AD

14

nephew a nd a dopt ed s on , h e b ec am e R om e s

emperor

following th e defeat of his last rival,

Antony,

at Actium

in

31 BC . During

his r eign h e

ided over

t he l as t

intensive period of Roman

Not

an able soldier himself, he

ha d the

of appointing capable

subordinates,

notably his

Agrippa, an d later younger family members.

I SARI US A D 505-565)

Eastern Roman general of

considerable

ability,

ecially gifted in

the

use

of

cavalry, Belisarius

notable

successes

on th e

Persian

frontier

an d

Africa an d Hi s success e arne d him t he e nm it y

the

Emperor Justinian.

S J ULI US

CAESAR c 100--44 BC )

bably Rome s most successful general, he

Gaul 58-50), twice bridging t he Rhi ne an d

g expeditions

to

Britain. Th e decision of his

Pompey, to side with his political enemies,

to the Civil Wa r 49-5 BC),

during

which

he wo n

at

Pharsalus,

Thapsus an d

Munda.

himself life

dictator, Caesar

was

murdered

a con sp ir acy led by

Brutus an d

Cassius.

I

AD

285-337)

e first

Christian

Emperor, Constantine spent nearly

his reign as a usurper, before establishing

himself

sole ruler.

Hi s

greatest military successes occurred in

l wars,

notably the

defeat of

Maxentius at th e

lvian Bridge in 312.

D O M I T IU S C O R B U LO

D. AD 67)

e o f th e most famous Roman commanders of th e

AD, wh o

famously

remarked on

th e lack of

of Imperial Governors to wage wa r c ompa re d

their Republican counterparts. A

strict

linarian, he fought in Ge rm a ny a nd

Armenia.

s reputation

was such that

Nero

ordered

hi m

to

s uicide as a potential rival.

LI CI NI US CRASSUS 115-53 BC)

skilled politician, Crassus w as als o an able

wh o systematically destroyed th e slave

mies led by Spartacus 71 BC).

Later

h e l ed the

of Parthia, bu t

a series of mistakes led to his

a nd d ea th a t C ar rh ae 53

BC).

GAIUS AURELIUS

VALERIUS

DIOC L E T IANUS

AD

245-313)

Diocletian

was

the creator

of th e

Tetrarchic

system,

dividing

the

empire

i nt o a n e as te rn

an d

western

half,

each r uled

by

an

Augustus an d his

deputy

or Caesar.

M uc h o f his

career

was spent

in

fighting

domestic

rivals, bu t he also

fought

a successful Persian War.

QUI NT US FABIUS M A X IM U S C U N C T A TO R c 275-203 BC )

Fabius was renowned as th e ma n wh o saved

Rome

by

delaying, avoiding direct confrontation with

Hannibal s victorious

Elected d ictator at

th e

age

of 58 i n 217, he

held

th e

consulship three

times during

th e Second Punic Wa r

an d exercised a great influence

on

Roman

strategy

fo r over a

decade.

HANNI B AL BARCA

c

247-188 BC )

Hannibal

was the personification of th e ideal

Hellenistic general. Throughout his campaign

he

dazzled his opponents at th e strategic an d tactical

levels,

repeatedly

achieving the apparently impossible.

A leader of genius, he w as able to inspire his ow n

senior

officers as much as

th e various

races

wh o fought

in t he ranks of his His ultimate

defeat

in t he w ar

with R om e h as more

to

d o w it h th e R om an s

relentless

determination than his ow n failings.

GAIUS

MAR I US

c 157-87

BC )

Traditionally believed

to

be th e ma n wh o converted the

citizen militia

into

a

professional

army,

he

was a

strict

disciplinarian

an d an able commander. However, his

career

was unorthodox and after victories over

Ju gu rth a an d the migrating Cimbri, Marius was on e of

th e

leaders

in Rom e s

first Civil War.

NARSES

AD

478-573)

An

imperial eunuch

wh o was given

military

command

l at e i n life,

N

arses achieved several successes in Italy

when

he

first supported and

then replaced

Belisarius,

winning victories at

Taginae

in 552 and

Casilinium

in

553. He

made

more effective use of

infantry

than

Belisarius, using them t o s up po rt his c v l r ~

GNAEUS

POMPEIUS M A G N U S 106--48 BC )

Pompey s career was extremely unorthodox, commanding

armies in Sicily, Africa an d Spain

under

S ulla, whilst still a

private citizen. He

completed the

defeat of

Mithridates

66-63 BC), bu t political failures led to his alliance with

Crassus an d

Caesar

the first

triumvirate).

After

Crassus

death,

this broke

down

an d led to th e Civil

Wa r

in which

Pompey was defeated at Pharsalus

48

BC) an d later

murdered

in Egypt.

2 1

5



B I OG R A PH I ES A N D P RI M AR Y

S OUR C E S

PUBLIUS CORNELIUS S C I PI O A F R IC A N U S 236 c. 184

BC)

Th e greatest Roman commander

of

th e

Second

Punic

War, he evicted the Carthaginians f rom

Spain an d

finally

defeated

H a nn ib al a t Z am a.

After th e wa r he fought in

Gaul

an d

under

his

brother s

command against Antiochus. An

inspirational leader, his well-trained legions

allowed

hi m

to experiment with variations on

traditional

Roman

tactics.

PUBLIUS CORNELIUS S C I PI O A E M IL I A NU S 185-129

BC)

A skilled commander, Scipio

wa s

th e adopted

grandson of Africanus.

After distinguished

service

in

Spain an d

th e first years

of

th e

Third Punic

War,

he was given

th e

command in Africa an d presided

over th e

destruction

of Carthage i n 146

BC.

In

133 BC he

captured the

Celtiberian

stronghold

of

Numantia.

LUCIUS SEPTIMI US

S EV ER US A D 145-211)

Th e eventual victor

of

th e Civil Wa r

that

followed

Commodus

murder,

Severus s pent m uch

of

his reign

on campaign. He led a highly successful expedition

against Parthia

an d established

a ne w province in

Mesopotamia. He d ie d i n Eboracum York) in

northern Britain, having

s pent the

last three years

fighting th e

Caledonian

tribes.

PUBLIUS CORNELIUS

SULLA

138-78

BC)

Initially

an associate

of

Marius,

Sulla

turned

against

h im w he n t he l at te r t ri ed to r ob h im

of

th e command

against Mithridates

of

Pontus, an d became the first

Roman

general to

march on Rome 88

BC .

After

defeating

th e

Pontic

invasion

of

Greece

86-4

BC , Sulla

returned

an d defeated his

Roman

rivals

with

great

bloodshed 83-2 BC .

Appointing

himself dictator, he

later retired to a life of debauchery an d died

soon

afterwards.

MAR C US

ULPIUS

T R AJ ANUS AD 52-117)

Adopted by th e aged Emperor Nerva, Trajan ascended

to the throne

in

AD 98. During his campaigns he

conquer ed D acia after tw o fierce wars AD 101-2,

105-6). He died during

his massive

Parthian

expedition

113-7) an d

many of

his

eastern

gains were abandoned

by his successor, Hadrian.

T I T US FLAV IU S V ESPA SIA N U S A D 9-79)

Vespasian commanded Legio Augusta

during

th e

invasion

of

Britain an d wa s later s ent to suppress th e

rebellion in Judaea.

In

th e Civil Wa r

that

began after

N ero s death, he gained support of all the Eastern

armies

an d

eventually

defeated

all his rivals,

later

proving to

be

on e of

the better

emperors.

I

P R I M A R Y SOURCES

C H A P T E R

1

Diodorus Siculus c 30s

BC

wrote a universal

history

in

Greek, part

of

which covering th e period

486-302

ha s

survived an d includes some details of Roman s t o r ~

Dionysius

of

Halicarnassus

late first

century

BC

was

a Greek scholar

working

in Rome who

produced

a

History o f Rome which survives for t he p er io d t o 443

BC.

L iv y 59 BC-AD 17) produced a Latin history of Rome

From the Foundation o f the City ab urbe condita in

142 books, m ost of which have been lost. Th e first

te n

books cover t he p er io d u p t o 293 BC. Fiercely

patriotic,

Livy s

military descriptions

ca n be unreliable.

Plutarch c

AD 4 6- 12 0) w as a Greek Biographer who

produced

a series of Parallel Lives pairing notable

Greek an d

Roman

figures. He is only ever as good as

these sources, many of which no longer survive. For

this period we have Lives of Romulus Coriolanus, an d

Camillus.

C HAP T E R

Appian

c AD 95 c.

170) was an Alexandrian

Greek

writing

i n R om e

under Antoninus Pius. Books survive

from

his Roman History covering th e Punic,

Macedonian and Syrian Wars.

Livy - Books 20-30 cover th e Second Punic War, whilst

31-45

deal

with

th e years up to 167 BC.

Plutarch - Lives of Pyrrhus, Fabius

Maximus

Marcellus, Flamininus, an d Aemilius Paullus.

Polybius c

203 c.

120

BC

served

against the Romans

in

th e

Third

Macedonian W ar

after which he went as

hostage to Rome w he re h e became a close associate

of

Scipio Aemilianus. Originally covering 264-146

BC,

he

is

th e best source

for

Roman warfare in

this

period, bu t

unfortunately much of his w or k has been lost.

C H A P T E R

3

Appian provides detailed accounts of th e

campaigns

in

Spain an d the Mithridatic Wars.

Th e

four books of

The Civil Wars

provide th e

only

continuous

account of

th e series

of

conflicts which caused the fall of th e

Republic.

Caesar

c 100-44 BC

wrote

Commentaries which,

with

the additional books w ritten by some of his

officers, cover the operations in Gaul 58-51

BC

an d

th e Civil Wa r 49-45

BC .

Skilfully written pieces of



these

remain

an invaluable

portr ait of

army on campaign.

106--43

C

was a famous orator, statesman,

d prolific author,

bu t

saw very little military service.

s

posthumously published

Letters to Atticus

an d

tters to his Friends

include

accounts

of

his

minor

in Cilicia

in 51-50. Letters to his Friends 10.

contains Sulpicius

Galba s

eye-witness

account of

Battle of Forum Gallorum in 43.

tarch -

Lives

of

Marius Sulla Sertorius Pompey

Antony Brutus an d Lucullus.

86-34

C

served under

Caesar

in Gaul,

bu t

s later forced from

public

life following a scandal

his governorship of Africa a nd t urne d

to

h i s t o r ~

Hi s

Jugurthine War

an d

Catilinarian

survive alon g w ith

fragments of

his

Roman

4

ian born c. AD 90 was

governor

of Ca ppa doc ia

H a dri an a nd p ro du ce d t wo b ri ef w or ks i n G re ek

with th e army s training

an d

tactics, th e

concerning

cavalry training

an d

th e

Battle

der against the Alans

describing operations

in

o

Cassius c AD

163-c.

235) was a

Roman

senator

o m t he Greek Eas t w ho

produced

a

Roman

History

ra n u p

to

his ow n times. Large sections of th e

rk, including all of th e late first

an d second

AD ,

survive only in

later

epitomes.

AD 40-103) governed

r i t ~ i n

in

AD

74-78

d later produced a b oo k o f

Strategems

describing

o ys u se d by commanders of th e

p as t t o

gain v i t o r ~

born c. 37)

was a

Jewish

general

o fought

against Rome

in

AD 66-7,

before

an d changing sides. Hi s

Jewish War

vides by f ar the mos t d etailed acco un t of th e first

army

on

campaign. However, he tends to

ggerate his ow n deeds

an d those of

his patron,

e Emperor

Titus.

uclo-Hyginus second century AD ) is th e name

ntionally given

to

th e

unknown

author of On

the

o f

camps.

born

c.

AD

69

was a

palace

official

at

Rome

o wrote Biographies

of

Rome s rulers

from Caesar

Domitian.

BIOGRAPHIES

A N D P RI MA RY

SOURCES

Tacitus born c. AD

56) wa s a

Roman senator

wh o

wrote

a

biography of

his father-in-law,

Agricola

who

campaigned in Britain from

AD

77 to 84), an d an

ethnographic work, the

Germania

describing

th e

tribes

of

Germany, with s ome mention

of

their

military practices. Substantial fragments of

The

Histories

an d

The

Annals

give

much

detail

of

th e

period

AD

14-70. Tacitus was

more

interested in

politics

than

war,

bu t

does provide

good accounts of

many conflicts.

Vegetius late fourth/very early fifth century AD )

produce d a n Epitome of Military Science arguing

for

revival of

traditional military

drill

an d training.

It

contains many interesting comments about

th e earlier

army, bu t it is often difficult

to

know which period

he

is

referring

to an d whether

he

reflects th e

theory or

actual

practice.

C H A P T E R S

Ammianus Marcellinus c AD 330 c. 395)

wa s a

Roman

officer

fr om t he G re ek E as t w ho

served in

th e

army i n t he m id dl e of th e fourth

n t u r ~

The surviving

books

of his Latin History deal

with

th e years 353-378.

Ammianus

narrative provides us

with

a h ig hl y detailed

picture of th e

l at er Roma n a rmy

in operation.

Herodian

died

c.

AD

250)

wa s a

senator wh o

produced

a

history

of

th e

Roman

emperors from

AD

180-238.

Although often unreliable or vague, Herodian is ou r

fullest

source

f or t hi s period.

Th e Historia Augusta

probably late

fourth century) is

a collection

of biographies of most of the emperors

from

Hadrian

to Carinus a nd N ume ria n, a lmost

cer tain ly th e w o rk of a s in gl e author. Its reliability is

highly questionable.

Th e Notitia Dignitatum c

AD

395) is

an

illustrated

manuscript listing th e officers

of

th e

later

army,

th e

units

they

commanded, and

their

stations.

A valuable

source,

it presents many problems of interpretation.

CHAP T E R 6

Maurice s Strategikon trans G.

T. Dennis

Philadelphia,

1988)) is a sixth-century

Military Manual describing in

detail

th e

format ion a nd

tactics

to

be

employed

by

Byzantine

armies.

Procopius mid sixth century) w as a civil servant who

served

on

th e s taf f of Belisarius for several

campaigns.

He wrote The

Wars

a n a cc ount of

the campaigns of

Justinian s

reign

to 550/1, including

conflicts

with th e

Persians, Vandals

a nd G ot hs , a nd th e Secret History.

2 1



FURT HE R

READING

F UR TH ER R EA D IN G

G E N E R A L

Th e literature on th e

Roman

army is truly vast, much

of

i t tucked away in

academic journals

inaccessible

to

th e

general reader.

Th e

works

listed here will

allow th e interested reader to begin a dee pe r s tudy i nto t he subject.

Good

general works are L. Keppie,

The Making

of

the Roman

rmy

London,

1984)

on the

Republican

a rm y a nd G. Webster,

The

Roman

Imperial

rmy London, 1985: repr. w ith updated bibliography Oklahoma, 1998) for the

Empire. Also useful are H. Parker,

The

Roman

Legions

(Oxford, 1928), Y Le

Bohec,

The Imperial

Roman rmy NewYork, 1994), and]. Peddie,

The

Roman

War Machine

(Gloucester, 1994),

although

no t all of th e latter s conclusions are

widely accepted. A little d at ed a nd r at he r t oo dogmatic, H. Delbriick, (trans

]. Renfroe),

History

of

the

r t of

War

within

the framework

of

Political History

vols 1- 2 (Westport, 1975) still contains much

of

interest. Well illustrated, more

general works include

General

Sir

John

Hackett (ed.),

Warfare in the

ncient

World

London, 1989),

a nd].

Warry,

Warfare in the Classical World

(London,

1980).

A. Goldsworthy,

The

Roman

rmy

at

WaG 1

BC-AD

2

(Oxford, 1996)

contains a detailed analysis on operational practices an d t he na ture of

battle

in

th e

Late Republic an d Early empire. H. Elton,

Warfare in Roman

Europe;

AD

35 425

Oxford,

1996) is an excellent an d

wide ranging study

of

the

Later

Roman r ~ More specific studies include ]. Roth,

The Logistics

of

the Roman

Imperial

rmy

at War

(264 BC-AD 235) (Leiden, 1999), an d N. Austin

B Rankov,

Exploratio: Military

and

Political Intelligence in the

Roman

World

from the Second Punic War to the Batt le

of

Adrianople

(London, 1995).

Military equipment

is covered only briefly in this

work,

bu t there are a

number

of

excellent

books

on

th e

subject,

notably

M.

Bishop

an d

]. Coul st on,

Roman

Military quipment

London, 1993), Connolly,

Greece

and

Rome at War

London,

1981), a nd H. Russell

Robinson,

The

rmour of

Imperial

Rome

London, 1975). Recent research in this field is regularly published in the

Journal

of Roman

Military quipment Studies.

C H A P T E R

I

A

good

recent survey

of

Rome s early history is

T

Cornell,

The Beginnings of

Rome. Italy

and Rome

from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars

c. 1 264 BC

London, 1995).

There

are few books dedicated to th e military history of this

period,

bu t notable articles include E. Rawson, T he

Literary

Sources for the

Pre-

Marian

Roman

Army ,

Papers of the British School at

Rome

39 (1971), 13-31,

an d L. Rawlings, Condottieri and Clansmen: Early Italian Warfare an d the

State. ,

in

K

Hopwood,

Organized Crime in the

ncient

World

(Swansea, 1999).

C H A P T E R

There

are

ma ny w orks on

this

period and

in particular the Punic Wars,

of

which

th e best are ]. Lazenby,

The First Punic War

London, 1996) an d

Hannibal s War

(Warminster, 1978). Several interesting articles are included in T

Cornell,

B

Rankov,

Sabin,

The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal

I

CS

London,

1996).

Also notable are F Adcock,

The

Roman r t of

War under the Republic

Cambridge Mass., 1940), W Rogers,

Greek and

Roman

Naval Warfare

(Annapolis,

1937),]. Thiel,

Studies

on

the History

of Roman

Sea-Power in

Republican

Times

Amsterdam,

1946),

an d B

Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army.

Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns

Cambridge, 1976).

21 8



3

contributions o n R om an imperialism are to be found in E. Badian,

man Imperialism in the Late Republic

(Oxford, 1968), S

Dyson, The Creation

f

the

Roman

Frontier

(Princeton, 1985), W

Harris, War

and

Imperialism in

Rome

327-70

(Oxford, 1976),

M.

Hopkins, Conquerors

and

Slaves

ridge, 1978), an d J. Rich an d G. Shipley (edd.), War

and

Society in the

an World (London, 1993). Also of great interest are

Brunt, Italian

225 BC D 14 (Oxford, 1971), J. Fuller, ]ulius Caesar:

Man

Soldier

Tyrant (London, 1965), E. Gabba Republican

Rome

the Army and the Allies

ford, 1976), N. Rosenstein

Imperatores Victi. Military Defeat

and

Aristocratic

petition in the

Middle and

Late Republic (Berkeley, 1990), an d

F

Smith,

rvice in the Post-Marian

Roman

Army (Manchester, 1958).

4

Cheesman, The

Auxilia of

the Roman Imperial Army (Oxford, 1914),

Dixon Southern,

The

Roman

Cavalry

(London, 1992), an d A. Johnson,

Forts

(London, 1983) all cover aspects of

t he a rm y

in this

period.

Campbell,

The Emperor

and

the

Roman

Army

Oxford,

1984) is

good on th e

itical role of th e Daily life is

dealt

with in R. Als ton, Soldier and Society

Roman Egypt (London, 1995), R. Davies, Service in the

Roman

Army

urgh, 1989), an d G. Watson, The Roman Soldier (London, 1969). J.

Mann,

ionary Recruitment and Veteran Settlement during the Principate (London,

83) remains a fine study of recruitment.

Th e Empire s frontiers a nd t he vexed question

o f G ra nd

Strategy are covered

E

Luttwak,

The Grand Strategy

of

the

Roman

Empire (New York, 1976),

Ferrill, Roman Imperial Grand Strategy Ne wYork, 1991), an d B Isaac, The

of Empire. The Roman Army in the East (Oxford, 1992).

D

Kennedy an d

Riley, Rome s Desert Frontier from the Air (London, 1990) offers spectacular

of

many

Roman outposts,

whilst a

good introduction to th e

copious

on

Hadrian s

Wall is D Breeze an d B

Dobson,

Hadrians

Wall

(London,

H.

M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (Oxford, 1964) still

contains

a wealth of

ation concerning Late n t i q u i t ~

Southern

K.

Dixon,

The Late Roman

(London, 1996) is a

handy introduction,

bu t no t always reliable, whilst

Ferrill, The

allof

the

Roman

Empire: The Military Explanation (London,

86) offers

on e

interpretation

of

th e military

problems of Late n t i q u i t ~

Coello, Unit Sizes in the Late

Roman

Army BAR S645 Oxford, 1996) presents

e meagre evidence for

unit

size, as does W Treadgold ,

Byzantium and

its

Army

(Stansford, 1995).

On

Roman

foreign policy see

D

Braund, Rome and

the Friendly King

don, 1984),

T

Burns,

Barbarians

within

the Gates

of

Rome: A Study

of

Military Policy and the Barbarians CA

375-425

D (Indiana, 1994),

Heather, Goths and Romans

332-489

(Oxford, 1991), M. Dodgeon S Lieu,

Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars 226-363 (London, 1991), an d

Lee, Information and Frontiers (Cambridge, 1993).

6

Blockley, East

Roman

Foreign Policy (Leeds, 1992) is useful. C. Fauber, Narses:

of

the Goths (Gloucester, 1990) is an accessible account

of

this

career. G. Greatrex,

Rome

and

Persia

at War 502-532 (Leeds, 1998)

a first rate s tudy of a single war, also containing

much

of

more

general interest.

F U RT H ER R E A DI N G

2 1

9



INDEX

IN X

Figures in italic refer to

captions

Achaemanid Persians, 190

Adrianople battle of

AD

378 , 169,

183, 192

Aequi, 37

Aetius, 198

Africa, 56, 65, 70, 92 104 107, 174,

198, 199

Agrippa Marcus

Vipsanius,

104 107

108

111

Alamanni

178, 180, 181, 182

Alans, 128

Alba Longa 30

Alesia, siege of 52

BC ,

86-7

Alexander the Great

42, 62, 70, 71, 74,

106, 136, 190

Alexandria

137, 141

Alps, 107

Amida 191, 191

Ammianus

Marcellinus, 167 191 192

217

Andriscus, 84

Antiochus

the

Great King of Syria,

52 82 73

Antiochus

King of Syria, 85

Antonine

Wall, 152

Antony, Mark

107 108

133, 135-6

Apennines, 39

Appian 216

aqueducts 200 1

Aquitaine

196

Arabia

190

Arausio, battle of 105

BC , 93

Arch of Constantine

Rome

172-3

176-7

Arch

of

Galerius,

Salonika

168

Arch of Septimius Severus,

Rome

134-5

Arch of Titus Rome, 138-9

archers,

128-9 132 133 134-5

167,

186 203

Ardashir

I, King

of the

Persians, 163,

186 186

Ariovistus, 85

aristocracy, 42, 80, 82, 90, 96

Armenia 133, 136, 186

Arminius

92 111 180

armour 50 51

auxiliary troops

120

cavalry, 42, 52, 131

helmets , 32, 33, 53, 76, 123, 125

hoplites, 24, 27, 32

infan

try, 43

late Roman army, 167

legionaries, 43

scale armour 124, 127

shields,

18 32

53, 125, 167

army, Hellenistic, 62,

70-74

army,

Roman:

citizen militia, 18, 21, 28-9 37, 47,

62 64 96-7

demobilization 101, 117

discipline, 47-9 65, 120, 124, 125

early Rome,

26-39

ferocity, 19, 93

foreign

troops

118-20 119

hoplites, 24, 27-33 27, 32

late Roman army, 167-79 192-3

living

conditions 120-22

loyalty,

117-18

162

organization

21-3 37-9 42-9 97-

100 98 105-6 117-22

patronage 21-2 121, 122

professional army,

92-101 117

promotion 121, 122

recruits, 18-19 47 48 62 96-7

120-21 174-9

193, 197

training

49, 122-4

uniforms, 16 43 171

see also

battles; cavalry;

formations;

infantry;

legions

army, Sassanid, 186

Arrian 128-9

217

Arsacids, 186, 192

Artabanus King, 186 186

Attila, 198

Augusta

Emerita 21

Augustus Gaius Julius Caesar

Octavianus , Emperor, 21, 78, 99,

104 107 11 107 109 114 115 17

175-6 215

Aurelian, Emperor, 162, 184,

187

Aurelius,

Marcus

114, 134,

160 163

164 166 172-3 176 180

auxilia auxiliary units ,

118-21

127,

176

Babylonia, 192

baggage

trains

144

Baginton, 156

Bar Kochb.a revolt AD 133 , 144, 145

barbarians

36,

85-90

112, 127, 129,

148 157 160 176 179 83 194 202

203

Bassus, Titus Flavius, 112

Bastarnae

127

battles:

early Rome,

28-9

length, 52

naval,

56-61

tactics, 49-55 64 125-31 126-7

see also formations n individual

battles

Belgic tribes, 85

Belisarius, 198, 198, 199-202, 203, 215

booty, 33-4 82, 104, 182

Boudicca, 117, 144

bridges, 20 21 22, 181

Brisiavi, 176

Britain, 85 105 115-17 144 146 148

152 153 153 174

bucellarii 199 203

Burgundians, 198

Byzantine army,

203-4

Caecus, Appius Claudius, 88

Caelius, Marcus 111

Caesar, Gaius Julius, 82, 84 86-7 88

99 100 100 1 101 102 104 6 106

107 111 118 158 215 216

Caesarea,

200 1

Caledonians

163, 164

Caligula, Emperor, 162

Camillus, 36

camps

23, 47,

50-51 123 143

Cannae battle

of 216

BC ,

49, 52, 64,

65 65 66-7 74 93

Cappadocia

190

Caracalla Emperor, 167, 167

Carrhae battle

of

53 BC , 133-4

Carthage

42, 50 52

55-70

56-7 63

74 75 78 83 85 90-91 92-3

casualties, 54,

120

Caudine Forks,

battle

of

321

BC , 74-5

cavalry, 42, 94-5 97 112 130

armour

123, 124, 131

auxiliary units, 52 118, 120

battle

of Pharsalus,

100 1

early Roman army, 33, 37

exploratores

124 5

late Roman army, 169 202-3

numbers

42, 47

Parthian 131-3

133

Sassanid, 186

tactics, 49-50 64, 70, 128, 129-31

training, 123

weapons, 45

Celtiberians, 90, 92

Celts, 82-3 82

85-8

centurions

45, 47, 54, 98 104 111

122, 126-7 137

Chalons battle

of AD

451 , 198

chariots,

71 80 81 81

Chatti 148



rboard formation see

quincunx

111

igi vase, 27

ar, 178

st, 137

ero, 217

mbri, 93, 96, 104

innatus, Lucius Quinctius, 37

salpine Gaul, 85, 88-90, 93

izen militia,

18,21,28-9,37,47,62,

64,96-7

zenship, Roman, 120, 121, 141, 167

states, 28, 42

il wars, 18, 99, 104, 105,

106 107

115,115,162,166,181,193,197,205

udius, Emperor, 114, 117, 162

us, Pulcher, Publius,

61

dius Albinus, 164

ts, 97-100, 98 100 117 118

126-7

onies, 36, 88-90

169, 170-71, 176, 181,

193, 199

tia Centuriata 29

26-7,

105-6, 115, 117,

164,204-5

us, Emperor, 162

munications, 22, 88-90, 152

cription, 120, 174

stantine the Great, 162, 166, 166,

169,170,174,176,176,215

antius, Emperor, 166

83

nsuls, 37, 47, 64, 80, 83, 104

bulo, Gnaeus Domitius, 215

Marcus

Licinius, 85, 107, 215

iphon, 134, 135, 192

iatii brothers, 30

honorum 8

scephalae, battle of 197

BC

70

1-2,

74

rus, 144

n Wars AD

101-2 an d

105-6 ,

114,114,118-20,126,194

River,

22,111,148,151,

152,

153, 163, 174, 176, 181, 198

199, 203

alus, King

of

the Dacians, 19

cius, Emperor, 162

48,104,111,117,119,122

rions, 47

tion, 120, 175

tors, 37

Cassius, 217

cletian, Emperor, 162, 162, 163,

165,166,169,174,176,215

Siculus, 216

Dionysius of

Halicarnassus,

29, 33, 216

diplomacy, 74, 180-81

discipline,

47-9,

65, 120, 124, 125

Domitian, Emperor, 137, 148

Drepana, battle of

249

BC 61

Drusus, 108 111

Dura

Europos,

188 9 190 191

Durotriges, 146

Dying

Gaul,

96

Ecnomus,

battle of

256

BC

60

Egypt, 85, 107, 137-41, 144

elephants, 40 42, 42, 71, 71, 186, 191

Elton,

H. ,

181

emperors, 18, 115-17,

162-6,

193,204

see also individual emperors

empire, 78-111,78-9,114-17,115,

148-9,196-7

engineering, 22,

21-2,

102-3,

181,

200 1

equestrian

officers, 163, 164

equites

cavalry , 42

Etruscans, 33, 35

extraordinarii 47, 50

Fabii clan, 33

Fabius Maximus, Quintus,

Cunctator ,

65, 215

festivals, 117, 122

fetiales priests , 34-5

field armies, 169-71, 174, 176, 193,

199,202

Flaminius, 70 8

foederati 196-7,

198, 199

foreign

t roops, 176- 9

formations:

late Roman army, 203

phalanxes,

27-8, 27, 39, 70-71

quincunx 44-5, 51-2,

99

testudo

tortoise , 18

triplex acies

49-52,

54-5, 65, 88, 99

fortresses, 142, 145, 146, 152, 156, 191,

199,208

forts, 102 3 143, 148, 152, 152, 153,

154,156-9,157,174-5,181,182,

206 9 208

Franks, 180, 182, 198

frontiers,

146-59,148-59,181,187,

193,205

Frontinus, 217

Galatians,

82-3

Galba,

Servius Sulpicius, 91

Galba,

Emperor, 163

galleys,

56-8

Gallic tribes see Gaul

Gallienus, 169, 170

Gamala,

143

garrisons, 93,137,148,152-3,181

INDEX

gateways, forts, 156, 208 9

Gaul

an d

Gallic tribes, 107, 174

battles with Romans,

85-8,

94-5

Caesar s

campaigns in

Gaul,

84, 104,

111

cavalry in Roman army, 118

Cisalpine

Gaul , 85-8,

93

Dying

Gaul,

96

Franks in, 180, 182, 198

frontiers, 158

head-hunting,

93

rebellions, 144, 162

Roman colonies, 88

sack

of

Rome, 35, 36,

93

siege

of

Alesia, 86-7

Transalpine

Gaul,

90

tribes, 88

Vercingetorix, 85, 86-7, 88, 92

warriors,

94

Germanicus,

111

Germany and Germanic tribes, 148,

179-83

battle

of Strasbourg,

178-9

cavalry in Roman army, 118

raids

against

Romans, 162, 176,

180-82

rebellions, 114, 144

recruits in

Roman

army, 176, 179

Roman

campaigns

against, 111, 115,

151, 164,

182-3

Roman control

of, 158

wa r

cries, 179

warriors,

127

gladius

sword , 44, 45, 97, 120, 125,

127

Gordian Ill, Emperor, 163

Goths,

162, 180, 192,

196-7

Gracchus, 93

Greece,27,28-9,42

Hadrian,

Emperor, 116, 123, 131, 145,

152,153,163

Hadrian s

Wall, 152-5,157-8,157,208,

208 9

Hamilcar,

85

hand-ta-hand

fighting, 52

Hannibal

Barca, 49, 52, 61, 61, 63, 64,

65-9,66-9,70,74,75,85,90,93,215

Hasdrubal,41

hastati soldiers , 43, 44-5, 49, 50 51

52,54

head-hunting,

93, 118

Hellenistic

kingdoms,

42, 50, 62,

70-75,93,144

helmets, 32, 33, 53, 76, 123, 125

Helvetii, 85

Herod

the

Great, 142 200

Herodian, 217

H istoria Augusta 217

2 2 1



INDEX

Homer, 27

hoplites, 24, 27-33, 27, 32

Horatii brothers, 30

Horatius, 30

Houseteads, 157, 158-9, 208

Huns, 198, 199

hunting, 170

Iberians, 90

Illyria, 85, 90, 107

Illyrian officers, 165-6

Illyricum, 174

imperialism,

78-111,78-9,114-17,

115,148-9

infantry:

armour and

weapons,

43-4, 4 3 ~

50 51 53 78

auxiliary

troops,

118, 118-19, 120

heavy infantry, 42,

43-5

late

Roman

army, 203

light infantry, 42,

45-7

Sassanid, 186

tactics, 53, 127-9,

167-9

see also

formations

Italy:

Ostrogoths,

198, 199

Roman

conquest,

35-7, 38,85-90

javelins, 44, 44, 53, 78, 128, 128, 129,

167

Jerusalem, 145

siege

of AD 70 ,81,

138-41

Jews,

141,141,142,

144

Josephus, 122,129,138,217

Jovian, Emperor, 181, 192

Judaea,

141, 144,145

Jugurtha,

King of

Numidia,

92, 92, 93,

96

Julian the Apostate, Emperor, 178, 182,

182, 183, 192

Justinian I, Emperor, 198, 198

Labienus,

Lake Regillus, battle of 496BC , 29-33

Lake Trasimene,

battle

of

217

BC ,

61,

65

legionaries,

50-51

76,94-5, 117, 119,

125,126,127,128

legions:

armour, 43

in battles, 49-55

formations, 99-100

cohorts, 97-100, 98,126-7

garrisons, 137

organization,

37-9,

42-9,117-18

size, 117, 167, 169

see also

army

Leonidas, 33

Libya, 144

Licinius, Emperor, 166

Ligurians, 88, 91

Ligustinus, Spurius, 97

limitanei 169, 171-4, 181, 193, 199

linear barriers, 152, 153-8, 154-5

Livia, 109

Livy,

29, 30 33, 97, 99, 216

Longinus, Cassius, 90

Lucanians, 36

Lucullus, 91, 105

Lusitanians, 90,

91-2

~ a c e d o n i a 5 5 6 2 7 0 7 4 75,83-4,

105

~ a c e d o n i a n

Wars, 92

Second 200-196 BC , 83

Third

172-167 BC , 83,90,93,97

Fourth

149-148 BC , 84

magistrates, 80-81, 83, 117

~ a g n e s i a battle

of

190BC , 52, 70,

71-2,72-3

~ a g o 6

~ a i d e n Castle, 146

~ a n c i n u s Gaius Hostilius, 92

maniples,

44-5,

49,51-2,55,97,

99-100

marching camps, 23, 47,

50-51,

123

~ a r c o m a n n i 180

~ a r i u s Gaius, 96, 97, 104, 215

~ a r o b o d u u s King

of

th e

~ a r c o m a n n i 180

marriage, 121

~ a s a d a 1 4 2 - 3 2 0 8

massacres, 19,91,93,111,145-6

Maurice s Strategikon 199,202,203,

217

~ a x e n t i u s Emperor, 166, 176

~ a x i m i a n Emperor, 162, 165, 166, 169

~ a x i m u s ~ a r c u s Valerius, 164

medical service,

120

mercenaries, 56, 62, 144

~ e r i d a

20-23

~ e s o p o t a m i a 114, 186, 190

~ i l v i a n Bridge, battle of AD 312), 176

~ i t h r i d a t e s

VI, King

of

Pontus, 105

monuments, 80 81 81 110 126

~ u s Publius Decius, 39

~ y l a e battle of, 60

myths, 26, 36

Nabataeans, 146

Napoleon

I, Emperor, 208

Naristae, 164

Narses,

198,198,203,215

naval battles, 56-61

Nero, Emperor, 115, 117, 136, 137, 162

Nisibis, 191, 192, 199

Notitia

Dignitatum 217

Numantia,

92, 92, 93, 205

Numidians, 92,

93

Octavian see Augustus

Odenathus, King, 184

Ostrogoths, 198

Palmyra, 162, 184-5, 187

Pannonian legions, 169

Pannonian

Rebellion

AD

6-9 ,

108

111, 114, 175-6

Parthians, 115,

131-6,132,

163,164,

183-6, 190, 192

patronage, 21-2,

121, 122

Paul, St, 137

Paullus, Aemilius, 81

Perseus, King of ~ a c e d o n 90

Persians, 162, 167, 168, 183-92, 186,

187,198,199,202,205

Pertinax, Emperor, 163, 164

Petra, 147

phalanxes,

27-8,

27,39,70-71

Pharsalus, battle of

48 BC , 100-1

Philip II, King of ~ a c e d o n 62, 70

Philip

King

of

~ a c e d o n 70,

70

74

pikemen, Hellenistic armies, 70, 74

pilum

javelin), 44, 44, 53, 97, 125, 128,

128,129,167

Plutarch, 216

politicians, 80-83, 104

Polybius,

42,42,

44,

47,48,

48,

52,53,

60,61,62,64,71,78,93,97-9,

121-2,216

Pompey Gnaeus Pompeius ~ a g n u s

85 100 1 101 104 105 215

Pompey, Sextus,

104 108

Pontus, 104, 133

Popilius Laenas, Gaius, 85

Postumius, Lucius, 88

Praeneste, 24

Praetorian Guard, 6, 121, 162-3, 169

priests,

34-5

Principate, 52,107,115-17,118,121,

124,144,156,159,169,175,183,

193,204

principes

soldiers), 43,44-5, 49,52,54

Procopius, 217

provinces, 90, 93, 121, 137-41, 146,

164,196-7

provincial governors, 81-3, 104, 107,

121, 122, 162

Pseudo-Hyginus, 217

pugio

daggers, 43, 45

P unic W ars, 45, 49

First 265-241 BC , 56-61, 56-7, 62,

64

Second 218-202 BC , 56-7, 62,

64-70,74,83,90,93,99,104

Third

149-146

BC ,

56-7,83,

92-3

Pydna, battle of 168

BC ,

52, 55, 72



hus, King

of

Epirus, 41, 42, 47, 52,

60 64 65 74 75

Bsheir, 174-5

formation, 44-5 51-2 99

nqueremes, 56, 57, 60

ds, 34, 35, 88 91 148 151 158 180

soms, 62

ia, battle

of

217

BC , 71

19 37 94-5 97 111 114

4, 162

18-19 47 48 62 96-7

0-21, 174-9, 193, 197

29-39 115

River, 22 111 152 153, 158,

ds, 22, 88-90 89 151, 152, 153

s centre of power, 163

ndation of, 26

llic sack, 35, 36

and Remus, 26, 26

llian tribes,

35-6

bre, battle

of

57 BC , 106

nites, 36, 36, 39, 61

egethusa Ulpia,

204 5

sanid Persians, 162, 163, 183-92,

io, Publius Cornelius, Africanus,

io Aemilianus, Publius Cornelius,

io Asiaticus,

81

shield), 125, 167

ucid Empire, 52, 62,

70 73 74 75

ate, 80, 83,

85 90 91 92

101, 104,

07, 117, 164-5

80-81 81

83, 84-5, 104, 106,

15, 164

pio, 178

vius Tullius, 29

rus, Emperor, 134-5, 163, 164, 164,

69-70 186 216

pur I, King of the Persians, 163,

84 190

18 32 53, 125, 167

ps, 55, 56-8

58-9

arii, 142

ily, 56, 59, 61, 64, 65

e warfare, 49, 86-7 140-43, 144-6,

82 186-90 190-91

ara, 192

slaves, 36, 81 82 82 83 85 96 111

176

Social War 90-88

BC ,

97, 9 7

soldiers

see

army; cavalry; centurions;

infantry; legionaries

Spain, 83 84 90-92 93 96 99 107,

174, 197

Sparta 33

spear s, 32, 70

standard-bearers 45, 46

standards 97, 97,

117 128 208

Strasbourg, battle

of

AD

357 178-9

183

Suebi 127

Suetonius 217

Sulla, Publius Cornelius, 101, 104, 216

Surenas, 136

swords, 43-4 45, 123

Syria, 107, 111 123 134, 135, 136, 190

Tacitus, 19, 111, 148 217

Taginae, battle of, 203

Tarentum 41, 42 , 52

Tarquins, 33

testudo

tortoise) formation 18

Tetrarchy, 162, 165, 166

Teutones, 93

Thrace

92 174

Tiberius, Emperor, 92 108 1 9 111

114

Titus Emperor, 81, 137, 138-9 141,

216

tortoise formation 18

training, 49, 122-4

Trajan, Emperor, 114, 114, 116 117

118 20 132 146 163 186 204 216

Trajan s

Column

Rome,

102 3 114

118 119 131 150 51 169 194

Transalpine Gaul 90

treaties, 74, 193

Trebia, battle

of

218

BC ,

52, 65

triarii

soldiers), 43,44-5 47, 49, 5

51

t ri bunes, 37, 39, 44, 47, 97,111

triplex acies

formation 49-52 54-5

65 88 99

triremes, 55,

56-8

triumphs 80 81 81, 83

trumpets 129

uniforms, 16, 43, 171

usurpers, 163, 164-6 193

Vadomarius 176

Valens, Emperor, 183, 192, 196

Valerian, Emperor, 162, 163

Vandals, 197, 198

Varus, Publius Quinctilius, 111

Vegetius, 122, 199, 203, 217

Veii, 33, 35

INDEX

ve/ites

light infantry), 45, 50, 50, 97

Vercingetorix, 85, 86-7 88 92

Verus, Lucius, 166

Vespasian, Emperor, 115, 137, 138, 143,

146

Via Appi a, 89

Villanovan culture, 33

Vindolanda, 206 7 2 8

Virgil,208

Viriathus, 91-2 93

Visigoths, 196-8

Vonatorix 124

Vulso,

Gnaeus Manlius

81,

82-3

war cries, 167, 179

warships, 55,

56-8

58-9

watch-towers, 150 51 153, 158

weapons:

auxiliary troops 120

late

Roman

army, 167

pi um javelin), 44, 44, 53,97 125

pugio

daggers, 43, 45

spears, 32, 70

swords,

43-4

45, 123

training, 123

Zama battle

of

202

BC ,

49, 61, 68-9

70, 78

Zenobia

Queen 184, 187

Zoroastrianism 190



PICTURE

CREDITS

PICTURE CREDITS

E.T. Archive pp.

2 3 16

24, 28, 32, 40 102 3 123 124 172 3 177. Ancient

Art

Architecture Collection pp.

6 20 1 36 43 44 46 48 55 70 71 75 78 82

88 92 93 94 left) 96 97 bottom) 104 105 112 133 145 146 158 9 163 167

184 5 186. Adrian

Goldsworthy

pp.

18 19 22 65 98 118 119 120 12 6 127

128, 129, 131, 142 left), 143 right) 156 194 204 209. A.K.G. pp.

26 27 61

76,

106 107 108

left)

109 110 130 137 150 1 153 162 164 166 182 188 9 202.

Corbis

pp.

30 1:

G.Dagli Orti; 58 9 Archivo Iconografico; 94 5 Nik Wheeler;

147 Alan Towse; 160Museo del Palazzo dei Conservatori, Rome; 190

Dean

Conger; 200-1

Richard

Nowitz;

206 7

Patrick Ward. Sonia Halliday

Photographs pp. 33, 89, 108 top bottom) 114 116 142 3 154 5 157 165

168 170 171 175 198.

Werner

Forman

pp. 34, 80 1 97 top) 134 5 138 9.

The

author would like to thank the Museo Tropaeum Traini at Adamklissi

Archaeological Museum

of

Constansa for their

kind

permission to

photograph

the images

reproduced on

pp. 126-9.

Drawings

on

the title

page and

on pages 42, 44, 45,

50 51

52, 53, 98, 156 are

Peter Smith and

Malcolm Swanston of

Arcadia Editions Ltd.

ENDPAPER: A first second century

mosaic from

Rome

showing a small galley patrolling the

Nile. The

Roman

navy

receives far less attention than the legions

but

its fleets were a major

factor in allowing Rome to conquer

and

control such a large empire.

.

30394334-roman-warfare.pdf

Documents