Download - 2020 Post-Election Analysis
2020 Post-Election AnalysisMay 2021
THIRDWAY THECOLLECTIVE LATINO VICTORYPOLITICALACTIONCOMMITTEE
12
Project OverviewThe fundamer ballot in 2020 ?
2
ProjectOverview
A Message from Marlon Marshall and Lynda Tran
Our team set out to conduct a postmortemanalysis of the 2020
cycle that would offeran honest and data-driven look at both whatworked well for Democrats runningfor the U.S. House
Representativesand the U.S. Senate and where the challengesour candidatesexperiencedcall for meaningfulsolutionsbefore
voters head back to the ballot box in just two short years.
be a standoutin the last half- centuryof congressionalgains for
Democratsand approachedour analysiswith temperedexpectationsaboutwhat should ” have happenedacrossthe
battlegroundmaps. Lastly, we were consciousof the ongoing
debatearound pollingaccuracyand effectiveness, and we
evaluatedthe publicand proprietarypolling we received
accordingly.
While we did not embark on the project with preconceived notions
about what strategies , tactics , or issues impacted electoral
outcomes , we believe we performed our work with eyes wide open
to the public discourse and historic health and economic crises that
touched every major campaign - and every individual in America -
in 2020. We knew it was important to explore the COVID -19
pandemic and its impact on everything from how campaigns
reached their supporters to whether and how voters were able to
make their voices heard . And we were professionally and
personally conscious of the heightened role that race played inthese elections - both in the GOP's bold -faced efforts to divide
Over 6 months , we explored the national and regional message
themes that played out in the campaigns ' own media and other
assets , reviewed the infrastructure and ecosystem that
supported these campaigns , and conducted our own deep dive
into the data and analytics using both final state voter files and
public and proprietary polling . While we intentionally devoted
the bulk of our time and effort to gathering first -person
observations based on the campaigns ' lived experience ,
throughout the , we continually sought out additional
data , integrated new analyses of 2020 demographics and
outcomes , and incorporated the wisdom and experience of
expert voices from across the Democratic political spectrum .
Americans and in helping to drive civic engagement and voter
enthusiasm in critical races nationally .Althoughwe explicitlyfocusedour effortson answeringthe
questionof " What happenedin 2020? rather than prescribingwhat should happen next, we hopethis analysis informs
DemocraticParty and broadermovement leadersas they
begin planningfor 2022and beyond.
We also went into the analysis grounded in many cycles of
experience and data on voter participation and longitudinal turnout
trends. As such, we understood the " blue wave 2018 elections to
3
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MaineMont
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Minn
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Idaho WisS.D.
Mass
Wyo Mich ConnR.I.
lowa ��
Neb NJ
Ohio
What We Found Ind Del
W.Va.
Calif.Kan. Va
Mo.Ky
N.C.
Tenn
Ariz Okla
Ark S.C.
Ala Ga.Miss
TexasLa
AlaskaFla.
Hawaii
4
What We Found Our findings
1
Our findingsVoters of color are persuasionvoters who needto be
convinced
2 . Republican attempts to brand Democrats as " radicals worked
3 Polling was a huge problem - even after 2016 adjustments
4 . COVID-19 affectedeverything
5 . Year round organizing worked, as did cross- Party collaboration
6 . Our hopes for 2020 were just too high
5
1.Voters of color are persuasionvoters who need to be convinced
6
Our Findings Voters of color are persuasion voters
Our assumptions about Dem support among voters of color
and the lack of differentiation in our messaging and outreach
within demographic groups - cost us support in key races
As in previous cycles, Democrats generally treated Black, Latino, and AAPI
voters as GOTV targets, concentrating outreach efforts closer to Election
Day and in some cases after early vote was already underway
Our approachto voters of
color
significantlyhurt ouroutcomes
Despite historic turnout, even where Black voters were key to Democraticsuccesses this past cycle - including in GA, AZ, and MI - the data show dropoff in support in 2020 compared to 2016 and 2018
Drop-off in support among Latino and Hispanic voters were the lynchpin in
Democratic losses in races in FL, TX, and NM - especially among working
class and non-college voters in these communities
Drop- off in AAPI support fueled losses in key races in CA, especially among
Vietnamese and Filipino voters
Campaign messaging to these groups typically did not account for differing
perceptions among gender , age groups, educational attainment , geography ,
or country of origin and there was a dearth of message research on Black
voters in particular
Black, AAPI, and Latino and Hispanic voters were targeted by misinformation
and disinformation efforts both online and on- the-ground - yet campaigns
were largely unableto either assess the reach or respond in real time
7
Our Findings Voters of color are persuasion voters
The Party
treated
We heard that there were substantial Party and campaign
misfires for engaging key demographic groups as a monolith -
most notably Latino and Hispanic voters
voters of
National strategy failed to take into account regional and local differences,
socioeconomic status, urbanicity, or country of origin - despite higher
support for Democrats among voters from Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the
Dominican compared to Cuban-American voters
Latino and Hispanic voters were broadly treated as GOTV targets rather
than audiences for persuasion earlier in the cycle, and the modeling,
polling, and subsequent campaign decision making reflected this
assumption
color as amonolith
especiallyLatino voters
Campaign messaging didn't always reflect the differing values and
priorities of urban Hispanic voters vs. rural Hispanic voters, much less
account for what would most persuade Hispanic men in the Rio Grande
Valley, oil and gas workers in New Mexico, or Latinas in South Florida
8
Our Findings Voters of color are persuasion voters
Turnout among Latino voters grew dramatically in 2020 - rising
by more than 30% compared to 2016Latino voters
made aLatino support was critical for the top of the ticket but especially in tight
states like AZ, PA, and NV where the margin of victory among Latino
voters exceeded Biden's win margin with the overall electorate
difference inLatinovoterswerealso a lynchpinin Sen. Kelly'swin in Arizonawherehis
supportnearlymatched2016 levels Bidensaw heavier lossesamong
Latinovoters, indicatingthat somesplit ticketvoting took place
top races Despite increased Latino turnout overall , Democrats saw a
significant dip in support in places with high concentrations of
Latino and Hispanic voters including in south FL and west TX
Part of the underperformancein 2020 is a reflectionof Clinton's strength
with Latino voters in 2016, when she outperformedObama's 2012 support
In FL- 26 , Republicans took a big lead in voter registration in 2020, saw
higher turnout among Latino voters, and netted more of their support
InTX-23, despitegrowingtheir shareof the overallelectorate, support
amongruralLatinovotersshiftedright by 13 points in 2020, mostlydue to
higherturnoutamongLatinoRepublicans
Our Findings Voters of color are persuasion voters
Latinos continue to be 10 points more Dem than the rest of the electorate, but
our advantage has shrunk
Latino voters have grown their share of the electorate in recent cycles , but in 2020 Democratic support among Latino voters
dropped in South Florida and parts of Texas
FL - 26Latino Precincts ( 80% )
TX-23
Maj. LatinoPrecincts
66%64% 65%
58% 59%
52%
40% 38%40%
34%
'16 '12CD CD CD
'20
CD
'18
CD
'20
*Source: ImmigrationHub Analysis on Latino Voters in 2020 10
Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters
EveninArizona where Mark Kellyretainedsupportfrom Latinovoters,
Republicansmadeinroadsat the top of the ticket
Presidential + 2020 Senate SpecialDem vote share by demo compositionSupport-wise, Sen. Kelly was able to retain near 2016 level
support among Latino voters, while Biden saw heavier
losses among Latinos than Kelly - indicating some split
ticket voting took place
34%
White Precincts(>90%)
39% 39%37%
'12 '16 '20 SEN '20
77%
Latino Precincts (>60%)
79%75% 77%
'12 '16 '20 SEN '20
11
InFL-26,DemocraticregistrationamongLatinonewregistrantsdroppedby 8
pointssince2016,while Republicanssaw a 13-pointincrease
OUTER R ING SUB URB S
INNER RING SUBURBS
UR BAN M IAM I-DADE
FL KEYS
WHI TE
BL AC K
LATINO
LATINO (CUBAN)
LATINO (NON-CUBAN)
Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters
Meanwhile, Latino voters across Miami-Dade were less likely to identify as Democrats in 2020 relative to 2016
and more likely to identify with neither party
34%
37%
33%
23%
26%
32%
30%
33%
PartyRegistrationin 2016
New Registrants
64%
DEM OTHER REP
43%
46%
49%
48%
48%
46%
49%
50%
33%
34%
29%
19%
22%
18%
16%
18%
17%
OUTER R ING SUB URB S
INNER RING SUBURBS
UR BAN M IAM I-DADE
FL KEYS
WHI TE
BL AC K
LATINO
LATINO (CUBAN)
LATINO (NON-CUBAN)
24%
21%
27%
30%
25%
25%
25%
26%
PartyRegistrationin 2020
NewRegistrants
DEM OTHER REP
67%
44%
42%
43%
43%
44%
35%
38%
45%
30%
27%
32%
40%
37%
29%
32%
37%
29%
12
Black voters
made a
difference in
top races
� Dramaticshifts in the electoratehelpedmany Tier 1districtsbecomebluerin 2020 – but Bidenwas moresuccessfulin cementingthis baselinesupport whilemany Congressionalcandidateslaggedbehind, includinginCA-39,TX-23, andTX-24
� AlthoughDemocratssaw a modestdip in support amongBlack voters(particularlyin VA-07 and the NC Senate race),Blackvoter turnoutincreasedsubstantiallynationally— resultingin morenet Democraticvotes from Black voters in 2020 than in 2016
� Blackvoters were critical to Democrats’victories in the Georgia runoffs—with higher turnout and less drop-off than other groups headingfrom thegeneral into the runoff elections
The data show that strongvote share amongBlack voters –
despitesome downwardtrends– likelymadethe differencein
top races
Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters
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Black voters werecritical to Democrats’victoriesin the Georgia runoff
electionsand helpedcement Democraticcontrolof the U.S.Senate
18% 19%
White Precincts(>90%)
N=423
'12 '16 '20 '21
Although turnout among Black voters dropped relative to 2016, Sen. Warnock overperformed both Clinton’s 2016 and
Biden’s 2020 support, and performed similarly to Obama’s 2012 margin
21% 21%
98% 96%95%
Black Precincts (>90%)
N=340
'12 '16 '20 '21
Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters
GA: Presidential + 2021 Runoff
Dem vote share by demo composition
97%
57%
Lat-Am Precincts(>20%)
N=41
65%61% 61%
'12 '16 '20 '21
41%
AAPI Precincts(>20%)
N=28
58% 59%
53%
'12 '16 '20 '21
14
Black voters
turned out in
big numbers –
but their
overall share
dropped
� Inthe NorthCarolina Senate race, Black voters grew their share of the electoratein2020 and saw increasedturnoutover 2016 – but the GOP also saw a slight
improvementamongBlackrural / exurbanvoters
� InVA-07, the turnout gap betweenall voters of color and white voters increased
comparedto 2016, benefitingthe GOP. Democrats’supportalso fell in majorityBlack precincts,althoughturnout inthese areas was uprelative to 2016
Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters
In2020, Blackvoterscompriseda smallershareof the overall
electorate.A substantialboostinturnoutnettedDemocratsmore rawvotes fromBlack voters than 2016, but the explosivegrowthamong white voters in mostracesoutpacedthese gains
Despiteincreasedturnout,Democratssaw a modestdip insupport
Still,Blackvoterswerecriticalto Democraticwins inthe GA runoff
electionsand helpedcementDemocraticcontrolof the U.S.Senate
� Turnout among Black voters dropped relative to 2016, but Sen. Warnockoverperformed both Clinton’s 2016 and Biden’s 2020 support, and performedsimilarly to Obama’s 2012 margin
� While turnout among all racial groups dropped heading into the runoffs, the drop-off was the least concentrated among Black voters
� Drop-off was also less prominent among voters in urban/inner ring areas – keyconstituencies for both Dem candidates – while drop-off was steeper for whiterural voters (which hurt Republican candidates)
15
Despite
robust
support from
Black voters,
there are
warning signs
for Dems
InMI-08,Slotkinmadegains over 2016
Demperformancein areas with more
voters of color,but lost some support
sinceher first cycle in 2018
76%80%
78%
76%73%
MI-08: Dem Support in
Diverse Precincts(Voters of Color >30%)
PRES CONG
'16 '18 '20
Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters
95%92% 91% 91%
'12 '16 '20
Pres
Democraticsupport has slightly
eroded in majority-Blackprecincts
in NC over the past three cycles
NC Senate: Dem Support in
Black Precincts (>75%)
'20
Sen
16
Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters
InNC,Republicansmadegreater gains amongBlack supporters,particularlyin
non-urbanareas
55%
BLACK
URBAN
+2PP +5PP +7PP +8PP
57%
Modeled Dem Turnout Prev Reg Modeled GOP Turnout Prev Reg
2016 TURNOUT 2020TURNOUT
BLACK
SUB I NNER
63%
68%
BLACK
SUB OUTER
67% 67%
74% 75%
BLACK
RURAL
51%
BLACK
URBAN
+1PP +6PP +9PP +11PP
70%
64%61% 61%
52%
2016 TURNOUT 2020TURNOUT
BLACK
SUB I NNER
58%
BLACK
SUB OUTER
BLACK
RURAL
72%
17
AAPI voters
made a
difference in
top races
� AAPI voters saw significant growth in their electorates with large
increases in registration and turnout
� Over 4 million ballots were cast by AAPI voters in 2020 – a 47% increaseover their 2.8 million turnout in 2016 and a substantially sharper rise than
the 12% increase among all other voters
� Georgia saw the second highest state-level increase in AAPI votes in the
nation with the surge exceeding Biden’s win margin – AAPI votes grew by
almost 62,000 votes over 2016 in a state where Biden won by just 12,000votes
� Arizona was among the top ten states that experienced a surge in AAPI
voters
• In CA-39, AAPI voters now comprise a quarter of the electorate (a 6-point
growth since 2016)
• While Biden grew support among this community since 2016 (three points
in TX-24, one point in CA-39), congressional candidates underperformed
him significantly in both districts
The data show risingelectoralparticipationfrom AAPIvoters
likely made the differencein top races – includingsome of the
closestpresidentialconteststhis cycle
Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters
18
2018
2020
2018
2016
2020
2016
InCA-39,the share of AAPI new registrantshas beensteadily increasingsince
2016and in2020 – now accountingfor nearly 1 in 3 new voters
Although Cisneros was unsuccessful in his re-election bid, the growth in registration and higher turnout among AAPI voters
helped Biden improve on 2016 support
AAPICOL AAPINON-COL WHCOL WHNON-COL
LATCOL LATNON-COL OTH
20%
19%
22%
25%
< 30 30-39 40-49 50-64 65+
32%
41%
2%
3%
8%
18%
33%
24%
31%
19%
16%
17%
12%
7%
15%
7%
CA-39: Compositionof New RegisteredVoters, 2016-2020
24%
14%
10%
10%
12%
20%
17%
22%
21%
19%
18%
13%
10%
6%
6%
6% 8%
9%
9%
AAPI-URB. AAPI-INNER WH-URB WH-INNER
LAT-URB LAT-INNER OTHER
21%
25%
28%
11%
13%
AAPI BLACK LATINO WHITE
15%
Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters
6%
6%
19%
17%
15%
6%
32%
32%
18%
17%
19%
31%
18%
21%
19%
40%
11%
37%
10%
35%
9%
15%
14%
13%
19
Congressional
candidates
underperformed
Biden with AAPI
voters
InTX-24, growthin the AAPI
electoratedidnot translateintovotes
for Valenzuela,who underperformed
Biden 2020 andClinton2016 support
'12
Pres
48%
TX-24: Dem Support
in AAPI Precincts (>20%)
60%
'16
Pres
'20
Pres
63%59%
Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters
'20
CD
InCA-39,althoughCisnerosimproved
on his 2018 support in Asian American
precincts,he still receivedroughly
9 points less than Biden
58% 59%
39%
CA-39: Dem Support
in AAPI Precincts (>50%)
PRES CONG
50%47%
'16 '18 '20
20
2. Republican attempts to brand
Democrats as “radicals” worked
21
Messaging
mattered – in
good ways
and bad
Win or lose, self-described progressive or moderate, Democratsconsistently raised a lack of a strong Democratic Party brand as asignificant concern in 2020
� Campaign public discourse – in paid media, earned media, and direct votercontact – and message and opinion research indicated that voters recalledattacks related to “radical socialists,” “Defund the Police,” and relatedmessages
� In the districts we looked at, those in which “law and order” or “socialism” wasa continued drumbeat also saw a higher share of Latino/AAPI/Black voterswho supported the GOP
� Districts with significant rural populations required in-person voter contact toeffectively push back on these attacks, but most chose not to do so
� Campaigns that were able to reach constituents with localmessages –especially incumbents who could point to specific legislative wins – fared best
� Anecdotally, messages about jobs, the economy, and rebuilding post-COVIDwere most effective – but the GOP successfully branded Dems as the Partythat would keep the economy shut down
� Republicans (Trump) successfully raised concerns about election security andVBM – potentially dampening their own voters’ enthusiasm
� GOP media organizations and overall structure made them more effectivethan Dems
Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked
22
Racewas a primaryfocus throughoutthe cycle –
mostnotablyas BlackLivesMatterprotestsand
the Defundthe Policemovementtook off in the
summerof 2020
• One candidate’sinternal campaignpollinginsummer2020
showedthat voters didn'tbelievethey "sharedtheir values,"a
notable shift from earlierresearchthat they interpretedas a need
to addressthe Defundthe Policemovement– whichthey did in
ads featuringa former Republicanlawenforcementofficeras a
validatorfor the candidate’svalues and character
• In NY-02,when Jackie Gordonwas askedif she supported
defundingthe police,she respondedby pointingto herdecades
longcareerin lawenforcement,as a militarypoliceofficer,
workingwiththe policeas a memberof the Babylontown
council,and thenas a guidancecounselor,invitingpoliceinto her
school– internalpollingindicatedthatconstituentsdidn'tbuy this
line of oppositionattack
• In NE-02,Kara Eastmanrefutedthe claimthatshe wantedto
defundthe policebothin debates and onsocialmedia,andcited
herpastexperienceworkingwithpolicedepartmentsas a social
worker,butshe didnotfeel her approachbluntedthe attacks
Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked
Campaignsand practitionerswidely described
2020messagingas nationalizedwith Trump at
the top of the ticket
• One theme that arose was Party messagingthat leanedtoo
heavily on"anti-Trump"rhetoricwithout harnessinga strong
economic frame
• As a formerMember of Congressdescribedthe issue,Democrats
focused onarguingthat Trumpwas bad, not why a Democratic
majority would help voters, “It was the lack of an economicplan
that really hurt”
• Some campaignteams we spoke withfelt that the Party didn’t
have a messagebeyond“DonaldTrump sucks,” andthis void led
to split-ticketvoting for Bidenat the top of the ticketand
Republicansdownballot(leadingto split outcomes in16districts
nationwide)o Inthis absenceof strong party branding,the opposition
latchedon to GOP talking points,suggestingour candidates
would “burndownyour house and take away the police.”o Dana Balter describedNY-24 notas a swingdistrict,but a
split ticketdistrict,where "we vote Democratfor president
and Republicanfor congress"
23
Candidates
mattered� Consistentwith previouscycles,presidentialperformancehad the largest
impact on down ballot races – just 16 of all federal races in 2020 saw split-ticket outcomes
� Most federal candidatesthat hadthe resourcesto offer uptheir bio earlier– andto maintaina bio track in their paidmedia for the durationof thecycle – fared best, winning by an averagemarginof D+1.8 (for Senatecandidates)and D+5.4 (for Housecandidates)and some outperformingthe top of the ticket
� Candidateswho won districts that PresidentBidendid not reliedon localknowledge,a personalbio that resonatedwith voters (often with abackgroundin nationalsecurity), anddisciplinedcampaignsthat stayedon messageandseamlesslyshiftedits operationsin a tumultuouscampaigncycle
The top of the ticketultimatelymatteredthe most,but the
personalrecordand bio of federalcandidatesmattered,too –
especiallywhere campaignshadearly funding
Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked
24
Candidateswithstrong,homegrownbiographies
that hadthe resourcesto stay on that message
throughouttheir campaignstendedto win
• In MI-08,CongresswomanElissaSlotkin’steam developedtheir
messaginginJanuary of 2020 focusedonherbiographyand
usedit to builda bridgeto the voters inher districtwhoweren’t
predisposedDemocraticbase voters
o Rep.Slotkinmessagedonhealthcare,sharingthe personal
story abouthermother’scancerand lack of healthinsurance
• In NY-19,CongressmanAntonioDelgadospent2019 doing33
townhalls across all 11countiesinhis district,ensuringthat the
messageof beingavailableand workinghardfor his constituents
was front and centero Whenthe pandemichit, the campaignstayedfocusedon
meetingthe needs of constituents,whichservedas a way to
inoculatethemselvesfromoutsidenarratives
• In the ArizonaSenaterace,SenatorMark Kelly’scampaignwent
up early – the first full week of September– and focusedheavily
onhis bio and appealingto multipledemographicsneededto win
statewide
o As one strategistnoted,peoplerespondedto differentparts
of his story inextremelypositiveways: “Seniorslovedthat
he is anastronaut,Latinoslovedhis commitmentto family,
and non-collegeeducatedwhite menlovedthat he is a
combatveteran”
Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked
o The campaignwas disciplinedand focusedon his bio for the
durationof the campaign,weavinginpositiveand negative
messagingcloser to ElectionDay
Positive messaging and branding worked –
especially early on. Later in the cycle, the
narrative was too cemented to break through no
matter how much a campaign spent in its closing
days.
25
“This election, Republicans tended to reach
people and connect at an emotional level and
Dems tried to connect with people at an
intellectual level.”
– National media consultant
26
Incumbent Democratic candidates focused their
COVID messaging on constituency services
• In NY-19, the Delgado team called constituents to see what they
needed rather than to ask for their vote
• In NJ-03, the focus was on being in this together, and
Representative Kim was able to visit small businesses (while
following COVID safety protocols)
• In MI-08, Representative Slotkin utilized messaging about PPE
being “Made in America,” which was specific to her district
because of its industrial nature
• In GA-06, Rep. Lucy McBath’s campaign research showed that
messaging on how the Congresswoman has delivered for
veterans by sponsoring the HAVEN Act to “stand up for our
veterans by amending current bankruptcy law and supporting
disabled veterans’ eligibility for relief during financial hardship”
resonated with voters
Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked
But Republicans successfully painted Democrats
as the Party that wanted to keep the country shut
down
• According to a leader of a national nonprofit organization, “We
were right to shut down the economy and mandate masks, but
we also needed to make clear that was because we stood for
getting the economy, schools and stadiums open ASAP. There is
a line between being the adults in the room and being the nanny
state, and during the election cycle, we did not make clear that
we were the party of solutions [in the way President Biden has
done so successfully since taking office.]”
• In FL-26, where a substantial portion of the population works on
cruise ships, in hospitality, and in the tourism industry,
constituents didn’t want to hear the message of “stay home,” but
looked to leaders for answers on when they would be able to get
back to work
When Democrats focused their COVID
messaging solely on health care without talking
about the economy, it exposed them to GOP
attacks.
27
RepublicansuniversallyattackedDemocratswith
the “socialist”label,and moderateDemocrats
struggledto countersince some within the Party
identifyas Democraticsocialists
• The socialismattack was calledoutby many Membersof
Congress and candidateswho were notsuccessfulwho believeit
hurt campaignsinstates and districtswithimmigrantpopulations
that fledsocialistgovernments,includingamongVenezuelan,
Cuban,Vietnamese,and Filipinovoters
• In NJ-07,the TomMalinowskicampaignfocusedtheir messaging
on issues and their Republicanopponent’srecordinthe state
senate – but challengerState SenatorTomKean’scampaign
promotedQAnonconspiracytheoristsand connectedMalinowski
to pedophiles,drowningout any conversationsabout policy
• As the Malinowskicampaignreported,“We were talkingissues
andour opponent'srecordinthe state senate.They were talking
about pedophiles.QAnonbecamea huge presenceinour race,
And drownedout conversationsaboutpolicy.Itfelt like
messagingbecamea wash. Ina districtas tightas this turningout
the base is whatmattered,andtheir motivatorwas partisanship”
Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked
The “Dem potpourri” of attacks meant to brand
Democrats as “radical” was effective –
especially where there wasn’t enough positive
bio early and where campaigns failed to
respond to the lies.
28
Our Findings Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “ radicals worked
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Our Findings Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “ radicals” worked
While practically everyone candidates ,
journalists , Party leaders, and pundits - has
focused on the impact of Defund the Police a
solo variable , it was just one of the multiple issues
that Republicans used to paint Democrats asradicals
• At oneendofthespectrum, candidateslikeRep. Spanberger
( VA -07) shared widely reported concerns that Republican efforts
to paint all Democrats as socialists who would defund the police
cost us multipleseats this cycle
• Similarly, Cameron campaign( VA-05) constantlyhad to
bat back claims that he supported defunding the police , even
after running ads that featured local law enforcement as
validators , and after the paper of record , the Roanoke Times ,
debunked the claim . It was particularly difficult for candidates of
color to avoid these race - based attacks
• This “ potpourri” includedeffortsto tie candidatesto
socialism, Medicare for All , the Green New Deal, Nancy Pelosi,AOC and “ the Squad " ( in these cases all framed as equally
radical) . These attacks were used to a greater or lesser degree
depending on the unique constituencies of a given district
• There was no one best way to counter these attacks, nor was
there clearagreementeven that weshouldaddressthe issue in
paid communications
• The GOP consistently framed the moment in and order
terms , which resonated with voters on both the right and the left
including Latino men and women, as the April 2021 EquisLabs
report Portrait of a Persuadable Latino ” called out
Inotherdistricts, DefundthePolicewasperceivedas a minorblip
among the other “ Dem potpourri” attacks. For example, in FL- ,
attacks against former Rep. Debbie Mucarsel-Powell focused
more on messages of socialism and support for women's choice -
issues that were more effective with her Hispanic and Latino
constituents
• Andinsomeraces, suchastheNorthCarolinaSenaterace,
Defund the Police "was in the bloodstream because it was part of
the presidential back and forth , " but it was never really a huge
part of the Senate campaign messaging on either side
How much Defund the Police dominated publicdiscourse - and by extension how much it
required campaign resources to address the issue
- varied widely by state and district
Based on interviews , data analysis , polling , andads analysis , where Defund the Police had asignificant impact , it was as a part of culturebased attack on Democrats that sought tostoke fears among voters about any candidatewith a D ' after their name
30
Noneof the candidatesor campaignsincludedin
this analysissupporteddefundingthe police,but
nearly allwere targetedwith paid ads claiming
they did
• In our review of the 20 digital ads with the highest numberof
impressions runby eachcandidate in19 races (760 total ads), 52
mentionedDefund the Police – with 2 runby Democratsand 50
runby Republicans
• Overall,Defund the Police was mentionedin14%of the GOP
digital ads with the highestnumberof impressionscomparedto
just 1% of the Democraticdigital ads with the highest impressions
• Even inraces where Defund the Police did not appear in paid
advertising,candidates reported that constituentsaskedabout it
during campaignevents, indicatingthat the messagewas
breaking throughinother channels
Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked
Some candidatesreportedthat itwas difficult to
determinewhether RepublicanDefundthe Police
attackswere effectivelylanding– and that
challenge impactedwhether and how they
responded
• Some campaigns that did notspecifically test “Defundthe Police”
in their pollingreportedtheir belief that other indicatorsthat they
were tracking – suchas “shares my values” – were a proxy for
how these attacks were impactingtheir overall favorability
amongvoters and made messagingdecisionsaccordingly
• CandaceValenzuela’spollinginTX-24 showedthat attacks
relatedto Defundthe Policeweren’tany more impactfulthan
other attacks,but the candidatereportedthat “peopleare
missingthe forest for the trees” and suspectedthese attacks
were more perniciousanddamagingthan pollingindicated
• One well-resourcedcampaignreportedthat while they believed
that Defundthe Policeand some of the more extreme “radical
Democrat”lines of attack mighthave resonatedwithvoters, they
ultimatelydid notuse their preparedresponseads, becausetheir
opponentdidnotputmoney behindany of these attacks
• Some candidatesoptedagainst respondingdirectly to
Republicanassertions,believingthat addressingthis complicated
issue would only give more oxygento a messagethat voters
weren’tbuying,particularlywhenthat pushback mightalienate
some of the candidates’activist bases who made up the majority
of volunteers
31
Whether and how candidates responded to
these attacks depended on the interplay of
district and candidate demographics and
background
• Manyconsultantsreinforcedthis conventionalwisdomthatcandidatesshouldn’tgiveoxygentoattacks,andcounseled
stickingto their corepositivecampaignmessages– withthe
notableexceptionof one pollster,who advocatedstronglyto
candidatesthatthey shouldtacklethe issueheadon. As he putit,
“Youhaveto showupto the debateif you'regoingto winit.”
Perceptions among voters on Defund the Police
varied depending on how the issue was framed –
in-cycle and post-election research has continued
to show conflicted views across and within
demographic groups
• Polling conducted by Brilliant Corners’ Cornell Belcher lastsummer for Run For Something and the Collective PAC found
that “defunding the police does not have wide appeal, but Blackvoters are divided on the issue,” however, the same poll foundthat “Reallocating police department funding is popular amongst
Biden supporters and Black voters”
• Similarly, findings from an Avalanche Research poll in April 2021found that while 63% of voters disagree with “defunding the
police,” 52% agree with “redirecting resources from police andfunding community programs”
Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked
Responses that featured endorsements from local
law enforcement have been widely hailed as
“effective,” but in hindsight some candidates and
Party leaders expressed regret that there wasn’t a
more forceful emotion- and values-based counter
• Law-enforcement endorsement ads addressed the substance of
the issue but avoided/missed the emotion of Republican attacks
and didn’t call them what they were – racist distractions from the
issues voters cared about most
• Some Party leadership indicated they wished they had called out
Republicans for distracting from ACA and other important issues
32
“The primary problem with Defund was not
Defund, but the lack of an economic message.
We became the party of shutting down the
economy, the party of wearing masks, the
party of taking kids out of school – not the
party of solutions and science.”
– Major Democratic funder
33
Republicans used Defund the Police attacks to
best effect against candidates of color in swing
districts with large white populations
• Candidates we spoke to universally shared dismay and deep
anguish in response to George Floyd’s murder, and supported
widespread popular demands for criminal justice reform – and
many Frontline members expressed their desire to leverage their
position to support these efforts
• Sitting U.S. Representatives including Lauren Underwood (IL-14),
Abigail Spanberger (VA-07), Debbie Mucarsel-Powell (FL-26),
Andy Kim (NJ-03), Elissa Slotkin (MI-08), Xochitl Torres Small
(NM-02), and Gil Cisneros (CA-39) turned that energy into
legislation and passed the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of
2020
• Some candidates of color reported feeling particularly wary of
amplifying discussion or debate of Defund the Police out of fear
for their own safety
• Some candidates from more conservative districts, or who had
law enforcement-related backgrounds, did respond directly to
attacks in paid communications – Sen. Ben Ray Lujan (NM), for
example, ran ads featuring local law enforcement officers
endorsing his candidacy
• Jackie Gordon (NY-02), a combat veteran who served at
Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked
Guantanamo Bay as military police, responded to questions about
defunding the police with “I am the police.”Her ads similarly
reinforced her background as a military police officer, without
addressing Defund the Police directly
• BothParty committees commissioned message research
conducted by longtime Democratic strategists Cornell Belcher
and KarenFinney, provided these resources to all their
campaigns, and encouraged candidates to do follow up polling in
their districts. Many candidates chose not to, but likely would
have benefited from researchon messaging that would be
effective inparticularly challenging districts, either due to the
demographic makeup or other local dynamics
Responding to Defund the Police attacks was
most challenging and complicated for
candidates of color and they found genericresponse strategies extremely frustrating
34
Our Findings Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “ radicals” worked
Some districts where law and order or “ socialism a drumbeat also saw
a higher share of Latino/ AAPI/ Black voters who supported the GOP
GOP Support Among Voters of Color
2016- 2020
Latino Precincts
( > 30% )
AAPIPrecincts
( > 20% )
Black Precincts
( > 50% )
60% 60%
53 %50 %
48%
41% 40% 41% 42%
34%35% 35%
31%
28 %
36%
31% 31%
25% 25%
21%
2016Pres.
2018CD
2020CD
2016Pres.
2018CDtoplinenotavail.
2018CD
2020CD
2016Pres.
2018CD
2020CD
2016Pres
2018CD
2020CD
2016Pres.
2020CD
2016Pres.
2018CD
2020CD
2016Pres
2018CD
2020CD
TX- 23 FL- 26 NM- CA- 39 TX- 24 CA- 39 VA
35
" Republicans were going to churches and
having pastors spread misinformation thatDemocrats were baby-killers, that we were infavor of killing babies right before a motherwas giving birth, they were showing verygraphic images...[ hen you hear it enough
times, you start to believe it.
FormerRep. Debbie Mucarsel-Powell
JJ
36
3. Polling was a huge problemeven after 2016 adjustments
37
Our Findings Polling was a huge problem
Polling was a
huge problem
Campaigns and experts reported that pollingwas a problemdespite adjustmentsmade after 2016 and was not alwayswellunderstoodby campaignsas tools for decision making
Polling failed to reach the right people especially white non- college
voters and the methodology changes made in the wake of the 2016
cycle to weight for education level were insufficient to ensure accurate
sampling
First- time candidates especially needed support in interpreting the
content and implications for taking risks or being creative in a year that
forced everyone to revise their campaign playbooks
These challenges led to an overly optimistic map and the Party chasing
races that have not historically been in play, such as the lowa Senate seat
38
Our Findings Polling was a huge problem
Polling in the 2020 cycle was widely viewed as a
catastrophic misfire from the top of the ticketdown
Certainly , there were some examples where pre -election polls
aligned with the ultimate electoral performance polls quite
precisely predicted the outcome of the Warnock - Loeffler runoff
election in Georgia and the Kelly race in Arizona . However ,
candidates , campaign and Party leadership , and leading
practitioners universally agreed that the dramatic overestimation of
Democratic support in both publicly - released and proprietary pollsreviewed as part of this analysis had an indisputable impact on
races in every part of the country :
• ThePartycommitteesinvestedtheir financialandstaffresources
in statewide races and congressionaldistricts that wereeither
landslidevictories ( where additionalfundingwas not needed) orwide losses basedon close polling ( where additionalfunding
couldn'tsurmountdistrict-specific obstacles)
Decliningresponserates furtherexacerbatedissues of nonresponse bias and led pollsters to miss Republicansupport
• Insufficientsample sizes of Latino voters in pre-election polls
greatly contributed to the Party failing to anticipate shifts in
support
While Democraticpollingprofessionalsare continuing to evaluatewhat happenedin 2020 and importantly, are doing
unprecedentedknowledgesharingacross the industryto inform
future work ( Source: DemocracyDocketpost) - pollstersandoperativesinterviewedfor this postmortemindicatedthey areconsideringmethodologyand the uniquevariablesat play with
DonaldTrumpon the ballot.
• InflatedpollingledDemocratsto believesomestretchraces
were competitiveand to take for granted other races as easy
wins, leading to an overly-expansive electoral map
• Supporters poured resources into races where historical trends
showeda Democraticvictorywasunlikelybutpollingsuggested
was winnable• Campaignsmade budgetarydecisions based on polling - and in
some cases were risk averse in their messaging , voter contact ,
and media plans when they believed their races were especially
close they thought they were winning by wide margins
What's clear is the “ soul- searching that followedthe 2016 election
and precipitatedchangesfor the 2018 cycle ( such as increaseduse
of mobilenumbersover landlinesand moremulti- modal surveys)did notchange the fundamentalapproach. Currentpolling relies
heavilyon past practices experiencedpollstersweighting
accordingto their assumptionsabout the electorate- which
impactsboth the samplingand the outcome.
39
Our Findings Polling was a huge problem
The myth of the " Trump voter The 2020 election cycle reinforced concerns
about non- response bias - especially among
white non- college educated voters• Despite being debunked in 2016, the “ shy Trump voter theory
that pollingissueswere due toTrumpsupporters' reluctanceto
share their honestopinions leaptback on the scenein the 2020
cycle with so many polls showing Democrats with a wide lead
• Following the 2016 election , the polling industry concluded thatissues were caused by a lack of proper educational weights
applied on survey data and late movement among undecided
voters
• Thesuccessand accuracyof pollingis predicatedon the idea
that the people who participate in a survey are an accurate
representation of the larger population - but as survey
participation falls , concerns about the representativeness of
those respondents increases
• Over the course of the 2020 cycle , voters were inundated with
polling calls and texts particularly in competitivestates anddistricts and declining responserates contributedto growing
concernsof how representativethe survey was, especially in
regions with large concentrationsof non- college educatedwhite
• In 2020, pollsters reported that while Trump voters were not
, they also did not answer surveys and were consequently
massively undercounted
voters
Polling misfires in 2020 laid bare a challenge
that the survey research industry has feared for
decades : there is a systematic difference
between people who take surveys and thosewho do not
• These declining responserates further exacerbated the issues of
non - response bias, which led some pollsters into missing
Republican support ( Source: FiveThirtyEight
• In recent months, pollsters and academics have theorized that
the COVID-19 pandemic led Democrats to be overrepresented insome polls - because Democrats are more likely to workremotely than Republicansand their anti-Trump energy madethem more likely to answer surveys further exacerbatingnonresponse bias issues
40
Latino voters are not a monolithic group and
should comprise a larger proportion of polling
samples
• One of the most surprising findings of the 2020 election was
Democrats’ underperformance with Latino voters relative to 2016
levels
• While the magnitude of the shift was beyond expectations, it
was hinted at in pre-election polls which showed Trump faring
better among Latino voters than he did four years prior (Source:
Matt Barretto, Latino Decisions)
• Although Latino voters as a whole tend to be more Democratic
than Republican, they don’t vote as a single bloc and should no
longer be targeted under this lens, particularly in pre-election
polls – how Latinos vote in Florida can be very different from
how Latinos in the Rio Grande Valley or on the West Coast vote,
and Democratic support among Latinos can greatly vary by
country of ethnicity
• Many polls conducted in the 2020 cycle did not take these
factors into account, nor did they ensure that Latino voters
comprised a large enough share in their polling samples
• These misfires inpolling led campaigns and organizations to
overlook gaps and drops in Latino support
Challenges remain in the future of polling,
despite the adjustments made after 2016
• In 2020, despite the efforts undertaken by pollsters to ensure theproper educational composition of the electorate (particularly in
states and regions with high concentrations of non-collegeeducated whites), these methodological adjustments provedinsufficient to correct the continued underestimation of Trumpand Republicansupport
Our Findings | Polling was a huge problem
Polling errors made some campaigns run as if
they were winning – which led to more risk
aversion and less responsiveness to changingcircumstances.
41
Our Findings Polling was a huge problem
In VA- , polling showed a consistently tight race for Webb since early
October and significantly underestimated his final margin
Ultimately, Good won by 6 points despite multiple public polls that showedWebb with a slight lead - a ten- point swing overall
VA- : Congressional Support Among Likely Voters
Good
( Margin) ( -6) ( -1) ( +3) ( +2 ) ( +3 ) ( -6)
53%
48%47% 47%
46%45%
47 %46%
45%
42 % 43%42%
8/3 9/14 10/1 10/8 10/22 Final
Election
Result
42
4. A Unique 2020 Challenge :COVID- 19 affected everything
43
Our Findings COVID- 19 affected everything
COVID - 19
affected
COVID- 19 dramatically transformedcampaign strategy and the
suite of tactics employed by both Senate and Congressional
campaigns
everything
The decision to stop canvassing and halt most in-person voter contact
activities was weathered well by campaigns that were innovative making
the pivot to virtual tactics quickly and later finding ways to be physically
present in their districts with socially-distanced events
Campaignsthat were unable to rely on virtual campaigning to reachvoters - either due to broadbandconstraints, local expectations about inperson outreach, a dearth of creativity, or a combinationof factorsconcludedthe lack of canvassingwas a criticalfactor in their loss ortighter- than expected margin
Vote- by-maileducationand ballotchasebecamean exponentiallylarger
budgetpriorityfor independentefforts in particular, with some
organizationsinvestingtens of millionsofdollars in theseefforts
44
Our Findings COVID- 19 affected everything
COVID changed everything about health care
conversations
Many Democrats missed the opportunity to talk
about COVID through an economic lens as the
cycle progressed• As soonas coronavirusdescendeduponthe U.S.and becamethe
dominant issue of 2020, candidates ' messaging and campaign
activities focused on addressing the immediate health crisis and
the collapse of local healthcare systems as infections surged
around the country• Of 740 digital ads that had the highest impressions for both
DemocraticandGOPcandidates, 12% mentionCOVID, again
mostly run by Democraticcandidates
• Amongall referencesto COVID-19 in thedigitaladsassessed, the
vast majority( 70%) were in ads run by Democrats
• CandidateshostedPPEgive-away eventsand sharedthe latest
informationabout the pandemicfeaturing local doctors and
• As the cyclecontinued into the fall , many Democratsdid not
pivot along with public discourse when they spoke about
COVID , it was still in the context of access to PPE, wearing masks ,
and trusting science , without further connecting those issues to
the critical necessity of re- opening the economy• And some Democratic health coverage messaging that worked
well in 2018 fell flat despite the pandemic : “ People aren't worried
about health insurance when they don't have jobs according to a
formernationalPartyofficial
• In someplaces, the GOP successfullyframedDemocratsas out of
touch on the economy because they prioritized messages about
staying home while most working -class jobs can't be done
remotely - especially in districts with larger Latino populations
In DebbieMucarsel- Powell'sdistrict ( FL- 26) , Votersdidn't
want to hear stay home,' they wantedto hear whenam
getting back to work ."
Sen. Ben Ray Lujan's campaign attributes some of their successto emphasizing the economic impact of COVID , efforts to get PPPloans out the door to help businesses keep their doors open, andtheir plans to get constituents back to work
nurses
• But as school and job closures dragged on, much of the public
narrative around COVID shifted to the economic impact of the
pandemic: When would schools re -open? When would workers
who couldn't work from home be able to go back to work?
45
Our Findings COVID- 19 affected everything
COVID- 19 changed the way Democratic
campaigns and organizations reached voters
COVID- 19 changed the way Democratic
campaigns raised money - potentially for theforeseeable future
• WhilemostRepublicansquicklyresumedcanvassingand in
personeventsaftera universalpausein Marchof2020, most
Democrats never returned to canvassing or in- person events
• Relationalorganizing and remote voter contact tactics absorbed
the significantvolunteer capacity of this cycle
• Despite COVID- 19, manyof the best- performingcandidates found
morecreativeways tosafelyget back in front of voters in the
field fromsocially-distancedlive gatheringsheldoutdoorsin
townsquaresand parkinglots to drive-thru charityevents
• Whilenearlyevery campaign, organization, andpolitical
professional acknowledged that the decision not to canvass was
the right call given what we knew about coronavirus at the time ,
many of those included in this analysis said in hindsight
Democrats could have been on doors safely in more places - and
Democrats would have won several close races if they had gone
back on the doors either sooner or in a more robust way than
they did
Campaignsraised hugesums of moneythroughZoom fundraisers
that involvedall kindsof new donorstraditionallyleft out of this
criticalaspectof campaigning- bothfrom the perspectiveof
hostingand attendingfundraisingevents youngpeople
and less- affluentvoterstakingpart in small- dollar gatheringsthatprovidedaddedvalue to the campaignsbecausethey did not
require the candidate to travel
• Related, candidates raised money from all across the country
withoutincurringadditionalfinancialcost to the campaignor
burningthroughevery campaign'smostvaluableresource: thecandidate'stime
• Candidatesand campaignsuniversallyexpressedexcitement
about the possibilityof continuingthesevirtualfundraisingevents
post- pandemic
It's impossible to evaluate the
2020 election cycle without
acknowledging how COVID-19
dramatically impacted every
aspect of every , up anddown the ballot
46
5. Year- round organizing worked ,as did cross -Party collaboration
47
Our Findings Year - round organizing and cross- Party collaboration worked
Races that did not have the benefit of longer -terminfrastructure investments - voter registration, continual inperson organizing and outreach - suffered most
Long-terminvestment
producedbetter results
Where candidates had either startedvoter registrationbefore the
pandemicor where state- based groups had invested long term in bringing
more people into the democratic process Democratseither won or lost by
narrow margins
Consistent relationship-building through year - round organizing made a
difference especially in communities of color, whether the organizers
were Democrats (as was the case in Georgia) or Republicans (as was true
of The LIBRE Initiative in Texas and Florida)
As one longtimeDemocraticoperativedescribedorganizingvoters of
color, " It's not a side deal, it's got to be core
48
Our Findings Year - round organizing cross- Party collaboration worked
Georgia saw record setting turnout in both the presidential and runoff
elections - nearly 5M in the general and 4.5M in the run- offs
In 2020 Georgia turnout far surpassed the 4 million who turned out in 2016 , and a big factor in this increased turnout was a
substantial increase in registration - 2 million voters were added to the voter file between 2016 and 2020
Georgia: Total new reg by monthsince 2016 presidential
MODEL DEM MODEL GOP
2018 GUB. CYCLE 2020 PRES. CYCLE
11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
49
Our Findings Year - round organizing and cross- Party collaboration worked
Democraticcoordinationin the face of a common national foil
DonaldTrump - led to extraordinarycollaborationacross the
Party ecosystem
The Partycoordinated
better thanLeadingDemocraticdonorsand funderstook part in collaborativetables
in 2020 organizedaroundsupportingon- the-groundwork in battleground
statesand districts
ever
Similarly, funders proactively organized others in the space to resource
anticipated voter education and voter protection needs the Count
Every Vote movement in the face of threats to the democratic process
telegraphed in advance by the Trump campaign organization
The 2020 cycle witnessed the first successful data sharing operation
across organizing efforts on the hard and soft sides, with campaigns and
external organizations consistently touting the value of the Democratic
Data Exchange ( ) in generating efficient voter contact universes for
persuasion, mobilization and ballot chase, and voter education
50
6. Our hopes for 2020 were
just too high
51
Our hopes for
2020 were
just too high
The mapassumed
the midterm
electorate was
predictive for 2020
We heard that Dem expectations for pickups in the Senate andHouse – and for retaining seats won during the “blue wave” of2018 – were too optimistic given historical trends for
presidential cycles
• Inaccurate polling compounded these assumptions and broadened analready expansive map
Our extrapolations about the behavior of first-time voters incorrectlyassumed Democratic support at proportionate rates to regular voters basedon their demographics
The key challenge of 2020 – the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequentshutdown of American life – severely limited the toolkit available toDemocrats, with the constraints on in-person events and canvassingharming first-time candidates the most
We heard from campaign strategists that the Party drove up expectationsby publicly signaling it expected to win everywhere it made a play
But our miscalculation likely benefited us as much as it hurt us
• The conventional wisdom that high turnout was a positive sign for
Democrats informed GOP strategy as well – so Republicans put resources
and energy into races that appeared close in polling but ultimately did not
require their investment
Our Findings | Our hopes for 2020 were just too high
52
“Our anchoring assumption is that we
should’ve just kept everything that we got in
2018 and that was reinforced by the polls.
But if you go down deeper at what seats we
lost, we’re basically losing seats we shouldn’t
have had.”
– Veteran national political strategist
53
Extraordinaryturnoutdrivenby increasedaccess
to VBMballotsandexcitementabout the
PresidentialelectionbenefitedRepublicans
• In NM-02,a swell in Republicanvoter turnoutin 2020 ledto a
Republicanvictory and the loss of FrontlineMemberXochitl
Torres Smallo Turnout inNM-02jumped 9 pointswithalmost89,000 more
votes cast in 2020 than 2016– however,itwas the
Republicanbase that showedhigher levels of enthusiasm
• While personalscandalwas likely a decidingfactorfor NCSenate
candidateCal Cunninghamgivenhis steady strongperformancein
internaland publicpollingaheadof the news of his extramarital
affair, increasedRepublicanturnoutinred areas far exceeded
expectationsand eclipsedthe marginsthe campaignanticipated
inits pathwayto victoryo Inthe NCSenaterace,althoughDemocratsgainedwith
White urbanvoters,GOPimprovementamongruraland
exurbanBlack voters gave Democratsa narrowedge but not
enoughto flip the state
• FormerRep.Gil Cisneros(CA-39)reportedthat becauseof the
demographicmakeupof the district,his team focusedsignificant
resourcesonturningout the voters of color whohadbeenkey to
his 2018victory – particularlyAAPI and Latino/Hispanic
communities
o Yet despitehighturnoutandenthusiasmamongthe
Democraticbase,CisnerosunderperformedBidenacrossall
racialgroups,particularlyAAPI voters whogrew theiroverall
share of the electorateby 6 pointssince 2016
Our Findings | Our hopes for 2020 were just too high
The2020 electionsmadeclear that turnout
effortsdon’t just benefitDemocrats
54
“We always think that if turnout is up, that’s
going to be beneficial for us. That’s not the
case, Republicans vote too and they’re doing
a very good job at it. So, when turnout is up,
we need to ask who instead of just being
excited about it.”
– NC political operative
55
Win/
Loss
*Based on modeled party in most states
52%
In2020,two-thirdsof the votingeligiblepopulationvoted – morethan inany
other electionin120 years
Percent Increase in Votes Cast, by Party*
2016 – 2020
48%
AZ CA-39 FL-26 GA IL-14 ME-02 MI-08 NC NE-02 NJ-03 NM-02 TX-23 TX-24 VA-07
Turnout was especially high in many battleground states and districts and grew by an average of 27% from 2016
across the Tier 1 races analyzed. Both parties benefited from this explosive growth in turnout.
63%
37%
21%
46% 44% 44%
55% 56%
49% 50%
51% 50%48%
DEM GOP
52%51%
Our Findings | Our hopes for 2020 were just too high
49%
61%
55%
39%
45%
38%
62%
56%
44%41%
59%
56
Campaigns,strategists,andpollstersalikesaid
pollingblind-spotsandmethodological
difficultiesledto an overlyoptimisticmap
• Pollingdifficulties,especiallyinruraldistricts where many
FrontlineandRedto Bluecandidatesare based,made these
districts look more likely to flip in2020 thanthe post-cycle
data show
o Electionforecastspredictedthe TX-23race to be inGina
OrtizJones’ favor – withFiveThirtyEightforecastinga 6-
pointadvantagefor the Democraticcandidate
• These pollingdifficulties filteredtheir way downto the Redto
Blue listand shiftedParty resourcesto races that were
ultimatelyunsuccessful,some by large margins
• Somestrategistsand campaignsreportedconcernthat the
Partypublicly telegrapheda significantfocus on expandingthe
Housemajorityinsteadof positioningthe electionas aneffort
to protectFrontlinemembers,includingthose seats gainedin
2018o While the DCCCspent$3millionmoreonthe Frontline
programthan the Redto Blue program– investingearly in
these districtsandaddingfieldorganizingstaff inspringof
2019 – severalFrontlinecandidatesand theirstaff
expressedtheirbelief thatprotectingincumbentswas nota
top priority for the DCCC
o Frontlineincumbentsexpresseda rangeof feelings towards
the DCCC– some felt it wantedtoomuch influenceinon-
the-grounddecision-making,while otherfreshman
Membersexpressedthe desire for moresupportand
guidancefromthe DCCC
Our Findings | Our hopes for 2020 were just too high
57
The expansivemapandinaccuratepollingalso
hurtRepublicans,who put moneyinnon-
competitiveracesanddivertedresourcesand
attentionfromracesthey couldhavewon
• Withsucha largebattlegroundmap,campaignsand strategists
indicatedthatRepublicans“followedus” to districts like TX-23
andTX-24that the GOP alreadyheld,insteadof investingin
other,moretraditionallyvulnerableareas for Democrats,like
MichiganHouseraceswhere they mighthavepickedup seats
• Givenheavy resourcingfor these unexpectedcampaigns
reportedin numerousmediaoutlets from late summerinto the
fall, Republicansspentless elsewhere,allowinga numberof
vulnerableDemocraticFrontlineincumbentsto winclose races,
includingRep.AbigailSpanberger(VA-07),JaredGolden(ME-
02), and Rep.ElissaSlotkin(MI-08)
• EveninNY-19,where Rep.AntonioDelgadoultimatelywonby
nearly12 points,lack of Republicanattentionwas a significant
factorina districtwithdemographicsthat couldhavemadethe
Congressmanvulnerableo As one Partyexecutivesaid, “A canof coke with anR next
to its namecouldhavewonagainstDelgado,”but rosy
predictionsaboutDemocraticgains in2020kept
Republicansfrom investingin the raceor recruitinga
strongchallenger
Our Findings | Our hopes for 2020 were just too high
Themap had important implicationsfor
fundraising,staffing,and messagingthat
ultimatelyshifted the outcomesinseveralkey
races across the country.WhiletheParty
securedthe Presidency,we lost FrontlineHouse
seats and were unableto closethegap in
severalhigh-profileSenatecampaignsthat were
widelyperceivedto be pick up opportunities.
58
Conclusion
cycle
VOTELIVESMATTER
059
Conclusion PartingThoughts from Marlonand Lynda
A FinalNote from the Authors Republicans would have found another racist dog whistle or fear
mongering tool to paint Democrats as out of touch radicals who
are trying to destroy the America we know and love . "Throughoutthis analysis, one of the things we reflectedon mostwas the impactand the implicationsof race in our politicaldiscourse. During the courseof nearly 150 interviewsthat includedelectedand Party leaders, candidatesand donors, campaignoperativesand leadingpractitionersacross the Democratic
ecosystem, the single most-cited challengeapart from the COVID19 pandemicwas our inability- unwillingness to addressracehead-on.
At the highest levels of the Party ecosystem , cultural competency
was a continual concern in 2020. Campaigns shared anecdote afteranecdote of the most well -intentioned Democratic supporters
displaying a stunning lack of cultural competency in an electoral
cycle where culture ” drove practically every outcome - from thesuburban white women who berated a Black woman candidate for
not attending the Black Lives Matter protest those women had
organized , to political operatives who advised another Blackwoman candidate not to be overly concerned with responding to
attacks on her “ Defund the Police ” stance , to Party Committee
staffers pushing candidates of color to pump their networks” as ifthe same rolodex - driven approach to fundraising translates in a
non- white , non -privileged world .
The DemocraticParty needs to be unapologeticabout race. And
we need to explain to all Americans why doing so is beneficial to
everyone.
Those of us who have worked in and around politics know in our
bones that what we witnessed in 2020 was not new. Sadly , race
baiting and fear mongering have long been part of the politicalmaneuvering and cultural dynamics of this country . But 2020
witnessed a revival of " dog -whistle politics and an overt racism
that increasingly flourished under the candidacy and presidency of
Donald Trump . And where voters probably regularly default to
voting based on culture over policy issues, 2020 whipped up
stereotypes and caricatures to a level we haven't seen in recent
electoral cycles and undoubtedly had an impact on voting
decisions around the country . As Dr. Cameron Webb's campaign
manager , Ben Young , put it, “ If it wasn't 'Defund the Police,
We've seen the same tactic before.
In 2008 and 2012, the messages were centered
on governmenttakeover of health care and class
warfare. In 2016, the messagewas " Build theWall, which morphed into claims in 2018 that all
Democratswanted to " Abolish ICE " openborders caravans of migrants.
"Defund the Police” was dog whistle.
60
The good news is that the 2020 experience has shined a spotlight
on areas the Democratic Party and Democratic leaders can make
gains in the future – from defining and sharing a vision on race and
racial justice to grappling with the Democratic brand to shoring up
our small “d” democratic institutions for the future. At a minimum,
this past cycle should make clear the urgency around combatting
GOP voter suppression efforts, so often a thinly veiled attempt to
exclude communities of color and in 2021 an open backlash to
expanded early vote and vote-by-mail that made it easier for more
voters than ever before to make their voices heard.
The opportunitycomingoff of 2020 is inhowwe dealwithand
definerace issuesinthe future.Hereare someideas:
Reimagine our Democratic Party message and narrative. The
Republican Party has long had a collective gospel about having
small government, low taxes, and a strong military. Our gospel
should be about championing all working people – including but
not limited to white working people – and lifting up our values of
opportunity, equity, inclusion. We need to make it exciting to be a
Democrat and to ensure voters believe we not only mean well, but
we understand their priorities and they trust we are actually
fighting for them – something that the series of focus groups with
swing voters recently conducted by Third Way shows continues to
be a challenge. The only way to do this well is for the Party to do
more, better research with voters of color and, based on what we
learn, to be more differentiated and targeted in how we
communicateacross these many-splendoredcommunities.
Commit to early investment and year-round organizing. Victories
in Georgia, Nevada, Arizona, and other states this cycle were built
on years of organizing and community servicing led by some of our
best political and labor organizers. This orientation is especially
critical in communities of color that we know value relationships
but whom we often treat in a transactional way, showing up every
2-4 years instead of being continually present and engaged. If
Democrats fail to organize communities of color – making the
continual case for how we’re standing up for justice, jobs, health
care, a quality education and more – we can be sure Republicans
will fill that void.
Reallocate our spending to reflect our commitment to the
communities we rely on to win. It’s not just about investing in key
communities for Democrats – it’s also about ensuring a more
equitable allocation of our resources overall. As one longtime
Latino elected leader put it, “It’s great that we spent more in 2020
on Latino voters than ever before. But what did we spend before?”
Or as Leslie Small, the Executive Director of America Votes in
Georgia told us, “We have, for years as the Democratic Party, have
treated these mythical white voters as the panacea, and so if you
have ten dollars, they’re going to give nine and a half to try and get
this white voter...For once, Georgia and voters of color were not
under invested in. And by investing in them at the level that they
should be invested in, you saw the results.”
Conclusion| PartingThoughtsfrom Marlonand Lynda
61
Endthe “persuasionvs. organizing”debateand focuson getting
votes, period.Campaignstypicallythink persuasionneedstostart
early andmobilizationshouldhappenrightaroundvotingtime.But
thatapproachdoesn’twork,and it isn’t helpfulfor longtermParty-
building.Whenitcomesto persuasionandturnout, it’s “both-and”
butneeds to happenall the time.
Too oftencampaignsview persuasionas a tactic to getwhite
Americanswhomay not be withus onour side,andturnoutas a
tactic togetour baseout(whichimplicitlymeanspeopleof color).
We shouldbe tryingto persuadeall voters to supportthe ideaswe
care about– andthatmeansengagingyear-round,especiallywith
communitiesof color.
Where we do need to focus on persuasion, it’s to make the
unequivocal case that ending systemic racism is good for
everyone. Right now, people think addressing racial injustice means
they are losing something, or that someone is taking something
away from them. Last year, when the conversation became about
“Defund the Police,” we were stuck on defense instead of telling a
proactive story about necessary systemic changes to policing that
would stem the violence and still prioritize and provide public
safety. There’s a way for a “Defund the Police” advocate and
someone who isn’t convinced we should divert police funding to
agree to disagree but to lift up the value of what everyone needs.
We need to be on offense on what we care about, why this is
important, and what we should be doing differently.
In 2021, we are more aware than ever of the disparate challenges
for communities of color that are continuing to play out in theaftermath of the Trump era – including the rising violence againstthe AAPI community that is impossible to separate from the formerPresident’s insistence on calling COVID-19 the “China virus,” “Kung-
flu,” or the “Wuhan virus.” Despite the hope sprung by the verdictin the Derek Chauvin trial, Black men and women in every state arecontinuing to lose their lives to police violence and racial injustice
that is far too often forgotten when today’s headlines linetomorrow’s waste baskets. And Latino and Hispanic people remaina political football, alternatively portrayed as an electoral prize or
the infamous “Other” from which American communities must beshielded.
The question is, what are we as a Party willing to do about it.
Conclusion| PartingThoughtsfrom Marlonand Lynda
“Diversityfor diversity’s sake is not the goal.
It’s about thecountry being a better country,
about the government being a better
government.”
– QuentinJames,Founder and President,The
CollectivePAC
62
Appendices
63
Process & Approach
64
Our approach
This study relied on
four categories of
analysis
1. Live interviews with candidates and staff, Members, Party leaders, external
organizations that were major players in the 2020 cycle, major funders, and
top strategists and vendors
2. Review of publicly available polling and proprietary polling where possible
3. Content analysis of TV ads for priority races aired by the campaigns and
independent expenditure efforts and broader online paid media spending
by the campaigns
4. Independentassessmentof the data analyticsandmodelingusingthe final
voter files releasedby the statesin early 2021
Appendix | Process & Approach
65
TIER 1
Tier 1 campaigns were selected by Third Way, Latino Victory, andthe Collective PACto reflect a broadly representativeset of themost competitive races inthe 2020 cycle, with candidates, District,
and campaigndynamics designed to provide a better understandingof what happened across the political landscape. The groups aimedfor regional and demographic representation,Districts withanticipatedvoter performance and electoral issues that were sharedwith other races beyondthis list, and politically-significant
campaigns with a cross-sectionof bothwins and losses.
1. AZ Sen - Mark Kelly
2. GA Sen - RaphaelWarnock3. GA Sen - Jon Ossoff
4. NC Sen - Cal Cunningham5. CA-39- Gil Cisneros
6. FL-26 - DebbieMucarsel-Powell
7. IL-14- LaurenUnderwood8. ME-02- JaredGolden
9. MI-08- ElissaSlotkin10. NE-02- KaraEastman
11. NJ-03- Andy Kim
12. NM-02- XochitlTorresSmall13. NY-02- JackieGordon
14. NY-19 - Antonio Delgado15. NY-24- DanaBalter
16. TX-23 - Gina OrtizJones
17. TX-24 - CandaceValenzuela18. VA-05- CameronWebb
19. VA-07- AbigailSpanberger
Appendix | Process & Approach
66
TIER 2
For Tier 2 races, this analysis relied on a broader survey of thepublicly-identifiedDCCC Frontline races and the DSCC Priority racesto gather additional informationand capture commonthemes across
the Party Committees’ highestpriority campaigns. Inadditionto themulti-layeredresearchfor Tier 1 races, this postmortemincludesfindings basedon informationreceivedfrom another 18 races. Theirresponses covered messaging, strategy, tactics, and the candidate’spersonal observations about the races.
1. AK Sen - Alan Gross
2. NMSen – Ben RayLujan3. CA-10- Rep. Josh Harder
4. CA-21- Rep. TJ Cox5. CA-25- ChristySmith
6. CA-48 - Rep. HarleyRouda
7. FL-15- Alan Cohn8. GA-06 - Rep.LucyMcBath
9. IA-03- Rep. Cindy Axne10. IL-06- Rep.Sean Casten
11. IN-05- ChristinaHale
12. MN-02- Rep.AngieCraig13. NC-08- PatriciaTimmons-Goodson
14. NJ-02- Amy Kennedy15. NJ-07- Rep.Tom Malinowski
16. NY-22- Rep. AnthonyBrindisi
17. OH-01- KateSchroder18. UT-04-Rep. BenMcAdams
Appendix | Process & Approach
67
The broaderDemocraticecosystem
The teamspoke extensivelywith otherMembersof Congressacrossthe spectrumof Democraticideologyfromsomeof the Party’smostprogressivevoices to “pragmaticmoderate”leaders – either1:1or aspartof listeningsessionsorganizedincollaborationwithCongressionalCaucusstaff. We interviewedmembersof theleadershipteamat the Partycommittees,leadersat key outsideorganizationsthat ran8- and 9-figureindependentprogramsin2020, stateorganizationsthat weremajorplayers,andleadingpractitionersacross the Democraticpoliticalspace – includingpollsters,data scientists,digital strategists,andmessageandmediaexperts.In total, this analysis involvedinterviewswith 143individuals.The Membersfromthe NewDemocratCoalition,theCongressionalBlack Caucus,the CongressionalHispanicCaucus,andthe CongressionalAsian PacificAmericanCaucusand staff ofthe CBCPAC,CHC BOLDPAC,NewDemActionFund,andASPIREPAC were especially instrumentalinhelpingto shape this study,connectthe researchteamto candidatesandtheir campaignstaff,andprovidedimportantdata andfeedback aboutwhat they saw inthe field.
Additionalinformativeresearch
Finally,the teamreviewedmajorpostmortemanalysesby otherorganizationsas they were releasedintothe publicdomain–includingthe Texas DemocraticParty,HigherGroundLabs,
EquisLabs,Catalist,and Priorities USA.Where the findings in this
postmortemused informationfrom other research or studies that
were conductedpost-election,those sources are directly cited.
Appendix | Process & Approach
68
Unprecedented Ad Spending
69
Spendingand raising money early created significant benefits for many
candidates
• In Michigan, one longtime statewide
political operative posited that it was
difficult for Republicans to recruit strong
candidates to run against Rep. Elissa
Slotkin (MI-08) or Rep. Haley Stephens
(MI-11) because these incumbents had
already amassed formidable war chests
early in the cycle
• Multiple candidates reported their ability
to go up on TV early in the cycle to
highlight their bios and frame the
narrative was hugely valuable
• Strong campaign cash allowed Rep.
Lauren Underwood (IL-14) to hire field
organizers early in the cycle and begin
moving a locally-focused program led by
both in-district and out-of-district staff
who developed a deep knowledge of
their turf
Off-the-charts fundraising didn’t always ensure blowout victories – or victory
at all – even if Democrats substantially outraised their opponents
VA-07 D+1.8 $8,494,948 $582,133 $3,670,266 $29,323
IL-14 D+1.4 $7,862,425 $537,898 $3,297,857 $90,059
Appendix | Unprecedented Ad Spending
Race2020
Outcome
Total
Receipts
Dem Candidate GOP Candidate
Cash on
Hand
Total
Receipts
Cash on
Hand
70
Senate Campaign + IE Ad Spend
Appendix | Unprecedented Ad Spending
Across the ecosystem– includingcandidate, coordinated,and issue groups - Democrats outspent Republicans in the Senate
Win/Loss
$153
SenateAd Spend,Candidate+ Coordinated+
IssueGroup(in millions)
DEM GOP
+ $41M + $40M + $112M
$182
$114$112
$74$70
NC SENATE AZ SENATE GA SENATE
71
Congressional Campaign + IE Ad Spend
Win/Loss
Appendix | Unprecedented Ad Spending
The following information regarding ad spend was available for the Tier 1races [source: AdImpact report]
Dems outspent Republicans in all races analyzed except for NY-24, where the GOP invested just as heavily as Dems
House Ad Spend, Candidate + Coordinated + Issue Groups(in millions)
DEM GOP
+$3M+$2M +$2M +$4M +$5M +$4M - +$4M +$3M +$6M +$4M
$12
$10 $9
$7$6
$7
$12$3 $2
$2 $16
$12
$2
$8
$11$10$7$7
$4 $5 $6
FL-26 IL-14 ME-02 MI-08 NJ-03 NM-02 NY-24 TX-23 TX-24 VA-05 VA-07
72
Digitaladspendingincreasedsignificantlyin2020,
withDemocratstypicallyoutspendingtheir
Republicanopponents– but a higherspenddidnot
alwaysmeanDemocraticvictory
• Inthe 2016 electioncycle,2-3% of the totalpoliticalad spend
across the coordinatedandindependentexpenditureefforts up
and down the ballotwent to digitalmedia – in2020,that spend
movedup to 18%. Approximately$700-800Mwas spentondigital
ads in the 2018cycle,while in2020,the spendwas $1.6B[Forbes].
The 2020electionsaw digitaladspendingonFacebookreach
$1.07Band $520Mon Google [AdImpactreport]
• The Democraticcandidateswe evaluatedran hundreds– and in
some cases thousands– of digitalads rangingin spendfrom less
than$100perad, upto $250,000on a single ad [Warnock]o Every Democratincludedinthis reviewinvesteda minimum
of $125,000on Facebookadvertisementsalone
o Althoughit is impossibleto comparethat figureto previous
cycles since 2020was the first timeFacebookand Google
havemade full access to politicaladvertisingdata available,
digitalspendingwidely increasedin 2020
• ManyDemocraticcandidatesoutspenttheir Republican
opponentsindigitaladvertisinginthe Houseand Senateo SenatorJon Ossoff’s campaignFacebookpage ran more
than $2.7 millioninads to DavidPerdue’s$537,686in the
2020cycle
o Senator RaphaelWarnock outspent Kelly Loeffler by over a
4:1 ratio, with over $4 million in spending to Loeffler’s
$814,697, with no candidate spending outside of the
2020/2021 cycle
o Rep. Lauren Underwood outspent her Republicanopponent
by a 14:1ratio,spending over $500,000 to Jim Oberweis’s
$35,318
• Although there are cases where Democrats were outspent online
o Gil Cisneros (CA-39) was outspent by Republicanopponent
Young Kim2:1 on Facebook platforms,with Rep.Kim
spending $834,337 to Cisneros’ $492,290
o Dana Balter was outspent by her opponent $157,612 to
$136,569
• Several Democrats who outspent their opponent online did not
ultimately win – includingXochitl Torres Small, NM-02 and Dr.
Cameron Webb, VA-05 – but nearly every Democrat who was
outspent in digital ads lost
Appendix | Unprecedented Ad Spending
73