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Building inclusive democracies: Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities inLatin AmericaDonna Lee Van Cott aa Department of Political Science, Tulane Univerity, New Orleans, USA

Online Publication Date: 01 December 2005

To cite this Article Van Cott, Donna Lee(2005)'Building inclusive democracies: Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in LatinAmerica',Democratization,12:5,820 837

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13510340500322215URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340500322215

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Building Inclusive Democracies: Indigenous

Peoples and Ethnic Minorities in

Latin America

D O N N A L E E V A N C O T T

The political mobilization of indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, and oppressed majoritieshas presented challenges to democratizing countries. Although, in other regions of the

world, this has fostered anti-democratic tendencies, in Latin America, on balance, it hasimproved the quality of democracy by placing new issues and values (justice, equality, toler-ance of difference) on the political agenda and by presenting a model of policy-making in whichcitizens have a central role. Indigenous movements have forced governments to take intoaccount the impact of public policy on societys most vulnerable. They have been less effectivein achieving the implementation of existing rights and in facilitating the design and adoption ofalternative forms of inter-ethnic governance. Using Latin America as a primary reference point,this inquiry analyzes the design and implementation of ethnically sensitive democratic insti-tutions in ethnically diverse and divided societies, particularly in reference to indigenous andAfro-descendant populations.

Key words: constitutional design; affirmative action; liberal culturalism; human rights

Indigenous Peoples, Ethnic Minorities and Democratization

Hostility among peoples of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, whether rooted in

generations of conflict or precipitated by recent events, is one of the most serious chal-

lenges to the survival and quality of democracy. Even where relatively free and fair

multi-party elections are regularly held, governments violating the rights of ethnic min-

orities and indigenous peoples, or failing to constrain dominant groups from oppressing

and exploiting others, prevent their citizens from enjoying democratic rights and

political freedoms. Discrimination and oppression erode the values of equality and soli-

darity, and reduce the quality of public trust that democratic culture requires. In many

cases, cultural difference itself impedes equitable access to democratic institutions and

fosters political exclusion. In the face of oppression or exclusion, minority groups may

opt to carve out a space of protection and autonomy for themselves and, thus, opt out of

participation in the larger state and society, with negative effects on national unity. It is,

thus, no accident that the most successful cases of democratization in Latin America

and post-communist Europe occurred in the least ethnically-diverse states such asHungary, Poland, Costa Rica, Uruguay while the most ethnically diverse states are

Donna Lee Van Cott is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Tulane Univerity, NewOrleans, USA.

Democratization, Vol.12, No.5, December 2005, pp.820837ISSN 1351-0347 print=1743-890X onlineDOI: 10.1080=13510340500322215# 2005 Taylor & Francis

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having a harder time constructing democratic institutions, for example Romania,

Ukraine, Guatemala and Peru.1

By the 1990s, public opinion in the advanced industrialized democracies had

shifted from the view that policies favouring ethnic minorities are the stuff of discre-tionary public policy to the view that ethnic minorities have rights and that these

rights protect the basic dignity of human beings.2 As a result, most countries have

codified minority rights in national political constitutions and many international

organizations have developed norms for protecting minority, immigrant and indigen-

ous peoples rights. Once the discretionary concern of national governments, the

question of minority rights has become internationalized and states increasingly are

pressured to adopt as a minimum these international standards in exchange for recog-

nition and access to trade and financial aid.3 European organizations in particular

have established a strong regime of minority-rights norms and condition admissionto institutions, such as the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), on the adoption of these standards. The Council of Europe and the Organ-

ization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have even mediated ethnic disputes in

post-communist Europe.4

However, although international standards for the treatment of ethnic minorities

and indigenous peoples provide useful guidelines for societies wishing to address

the problems that ethnic conflict and inequality create for democracy, they alone

cannot resolve ethnic tensions. Such standards must be accepted and embraced by

political elites and mass publics a difficult prospect, particularly in poor andnewly democratic countries, where cultural lines tend to be drawn around socio-

economic classes. And Western democracies and international organizations must

be willing to pursue enforcement, something that they have tended to subordinate

to overriding security and political concerns.5 Even in Europe, where minority-rights

norms are most developed, the substance of the minimal standard for minority rights

remains unclear, given the diversity of norms and their uneven application. Western

countries have been reluctant to force the issue on their eastern neighbours as this

could lead to further tensions or result in an examination of their own minority-

rights regimes, and post-communist countries have rejected the favoured approaches

to moderating ethno-national conflict adopted in the West. In fact, since the fall of

communism, in many post-communist countries minorities actually have fewer

rights, since eastern European elites largely perceive minorities to be a serious secur-

ity threat.6

This inquiry surveys the main approaches that scholars and policy-makers use to

construct democratic institutions in ethnically diverse and divided societies. It then

focuses on particular cases of ethnic accommodation in Latin America. In the Latin

American context, this almost always concerns indigenous peoples, the descendants

of the inhabitants of the Americas at the time of the arrival of Europeans in the

sixteenth century. Although there is no widely accepted definition of indigenous

peoples, partly due to indigenous activists insistence that they retain the right to

define themselves, they are comparable to national minorities, in that they exist as

distinct cultural and political systems within modern states, and that they aspire to

self-government. Kymlicka argues that, whereas national minorities lost the battle

B U I L D I N G I N C L U S I V E D E M O C R A C I E S 821



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to establish themselves as the dominant group within a modern state, indigenous

peoples were isolated from the processes of nation-building and state-building

entirely.7 This distinction may hold up in Europe, but it fails in the American

context, where nation-building was undertaken through the destruction and subordi-nation of indigenous cultures and authorities. It is the process of economic modern-

ization, rather than nation-building, from which indigenous peoples have been

relatively more isolated. Finally, the account evaluates efforts by democracies in

that region to implement institutional solutions for managing ethnic conflict and

offers practical recommendations for policy-makers.

Conceptual Issues and Approaches

Notwithstanding the intellectual convergence on the idea that ethnic minority andindigenous rights should be protected, debate persists over how liberal-democratic

institutions can best protect minorities while promoting values and practices essential

to democracy. How should liberalism which developed in a context of relative

ethnic homogeneity be interpreted in a context of ethnically diverse societies,

particularly in those lacking a liberal-democratic philosophico-cultural tradition?

Does the recognition of distinct national minority groups destroy the cohesion and

collective identity necessary for democratic nationhood, or is that recognition

required to uphold basic liberal principles? How can minority cultures be respected

and protected from the intrusion of dominant cultures, while protecting individualmembers of minority cultures from violations of their right to express a version of

their culture that may diverge from that of their cultural authorities? Should the

liberal-democratic state aim to express complete neutrality with respect to culture

and ethnicity or, since all states implicitly favour the dominant culture and attempt

to build a cohesive nation around this model, should they aim to reflect all cultures

explicitly and equally? Does the equality of universal political institutions better

promote democratic values and practices than the asymmetry of special autonomous

regions and political rights?

Within political philosophy a consensus has emerged around liberal culturalism,

which Kymlicka defines as

the view that liberal states should not only uphold the familiar set of individual

civil and political rights which are protected in all democracies, but should also

adopt various group-specific rights and policies which are intended to recognize

and accommodate the distinctive identities and needs of ethnic cultural groups.8

In practice this means that the state may need to intervene to protect individuals from

restrictions against their individual rights imposed by ethnic group members, and that

the state should protect minority cultures against the intrusion of more dominant

groups in society.

State practice, however, demonstrates neither convergence nor consistency.

Among those who design policies for states a key debate concerns the question of

whether or not ethnicity should be politicized. Arend Lijphart is the most renowned

proponent of the view that ethnically divided societies must design institutions that

822 D E M O C R A T I Z A T I O N



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explicitly recognize ethnic identity in order to promote power-sharing (also called

consociationalism) and group autonomy. In power-sharing systems, leaders of

explicitly identified communal groups participate in a grand coalition government,

in which each group receives a proportional share of state resources, maintains auton-omy over sensitive cultural issues, and reserves the right to veto policies concerning

cultural rights, that is, policies pertaining to language, education and religion.9

Quasi-power-sharing arrangements reserve seats in government for minority

groups in order to ensure their participation and, thus, their loyalty to the political

system. For example, the legislatures in India and Iran reserve seats for lower-caste

groups and religious minorities, respectively, and American policy-makers, prior to

the January 2004 elections in Iraq, had suggested that seats be reserved for Sunnis,

who make up 20 per cent of the population, to avoid their domination by Shiites

and Kurds.10

The model is based on the successful experiences of Belgium and theNetherlands and, to a lesser extent, Austria and Switzerland.

Although Lijphart endorses power-sharing for all societies, the model has failed to

succeed in developing countries. Among the most important reasons for failure are:

(1) the presence of significant group-based economic and social inequality, political

instability and societal violence; (2) the resultant scarcity of inter-ethnic trust and

shared elite values and interests in developing as opposed to advanced industrialized

societies; as well as (3) varying birth rates among ethnic groups, which require

difficult, periodic adjustments in the distribution of power and resources. Moreover,

the approach tends to reduce the fluidity of communal identities and to reduce thescope of choice for voters. Thus, power-sharing is best used where cultural and

economic differences are not great and democratic values are strong.

Donald L. Horowitz offers a distinct approach that promotes the careful design

of institutions to diminish the political salience of ethnic and other communal iden-

tities in order to discourage the adoption of stable communal identities and to create

incentives for inter-ethnic elite cooperation. The approach relies mainly on electoral

laws that punish extremism and reward political moderation and preelectoral inter-

ethnic coalition building.11 The difficulty is that it is impossible for such laws to

promote all democratic values at once. For example, laws that increase the account-

ability of politicians directly to constituents and promote durable government

coalitions may reduce the proportionality of representation and even exclude

small minorities. Laws that explicitly promote the proportional representation of

minorities in office may discourage inter-ethnic cooperation by fragmenting the

party system and legislative bodies.12 Moreover, it is difficult to convince societies

that are accustomed to certain institutions to adopt new ones with which they lack

cultural affinity. Generations of failed presidentialism have yet to convince Latin

Americans that they should try parliamentary systems, which may produce more

stable and effective governments and allow executives to govern with legislative

support.13

It is difficult to know beforehand how electoral laws developed in the West will

affect political outcomes in different cultural contexts.14 It is equally plausible that

more ethnically homogeneous electoral districts will promote inter-ethnic cooperation

by satisfying ethnic elites hunger for government jobs and their constituents quest




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for authentic representation, as it is that ethnically heterogeneous districts will

promote inter-ethnic cooperation by encouraging more moderate political views. The

only pattern discernible is that Western democracies have been relatively successful

at designing policies that harmonize the twin goals of (1) building national unity andcollective identity, and (2) protecting minority rights. These policies have tended to

promote greater equality among groups and, thus, to reduce incidences of conflict

derived from fears of domination. This typically is accomplished through a combi-

nation of federalism the devolution of executive, legislative, and judicial powers,

resources, and responsibilities to sub-national levels of government15 and multi-

cultural policies targeted at ethnically distinct immigrant groups, which typically

protect (and sometimes publicly fund) their distinct justice, religious and educational

institutions. Shifting powers to local or regional levels where national minorities and

indigenous peoples constitute majorities enables them to freely develop their cultureswithout interference and to exercise powers of self-government that reduce the

feeling of domination by the majority.16 Where federalism is inappropriate or lacks

public support, quasi-federal arrangements provide some autonomy for distinct

groups. Examples of such arrangements include the establishment of legislatures

for Scotland and Wales within Great Britain, and the relationship of Puerto Rico

and the Aaland Islands to the United States and Finland, respectively.17

Federalism has been most successful where all sub-units of the state have rela-

tively equal powers. Switzerland and India are good examples of successful federal-

ism, representing the wealthy industrialized and poor industrializing worlds,respectively. Typically, however, a country has one or a few regions where national

minorities are concentrated and seek autonomous self-governing rights, while the

remainder of the country is divided into units based upon region rather than ethnicity.

For example, Canadas federal system and Spains system of autonomous commu-

nities were constructed in order to satisfy autonomy claims from the province of

Quebec and the Catalan, Basque and Galician communities, respectively. Asym-

metric federalism, however, establishes a tension between minority ethnic groups,

who seek special autonomy rights that regionally defined units lack, and the

majority, which seeks to prevent any region from acquiring greater rights than

those enjoyed by all units in order to uphold the principle of equality.18 Although

instituted in order to reduce demands for secession, asymmetric federalism may

increase such demands, as autonomous peoples come to view themselves as

capable of going it alone.

Federalism does not always produce the desired result. When federal sub-units are

drawn around territorially concentrated ethnic groups identities tend to become rigid

and power is typically seized by more extreme members of the ethnic elite in each

subunit, reducing the choices of citizens to candidates and platforms proposed by

this ethnic elite.19 In the post-communist and developing worlds federal systems

have proved to be extremely vulnerable to collapse and secession: the Soviet

Union, Yugoslavia (neither of them true federations) and Czechoslovakia barely

survived the fall of communism, and separatist movements continue to agitate in

Russia, India, Nigeria and Ethiopia. In democratizing countries, societies often lack

the abundant goodwill necessary for successful territorial power-sharing. The




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failure of federalism in post-communist Europe largely is attributable to the lack of a

democratic context for its operation and the simultaneous oppression of minorities

within the system. This legacy has made the federalism option anathema among

leaders in ethnically diverse eastern and central European countries, who view it asencouraging disloyalty and even secession among minorities. Such leaders find

the spectre of their minorities seeking to secede and join ethnic kin in neighbouring

countries particularly threatening.20

A situation somewhat comparable to asymmetric federalism exists in industrial-

ized countries that create self-governing reserves for indigenous peoples, who

typically receive distinct treatment under national and international law compared

to ethnic minorities. Indigenous peoples have been relatively more isolated

geographically, politically and economically from the process of economic and

political modernization, and their cultures are relatively less similar to the dominantculture in the state in which they reside. The greater vulnerability of indigenous

groups, their relatively small numbers compared to the total population, and wide-

spread sympathy for the justice of their rights claims have led to relatively generous

regimes of autonomous rights in advanced industrialized democracies, including

Canada, Sweden, New Zealand and the United States. Autonomous reserves

remove indigenous cultures from specific aspects of the jurisdiction of national and

sub-national governments whether federal or unitary and confer special

powers which allow indigenous authorities to control access to indigenous culture

and territory by outsiders and to apply culturally appropriate means of conflictresolution and rule adjudication. For example, in the United States, Native American

reservations are exempt from state law and have their own tribal courts and police,

and Canadas Inuit have governed an autonomous territory called Nunuvut since

1999. New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries have established autonomous

territorial rights for the Maori and the Sami, respectively.

In contrast to the success of liberal culturalism in wealthy democracies, insti-

tutions in developing countries designed to protect ethnic minorities and indigenous

peoples rights have had more limited results. A key obstacle is the far higher

degree of inequality in developing areas, which typically corresponds to ethnic

differences. Developing countries lack the economic resources, and usually the pol-

itical will, to rapidly ameliorate inter-group inequalities. Many indigenous and

ethnic groups claims are essentially redistributive and poor, developing countries,

having fewer resources and less economic autonomy relative to international

financial institutions and markets, find redistribution to be more challenging.

In addition, developing countries often contain what Amy Chua calls market-

dominant minorities: ethnically distinct groups that monopolize economic and

financial resources and access to international markets, while widespread poverty

afflicts an ethnically distinct majority. As Chua observes, many contemporary

ethnic conflicts consist of the efforts of market-dominant minorities to maintain

their dominance in the face of intense resentment expressed by impoverished and

excluded majorities. Contemporary efforts to open markets to international

commerce tend to exacerbate existing inequalities, since market-dominant min-

orities benefit disproportionately.21




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The Latin American Experience

Latin America is an interesting region for the discussion of approaches to ethnic

accommodation in democratizing countries. Ethnic conflict in the region mainlyconcerns the longstanding inequalities among the regions three main ethno-

racial groups: the descendants of the original inhabitants, indigenous peoples or

Indians; the descendants of European conquerors and immigrants, whites or

criollos; and the descendants of African slaves, Afro-descendants or blacks.

Indigenous peoples constitute approximately 40 million individuals, or roughly

ten per cent of Latin Americas population, with large concentrations in Bolivia,

Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru.22 Contemporary indigenous social

movements formed in the 1960s and 1970s to demand bilingual education and collec-

tive land rights. These movements gained strength and public recognition in the 1980s

and became important collective political actors in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador

and Mexico. By the 1990s, extensive and persistent interaction with neighbouring

movements generated a common, cohesive set of indigenous rights claims associated

with the right to self-determination, or the right to freely develop their cultures, forms

of production, and traditional modes of political organization.23

The Afro-descendant population is estimated at 120150 million, or roughly 30

per cent of the regions population, with high concentrations in the circum-Caribbean

and Brazil.24 Most blacks live in urban areas and do not identify themselves as

members of a distinct ethnic group. In the 1970s urban intellectuals inspired by the

American Black Power movement tried to organize national movements for racial

equality, but these have failed to gain momentum, since most Afro-descendants do

not identify themselves as such but have, rather, assimilated into the national or a

regional culture. In contrast, there are Afro-descendant communities in geographi-

cally remote areas that runaway slaves established in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries. Geographic isolation enabled these communities to develop and maintain

distinct cultures derived from their African ancestry. Afro-descendant political mobil-

ization was delayed until the late 1980s, and has been most active in Brazil, Colom-

bia, Ecuador, Honduras and Peru. The principal demands expressed are for collective

land rights for rural communities on which Afro-descendants often have a commoncause with their indigenous neighbours and an affirmative action agenda to

acknowledge and to remediate the markedly lower socio-economic status of blacks.

Afro-descendant organizations are far weaker and less cohesive than their indigenous

counterparts and, thus, far less effective. They have achieved policy goals mainly in

alliance with stronger indigenous organizations and, in some countries like Bolivia

and Honduras, they have a similar legal status as indigenous peoples.25

In Latin America, we see some of the tension and conflict that Chua attributes to the

existence of market-dominant minorities: in this case, the light-skinned economic and

political elite of European descent and, to lesser degree, successful immigrant commu-nities from Lebanon, China and elsewhere. Whites dominate politics and the military,

and enjoy preferential access to economic opportunities and resources, while a

majority of indigenous and Afro-descendant Latin Americans live in poverty. A

large proportion of the most violent episodes of conflict witnessed in Latin America




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in the last decade is attributable to popular backlash against efforts by the light-skinned

elite to undertake neo-liberal reforms that would improve their own market position,

but would harm indigenous and Afro-descendant communities and economies.

Examples are the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, and the 2003 GasWar that toppled Bolivian President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. Inter-ethnic

relations are complicated by the great extent of racial mixing, which has created a

numerically dominant mestizo or mixed-race group. Individuals can achieve limited

upward mobility by migrating from rural indigenous or Afro-descendant communities

to urban centres and adopting the cultural habits of the Europhile elite.

Since independence in the nineteenth century, and for most of the regions history,

Latin American states have attempted to destroy indigenous languages and cultures

and to forcibly assimilate the indigenous population. The liberal reforms of the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries dismembered much of the collective territor-ial base upon which indigenous cultures depended for their existence. In the 1930s

indigenist policies emphasized Spanish-language education and the integration of

distinct indigenous cultures into national life. These policies persisted into the

1960s and 1970s in most countries. In the last 15 years, however, the region

has become a laboratory for the design and implementation of liberal culturalist

policies, particularly with respect to indigenous rights, autonomous regimes and

affirmative action.

The Constitutional Reform Wave

A wave of constitutional reform followed the regions return to elected, civilian rule in

the 1980s. By the 1990s, almost all Latin American countries had undertaken major

reforms or wholesale replacements of their constitutions in an effort to modernize

the state and the economy, to establish regimes of human-rights protection that

would prevent a return to military-style, authoritarian rule, and to resolve institutional

problems related to the hyper-centralization of public administration, judicial weakness

and the exaggerated powers of the executive relative to the legislature.26 Indigenous

peoples organizations throughout the hemisphere had achieved a high level of political

organization and mobilization by this time and many were able to insert their rights

claims into the new constitutions by linking them to elite goals. For example, indigen-

ous peoples organizations promoted decentralization as a means to create a territorial

system amenable to constructing self-governing autonomous reserves. They joined

forces with liberal elites and their allies in international financial institutions seeking

to decentralize administrative and political powers and resources in order to create a

more efficient, responsive and accountable state. Indigenous organizations promoted

the recognition of indigenous customary law and institutions of self-government as a

means to fortify spheres of territorial autonomy with meaningful jurisdictional

powers and, thus, end local elites domination of indigenous peoples. They joined

forces with political elites seeking to increase the coverage and quality of the rule of

law in rural areas, where ordinary courts and police had been unable to establish

order in the face of guerrilla violence and criminal activity.27

Contemporary Latin American constitutions vary considerably in the kind and

number of indigenous rights provisions they encompass. Table 1 illustrates the




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T A B L E 1

M U L T I - C U L T U R A L R I G H T S F O R I N D I G E N O U S P E O P L E S I N L A T I N A M

Country

Date ofconstitution/recognition

Collectiveland

rightsSelf-government

rightsCultural

rightsCustomary

law

Representaconsulta

in govern

Argentina 1994 Belize 1981Bolivia 1995 for limited

purposes

Brazil 1988 Chile 1993 by

statute limited

Colombia 1991

Costa Rica Laws passedin 1977/1993/1999

Ecuador 1998 El Salvador 1983/199192 Guatemala 1986 Guyana 1980/1996 Honduras 1982 Mexico 1917/1992/2001 Nicaragua 1987/1995 Panama 1972/1983/199394 Paraguay 1992 Peru 1993/200304 weakened

in 1993

Suriname 1987Venezuela 1999

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distribution of the most common types of constitutional rights accorded to indigenous

peoples: collective land rights; self-governing rights; cultural rights, which typically

refer to official status for language and/or the right to bilingual education; the right

to practice customary law; reserved seats in legislative bodies; and the rhetorical rec-ognition of a distinct status. The last column indicates whether the country has ratified

International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 (1989) Concerning Tribal

and Indigenous Peoples in Independent Countries. Such countries recognize indigen-

ous peoples right to hold land collectively, govern themselves, exercise customary

law and to receive some type of language recognition and an appropriate educational

policy.

Two trends are discernible with respect to the codification of indigenous rights in

Latin America. Firstly, over time, countries tended to expand and deepen indigenous

rights regimes as these were adopted in neighbouring countries and received supportfrom international actors. Colombia, the first country to adopt a significant regime of

indigenous constitutional rights, inspired Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador and, sub-

sequently, Venezuela to adopt similar rights. Secondly, countries with smaller indigen-

ous populations tended to adopt more generous and meaningful indigenous rights

regimes. The most important autonomous regimes established for indigenous peoples

are located in Colombia, Nicaragua and Panama, where indigenous populations consti-

tute ten per cent or less of the total population. Panama, where indigenous peoples con-

stitute 8.4 per cent of the population, contains the regions oldest indigenous self-

governing reserves, called comarcas. The Kuna secured theirs in the 1920s followinga long-running war with the state, and with support from the United States govern-

ment.28 Similarly, only in Colombia and Venezuela, where indigenous peoples consti-

tute less than three per cent of the population, have indigenous seats been reserved in

legislatures. In 1991, two seats were reserved for indigenous senators in the Colombian

National Senate and five seats were reserved in the Chamber of Deputies for indigenous

peoples, Afro-Colombians and Colombians living abroad. In 1999, three indigenous

seats were reserved in the single-chamber Venezuelan National Assembly and a seat

is reserved in municipal and state assemblies where indigenous populations are

present. The measures automatically provided political representation and a platform

for public voice to an excluded sector of society. Moreover, indigenous organizations

have used the reserved seats and the resources accruing to them to launch successful

electoral vehicles that are competing with surprising success in general elections at

all levels of government. For example, in 2000 a Venezuelan indigenous political

party won the governorship of the state of Amazonas, elected a representative to the

National Assembly (in addition to the three indigenous legislators required by law),

and elected mayors for three of the states seven municipalities.29

Elites in countries with significant indigenous populations, fearing the dramatic

implications of a shift of power in favour of a large excluded group, have tended

to adopt more restrictive multi-cultural policies and have avoided granting territorial

autonomy or guaranteeing access to the formal political system. Elites in these

countries have, traditionally, united to prevent the incorporation of the indigenous

majority (or significant minority), and created institutions designed to exclude the

poor, dark-skinned majority. The relatively poor quality of democracy in such




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countries gave indigenous social movements relatively less leverage for alliance for-

mation and political action.

Weak movements in favour of the cultural and territorial rights of isolated, riverine

black communities in the Pacific Coast region emerged in Colombia and Ecuador inthe late 1980s and made claims based on historic continuity as distinct cultures

dating back hundreds of years. They emulated the successful discourses and strategies

of indigenous organizations. As a result, Latin Americans of African descent have

received some modest constitutional rights in both countries. Colombia was the first

country to recognize Afro-descendants as a distinct ethnic group deserving of

special rights. It did so at the insistence of indigenous delegates participating in

the 1991 National Constituent Assembly. Implemented through Law 70 (1993),

Afro-Colombian rights include collective land rights, support for culture and education,

and the creation of a reserved seat for an Afro-Colombian representative in the nationalChamber of Deputies. Although these rights originally were targeted toward the des-

cendants of black slaves living in traditional, riverine communities in the Pacific

Coast region, Colombias Constitutional Court subsequently interpreted the subject

of Afro-Colombian rights more broadly, opening up the possibility that blacks else-

where in the country might develop distinct cultures requiring state protection.30

Afro-Ecuadorians gained constitutional rights in the 1998 Constitution. As in

Colombia, these resulted largely from alliances with stronger indigenous peoples

organizations and are noticeably weaker than those accorded to indigenous peoples,

who are considered in both countries to have stronger cultural identities and morelegitimate claims to territorial and political sovereignty. Afro-Ecuadorian consti-

tutional rights also are more vague. Apart from the recognition of collective land

rights, the applicability of indigenous constitutional rights to Afro-Ecuadorians is to

be determined by law. The process of negotiation between black activists and the

state over this legislation has enabled incipient black rights movements in Colombia

and Ecuador to grow. Thus, perhaps the most important impact of constitutional

recognition was the public legitimation of Afro-descendant identity and culture, which

encouraged more Colombians and Ecuadorians to identify themselves as black.31

Brazil, Honduras and Nicaragua also recognize some limited collective land rights

for descendants of escaped slave communities.32 Honduras and Peru have established

official agencies to address the needs of black populations, but they have little legal

authority or resources.33 Elsewhere, recognition of black rights takes the form of pro-

grammes to remediate racial discrimination. In Brazil, which has the largest black

population outside Nigeria, the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration in

October 2001 enacted a variety of affirmative action policies for blacks, including

20 per cent hiring quotas in three ministries, an effort to improve the performance

of blacks on the entrance exam for the diplomatic corps, and a 40 per cent admission

quota for universities in three states. By December 2001, quotas had been established

for blacks in television programmes and advertisements and 14 distinct quota propo-

sals awaited congressional action. Many state and municipal governments were

considering similar policies. In 2002 President Cardoso issued a decree establishing

a National Affirmative Action Program.34 According to Htun, this remarkable change

of policy in Brazil where elites have long denied the existence of racial




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discrimination partly is attributable to soul-searching provoked by preparations for

the September 2001 World Conference on Racism. In the months leading up to the

conference, black legislators met to demand attention to the problem of racial equality

and the new policies fulfil pledges made at the conference.35 Thus, in the same waythat international activism around the ratification of ILO Convention 169 put pressure

on states to address indigenous rights, international activity surrounding the racism

conference helped to forge a consensus in Brazil that something must be done,

even though the conference itself may be deemed a failure.36 The left-leaning Luis

Inacio da Silva administration subsequently established a Ministry for the Promotion

of Racial Equality and, in 2004, the Federal University of Sao Paulo adopted a quota

system for black, mixed-race and indigenous applicants, reserving 10 per cent of new

openings for these populations.37

Liberal Culturalism in Practice

The simultaneous adoption of European-style mechanisms for the enforcement of

human rights such as the Swedish Human Rights Ombudsperson, the Western

European Constitutional Court, and the office of the Prosecutor General, which

holds government officials accountable to the law provided tools for disadvantaged

groups to petition the government for redress when their rights are violated. In some

cases, these mechanisms have enabled indigenous and Afro-descendant organizations

to force the implementation of constitutional rights that had been stalled by legislative

inaction or obstruction. For example, Colombias 1991 constitution established aConstitutional Tribunal to protect citizens constitutional rights from violations by

the state and private actors. The tribunal has adjudicated dozens of tutelas (writs of

protection) that indigenous and, to a lesser extent, Afro-descendant individuals and

communities, have brought before it. The majority of these have been decided in

favour of ethnic minorities and, in several important cases, the tribunal has actually

expanded and deepened the implications of the rights in question.38

Nevertheless, serious challenges impede the implementation of indigenous and

Afro-descendant rights in Latin America. A high level of structural inequality and

poverty that is closely associated with ethnicity exacerbates conflicts among ethnic

groups, while sustained economic crisis since the early 1980s reduces state resources

for redistribution and poverty alleviation. Throughout the region, particularly in

Guatemala, Colombia, Brazil and Peru, rural violence against indigenous and Afro-

descendant peoples inhibits the exercise of existing rights, particularly land rights,

and the weakness of the rule of law provides inadequate recourse to protection. For

various reasons, the most difficult right to implement has been collective land rights.

First, in Latin America the state retains subsoil rights and can exploit such

resources or sell them to private corporations. It has been particularly difficult for

indigenous peoples to protect collective land rights where petroleum and other pre-

cious natural resources are located and, in fact, a significant portion of unexploited

natural resources in Latin America is located on indigenous land.39 Secondly, conser-

vative political elites, who often are over-represented in legislatures, have prevented

the passage of legislation implementing territorial rights, since such rights conflict

with their interests in expanding the agricultural, grazing and extractive frontiers.




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Thirdly, and this affects all constitutional rights, many Latin American countries have

experienced extreme political instability and party system fragmentation since the

adoption of new constitutions, rendering legislatures incapable of passing all but

the most routine legislation. This problem has been particularly marked inEcuador, where the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian self-governing regimes have

awaited implementation since 1998.

According to an analyst for the Inter-American Development Bank, the main

reason for the slow progress of implementation is that governments lack sufficient

financial resources, staff with expertise in indigenous public policy, and mechanisms

for the state and ethnic minorities to hold each other accountable. It is rare that ethnic

minorities serve in positions of authority in state agencies working with ethnic min-

orities.40 This situation has improved somewhat since the late 1990s, when indigen-

ous peoples entered national legislatures, often with indigenous movement-basedpolitical parties, notably Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador. In the absence of effective

formal political representation, policies are most likely to be implemented where

ethnic minorities are well organized into a single, coherent social movement that is

able to apply sustained pressure. Unfortunately, implementation is a frustrating

Catch-22 situation: elite consensus and political stability is required for effective leg-

islative and executive action, but such conditions tend not to lead to the adoption of

generous ethnic rights regimes. They are more likely to facilitate a more incremental

approach that is unlikely to satisfy extremely disadvantaged groups.

Attention to the needs of ethnic minorities also is impeded by widespread resist-ance to the idea that racial and ethnic difference and inequality exist in Latin America.

This has changed somewhat since the consciousness-raising efforts surrounding

the 1992 marking of the quincentenary (the 500th anniversary of Columbus

voyage to the Americas). But many Latin Americans prefer to reduce race- and

ethnicity-based inequality to class and to deny the extent of racial discrimination.

Even states that recognize a generous regime of rights for indigenous peoples tend

to focus on cultural differences and avoid discussion of race, preferring to promote

the myth of the racially neutral state.41

Nevertheless, the symbolic recognition gained in these constitutions has helped to

revive indigenous and Afro-descendant cultures and to inspire identity-based social

movements to mobilize politically to realize and expand their new rights. Improve-

ments in the quality of democracy in the region have opened space for these move-

ments, whose effective representation of once-excluded sectors of society, in turn,

enhances the quality of democracy. Although critics of these reforms argue that sym-

bolic recognition means nothing, particularly in a context in which it has been difficult

to fully implement more substantive ethnic rights, symbolic recognition after centu-

ries of humiliation and domination is enormously important to Latin Americas indi-

genous peoples, whose struggle is as much for substantive rights as it is for dignity

and recognition of their status as peoples existing prior to the Latin American state

and, thus, entitled to a special place in political institutions. Symbolic recognition

was crucial to the revitalization of Afro-descendant identity in South America. As

Kymlicka and Norman argue, symbolic gestures granting or denying recognition

can have profound and continuing effects within a political culture in ways that




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directly affect the well-being and self-respect of citizens of minority cultures, as well

as their enthusiasm to participate in the political life of a larger state.42 Horowitz

concurs that such recognition is of great importance in democratizing multi-ethnic

societies because it explicitly includes threatened, non-dominant minorities in thefuture of the political project. More practically, indigenous organizations have used

symbolic constitutional language to argue claims before constitutional courts and

to oppose legislation proposed by national parliaments.

The multi-cultural rights discussed above represent a common approach in Latin

America to addressing longstanding political, economic and social exclusion of indi-

genous peoples and, in a few cases, Afro-descendants. Countries recognizing strong

regimes of multi-cultural rights Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and certain states

within Mexico, such as Oaxaca base these regimes on a federal or quasi-federal poli-

tico-territorial organization that supports ethnically defined electoral districts and self-governing autonomous reserves, municipalities or regions, where land is held collec-

tively, indigenous customary law is practiced and authorities are chosen through cus-

tomary means.43 This represents the territorial power-sharing approach that

Kymlicka advocates. In two countries Colombia and Venezuela this approach

is combined with aspects of group-based power-sharing, in that seats are reserved

for indigenous and, in Colombia, Afro-descendant minorities in legislative bodies.

Only in Peru do we see the adoption of Horowitzs advice to design electoral rules

that encourage inter-ethnic electoral alliances. In 2002, the Peruvian government

adopted legislation requiring political parties in certain Amazonian electoral districtsto place indigenous peoples in 15 per cent of the slots on their candidate lists.44

Conclusion: Implications for Scholars and Policy-makers

The political mobilization of indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities and oppressed

majorities has presented challenges to democratizing countries. Although in other

regions of the world this has fostered anti-democratic tendencies, in Latin America,

on balance, it has improved the quality of democracy by placing new issues and

values justice, equality, tolerance of difference on the political agenda and by

presenting a model of policy-making in which citizens have a central role. Indigenous

movements have forced governments to take into account the impact of public policy

on societys most vulnerable. They have been less effective in achieving the

implementation of existing rights and in facilitating the design and adoption of

alternative forms of inter-ethnic governance.

What, then, can be done to enable ethnic minorities, excluded and oppressed

majorities, and indigenous peoples to enjoy the benefits of democracy? What

lessons does the Latin American experience offer?

First, ethnic political mobilization is more effective when combined with inter-

national pressure, particularly from international financial institutions and aid organ-

izations willing to require sensitivity to ethnic claims in exchange for granting to

states access to financial assistance. Western democracies and the multilateral insti-

tutions that they support must establish clear, consistent standards with respect to

minority rights and these standards must be vigorously and consistently enforced.




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Second, external aid agencies and governments should invest in the organizational

and technical capacity of disadvantaged ethnic minorities and indigenous organiz-

ations and professionals. Where these entities are strong, positive policy outcomes

are more likely.45

Third, as the case of Colombia and its activist Constitutional Court demonstrates,

strong judicial institutions are crucial for the protection of the rights of vulnerable

groups, particularly in the face of resistance on the part of dominant groups. Individ-

uals and organizations representing ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples must

have easy access to credible, efficient judicial mechanisms for asserting and protect-

ing their rights. Even where they are relatively cohesive and well organized, organ-

izations representing oppressed groups require a strong legal system to ensure the

existence of a democratic public space in which to make claims and to participate

in formal and informal politics. This is even more important in developing regions,such as Latin America, where economic inequalities correspond to ethnic identity

and significantly impair access to justice. A strong rule of law and strong judicial

institutions are as vital to the quality of ethnic relations as they have been proven

to be vital to the quality of democracy.46

Fourth, where ethnic identity is a proxy for economic status, states must undertake

significant programmes of redistribution in order to reduce the economic basis of ethnic

inequality. As Chua observes, this requires redistributive tax systems. Such systems,

however, are weak in the developing world, since governments generally are too

weak to force privileged minorities to pay their share, let alone more than theirshare. Redistributive policies should include public funding for the fledgling political

parties of oppressed ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples to reduce the significant

disadvantage they face in competition against well-funded dominant groups.47 No real

progress can be made, however, until privileged ethnic minorities voluntarily contribute

to the reduction of inequality. Given the violent backlash against market-dominant,

light-skinned elites and foreigners, the time may be coming when such elites understand

it is in their best interest to address the basic needs of the impoverished majority.48

Finally, governments must be flexible. They must try new ideas and tailor

well-known conflict resolution mechanisms and institutional designs to the particular

circumstances in their own societies. Such circumstances change over time, often

quickly, and require constant vigilance, a disposition to negotiate, and a commitment

to inter-ethnic cohabitation. Policy-makers, committed as they are to producing

measurable, substantive results, should not underestimate the importance of symbolic

gestures and the act of talking, both of which send signals to excluded ethnic

minorities and indigenous peoples, and to members of dominant groups, that a

process of accommodation is underway.

NOTES

1. Will Kymlicka, Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, in Will Kymlickaand Magda Opalski (eds), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?: Western Political Theory and Ethnic

Relations in Eastern Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.3.2. Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2001), p.6.




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3. The most important global standard is the 1992 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of PersonsBelonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. With respect to indigenouspeoples, International Labour Organization Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and TribalPeoples in Independent States (1989), and the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of

Indigenous Peoples, are the most relevant norms.4. See Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular (note 2), pp.67; Graham Smith, Sustainable Federalism,

Democratization, and Distributive Justice, in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds), Citizenshipin Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.345.

5. Will Kymlicka, Reply and Conclusion, in Kymlicka and Opalski (note 1), pp.369 87.6. See Kymlicka, Western Political Theory (note 1), and Reply and Conclusion (note 5). See also Jon

Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuildingthe Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.24760. The most importantEuropean norms are the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europes 1990 CopenhagenDeclaration on the Rights of National Minorities, and the weaker Council of Europe 1995 FrameworkConvention for Protection of National Minorities.

7. Kymlicka, Western Political Theory (note 1), p.24.

8. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular (note 2), p.9; for a complete statement of this approach, see WillKymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1995).

9. Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, Journal of Democracy Vol.15, No.3(April 2004), pp.96109.

10. Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Is Suggesting Guaranteed Role for Iraqs Sunnis, The New York Times, 26December 2004, online edition.

11. See Donald L. Horowitz, Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers,Journal of DemocracyVol.14, No.4 (2003), pp.115 27; Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: ElectoralEngineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

12. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, The Quality of Democracy: An Overview, Journal ofDemocracy Vol.15, No.4 (October 2004), p.21; Horowitz, Electoral Systems (note 11).

13. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of LatinAmerica, Vol.2 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).14. Horowitz, Electoral Systems (note 11); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley,

CA: University of California Press, 1985).15. On the topic of federalism and autonomy, see Yash Ghai, Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating

Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); HurstHannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting

Rights, rev. ed. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990); Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy:Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

16. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular (note 2), pp.3, 95.17. Kymlicka, Western Political Theory (note 1), p.30.18. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular (note 2), p.105.19. Graham Smith, Sustainable Federalism, Democratization, and Distributive Justice, in Will Kymlicka

and Wayne Norman (eds), Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000),p.345.

20. Kymlicka, Reply and Conclusion (note 5).21. Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global

Instability (New York: Anchor Books, 2004).22. Cletus Gregor Barie, Pueblos Indgenas y Derechos Constitucionales en America Latina: Un

Panorama, 2nd ed. (Mexico: Comision Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indgenas, AbyaYala, 2003), pull-out chart.

23. This literature is vast. Among the most cited general and comparative works are Alison Brysk,FromTribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America (Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); David Maybury-Lewis (ed.), The Politics of Ethnicity: Indigen-ous Peoples and Latin American States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Rodolfo

Stavenhagen, Indigenous Rights: Some Conceptual Problems, in Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg(eds), Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America (Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp.14160; Kay Warren and Jean Jackson (eds), Indigenous Movements,Self-Representation, and the State in Latin America (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2002); andDeborah J. Yashar, Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in LatinAmerica, Comparative Politics,Vol.31, No.1 (Oct. 1998), pp.2342.




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24. Inter-American Dialogue, Race Report (Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue, 2003); WorldBank, .

25. Eva T. Thorne, Ethnic and Race-based Political Organization and Mobilization in Latin America:Lessons for Public Policy, paper prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank, p.18.

26. For a discussion of these reforms, see Julio Faundez, Constitutionalism: A Timely Revival, inDouglas Greenberg et al. (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the ContemporaryWorld (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.354 60; Cesar Landa and Julio Faundez(eds), Contemporary Constitutional Challenges (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru,Fondo Editorial, 1996).

27. On this process, see Willem Assies et al. (eds), The Challenge of Diversity: Indigenous Peoples andReform of the State in Latin America (Amsterdam: Thela Thesis, 2000); Barie (note 22); RachelSieder (ed.), Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Donna Lee Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past:The Politics of Diversity in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).

28. The Embera-Wounaan obtained their comarca in 1993, followed by the Ngobe-Bugle in 1997.Although Panamanian Indians enjoy considerable autonomy within these reserves, conflict continues

over the presence of non-Indians within the comarcas and over the unresolved issue of access to andownership of natural resources. Thorne (note 25), p.21

29. See Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of EthnicPolitics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Venezuelan electoral results at.

30. See Jaime Arocha, Nina S. de Friedemann, Marco de Referencia Historico-Cultural para la ley SobreDerechos Etnicos de las Comunidades Negras en Colombia, America Negra Vol.3 (June 1992),pp.3954; Libia Grueso, Carlos Rosero and Arturo Escobar, The Process of Community Organizingin the Southern Pacific Coast Region of Colombia, in Sonia Alvarez et al. (eds), Cultures of Politics/Politics of Cultures: Revisioning Latin American Social Movements in (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1998), pp.196219; Van Cott (note 27); Peter Wade, Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics of

Racial Identity in Colombia (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

31. Grueso, Rosero and Escobar (note 30); Van Cott (note 27), pp.97 8; Wade (note 30), pp.182, 356 8;author interview, Pablo de la Torre, 28 July 1999.32. Thorne (note 25), p.6.33. Inter-American Dialogue, Race Report 2004.34. Mala Htun, From Racial Democracy To Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in

Brazil, Latin American Research Review Vol.39, No.1 (2004), pp.6171.35. The full name of the conference was: World Conference Against Racism, Racial and Ethnic Discrimi-

nation, Xenophobia And Related Intolerance. Htun (note 34), pp.612.36. Anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic groups seeking to make Palestinian rights the dominant issue repeatedly

disrupted the conference. The issue of reparations for colonization and slavery also impeded thecreation of governmental consensus and a plan of action. Natalie Steinberg, Background Paper onthe World Conference against Racism, Racial and Ethnic Discrimination, Xenophobia and RelatedIntolerance, November 2001, available at .

37. Htun (note 34), pp.61 2; Thorne (note 35), p.23; UNIFESP to Adopt Quota System for BlackStudents, 1 September 2004, translated and reprinted in The Black Americas Issue 8 (September2004), p.2.

38. For example, the tribunal affirmed the right of indigenous peoples to exercise their customary disputeresolution mechanisms even when these violate ordinary legislation and constitutional rights of lowerrank than the right to cultural and ethnic diversity. Van Cott(note 27), pp.112 18; Donna Lee Van Cott,A Political Analysis of Legal Pluralism in Bolivia and Colombia, Journal of Latin American StudiesVol.32, No.1 (February 2000), pp.20734.

39. Juan Houghton and Beverly Bell, Indigenous Movements and Globalization in Latin America,NativeAmericas (Spring 2004), pp.1119.

40. Thorne (note 25), p.2.41. Htun (note 34); Thorne (note 25), p.3.

42. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts,Concepts, in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds), Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2000), p.29.

43. On territorial autonomy in Latin America, see Hector Daz Polanco, Autonoma Regional: La autode-terminacion de los pueblos indios (Mexico: Siglo veintiuno editores, 1991); Donna Lee Van Cott,Explaining Ethnic Autonomy Regimes in Latin America, Studies in Comparative International




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Development Vol.5, No.4 (Winter 2001), pp.3058. On experiments with autonomy in Mexico, seeAracely Burguete Cal y Mayor, coord., Mexico: Experiencias de Autonoma Indgena (Copenhagen:International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs, 1999).

44. Van Cott (note 29), ch.5.

45. Thorne (note 25), pp.26-30.46. Diamond and Morlino (note 12), pp.23, 26; see also Juan Mendez, Guillermo ODonnell and Paulo

Sergio Pinheiro (eds), The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America (NotreDame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999); Guillermo ODonnell, The State, Democratization,and Some Conceptual Problems, in William C. Smith et al. (eds), Latin American Political Economyin the Age of Neoliberal Reform (Miami, FL: NorthSouth Center, 1994), pp.15780.

47. Diamond and Morlino (note 12), p.24.48. Chua (note 21), pp. 267 79.

Maunuscript accepted for publication August 2005.

Address for correspondence: Donna Lee Van Cott, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 316

Norman Mayer Hall, New Orleans, LA 70118, USA. E-mail: .




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