Liberty and Constitutionalism: Five Founding FreedomsSummer Teachers’ Academy
on the History & Principles of the American Founding
Day FourThursday, July 15, 2010
Freedom from FearVisiting Scholar:Jessica Roney, Ohio University
Readings:DOCUMENT PAGE
Statute of Northampton 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) 2
Sir John Knight’s Case (1686) 3
Virginia Statutes, 1623-24, 1684 4First General Letter of the Governor and Deputy of the New England Company for a Plantation in Massachusetts Bay, April 1629 7
1643 Militia Statute, Massachusetts Bay 8
The British Bill of Rights, 1689, Section 7 11Andrew Fletcher, A Discourse Concerning Militia’s and Standing Armies… (1697) 20
Benjamin Franklin, Plain Truth (1747) 37
“Ordinance for Disarming Non-Associators,” 19 July 1776 49
Pennsylvania Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Article 13 (1776) 51
George Washington to the President of Congress 52
U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 (1787) 61
Federalist Paper No. 25 (1787) 64
Federalist Paper No. 28 (1787) 70
Federalist Paper No. 29 (1788) 75Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention—17th, 18th, and 19th Amendments (27 June 1788) 81
Annals of Congress, Monday, 17 August 1789 82
U.S. Constitution, Second Amendment (1790) 87
1
Statute of Northampton 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328)
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 5, Amendment II, Document 1http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs1.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Document:
Statute of Northampton 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328)
Item, it is enacted, that no man great nor small, of what condition soever he be, except the
king's servants in his presence, and his ministers in executing of the king's precepts, or of
their office, and such as be in their company assisting them, and also [upon a cry made for
arms to keep the peace, and the same in such places where such acts happen,] be so hardy to
come before the King's justices, or other of the King's ministers doing their office, with
force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night
nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no
part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the
King's pleasure. And that the King's justices in their presence, sheriffs, and other ministers
in their bailiwicks, lords of franchises, and their bailiffs in the same, and mayors and bailiffs
of cities and boroughs, within the same cities and boroughs, and borough-holders,
constables, and wardens of the peace within their wards, shall have power to execute this
act. And that the justices assigned, at their coming down into the country, shall have power
to enquire how such officers and lords have exercised their offices in this case, and to punish
them whom they find that have not done that which pertained to their office.
2
Sir John Knight’s Case (1686)
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 5, Amendment II, Document 2http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs2.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Document:
Sir John Knight's Case87 Eng. Rep. 75 K.B. 1686
An information was exhibited against him by the Attorney General, upon the statute of 2
Edw. 3, c. 3, which prohibits "all persons from coming with force and arms before the
King's Justices, &c., and from going or riding armed in affray of peace, on pain to forfeit his
armour, and suffer imprisonment at the King's pleasure." This statute is confirmed by that of
20 Rich. 2, c. 1, with an addition of a further punishment, which is to make a fine to the
King.
The information sets forth, that the defendant did walk about the streets armed with guns,
and that he went into the church of St. Michael, in Bristol, in the time of divine service, with
a gun, to terrify the King's subjects, contra formam statuti.
This case was tried at the Bar, and the defendant was acquitted.
The Chief Justice said, that the meaning of the statute of 2 Edw. 3, c. 3, was to punish
people who go armed to terrify the King's subjects. It is likewise a great offence at the
common law, as if the King were not able or willing to protect his subjects; and therefore
this Act is but an affirmance of that law; and it having appointed a penalty, this Court can
inflict no other punishment than what is therein directed.
3
Virginia Statutes, 1623-24, 1684
Online Source:
Hening’s Statutes at LargeTranscribed for the internet by Freddie L. Spradlin, Torrance, CAhttp://vagenweb.org/hening/index.htm
Print Source:
William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature, in the year 1619. 1823
Document 1: Vol. 1, p. 127Document 2: Vol. 3, pp. 13-14
Document 1:
Virginia Statutes, March 1623-4
24. That no man go or send abroad without a sufficient partie will armed.
25. That men go not to worke in the ground without their arms (and a centinell upon
them.)
27. That the commander of every plantation take care that there be sufficient of
powder and amunition within the plantation under his command and their pieces fixt
and their arms compleate.
29. That no commander of any plantation do either himselfe or suffer others to spend
powder unneccessarily in drinking or entertainments, &c.
4
Document 2:
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, APRIL 1684.−−−36th CHARLES II.
ACT IV. An act for the better supply of the country with armes and ammunition.
FOR the encouragement of the inhabitants of this his majesties collony and dominion of
Virginia, to provide themselves with armes and ammunition, for the defence of this his
majesties country, and that they may appear well and compleately furnished when
commanded to masters and other the king's service, which many persons have hitherto
delayed to do, for that their arms have been imprest and taken from them. −− Be it (a)
enacted by the governour, councill and burgesses of this present general assembly, and the
authority thereof, and it is hereby enacted, That all such swords, musketts, (b) pistolls,
carbines, guns, and other armes and furniture, as the inhabitants of this country are already
provided, or shall provide and furnish themselves with, for their necessary use and service,
shall from henceforth be free and exempted from being imprest or taken from him or them,
that already are provided or shall so provide or furnish himselfe, neither shall the same be
lyable to be taken by any distresse, seizure, attachment or execution, Any law, usage or
custom to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.
And be it further enacted, That between this and the five and twentieth day of March,
which shall be in the yeare of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty six, every trooper of
the respective counties of this country, shall furnish and supply himself with a good able
horse, saddle, and all arms and (c) furniture, fitt and compleat for a trooper, and that every
foot soldier, shall furnish and supply himselfe, with a sword, musquet and other furniture fitt
for a soldier, and that each trooper and foot souldier, be provided with two pounds of
powder, and eight pounds of shott, and shall continually keep their armes well fixt, cleane
and fitt for the king's service.
And be it further enacted, That every trooper, failing to supply himselfe within the time
aforesaid, with such arms and furniture and not afterwards keeping the same well fixt, shall
forfeite four hundred pounds of tobacco, to his majesty, for the use of the county in which
5
the (a) delinquent shall live, towards the provideing of colours, drums and trumpetts therein,
and every foot souldier soe failing to provide himselfe, within the time aforesaid, and not
keeping the same well fixt, shall forfeit two hundred pounds of tobacco to his majesty. for
the use aforesaid, and that all the militia offices of this country, take care to see the
execution and due observation of this act, in their several and respective regiments, troops
and companies.
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That every collonell of a regiment
within this country, shall once every yeare, upon the first Thursday in October, yearly, cause
a generall muster, and exercise of the regiment under his command, or oftner if occasion
shall require.
And that every captain or commander of any troop of horse or foot company, within this
country, shall once at the least in every three months, muster, traine and exercise, the troop
or company under his command, to the end, they may be the better fitted and enabled, for
his majesties and the countryes service, when they shall be commanded thereunto.
6
First General Letter of the Governor and Deputy of the New England Company for a Plantation in Massachusetts Bay,
April 1629
Online Source:
American LibrariesInternet Archivehttp://www.archive.org/stream/recordsofgoverno01mass#page/392/mode/1up
Print Source:
Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England. 1:392
Document:
To exercise armes.
Yow haue had form caution giuen yow to take heede of beeing too secure in trusting the
Indians, wch wee againe comend to yor care ; and that yow may bee the better able to resist
both forraigne enemies & the natives, if ether should assaile yow, wee pray yow lett all such
as liue vnder or gounment, both or servants and other planters & their servants, bee exercised
in the vse of armes, and certaine tymes appointed to muster them, in wch business Mr Sharpe
and Mr Graues wilbe assistant to yow. Mr Sharpe is by vs entertained to bee mr gunn of or
ordnance, in wch service hee is to employ soe much of his tyme as the charge of that office
doth require, and in the rest hee is to follow other imploymts of or gounors & others, for
whose employmt hee is ᷈pticularly sent over./
7
1643 Militia Statute, Massachusetts Bay
Online Source:
http://books.google.com/books?id=ND8OAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=shurtleff+records+of+massachusetts&source=bl&ots=tIyshcex99&sig=zIKcZeAHRMWxZZlY7kRrWouOzCg&hl=en&ei=fGAJTMeAJ5X0Ms3SwLUE&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false
Print Source:
Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England. Volume 2, pp. 42-43.
Document:
1643 Militia Statute
1. It is ordered, first, that the regiment & comaund of the millitary affaires bee so ordered
that upon any suddaine exigent or assault upon any place, there may bee a lawfull authority
to make resistance; for, as piety cannot bee maintained wthout church ordinances & officrs,
nor iustice wthout lawes & magistracy, no more can or safety & peace bee pserved wthout
millitary orders & officrs ; & though wee conceive the supreame power of comaund of the
forces bee in the Cort Genrall, so that no war ought to bee undertaken wthout their authority,
yet because that great body cannot be ready in suddaine cases to act by itselfe, wee conceive
it necessary that there bee a councell, wherof the Govrnor to bee alway one, invested wth
power & authority, in all cases of danger & assault, to raise y* whole force of the country, or
any part therof, & to draw them together to one or more places wthin this iurisdiction, or
otherwise to dispose of them in the best mann', for the necessary defence of the country.
2'ly. That there bee chosen a sergent maior genrall to leade & conduct their forces levyed,
& to execute all orders & directions of the councell.
3'ly. Because assaults may (& comonly are, sudden, not admiting of any delay, wee
conceive it likewise necessary that in every sheire there bee appointed one leiftenant, who 8
shall have power to cause the force of that sheire, or any part therof, (in suddaine cases,
where timely notice cannot bee given to the Govrnor & councell,) who shall give order to
the force levied to march to any part of the sheire for the defence therof, or otherwise
dispose of them, till hee receive order from the Gournor & councell; & furthr, that in every
sheire there bee one sergent maior, to comaund, leade, & conduct the forces of that sheire,
being called together; who shall also have power in the absence of the leiftenant to raise the
force of that sheire.
4'ly. That the regiments or sheires bee divided into sev'all companies, and where any
towne hath not a convenient number of men, that they bee adioyned to some other towne to
make a full company, & that in evry such company there bee a captaine, & other onicrs, &
that the captaine have power to call his company together, & to make any iust & necessary
defence, & to dismiss them, as hee seeth occasion, when there is no other comaund to the
contrary.
5'ly. It is very convenient that once in every yeare the supior officr should call the
regiment togethr, that evry man may know his place, & that all the horse listed in that sheire
shall appear at that meeting, & that the chiefe officr cause them there to bee exercised.
6'ly. That a beacon fired, & 4 muskets discharged, & a drum beaten shalbee an alarum, at
wch every man shall repaire to his colors, or appointed meeting place, to attend further
order.
7. Secondly, the regiment being thus settled, wee conceive it further necessary that the
Govrnor, councell, leiften" of sheires, & sergent *maior do r*34.1 meete once every yeare to
consult of the best meanes of or safety, & to take notice of all millitary affaires; to see that
all officrs do faithfully discharge the trust coinitted to them, & to punish all disordrs, &
neglects in all officrs ; to take care that all places bee pvided wth able officrs, & where such
are wanting, to appoint one of other places, giving them recompence for their paines; to
dispose of the magazeine in the most convenient place, & to consider of meanes to furnish
9
them; to consider of fortifications, & the means to effect it, & to suffer no publiq. fort to bee
erected wthout their appbation.
8. Also, in every sheire or regiment the leif?, serg' maior, & the cheife officer of every
company shall meete once or twice evry yeare to consult of such matters as tend to the
safety of that sheire, & of meanes of pvideg amunition & armes, & to appoint what sort of
armes every man should beare, & what forses shalbee inroaled, & to take care of the
ordinance, publique armes, & magazine of the sheire or town, to pvide one caiioneer at the
least, to consider of the forts in the sheirs, & to take care of them, & not to suffer any fort
(though it bee not of publiq. concernm') to bee erected, wthout their appbation, to take notice
of all disorders & neglects of souldiers or inferior officTM in watchings, trainings, $6, & to
reforme & punish them, reserving power to the captaines of evry company to execute all
such orders of Cot as are or shalbee betrusted to their care, & giving them power to warn
any offender, or Psent any offence of a millitary nature to the councell or meeting. 9. And
wee conceive it needfull that the order of Cort, wch binds evry man to furnish a musquet,
should not bee in force against such as are pvided to serve wth pike & costlet, that so those
places that are unfurnished of pikes may bee incuraged to pvide them. 10. It would bee
convenient, that all millitary dispatches & order might bee issued after the usuall manner
from the supior to the inferior officer.
10
The British Bill of Rights, 1689, Section 7
Online Source:
Avalon Projecthttp://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp
Document:
English Bill of Rights 1689
AN ACT DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE SUBJECT AND SETTLING THE SUCCESSION OF THE CROWN
Whereas the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster,
lawfully, fully and freely representing all the estates of the people of this realm, did upon the
thirteenth day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty-eight
[old style date] present unto their Majesties, then called and known by the names and style
of William and Mary, prince and princess of Orange, being present in their proper persons, a
certain declaration in writing made by the said Lords and Commons in the words following,
viz.:
Whereas the late King James the Second, by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges
and ministers employed by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant
religion and the laws and liberties of this kingdom;
By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws and the
execution of laws without consent of Parliament;
By committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates for humbly petitioning to be excused
from concurring to the said assumed power;
11
By issuing and causing to be executed a commission under the great seal for erecting a court
called the Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes;
By levying money for and to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative for other time
and in other manner than the same was granted by Parliament;
By raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace without
consent of Parliament, and quartering soldiers contrary to law;
By causing several good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when
papists were both armed and employed contrary to law;
By violating the freedom of election of members to serve in Parliament;
By prosecutions in the Court of King's Bench for matters and causes cognizable only in
Parliament, and by divers other arbitrary and illegal courses;
And whereas of late years partial corrupt and unqualified persons have been returned and
served on juries in trials, and particularly divers jurors in trials for high treason which were
not freeholders;
And excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases to elude the
benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects;
And excessive fines have been imposed;
And illegal and cruel punishments inflicted;
And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures before any conviction or
judgment against the persons upon whom the same were to be levied;
12
All which are utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes and freedom of
this realm;
And whereas the said late King James the Second having abdicated the government and the
throne being thereby vacant, his Highness the prince of Orange (whom it hath pleased
Almighty God to make the glorious instrument of delivering this kingdom from popery and
arbitrary power) did (by the advice of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and divers principal
persons of the Commons) cause letters to be written to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal
being Protestants, and other letters to the several counties, cities, universities, boroughs and
cinque ports, for the choosing of such persons to represent them as were of right to be sent to
Parliament, to meet and sit at Westminster upon the two and twentieth day of January in this
year one thousand six hundred eighty and eight [old style date], in order to such an
establishment as that their religion, laws and liberties might not again be in danger of being
subverted, upon which letters elections having been accordingly made;
And thereupon the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, pursuant to their
respective letters and elections, being now assembled in a full and free representative of this
nation, taking into their most serious consideration the best means for attaining the ends
aforesaid, do in the first place (as their ancestors in like case have usually done) for the
vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties declare
That the pretended power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by regal authority
without consent of Parliament is illegal;
That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal
authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal;
That the commission for erecting the late Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes,
and all other commissions and courts of like nature, are illegal and pernicious;
13
That levying money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative, without grant
of Parliament, for longer time, or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is
illegal;
That it is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and prosecutions
for such petitioning are illegal;
That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be
with consent of Parliament, is against law;
That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their
conditions and as allowed by law;
That election of members of Parliament ought to be free;
That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament;
That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted;
That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned, and jurors which pass upon men in
trials for high treason ought to be freeholders;
That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction
are illegal and void;
And that for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening and preserving of
the laws, Parliaments ought to be held frequently.
14
And they do claim, demand and insist upon all and singular the premises as their undoubted
rights and liberties, and that no declarations, judgments, doings or proceedings to the
prejudice of the people in any of the said premises ought in any wise to be drawn hereafter
into consequence or example; to which demand of their rights they are particularly
encouraged by the declaration of his Highness the prince of Orange as being the only means
for obtaining a full redress and remedy therein. Having therefore an entire confidence that
his said Highness the prince of Orange will perfect the deliverance so far advanced by him,
and will still preserve them from the violation of their rights which they have here asserted,
and from all other attempts upon their religion, rights and liberties, the said Lords Spiritual
and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster do resolve that William and Mary,
prince and princess of Orange, be and be declared king and queen of England, France and
Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging, to hold the crown and royal dignity of the
said kingdoms and dominions to them, the said prince and princess, during their lives and
the life of the survivor to them, and that the sole and full exercise of the regal power be only
in and executed by the said prince of Orange in the names of the said prince and princess
during their joint lives, and after their deceases the said crown and royal dignity of the same
kingdoms and dominions to be to the heirs of the body of the said princess, and for default
of such issue to the Princess Anne of Denmark and the heirs of her body, and for default of
such issue to the heirs of the body of the said prince of Orange. And the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal and Commons do pray the said prince and princess to accept the same
accordingly.
And that the oaths hereafter mentioned be taken by all persons of whom the oaths have
allegiance and supremacy might be required by law, instead of them; and that the said oaths
of allegiance and supremacy be abrogated.
I, A.B., do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to
their Majesties King William and Queen Mary. So help me God.
I, A.B., do swear that I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure as impious and heretical
this damnable doctrine and position, that princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope
15
or any authority of the see of Rome may be deposed or murdered by their subjects or any
other whatsoever. And I do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate
hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence or authority,
ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm. So help me God.
Upon which their said Majesties did accept the crown and royal dignity of the kingdoms of
England, France and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto belonging, according to the
resolution and desire of the said Lords and Commons contained in the said declaration. And
thereupon their Majesties were pleased that the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and
Commons, being the two Houses of Parliament, should continue to sit, and with their
Majesties' royal concurrence make effectual provision for the settlement of the religion, laws
and liberties of this kingdom, so that the same for the future might not be in danger again of
being subverted, to which the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons did agree,
and proceed to act accordingly. Now in pursuance of the premises the said Lords Spiritual
and Temporal and Commons in Parliament assembled, for the ratifying, confirming and
establishing the said declaration and the articles, clauses, matters and things therein
contained by the force of law made in due form by authority of Parliament, do pray that it
may be declared and enacted that all and singular the rights and liberties asserted and
claimed in the said declaration are the true, ancient and indubitable rights and liberties of the
people of this kingdom, and so shall be esteemed, allowed, adjudged, deemed and taken to
be; and that all and every the particulars aforesaid shall be firmly and strictly holden and
observed as they are expressed in the said declaration, and all officers and ministers
whatsoever shall serve their Majesties and their successors according to the same in all time
to come. And the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, seriously considering
how it hath pleased Almighty God in his marvellous providence and merciful goodness to
this nation to provide and preserve their said Majesties' royal persons most happily to reign
over us upon the throne of their ancestors, for which they render unto him from the bottom
of their hearts their humblest thanks and praises, do truly, firmly, assuredly and in the
sincerity of their hearts think, and do hereby recognize, acknowledge and declare, that King
James the Second having abdicated the government, and their Majesties having accepted the
crown and royal dignity as aforesaid, their said Majesties did become, were, are and of right
16
ought to be by the laws of this realm our sovereign liege lord and lady, king and queen of
England, France and Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging, in and to whose
princely persons the royal state, crown and dignity of the said realms with all honours,
styles, titles, regalities, prerogatives, powers, jurisdictions and authorities to the same
belonging and appertaining are most fully, rightfully and entirely invested and incorporated,
united and annexed. And for preventing all questions and divisions in this realm by reason
of any pretended titles to the crown, and for preserving a certainty in the succession thereof,
in and upon which the unity, peace, tranquility and safety of this nation doth under God
wholly consist and depend, the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do beseech
their Majesties that it may be enacted, established and declared, that the crown and regal
government of the said kingdoms and dominions, with all and singular the premises
thereunto belonging and appertaining, shall be and continue to their said Majesties and the
survivor of them during their lives and the life of the survivor of them, and that the entire,
perfect and full exercise of the regal power and government be only in and executed by his
Majesty in the names of both their Majesties during their joint lives; and after their deceases
the said crown and premises shall be and remain to the heirs of the body of her Majesty, and
for default of such issue to her Royal Highness the Princess Anne of Denmark and the heirs
of the body of his said Majesty; and thereunto the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and
Commons do in the name of all the people aforesaid most humbly and faithfully submit
themselves, their heirs and posterities for ever, and do faithfully promise that they will stand
to, maintain and defend their said Majesties, and also the limitation and succession of the
crown herein specified and contained, to the utmost of their powers with their lives and
estates against all persons whatsoever that shall attempt anything to the contrary. And
whereas it hath been found by experience that it is inconsistent with the safety and welfare
of this Protestant kingdom to be governed by a popish prince, or by any king or queen
marrying a papist, the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do further pray that
it may be enacted, that all and every person and persons that is, are or shall be reconciled to
or shall hold communion with the see or Church of Rome, or shall profess the popish
religion, or shall marry a papist, shall be excluded and be for ever incapable to inherit,
possess or enjoy the crown and government of this realm and Ireland and the dominions
thereunto belonging or any part of the same, or to have, use or exercise any regal power,
17
authority or jurisdiction within the same; and in all and every such case or cases the people
of these realms shall be and are hereby absolved of their allegiance; and the said crown and
government shall from time to time descend to and be enjoyed by such person or persons
being Protestants as should have inherited and enjoyed the same in case the said person or
persons so reconciled, holding communion or professing or marrying as aforesaid were
naturally dead; and that every king and queen of this realm who at any time hereafter shall
come to and succeed in the imperial crown of this kingdom shall on the first day of the
meeting of the first Parliament next after his or her coming to the crown, sitting in his or her
throne in the House of Peers in the presence of the Lords and Commons therein assembled,
or at his or her coronation before such person or persons who shall administer the coronation
oath to him or her at the time of his or her taking the said oath (which shall first happen),
make, subscribe and audibly repeat the declaration mentioned in the statute made in the
thirtieth year of the reign of King Charles the Second entitled, _An Act for the more
effectual preserving the king's person and government by disabling papists from sitting in
either House of Parliament._ But if it shall happen that such king or queen upon his or her
succession to the crown of this realm shall be under the age of twelve years, then every such
king or queen shall make, subscribe and audibly repeat the same declaration at his or her
coronation or the first day of the meeting of the first Parliament as aforesaid which shall first
happen after such king or queen shall have attained the said age of twelve years. All which
their Majesties are contented and pleased shall be declared, enacted and established by
authority of this present Parliament, and shall stand, remain and be the law of this realm for
ever; and the same are by their said Majesties, by and with the advice and consent of the
Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in Parliament assembled and by the authority
of the same, declared, enacted and established accordingly.
II. And be it further declared and enacted by the authority aforesaid, that from and after this
present session of Parliament no dispensation by _non obstante_ of or to any statute or any
part thereof shall be allowed, but that the same shall be held void and of no effect, except a
dispensation be allowed of in such statute, and except in such cases as shall be specially
18
provided for by one or more bill or bills to be passed during this present session of
Parliament.
III. Provided that no charter or grant or pardon granted before the three and twentieth day of
October in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty-nine shall be any ways
impeached or invalidated by this Act, but that the same shall be and remain of the same
force and effect in law and no other than as if this Act had never been made.
19
Andrew Fletcher, A Discourse Concerning Militia’s and Standing Armies… (1697)
Online Source:
Constitution Societyhttp://www.constitution.org/fletchr/fletchr.htm
Copyright (c), 1979, Scottish Academic Press. Permission to reprint granted May 23, 1996 by Dr. Douglas Grant of the Scottish Academic Press. Reprint published by Scottish Academic Press in Edinburgh in 1979 as Fletcher of Saltoun, Selected Writings by David Daiches.
Permission from Scottish Academic Press to reprint this material, was obtained by Dr. Bill Boyle of New Mexico State University. The original British style of spelling has been retained (e.g., favour vs. favor). The word "prentice" was changed to "apprentice" in the two places where it occurred. The original preference for lengthy paragraphs has likewise been preserved.
Print Source:
The Political Works of Andrew Fletcher, Esq. London, 1732
Document:[Last two paragraphs of the Preface]A full account of the political context within which Fletcher's pamphlets and speeches were produced will be found in the present writer's Scotland and the Union (London, 1977).
The text of the pamphlets and speeches here reprinted is taken from The Political Works of Andrew Fletcher, Esq., London, 1732. This reprints accurately the original pamphlets but with a somewhat more modern spelling and punctuation. The Glasgow edition of 1749 is also an accurate reprint but modernizes spelling and punctuation rather more. The present text is therefore in the tradition of continuous discreet modernising combined with otherwise accurate reprinting, and it is hoped that it will be accessible to a wider reading public than a simple reproduction of the original pamphlets.
Fletcher of Saltoun, Selected WritingsEdinburgh: Printed in the Year MDCXCVIII
A Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias, pp. 14-30
20
…Having shown the difference between the past and present government of Britain, how
precarious our liberties are, and how from having the best security for them we arc in hazard
of having none at all; it is to be hoped that those who are for a standing army, and losing no
occasion of advancing and extending the prerogative, from a mistaken opinion that they
establish the ancient government of these nations, will see what sort of patriots they are.
But we are told, that only standing mercenary forces can defend Britain from the perpetual
standing armies of France. However frivolous this assertion be, as indeed no good argument
can be brought to support it, either from reason or experience, as shall be proved hereafter;
yet allowing it to be good, what security can the nations have that these standing forces shall
not at some time or other be made use of to suppress the liberties of the people, though not
in this king's time, to whom we owe their preservation? For I hope there is no man so weak
to think, that keeping up the army for a year, or for any longer time than the parliaments of
both nations shall have engaged the public faith to make good all deficiencies of funds
granted for their maintenance, is not the keeping them up for ever. It is a pitiful shift in the
undertakers for a standing army, to say, we are not for a standing army, we are only for an
army from year to year, or till the militia be made useful. For Britain cannot be in any
hazard from France; at least till that kingdom, so much exhausted by war and persecution,
shall have a breathing space to recover. Before that time our militias will be in order; and in
the meantime the fleet. Besides, no prince ever surrendered so great countries and so many
strong places, I shall not say, in order to make a new war; but as these men will have it, to
continue the same. The French King is old and diseased, and was never willing to hazard
much by any bold attempt. If he, or the dauphin, upon his decease, may be suspected of any
farther design, it must be upon the Spanish monarchy, in case of the death of that King. And
if it be objected, that we shall stand in need of an army, in such a conjuncture, I answer, that
our part in that, or in any other foreign war, will be best managed by sea, as shall be shown
hereafter.
Let us then see if mercenary armies be not exactly calculated to enslave a nation. Which I
think may be easily proved, if we consider that such troops are generally composed of men
who make a trade of war; and having little or no patrimony, or spent what they once had,
21
enter into that employment in hopes of its continuance during life, not at all thinking how to
make themselves capable of any other. By which means heavy and perpetual taxes must be
entailed for ever upon the people for their subsistence; and since all their relations stand
engaged to support their interest, let all men judge, if this will not prove a very united and
formidable party in a nation.
But the undertakers must pardon me if I tell them, that no well-constituted government ever
suffered any such men in it, whose interest leads them to embroil the state in war, and are a
useless and insupportable burden in time of peace. Venice or Holland are neither of them
examples to prove the contrary; for had not their situation been different from that of other
countries, their liberty had not continued to this time. And they suffer no forces to remain
within those inaccessible places, which are the chief seats of their power. Carthage, that had
not those advantages of situation, and yet used mercenary forces, was brought to the brink of
ruin by them in a time of peace, beaten in three wars, and at last subdued by the Romans. If
ever any government stood in need of such a sort of men, it was that of ancient Rome,
because they were engaged in perpetual war. The argument can never be so strong in any
other case. But the Romans well knowing such men and liberty to be incompatible, and yet
being under a necessity of having armies constantly on foot, made frequent changes of the
men that served in them; who, when they had been some time in the army, were permitted to
return to their possessions, trades, or other employments. And to show how true a judgment
that wise state made of this matter, it is sufficient to observe, that those who subverted that
government, the greatest that ever was amongst men, found themselves obliged to continue
the same soldiers always in constant pay and service.
If during the late war we had followed so wise a course as that of Rome, there had been
thrice as many trained men in the nations as at present there are; no difficulties about
recruits, nor debates about keeping up armies in time of peace, because some men resolve to
live by arms in time of peace, whether it be for the good of the nations or not. And since
such was the practice of Rome, I hope no man will have the confidence to say that this
method was not as effectual for war as any other. If it be objected that Rome had perpetual
wars, and therefore that might be a good practice among them, which would not be so with
22
us, I confess I cannot see the consequence; for if Rome had perpetual wars, the Romans
ought still to have continued the same men in their armies, that they might, according to the
notion of these men, render their troops more useful. And if we did change our men during a
war, we should have more men that would understand something of it. If any man say, not
so much as if they continued in the army: I answer, that many of those who continue in the
army are afterwards swept away by the war, and live not to be of use in time of peace; that
those who escape the war, being fewer than in the other case, are soon consumed: and that
mercenary standing forces in time of peace, if not employed to do mischief, soon become
like those of Holland in 72, fit only to lose forty strong places in forty days.
There is another thing which I would not mention if it were not absolutely necessary to my
present purpose; and that is, the usual manners of those who are engaged in mercenary
armies. I speak now of officers in other parts of Europe, and not of those in our armies,
allowing them to be the best, and if they will have it so, quite different from all others. I will
not apply to them any part of what I shall say concerning the rest. They themselves best
know how far anything of that nature may be applicable to them. I say then, most princes of
Europe having put themselves upon the foot of keeping up forces, rather numerous than well
entertained, can give but small allowance to officers, and that likewise is for the most part
very ill paid, in order to render them the more necessitous and depending; and yet they
permit them to live inall that extravagancy which mutual example and emulation prompts
them to. By which means the officers become insensibly engaged in numberless frauds,
oppressions, and cruelties, the colonels against the captains, and the captains against the
inferior soldiers; and all of them against all persons with whom they have any kind of
business. So that there is hardly any sort of men who are less men of honour than the
officers of mercenary forces: and indeed honour has now no other signification amongst
them than courage. Besides, most men that enter into those armies, whether officers or
soldiers, as if they were obliged to show themselves new creatures, and perfectly regenerate,
if before they were modest or sober, immediately turn themselves to all manner of
debauchery and wickedness, committing all kinds of injustice and barbarity against poor and
defenceless people. Now though the natural temper of our men be more just and honest than
that of the French, or of any other people, yet may it not be feared, that such bad manners
23
may prove contagious? And if such manners do not fit men to enslave a nation, devils only
must do it. on the other hand, if it should happen that the officers of standing armies in
Britain should live with greater regularity and modesty than was ever yet seen in that sort of
men, it might very probably fall out, that being quartered in all parts of the country, some of
them might be returned members of parliament for divers of the electing boroughs; and of
what consequence that would be, I leave all men to judge. So that whatever be the conduct
of a mercenary army, we can never be secure as long as any such force is kept up in Britain.
But the undertakers for a standing army will say: will you turn so many gentlemen to starve,
who have faithfully served the government? This question I allow to be founded upon some
reason. For it ought to be acknowledged in justice to our soldiery, that on all occasions, and
in all actions, both officers and soldiers have done their part; and therefore I think it may be
reasonable, that all officers and soldiers of above forty years, in consideration of their
unfitness to apply themselves at that age to any other employment, should be recommended
to the bounty of both parliaments.
I confess I do not see by what rules of good policy any mercenary forces have been
connived at either in Scotland, England, or Ireland. Sure, it is allowing the dispensing power
in the most essential point of the constitution of government in these nations.
Scotland and England are nations that were formerly very jealous of liberty; of which there
are many remarkable instances in the histories of these countries. And we may hope that the
late revolution having given such a blow to arbitrary power in these kingdoms, they will be
very careful to preserve their rights and privileges. And sure it is not very suitable to these,
that any standing forces be kept up in Britain: or that there should be any Scots, English, or
Irish regiments maintained in Ireland, or anywhere abroad; or regiments of any nation at the
charge of England. I shall not say how readily the regiments that were in the service of
Holland came over against the duke of Monmouth: he was a rebel, and did not succeed. But
we all know with what expedition the Irish mercenary forces were brought into Britain to
oppose his present majesty in that glorious enterprise for our deliverance.
24
The subjects formerly had a real security for their liberty, by having the sword in their own
hands. That security, which is the greatest of all others, is lost; and not only so, but the
sword is put into the hand of the king by his power over the militia. All this is not enough;
but we must have in both kingdoms standing armies of mercenaries, who for the most part
have no other way to subsist, and consequently are capable to execute any commands: and
yet every man must think his liberties as safe as ever, under pain of being thought
disaffected to the monarchy. But sure it must not be the ancient limited and legal monarchies
of Scotland and England that these gentlemen mean. It must be a French fashion of
monarchy, where the king has power to do what he pleases, and the people no security for
anything they possess. We have quitted our ancient security, and put the militia into the
power of the king. The only remaining security we have is, that no standing armies were
ever yet allowed in time of peace, the parliament of England having so often and so
expressly declared them to be contrary to law: and that of Scotland having not only declared
them to be a grievance, but made the keeping them up an article in the forfeiture of the late
King James. If a standing army be allowed, what difference will there be between the
government we shall then live under, and any kind of government under a good prince? Of
which there have been some in the most despotic tyrannies. If these be limited and not
absolute monarchies, then, as there are conditions, so there ought to be securities on both
sides. The barons never pretended that their militias should be constantly on foot, and
together in bodies in times of peace. It is evident that would have subverted the constitution,
and made every one of them a petty tyrant. And it is as evident, that standing forces are the
fittest instruments to make a tyrant. Whoever is for making the king's power too great or too
little, is an enemy to the monarchy. But to give him standing armies, puts his power beyond
control, and consequently makes him absolute. If the people had any other real security for
their liberty than that there be no standing armies in time of peace, there might be some
colour to demand them. But if that only remaining security be taken away from the people,
we have destroyed these monarchies.
It is pretended we are in hazard of being invaded by a powerful enemy; shall we therefore
destroy our government? What is it then that we would defend? Is it our persons, by the ruin
of our government? in what then shall we be gainers? In saving our lives by the loss of our
25
liberties? if our pleasures and luxury make us live like brutes, it seems we must not pretend
to reason any better than they. I would fain know, if there be any other way of making a
prince absolute, than by allowing him a standing army: if by it all princes have not been
made absolute; if without it, any. Whether our enemies shall conquer us is uncertain; but
whether standing armies will enslave us, neither reason nor experience will suffer us to
doubt. It is therefore evident that no pretence of danger from abroad can be an argument to
keep up standing armies or any mercenary forces.
Let us now consider whether we may not be able to defend ourselves by well- regulated
militias against any foreign force, though never so formidable: that these nations may be free
from the fears of invasion from abroad, as well as from the danger of slavery at home.
After the barons had lost the military service of their vassals, militias of some kind or other
were established in most parts of Europe. But the prince having everywhere the power of
naming and preferring the officers of these militias, they could be no balance in government
as the former were. And he that will consider what has been said in this discourse, will
easily perceive that the essential quality requisite to such a militia, as might fully answer the
ends of the former, must be, that the officers should be named and preferred, as well as they
and the soldiers paid, by the people that set them out. So that if princes look upon the
present militias as not capable of defending a nation against foreign armies, the people have
little reason to entrust them with the defence of their liberties.
And though upon the dissolution of that ancient militia under the barons, which made these
nations so great and glorious, by setting up militias generally through Europe, the sword
came not into the hands of the Commons, which was the only thing could have continued
the former balance of government, but was everywhere put into the hands of the king:
nevertheless ambitious princes, who aimed at absolute power, thinking they could never use
it effectually to that end, unless it were wielded by mercenaries, and men that had no other
interest in the commonwealth than their pay, have still endeavoured by all means to discredit
militias, and render them burdensome to the people, by never suffering them to be upon any
right, or so much as tolerable foot, and all to persuade the necessity of standing forces. And
26
indeed they have succeeded too well in this design: for the greatest part of the world has
been fooled into an opinion that a militia cannot be made serviceable. I shall not say it was
only militias could conquer the world; and that princes to have succeeded fully in the design
before-mentioned must have destroyed all the history and memory of ancient governments,
where the accounts of so many excellent models of militia are yet extant. I know the
prejudice and ignorance of the world concerning the art of war, as it was practised by the
ancients; though what remains of that knowledge in their writings be sufficient to give a
mean opinion of the modem discipline. For this reason I shall examine, by what has passed
of late years in these nations, whether experience have convinced us, that officers bred in
foreign wars, be so far preferable to others who have been under no other discipline than that
of an ordinary and ill-regulated militia; and if the commonalty of both kingdoms, at their
first entrance upon service, be not as capable of a resolute military action, as any standing
forces. This doubt will be fully resolved, by considering the actions of the marquis of
Montrose, which may be compared, all circumstances considered, with those of Caesar, as
well for the military skill, as the bad tendency of them; though the marquis had never served
abroad, nor seen any action, before the six victories, which, with numbers much inferior to
those of his enemies, he obtained in one year; and the most considerable of them were
chiefly gained by the assistance of the tenants and vassals of the family of Gordon. The
battle of Naseby will be a farther illustration of this matter, which is generally thought to
have been the deciding action of the late civil war. The number of forces was equal on both
sides; nor was there any advantage in the ground, or extraordinary accident that happened
during the fight, which could be of considerable importance to either. In the army of the
parliament, nine only of the officers had served abroad, and most of the soldiers were
apprentices drawn out of London but two months before. In the king's army there were
above a thousand officers that had served in foreign parts: yet was that army routed and
broken by those new-raised apprentices; who were observed to be obedient to command,
and brave in fight; not only in that action, but on all occasions during that active campaign.
The people of these nations are not a dastardly crew, like those born in misery under
oppression and slavery, who must have time to rub off that fear, cowardice, and stupidity
which they bring from home. And though officers seem to stand in more need of experience
27
than private soldiers; yet in that battle it was seen that the sobriety and principle of the
officers on the one side, prevailed over the experience of those on the other.
It is well known that divers regiments of our army, lately in Flanders, have never been once
in action, and not one half of them above thrice, nor any of them five times during the whole
war. Oh, but they have been under discipline, and accustomed to obey! And so may men in
militias. We have had to do with an enemy, who, though abounding in numbers of excellent
officers, yet durst never fight us without a visible advantage. Is that enemy like to invade us,
when he must be unavoidably necessitated to put all to hazard in ten days, or starve?
A good militia is of such importance to a nation, that it is the chief part of the constitution of
any free government. For though as to other things, the constitution be never so slight, a
good militia will always preserve the public liberty. But in the best constitution that ever
was, as to all other parts of government, if the militia be not upon a right foot, the liberty of
that people must perish. The militia of ancient Rome, the best that ever was in any
government, made her mistress of the world: but standing armies enslaved that great people,
and their excellent militia and freedom perished together. The Lacedemonians continued
eight hundred years free, and in great honour, because they had a good militia. The Swisses
at this day are the freest, happiest, and the people of all Europe who can best defend
themselves, because they have the best militia.
I have shown that liberty in the monarchical governments of Europe, subsisted so long as the
militia of the barons was on foot: and that on the decay of their militia (which though it was
none of the best, so was it none of the worst) standing forces and tyranny have been
everywhere introduced, unless in Britain and Ireland; which by reason of their situation,
having the sea for frontier, and a powerful fleet to protect them, could afford no pretence for
such forces. And though any militia, however slightly constituted, be sufficient for that
reason to defend us; yet all improvements in the constitution of militias, being further
securities for the liberty of the people, I think we ought to endeavour the amendment of
them, and till that can take place, to make the present militias useful in the former and
ordinary methods.
28
That the whole free people of any nation ought to be exercised to arms, not only the example
of our ancestors, as appears by the acts of parliament made in both kingdoms to that
purpose, and that of the wisest governments among the ancients; but the advantage of
choosing out of great numbers, seems clearly to demonstrate. For in countries where
husbandry, trade, manufactures, and other mechanical arts are carried on, even in time of
war, the impediments of men are so many and so various, that unless the whole people be
exercised, no considerable numbers of men can be drawn out, without disturbing those
employments, which are the vitals of the political body. Besides, that upon great defeats, and
under extreme calamities, from which no government was ever exempted, every nation
stands in need of all the people, as the ancients sometimes did of their slaves. And I cannot
see why arms should be denied to any man who is not a slave, since they are the only true
badges of liberty; and ought never, but in times of utmost necessity, to be put into the hands
of mercenaries or slaves: neither can I understand why any man that has arms should not be
taught the use of them.
By the constitution of the present militia in both nations, there is but a small number of the
men able to bear arms exercised; and men of quality and estate are allowed to send any
wretched servant in their place: so that they themselves are become mean, by being disused
to handle arms; and will not learn the use of them, because they are ashamed of their
ignorance: by which means the militias being composed only of servants, these nations seem
altogether unfit to defend themselves, and standing forces to be necessary. Now can it be
supposed that a few servants will fight for the defence of their masters' estates, if their
masters only look on? Or that some inconsiderate freeholders, as for the most part those who
command the militia are, should, at the head of those servants, expose their lives for men of
more plentiful estates, without being assisted by them? No bodies of military men can be of
any force or value, unless many persons of quality or education be among them; and such
men should blush to think of excusing themselves from serving their country, at least for
some years, in a military capacity, if they consider that every Roman was obliged to spend
fifteen years of his life in their armies. Is it not a shame that any man who possesses an
estate, and is at the same time healthful and young, should not fit himself by all means for
29
the defence of that, and his country, rather than to pay taxes to maintain a mercenary, who
though he may defend Mm during a war, will be sure to insult and enslave him in time of
peace. Men must not think that any country can be in a constant posture of defence, without
some trouble and charge; but certainly it is better to undergo this, and to preserve our liberty
with honour, than to be subjected to heavy taxes, and yet have it insolently ravished from us,
to our present oppression, and the lasting misery of our posterity. But it will be said, where
are the men to be found who shall exercise all this people in so many several places at once?
for the nobility and gentry know nothing of the matter; and to hire so many soldiers of
fortune, as they call them, will bechargeable, and may be dangerous, these men being all
mercenaries, and always the same men, in the same trusts: besides that the employing such
men would not be suitable to the design of breeding the men of quality and estate to
command, as well as the others to obey.
To obviate these difficulties, and because the want of a good model of militia, and a right
method for training people in time of peace, so as they need not apprehend any war, though
never so sudden, is at this day the bane of the liberty of Europe, I shall propose one,
accommodated to the invincible difficulty of bringing men of quality and estate, or men of
any rank, who have passed the time of youth, to the use of arms; and new, because though
we have many excellent models of militia, delivered to us by ancient authors, with respect to
the use of them in time of war, yet they give us but little information concerning the
methods by which they trained their whole people for war in time of peace; so that if the
model which I shall propose have not the authority of the ancients to recommend it, yet
perhaps by a severe discipline, and a right method of disposing the minds of men, as well as
forming their bodies, for military and virtuous actions, it may have some resemblance of
their excellent institutions.
What I would offer is, that four camps be formed, one in Scotland, and three in England;
into which all the young men of the respective countries should enter, on the first day of the
two and twentieth year of their age; and remain there the space of two years, if they be of
fortunes sufficient to maintain themselves; but if they are not, then to remain a year only, at
the expense of the public. In this camp they should be taught the use of all sorts of arms,
30
with the necessary evolutions; as also wrestling, leaping, swimming, and the like exercises.
He whose condition would permit him to buy and maintain a horse, should be obliged so to
do, and be taught to vault, to ride, and to manage his own horse. This camp should seldom
remain above eight days in one place, but remove from heath to heath; not only upon the
account of cleanliness and health, but to teach the youth to fortify a camp, to march, and to
accustom them (respect being always had to those of a weak constitution) to carry as much
in their march as ever any Roman soldier did; that is to say, their tents, provision, arms,
armour, their utensils, and the palisades of their camp. They should be taught to forage, and
be obliged to use the countrymen with all justice in their bargains, for that and all other
things they stand in need of from them. The food of every man within the camp should be
the same; for bread they should have only wheat, which they are to be obliged to grind with
hand-mills; they should have some salt, and a certain number of beeves allowed them at
certain times of the year. Their drink should be water, sometimes tempered with a
proportion of brandy, and at other times with vinegar. Their clothes should be plain, coarse,
and of a fashion fitted in everything for the fatigue of a camp. For all these things those who
could should pay; and those who could not should be defrayed by the public, as has been
said. The camp should be sometimes divided into two parts, which should remove from each
other many miles, and should break up again at the same time, in order to meet upon some
mountainous, marshy, woody, or in a word, cross ground; that not only their diligence,
patience, and suffering in marches, but their skill in seizing of grounds, posting bodies of
horse and foot, and advancing towards each other; their choosing a camp, and drawing out
of it in order to a battle, might be seen, as well as what orders of battle they would form
upon the variety of different grounds. The persons of quality or estate should likewise be
instructed in fortification, gunnery, and all things belonging to the duty of an engineer: and
forts should be sometimes built by the whole camp, where all the arts of attacking and
defending places should be practised. The youth having been taught to read at schools,
should be obliged to read at spare hours some excellent histories, but chiefly those in which
military actions are best described; with the books that have been best written concerning
the military art. Speeches exhorting to military and virtuous actions should be often
composed, and pronounced publicly by such of the youth as were, by education and natural
talents, qualified for it. There being none but military men allowed within the camp, and no
31
churchmen being of that number, such of the youth as may be fit to exhort the rest to all
Christian and moral duties, chiefly to humility, modesty, charity, and the pardoning of
private injuries, should be chosen to do it every Sunday, and the rest of that day spent in
reading books, and in conversation directed to the same end. And all this under so severe
and rigorous orders, attended with so exact an execution by reward and punishment, that no
officer within the camp should have the power of pardoning the one, or withholding the
other. The rewards should be all honorary, and contrived to suit the nature of the different
good qualities and degrees in which any of the youth had shown, either his modesty,
obedience, patience in suffering, temperance, diligence, address, invention, judgment,
temper, or valour. The punishments should be much more rigorous than those inflicted for
the same crimes by the law of the land. And there should be punishments for some things,
not liable to any by the common law, immodest and insolent words or actions, gaming, and
the like. No woman should be suffered to come within the camp, and the crimes of abusing
their own bodies any manner of way, punished with death. All these things to be judged by
their own councils of war; and those councils to have for rule, certain articles drawn up and
approved by the respective parliaments. The officers and masters, for instructing and
teaching the youth, in all the exercises above-mentioned, should upon the first establishment
of such a camp, be the most expert men in those disciplines; and brought by encouragements
from all places of Europe; due care being taken that they should not indict the youth with
foreign manners. But afterwards they ought to consist of such men of quality or fortune as
should be chosen for that end, out of those who had formerly passed two years in the camp,
and since that time had improved themselves in the wars; who upon their return should be
obliged to serve two years in that station. As for the numbers of those officers, or masters;
their several duties; that of the camp-master-general, and of the commissaries; the times and
manner of exercise, with divers other particulars of less consideration, and yet necessary to
be determined, in order to put such a design in execution, for brevity's sake I omit them, as
easy to be resolved. But certainly it were no hard matter, for men that had passed through
such a discipline as that of the camp I have described, to retain it after they should return to
their several homes; if the people of every town and village, together with those of the
adjacent habitations, were obliged to meet fifty times in the year, on such days as should be
found most convenient; and exercise four hours every time: for all men being instructed in
32
what they are to do; and the men of quality and estate most knowing, and expert of all
others, the exercise might be performed in great perfection. There might also be yearly in the
summer time, a camp of some thousands of the nearest neighbours brought and kept together
for a week to do those exercises, which cannot be performed in any other place: every man
of a certain estate being obliged to keep a horse fit for the war. By this means it would be
easy upon any occasion, though never so small (as for example, the keeping of the peace,
and putting the laws in execution where force is necessary) or never so great and sudden (as
upon account of invasions and conspiracies) to bring together such numbers of officers and
soldiers as the exigence required, according to the practice of ancient Rome; which in this
particular might be imitated by us without difficulty: and if such a method were once
established, there would be no necessity of keeping up a militia formed into regiments of
foot and horse in time of peace. Now if this militia should stand in need of any farther
improvement (because no militias seem comparable to those exercised in actual war; as that
of the barons by their constant feuds; and that of Rome, and some other ancient
commonwealths, by their perpetual wars) a certain small number of forces might be
employed in any foreign country where there should be action; a fourth part of which might
be changed every year; that all those who had in this manner acquired experience, might be
dispersed among the several regiments of any army, that the defence of these countries
should at any time call for; which would serve to confirm and give assurance to the rest.
Such a militia would be of no great expense to these nations; for the mean clothing and
provisions for those who could not maintain themselves, being given only for one year,
would amount to little; and no other expense would be needful, except for their arms, a
small train of artillery for each camp, and what is to be given for the encouragement of the
first officers and masters.
A militia upon such a foot would have none of the infinite and insuperable difficulties there
are, to bring a few men who live at a great distance from one another, frequently together to
exercise; at which consequently they must be from home every time several days: of finding
such a number of masters, as are necessary to train so many thousands of people ignorant of
all exercise, in so many different places, and for the most part at the same time: it would
have none of those innumerable encumbrances, and unnecessary expenses, with which a
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militia formed into regiments of foot and horse in time of peace is attended. in such a camp
the youth would not only be taught the exercise of a musket with a few evolutions, which is
all that men in ordinary militias pretend to, and is the least part of the duty of a soldier; but
besides a great many exercises to strengthen and dispose the body for fight, they would learn
to fence, to ride, and manage a horse for the war; to forage and live in a camp; to fortify,
attack, and defend any place; and what is no less necessary, to undergo the greatest toils, and
to give obedience to the severest orders. Such a militia, by sending beyond seas certain
proportions of it, and relieving them from time to time, would enable us to assist our allies
more powerfully than by standing armies we could ever do. Such a camp would take away
the great difficulty of bringing men of all conditions, who have passed the time of their
youth, to apply themselves to the use and exercise of arms; and beginning with them early,
when like wax they may be moulded into any shape, would dispose them to place their
greatest honour in the performance of those exercises, and inspire them with the fires of
military glory, to which that age is so inclined; which impression being made upon their
youth, would last as long as life. Such a camp would be as great a school of virtue as of
military discipline: in which the youth would learn to stand in need of few things; to be
content with that small allowance which nature requires; to suffer, as well as to act; to be
modest, as well as brave; to be as much ashamed of doing anything insolent or injurious, as
of turning their back upon an enemy; they would learn to forgive injuries done to
themselves, but to embrace with joy the occasions of dying to revenge those done to their
country: and virtue imbibed in younger years would cast a flavour to the utmost periods of
life. In a word, they would learn greater and better things than the military art, and more
necessary too, if anything can be more necessary than the defence of our country. Such a
militia might not only defend a people living in an island, but even such as are placed in the
midst of the most warlike nations of the world.
Now till such a militia may be brought to some perfection, our present militia is not only
sufficient to defend us; but considering the circumstances of the French affairs, especially
with relation to Spain, Britain cannot justly apprehend an invasion, if the fleet of England, to
which Scotland furnished during the late war seven or eight thousand seamen, were in such
order as it ought to be. And it can never be the interest of these nations to take any other
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share in preserving the balance of Europe, than what may be performed by our fleet. By
which means our money will be spent amongst ourselves; our trade preserved to support the
charge of the navy; our enemies totally driven out of the sea, and great numbers of their
forces diverted from opposing the armies of our allies abroad, to the defence of their own
coasts.
If this method had been taken in the late war, I presume it would have proved not only more
advantageous to us, but also more serviceable to our allies than that which was followed.
And it is in vain to say, that at this rate we shall have no allies at all: for the weaker party on
the Continent must be contented to accept our assistance in the manner we think fit to give
it, or inevitably perish. But if we send any forces beyond the seas to join those of our allies,
they ought to be part of our militia, as has been said, and not standing forces; otherwise, at
the end of every war, the present struggle will recur, and at one time or other these nations
will be betrayed, and a standing army established: so that nothing can save us from
following the fate of all the other kingdoms in Europe, but putting our trust altogether in our
fleet and militias, and having no other forces than these. The sea is the only empire which
can naturally belong to us. Conquest is not our interest, much less to consume our people
and treasure in conquering for others.
To conclude; if we seriously consider the happy condition of these nations, who have lived
so long under the blessings of liberty, we cannot but be affected with the most tender
compassion to think that the Scots, who have for so many ages, with such resolution,
defended their liberty against the Picts, Britons, Romans, Saxons, Danes, Irish, Normans,
and English, as well as against the violence and tyranny of so many of their own princes;
that the English, who, whatever revolutions their country has been subject to, have still
maintained their rights and liberties against all attempts; who possess a country, everywhere
cultivated and improved by the industry of rich husbandman; her rivers and harbours filled
with ships; her cities, towns, and villages enriched with manufactures; where men of vast
estates live in secure possession of them, and whose merchants live in as great splendour as
the nobility of other nations: that Scotland which has a gentry born to excel in arts and arms:
that England which has a commonalty, not only surpassing all those of that degree which the
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world can now boast of, but also those of all former ages, in courage, honesty, good sense,
industry, and generosity of temper; in whose very looks there are such visible marks of a
free and liberal education; which advantages cannot be imputed to the climate, or to any
other cause, but the freedom of the government under which they live: I say, it cannot but
make the hearts of all honest men bleed to think, that in their days the felicity and liberties of
such countries must come to a period, if the parliaments do not prevent it, and his majesty be
not prevailed upon to lay aside the thoughts of mercenary armies, which, if once established,
will inevitably produce those fatal consequences that have always attended such forces in
the other kingdoms of Europe; violation of property, decay of trade, oppression of the
country by heavy taxes and quarters, the utmost misery and slavery of the poorer sort, the
ruin of the nobility by their expenses in court and army, deceit and treachery in all ranks of
men, occasioned by want and necessity. Then shall we see the gentry of Scotland, ignorant
through want of education, and cowardly by being oppressed; then shall we see the once
happy commonalty of England become base and abject, by being continually exposed to the
brutal insolence of the soldiers; the women debauched by their lust; ugly and nasty through
poverty, and the want of things necessary to preserve their natural beauty. Then shall we see
that great city, the pride and glory, not only of our island, but of the world, subjected to the
excessive impositions Paris now lies under, and reduced to a peddling trade, serving only to
foment the luxury of a court. Then will Britain know what obligations she has to those who
are for mercenary armies.
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Benjamin Franklin, Plain Truth (1747)
Online Source:The Papers of Benjamin FranklinSponsored by The American Philosophical Society and Yale UniversityDigital Edition by The Packard Humanities Institutehttp://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp
Document:
Plain Truth
Plain Truth: or, Serious Considerations On the Present State of the City of Philadelphia, and Province of Pennsylvania. By a Tradesman of Philadelphia. Printed in the Year
MDCCXLVII.
It is said the wise Italians make this proverbial Remark on our Nation, viz. The English
FEEL, but they do not SEE. That is, they are sensible of Inconveniencies when they are
present, but do not take sufficient Care to prevent them: Their natural Courage makes them
too little apprehensive of Danger, so that they are often surpriz’d by it, unprovided of the
proper Means of Security. When ’tis too late they are sensible of their Imprudence: After
great Fires, they provide Buckets and Engines: After a Pestilence they think of keeping clean
their Streets and common Shores: and when a Town has been sack’d by their Enemies, they
provide for its Defence, &c. This Kind of AFTER-WISDOM is indeed so common with us, as
to occasion the vulgar, tho’ very significant Saying, When the Steed is stolen, you shut the
Stable Door.
But the more insensible we generally are of publick Danger, and indifferent when
warn’d of it, so much the more freely, openly, and earnestly, ought such as apprehend it, to
speak their Sentiments; that if possible, those who seem to sleep, may be awaken’d, to think
of some Means of Avoiding or Preventing the Mischief before it be too late.
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Believing therefore that ’tis my DUTY, I shall honestly speak my Mind in the following
Paper.
War, at this Time, rages over a great Part of the known World; our News-Papers are
Weekly filled with fresh Accounts of the Destruction it every where occasions.
Pennsylvania, indeed, situate in the Center of the Colonies, has hitherto enjoy’d profound
Repose; and tho’ our Nation is engag’d in a bloody War, with two great and powerful
Kingdoms, yet, defended, in a great Degree, from the French on the one Hand by the
Northern Provinces, and from the Spaniards on the other by the Southern, at no small
Expence to each, our People have, till lately, slept securely in their Habitations.
There is no British Colony excepting this, but has made some Kind of Provision for its
Defence; many of them have therefore never been attempted by an Enemy; and others that
were attack’d, have generally defended themselves with Success. The Length and Difficulty
of our Bay and River has been thought so effectual a Security to us, that hitherto no Means
have been entered into that might discourage an Attempt upon us, or prevent its succeeding.
But whatever Security this might have been while both Country and City were poor,
and the Advantage to be expected scarce worth the Hazard of an Attempt, it is now doubted
whether we can any longer safely depend upon it. Our Wealth, of late Years much
encreas’d, is one strong Temptation, our defenceless State another, to induce an Enemy to
attack us; while the Acquaintance they have lately gained with our Bay and River, by Means
of the Prisoners and Flags of Truce they have had among us; by Spies which they almost
every where maintain, and perhaps from Traitors among ourselves; with the Facility of
getting Pilots to conduct them; and the known Absence of Ships of War, during the greatest
Part of the Year, from both Virginia and New-York, ever since the War began, render the
Appearance of Success to the Enemy far more promising, and therefore highly encrease our
DANGER.
That our Enemies may have Spies abroad, and some even in these Colonies, will not be
made much doubt of, when ’tis considered, that such has been the Practice of all Nations in
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all Ages, whenever they were engaged, or intended to engage in War. Of this we have an
early Example in the Book of Judges (too too [sic] pertinent to our Case, and therefore I
must beg leave a little to enlarge upon it) where we are told, Chap. xviii, v. 2, That the
Children of Dan sent of their Family five Men from their Coasts to spie out the Land, and
search it, saying, Go, search the LAND. These Danites it seems were at this Time not very
orthodox in their Religion, and their Spies met with a certain idolatrous Priest of their own
Persuasion, v. 3, and they said to him, Who brought thee hither! what makest thou in this
Place? and what hast thou here? [would to God no such Priests were to be found, among
us.] And they said unto him, verse 5, Ask Counsel of God, that we may know whether our
Way which we go shall be prosperous? And the Priest said unto them, Go in Peace; before
the Lord is your Way wherein you go. [Are there no Priests among us, think you, that might,
in the like Case, give an Enemy as good Encouragement? ’Tis well known, that we have
Numbers of the same Religion with those who of late encouraged the French to invade our
Mother-Country.] And they came, Verse 7, to Laish, and saw the People that were therein,
how they dwelt CARELESS, after the Manner of the Zidonians, QUIET and SECURE. They
thought themselves secure, no doubt; and as they never had been disturbed, vainly imagined
they never should. ’Tis not unlikely that some might see the Danger they were exposed to by
living in that careless Manner, but that if these publickly expressed their Apprehensions, the
rest reproached them as timorous Persons, wanting Courage or Confidence in their Gods,
who (they might say) had hitherto protected them. But the Spies, Verse 8, returned, and said
to their Countrymen, Verse 9, Arise that we may go up against them; for we have seen the
Land, and behold it is very good! And are ye still? Be not slothful to go. Verse 10, When ye
go, ye shall come unto a People SECURE; [that is, a People that apprehend no Danger, and
therefore have made no Provision against it; great Encouragement this!] and to a large
Land, and a Place where there is no Want of any Thing. What could they desire more?
Accordingly we find, in the following Verses, that Six hundred Men only, appointed with
Weapons of War, undertook the Conquest of this large Land; knowing that 600 Men, armed
and disciplined, would be an Over-match perhaps for 60,000, unarmed, undisciplined, and
off their Guard. And when they went against it, the idolatrous Priest, Verse 17, with his
graven Image, and his Ephod, and his Teraphim, and his molten Image, [Plenty of
superstitious Trinkets] joined with them, and, no doubt, gave them all the Intelligence and
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Assistance in his Power; his Heart, as the Text assures us, being glad, perhaps for Reasons
more than one. And now, what was the Fate of poor Laish! The 600 Men being arrived,
found, as the Spies had reported, a People QUIET and SECURE, Verse 20, 21. And they smote
them with the Edge of the Sword, and burnt the City with FIRE; and there was no
DELIVERER, because it was far from Zidon. Not so far from Zidon, however, as
Pennsylvania is from Britain; and yet we are, if possible, more careless than the People of
Laish! As the Scriptures are given for our Reproof, Instruction and Warning, may we make a
due Use of this Example, before it be too late!
And is our Country, any more than our City, altogether free from Danger? Perhaps not.
We have, ’tis true, had a long Peace with the Indians: But it is a long Peace indeed, as well
as a long Lane, that has no Ending. The French know the Power and Importance of the Six
Nations, and spare no Artifice, Pains or Expence, to gain them to their Interest. By their
Priests they have converted many to their Religion, and these have openly espoused their
Cause. The rest appear irresolute which Part to take; no Persuasions, tho’ enforced with
costly Presents, having yet been able to engage them generally on our Side, tho’ we had
numerous Forces on their Borders, ready to second and support them. What then may be
expected, now those Forces are, by Orders from the Crown, to be disbanded; when our
boasted Expedition is laid aside, thro’ want (as it may appear to them) either of Strength or
Courage; when they see that the French, and their Indians, boldly, and with Impunity, ravage
the Frontiers of NewYork, and scalp the Inhabitants; when those few Indians that engaged
with us against the French, are left exposed to their Resentment: When they consider these
Things, is there no Danger that, thro’ Disgust at our Usage, joined with Fear of the French
Power, and greater Confidence in their Promises and Protection than in ours, they may be
wholly gained over by our Enemies, and join in the War against us? If such should be the
Case, which God forbid, how soon may the Mischief spread to our Frontier Counties? And
what may we expect to be the Consequence, but deserting of Plantations, Ruin, Bloodshed
and Confusion!
Perhaps some in the City, Towns and Plantations near the River, may say to
themselves, An Indian War on the Frontiers will not affect us; the Enemy will never come
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near our Habitations; let those concern’d take Care of themselves. And others who live in
the Country, when they are told of the Danger the City is in from Attempts by Sea, may say,
What is that to us? The Enemy will be satisfied with the Plunder of the Town, and never
think it worth his while to visit our Plantations: Let the Town take care of itself. These are
not mere Suppositions, for I have heard some talk in this strange Manner. But are these the
Sentiments of true Pennsylvanians, of Fellow-Countrymen, or even of Men that have
common Sense or Goodness? Is not the whole Province one Body, united by living under
the same Laws, and enjoying the same Priviledges? Are not the People of City and Country
connected as Relations both by Blood and Marriage, and in Friendships equally dear? Are
they not likewise united in Interest, and mutually useful and necessary to each other? When
the Feet are wounded, shall the Head say, It is not me; I will not trouble myself to contrive
Relief? Or if the Head is in Danger, shall the Hands say, We are not affected, and therefore
will lend no Assistance! No. For so would the Body be easily destroyed: But when all Parts
join their Endeavours for its Security, it is often preserved. And such should be the Union
between the Country and the Town; and such their mutual Endeavours for the Safety of the
Whole. When NewEngland, a distant Colony, involv’d itself in a grievous Debt to reduce
Cape-Breton, we freely gave Four Thousand Pounds for their Relief. And at another Time,
remembering that Great Britain, still more distant, groan’d under heavy Taxes in Supporting
the War, we threw in our Mite to their Assistance, by a free Gift of Three Thousand Pounds:
And shall Country and Town join in helping Strangers (as those comparatively are) and yet
refuse to assist each other?
But whatever different Opinions we have of our Security in other Respects, our TRADE,
all seem to agree, is in Danger of being ruin’d in another Year. The great Success of our
Enemies, in two different Cruizes this last Summer in our Bay, must give them he greatest
Encouragement to repeat more frequently their Visits, the Profit being almost certain, and
the Risque next to nothing. Will not the first Effect of this be, an Enhauncing of the Price of
all foreign Goods to the Tradesman and Farmer, who use or consume them? For the Rate of
Insurance will increase in Proportion to the Hazard of Importing them; and in the same
Proportion will the Price of those Goods increase. If the Price of the Tradesman’s Work and
the Farmer’s Produce would encrease equally with the Price of foreign Commodities, the
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Damage would not be so great: But the direct contrary must happen. For the same Hazard,
or Rate of Insurance, that raises the Price of what is imported, must be deducted out of, and
lower the Price of what is exported. Without this Addition and Deduction, as long as the
Enemy cruize at our Capes, and take those Vessels that attempt to go out, as well as those
that endeavour to come in, none can afford to trade, and Business must be soon at a Stand.
And will not the Consequences be, A discouraging of many of the Vessels that us’d to come
from other Places to purchase our Produce, and thereby a Turning of the Trade to Ports that
can be entered with less Danger, and capable of furnishing them with the same
Commodities, as New-York, &c? A Lessening of Business to every Shopkeeper, together
with Multitudes of bad Debts; the high Rate of Goods discouraging the Buyers, and the low
Rates of their Labour and Produce rendering them unable to pay for what they had bought:
Loss of Employment to the Tradesman, and bad Pay for what little he does: And lastly, Loss
of many Inhabitants, who will retire to other Provinces not subject to the like
Inconveniencies; whence a Lowering of the Value of Lands, Lots, and Houses.
The Enemy, no doubt, have been told, That the People of Pennsylvania are Quakers,
and against all Defence, from a Principle of Conscience; this, tho’ true of a Part, and that a
small Part only of the Inhabitants, is commonly said of the Whole; and what may make it
look probable to Strangers, is, that in Fact, nothing is done by any Part of the People towards
their Defence. But to refuse Defending one’s self or one’s Country, is so unusual a Thing
among Mankind, that possibly they may not believe it, till by Experience they find, they can
come higher and higher up our River, seize our Vessels, land and plunder our Plantations
and Villages, and retire with their Booty unmolested. Will not this confirm the Report, and
give them the greatest Encouragement to strike one bold Stroke for the City, and for the
whole Plunder of the River?
It is said by some, that the Expence of a Vessel to guard our Trade, would be very
heavy, greater than perhaps all the Enemy can be supposed to take from us at Sea would
amount to; and that it would be cheaper for the Government to open an Insurance-Office,
and pay all Losses. But is this right Reasoning? I think not: For what the Enemy takes is
clear Loss to us, and Gain to him; encreasing his Riches and Strength as much as it
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diminishes ours, so making the Difference double; whereas the Money paid our own
Tradesmen for Building and Fitting out a Vessel of Defence, remains in the Country, and
circulates among us; what is paid to the Officers and Seamen that navigate her, is also spent
ashore, and soon gets into other Hands; the Farmer receives the Money for her Provisions;
and on the whole, nothing is clearly lost to the Country but her Wear and Tear, or so much
as she sells for at the End of the War less than her first Cost. This Loss, and a trifling one it
is, is all the Inconvenience: But how many and how great are the Conveniencies and
Advantages! And should the Enemy, thro’ our Supineness and Neglect to provide for the
Defence both of our Trade and Country, be encouraged to attempt this City, and after
plundering us of our Goods, either burn it, or put it to Ransom; how great would that Loss
be! Besides the Confusion, Terror, and Distress, so many Hundreds of Families would be
involv’d in!
The Thought of this latter Circumstance so much affects me, that I cannot forbear
expatiating somewhat more upon it. You have, my dear Countrymen, and Fellow Citizens,
Riches to tempt a considerable Force to unite and attack you, but are under no Ties or
Engagements to unite for your Defence. Hence, on the first Alarm, Terror will spread over
All; and as no Man can with Certainty depend that another will stand by him, beyong Doubt
very many will seek Safety by a speedy Flight. Those that are reputed rich, will flee, thro’
Fear of Torture, to make them produce more than they are able. The Man that has a Wife
and Children, will find them hanging on his Neck, beseeching him with Tears to quit the
City, and save his Life, to guide and protect them in that Time of general Desolation and
Ruin. All will run into Confusion, amidst Cries and Lamentations, and the Hurry and
Disorder of Departers, carrying away their Effects. The Few that remain will be unable to
resist. Sacking the City will be the first, and Burning it, in all Probability, the last Act of the
Enemy. This, I believe, will be the Case, if you have timely Notice. But what must be your
Condition, if suddenly surprized, without previous Alarm, perhaps in the Night! Confined to
your Houses, you will have nothing to trust to but the Enemy’s Mercy. Your best Fortune
will be, to fall under the Power of Commanders of King’s Ships, able to controul the
Mariners; and not into the Hands of licentious Privateers. Who can, without the utmost
Horror, conceive the Miseries of the Latter! when your Persons, Fortunes, Wives and
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Daughters, shall be subject to the wanton and unbridled Rage, Rapine and Lust, of Negroes,
Molattoes, and others, the vilest and most abandoned of Mankind. A dreadful Scene! which
some may represent as exaggerated. I think it my Duty to warn you: Judge for yourselves.
’Tis true, with very litte Notice, the Rich may shift for themselves. The Means of
speedy Flight are ready in their Hands; and with some previous Care to lodge Money and
Effects in distant and secure Places, tho’ they should lose much, yet enough may be left
them, and to spare. But most unhappily circumstanced indeed are we, the middling People,
the Tradesmen, Shopkeepers, and Farmers of this Province and City! We cannot all fly with
our Families; and if we could, how shall we subsist? No; we and they, and what little we
have gained by hard Labour and Industry, must bear the Brunt: The Weight of
Contributions, extorted by the Enemy (as it is of Taxes among ourselves) must be surely
borne by us. Nor can it be avoided as we stand at present; for tho’ we are numerous, we are
quite defenceless, having neither Forts, Arms, Union, nor Discipline. And tho’ it were true,
that our Trade might be protected at no great Expence, and our Country and our City easily
defended, if proper Measures were but taken; yet who shall take these Measures? Who shall
pay that Expence? On whom may we fix our Eyes with the least Expectation that they will
do any one Thing for our Security? Should we address that wealthy and powerful Body of
People, who have ever since the War governed our Elections, and filled almost every Seat in
our Assembly; should we intreat them to consider, if not as Friends, at least as Legislators,
that Protection is as truly due from the Government to the People, as Obedience from the
People to the Government; and that if on account of their religious Scruples, they themselves
could do no Act for our Defence, yet they might retire, relinquish their Power for a Season,
quit the Helm to freer Hands during the present Tempest, to Hands chosen by their own
Interest too, whose Prudence and Moderation, with regard to them, they might safely
confide in; secure, from their own native Strength, of resuming again their present Stations,
whenever it shall please them: Should we remind them, that the Publick Money, raised from
All, belongs to All; that since they have, for their own Ease, and to secure themselves in the
quiet Enjoyment of their Religious Principles (and may they long enjoy them) expended
such large Sums to oppose Petitions, and engage favourable Representations of their
Conduct, if they themselves could by no Means be free to appropriate any Part of the
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Publick Money for our Defence; yet it would be no more than Justice to spare us a
reasonable Sum for that Purpose, which they might easily give to the King’s Use as
heretofore, leaving all the Appropriation to others, who would faithfully apply it as we
desired: Should we tell them, that tho’ the Treasury be at present empty, it may soon be
filled by the outstanding Publick Debts collected; or at least Credit might be had for such a
Sum, on a single Vote of the Assembly: That tho’ they themselves may be resigned and easy
under this naked, defenceless State of the Country, it is far otherwise with a very great Part
of the People; with us, who can have no Confidence that God will protect those that neglect
the Use of rational Means for their Security; nor have any Reason to hope, that our Losses, if
we should suffer any, may be made up by Collections in our Favour at Home? Should we
conjure them by all the Ties of Neighbourhood, Friendship, Justice and Humanity, to
consider these Things; and what Distraction, Misery and Confusion, what Desolation and
Distress, may possibly be the Effect of their unseasonable Predominancy and Perseverance;
yet all would be in vain: For they have already been by great Numbers of the People
petitioned in vain. Our late Governor did for Years sollicit, request, and even threaten them
in vain. The Council have since twice remonstrated to them in vain. Their religious
Prepossessions are unchangeable, their Obstinacy invincible. Is there then the least Hope
remaining, that from that Quarter any Thing should arise for our Security?
And is our Prospect better, if we turn our Eyes to the Strength of the opposite Party,
those Great and rich Men, Merchants and others, who are ever railing at Quakers for doing
what their Principles seem to require, and what in Charity we ought to believe they think
their Duty, but take no one Step themselves for the Publick Safety? They have so much
Wealth and Influence, if they would use it, that they might easily, by their Endeavours and
Example, raise a military Spirit among us, make us fond, studious of, and expert in Martial
Discipline, and effect every Thing that is necessary, under God, for our Protection. But
ENVY seems to have taken Possession of their Hearts, and to have eaten out and destroyed
every generous, noble, Publick-spirited Sentiment. Rage at the Disappointment of their little
Schemes for Power, gnaws their Souls, and fills them with such cordial Hatred to their
Opponents, that every Proposal, by the Execution of which those may receive Benefit as
well as themselves, is rejected with Indignation. What, say they, shall we lay out our Money
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to protect the Trade of Quakers? Shall we fight to defend Quakers? No; Let the Trade
perish, and the City burn; let what will happen, we shall never lift a Finger to prevent it. Yet
the Quakers have conscience to plead for their Resolution not to fight, which these
Gentlemen have not: Conscience with you, Gentlemen, is on the other Side of the Question:
Conscience enjoins it as a DUTY on you (and indeed I think it such on every Man) to defend
your Country, your Friends, your Aged Parents, your Wives, and helpless Children: And yet
you resolve not to perform this Duty, but act contrary to your own Consciences, because the
Quakers act according to theirs. ’Till of late I could scarce believe the Story of him who
refused to pump in a sinking Ship, because one on board, whom he hated, would be saved
by it as well as himself. But such, it seems, is the Unhappiness of human Nature, that our
Passions, when violent, often are too hard for the united Force of Reason, Duty and Religion.
Thus unfortunately are we circumstanc’d at this Time, my dear Countrymen and
Fellow-Citizens; we, I mean, the middling People, the Farmers, Shopkeepers and Tradesmen
of this City and Country. Thro’ the Dissensions of our Leaders, thro’ Mistaken Principles of
religion, join’d with a Love of Worldly Power, on the one Hand; thro’ Pride, Envy and
implacable Resentment on the other; our Lives, our Families and little Fortunes, dear to us as
any Great Man’s can be to him, are to remain continually expos’d to Destruction, from an
enterprizing, cruel, now well-inform’d, and by Success encourag’d Enemy. It seems as if
Heaven, justly displead’d at our growing Wickedness, and determin’d to punish this once
favour’d Land, had suffered our Chiefs to engage in these foolish and mischievous
Contentions, for little Posts and paltry Distinctions, that our Hands might be bound up, our
Understandings darkned and misled, and every Means of our Security neglected. It seems as
if our greatest Men, our Cives nobilissimi of both Parties, had sworn the Ruin of the Country,
and invited the French, our most inveterate Enemy, to destroy it. Where then shall we seek
for Succour and Protection? The Government we are immediately under denies it to us; and
if the Enemy comes, we are far from ZIDON, and there is no Deliverer near. Our Case
indeed is dangerously bad; but perhaps there is yet a Remedy, if we have but the Prudence
and the Spirit to apply it.
46
If this now flourishing City, and greatly improving Colony, is destroy’d and ruin’d, it
will not be for want of Numbers of Inhabitants able to bear Arms in its Defence. ’Tis
computed that we have at least (exclusive of the Quakers) 60,000 Fighting Men, acquainted
with Fire-Arms, many of them Hunters and Marksmen, hardy and bold. All we want is
Order, Discipline, and a few Cannon. At present we are like the separate Filaments of Flax
before the Thread is form’d, without Strength because without Connection; but UNION
would make us strong and even formidable: Tho’ the Great should neither help nor join us;
tho’ they should even oppose our Uniting from some mean Views of their own, yet, if we
resolve upon it, and it please GOD to inspire us with the necessary Prudence and Vigour, it
may be effected. Great Numbers of our People are of BRITISH RACE, and tho’ the fierce
fighting Animals of those happy Islands, are said to abate their native Fire and Intrepidity,
when removed to a Foreign Clime, yet with the People ’tis not so; Our Neighbours of New-
England afford the World a convincing Proof, that BRITONS, tho’ a Hundred Years
transplanted, and to the remotest Part of the Earth, may yet retain, even to the third and
fourth Descent, that Zeal for the Publick Good, that military Prowess, and that undaunted
Spirit, which has in every Age distinguished their Nation. What Numbers have we likewise
of those brave People, whose Fathers in the last Age made so glorious a Stand for our
Religion and Liberties, when invaded by a powerful French Army, join’d by Irish
Catholicks, under a bigotted Popish King! Let the Memorable SIEGE of LONDONDERRY, and
the signal Actions of the INISKILLINGERS, by which the Heart of that Prince’s Schemes was
broken, be perpetual Testimonies of the Courage and Conduct of those noble Warriors! Nor
are there wanting amongst us, Thousands of that Warlike Nation, whose Sons have ever
since the Time of Caesar maintained the Character he gave their Fathers, of joining the most
obstinate Courage to all the other military Virtues. I mean the Brave and steady GERMANS.
Numbers of whom have actually borne Arms in the Service of their respective Princes; and
if they fought well for their Tyrants and Oppressors, would they refuse to unite with us in
Defence of their newly acquired and most precious Liberty and Property? Were this Union
form’d, were we once united, thoroughly arm’d and disciplin’d, was every Thing in our
Power done for our Security, as far as human Means and Foresight could provide, we might
then, with more Propriety, humbly ask the Assistance of Heaven, and a Blessing on our
lawful Endeavours. The very Fame of our Strength and Readiness would be a Means of
47
Discouraging our Enemies; for ’tis a wise and true Saying, that One Sword often keeps
another in the Scabbard. The Way to secure Peace is to be prepared for War. They that are
on their Guard, and appear ready to receive their Adversaries, are in much less Danger of
being attack’d, than the supine, secure and negligent. We have yet a Winter before us, which
may afford a good and almost sufficient Opportunity for this, if we seize and improve it with
a becoming Vigour. And if the Hints contained in this Paper are so happy as t meet with a
suitable Disposition of Mind in his Countrymen and Fellow Citizens, the Writer of it will, in
a few Days, lay before them a Form of an ASSOCIATION for the Purposes herein mentioned,
together with a practicable Scheme for raising the Money necessary for the Defence of our
Trade, City, and Country, without laying a Burthen on any Man.
May the GOD of WISDOM, STRENGTH and POWER, the Lord of the Armies of Israel,
inspire us with Prudence in this Time of DANGER; take away from us all the Seeds of
Contention and Division, and unite the Hearts and Counsels of all of us, of whatever SECT
or NATION, in one Bond of Peace, Brotherly Love, and generous Publick spirit; May he give
us Strength and Resolution to amend our Lives, and remove from among us every Thing that
is displeasing to him; afford us his most Gracious Protection, confound the Designs of our
Enemies, and give PEACE in all our Borders, is the sincere Prayer of
A TRADESMAN of Philadelphia.
Conjuravere cives nobilissimi Patriam incendere; GALLORUM GENTEM, infestissimam
nomini Romano, ad Bellum arcessunt. CAT. in SALUST.
48
“Ordinance for Disarming Non-Associators,” 19 July 1776
Online Source:
American Archives: Documents of the American Revolution, 1774-1776Northern Illinois University Archiveshttp://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/var/lib/philologic/databases/amarch/.22221(Note: The title on the webpage is incorrect)
Print Source:
Peter Force ed. American Archives. Washington, 1837-53. Vol. 2, p. 6.
Document:
“Ordinance for Disarming Non-Associators,” 19 July 1776
The House resumed the consideration of the Ordinance respecting the Arms of Non-
Associators; and after a considerable time employed in debating thereon and amending the
same, it was ordained in the following words, viz:
Whereas the Non-Associators in this State have either refused or neglected to deliver up
their Arms according to the Resolves of the honourable Continental Congress and the
Assembly of Pennsylvania, and effectual measures have not been taken to carry the said
Resolves into execution:
Be it therefore Ordained, by the authority of this Convention, That the Colonel or next
officer in command of every Battalion of Militia in this State, is hereby authorized,
empowered and required to collect, receive, and take all the Arms in his district or township
nearest to such officer, which are in the hands of Non-Associators, in the most expeditious
and effectual manner in his power, and shall give to the owners receipts for such Arms,
specifying the amount of the appraisement; and such as can be repaired shall with all
possible despatch be rendered fit for service, and the value according to the appraisement of
49
all such Arms, together with the repairs and transportation, shall be paid to the officers by
the Treasurer, on the order of the Council of Safety, for the use of the owners, and defraying
the charges.
And be it further Ordained, That the same Arms shall be appraised by any three reputable
freeholders appointed by the Commanding Officer. But if the owner of any Arms shall
neglect or refuse to apply for such money within six months, the same shall be applied
towards the repairs of the Arms: and the Colonels are hereby authorized to draw for the
necessary sums of money, for the purposes aforesaid, on the Council of Safety.
And it is further Ordained, That the Colonels aforesaid shall arm the Associators with the
said Arms, and keep an account to whom they are delivered, and return the same to the
Council of Safety; and every Associator shall be answerable for such Arms or the value,
unless lost or destroyed by some unavoidable accident, or in actual service.
And be it further Ordained, That in case any Arms so collected shall not be worth repairing,
the same shall be laid by until such time as may be thought proper by the Committee of the
County to return them to the owners.
Moved and Resolved, That the salary of each of the Delegates to be chosen to serve this
State in Congress shall be twenty shillings per diem.
The election of Delegates is adjourned to eight o' clock to-morrow morning.
Adjourned till to-morrow morning, eight o' clock.
50
Pennsylvania Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Article 13 (1776)
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 5, Amendment II, Document 5http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs5.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Print Source:
Thorpe, Francis Newton, ed. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909. Vol. 5, p. 3083.
Document:
Pennsylvania Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Article 13 (1776)
XIII. That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state;
and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be
kept up; And that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by,
the civil power.
51
George Washington to the President of Congress
24 September 24 1776
Online Source:
Electronic Text CenterUniversity of Virginia Libraryhttp://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=WasFi06.xml&images=images/
modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=78&division=div1
Print Source:
Washington, George, 1732-1799. The writings of George Washington from the original manuscript sources: Volume 6
Document:
George Washington to the President of Congress, September 24, 17761
Sir: From the hours allotted to Sleep, I will borrow a few Moments to convey my thoughts
on sundry important matters to Congress. I shall offer them, with that sincerity which ought
to characterize a man of candour; and with the freedom which may be used in giving useful
information, without incurring the imputation of presumption.
We are now as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution of our Army;2 the
remembrance of the difficulties which heppened upon that occasion last year, the
consequences which might have followed the change, if proper advantages had been taken 1 This letter was actually written in the early morning hours of September 25. (See Washington's letter to Congress, Sept. 25, 1776, post .)
2 The term of service for almost the whole army was to expire at or before the end of the year. Samuel Adams passed through New York on the 14th, and in a letter to John Adams (August 16) said he found "the General and his family in health and spirits; indeed, every officer and soldier appears to be determined.…I see now, more than ever I did, the importance of Congress attending immediately to enlistments for the next campaign. It would be a pity to lose your old soldiers. I am of opinion that a more generous bounty should be given, -- twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land for three years at least."
52
by the Enemy; added to a knowledge of the present temper and Situation of the Troops,
reflect but a very gloomy prospect upon the appearance of things now, and satisfie me,
beyond the possibility of doubt, that unless some speedy, and effectual measures are adopted
by Congress, our cause will be lost.
It is in vain to expect, that any (or more than a trifling) part of this Army will again
engage in the Service on the encouragement offered by Congress. When Men find that their
Townsmen and Companions are receiving 20, 30, and more Dollars, for a few Months
Service, (which is truely the case) it cannot be expected; without using compulsion; and to
force them into the Service would answer no valuable purpose. When Men are irritated, and
the Passions inflamed, they fly hastely and chearfully to Arms; but after the first emotions
are over, to expect, among such People, as compose the bulk of an Army, that they are
influenced by any other principles than those of Interest, is to look for what never did, and I
fear never will happen; the Congress will deceive themselves therefore if they expect it.
A Soldier reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged in, and the
inestimable rights he is contending for, hears you with patience, and acknowledges the truth
of your observations, but adds, that it is of no more Importance to him than others. The
Officer makes you the same reply, with this further remark, that his pay will not support
him, and he cannot ruin himself and Family to serve his Country, when every Member of the
community is equally Interested and benefitted by his Labours. The few therefore, who act
upon Principles of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop in the
Ocean. It becomes evidently clear then, that as this Contest is not likely to be the Work of a
day; as the War must be carried on systematically, and to do it, you must have good
Officers, there are, in my Judgment, no other possible means to obtain them but by
establishing your Army upon a permanent footing; and giving your Officers good pay; this
will induce Gentlemen, and Men of Character to engage; and till the bulk of your Officers
are composed of such persons as are actuated by Principles of honour, and a spirit of
enterprize, you have little to expect from them. -- They ought to have such allowances as
will enable them to live like, and support the Characters of Gentlemen; and not be driven by
a scanty pittance to the low, and dirty arts which many of them practice, to filch the Public
53
of more than the difference of pay would amount to upon an ample allowe. besides,
something is due to the Man who puts his life in his hands, hazards his health, and forsakes
the Sweets of domestic enjoyments. Why a Captn. in the Continental Service should receive
no more than 5/. Curry per day, for performing the same duties that an officer of the same
Rank in the British Service receives 10/. Sterlg. for, I never could conceive; especially when
the latter is provided with every necessary he requires, upon the best terms, and the former
can scarce procure them, at any Rate. There is nothing that gives a Man consequence, and
renders him fit for Command, like a support that renders him Independant of every body but
the State he Serves.3
With respect to the Men, nothing but a good bounty can obtain them upon a permanent
establishment; and for no shorter time than the continuance of the War, ought they to be
engaged; as Facts incontestibly prove, that the difficulty, and cost of Inlistments, increase
with time. When the Army was first raised at Cambridge, I am persuaded the Men might
have been got without a bounty for the War: after this, they began to see that the Contest
was not likely to end so speedily as was immagined, and to feel their consequence, by
remarking, that to get the Militia In, in the course of last year, many Towns were induced to
give them a bounty. Foreseeing the Evils resulting from this, and the destructive
consequences which unavoidably would follow short Inlistments, I took the Liberty in a
long Letter, written by myself (date not now recollected, as my Letter Book is not here) to
recommend the Inlistments for and during the War; assigning such Reasons for it, as
experience has since convinced me were well founded. At that time twenty Dollars would, I
am persuaded, have engaged the Men for this term. But it will not do to look back, and if the
present opportunity is slip'd, I am perswaded that twelve months more will Increase our
difficulties fourfold. I shall therefore take the freedom of giving it as my opinion, that a
good Bounty be immediately offered, aided by the proffer of at least 100, or 150 Acres of
Land and a suit of Cloaths and Blankt, to each non-Comd. Officer and Soldier; as I have
good authority for saying, that however high the Men's pay may appear, it is barely
sufficient in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of goods, to keep them in Cloaths,
3 See Washington's letter to Congress, Oct. 4, 1776, post . Ford quotes from General Greene's letter to Governor Cooke (October 3) on this point: "We want nothing but good officers to constitute as good an army as ever marched into the field. Our men are much better than the officers."
54
much less afford support to their Families. If this encouragement then is given to the Men,
and such Pay allowed the Officers as will induce Gentlemen of Character and liberal
Sentiments to engage; and proper care and precaution are used in the nomination (having
more regard to the Characters of Persons, than the Number of Men they can Inlist) we
should in a little time have an Army able to cope with any that can be opposed to it, as there
are excellent Materials to form one out of: but while the only merit an Officer possesses is
his ability to raise Men; while those Men consider, and treat him as an equal; and (in the
Character of an Officer) regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one
common herd; no order, nor no discipline can prevail; nor will the Officer ever meet with
that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination.4
To place any dependance upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff. Men just
dragged from the tender Scenes of domestick life; unaccustomed to the din of Arms; totally
unacquainted with every kind of Military skill, which being followed by a want of
confidence in themselves, when opposed to Troops regularly train'd, disciplined, and
appointed, superior in knowledge, and superior in Arms, makes them timid, and ready to fly
from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, (particularly
in the lodging) brings on sickness in many; impatience in all, and such an unconquerable
desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful, and
scandalous Desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others. Again, Men
accustomed to unbounded freedom, and no controul, cannot not brook the Restraint which is
indispensably necessary to the good order and Government of an Army; without which,
licentiousness, and every kind of disorder triumpantly reign. To bring Men to a proper
degree of Subordination, is not the work of a day, a Month or even a year; and unhappily for
us, and the cause we are Engaged in, the little discipline I have been labouring to establish in
the Army under my immediate Command, is in a manner done away by having such a
mixture of Troops as have been called together within these few Months.
4 "To attempt to introduce discipline and subordination into a new army must always be a work of much difficulty, but where the principles of democracy so universally prevail, where so great an equality and so thorough a levelling spirit predominates, either no discipline can be established, or he who attempts it must become odious and detestable, a position which no one will choose. It is impossible for any one to have an idea of the complete equality which exists between the officers and men who composed the greater part of our troops." -- Joseph Reed to Esther Reed ( his wife ), Oct. 11, 1776.
55
Relaxed, and unfit, as our Rules and Regulations of War are, for the Government of an
Army, the Militia (those properly so called, for of these we have two sorts, the Six Months
Men and those sent in as a temporary aid) do not think themselves subject to 'em, and
therefore take liberties, which the Soldier is punished for; this creates jealousy; jealousy
begets dissatisfaction, and these by degrees ripen into Mutiny; keeping the whole Army in a
confused, and disordered State; rendering the time of those who wish to see regularity and
good Order prevail more unhappy than Words can describe. Besides this, such repeated
changes take place, that all arrangement is set at nought, and the constant fluctuation of
things, deranges every plan, as fast as adopted.
These Sir, Congress may be assured, are but a small part of the Inconveniences which
might be enumerated and attributed to Militia; but there is one that merits particular
attention, and that is the expence. Certain I am, that it would be cheaper to keep 50, or
100,000 Men in constant pay than to depend upon half the number, and supply the other half
occasionally by Militia. The time the latter is in pay before and after they are in Camp,
assembling and Marching; the waste of Ammunition; the consumption of Stores, which in
spite of every Resolution, and requisition of Congress they must be furnished with, or sent
home, added to other incidental expences consequent upon their coming, and conduct in
Camp, surpasses all Idea, and destroys every kind of regularity and oeconomy which you
could establish among fixed and Settled Troops; and will, in my opinion prove (if the
scheme is adhered to) the Ruin of our Cause.
The Jealousies of a standing Army, and the Evils to be apprehended from one, are remote;
and in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the
consequence of wanting one, according to my Ideas, formed from the present view of things,
is certain, and inevitable Ruin; for if I was called upon to declare upon Oath, whether the
Militia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole; I should subscribe to the
latter. I do not mean by this however to arraign the Conduct of Congress, in so doing I
should equally condemn my own measures, (if I did not my judgment); but experience,
which is the best criterion to work by, so fully, clearly, and decisively reprobates the
56
practice of trusting to Militia, that no Man who regards order, regularity, and oeconomy; or
who has any regard for his own honour, Character, or peace of Mind, will risk them upon
this Issue.5
No less attention should be paid to the choice of Surgeons than other Officers of the
Army; they should undergo a regular examination; and if not appointed by the Director
Genl. and Surgeons of the Hospital, they ought to be subordinate to, and governed by his
directions; the Regimental Surgeons I am speaking of, many of whom are very great
Rascals, countenancing the Men in sham Complaints to exempt them from duty, and often
receiving Bribes to Certifie Indispositions, with a view to procure discharges or Furloughs;
but independant of these practices, while they are considered as unconnected with the Genl.
Hospital there will be nothing but continual Complaints of each other: The Director of the
Hospital charging them with enormity in their drafts for the Sick; and they him, for denying
such things as are necessary. In short, there is a constant bickering among them, which tends
greatly to the Injury of the Sick; and will always subsist till the Regimental Surgeons are
made to look up to the Director Genl. of the Hospital as a Superior. Whether this is the case
in regular Armies, or not, I cannot undertake to say; but certain I am there is a necessity for
it in this, or the Sick will suffer; the Regimental Surgeons are aiming, I am persuaded, to
5 Congress had, before this letter reached it, resolved (September 16) on a bounty of $20 and 100 acres of land to each noncommissioned officer and private soldier; the commissioned officers were to receive bounties in land only, scaled according to rank, September 20 Congress resolved to raise a new army and provided for supplies, etc. In transmitting these resolves to the States, President Hancock made liberal use of this Washington letter, sometimes copying whole sentences verbatim. Ford quotes General Greene's letter of September 28 as more outspoken in opinion of where the blame should rest. "The policy of Congress has been the most absurd and ridiculous imaginable, pouring in militia-men who come and go every month. A military force established upon such principles defeats itself.…The Congress goes upon a penurious plan. The present pay of the officers will not support them, and it is generally determined by the best officers to quit the service, unless a more adequate provision is made for their support. The present establishment is not thought reputable. The Congress have never furnished the men voted by near one half, certainly by above a third. Had we numbers we need not have retreated from Long Island or New York.…We must have an army to meet the enemy everywhere, to act offensively as well as defensively. Our soldiers are as good as ever were; and were the officers half as good as the men, they would beat any army on the globe of equal numbers." In a letter to General Gates (October 14),General Lee expressed his opinion of Congress and of the army in a laconic but characteristic manner. "I write this scrawl," he says, "in a hurry. Colonel Wood will describe the position of our army, which, in my own breast, I do not approve. Inter nos Congress seem to stumble at every step. I have been very free in delivering my opinion to them. General Washington is much to blame in not menacing them with resignation, unless they refrain from unhinging the army by their absurd interference."
57
break up the Genl. Hospital, and have, in numberless Instances, drawn for Medic'roes,
Stores &ca. in the most profuse and extravagant manner, for private purposes.6
Another matter highly worthy of attention, is, that other Rules and Regulation's may be
adopted for the Government of the Army than those now in existence, otherwise the Army,
but for the name, might as well be disbanded. For the most attrocious offences, (one or two
Instances only excepted) a Man receives no more than 39 Lashes; and these perhaps (thro'
the collusion of the Officer who is to see it inflicted), are given in such a manner as to
become rather a matter of sport than punishment; but when inflicted as they ought, many
hardend fellows who have been the Subjects, have declared that for a bottle of Rum they
would undergo a Second operation; it is evident therefore that this punishment is inadequate
to many Crimes it is assigned to, as a proof of it, thirty and 40 Soldiers will desert at a time;
and of late, a practice prevails, (as you will see by my Letter of the 22d) of the most
alarming nature; and which will, if it cannot be checked, prove fatal both to the Country and
Army; I mean the infamous practice of Plundering, for under the Idea of Tory property, or
property which may fall into the hands of the Enemy, no Man is secure in his effects, and
scarcely in his Person; for in order to get at them, we have several Instances of People being
frightned out of their Houses under pretence of those Houses being ordered to be burnt; and
this is done with a view of siezing the Goods; nay, in order that the villany may be more
effectually concealed, some Houses have actually been burnt to cover the theft.
I have with some others, used my utmost endeavours to stop this horrid practice, but
under the present lust after plunder, and want of Laws to punish Offenders, I might almost
as well attempt to remove Mount Atlas. -- I have ordered instant corporal Punishment upon
every Man who passes our Lines, or is seen with Plunder, that the Offenders might be
punished for disobedience of Orders; and Inclose you the proceedings of a Court Martial
held upon an Officer, who with a Party of Men had robbd a House a little beyond our Lines
of a Number of valuable Goods; among which (to shew that nothing escapes) were four
large Pier looking Glasses, Women's Cloaths, and other Articles which one would think, 6 On receiving this letter (September 30) a resolution was passed by Congress requesting the several States to appoint skillful surgeons and physicians to examine the surgeons and surgeons' mates who offered themselves to serve in the army or navy, and declaring that no commission should be issued to any who should not produce a certificate from such examiners that they were qualified for the duties of their office.
58
could be of no Earthly use to him. He was met by a Major of Brigade who ordered him to
return the Goods, as taken contrary to Genl. Orders, which he not only peremptorily refused
to do, but drew up his Party and swore he would defend them at the hazard of his Life; on
which I ordered him to be arrested, and tryed for Plundering, Disobedience of Orders, and
Mutiny; for the Remit, I refer to the Proceedings of the Court; whose judgment appeared so
exceedingly extraordinary,7 that I ordered a Reconsideration of the matter, upon which, and
with the Assistance of fresh evidence, they made Shift to Cashier him.
I adduce this Instance to give some Idea to Congress of the Currt. Sentiments and general
run of the Officers which compose the present Army; and to shew how exceedingly
necessary it is to be careful in the choice of the New Sett, even if it should take double the
time to compleat the Levies. An Army formed of good Officers moves like Clock-Work; but
there is no Situation upon Earth, less enviable, nor more distressing, than that Person's who
is at the head of Troops, who are regardless of Order and discipline; and who are unprovided
with almost every necessary. In a word the difficulties which have forever surrounded me
since I have been in the Service, and kept my Mind constantly upon the stretch; The Wounds
which my Feelings as an Officer have received by a thousand things which have happened,
contrary to my expectation and Wishes; the effect of my own Conduct, and present
appearance of things, so little pleasing to myself, as to render it a matter of no Surprize (to
me) if I should stand capitally censured by Congress; added to a consciousness of my
inability to govern an Army composed of such discordant parts, and under such a variety of
intricate and perplexing circumstances; induces not only a belief, but a thorough conviction
in my Mind, that it will be impossible unless there is a thorough change in our Military
Systems for me to conduct matters in such a manner, as to give satisfaction to the Publick
which is all the recompence I aim at, or ever wished for.8
7 Washington's many difficulties in enforcing discipline in an Army which had to be handled carefully with an eye to reenlistments are pictured in the General Orders. The court decided that Ensign Matthew Macumber, of the Sixteenth Continental Infantry, was not guilty of plundering but was guilty of insubordination and disrespect to his superior officer. The sentence was that he apologize and be reprimanded before the regiment. The copy of the court's proceedings forwarded to Congress bears this note in Washington's writing: "It is to be observed that the Men who were to share the Plunder became the Evidences for the Prisoner G. W -- n." (See General Orders, Sept. 22, 1776, ante .) On September 30 Congress directed that the court assign its reasons for the acquittal and that the same be forwarded to Congress. The court. however, attempted to justify its verdict in a report, dated October 7, which was forwarded to Congress by Washington on October 8.
59
Before I conclude I must apologize for the liberties taken in this Letter and for the blots
and scratchings therein, not having time to give it more correctly. With truth I can add, that
with every Sentiment of respect and esteem. I am etc.
8 On September 20 Congress appointed Roger Sherman, Elbridge Gerry, and Francis Lewis a committee to visit camp "to enquire into the State of the Army, and the best means of supplying their wants." They reached camp the 24th and conferred with the general officers the 26th and 27th. Their report was rendered October 3. In the Washington Papers are 12 "Queries to be made at Head Quarters" with answers to the first two in the writing of Robert Hanson Harrison, which established the strength needed for the Army at 40,000, exclusive of the Flying Camp. (See Journals of the Continental Congress , Oct. 3, 8, and 9, 1776.) The committee recommended that Brig. Gen. Thomas Mifflin should replace Col. Stephen Moylan at the head of the Quartermaster Department.
60
U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 (1787)
Online Source:
Cornell University Law SchoolLegal Information Institutehttp://topics.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei
Document:
U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay
the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but
all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes;
To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of
weights and measures;
To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United
States;
To establish post offices and post roads;
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To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;
To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;
To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against
the law of nations;
To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on
land and water;
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer
term than two years;
To provide and maintain a navy;
To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress
insurrections and repel invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part
of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states
respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding
ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress,
become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over
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all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be,
for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;--And
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
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Federalist Paper No. 25 (1787)
Online Source:
The Library of Congresshttp://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_25.html
Print Source:
New York Packet, Friday, 21 December 1787.
Document:
Federalist No. 25 (21 December 1787)
Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be
provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be,
in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our political association, as it would in
practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual
members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the
Confederacy.
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood do not border
on particular States, but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in
different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like
manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury. It happens that
some States, from local situation, are more directly exposed. New York is of this class.
Upon the plan of separate provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of
the establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate or ultimate
protection of her neighbors. This would neither be equitable as it respected New York nor 64
safe as it respected the other States. Various inconveniences would attend such a system.
The States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as
little able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of competent
provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or
inability of a part. If the resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its
provisions should be proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm
at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or three of its members,
and those probably amongst the most powerful. They would each choose to have some
counterpoise, and pretenses could easily be contrived. In this situation, military
establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or
proper size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be engines for the
abridgment or demolition of the national authcrity.
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State governments will too
naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the Union, the foundation of which will be the
love of power; and that in any contest between the federal head and one of its members the
people will be most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition to this immense
advantage, the ambition of the members should be stimulated by the separate and
independent possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too
great a facility to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional
authority of the Union. On the other hand, the liberty of the people would be less safe in this
state of things than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national
government. As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had
better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be jealous than in those of
which they are least likely to be jealous. For it is a truth, which the experience of ages has
attested, that the people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights
are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to the Union from the
separate possession of military forces by the States, have, in express terms, prohibited them
from having either ships or troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the
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existence of a federal government and military establishments under State authority are not
less at variance with each other than a due supply of the federal treasury and the system of
quotas and requisitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the impropriety of
restraints on the discretion of the national legislature will be equally manifest. The design of
the objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in time of peace,
though we have never been informed how far it is designed the prohibition should extend;
whether to raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity or
not. If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be
ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised what shall be
denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the Constitution? What time shall
be requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say
they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised continues?
This would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE, against threatening
or impending danger, which would be at once to deviate from the literal meaning of the
prohibition, and to introduce an extensive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the
continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted to the national government,
and the matter would then be brought to this issue, that the national government, to provide
against apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards
keep them on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community was in any
degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford
ample room for eluding the force of the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on the supposed
probability, or at least possibility, of a combination between the executive and the
legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should this at any time happen, how easy would
it be to fabricate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain or
Britain, would always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired appearances might
even be given to some foreign power, and appeased again by timely concessions. If we can
reasonably presume such a combination to have been formed, and that the enterprise is
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warranted by a sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from whatever
cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution of the project.
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the
RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most
extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its
Constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a
formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy within
our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies
of men for the protection of the State. We must receive the blow, before we could even
prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and
meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a
free government. We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders,
and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are
afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty,
by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and
would be at all times equal to the national defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to
have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been
saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too
recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war
against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the
same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this
position. The American militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their valor on
numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel
and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts
alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is a science to be
acquired and perfected by diligence, by perserverance, by time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course of human affairs,
defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of the truth of this remark.
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The Bill of Rights of that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and
ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound
peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties, has resolved to
raise a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up as long as there is any
appearance of danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on
the same subject, though on different ground. That State (without waiting for the sanction of
Congress, as the articles of the Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell
a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of
revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure; but
the instance is still of use to instruct us that cases are likely to occur under our government,
as well as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in time
of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is therefore improper in this
respect to control the legislative discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United
States, how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its
own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment
provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the post of admiral
should not be conferred twice on the same person. The Peloponnesian confederates, having
suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before
served with success in that capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians,
to gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient
institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the real power
of admiral, under the nominal title of vice-admiral. This instance is selected from among a
multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated by
domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in
their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be
cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because
they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs
that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the
68
constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of
necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
PUBLIUS.
69
Federalist Paper No. 28 (1787)
Online Source:
Library of Congresshttp://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_28.html
Print Source:
Independent Journal [26 December 1787]
Document:
Federalist Paper No. 28 (1787)Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated to
resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by
the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all
societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as
inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that the
idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the
only admissible principle of republican government), has no place but in the reveries of
those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national government, there could be
no remedy but force. The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the
mischief. If it should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the
residue would be adequate to its suppression; and the national presumption is that they
would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause,
eventually endangers all government. Regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the
Union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion had not communicated itself to
oppose the insurgents; and if the general government should be found in practice conducive
to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe that they would be
disinclined to its support.
If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a principal part of it, the
employment of a different kind of force might become unavoidable. It appears that
Massachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders within that
State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of her
citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State of New
York had been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont,
could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone?
Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the
execution of her design? If it must then be admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force
different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the State
governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the national government might be
under a like necessity, in similar extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not
surprising that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should urge as
an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for
which they contend; and what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable
consequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility
to the unceasing agitations and frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges of
petty republics?
Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of one general system, two,
or three, or even four Confederacies were to be formed, would not the same difficulty
oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be
exposed to the same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the
same expedients for upholding its authority which are objected to in a government for all the
States? Would the militia, in this supposition, be more ready or more able to support the
federal authority than in the case of a general union? All candid and intelligent men must,
upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally applicable
to either of the two cases; and that whether we have one government for all the States, or
different governments for different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire
separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force
constituted differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the community and to
maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them which amount
to insurrections and rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those who require
a more peremptory provision against military establishments in time of peace, to say that the
whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the
people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the rights and
privileges of the people, which is attainable in civil society.9
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but
in the exertion of that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms
of government, and which against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with
infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state. In
a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different
parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct government in each,
can take no regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms,
without concert, without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The
usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition in
embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to
form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their
early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and
movements, and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly
directed against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a
peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.
9 Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased extent
of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them.
The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial
strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more competent to a
struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. But in a confederacy the
people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power
being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready
to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition
towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will
infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of
the other as the instrument of redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to
preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments
will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public
liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so
likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The
legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the danger at a
distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they
can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources
of the community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different States, and
unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already experienced its utility
against the attacks of a foreign power. And it would have precisely the same effect against
the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the federal army should be able
to quell the resistance of one State, the distant States would have it in their power to make
head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue
the opposition in others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was
left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.
We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all events, be regulated by
the resources of the country. For a long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a
large army; and as the means of doing this increase, the population and natural strength of
the community will proportionably increase. When will the time arrive that the federal
government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great
body of the people of an immense empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of
their State governments, to take measures for their own defense, with all the celerity,
regularity, and system of independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a
disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.
PUBLIUS
Federalist Paper No. 29 (1788)
Online Source:
Library of Congresshttp://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_29.html
Print Source:
Daily Advertiser. Thursday, 10 January 1788
Document:
Federalist Paper No. 29 (10 January 10 1788)Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection
and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and
of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and
discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they
were called into service for the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties
of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar
moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the
degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to their usefulness. This
desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to
the direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that
the plan of the convention proposes to empower the Union "to provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be
employed in the service of the United States, RESERVING TO THE STATES
RESPECTIVELY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY
OF TRAINING THE MILITIA ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY
CONGRESS."
Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan of the convention,
there is none that was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one
from which this particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be the
most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the
disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing
armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose
care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the
inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can
command the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in
support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different
kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To
render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a
thousand prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
the Union, it has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed
Constitution for calling out the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the
execution of his duty, whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his
only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and
sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favorable
opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one
breath, that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us
in the next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS.
The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as
absurd to doubt, that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute its
declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers
who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right
to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would involve
that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing
the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a
want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of color, it
will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the
authority of the federal government over the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What
reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of authority,
merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we think of
the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this manner? How shall we
prevent a conflict between charity and judgment?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are even taught to
apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the federal government. It is
observed that select corps may be formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may be
rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the
militia may be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far
from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as
dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member
of the federal legislature from this State on the subject of a militia establishment, I should
hold to him, in substance, the following discourse:
"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile as it would be
injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in
military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a
week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry,
and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through
military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of
perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a
real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an
annual deduction from the productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating
upon the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole expense of the
civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of
labor and industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if
made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably
be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and
equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble
them once or twice in the course of a year.
"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be abandoned as mischievous
or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance that a well-digested plan should,
as soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of
the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of
moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them for service in case of need. By
thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained
militia, ready to take the field whenever the defense of the State shall require it. This will not
only lessen the call for military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time
oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable
to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to
them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those
of their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a
standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist."
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should I reason on the
same subject, deducing arguments of safety from the very sources which they represent as
fraught with danger and perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point,
is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.
There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of danger to liberty from
the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to
consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous
artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism.
Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our
brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men
who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in
the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension
can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to
command its services when necessary, while the particular States are to have the SOLE
AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS? If it were possible seriously to
indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable establishment under the federal
government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the States ought at
once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will always secure to
them a preponderating influence over the militia.
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he
is perusing some ill-written tale or romance, which instead of natural and agreeable images,
exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes "Gorgons, hydras, and
chimeras dire"; discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming
everything it touches into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable suggestions which
have taken place respecting the power of calling for the services of the militia. That of New
Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to
Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch
are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one moment there is to be a
large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the people; at another moment the militia of
Virginia are to be dragged from their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the
republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an
equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the
persons who rave at this rate imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any
conceits or absurdities upon the people of America for infallible truths?
If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism, what need of the
militia? If there should be no army, whither would the militia, irritated by being called upon
to undertake a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of
slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants,
who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their imagined
intrenchments of power, and to make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused
and incensed people? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous
and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the detestation of the very instruments of
their intended usurpations? Do they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful
acts of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred
and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to
a discerning people? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered
enthusiasts? If we were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most
ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would employ such preposterous
means to accomplish their designs.
In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper that the militia of a
neighboring State should be marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard
the republic against the violence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in
respect to the first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a
principal end of our political association. If the power of affording it be placed under the
direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the
dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements of
selfpreservation to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.
PUBLIUS.
Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention—17 th, 18 th, and 19 th Amendments (27 June 1788)
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 5, Bill of Rights, Document 9http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss9.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Print Source:
Elliot, Jonathan, ed. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. . . . 5 vols. 2d ed. 1888. Reprint. New York: Burt Franklin, n.d. Vol. 3, pp. 657-61.
Document:
Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention—17th, 18th, and 19th Amendments 27 June 1788
"17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia,
composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence
of a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and therefore
ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit;
and that, in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by,
the civil power.
"18th. That no soldier in time of peace ought to be quartered in any house without the
consent of the owner, and in time of war in such manner only as the law directs.
"19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon
payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.
Annals of Congress, Monday, 17 August 1789
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 5, Amendment II, Document 6http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs6.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Print Source:
Annals of Congress. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States. "History of Congress." 42 vols. Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1834--56. Vol. 1, pp. 749—52.
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Annals of CongressMonday, 17 August 1789
The House again resolved itself into a committee, Mr. Boudinot in the chair, on the
proposed amendments to the constitution. The third clause of the fourth proposition in the
report was taken into consideration, being as follows: "A well regulated militia, composed
of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be
compelled to bear arms."
Mr. Gerry.--This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to secure the people against the
mal-administration of the Government; if we could suppose that, in all cases, the rights of
the people would be attended to, the occasion for guards of this kind would be removed.
Now, I am apprehensive, sir, that this clause would give an opportunity to the people in
power to destroy the constitution itself. They can declare who are those religiously
scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing arms.
What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the
bane of liberty. Now, it must be evident, that, under this provision, together with their other
powers, Congress could take such measures with respect to a militia, as to make a standing
army necessary. Whenever Governments mean to invade the rights and liberties of the
people, they always attempt to destroy the militia, in order to raise an army upon their ruins.
This was actually done by Great Britain at the commencement of the late revolution. They
used every means in their power to prevent the establishment of an effective militia to the
eastward. The Assembly of Massachusetts, seeing the rapid progress that administration
were making to divest them of their inherent privileges, endeavored to counteract them by
the organization of the militia; but they were always defeated by the influence of the Crown.
Mr. Seney wished to know what question there was before the committee, in order to
ascertain the point upon which the gentleman was speaking.
Mr. Gerry replied that he meant to make a motion, as he disapproved of the words as they
read. He then proceeded. No attempts that they made were successful, until they engaged in
the struggle which emancipated them at once from their thraldom. Now, if we give a
discretionary power to exclude those from militia duty who have religious scruples, we may
as well make no provision on this head. For this reason, he wished the words to be altered so
as to be confined to persons belonging to a religious sect scrupulous of bearing arms.
Mr. Jackson did not expect that all the people of the United States would turn Quakers or
Moravians; consequently, one part would have to defend the other in case of invasion. Now
this, in his opinion, was unjust, unless the constitution secured an equivalent: for this reason
he moved to amend the clause, by inserting at the end of it, "upon paying an equivalent, to
be established by law."
Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, inquired what were the words used by the conventions
respecting this amendment. If the gentleman would conform to what was proposed by
Virginia and Carolina, he would second him. He thought they were to be excused provided
they found a substitute.
Mr. Jackson was willing to accommodate. He thought the expression was, "No one,
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service, in
person, upon paying an equivalent."
Mr. Sherman conceived it difficult to modify the clause and make it better. It is well known
that those who are religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, are equally scrupulous of getting
substitutes or paying an equivalent. Many of them would rather die than do either one or the
other; but he did not see an absolute necessity for a clause of this kind. We do not live under
an arbitrary Government, said he, and the States, respectively, will have the government of
the militia, unless when called into actual service; besides, it would not do to alter it so as to
exclude the whole of any sect, because there are men amongst the Quakers who will turn
out, notwithstanding the religious principles of the society, and defend the cause of their
country. Certainly it will be improper to prevent the exercise of such favorable dispositions,
at least whilst it is the practice of nations to determine their contests by the slaughter of their
citizens and subjects.
Mr. Vining hoped the clause would be suffered to remain as it stood, because he saw no use
in it if it was amended so as to compel a man to find a substitute, which, with respect to the
Government, was the same as if the person himself turned out to fight.
Mr. Stone inquired what the words "religiously scrupulous" had reference to: was it of
bearing arms? If it was, it ought so to be expressed.
Mr. Benson moved to have the words "but no person religiously scrupulous shall be
compelled to bear arms," struck out. He would always leave it to the benevolence of the
Legislature, for, modify it as you please, it will be impossible to express it in such a manner
as to clear it from ambiguity. No man can claim this indulgence of right. It may be a
religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion
of the Government. If this stands part of the constitution, it will be a question before the
Judiciary on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of the militia,
whether it comports with this declaration or not. It is extremely injudicious to intermix
matters of doubt with fundamentals.
I have no reason to believe but the Legislature will always possess humanity enough to
indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but they ought to be left to
their discretion.
The motion for striking out the whole clause being seconded, was put, and decided in the
negative--22 members voting for it, and 24 against it.
Mr. Gerry objected to the first part of the clause, on account of the uncertainty with which it
is expressed. A well regulated militia being the best security of a free State, admitted an idea
that a standing army was a secondary one. It ought to read, "a well regulated militia, trained
to arms;" in which case it would become the duty of the Government to provide this
security, and furnish a greater certainty of its being done.
Mr. Gerry's motion not being seconded, the question was put on the clause as reported;
which being adopted,
Mr. Burke proposed to add to the clause just agreed to, an amendment to the following
effect: "A standing army of regular troops in time of peace is dangerous to public liberty,
and such shall not be raised or kept up in time of peace but from necessity, and for the
security of the people, nor then without the consent of two-thirds of the members present of
both Houses; and in all cases the military shall be subordinate to the civil authority." This
being seconded.
Mr. Vining asked whether this was to be considered as an addition to the last clause, or an
amendment by itself. If the former, he would remind the gentleman the clause was decided;
if the latter, it was improper to introduce new matter, as the House had referred the report
specially to the Committee of the whole.
Mr. Burke feared that, what with being trammelled in rules, and the apparent disposition of
the committee, he should not be able to get them to consider any amendment; he submitted
to such proceeding because he could not help himself.
Mr. Hartley thought the amendment in order, and was ready to give his opinion on it. He
hoped the people of America would always be satisfied with having a majority to govern.
He never wished to see two-thirds or three-fourths required, because it might put it in the
power of a small minority to govern the whole Union.
U.S. Constitution, Second Amendment (1790)
Online Source:
The National Archiveshttp://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html
Document:
Amendment II
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.