Liberty and Constitutionalism: Five Founding FreedomsSummer Teachers’ Academy

on the History & Principles of the American Founding

Day FourThursday, July 15, 2010

Freedom from FearVisiting Scholar:Jessica Roney, Ohio University

Readings:DOCUMENT PAGE

Statute of Northampton 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) 2

Sir John Knight’s Case (1686) 3

Virginia Statutes, 1623-24, 1684 4First General Letter of the Governor and Deputy of the New England Company for a Plantation in Massachusetts Bay, April 1629 7

1643 Militia Statute, Massachusetts Bay 8

The British Bill of Rights, 1689, Section 7 11Andrew Fletcher, A Discourse Concerning Militia’s and Standing Armies… (1697) 20

Benjamin Franklin, Plain Truth (1747) 37

“Ordinance for Disarming Non-Associators,” 19 July 1776 49

Pennsylvania Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Article 13 (1776) 51

George Washington to the President of Congress 52

U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 (1787) 61

Federalist Paper No. 25 (1787) 64

Federalist Paper No. 28 (1787) 70

Federalist Paper No. 29 (1788) 75Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention—17th, 18th, and 19th Amendments (27 June 1788) 81

Annals of Congress, Monday, 17 August 1789 82

U.S. Constitution, Second Amendment (1790) 87

1

Statute of Northampton 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328)

Online Source:

The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 5, Amendment II, Document 1http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs1.htmlThe University of Chicago Press

Document:

Statute of Northampton 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328)

Item, it is enacted, that no man great nor small, of what condition soever he be, except the

king's servants in his presence, and his ministers in executing of the king's precepts, or of

their office, and such as be in their company assisting them, and also [upon a cry made for

arms to keep the peace, and the same in such places where such acts happen,] be so hardy to

come before the King's justices, or other of the King's ministers doing their office, with

force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night

nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no

part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the

King's pleasure. And that the King's justices in their presence, sheriffs, and other ministers

in their bailiwicks, lords of franchises, and their bailiffs in the same, and mayors and bailiffs

of cities and boroughs, within the same cities and boroughs, and borough-holders,

constables, and wardens of the peace within their wards, shall have power to execute this

act. And that the justices assigned, at their coming down into the country, shall have power

to enquire how such officers and lords have exercised their offices in this case, and to punish

them whom they find that have not done that which pertained to their office.

2

Sir John Knight’s Case (1686)

Online Source:

The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 5, Amendment II, Document 2http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs2.htmlThe University of Chicago Press

Document:

Sir John Knight's Case87 Eng. Rep. 75 K.B. 1686

An information was exhibited against him by the Attorney General, upon the statute of 2

Edw. 3, c. 3, which prohibits "all persons from coming with force and arms before the

King's Justices, &c., and from going or riding armed in affray of peace, on pain to forfeit his

armour, and suffer imprisonment at the King's pleasure." This statute is confirmed by that of

20 Rich. 2, c. 1, with an addition of a further punishment, which is to make a fine to the

King.

The information sets forth, that the defendant did walk about the streets armed with guns,

and that he went into the church of St. Michael, in Bristol, in the time of divine service, with

a gun, to terrify the King's subjects, contra formam statuti.

This case was tried at the Bar, and the defendant was acquitted.

The Chief Justice said, that the meaning of the statute of 2 Edw. 3, c. 3, was to punish

people who go armed to terrify the King's subjects. It is likewise a great offence at the

common law, as if the King were not able or willing to protect his subjects; and therefore

this Act is but an affirmance of that law; and it having appointed a penalty, this Court can

inflict no other punishment than what is therein directed.

3

Virginia Statutes, 1623-24, 1684

Online Source:

Hening’s Statutes at LargeTranscribed for the internet by Freddie L. Spradlin, Torrance, CAhttp://vagenweb.org/hening/index.htm

Print Source:

William Waller Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature, in the year 1619. 1823

Document 1: Vol. 1, p. 127Document 2: Vol. 3, pp. 13-14

Document 1:

Virginia Statutes, March 1623-4

24. That no man go or send abroad without a sufficient partie will armed.

25. That men go not to worke in the ground without their arms (and a centinell upon

them.)

27. That the commander of every plantation take care that there be sufficient of

powder and amunition within the plantation under his command and their pieces fixt

and their arms compleate.

29. That no commander of any plantation do either himselfe or suffer others to spend

powder unneccessarily in drinking or entertainments, &c.

4

Document 2:

LAWS OF VIRGINIA, APRIL 1684.−−−36th CHARLES II. 

ACT IV. An act for the better supply of the country with armes and ammunition.

      FOR the encouragement of the inhabitants of this his majesties collony and dominion of

Virginia, to provide themselves with armes and ammunition, for the defence of this his

majesties country, and that they may appear well and compleately furnished when

commanded to masters and other the king's service, which many persons have hitherto

delayed to do, for that their arms have been imprest and taken from them. −− Be it (a)

enacted by the governour, councill and burgesses of this present general assembly, and the

authority thereof, and it is hereby enacted, That all such swords, musketts, (b) pistolls,

carbines, guns, and other armes and furniture, as the inhabitants of this country are already

provided, or shall provide and furnish themselves with, for their necessary use and service,

shall from henceforth be free and exempted from being imprest or taken from him or them,

that already are provided or shall so provide or furnish himselfe, neither shall the same be

lyable to be taken by any distresse, seizure, attachment or execution, Any law, usage or

custom to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.

      And be it further enacted, That between this and the five and twentieth day of March,

which shall be in the yeare of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty six, every trooper of

the respective counties of this country, shall furnish and supply himself with a good able

horse, saddle, and all arms and (c) furniture, fitt and compleat for a trooper, and that every

foot soldier, shall furnish and supply himselfe, with a sword, musquet and other furniture fitt

for a soldier, and that each trooper and foot souldier, be provided with two pounds of

powder, and eight pounds of shott, and shall continually keep their armes well fixt, cleane

and fitt for the king's service.

      And be it further enacted, That every trooper, failing to supply himselfe within the time

aforesaid, with such arms and furniture and not afterwards keeping the same well fixt, shall

forfeite four hundred pounds of tobacco, to his majesty, for the use of the county in which

5

the (a) delinquent shall live, towards the provideing of colours, drums and trumpetts therein,

and every foot souldier soe failing to provide himselfe, within the time aforesaid, and not

keeping the same well fixt, shall forfeit two hundred pounds of tobacco to his majesty. for

the use aforesaid, and that all the militia offices of this country, take care to see the

execution and due observation of this act, in their several and respective regiments, troops

and companies.

      And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That every collonell of a regiment

within this country, shall once every yeare, upon the first Thursday in October, yearly, cause

a generall muster, and exercise of the regiment under his command, or oftner if occasion

shall require.

      And that every captain or commander of any troop of horse or foot company, within this

country, shall once at the least in every three months, muster, traine and exercise, the troop

or company under his command, to the end, they may be the better fitted and enabled, for

his majesties and the countryes service, when they shall be commanded thereunto.

6

First General Letter of the Governor and Deputy of the New England Company for a Plantation in Massachusetts Bay,

April 1629

Online Source:

American LibrariesInternet Archivehttp://www.archive.org/stream/recordsofgoverno01mass#page/392/mode/1up

Print Source:

Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England. 1:392

Document:

To exercise armes.

Yow haue had form caution giuen yow to take heede of beeing too secure in trusting the

Indians, wch wee againe comend to yor care ; and that yow may bee the better able to resist

both forraigne enemies & the natives, if ether should assaile yow, wee pray yow lett all such

as liue vnder or gounment, both or servants and other planters & their servants, bee exercised

in the vse of armes, and certaine tymes appointed to muster them, in wch business Mr Sharpe

and Mr Graues wilbe assistant to yow. Mr Sharpe is by vs entertained to bee mr gunn of or

ordnance, in wch service hee is to employ soe much of his tyme as the charge of that office

doth require, and in the rest hee is to follow other imploymts of or gounors & others, for

whose employmt hee is ᷈pticularly sent over./

7

1643 Militia Statute, Massachusetts Bay

Online Source:

http://books.google.com/books?id=ND8OAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=shurtleff+records+of+massachusetts&source=bl&ots=tIyshcex99&sig=zIKcZeAHRMWxZZlY7kRrWouOzCg&hl=en&ei=fGAJTMeAJ5X0Ms3SwLUE&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

Print Source:

Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England. Volume 2, pp. 42-43.

Document:

1643 Militia Statute

1. It is ordered, first, that the regiment & comaund of the millitary affaires bee so ordered

that upon any suddaine exigent or assault upon any place, there may bee a lawfull authority

to make resistance; for, as piety cannot bee maintained wthout church ordinances & officrs,

nor iustice wthout lawes & magistracy, no more can or safety & peace bee pserved wthout

millitary orders & officrs ; & though wee conceive the supreame power of comaund of the

forces bee in the Cort Genrall, so that no war ought to bee undertaken wthout their authority,

yet because that great body cannot be ready in suddaine cases to act by itselfe, wee conceive

it necessary that there bee a councell, wherof the Govrnor to bee alway one, invested wth

power & authority, in all cases of danger & assault, to raise y* whole force of the country, or

any part therof, & to draw them together to one or more places wthin this iurisdiction, or

otherwise to dispose of them in the best mann', for the necessary defence of the country.

2'ly. That there bee chosen a sergent maior genrall to leade & conduct their forces levyed,

& to execute all orders & directions of the councell.

3'ly. Because assaults may (& comonly are, sudden, not admiting of any delay, wee

conceive it likewise necessary that in every sheire there bee appointed one leiftenant, who 8

shall have power to cause the force of that sheire, or any part therof, (in suddaine cases,

where timely notice cannot bee given to the Govrnor & councell,) who shall give order to

the force levied to march to any part of the sheire for the defence therof, or otherwise

dispose of them, till hee receive order from the Gournor & councell; & furthr, that in every

sheire there bee one sergent maior, to comaund, leade, & conduct the forces of that sheire,

being called together; who shall also have power in the absence of the leiftenant to raise the

force of that sheire.

4'ly. That the regiments or sheires bee divided into sev'all companies, and where any

towne hath not a convenient number of men, that they bee adioyned to some other towne to

make a full company, & that in evry such company there bee a captaine, & other onicrs, &

that the captaine have power to call his company together, & to make any iust & necessary

defence, & to dismiss them, as hee seeth occasion, when there is no other comaund to the

contrary.

5'ly. It is very convenient that once in every yeare the supior officr should call the

regiment togethr, that evry man may know his place, & that all the horse listed in that sheire

shall appear at that meeting, & that the chiefe officr cause them there to bee exercised.

6'ly. That a beacon fired, & 4 muskets discharged, & a drum beaten shalbee an alarum, at

wch every man shall repaire to his colors, or appointed meeting place, to attend further

order.

7. Secondly, the regiment being thus settled, wee conceive it further necessary that the

Govrnor, councell, leiften" of sheires, & sergent *maior do r*34.1 meete once every yeare to

consult of the best meanes of or safety, & to take notice of all millitary affaires; to see that

all officrs do faithfully discharge the trust coinitted to them, & to punish all disordrs, &

neglects in all officrs ; to take care that all places bee pvided wth able officrs, & where such

are wanting, to appoint one of other places, giving them recompence for their paines; to

dispose of the magazeine in the most convenient place, & to consider of meanes to furnish

9

them; to consider of fortifications, & the means to effect it, & to suffer no publiq. fort to bee

erected wthout their appbation.

8. Also, in every sheire or regiment the leif?, serg' maior, & the cheife officer of every

company shall meete once or twice evry yeare to consult of such matters as tend to the

safety of that sheire, & of meanes of pvideg amunition & armes, & to appoint what sort of

armes every man should beare, & what forses shalbee inroaled, & to take care of the

ordinance, publique armes, & magazine of the sheire or town, to pvide one caiioneer at the

least, to consider of the forts in the sheirs, & to take care of them, & not to suffer any fort

(though it bee not of publiq. concernm') to bee erected, wthout their appbation, to take notice

of all disorders & neglects of souldiers or inferior officTM in watchings, trainings, $6, & to

reforme & punish them, reserving power to the captaines of evry company to execute all

such orders of Cot as are or shalbee betrusted to their care, & giving them power to warn

any offender, or Psent any offence of a millitary nature to the councell or meeting. 9. And

wee conceive it needfull that the order of Cort, wch binds evry man to furnish a musquet,

should not bee in force against such as are pvided to serve wth pike & costlet, that so those

places that are unfurnished of pikes may bee incuraged to pvide them. 10. It would bee

convenient, that all millitary dispatches & order might bee issued after the usuall manner

from the supior to the inferior officer.

10

The British Bill of Rights, 1689, Section 7

Online Source:

Avalon Projecthttp://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp

Document:

English Bill of Rights 1689

AN ACT DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE SUBJECT AND SETTLING THE SUCCESSION OF THE CROWN

Whereas the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster,

lawfully, fully and freely representing all the estates of the people of this realm, did upon the

thirteenth day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty-eight

[old style date] present unto their Majesties, then called and known by the names and style

of William and Mary, prince and princess of Orange, being present in their proper persons, a

certain declaration in writing made by the said Lords and Commons in the words following,

viz.:

Whereas the late King James the Second, by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges

and ministers employed by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant

religion and the laws and liberties of this kingdom;

By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws and the

execution of laws without consent of Parliament;

By committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates for humbly petitioning to be excused

from concurring to the said assumed power;

11

By issuing and causing to be executed a commission under the great seal for erecting a court

called the Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes;

By levying money for and to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative for other time

and in other manner than the same was granted by Parliament;

By raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace without

consent of Parliament, and quartering soldiers contrary to law;

By causing several good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when

papists were both armed and employed contrary to law;

By violating the freedom of election of members to serve in Parliament;

By prosecutions in the Court of King's Bench for matters and causes cognizable only in

Parliament, and by divers other arbitrary and illegal courses;

And whereas of late years partial corrupt and unqualified persons have been returned and

served on juries in trials, and particularly divers jurors in trials for high treason which were

not freeholders;

And excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases to elude the

benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects;

And excessive fines have been imposed;

And illegal and cruel punishments inflicted;

And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures before any conviction or

judgment against the persons upon whom the same were to be levied;

12

All which are utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes and freedom of

this realm;

And whereas the said late King James the Second having abdicated the government and the

throne being thereby vacant, his Highness the prince of Orange (whom it hath pleased

Almighty God to make the glorious instrument of delivering this kingdom from popery and

arbitrary power) did (by the advice of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and divers principal

persons of the Commons) cause letters to be written to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal

being Protestants, and other letters to the several counties, cities, universities, boroughs and

cinque ports, for the choosing of such persons to represent them as were of right to be sent to

Parliament, to meet and sit at Westminster upon the two and twentieth day of January in this

year one thousand six hundred eighty and eight [old style date], in order to such an

establishment as that their religion, laws and liberties might not again be in danger of being

subverted, upon which letters elections having been accordingly made;

And thereupon the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, pursuant to their

respective letters and elections, being now assembled in a full and free representative of this

nation, taking into their most serious consideration the best means for attaining the ends

aforesaid, do in the first place (as their ancestors in like case have usually done) for the

vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties declare

That the pretended power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by regal authority

without consent of Parliament is illegal;

That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal

authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal;

That the commission for erecting the late Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes,

and all other commissions and courts of like nature, are illegal and pernicious;

13

That levying money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative, without grant

of Parliament, for longer time, or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is

illegal;

That it is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and prosecutions

for such petitioning are illegal;

That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be

with consent of Parliament, is against law;

That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their

conditions and as allowed by law;

That election of members of Parliament ought to be free;

That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be

impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament;

That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted;

That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned, and jurors which pass upon men in

trials for high treason ought to be freeholders;

That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction

are illegal and void;

And that for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening and preserving of

the laws, Parliaments ought to be held frequently.

14

And they do claim, demand and insist upon all and singular the premises as their undoubted

rights and liberties, and that no declarations, judgments, doings or proceedings to the

prejudice of the people in any of the said premises ought in any wise to be drawn hereafter

into consequence or example; to which demand of their rights they are particularly

encouraged by the declaration of his Highness the prince of Orange as being the only means

for obtaining a full redress and remedy therein. Having therefore an entire confidence that

his said Highness the prince of Orange will perfect the deliverance so far advanced by him,

and will still preserve them from the violation of their rights which they have here asserted,

and from all other attempts upon their religion, rights and liberties, the said Lords Spiritual

and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster do resolve that William and Mary,

prince and princess of Orange, be and be declared king and queen of England, France and

Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging, to hold the crown and royal dignity of the

said kingdoms and dominions to them, the said prince and princess, during their lives and

the life of the survivor to them, and that the sole and full exercise of the regal power be only

in and executed by the said prince of Orange in the names of the said prince and princess

during their joint lives, and after their deceases the said crown and royal dignity of the same

kingdoms and dominions to be to the heirs of the body of the said princess, and for default

of such issue to the Princess Anne of Denmark and the heirs of her body, and for default of

such issue to the heirs of the body of the said prince of Orange. And the Lords Spiritual and

Temporal and Commons do pray the said prince and princess to accept the same

accordingly.

And that the oaths hereafter mentioned be taken by all persons of whom the oaths have

allegiance and supremacy might be required by law, instead of them; and that the said oaths

of allegiance and supremacy be abrogated.

I, A.B., do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to

their Majesties King William and Queen Mary. So help me God.

I, A.B., do swear that I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure as impious and heretical

this damnable doctrine and position, that princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope

15

or any authority of the see of Rome may be deposed or murdered by their subjects or any

other whatsoever. And I do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate

hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence or authority,

ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm. So help me God.

Upon which their said Majesties did accept the crown and royal dignity of the kingdoms of

England, France and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto belonging, according to the

resolution and desire of the said Lords and Commons contained in the said declaration. And

thereupon their Majesties were pleased that the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and

Commons, being the two Houses of Parliament, should continue to sit, and with their

Majesties' royal concurrence make effectual provision for the settlement of the religion, laws

and liberties of this kingdom, so that the same for the future might not be in danger again of

being subverted, to which the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons did agree,

and proceed to act accordingly. Now in pursuance of the premises the said Lords Spiritual

and Temporal and Commons in Parliament assembled, for the ratifying, confirming and

establishing the said declaration and the articles, clauses, matters and things therein

contained by the force of law made in due form by authority of Parliament, do pray that it

may be declared and enacted that all and singular the rights and liberties asserted and

claimed in the said declaration are the true, ancient and indubitable rights and liberties of the

people of this kingdom, and so shall be esteemed, allowed, adjudged, deemed and taken to

be; and that all and every the particulars aforesaid shall be firmly and strictly holden and

observed as they are expressed in the said declaration, and all officers and ministers

whatsoever shall serve their Majesties and their successors according to the same in all time

to come. And the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, seriously considering

how it hath pleased Almighty God in his marvellous providence and merciful goodness to

this nation to provide and preserve their said Majesties' royal persons most happily to reign

over us upon the throne of their ancestors, for which they render unto him from the bottom

of their hearts their humblest thanks and praises, do truly, firmly, assuredly and in the

sincerity of their hearts think, and do hereby recognize, acknowledge and declare, that King

James the Second having abdicated the government, and their Majesties having accepted the

crown and royal dignity as aforesaid, their said Majesties did become, were, are and of right

16

ought to be by the laws of this realm our sovereign liege lord and lady, king and queen of

England, France and Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging, in and to whose

princely persons the royal state, crown and dignity of the said realms with all honours,

styles, titles, regalities, prerogatives, powers, jurisdictions and authorities to the same

belonging and appertaining are most fully, rightfully and entirely invested and incorporated,

united and annexed. And for preventing all questions and divisions in this realm by reason

of any pretended titles to the crown, and for preserving a certainty in the succession thereof,

in and upon which the unity, peace, tranquility and safety of this nation doth under God

wholly consist and depend, the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do beseech

their Majesties that it may be enacted, established and declared, that the crown and regal

government of the said kingdoms and dominions, with all and singular the premises

thereunto belonging and appertaining, shall be and continue to their said Majesties and the

survivor of them during their lives and the life of the survivor of them, and that the entire,

perfect and full exercise of the regal power and government be only in and executed by his

Majesty in the names of both their Majesties during their joint lives; and after their deceases

the said crown and premises shall be and remain to the heirs of the body of her Majesty, and

for default of such issue to her Royal Highness the Princess Anne of Denmark and the heirs

of the body of his said Majesty; and thereunto the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and

Commons do in the name of all the people aforesaid most humbly and faithfully submit

themselves, their heirs and posterities for ever, and do faithfully promise that they will stand

to, maintain and defend their said Majesties, and also the limitation and succession of the

crown herein specified and contained, to the utmost of their powers with their lives and

estates against all persons whatsoever that shall attempt anything to the contrary. And

whereas it hath been found by experience that it is inconsistent with the safety and welfare

of this Protestant kingdom to be governed by a popish prince, or by any king or queen

marrying a papist, the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do further pray that

it may be enacted, that all and every person and persons that is, are or shall be reconciled to

or shall hold communion with the see or Church of Rome, or shall profess the popish

religion, or shall marry a papist, shall be excluded and be for ever incapable to inherit,

possess or enjoy the crown and government of this realm and Ireland and the dominions

thereunto belonging or any part of the same, or to have, use or exercise any regal power,

17

authority or jurisdiction within the same; and in all and every such case or cases the people

of these realms shall be and are hereby absolved of their allegiance; and the said crown and

government shall from time to time descend to and be enjoyed by such person or persons

being Protestants as should have inherited and enjoyed the same in case the said person or

persons so reconciled, holding communion or professing or marrying as aforesaid were

naturally dead; and that every king and queen of this realm who at any time hereafter shall

come to and succeed in the imperial crown of this kingdom shall on the first day of the

meeting of the first Parliament next after his or her coming to the crown, sitting in his or her

throne in the House of Peers in the presence of the Lords and Commons therein assembled,

or at his or her coronation before such person or persons who shall administer the coronation

oath to him or her at the time of his or her taking the said oath (which shall first happen),

make, subscribe and audibly repeat the declaration mentioned in the statute made in the

thirtieth year of the reign of King Charles the Second entitled, _An Act for the more

effectual preserving the king's person and government by disabling papists from sitting in

either House of Parliament._ But if it shall happen that such king or queen upon his or her

succession to the crown of this realm shall be under the age of twelve years, then every such

king or queen shall make, subscribe and audibly repeat the same declaration at his or her

coronation or the first day of the meeting of the first Parliament as aforesaid which shall first

happen after such king or queen shall have attained the said age of twelve years. All which

their Majesties are contented and pleased shall be declared, enacted and established by

authority of this present Parliament, and shall stand, remain and be the law of this realm for

ever; and the same are by their said Majesties, by and with the advice and consent of the

Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in Parliament assembled and by the authority

of the same, declared, enacted and established accordingly.

II. And be it further declared and enacted by the authority aforesaid, that from and after this

present session of Parliament no dispensation by _non obstante_ of or to any statute or any

part thereof shall be allowed, but that the same shall be held void and of no effect, except a

dispensation be allowed of in such statute, and except in such cases as shall be specially

18

provided for by one or more bill or bills to be passed during this present session of

Parliament.

III. Provided that no charter or grant or pardon granted before the three and twentieth day of

October in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty-nine shall be any ways

impeached or invalidated by this Act, but that the same shall be and remain of the same

force and effect in law and no other than as if this Act had never been made.

19

Andrew Fletcher, A Discourse Concerning Militia’s and Standing Armies… (1697)

Online Source:

Constitution Societyhttp://www.constitution.org/fletchr/fletchr.htm

Copyright (c), 1979, Scottish Academic Press. Permission to reprint granted May 23, 1996 by Dr. Douglas Grant of the Scottish Academic Press. Reprint published by Scottish Academic Press in Edinburgh in 1979 as Fletcher of Saltoun, Selected Writings by David Daiches.

Permission from Scottish Academic Press to reprint this material, was obtained by Dr. Bill Boyle of New Mexico State University. The original British style of spelling has been retained (e.g., favour vs. favor). The word "prentice" was changed to "apprentice" in the two places where it occurred. The original preference for lengthy paragraphs has likewise been preserved.

Print Source:

The Political Works of Andrew Fletcher, Esq. London, 1732

Document:[Last two paragraphs of the Preface]A full account of the political context within which Fletcher's pamphlets and speeches were produced will be found in the present writer's Scotland and the Union (London, 1977).

The text of the pamphlets and speeches here reprinted is taken from The Political Works of Andrew Fletcher, Esq., London, 1732. This reprints accurately the original pamphlets but with a somewhat more modern spelling and punctuation. The Glasgow edition of 1749 is also an accurate reprint but modernizes spelling and punctuation rather more. The present text is therefore in the tradition of continuous discreet modernising combined with otherwise accurate reprinting, and it is hoped that it will be accessible to a wider reading public than a simple reproduction of the original pamphlets.

Fletcher of Saltoun, Selected WritingsEdinburgh: Printed in the Year MDCXCVIII

A Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias, pp. 14-30

20

…Having shown the difference between the past and present government of Britain, how

precarious our liberties are, and how from having the best security for them we arc in hazard

of having none at all; it is to be hoped that those who are for a standing army, and losing no

occasion of advancing and extending the prerogative, from a mistaken opinion that they

establish the ancient government of these nations, will see what sort of patriots they are.

But we are told, that only standing mercenary forces can defend Britain from the perpetual

standing armies of France. However frivolous this assertion be, as indeed no good argument

can be brought to support it, either from reason or experience, as shall be proved hereafter;

yet allowing it to be good, what security can the nations have that these standing forces shall

not at some time or other be made use of to suppress the liberties of the people, though not

in this king's time, to whom we owe their preservation? For I hope there is no man so weak

to think, that keeping up the army for a year, or for any longer time than the parliaments of

both nations shall have engaged the public faith to make good all deficiencies of funds

granted for their maintenance, is not the keeping them up for ever. It is a pitiful shift in the

undertakers for a standing army, to say, we are not for a standing army, we are only for an

army from year to year, or till the militia be made useful. For Britain cannot be in any

hazard from France; at least till that kingdom, so much exhausted by war and persecution,

shall have a breathing space to recover. Before that time our militias will be in order; and in

the meantime the fleet. Besides, no prince ever surrendered so great countries and so many

strong places, I shall not say, in order to make a new war; but as these men will have it, to

continue the same. The French King is old and diseased, and was never willing to hazard

much by any bold attempt. If he, or the dauphin, upon his decease, may be suspected of any

farther design, it must be upon the Spanish monarchy, in case of the death of that King. And

if it be objected, that we shall stand in need of an army, in such a conjuncture, I answer, that

our part in that, or in any other foreign war, will be best managed by sea, as shall be shown

hereafter.

Let us then see if mercenary armies be not exactly calculated to enslave a nation. Which I

think may be easily proved, if we consider that such troops are generally composed of men

who make a trade of war; and having little or no patrimony, or spent what they once had,

21

enter into that employment in hopes of its continuance during life, not at all thinking how to

make themselves capable of any other. By which means heavy and perpetual taxes must be

entailed for ever upon the people for their subsistence; and since all their relations stand

engaged to support their interest, let all men judge, if this will not prove a very united and

formidable party in a nation.

But the undertakers must pardon me if I tell them, that no well-constituted government ever

suffered any such men in it, whose interest leads them to embroil the state in war, and are a

useless and insupportable burden in time of peace. Venice or Holland are neither of them

examples to prove the contrary; for had not their situation been different from that of other

countries, their liberty had not continued to this time. And they suffer no forces to remain

within those inaccessible places, which are the chief seats of their power. Carthage, that had

not those advantages of situation, and yet used mercenary forces, was brought to the brink of

ruin by them in a time of peace, beaten in three wars, and at last subdued by the Romans. If

ever any government stood in need of such a sort of men, it was that of ancient Rome,

because they were engaged in perpetual war. The argument can never be so strong in any

other case. But the Romans well knowing such men and liberty to be incompatible, and yet

being under a necessity of having armies constantly on foot, made frequent changes of the

men that served in them; who, when they had been some time in the army, were permitted to

return to their possessions, trades, or other employments. And to show how true a judgment

that wise state made of this matter, it is sufficient to observe, that those who subverted that

government, the greatest that ever was amongst men, found themselves obliged to continue

the same soldiers always in constant pay and service.

If during the late war we had followed so wise a course as that of Rome, there had been

thrice as many trained men in the nations as at present there are; no difficulties about

recruits, nor debates about keeping up armies in time of peace, because some men resolve to

live by arms in time of peace, whether it be for the good of the nations or not. And since

such was the practice of Rome, I hope no man will have the confidence to say that this

method was not as effectual for war as any other. If it be objected that Rome had perpetual

wars, and therefore that might be a good practice among them, which would not be so with

22

us, I confess I cannot see the consequence; for if Rome had perpetual wars, the Romans

ought still to have continued the same men in their armies, that they might, according to the

notion of these men, render their troops more useful. And if we did change our men during a

war, we should have more men that would understand something of it. If any man say, not

so much as if they continued in the army: I answer, that many of those who continue in the

army are afterwards swept away by the war, and live not to be of use in time of peace; that

those who escape the war, being fewer than in the other case, are soon consumed: and that

mercenary standing forces in time of peace, if not employed to do mischief, soon become

like those of Holland in 72, fit only to lose forty strong places in forty days.

There is another thing which I would not mention if it were not absolutely necessary to my

present purpose; and that is, the usual manners of those who are engaged in mercenary

armies. I speak now of officers in other parts of Europe, and not of those in our armies,

allowing them to be the best, and if they will have it so, quite different from all others. I will

not apply to them any part of what I shall say concerning the rest. They themselves best

know how far anything of that nature may be applicable to them. I say then, most princes of

Europe having put themselves upon the foot of keeping up forces, rather numerous than well

entertained, can give but small allowance to officers, and that likewise is for the most part

very ill paid, in order to render them the more necessitous and depending; and yet they

permit them to live inall that extravagancy which mutual example and emulation prompts

them to. By which means the officers become insensibly engaged in numberless frauds,

oppressions, and cruelties, the colonels against the captains, and the captains against the

inferior soldiers; and all of them against all persons with whom they have any kind of

business. So that there is hardly any sort of men who are less men of honour than the

officers of mercenary forces: and indeed honour has now no other signification amongst

them than courage. Besides, most men that enter into those armies, whether officers or

soldiers, as if they were obliged to show themselves new creatures, and perfectly regenerate,

if before they were modest or sober, immediately turn themselves to all manner of

debauchery and wickedness, committing all kinds of injustice and barbarity against poor and

defenceless people. Now though the natural temper of our men be more just and honest than

that of the French, or of any other people, yet may it not be feared, that such bad manners

23

may prove contagious? And if such manners do not fit men to enslave a nation, devils only

must do it. on the other hand, if it should happen that the officers of standing armies in

Britain should live with greater regularity and modesty than was ever yet seen in that sort of

men, it might very probably fall out, that being quartered in all parts of the country, some of

them might be returned members of parliament for divers of the electing boroughs; and of

what consequence that would be, I leave all men to judge. So that whatever be the conduct

of a mercenary army, we can never be secure as long as any such force is kept up in Britain.

But the undertakers for a standing army will say: will you turn so many gentlemen to starve,

who have faithfully served the government? This question I allow to be founded upon some

reason. For it ought to be acknowledged in justice to our soldiery, that on all occasions, and

in all actions, both officers and soldiers have done their part; and therefore I think it may be

reasonable, that all officers and soldiers of above forty years, in consideration of their

unfitness to apply themselves at that age to any other employment, should be recommended

to the bounty of both parliaments.

I confess I do not see by what rules of good policy any mercenary forces have been

connived at either in Scotland, England, or Ireland. Sure, it is allowing the dispensing power

in the most essential point of the constitution of government in these nations.

Scotland and England are nations that were formerly very jealous of liberty; of which there

are many remarkable instances in the histories of these countries. And we may hope that the

late revolution having given such a blow to arbitrary power in these kingdoms, they will be

very careful to preserve their rights and privileges. And sure it is not very suitable to these,

that any standing forces be kept up in Britain: or that there should be any Scots, English, or

Irish regiments maintained in Ireland, or anywhere abroad; or regiments of any nation at the

charge of England. I shall not say how readily the regiments that were in the service of

Holland came over against the duke of Monmouth: he was a rebel, and did not succeed. But

we all know with what expedition the Irish mercenary forces were brought into Britain to

oppose his present majesty in that glorious enterprise for our deliverance.

24

The subjects formerly had a real security for their liberty, by having the sword in their own

hands. That security, which is the greatest of all others, is lost; and not only so, but the

sword is put into the hand of the king by his power over the militia. All this is not enough;

but we must have in both kingdoms standing armies of mercenaries, who for the most part

have no other way to subsist, and consequently are capable to execute any commands: and

yet every man must think his liberties as safe as ever, under pain of being thought

disaffected to the monarchy. But sure it must not be the ancient limited and legal monarchies

of Scotland and England that these gentlemen mean. It must be a French fashion of

monarchy, where the king has power to do what he pleases, and the people no security for

anything they possess. We have quitted our ancient security, and put the militia into the

power of the king. The only remaining security we have is, that no standing armies were

ever yet allowed in time of peace, the parliament of England having so often and so

expressly declared them to be contrary to law: and that of Scotland having not only declared

them to be a grievance, but made the keeping them up an article in the forfeiture of the late

King James. If a standing army be allowed, what difference will there be between the

government we shall then live under, and any kind of government under a good prince? Of

which there have been some in the most despotic tyrannies. If these be limited and not

absolute monarchies, then, as there are conditions, so there ought to be securities on both

sides. The barons never pretended that their militias should be constantly on foot, and

together in bodies in times of peace. It is evident that would have subverted the constitution,

and made every one of them a petty tyrant. And it is as evident, that standing forces are the

fittest instruments to make a tyrant. Whoever is for making the king's power too great or too

little, is an enemy to the monarchy. But to give him standing armies, puts his power beyond

control, and consequently makes him absolute. If the people had any other real security for

their liberty than that there be no standing armies in time of peace, there might be some

colour to demand them. But if that only remaining security be taken away from the people,

we have destroyed these monarchies.

It is pretended we are in hazard of being invaded by a powerful enemy; shall we therefore

destroy our government? What is it then that we would defend? Is it our persons, by the ruin

of our government? in what then shall we be gainers? In saving our lives by the loss of our

25

liberties? if our pleasures and luxury make us live like brutes, it seems we must not pretend

to reason any better than they. I would fain know, if there be any other way of making a

prince absolute, than by allowing him a standing army: if by it all princes have not been

made absolute; if without it, any. Whether our enemies shall conquer us is uncertain; but

whether standing armies will enslave us, neither reason nor experience will suffer us to

doubt. It is therefore evident that no pretence of danger from abroad can be an argument to

keep up standing armies or any mercenary forces.

Let us now consider whether we may not be able to defend ourselves by well- regulated

militias against any foreign force, though never so formidable: that these nations may be free

from the fears of invasion from abroad, as well as from the danger of slavery at home.

After the barons had lost the military service of their vassals, militias of some kind or other

were established in most parts of Europe. But the prince having everywhere the power of

naming and preferring the officers of these militias, they could be no balance in government

as the former were. And he that will consider what has been said in this discourse, will

easily perceive that the essential quality requisite to such a militia, as might fully answer the

ends of the former, must be, that the officers should be named and preferred, as well as they

and the soldiers paid, by the people that set them out. So that if princes look upon the

present militias as not capable of defending a nation against foreign armies, the people have

little reason to entrust them with the defence of their liberties.

And though upon the dissolution of that ancient militia under the barons, which made these

nations so great and glorious, by setting up militias generally through Europe, the sword

came not into the hands of the Commons, which was the only thing could have continued

the former balance of government, but was everywhere put into the hands of the king:

nevertheless ambitious princes, who aimed at absolute power, thinking they could never use

it effectually to that end, unless it were wielded by mercenaries, and men that had no other

interest in the commonwealth than their pay, have still endeavoured by all means to discredit

militias, and render them burdensome to the people, by never suffering them to be upon any

right, or so much as tolerable foot, and all to persuade the necessity of standing forces. And

26

indeed they have succeeded too well in this design: for the greatest part of the world has

been fooled into an opinion that a militia cannot be made serviceable. I shall not say it was

only militias could conquer the world; and that princes to have succeeded fully in the design

before-mentioned must have destroyed all the history and memory of ancient governments,

where the accounts of so many excellent models of militia are yet extant. I know the

prejudice and ignorance of the world concerning the art of war, as it was practised by the

ancients; though what remains of that knowledge in their writings be sufficient to give a

mean opinion of the modem discipline. For this reason I shall examine, by what has passed

of late years in these nations, whether experience have convinced us, that officers bred in

foreign wars, be so far preferable to others who have been under no other discipline than that

of an ordinary and ill-regulated militia; and if the commonalty of both kingdoms, at their

first entrance upon service, be not as capable of a resolute military action, as any standing

forces. This doubt will be fully resolved, by considering the actions of the marquis of

Montrose, which may be compared, all circumstances considered, with those of Caesar, as

well for the military skill, as the bad tendency of them; though the marquis had never served

abroad, nor seen any action, before the six victories, which, with numbers much inferior to

those of his enemies, he obtained in one year; and the most considerable of them were

chiefly gained by the assistance of the tenants and vassals of the family of Gordon. The

battle of Naseby will be a farther illustration of this matter, which is generally thought to

have been the deciding action of the late civil war. The number of forces was equal on both

sides; nor was there any advantage in the ground, or extraordinary accident that happened

during the fight, which could be of considerable importance to either. In the army of the

parliament, nine only of the officers had served abroad, and most of the soldiers were

apprentices drawn out of London but two months before. In the king's army there were

above a thousand officers that had served in foreign parts: yet was that army routed and

broken by those new-raised apprentices; who were observed to be obedient to command,

and brave in fight; not only in that action, but on all occasions during that active campaign.

The people of these nations are not a dastardly crew, like those born in misery under

oppression and slavery, who must have time to rub off that fear, cowardice, and stupidity

which they bring from home. And though officers seem to stand in more need of experience

27

than private soldiers; yet in that battle it was seen that the sobriety and principle of the

officers on the one side, prevailed over the experience of those on the other.

It is well known that divers regiments of our army, lately in Flanders, have never been once

in action, and not one half of them above thrice, nor any of them five times during the whole

war. Oh, but they have been under discipline, and accustomed to obey! And so may men in

militias. We have had to do with an enemy, who, though abounding in numbers of excellent

officers, yet durst never fight us without a visible advantage. Is that enemy like to invade us,

when he must be unavoidably necessitated to put all to hazard in ten days, or starve?

A good militia is of such importance to a nation, that it is the chief part of the constitution of

any free government. For though as to other things, the constitution be never so slight, a

good militia will always preserve the public liberty. But in the best constitution that ever

was, as to all other parts of government, if the militia be not upon a right foot, the liberty of

that people must perish. The militia of ancient Rome, the best that ever was in any

government, made her mistress of the world: but standing armies enslaved that great people,

and their excellent militia and freedom perished together. The Lacedemonians continued

eight hundred years free, and in great honour, because they had a good militia. The Swisses

at this day are the freest, happiest, and the people of all Europe who can best defend

themselves, because they have the best militia.

I have shown that liberty in the monarchical governments of Europe, subsisted so long as the

militia of the barons was on foot: and that on the decay of their militia (which though it was

none of the best, so was it none of the worst) standing forces and tyranny have been

everywhere introduced, unless in Britain and Ireland; which by reason of their situation,

having the sea for frontier, and a powerful fleet to protect them, could afford no pretence for

such forces. And though any militia, however slightly constituted, be sufficient for that

reason to defend us; yet all improvements in the constitution of militias, being further

securities for the liberty of the people, I think we ought to endeavour the amendment of

them, and till that can take place, to make the present militias useful in the former and

ordinary methods.

28

That the whole free people of any nation ought to be exercised to arms, not only the example

of our ancestors, as appears by the acts of parliament made in both kingdoms to that

purpose, and that of the wisest governments among the ancients; but the advantage of

choosing out of great numbers, seems clearly to demonstrate. For in countries where

husbandry, trade, manufactures, and other mechanical arts are carried on, even in time of

war, the impediments of men are so many and so various, that unless the whole people be

exercised, no considerable numbers of men can be drawn out, without disturbing those

employments, which are the vitals of the political body. Besides, that upon great defeats, and

under extreme calamities, from which no government was ever exempted, every nation

stands in need of all the people, as the ancients sometimes did of their slaves. And I cannot

see why arms should be denied to any man who is not a slave, since they are the only true

badges of liberty; and ought never, but in times of utmost necessity, to be put into the hands

of mercenaries or slaves: neither can I understand why any man that has arms should not be

taught the use of them.

By the constitution of the present militia in both nations, there is but a small number of the

men able to bear arms exercised; and men of quality and estate are allowed to send any

wretched servant in their place: so that they themselves are become mean, by being disused

to handle arms; and will not learn the use of them, because they are ashamed of their

ignorance: by which means the militias being composed only of servants, these nations seem

altogether unfit to defend themselves, and standing forces to be necessary. Now can it be

supposed that a few servants will fight for the defence of their masters' estates, if their

masters only look on? Or that some inconsiderate freeholders, as for the most part those who

command the militia are, should, at the head of those servants, expose their lives for men of

more plentiful estates, without being assisted by them? No bodies of military men can be of

any force or value, unless many persons of quality or education be among them; and such

men should blush to think of excusing themselves from serving their country, at least for

some years, in a military capacity, if they consider that every Roman was obliged to spend

fifteen years of his life in their armies. Is it not a shame that any man who possesses an

estate, and is at the same time healthful and young, should not fit himself by all means for

29

the defence of that, and his country, rather than to pay taxes to maintain a mercenary, who

though he may defend Mm during a war, will be sure to insult and enslave him in time of

peace. Men must not think that any country can be in a constant posture of defence, without

some trouble and charge; but certainly it is better to undergo this, and to preserve our liberty

with honour, than to be subjected to heavy taxes, and yet have it insolently ravished from us,

to our present oppression, and the lasting misery of our posterity. But it will be said, where

are the men to be found who shall exercise all this people in so many several places at once?

for the nobility and gentry know nothing of the matter; and to hire so many soldiers of

fortune, as they call them, will bechargeable, and may be dangerous, these men being all

mercenaries, and always the same men, in the same trusts: besides that the employing such

men would not be suitable to the design of breeding the men of quality and estate to

command, as well as the others to obey.

To obviate these difficulties, and because the want of a good model of militia, and a right

method for training people in time of peace, so as they need not apprehend any war, though

never so sudden, is at this day the bane of the liberty of Europe, I shall propose one,

accommodated to the invincible difficulty of bringing men of quality and estate, or men of

any rank, who have passed the time of youth, to the use of arms; and new, because though

we have many excellent models of militia, delivered to us by ancient authors, with respect to

the use of them in time of war, yet they give us but little information concerning the

methods by which they trained their whole people for war in time of peace; so that if the

model which I shall propose have not the authority of the ancients to recommend it, yet

perhaps by a severe discipline, and a right method of disposing the minds of men, as well as

forming their bodies, for military and virtuous actions, it may have some resemblance of

their excellent institutions.

What I would offer is, that four camps be formed, one in Scotland, and three in England;

into which all the young men of the respective countries should enter, on the first day of the

two and twentieth year of their age; and remain there the space of two years, if they be of

fortunes sufficient to maintain themselves; but if they are not, then to remain a year only, at

the expense of the public. In this camp they should be taught the use of all sorts of arms,

30

with the necessary evolutions; as also wrestling, leaping, swimming, and the like exercises.

He whose condition would permit him to buy and maintain a horse, should be obliged so to

do, and be taught to vault, to ride, and to manage his own horse. This camp should seldom

remain above eight days in one place, but remove from heath to heath; not only upon the

account of cleanliness and health, but to teach the youth to fortify a camp, to march, and to

accustom them (respect being always had to those of a weak constitution) to carry as much

in their march as ever any Roman soldier did; that is to say, their tents, provision, arms,

armour, their utensils, and the palisades of their camp. They should be taught to forage, and

be obliged to use the countrymen with all justice in their bargains, for that and all other

things they stand in need of from them. The food of every man within the camp should be

the same; for bread they should have only wheat, which they are to be obliged to grind with

hand-mills; they should have some salt, and a certain number of beeves allowed them at

certain times of the year. Their drink should be water, sometimes tempered with a

proportion of brandy, and at other times with vinegar. Their clothes should be plain, coarse,

and of a fashion fitted in everything for the fatigue of a camp. For all these things those who

could should pay; and those who could not should be defrayed by the public, as has been

said. The camp should be sometimes divided into two parts, which should remove from each

other many miles, and should break up again at the same time, in order to meet upon some

mountainous, marshy, woody, or in a word, cross ground; that not only their diligence,

patience, and suffering in marches, but their skill in seizing of grounds, posting bodies of

horse and foot, and advancing towards each other; their choosing a camp, and drawing out

of it in order to a battle, might be seen, as well as what orders of battle they would form

upon the variety of different grounds. The persons of quality or estate should likewise be

instructed in fortification, gunnery, and all things belonging to the duty of an engineer: and

forts should be sometimes built by the whole camp, where all the arts of attacking and

defending places should be practised. The youth having been taught to read at schools,

should be obliged to read at spare hours some excellent histories, but chiefly those in which

military actions are best described; with the books that have been best written concerning

the military art. Speeches exhorting to military and virtuous actions should be often

composed, and pronounced publicly by such of the youth as were, by education and natural

talents, qualified for it. There being none but military men allowed within the camp, and no

31

churchmen being of that number, such of the youth as may be fit to exhort the rest to all

Christian and moral duties, chiefly to humility, modesty, charity, and the pardoning of

private injuries, should be chosen to do it every Sunday, and the rest of that day spent in

reading books, and in conversation directed to the same end. And all this under so severe

and rigorous orders, attended with so exact an execution by reward and punishment, that no

officer within the camp should have the power of pardoning the one, or withholding the

other. The rewards should be all honorary, and contrived to suit the nature of the different

good qualities and degrees in which any of the youth had shown, either his modesty,

obedience, patience in suffering, temperance, diligence, address, invention, judgment,

temper, or valour. The punishments should be much more rigorous than those inflicted for

the same crimes by the law of the land. And there should be punishments for some things,

not liable to any by the common law, immodest and insolent words or actions, gaming, and

the like. No woman should be suffered to come within the camp, and the crimes of abusing

their own bodies any manner of way, punished with death. All these things to be judged by

their own councils of war; and those councils to have for rule, certain articles drawn up and

approved by the respective parliaments. The officers and masters, for instructing and

teaching the youth, in all the exercises above-mentioned, should upon the first establishment

of such a camp, be the most expert men in those disciplines; and brought by encouragements

from all places of Europe; due care being taken that they should not indict the youth with

foreign manners. But afterwards they ought to consist of such men of quality or fortune as

should be chosen for that end, out of those who had formerly passed two years in the camp,

and since that time had improved themselves in the wars; who upon their return should be

obliged to serve two years in that station. As for the numbers of those officers, or masters;

their several duties; that of the camp-master-general, and of the commissaries; the times and

manner of exercise, with divers other particulars of less consideration, and yet necessary to

be determined, in order to put such a design in execution, for brevity's sake I omit them, as

easy to be resolved. But certainly it were no hard matter, for men that had passed through

such a discipline as that of the camp I have described, to retain it after they should return to

their several homes; if the people of every town and village, together with those of the

adjacent habitations, were obliged to meet fifty times in the year, on such days as should be

found most convenient; and exercise four hours every time: for all men being instructed in

32

what they are to do; and the men of quality and estate most knowing, and expert of all

others, the exercise might be performed in great perfection. There might also be yearly in the

summer time, a camp of some thousands of the nearest neighbours brought and kept together

for a week to do those exercises, which cannot be performed in any other place: every man

of a certain estate being obliged to keep a horse fit for the war. By this means it would be

easy upon any occasion, though never so small (as for example, the keeping of the peace,

and putting the laws in execution where force is necessary) or never so great and sudden (as

upon account of invasions and conspiracies) to bring together such numbers of officers and

soldiers as the exigence required, according to the practice of ancient Rome; which in this

particular might be imitated by us without difficulty: and if such a method were once

established, there would be no necessity of keeping up a militia formed into regiments of

foot and horse in time of peace. Now if this militia should stand in need of any farther

improvement (because no militias seem comparable to those exercised in actual war; as that

of the barons by their constant feuds; and that of Rome, and some other ancient

commonwealths, by their perpetual wars) a certain small number of forces might be

employed in any foreign country where there should be action; a fourth part of which might

be changed every year; that all those who had in this manner acquired experience, might be

dispersed among the several regiments of any army, that the defence of these countries

should at any time call for; which would serve to confirm and give assurance to the rest.

Such a militia would be of no great expense to these nations; for the mean clothing and

provisions for those who could not maintain themselves, being given only for one year,

would amount to little; and no other expense would be needful, except for their arms, a

small train of artillery for each camp, and what is to be given for the encouragement of the

first officers and masters.

A militia upon such a foot would have none of the infinite and insuperable difficulties there

are, to bring a few men who live at a great distance from one another, frequently together to

exercise; at which consequently they must be from home every time several days: of finding

such a number of masters, as are necessary to train so many thousands of people ignorant of

all exercise, in so many different places, and for the most part at the same time: it would

have none of those innumerable encumbrances, and unnecessary expenses, with which a

33

militia formed into regiments of foot and horse in time of peace is attended. in such a camp

the youth would not only be taught the exercise of a musket with a few evolutions, which is

all that men in ordinary militias pretend to, and is the least part of the duty of a soldier; but

besides a great many exercises to strengthen and dispose the body for fight, they would learn

to fence, to ride, and manage a horse for the war; to forage and live in a camp; to fortify,

attack, and defend any place; and what is no less necessary, to undergo the greatest toils, and

to give obedience to the severest orders. Such a militia, by sending beyond seas certain

proportions of it, and relieving them from time to time, would enable us to assist our allies

more powerfully than by standing armies we could ever do. Such a camp would take away

the great difficulty of bringing men of all conditions, who have passed the time of their

youth, to apply themselves to the use and exercise of arms; and beginning with them early,

when like wax they may be moulded into any shape, would dispose them to place their

greatest honour in the performance of those exercises, and inspire them with the fires of

military glory, to which that age is so inclined; which impression being made upon their

youth, would last as long as life. Such a camp would be as great a school of virtue as of

military discipline: in which the youth would learn to stand in need of few things; to be

content with that small allowance which nature requires; to suffer, as well as to act; to be

modest, as well as brave; to be as much ashamed of doing anything insolent or injurious, as

of turning their back upon an enemy; they would learn to forgive injuries done to

themselves, but to embrace with joy the occasions of dying to revenge those done to their

country: and virtue imbibed in younger years would cast a flavour to the utmost periods of

life. In a word, they would learn greater and better things than the military art, and more

necessary too, if anything can be more necessary than the defence of our country. Such a

militia might not only defend a people living in an island, but even such as are placed in the

midst of the most warlike nations of the world.

Now till such a militia may be brought to some perfection, our present militia is not only

sufficient to defend us; but considering the circumstances of the French affairs, especially

with relation to Spain, Britain cannot justly apprehend an invasion, if the fleet of England, to

which Scotland furnished during the late war seven or eight thousand seamen, were in such

order as it ought to be. And it can never be the interest of these nations to take any other

34

share in preserving the balance of Europe, than what may be performed by our fleet. By

which means our money will be spent amongst ourselves; our trade preserved to support the

charge of the navy; our enemies totally driven out of the sea, and great numbers of their

forces diverted from opposing the armies of our allies abroad, to the defence of their own

coasts.

If this method had been taken in the late war, I presume it would have proved not only more

advantageous to us, but also more serviceable to our allies than that which was followed.

And it is in vain to say, that at this rate we shall have no allies at all: for the weaker party on

the Continent must be contented to accept our assistance in the manner we think fit to give

it, or inevitably perish. But if we send any forces beyond the seas to join those of our allies,

they ought to be part of our militia, as has been said, and not standing forces; otherwise, at

the end of every war, the present struggle will recur, and at one time or other these nations

will be betrayed, and a standing army established: so that nothing can save us from

following the fate of all the other kingdoms in Europe, but putting our trust altogether in our

fleet and militias, and having no other forces than these. The sea is the only empire which

can naturally belong to us. Conquest is not our interest, much less to consume our people

and treasure in conquering for others.

To conclude; if we seriously consider the happy condition of these nations, who have lived

so long under the blessings of liberty, we cannot but be affected with the most tender

compassion to think that the Scots, who have for so many ages, with such resolution,

defended their liberty against the Picts, Britons, Romans, Saxons, Danes, Irish, Normans,

and English, as well as against the violence and tyranny of so many of their own princes;

that the English, who, whatever revolutions their country has been subject to, have still

maintained their rights and liberties against all attempts; who possess a country, everywhere

cultivated and improved by the industry of rich husbandman; her rivers and harbours filled

with ships; her cities, towns, and villages enriched with manufactures; where men of vast

estates live in secure possession of them, and whose merchants live in as great splendour as

the nobility of other nations: that Scotland which has a gentry born to excel in arts and arms:

that England which has a commonalty, not only surpassing all those of that degree which the

35

world can now boast of, but also those of all former ages, in courage, honesty, good sense,

industry, and generosity of temper; in whose very looks there are such visible marks of a

free and liberal education; which advantages cannot be imputed to the climate, or to any

other cause, but the freedom of the government under which they live: I say, it cannot but

make the hearts of all honest men bleed to think, that in their days the felicity and liberties of

such countries must come to a period, if the parliaments do not prevent it, and his majesty be

not prevailed upon to lay aside the thoughts of mercenary armies, which, if once established,

will inevitably produce those fatal consequences that have always attended such forces in

the other kingdoms of Europe; violation of property, decay of trade, oppression of the

country by heavy taxes and quarters, the utmost misery and slavery of the poorer sort, the

ruin of the nobility by their expenses in court and army, deceit and treachery in all ranks of

men, occasioned by want and necessity. Then shall we see the gentry of Scotland, ignorant

through want of education, and cowardly by being oppressed; then shall we see the once

happy commonalty of England become base and abject, by being continually exposed to the

brutal insolence of the soldiers; the women debauched by their lust; ugly and nasty through

poverty, and the want of things necessary to preserve their natural beauty. Then shall we see

that great city, the pride and glory, not only of our island, but of the world, subjected to the

excessive impositions Paris now lies under, and reduced to a peddling trade, serving only to

foment the luxury of a court. Then will Britain know what obligations she has to those who

are for mercenary armies.

36

Benjamin Franklin, Plain Truth (1747)

Online Source:The Papers of Benjamin FranklinSponsored by The American Philosophical Society and Yale UniversityDigital Edition by The Packard Humanities Institutehttp://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp

Document:

Plain Truth

Plain Truth: or, Serious Considerations On the Present State of the City of Philadelphia, and Province of Pennsylvania. By a Tradesman of Philadelphia. Printed in the Year

MDCCXLVII.

It is said the wise Italians make this proverbial Remark on our Nation, viz. The English

FEEL, but they do not SEE. That is, they are sensible of Inconveniencies when they are

present, but do not take sufficient Care to prevent them: Their natural Courage makes them

too little apprehensive of Danger, so that they are often surpriz’d by it, unprovided of the

proper Means of Security. When ’tis too late they are sensible of their Imprudence: After

great Fires, they provide Buckets and Engines: After a Pestilence they think of keeping clean

their Streets and common Shores: and when a Town has been sack’d by their Enemies, they

provide for its Defence, &c. This Kind of AFTER-WISDOM is indeed so common with us, as

to occasion the vulgar, tho’ very significant Saying, When the Steed is stolen, you shut the

Stable Door.

But the more insensible we generally are of publick Danger, and indifferent when

warn’d of it, so much the more freely, openly, and earnestly, ought such as apprehend it, to

speak their Sentiments; that if possible, those who seem to sleep, may be awaken’d, to think

of some Means of Avoiding or Preventing the Mischief before it be too late.

37

Believing therefore that ’tis my DUTY, I shall honestly speak my Mind in the following

Paper.

War, at this Time, rages over a great Part of the known World; our News-Papers are

Weekly filled with fresh Accounts of the Destruction it every where occasions.

Pennsylvania, indeed, situate in the Center of the Colonies, has hitherto enjoy’d profound

Repose; and tho’ our Nation is engag’d in a bloody War, with two great and powerful

Kingdoms, yet, defended, in a great Degree, from the French on the one Hand by the

Northern Provinces, and from the Spaniards on the other by the Southern, at no small

Expence to each, our People have, till lately, slept securely in their Habitations.

There is no British Colony excepting this, but has made some Kind of Provision for its

Defence; many of them have therefore never been attempted by an Enemy; and others that

were attack’d, have generally defended themselves with Success. The Length and Difficulty

of our Bay and River has been thought so effectual a Security to us, that hitherto no Means

have been entered into that might discourage an Attempt upon us, or prevent its succeeding.

But whatever Security this might have been while both Country and City were poor,

and the Advantage to be expected scarce worth the Hazard of an Attempt, it is now doubted

whether we can any longer safely depend upon it. Our Wealth, of late Years much

encreas’d, is one strong Temptation, our defenceless State another, to induce an Enemy to

attack us; while the Acquaintance they have lately gained with our Bay and River, by Means

of the Prisoners and Flags of Truce they have had among us; by Spies which they almost

every where maintain, and perhaps from Traitors among ourselves; with the Facility of

getting Pilots to conduct them; and the known Absence of Ships of War, during the greatest

Part of the Year, from both Virginia and New-York, ever since the War began, render the

Appearance of Success to the Enemy far more promising, and therefore highly encrease our

DANGER.

That our Enemies may have Spies abroad, and some even in these Colonies, will not be

made much doubt of, when ’tis considered, that such has been the Practice of all Nations in

38

all Ages, whenever they were engaged, or intended to engage in War. Of this we have an

early Example in the Book of Judges (too too [sic] pertinent to our Case, and therefore I

must beg leave a little to enlarge upon it) where we are told, Chap. xviii, v. 2, That the

Children of Dan sent of their Family five Men from their Coasts to spie out the Land, and

search it, saying, Go, search the LAND. These Danites it seems were at this Time not very

orthodox in their Religion, and their Spies met with a certain idolatrous Priest of their own

Persuasion, v. 3, and they said to him, Who brought thee hither! what makest thou in this

Place? and what hast thou here? [would to God no such Priests were to be found, among

us.] And they said unto him, verse 5, Ask Counsel of God, that we may know whether our

Way which we go shall be prosperous? And the Priest said unto them, Go in Peace; before

the Lord is your Way wherein you go. [Are there no Priests among us, think you, that might,

in the like Case, give an Enemy as good Encouragement? ’Tis well known, that we have

Numbers of the same Religion with those who of late encouraged the French to invade our

Mother-Country.] And they came, Verse 7, to Laish, and saw the People that were therein,

how they dwelt CARELESS, after the Manner of the Zidonians, QUIET and SECURE. They

thought themselves secure, no doubt; and as they never had been disturbed, vainly imagined

they never should. ’Tis not unlikely that some might see the Danger they were exposed to by

living in that careless Manner, but that if these publickly expressed their Apprehensions, the

rest reproached them as timorous Persons, wanting Courage or Confidence in their Gods,

who (they might say) had hitherto protected them. But the Spies, Verse 8, returned, and said

to their Countrymen, Verse 9, Arise that we may go up against them; for we have seen the

Land, and behold it is very good! And are ye still? Be not slothful to go. Verse 10, When ye

go, ye shall come unto a People SECURE; [that is, a People that apprehend no Danger, and

therefore have made no Provision against it; great Encouragement this!] and to a large

Land, and a Place where there is no Want of any Thing. What could they desire more?

Accordingly we find, in the following Verses, that Six hundred Men only, appointed with

Weapons of War, undertook the Conquest of this large Land; knowing that 600 Men, armed

and disciplined, would be an Over-match perhaps for 60,000, unarmed, undisciplined, and

off their Guard. And when they went against it, the idolatrous Priest, Verse 17, with his

graven Image, and his Ephod, and his Teraphim, and his molten Image, [Plenty of

superstitious Trinkets] joined with them, and, no doubt, gave them all the Intelligence and

39

Assistance in his Power; his Heart, as the Text assures us, being glad, perhaps for Reasons

more than one. And now, what was the Fate of poor Laish! The 600 Men being arrived,

found, as the Spies had reported, a People QUIET and SECURE, Verse 20, 21. And they smote

them with the Edge of the Sword, and burnt the City with FIRE; and there was no

DELIVERER, because it was far from Zidon. Not so far from Zidon, however, as

Pennsylvania is from Britain; and yet we are, if possible, more careless than the People of

Laish! As the Scriptures are given for our Reproof, Instruction and Warning, may we make a

due Use of this Example, before it be too late!

And is our Country, any more than our City, altogether free from Danger? Perhaps not.

We have, ’tis true, had a long Peace with the Indians: But it is a long Peace indeed, as well

as a long Lane, that has no Ending. The French know the Power and Importance of the Six

Nations, and spare no Artifice, Pains or Expence, to gain them to their Interest. By their

Priests they have converted many to their Religion, and these have openly espoused their

Cause. The rest appear irresolute which Part to take; no Persuasions, tho’ enforced with

costly Presents, having yet been able to engage them generally on our Side, tho’ we had

numerous Forces on their Borders, ready to second and support them. What then may be

expected, now those Forces are, by Orders from the Crown, to be disbanded; when our

boasted Expedition is laid aside, thro’ want (as it may appear to them) either of Strength or

Courage; when they see that the French, and their Indians, boldly, and with Impunity, ravage

the Frontiers of NewYork, and scalp the Inhabitants; when those few Indians that engaged

with us against the French, are left exposed to their Resentment: When they consider these

Things, is there no Danger that, thro’ Disgust at our Usage, joined with Fear of the French

Power, and greater Confidence in their Promises and Protection than in ours, they may be

wholly gained over by our Enemies, and join in the War against us? If such should be the

Case, which God forbid, how soon may the Mischief spread to our Frontier Counties? And

what may we expect to be the Consequence, but deserting of Plantations, Ruin, Bloodshed

and Confusion!

Perhaps some in the City, Towns and Plantations near the River, may say to

themselves, An Indian War on the Frontiers will not affect us; the Enemy will never come

40

near our Habitations; let those concern’d take Care of themselves. And others who live in

the Country, when they are told of the Danger the City is in from Attempts by Sea, may say,

What is that to us? The Enemy will be satisfied with the Plunder of the Town, and never

think it worth his while to visit our Plantations: Let the Town take care of itself. These are

not mere Suppositions, for I have heard some talk in this strange Manner. But are these the

Sentiments of true Pennsylvanians, of Fellow-Countrymen, or even of Men that have

common Sense or Goodness? Is not the whole Province one Body, united by living under

the same Laws, and enjoying the same Priviledges? Are not the People of City and Country

connected as Relations both by Blood and Marriage, and in Friendships equally dear? Are

they not likewise united in Interest, and mutually useful and necessary to each other? When

the Feet are wounded, shall the Head say, It is not me; I will not trouble myself to contrive

Relief? Or if the Head is in Danger, shall the Hands say, We are not affected, and therefore

will lend no Assistance! No. For so would the Body be easily destroyed: But when all Parts

join their Endeavours for its Security, it is often preserved. And such should be the Union

between the Country and the Town; and such their mutual Endeavours for the Safety of the

Whole. When NewEngland, a distant Colony, involv’d itself in a grievous Debt to reduce

Cape-Breton, we freely gave Four Thousand Pounds for their Relief. And at another Time,

remembering that Great Britain, still more distant, groan’d under heavy Taxes in Supporting

the War, we threw in our Mite to their Assistance, by a free Gift of Three Thousand Pounds:

And shall Country and Town join in helping Strangers (as those comparatively are) and yet

refuse to assist each other?

But whatever different Opinions we have of our Security in other Respects, our TRADE,

all seem to agree, is in Danger of being ruin’d in another Year. The great Success of our

Enemies, in two different Cruizes this last Summer in our Bay, must give them he greatest

Encouragement to repeat more frequently their Visits, the Profit being almost certain, and

the Risque next to nothing. Will not the first Effect of this be, an Enhauncing of the Price of

all foreign Goods to the Tradesman and Farmer, who use or consume them? For the Rate of

Insurance will increase in Proportion to the Hazard of Importing them; and in the same

Proportion will the Price of those Goods increase. If the Price of the Tradesman’s Work and

the Farmer’s Produce would encrease equally with the Price of foreign Commodities, the

41

Damage would not be so great: But the direct contrary must happen. For the same Hazard,

or Rate of Insurance, that raises the Price of what is imported, must be deducted out of, and

lower the Price of what is exported. Without this Addition and Deduction, as long as the

Enemy cruize at our Capes, and take those Vessels that attempt to go out, as well as those

that endeavour to come in, none can afford to trade, and Business must be soon at a Stand.

And will not the Consequences be, A discouraging of many of the Vessels that us’d to come

from other Places to purchase our Produce, and thereby a Turning of the Trade to Ports that

can be entered with less Danger, and capable of furnishing them with the same

Commodities, as New-York, &c? A Lessening of Business to every Shopkeeper, together

with Multitudes of bad Debts; the high Rate of Goods discouraging the Buyers, and the low

Rates of their Labour and Produce rendering them unable to pay for what they had bought:

Loss of Employment to the Tradesman, and bad Pay for what little he does: And lastly, Loss

of many Inhabitants, who will retire to other Provinces not subject to the like

Inconveniencies; whence a Lowering of the Value of Lands, Lots, and Houses.

The Enemy, no doubt, have been told, That the People of Pennsylvania are Quakers,

and against all Defence, from a Principle of Conscience; this, tho’ true of a Part, and that a

small Part only of the Inhabitants, is commonly said of the Whole; and what may make it

look probable to Strangers, is, that in Fact, nothing is done by any Part of the People towards

their Defence. But to refuse Defending one’s self or one’s Country, is so unusual a Thing

among Mankind, that possibly they may not believe it, till by Experience they find, they can

come higher and higher up our River, seize our Vessels, land and plunder our Plantations

and Villages, and retire with their Booty unmolested. Will not this confirm the Report, and

give them the greatest Encouragement to strike one bold Stroke for the City, and for the

whole Plunder of the River?

It is said by some, that the Expence of a Vessel to guard our Trade, would be very

heavy, greater than perhaps all the Enemy can be supposed to take from us at Sea would

amount to; and that it would be cheaper for the Government to open an Insurance-Office,

and pay all Losses. But is this right Reasoning? I think not: For what the Enemy takes is

clear Loss to us, and Gain to him; encreasing his Riches and Strength as much as it

42

diminishes ours, so making the Difference double; whereas the Money paid our own

Tradesmen for Building and Fitting out a Vessel of Defence, remains in the Country, and

circulates among us; what is paid to the Officers and Seamen that navigate her, is also spent

ashore, and soon gets into other Hands; the Farmer receives the Money for her Provisions;

and on the whole, nothing is clearly lost to the Country but her Wear and Tear, or so much

as she sells for at the End of the War less than her first Cost. This Loss, and a trifling one it

is, is all the Inconvenience: But how many and how great are the Conveniencies and

Advantages! And should the Enemy, thro’ our Supineness and Neglect to provide for the

Defence both of our Trade and Country, be encouraged to attempt this City, and after

plundering us of our Goods, either burn it, or put it to Ransom; how great would that Loss

be! Besides the Confusion, Terror, and Distress, so many Hundreds of Families would be

involv’d in!

The Thought of this latter Circumstance so much affects me, that I cannot forbear

expatiating somewhat more upon it. You have, my dear Countrymen, and Fellow Citizens,

Riches to tempt a considerable Force to unite and attack you, but are under no Ties or

Engagements to unite for your Defence. Hence, on the first Alarm, Terror will spread over

All; and as no Man can with Certainty depend that another will stand by him, beyong Doubt

very many will seek Safety by a speedy Flight. Those that are reputed rich, will flee, thro’

Fear of Torture, to make them produce more than they are able. The Man that has a Wife

and Children, will find them hanging on his Neck, beseeching him with Tears to quit the

City, and save his Life, to guide and protect them in that Time of general Desolation and

Ruin. All will run into Confusion, amidst Cries and Lamentations, and the Hurry and

Disorder of Departers, carrying away their Effects. The Few that remain will be unable to

resist. Sacking the City will be the first, and Burning it, in all Probability, the last Act of the

Enemy. This, I believe, will be the Case, if you have timely Notice. But what must be your

Condition, if suddenly surprized, without previous Alarm, perhaps in the Night! Confined to

your Houses, you will have nothing to trust to but the Enemy’s Mercy. Your best Fortune

will be, to fall under the Power of Commanders of King’s Ships, able to controul the

Mariners; and not into the Hands of licentious Privateers. Who can, without the utmost

Horror, conceive the Miseries of the Latter! when your Persons, Fortunes, Wives and

43

Daughters, shall be subject to the wanton and unbridled Rage, Rapine and Lust, of Negroes,

Molattoes, and others, the vilest and most abandoned of Mankind. A dreadful Scene! which

some may represent as exaggerated. I think it my Duty to warn you: Judge for yourselves.

’Tis true, with very litte Notice, the Rich may shift for themselves. The Means of

speedy Flight are ready in their Hands; and with some previous Care to lodge Money and

Effects in distant and secure Places, tho’ they should lose much, yet enough may be left

them, and to spare. But most unhappily circumstanced indeed are we, the middling People,

the Tradesmen, Shopkeepers, and Farmers of this Province and City! We cannot all fly with

our Families; and if we could, how shall we subsist? No; we and they, and what little we

have gained by hard Labour and Industry, must bear the Brunt: The Weight of

Contributions, extorted by the Enemy (as it is of Taxes among ourselves) must be surely

borne by us. Nor can it be avoided as we stand at present; for tho’ we are numerous, we are

quite defenceless, having neither Forts, Arms, Union, nor Discipline. And tho’ it were true,

that our Trade might be protected at no great Expence, and our Country and our City easily

defended, if proper Measures were but taken; yet who shall take these Measures? Who shall

pay that Expence? On whom may we fix our Eyes with the least Expectation that they will

do any one Thing for our Security? Should we address that wealthy and powerful Body of

People, who have ever since the War governed our Elections, and filled almost every Seat in

our Assembly; should we intreat them to consider, if not as Friends, at least as Legislators,

that Protection is as truly due from the Government to the People, as Obedience from the

People to the Government; and that if on account of their religious Scruples, they themselves

could do no Act for our Defence, yet they might retire, relinquish their Power for a Season,

quit the Helm to freer Hands during the present Tempest, to Hands chosen by their own

Interest too, whose Prudence and Moderation, with regard to them, they might safely

confide in; secure, from their own native Strength, of resuming again their present Stations,

whenever it shall please them: Should we remind them, that the Publick Money, raised from

All, belongs to All; that since they have, for their own Ease, and to secure themselves in the

quiet Enjoyment of their Religious Principles (and may they long enjoy them) expended

such large Sums to oppose Petitions, and engage favourable Representations of their

Conduct, if they themselves could by no Means be free to appropriate any Part of the

44

Publick Money for our Defence; yet it would be no more than Justice to spare us a

reasonable Sum for that Purpose, which they might easily give to the King’s Use as

heretofore, leaving all the Appropriation to others, who would faithfully apply it as we

desired: Should we tell them, that tho’ the Treasury be at present empty, it may soon be

filled by the outstanding Publick Debts collected; or at least Credit might be had for such a

Sum, on a single Vote of the Assembly: That tho’ they themselves may be resigned and easy

under this naked, defenceless State of the Country, it is far otherwise with a very great Part

of the People; with us, who can have no Confidence that God will protect those that neglect

the Use of rational Means for their Security; nor have any Reason to hope, that our Losses, if

we should suffer any, may be made up by Collections in our Favour at Home? Should we

conjure them by all the Ties of Neighbourhood, Friendship, Justice and Humanity, to

consider these Things; and what Distraction, Misery and Confusion, what Desolation and

Distress, may possibly be the Effect of their unseasonable Predominancy and Perseverance;

yet all would be in vain: For they have already been by great Numbers of the People

petitioned in vain. Our late Governor did for Years sollicit, request, and even threaten them

in vain. The Council have since twice remonstrated to them in vain. Their religious

Prepossessions are unchangeable, their Obstinacy invincible. Is there then the least Hope

remaining, that from that Quarter any Thing should arise for our Security?

And is our Prospect better, if we turn our Eyes to the Strength of the opposite Party,

those Great and rich Men, Merchants and others, who are ever railing at Quakers for doing

what their Principles seem to require, and what in Charity we ought to believe they think

their Duty, but take no one Step themselves for the Publick Safety? They have so much

Wealth and Influence, if they would use it, that they might easily, by their Endeavours and

Example, raise a military Spirit among us, make us fond, studious of, and expert in Martial

Discipline, and effect every Thing that is necessary, under God, for our Protection. But

ENVY seems to have taken Possession of their Hearts, and to have eaten out and destroyed

every generous, noble, Publick-spirited Sentiment. Rage at the Disappointment of their little

Schemes for Power, gnaws their Souls, and fills them with such cordial Hatred to their

Opponents, that every Proposal, by the Execution of which those may receive Benefit as

well as themselves, is rejected with Indignation. What, say they, shall we lay out our Money

45

to protect the Trade of Quakers? Shall we fight to defend Quakers? No; Let the Trade

perish, and the City burn; let what will happen, we shall never lift a Finger to prevent it. Yet

the Quakers have conscience to plead for their Resolution not to fight, which these

Gentlemen have not: Conscience with you, Gentlemen, is on the other Side of the Question:

Conscience enjoins it as a DUTY on you (and indeed I think it such on every Man) to defend

your Country, your Friends, your Aged Parents, your Wives, and helpless Children: And yet

you resolve not to perform this Duty, but act contrary to your own Consciences, because the

Quakers act according to theirs. ’Till of late I could scarce believe the Story of him who

refused to pump in a sinking Ship, because one on board, whom he hated, would be saved

by it as well as himself. But such, it seems, is the Unhappiness of human Nature, that our

Passions, when violent, often are too hard for the united Force of Reason, Duty and Religion.

Thus unfortunately are we circumstanc’d at this Time, my dear Countrymen and

Fellow-Citizens; we, I mean, the middling People, the Farmers, Shopkeepers and Tradesmen

of this City and Country. Thro’ the Dissensions of our Leaders, thro’ Mistaken Principles of

religion, join’d with a Love of Worldly Power, on the one Hand; thro’ Pride, Envy and

implacable Resentment on the other; our Lives, our Families and little Fortunes, dear to us as

any Great Man’s can be to him, are to remain continually expos’d to Destruction, from an

enterprizing, cruel, now well-inform’d, and by Success encourag’d Enemy. It seems as if

Heaven, justly displead’d at our growing Wickedness, and determin’d to punish this once

favour’d Land, had suffered our Chiefs to engage in these foolish and mischievous

Contentions, for little Posts and paltry Distinctions, that our Hands might be bound up, our

Understandings darkned and misled, and every Means of our Security neglected. It seems as

if our greatest Men, our Cives nobilissimi of both Parties, had sworn the Ruin of the Country,

and invited the French, our most inveterate Enemy, to destroy it. Where then shall we seek

for Succour and Protection? The Government we are immediately under denies it to us; and

if the Enemy comes, we are far from ZIDON, and there is no Deliverer near. Our Case

indeed is dangerously bad; but perhaps there is yet a Remedy, if we have but the Prudence

and the Spirit to apply it.

46

If this now flourishing City, and greatly improving Colony, is destroy’d and ruin’d, it

will not be for want of Numbers of Inhabitants able to bear Arms in its Defence. ’Tis

computed that we have at least (exclusive of the Quakers) 60,000 Fighting Men, acquainted

with Fire-Arms, many of them Hunters and Marksmen, hardy and bold. All we want is

Order, Discipline, and a few Cannon. At present we are like the separate Filaments of Flax

before the Thread is form’d, without Strength because without Connection; but UNION

would make us strong and even formidable: Tho’ the Great should neither help nor join us;

tho’ they should even oppose our Uniting from some mean Views of their own, yet, if we

resolve upon it, and it please GOD to inspire us with the necessary Prudence and Vigour, it

may be effected. Great Numbers of our People are of BRITISH RACE, and tho’ the fierce

fighting Animals of those happy Islands, are said to abate their native Fire and Intrepidity,

when removed to a Foreign Clime, yet with the People ’tis not so; Our Neighbours of New-

England afford the World a convincing Proof, that BRITONS, tho’ a Hundred Years

transplanted, and to the remotest Part of the Earth, may yet retain, even to the third and

fourth Descent, that Zeal for the Publick Good, that military Prowess, and that undaunted

Spirit, which has in every Age distinguished their Nation. What Numbers have we likewise

of those brave People, whose Fathers in the last Age made so glorious a Stand for our

Religion and Liberties, when invaded by a powerful French Army, join’d by Irish

Catholicks, under a bigotted Popish King! Let the Memorable SIEGE of LONDONDERRY, and

the signal Actions of the INISKILLINGERS, by which the Heart of that Prince’s Schemes was

broken, be perpetual Testimonies of the Courage and Conduct of those noble Warriors! Nor

are there wanting amongst us, Thousands of that Warlike Nation, whose Sons have ever

since the Time of Caesar maintained the Character he gave their Fathers, of joining the most

obstinate Courage to all the other military Virtues. I mean the Brave and steady GERMANS.

Numbers of whom have actually borne Arms in the Service of their respective Princes; and

if they fought well for their Tyrants and Oppressors, would they refuse to unite with us in

Defence of their newly acquired and most precious Liberty and Property? Were this Union

form’d, were we once united, thoroughly arm’d and disciplin’d, was every Thing in our

Power done for our Security, as far as human Means and Foresight could provide, we might

then, with more Propriety, humbly ask the Assistance of Heaven, and a Blessing on our

lawful Endeavours. The very Fame of our Strength and Readiness would be a Means of

47

Discouraging our Enemies; for ’tis a wise and true Saying, that One Sword often keeps

another in the Scabbard. The Way to secure Peace is to be prepared for War. They that are

on their Guard, and appear ready to receive their Adversaries, are in much less Danger of

being attack’d, than the supine, secure and negligent. We have yet a Winter before us, which

may afford a good and almost sufficient Opportunity for this, if we seize and improve it with

a becoming Vigour. And if the Hints contained in this Paper are so happy as t meet with a

suitable Disposition of Mind in his Countrymen and Fellow Citizens, the Writer of it will, in

a few Days, lay before them a Form of an ASSOCIATION for the Purposes herein mentioned,

together with a practicable Scheme for raising the Money necessary for the Defence of our

Trade, City, and Country, without laying a Burthen on any Man.

May the GOD of WISDOM, STRENGTH and POWER, the Lord of the Armies of Israel,

inspire us with Prudence in this Time of DANGER; take away from us all the Seeds of

Contention and Division, and unite the Hearts and Counsels of all of us, of whatever SECT

or NATION, in one Bond of Peace, Brotherly Love, and generous Publick spirit; May he give

us Strength and Resolution to amend our Lives, and remove from among us every Thing that

is displeasing to him; afford us his most Gracious Protection, confound the Designs of our

Enemies, and give PEACE in all our Borders, is the sincere Prayer of

A TRADESMAN of Philadelphia.

Conjuravere cives nobilissimi Patriam incendere; GALLORUM GENTEM, infestissimam

nomini Romano, ad Bellum arcessunt. CAT. in SALUST.

48

“Ordinance for Disarming Non-Associators,” 19 July 1776

Online Source:

American Archives: Documents of the American Revolution, 1774-1776Northern Illinois University Archiveshttp://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/var/lib/philologic/databases/amarch/.22221(Note: The title on the webpage is incorrect)

Print Source:

Peter Force ed. American Archives. Washington, 1837-53. Vol. 2, p. 6.

Document:

“Ordinance for Disarming Non-Associators,” 19 July 1776

The House resumed the consideration of the Ordinance respecting the Arms of Non-

Associators; and after a considerable time employed in debating thereon and amending the

same, it was ordained in the following words, viz:

Whereas the Non-Associators in this State have either refused or neglected to deliver up

their Arms according to the Resolves of the honourable Continental Congress and the

Assembly of Pennsylvania, and effectual measures have not been taken to carry the said

Resolves into execution:

Be it therefore Ordained, by the authority of this Convention, That the Colonel or next

officer in command of every Battalion of Militia in this State, is hereby authorized,

empowered and required to collect, receive, and take all the Arms in his district or township

nearest to such officer, which are in the hands of Non-Associators, in the most expeditious

and effectual manner in his power, and shall give to the owners receipts for such Arms,

specifying the amount of the appraisement; and such as can be repaired shall with all

possible despatch be rendered fit for service, and the value according to the appraisement of

49

all such Arms, together with the repairs and transportation, shall be paid to the officers by

the Treasurer, on the order of the Council of Safety, for the use of the owners, and defraying

the charges.

And be it further Ordained, That the same Arms shall be appraised by any three reputable

freeholders appointed by the Commanding Officer. But if the owner of any Arms shall

neglect or refuse to apply for such money within six months, the same shall be applied

towards the repairs of the Arms: and the Colonels are hereby authorized to draw for the

necessary sums of money, for the purposes aforesaid, on the Council of Safety.

And it is further Ordained, That the Colonels aforesaid shall arm the Associators with the

said Arms, and keep an account to whom they are delivered, and return the same to the

Council of Safety; and every Associator shall be answerable for such Arms or the value,

unless lost or destroyed by some unavoidable accident, or in actual service.

And be it further Ordained, That in case any Arms so collected shall not be worth repairing,

the same shall be laid by until such time as may be thought proper by the Committee of the

County to return them to the owners.

Moved and Resolved, That the salary of each of the Delegates to be chosen to serve this

State in Congress shall be twenty shillings per diem.

The election of Delegates is adjourned to eight o' clock to-morrow morning.

Adjourned till to-morrow morning, eight o' clock.

50

Pennsylvania Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Article 13 (1776)

Online Source:

The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 5, Amendment II, Document 5http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs5.htmlThe University of Chicago Press

Print Source:

Thorpe, Francis Newton, ed. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909. Vol. 5, p. 3083.

Document:

Pennsylvania Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Article 13 (1776)

XIII. That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state;

and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be

kept up; And that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by,

the civil power.

51

George Washington to the President of Congress

24 September 24 1776

Online Source:

Electronic Text CenterUniversity of Virginia Libraryhttp://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=WasFi06.xml&images=images/

modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=78&division=div1

Print Source:

Washington, George, 1732-1799. The writings of George Washington from the original manuscript sources: Volume 6

Document:

George Washington to the President of Congress, September 24, 17761

    Sir: From the hours allotted to Sleep, I will borrow a few Moments to convey my thoughts

on sundry important matters to Congress. I shall offer them, with that sincerity which ought

to characterize a man of candour; and with the freedom which may be used in giving useful

information, without incurring the imputation of presumption.

    We are now as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution of our Army;2 the

remembrance of the difficulties which heppened upon that occasion last year, the

consequences which might have followed the change, if proper advantages had been taken 1 This letter was actually written in the early morning hours of September 25. (See Washington's letter to Congress, Sept. 25, 1776, post .)

2 The term of service for almost the whole army was to expire at or before the end of the year. Samuel Adams passed through New York on the 14th, and in a letter to John Adams (August 16) said he found "the General and his family in health and spirits; indeed, every officer and soldier appears to be determined.…I see now, more than ever I did, the importance of Congress attending immediately to enlistments for the next campaign. It would be a pity to lose your old soldiers. I am of opinion that a more generous bounty should be given, -- twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land for three years at least."

52

by the Enemy; added to a knowledge of the present temper and Situation of the Troops,

reflect but a very gloomy prospect upon the appearance of things now, and satisfie me,

beyond the possibility of doubt, that unless some speedy, and effectual measures are adopted

by Congress, our cause will be lost.

    It is in vain to expect, that any (or more than a trifling) part of this Army will again

engage in the Service on the encouragement offered by Congress. When Men find that their

Townsmen and Companions are receiving 20, 30, and more Dollars, for a few Months

Service, (which is truely the case) it cannot be expected; without using compulsion; and to

force them into the Service would answer no valuable purpose. When Men are irritated, and

the Passions inflamed, they fly hastely and chearfully to Arms; but after the first emotions

are over, to expect, among such People, as compose the bulk of an Army, that they are

influenced by any other principles than those of Interest, is to look for what never did, and I

fear never will happen; the Congress will deceive themselves therefore if they expect it.

    A Soldier reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged in, and the

inestimable rights he is contending for, hears you with patience, and acknowledges the truth

of your observations, but adds, that it is of no more Importance to him than others. The

Officer makes you the same reply, with this further remark, that his pay will not support

him, and he cannot ruin himself and Family to serve his Country, when every Member of the

community is equally Interested and benefitted by his Labours. The few therefore, who act

upon Principles of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop in the

Ocean. It becomes evidently clear then, that as this Contest is not likely to be the Work of a

day; as the War must be carried on systematically, and to do it, you must have good

Officers, there are, in my Judgment, no other possible means to obtain them but by

establishing your Army upon a permanent footing; and giving your Officers good pay; this

will induce Gentlemen, and Men of Character to engage; and till the bulk of your Officers

are composed of such persons as are actuated by Principles of honour, and a spirit of

enterprize, you have little to expect from them. -- They ought to have such allowances as

will enable them to live like, and support the Characters of Gentlemen; and not be driven by

a scanty pittance to the low, and dirty arts which many of them practice, to filch the Public

53

of more than the difference of pay would amount to upon an ample allowe. besides,

something is due to the Man who puts his life in his hands, hazards his health, and forsakes

the Sweets of domestic enjoyments. Why a Captn. in the Continental Service should receive

no more than 5/. Curry per day, for performing the same duties that an officer of the same

Rank in the British Service receives 10/. Sterlg. for, I never could conceive; especially when

the latter is provided with every necessary he requires, upon the best terms, and the former

can scarce procure them, at any Rate. There is nothing that gives a Man consequence, and

renders him fit for Command, like a support that renders him Independant of every body but

the State he Serves.3

    With respect to the Men, nothing but a good bounty can obtain them upon a permanent

establishment; and for no shorter time than the continuance of the War, ought they to be

engaged; as Facts incontestibly prove, that the difficulty, and cost of Inlistments, increase

with time. When the Army was first raised at Cambridge, I am persuaded the Men might

have been got without a bounty for the War: after this, they began to see that the Contest

was not likely to end so speedily as was immagined, and to feel their consequence, by

remarking, that to get the Militia In, in the course of last year, many Towns were induced to

give them a bounty. Foreseeing the Evils resulting from this, and the destructive

consequences which unavoidably would follow short Inlistments, I took the Liberty in a

long Letter, written by myself (date not now recollected, as my Letter Book is not here) to

recommend the Inlistments for and during the War; assigning such Reasons for it, as

experience has since convinced me were well founded. At that time twenty Dollars would, I

am persuaded, have engaged the Men for this term. But it will not do to look back, and if the

present opportunity is slip'd, I am perswaded that twelve months more will Increase our

difficulties fourfold. I shall therefore take the freedom of giving it as my opinion, that a

good Bounty be immediately offered, aided by the proffer of at least 100, or 150 Acres of

Land and a suit of Cloaths and Blankt, to each non-Comd. Officer and Soldier; as I have

good authority for saying, that however high the Men's pay may appear, it is barely

sufficient in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of goods, to keep them in Cloaths,

3 See Washington's letter to Congress, Oct. 4, 1776, post . Ford quotes from General Greene's letter to Governor Cooke (October 3) on this point: "We want nothing but good officers to constitute as good an army as ever marched into the field. Our men are much better than the officers."

54

much less afford support to their Families. If this encouragement then is given to the Men,

and such Pay allowed the Officers as will induce Gentlemen of Character and liberal

Sentiments to engage; and proper care and precaution are used in the nomination (having

more regard to the Characters of Persons, than the Number of Men they can Inlist) we

should in a little time have an Army able to cope with any that can be opposed to it, as there

are excellent Materials to form one out of: but while the only merit an Officer possesses is

his ability to raise Men; while those Men consider, and treat him as an equal; and (in the

Character of an Officer) regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one

common herd; no order, nor no discipline can prevail; nor will the Officer ever meet with

that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination.4

    To place any dependance upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff. Men just

dragged from the tender Scenes of domestick life; unaccustomed to the din of Arms; totally

unacquainted with every kind of Military skill, which being followed by a want of

confidence in themselves, when opposed to Troops regularly train'd, disciplined, and

appointed, superior in knowledge, and superior in Arms, makes them timid, and ready to fly

from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, (particularly

in the lodging) brings on sickness in many; impatience in all, and such an unconquerable

desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful, and

scandalous Desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others. Again, Men

accustomed to unbounded freedom, and no controul, cannot not brook the Restraint which is

indispensably necessary to the good order and Government of an Army; without which,

licentiousness, and every kind of disorder triumpantly reign. To bring Men to a proper

degree of Subordination, is not the work of a day, a Month or even a year; and unhappily for

us, and the cause we are Engaged in, the little discipline I have been labouring to establish in

the Army under my immediate Command, is in a manner done away by having such a

mixture of Troops as have been called together within these few Months.

4 "To attempt to introduce discipline and subordination into a new army must always be a work of much difficulty, but where the principles of democracy so universally prevail, where so great an equality and so thorough a levelling spirit predominates, either no discipline can be established, or he who attempts it must become odious and detestable, a position which no one will choose. It is impossible for any one to have an idea of the complete equality which exists between the officers and men who composed the greater part of our troops." -- Joseph Reed to Esther Reed ( his wife ), Oct. 11, 1776.

55

    Relaxed, and unfit, as our Rules and Regulations of War are, for the Government of an

Army, the Militia (those properly so called, for of these we have two sorts, the Six Months

Men and those sent in as a temporary aid) do not think themselves subject to 'em, and

therefore take liberties, which the Soldier is punished for; this creates jealousy; jealousy

begets dissatisfaction, and these by degrees ripen into Mutiny; keeping the whole Army in a

confused, and disordered State; rendering the time of those who wish to see regularity and

good Order prevail more unhappy than Words can describe. Besides this, such repeated

changes take place, that all arrangement is set at nought, and the constant fluctuation of

things, deranges every plan, as fast as adopted.

    These Sir, Congress may be assured, are but a small part of the Inconveniences which

might be enumerated and attributed to Militia; but there is one that merits particular

attention, and that is the expence. Certain I am, that it would be cheaper to keep 50, or

100,000 Men in constant pay than to depend upon half the number, and supply the other half

occasionally by Militia. The time the latter is in pay before and after they are in Camp,

assembling and Marching; the waste of Ammunition; the consumption of Stores, which in

spite of every Resolution, and requisition of Congress they must be furnished with, or sent

home, added to other incidental expences consequent upon their coming, and conduct in

Camp, surpasses all Idea, and destroys every kind of regularity and oeconomy which you

could establish among fixed and Settled Troops; and will, in my opinion prove (if the

scheme is adhered to) the Ruin of our Cause.

    The Jealousies of a standing Army, and the Evils to be apprehended from one, are remote;

and in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the

consequence of wanting one, according to my Ideas, formed from the present view of things,

is certain, and inevitable Ruin; for if I was called upon to declare upon Oath, whether the

Militia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole; I should subscribe to the

latter. I do not mean by this however to arraign the Conduct of Congress, in so doing I

should equally condemn my own measures, (if I did not my judgment); but experience,

which is the best criterion to work by, so fully, clearly, and decisively reprobates the

56

practice of trusting to Militia, that no Man who regards order, regularity, and oeconomy; or

who has any regard for his own honour, Character, or peace of Mind, will risk them upon

this Issue.5

    No less attention should be paid to the choice of Surgeons than other Officers of the

Army; they should undergo a regular examination; and if not appointed by the Director

Genl. and Surgeons of the Hospital, they ought to be subordinate to, and governed by his

directions; the Regimental Surgeons I am speaking of, many of whom are very great

Rascals, countenancing the Men in sham Complaints to exempt them from duty, and often

receiving Bribes to Certifie Indispositions, with a view to procure discharges or Furloughs;

but independant of these practices, while they are considered as unconnected with the Genl.

Hospital there will be nothing but continual Complaints of each other: The Director of the

Hospital charging them with enormity in their drafts for the Sick; and they him, for denying

such things as are necessary. In short, there is a constant bickering among them, which tends

greatly to the Injury of the Sick; and will always subsist till the Regimental Surgeons are

made to look up to the Director Genl. of the Hospital as a Superior. Whether this is the case

in regular Armies, or not, I cannot undertake to say; but certain I am there is a necessity for

it in this, or the Sick will suffer; the Regimental Surgeons are aiming, I am persuaded, to

5 Congress had, before this letter reached it, resolved (September 16) on a bounty of $20 and 100 acres of land to each noncommissioned officer and private soldier; the commissioned officers were to receive bounties in land only, scaled according to rank, September 20 Congress resolved to raise a new army and provided for supplies, etc. In transmitting these resolves to the States, President Hancock made liberal use of this Washington letter, sometimes copying whole sentences verbatim. Ford quotes General Greene's letter of September 28 as more outspoken in opinion of where the blame should rest. "The policy of Congress has been the most absurd and ridiculous imaginable, pouring in militia-men who come and go every month. A military force established upon such principles defeats itself.…The Congress goes upon a penurious plan. The present pay of the officers will not support them, and it is generally determined by the best officers to quit the service, unless a more adequate provision is made for their support. The present establishment is not thought reputable. The Congress have never furnished the men voted by near one half, certainly by above a third. Had we numbers we need not have retreated from Long Island or New York.…We must have an army to meet the enemy everywhere, to act offensively as well as defensively. Our soldiers are as good as ever were; and were the officers half as good as the men, they would beat any army on the globe of equal numbers."    In a letter to General Gates (October 14),General Lee expressed his opinion of Congress and of the army in a laconic but characteristic manner. "I write this scrawl," he says, "in a hurry. Colonel Wood will describe the position of our army, which, in my own breast, I do not approve. Inter nos Congress seem to stumble at every step. I have been very free in delivering my opinion to them. General Washington is much to blame in not menacing them with resignation, unless they refrain from unhinging the army by their absurd interference."

57

break up the Genl. Hospital, and have, in numberless Instances, drawn for Medic'roes,

Stores &ca. in the most profuse and extravagant manner, for private purposes.6

    Another matter highly worthy of attention, is, that other Rules and Regulation's may be

adopted for the Government of the Army than those now in existence, otherwise the Army,

but for the name, might as well be disbanded. For the most attrocious offences, (one or two

Instances only excepted) a Man receives no more than 39 Lashes; and these perhaps (thro'

the collusion of the Officer who is to see it inflicted), are given in such a manner as to

become rather a matter of sport than punishment; but when inflicted as they ought, many

hardend fellows who have been the Subjects, have declared that for a bottle of Rum they

would undergo a Second operation; it is evident therefore that this punishment is inadequate

to many Crimes it is assigned to, as a proof of it, thirty and 40 Soldiers will desert at a time;

and of late, a practice prevails, (as you will see by my Letter of the 22d) of the most

alarming nature; and which will, if it cannot be checked, prove fatal both to the Country and

Army; I mean the infamous practice of Plundering, for under the Idea of Tory property, or

property which may fall into the hands of the Enemy, no Man is secure in his effects, and

scarcely in his Person; for in order to get at them, we have several Instances of People being

frightned out of their Houses under pretence of those Houses being ordered to be burnt; and

this is done with a view of siezing the Goods; nay, in order that the villany may be more

effectually concealed, some Houses have actually been burnt to cover the theft.

    I have with some others, used my utmost endeavours to stop this horrid practice, but

under the present lust after plunder, and want of Laws to punish Offenders, I might almost

as well attempt to remove Mount Atlas. -- I have ordered instant corporal Punishment upon

every Man who passes our Lines, or is seen with Plunder, that the Offenders might be

punished for disobedience of Orders; and Inclose you the proceedings of a Court Martial

held upon an Officer, who with a Party of Men had robbd a House a little beyond our Lines

of a Number of valuable Goods; among which (to shew that nothing escapes) were four

large Pier looking Glasses, Women's Cloaths, and other Articles which one would think, 6 On receiving this letter (September 30) a resolution was passed by Congress requesting the several States to appoint skillful surgeons and physicians to examine the surgeons and surgeons' mates who offered themselves to serve in the army or navy, and declaring that no commission should be issued to any who should not produce a certificate from such examiners that they were qualified for the duties of their office.

58

could be of no Earthly use to him. He was met by a Major of Brigade who ordered him to

return the Goods, as taken contrary to Genl. Orders, which he not only peremptorily refused

to do, but drew up his Party and swore he would defend them at the hazard of his Life; on

which I ordered him to be arrested, and tryed for Plundering, Disobedience of Orders, and

Mutiny; for the Remit, I refer to the Proceedings of the Court; whose judgment appeared so

exceedingly extraordinary,7 that I ordered a Reconsideration of the matter, upon which, and

with the Assistance of fresh evidence, they made Shift to Cashier him.

    I adduce this Instance to give some Idea to Congress of the Currt. Sentiments and general

run of the Officers which compose the present Army; and to shew how exceedingly

necessary it is to be careful in the choice of the New Sett, even if it should take double the

time to compleat the Levies. An Army formed of good Officers moves like Clock-Work; but

there is no Situation upon Earth, less enviable, nor more distressing, than that Person's who

is at the head of Troops, who are regardless of Order and discipline; and who are unprovided

with almost every necessary. In a word the difficulties which have forever surrounded me

since I have been in the Service, and kept my Mind constantly upon the stretch; The Wounds

which my Feelings as an Officer have received by a thousand things which have happened,

contrary to my expectation and Wishes; the effect of my own Conduct, and present

appearance of things, so little pleasing to myself, as to render it a matter of no Surprize (to

me) if I should stand capitally censured by Congress; added to a consciousness of my

inability to govern an Army composed of such discordant parts, and under such a variety of

intricate and perplexing circumstances; induces not only a belief, but a thorough conviction

in my Mind, that it will be impossible unless there is a thorough change in our Military

Systems for me to conduct matters in such a manner, as to give satisfaction to the Publick

which is all the recompence I aim at, or ever wished for.8

7 Washington's many difficulties in enforcing discipline in an Army which had to be handled carefully with an eye to reenlistments are pictured in the General Orders. The court decided that Ensign Matthew Macumber, of the Sixteenth Continental Infantry, was not guilty of plundering but was guilty of insubordination and disrespect to his superior officer. The sentence was that he apologize and be reprimanded before the regiment. The copy of the court's proceedings forwarded to Congress bears this note in Washington's writing: "It is to be observed that the Men who were to share the Plunder became the Evidences for the Prisoner G. W -- n." (See General Orders, Sept. 22, 1776, ante .) On September 30 Congress directed that the court assign its reasons for the acquittal and that the same be forwarded to Congress. The court. however, attempted to justify its verdict in a report, dated October 7, which was forwarded to Congress by Washington on October 8.

59

    Before I conclude I must apologize for the liberties taken in this Letter and for the blots

and scratchings therein, not having time to give it more correctly. With truth I can add, that

with every Sentiment of respect and esteem. I am etc.

8 On September 20 Congress appointed Roger Sherman, Elbridge Gerry, and Francis Lewis a committee to visit camp "to enquire into the State of the Army, and the best means of supplying their wants." They reached camp the 24th and conferred with the general officers the 26th and 27th. Their report was rendered October 3. In the Washington Papers are 12 "Queries to be made at Head Quarters" with answers to the first two in the writing of Robert Hanson Harrison, which established the strength needed for the Army at 40,000, exclusive of the Flying Camp. (See Journals of the Continental Congress , Oct. 3, 8, and 9, 1776.) The committee recommended that Brig. Gen. Thomas Mifflin should replace Col. Stephen Moylan at the head of the Quartermaster Department.

60

U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 (1787)

Online Source:

Cornell University Law SchoolLegal Information Institutehttp://topics.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei

Document:

U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay

the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but

all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the

Indian tribes;

To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of

bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of

weights and measures;

To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United

States;

To establish post offices and post roads;

61

To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors

and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against

the law of nations;

To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on

land and water;

To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer

term than two years;

To provide and maintain a navy;

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress

insurrections and repel invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part

of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states

respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia

according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding

ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress,

become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over

62

all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be,

for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;--And

To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the

foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the

United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

63

Federalist Paper No. 25 (1787)

Online Source:

The Library of Congresshttp://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_25.html

Print Source:

New York Packet, Friday, 21 December 1787.

Document:

Federalist No. 25 (21 December 1787)

Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be

provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be,

in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our political association, as it would in

practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual

members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the

Confederacy.

The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood do not border

on particular States, but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in

different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like

manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury. It happens that

some States, from local situation, are more directly exposed. New York is of this class.

Upon the plan of separate provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of

the establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate or ultimate

protection of her neighbors. This would neither be equitable as it respected New York nor 64

safe as it respected the other States. Various inconveniences would attend such a system.

The States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as

little able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of competent

provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or

inability of a part. If the resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its

provisions should be proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm

at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or three of its members,

and those probably amongst the most powerful. They would each choose to have some

counterpoise, and pretenses could easily be contrived. In this situation, military

establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or

proper size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be engines for the

abridgment or demolition of the national authcrity.

Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State governments will too

naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the Union, the foundation of which will be the

love of power; and that in any contest between the federal head and one of its members the

people will be most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition to this immense

advantage, the ambition of the members should be stimulated by the separate and

independent possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too

great a facility to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional

authority of the Union. On the other hand, the liberty of the people would be less safe in this

state of things than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national

government. As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had

better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be jealous than in those of

which they are least likely to be jealous. For it is a truth, which the experience of ages has

attested, that the people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights

are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.

The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to the Union from the

separate possession of military forces by the States, have, in express terms, prohibited them

from having either ships or troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the

65

existence of a federal government and military establishments under State authority are not

less at variance with each other than a due supply of the federal treasury and the system of

quotas and requisitions.

There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the impropriety of

restraints on the discretion of the national legislature will be equally manifest. The design of

the objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in time of peace,

though we have never been informed how far it is designed the prohibition should extend;

whether to raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity or

not. If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be

ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised what shall be

denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the Constitution? What time shall

be requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say

they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised continues?

This would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE, against threatening

or impending danger, which would be at once to deviate from the literal meaning of the

prohibition, and to introduce an extensive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the

continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted to the national government,

and the matter would then be brought to this issue, that the national government, to provide

against apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards

keep them on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community was in any

degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford

ample room for eluding the force of the provision.

The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on the supposed

probability, or at least possibility, of a combination between the executive and the

legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should this at any time happen, how easy would

it be to fabricate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain or

Britain, would always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired appearances might

even be given to some foreign power, and appeased again by timely concessions. If we can

reasonably presume such a combination to have been formed, and that the enterprise is

66

warranted by a sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from whatever

cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution of the project.

If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the

RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most

extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its

Constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a

formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy within

our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies

of men for the protection of the State. We must receive the blow, before we could even

prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and

meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a

free government. We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders,

and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are

afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty,

by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.

Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and

would be at all times equal to the national defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to

have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been

saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too

recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war

against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the

same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this

position. The American militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their valor on

numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel

and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts

alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is a science to be

acquired and perfected by diligence, by perserverance, by time, and by practice.

All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course of human affairs,

defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of the truth of this remark.

67

The Bill of Rights of that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and

ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound

peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties, has resolved to

raise a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up as long as there is any

appearance of danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on

the same subject, though on different ground. That State (without waiting for the sanction of

Congress, as the articles of the Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell

a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of

revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure; but

the instance is still of use to instruct us that cases are likely to occur under our government,

as well as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in time

of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is therefore improper in this

respect to control the legislative discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United

States, how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its

own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment

provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.

It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the post of admiral

should not be conferred twice on the same person. The Peloponnesian confederates, having

suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before

served with success in that capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians,

to gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient

institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the real power

of admiral, under the nominal title of vice-admiral. This instance is selected from among a

multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated by

domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in

their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be

cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because

they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs

that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the

68

constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of

necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.

PUBLIUS.

69

Federalist Paper No. 28 (1787)

Online Source:

Library of Congresshttp://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_28.html

Print Source:

Independent Journal [26 December 1787]

Document:

Federalist Paper No. 28 (1787)Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated to

resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by

the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all

societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as

inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that the

idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the

only admissible principle of republican government), has no place but in the reveries of

those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.

Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national government, there could be

no remedy but force. The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the

mischief. If it should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the

residue would be adequate to its suppression; and the national presumption is that they

would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause,

eventually endangers all government. Regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the

Union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion had not communicated itself to

oppose the insurgents; and if the general government should be found in practice conducive

to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe that they would be

disinclined to its support.

If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a principal part of it, the

employment of a different kind of force might become unavoidable. It appears that

Massachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders within that

State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of her

citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State of New

York had been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont,

could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone?

Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the

execution of her design? If it must then be admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force

different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the State

governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the national government might be

under a like necessity, in similar extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not

surprising that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should urge as

an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for

which they contend; and what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable

consequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility

to the unceasing agitations and frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges of

petty republics?

Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of one general system, two,

or three, or even four Confederacies were to be formed, would not the same difficulty

oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be

exposed to the same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the

same expedients for upholding its authority which are objected to in a government for all the

States? Would the militia, in this supposition, be more ready or more able to support the

federal authority than in the case of a general union? All candid and intelligent men must,

upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally applicable

to either of the two cases; and that whether we have one government for all the States, or

different governments for different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire

separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force

constituted differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the community and to

maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them which amount

to insurrections and rebellions.

Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those who require

a more peremptory provision against military establishments in time of peace, to say that the

whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the

people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the rights and

privileges of the people, which is attainable in civil society.9

If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but

in the exertion of that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms

of government, and which against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with

infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state. In

a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different

parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct government in each,

can take no regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms,

without concert, without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The

usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition in

embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to

form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their

early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and

movements, and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly

directed against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a

peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.

9 Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.

The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased extent

of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them.

The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial

strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more competent to a

struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. But in a confederacy the

people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power

being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready

to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition

towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will

infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of

the other as the instrument of redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to

preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!

It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments

will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public

liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so

likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The

legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the danger at a

distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they

can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources

of the community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different States, and

unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.

The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already experienced its utility

against the attacks of a foreign power. And it would have precisely the same effect against

the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the federal army should be able

to quell the resistance of one State, the distant States would have it in their power to make

head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue

the opposition in others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was

left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.

We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all events, be regulated by

the resources of the country. For a long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a

large army; and as the means of doing this increase, the population and natural strength of

the community will proportionably increase. When will the time arrive that the federal

government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great

body of the people of an immense empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of

their State governments, to take measures for their own defense, with all the celerity,

regularity, and system of independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a

disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.

PUBLIUS

Federalist Paper No. 29 (1788)

Online Source:

Library of Congresshttp://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_29.html

Print Source:

Daily Advertiser. Thursday, 10 January 1788

Document:

Federalist Paper No. 29 (10 January 10 1788)Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection

and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and

of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy.

It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and

discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they

were called into service for the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties

of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar

moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the

degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to their usefulness. This

desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to

the direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that

the plan of the convention proposes to empower the Union "to provide for organizing,

arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be

employed in the service of the United States, RESERVING TO THE STATES

RESPECTIVELY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY

OF TRAINING THE MILITIA ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY

CONGRESS."

Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan of the convention,

there is none that was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one

from which this particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be the

most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the

disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing

armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose

care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the

inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can

command the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in

support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different

kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To

render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a

thousand prohibitions upon paper.

In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of

the Union, it has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed

Constitution for calling out the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the

execution of his duty, whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his

only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and

sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favorable

opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one

breath, that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us

in the next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS.

The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as

absurd to doubt, that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute its

declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers

who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right

to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would involve

that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing

the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a

want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of color, it

will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the

authority of the federal government over the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What

reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of authority,

merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we think of

the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this manner? How shall we

prevent a conflict between charity and judgment?

By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are even taught to

apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the federal government. It is

observed that select corps may be formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may be

rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the

militia may be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far

from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as

dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member

of the federal legislature from this State on the subject of a militia establishment, I should

hold to him, in substance, the following discourse:

"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile as it would be

injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in

military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a

week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry,

and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through

military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of

perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a

real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an

annual deduction from the productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating

upon the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole expense of the

civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of

labor and industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if

made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably

be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and

equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble

them once or twice in the course of a year.

"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be abandoned as mischievous

or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance that a well-digested plan should,

as soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of

the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of

moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them for service in case of need. By

thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained

militia, ready to take the field whenever the defense of the State shall require it. This will not

only lessen the call for military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time

oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable

to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to

them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those

of their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a

standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist."

Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should I reason on the

same subject, deducing arguments of safety from the very sources which they represent as

fraught with danger and perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point,

is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.

There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of danger to liberty from

the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to

consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous

artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism.

Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our

brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men

who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in

the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension

can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to

command its services when necessary, while the particular States are to have the SOLE

AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS? If it were possible seriously to

indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable establishment under the federal

government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the States ought at

once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will always secure to

them a preponderating influence over the militia.

In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he

is perusing some ill-written tale or romance, which instead of natural and agreeable images,

exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes "Gorgons, hydras, and

chimeras dire"; discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming

everything it touches into a monster.

A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable suggestions which

have taken place respecting the power of calling for the services of the militia. That of New

Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to

Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch

are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one moment there is to be a

large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the people; at another moment the militia of

Virginia are to be dragged from their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the

republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an

equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the

persons who rave at this rate imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any

conceits or absurdities upon the people of America for infallible truths?

If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism, what need of the

militia? If there should be no army, whither would the militia, irritated by being called upon

to undertake a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of

slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants,

who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their imagined

intrenchments of power, and to make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused

and incensed people? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous

and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the detestation of the very instruments of

their intended usurpations? Do they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful

acts of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred

and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to

a discerning people? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered

enthusiasts? If we were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most

ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would employ such preposterous

means to accomplish their designs.

In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper that the militia of a

neighboring State should be marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard

the republic against the violence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in

respect to the first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a

principal end of our political association. If the power of affording it be placed under the

direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the

dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements of

selfpreservation to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.

PUBLIUS.

Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention—17 th, 18 th, and 19 th Amendments (27 June 1788)

Online Source:

The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 5, Bill of Rights, Document 9http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss9.htmlThe University of Chicago Press

Print Source:

Elliot, Jonathan, ed. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. . . . 5 vols. 2d ed. 1888. Reprint. New York: Burt Franklin, n.d. Vol. 3, pp. 657-61.

Document:

Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention—17th, 18th, and 19th Amendments 27 June 1788

"17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia,

composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence

of a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and therefore

ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit;

and that, in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by,

the civil power.

"18th. That no soldier in time of peace ought to be quartered in any house without the

consent of the owner, and in time of war in such manner only as the law directs.

"19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon

payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.

Annals of Congress, Monday, 17 August 1789

Online Source:

The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 5, Amendment II, Document 6http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs6.htmlThe University of Chicago Press

Print Source:

Annals of Congress. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States. "History of Congress." 42 vols. Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1834--56. Vol. 1, pp. 749—52.

Document:

Annals of CongressMonday, 17 August 1789

The House again resolved itself into a committee, Mr. Boudinot in the chair, on the

proposed amendments to the constitution. The third clause of the fourth proposition in the

report was taken into consideration, being as follows: "A well regulated militia, composed

of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to

keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be

compelled to bear arms."

Mr. Gerry.--This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to secure the people against the

mal-administration of the Government; if we could suppose that, in all cases, the rights of

the people would be attended to, the occasion for guards of this kind would be removed.

Now, I am apprehensive, sir, that this clause would give an opportunity to the people in

power to destroy the constitution itself. They can declare who are those religiously

scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing arms.

What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the

bane of liberty. Now, it must be evident, that, under this provision, together with their other

powers, Congress could take such measures with respect to a militia, as to make a standing

army necessary. Whenever Governments mean to invade the rights and liberties of the

people, they always attempt to destroy the militia, in order to raise an army upon their ruins.

This was actually done by Great Britain at the commencement of the late revolution. They

used every means in their power to prevent the establishment of an effective militia to the

eastward. The Assembly of Massachusetts, seeing the rapid progress that administration

were making to divest them of their inherent privileges, endeavored to counteract them by

the organization of the militia; but they were always defeated by the influence of the Crown.

Mr. Seney wished to know what question there was before the committee, in order to

ascertain the point upon which the gentleman was speaking.

Mr. Gerry replied that he meant to make a motion, as he disapproved of the words as they

read. He then proceeded. No attempts that they made were successful, until they engaged in

the struggle which emancipated them at once from their thraldom. Now, if we give a

discretionary power to exclude those from militia duty who have religious scruples, we may

as well make no provision on this head. For this reason, he wished the words to be altered so

as to be confined to persons belonging to a religious sect scrupulous of bearing arms.

Mr. Jackson did not expect that all the people of the United States would turn Quakers or

Moravians; consequently, one part would have to defend the other in case of invasion. Now

this, in his opinion, was unjust, unless the constitution secured an equivalent: for this reason

he moved to amend the clause, by inserting at the end of it, "upon paying an equivalent, to

be established by law."

Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, inquired what were the words used by the conventions

respecting this amendment. If the gentleman would conform to what was proposed by

Virginia and Carolina, he would second him. He thought they were to be excused provided

they found a substitute.

Mr. Jackson was willing to accommodate. He thought the expression was, "No one,

religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service, in

person, upon paying an equivalent."

Mr. Sherman conceived it difficult to modify the clause and make it better. It is well known

that those who are religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, are equally scrupulous of getting

substitutes or paying an equivalent. Many of them would rather die than do either one or the

other; but he did not see an absolute necessity for a clause of this kind. We do not live under

an arbitrary Government, said he, and the States, respectively, will have the government of

the militia, unless when called into actual service; besides, it would not do to alter it so as to

exclude the whole of any sect, because there are men amongst the Quakers who will turn

out, notwithstanding the religious principles of the society, and defend the cause of their

country. Certainly it will be improper to prevent the exercise of such favorable dispositions,

at least whilst it is the practice of nations to determine their contests by the slaughter of their

citizens and subjects.

Mr. Vining hoped the clause would be suffered to remain as it stood, because he saw no use

in it if it was amended so as to compel a man to find a substitute, which, with respect to the

Government, was the same as if the person himself turned out to fight.

Mr. Stone inquired what the words "religiously scrupulous" had reference to: was it of

bearing arms? If it was, it ought so to be expressed.

Mr. Benson moved to have the words "but no person religiously scrupulous shall be

compelled to bear arms," struck out. He would always leave it to the benevolence of the

Legislature, for, modify it as you please, it will be impossible to express it in such a manner

as to clear it from ambiguity. No man can claim this indulgence of right. It may be a

religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion

of the Government. If this stands part of the constitution, it will be a question before the

Judiciary on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of the militia,

whether it comports with this declaration or not. It is extremely injudicious to intermix

matters of doubt with fundamentals.

I have no reason to believe but the Legislature will always possess humanity enough to

indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but they ought to be left to

their discretion.

The motion for striking out the whole clause being seconded, was put, and decided in the

negative--22 members voting for it, and 24 against it.

Mr. Gerry objected to the first part of the clause, on account of the uncertainty with which it

is expressed. A well regulated militia being the best security of a free State, admitted an idea

that a standing army was a secondary one. It ought to read, "a well regulated militia, trained

to arms;" in which case it would become the duty of the Government to provide this

security, and furnish a greater certainty of its being done.

Mr. Gerry's motion not being seconded, the question was put on the clause as reported;

which being adopted,

Mr. Burke proposed to add to the clause just agreed to, an amendment to the following

effect: "A standing army of regular troops in time of peace is dangerous to public liberty,

and such shall not be raised or kept up in time of peace but from necessity, and for the

security of the people, nor then without the consent of two-thirds of the members present of

both Houses; and in all cases the military shall be subordinate to the civil authority." This

being seconded.

Mr. Vining asked whether this was to be considered as an addition to the last clause, or an

amendment by itself. If the former, he would remind the gentleman the clause was decided;

if the latter, it was improper to introduce new matter, as the House had referred the report

specially to the Committee of the whole.

Mr. Burke feared that, what with being trammelled in rules, and the apparent disposition of

the committee, he should not be able to get them to consider any amendment; he submitted

to such proceeding because he could not help himself.

Mr. Hartley thought the amendment in order, and was ready to give his opinion on it. He

hoped the people of America would always be satisfied with having a majority to govern.

He never wished to see two-thirds or three-fourths required, because it might put it in the

power of a small minority to govern the whole Union.

U.S. Constitution, Second Amendment (1790)

Online Source:

The National Archiveshttp://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html

Document:

Amendment II

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the

people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.