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Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR2126
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-36540)
ON A CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 88.1 MILLION
(US$ 110.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA
FOR A
COMMUNITY BASED URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
March 28, 2012
Urban and Water
AFCW2, Federal Republic of Nigeria
Africa Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Exchange Rate Effective March 26th
, 2012
Currency Unit = Nigerian Naira (NGN)
XDR 1.00 = US$ 1.54
US$ 1.00 = NGN 157.45
FISCAL YEAR
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AFTOS World Bank Africa Core Operations Services
CBUDP Community Based Urban Development Project
CDD Community Driven Development
CDS City Development Strategy
CMU World Bank Country Management Unit
CTC Community Technical Committee
ERR Economic Rate of Return
FGD Focus Group Discussion
FGN Federal Government of Nigeria
FMWH Federal Ministry of Works and Housing
FMF Federal Ministry of Finance
FMHUD Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development
FPCU Federal Project Coordination Unit
IDA International Development Association
ISR Implementation Supervision Report
JISU Joint Interim Strategy Update
LG Local Government
MTR Midterm Review
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NPV Net Present Value
PDO Project Development Objective
PIM Project Implementation Manual
PIU Project Implementation Unit
PSC Project Steering Committee
SG State Government
SMU World Bank Sector Management Unit
TTL Task Team Leader
Vice President: Obiageli Ezekwesili
Country Director: Marie-Francoise Marie-Nelly
Sector Director: Jamal Saghir
Acting Sector Manager: Alexander E. Bakalian
Project Team Leader: Hassan Madu Kida
ICR Author / Team Leader: Hassan Madu Kida
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
Community Based Urban Development Project
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information
B. Key Dates
C. Ratings Summary
D. Sector and Theme Codes
E. Bank Staff
F. Results Framework Analysis
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
H. Restructuring
I. Disbursement Graph
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 6
3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 11
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 16
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 17
6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 20
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 20
ANNEXES
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 21
Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 22
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 26
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 28
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 30
Annex 6. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 33
Annex 7. ICR Sources and List of Supporting Documents .......................................... 37
Annex 8. Questionnaire sent to Project Implementation Units……………………….38
MAP
A. Basic Information
Country: Nigeria Project Name:
Community-Based
Urban Development
Project
Project ID: P069901 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-36540
ICR Date: 29/02/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR
Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: FEDERAL MINISTRY
OF FINANCE
Original Total
Commitment: XDR 88.10M Disbursed Amount: XDR 88.10M
Revised Amount: XDR 88.10M
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies: Federal Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and State PIUs of Akwa
Ibom, Bauchi, Ebonyi, Edo, Jigawa, Nassarawa, Ogun, and Ondo.
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B. Key Dates
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 03/01/2000 Effectiveness: 06/23/2003 06/23/2003
Appraisal: 04/01/2002 Restructuring(s):
06/28/2005
03/18/2009
06/23/2010
Approval: 06/06/2002 Mid-term Review: 04/30/2008
Closing: 06/30/2009 08/31/2011
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial
Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing
Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Borrower
Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating
Potential Problem Project
at any time (Yes/No): Yes
Quality at Entry
(QEA): None
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No): Yes
Quality of
Supervision (QSA): None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Agro-industry 22
General education sector 26
General public administration sector 8
General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 22
Roads and highways 22
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
HIV/AIDS 13
Municipal finance 25
Participation and civic engagement 24
Public expenditure, financial management and
procurement 13
Urban services and housing for the poor 25
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Obiageli Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo
Country Director: Marie-Francoise Marie-Nelly Mark D. Tomlinson
Sector Director: Jamal Saghir Letitia A. Obeng
Sector Manager: Alexander E. Bakalian (acting) Letitia A. Obeng
Project Team Leader: Hassan Madu Kida Alison C.N. Cave
ICR Author/Team Leader: Hassan Madu Kida
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) (i) Establish partnerships between communities and their Local Governments (LGs) so
that sub-project proposals are developed jointly by them;
(ii) deliver basic urban services in poor urban settlements; and
(iii) demonstrate viable approaches to infrastructure development and service delivery
that enable LGs to move away from a culture of total financial dependency for
infrastructure investment and even recurrent infrastructure O&M expenditures.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving
authority) To increase access to basic urban services in selected cities.
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Original PDO indicators included: (PDO1) the partnerships result in the bulk of project
proceeds being invested on-site1, (PDO 2) i) reduced time spent on water collection and
lower unit costs, ii) reduced incidence of flooding, iii) increased use of public transport,
and iv) higher satisfaction levels for services delivered – water, roads, drainage, solid
waste management, and (PDO3) increase in own source revenue generation by 5% per
annum in real terms for LGs. The PAD did not include baseline values for PDO2 and 3
nor specific targets as the demand-based design of the project did not allow to know, a
priori, the choices that the communities would make during implementation.
Revised PDO after the restructuring included:
Indicator Baseline
Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Number of people with access
to water supply 0 NA NA 912,000
Number of people with access
to sanitation facilities 0 NA NA 843,700
Number of people using
rehabilitated or newly built
access roads
0 NA NA 2,171,000
Number of people reached
through HIV-AIDS campaigns 0 NA NA 598,020
Number of people enrolled in
school 0 NA NA 36,629
Number of people who go to
clinic on a daily basis 0 NA NA 360
1 “On-site” means local infrastructure investments within the poor areas of the cities selected. It is opposed
to “off-site” which refers to trunk infrastructure outside the poor settlements themselves. An implicit
assumption at project appraisal was that decision-makers may be inclined to favor “off-site” investments.
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline
Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Water supply schemes 0 NA NA 39
Public toilets 0 NA NA 193
Refuse collection trucks in service 0 NA NA 38
Incinerators 0 NA NA 5
Compactors 0 NA NA 1
Roads (km) 0 NA NA 179.3
Footpaths (km) 0 NA NA 18
Bus shelters 0 NA NA 5
People trained on HIV-AIDS 0 NA NA 24,587
Condom packets distributed 0 NA NA 25,400
Individuals tested on HIV-AIDS 0 NA NA 29,600
Classrooms and school
infrastructures built 0 NA NA 247
Classrooms and school
infrastructures renovated 0 NA NA 315
Education equipment items
provided 0 NA NA 6,412
Health Centers 0 NA NA 13
Health centers beds 0 NA NA 144
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 12/18/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00
2 05/30/2003 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 0.00
3 11/26/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.89
4 05/25/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.82
5 06/18/2004 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 5.32
6 12/08/2004 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 5.92
7 04/22/2005 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 8.84
8 06/29/2005 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 11.17
9 12/13/2005 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 17.86
10 06/06/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 23.29
11 11/22/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 28.72
12 05/25/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 37.08
13 11/22/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 45.05
14 05/22/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 53.54
15 11/28/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 61.15
16 05/22/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 66.14
17 12/29/2009 Moderately
Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 81.63
18 06/02/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 93.34
19 03/29/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 134.26
20 Draft Satisfactory Satisfactory 136.20
H. Restructuring (if any)
Restructuring
Date(s)
Board
Approved
PDO Change
ISR Ratings at
Restructuring
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in USD
millions
Reason for Restructuring &
Key Changes Made DO IP
06/28/2005 Board U U 11.17 PDOs changed. Outreach of
component 2 reduced
03/18/2009 Country
Director S S 64.28 20 months closure extension
06/23/2010 Country
Director S S 93.34 6 months closure extension
I. Disbursement Profile
1
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
1. The Community Based Urban Development Project (CBUDP) was prepared
during the first years of democracy in Nigeria after more than three decades of
military rule. The CBUDP was part of the first wave of projects with which the
Bank scaled up its portfolio after years of keeping a low profile during the
military regime. The general institutional setting was weak, corruption levels were
high, and public procurement processes were extremely weak.
2. The main urban issues in Nigeria in 2002 were: (i) rapid urbanization, increasing
urban poverty, and social unrest in cities, (ii) infrastructure deficiencies,
especially in low-income neighborhoods, due to inadequate investment in new
facilities and negligible maintenance of existing facilities, (iii) poor utilization of
existing resources, (iv) inadequate fiscal decentralization leading to high levels of
dependency on Federal resource flows to maintain and increase recurrent and
capital expenditures, (v) inadequate access by Local Governments (LGs) to
financing for infrastructure investments, and (vi) inadequate technical and
management capacity at both State and LG levels, coupled with poor urban
information systems.
3. The project was in line with the Government‟s priorities. The Federal
Government of Nigeria‟s (FGN) National Urban Development Policy of 1997
aimed to improve the living standards of the Nigerian people by facilitating
adequate, efficient and functional service delivery. This was to be achieved by
providing infrastructure developed to design standards that would make urban
facilities and amenities more affordable through investments in a package of basic
services to upgrade poor urban settlements.
4. The Nigeria Joint Interim Strategy Update (JISU) of June 2001structured IDA
assistance to Nigeria through three strategic pillars: (i) community-driven
development, (ii) governance, and (iii) private sector-led growth. The CBUDP
aimed at addressing communities‟ needs. The governance pillar was reflected in
the partnership between local communities, LGs and State Governments (SGs) to
boost good governance by empowering local governments to provide services to
local communities, while at the same time empowering communities to demand
such services from their government. Finally, the infrastructure works and the
out-sourcing of some operations to the private sector was to promote its role in
economic growth. The rationale for Bank assistance was thus comprehensively
justified.
5. Given IDA‟s experience in urban development – including community-based
urban development – this CBUDP was intended to enable the FGN to develop an
approach to infrastructure provision that promoted demand-led and participatory
2
planning techniques for public expenditures on infrastructure within budget
constraints, thereby promoting better utilization of resources. It also aimed at
assisting States in developing long-term, realistic and workable financing
strategies for scaling-up upgrading interventions in their cities in the future, and
help the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing (FMWH) draw lessons from
urban policy work in Nigeria.
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators
6. The original Project Development Objectives (PDOs) were to: (PDO1) Establish
partnerships between communities and their LGs so that sub-project proposals are
developed jointly by them; (PDO2) Deliver basic urban services in poor urban
settlements; and (PDO3) Demonstrate viable approaches to infrastructure
development and service delivery that enable LGs to move away from a culture of
total financial dependency for infrastructure investment and even recurrent
infrastructure O&M expenditures.
7. The original key outcome/impact indicators corresponding to the PDOs were:
(PDO1) the partnerships result in the bulk of project proceeds being invested on-
site2, (PDO 2) i) reduced time spent on water collection and lower unit costs, ii)
reduced incidence of flooding, iii) increased use of public transport, and iv) higher
satisfaction levels for services delivered – water, roads, drainage, solid waste
management, and (PDO3) increase in own source revenue generation by 5% per
annum in real terms for LGs.
1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key
Indicators, and reasons/justification
8. The project was restructured in June 2005 (Board approval). The three original
PDOs were replaced by the following: “To increase access to basic urban services
in selected cities.” The restructuring thus eliminated the original PDO1 and PDO3
and widened the target area of PDO2 from „poor urban settlements‟ to „selected
cities‟. The 3 new PDO indicators were changed to: (1) increased access to all
weather roads, (2) increased access to safe reliable and affordable water supply,
and (3) increased access of primary school children to improved school facilities
and services. The corresponding output indicators were: (i) infrastructure
investments as agreed in the States, (ii) upgrading fund, (iii) capacity building,
and (iv) greater awareness of HIV/AIDS.
9. The main reason for the 2005 restructuring was the need to modify the project‟s
second component design. First, because only eight cities (out of thirteen
envisaged by project design) had demonstrated demand for the second phase of
the CBUDP. Second, the substantial appreciation of the SDR with respect to the
2 Idem.
3
Naira since project preparation increased the available financial resources. These
combined elements necessitated a revision of the project design.
10. Other reasons to restructure the project included: (i) Political interference had
caused substantial delays, both during the bid evaluation process, and, in some
cases, even after awards had been cleared by IDA. The latter had resulted in
delayed signing of cleared contracts of as much as six to eight months in some
cases. As a result, disbursement under the project was slow and thus required
changes in the implementation arrangements; (ii) The Federal Project
Coordination Unit (FPCU) had not been functional, and there was no entity
coordinating, monitoring, or providing support to the State Project
Implementation Units (PIUs) to proactively mitigate against implementation
delays; (iii) The 20% counterpart fund requirement in CBUDP was found to be
high, given the low per capita GDP of Nigeria.
11. The results indicators were aligned to the restructured PDO and further refined in
January 2010 following a review by the Bank‟s Sector Management Unit (SMU),
the Country Management Unit (CMU), and the Africa Core Operations Services
(AFTOS). The indicators included (1) number of people with access to water
supply, (2) number of people with access to sanitation facilities, (3) number of
people using rehabilitated or newly built access roads, (4) number of people
reached through HIV-AIDS campaigns, (5) number of pupils enrolled in school,
and (6) number of people who go to clinic on a daily basis.
12. No target values were prescribed for PDO2 indicators before restructuring and the
PDO indicators after the restructuring. It is considered that this was the result of
the community based approach for the project, where individual investments were
demand driven and could not have been identified upfront.
13. Since the bulk of the investments under the project (91.7%) took place after the
restructuring of 2005 (see section 3.5), the indicators outlined in paragraph 11
above have been taken as the most valid ones and have been primarily used for
this ICR, as they best match the character of the project following restructuring
and the availability of data. In addition, and where necessary, some information
on previous indicators has also been used both in quantitative and in qualitative
terms. The sources of data used for the ICR are more fully outlined in Annex 7.
1.4 Main Beneficiaries
14. The main beneficiaries have been citizens gaining infrastructure and services in
seven cities (Uyo in Akwa Ibom State, Bauchi City in Bauchi State, Abakaliki in
Ebonyi State, Benin City in Edo State, Hadejia in Jigawa State, Karu in
Nassarawa State, and Abeokuta in Ogun State). Another city was added in 2005:
Akure in Ondo State. Before 2005, the beneficiaries of the seven original cities
were just those inhabitants of some low-income urban settlements. Investments
4
after the restructuring expanded the benefits to larger areas and many more
communities.
15. Other beneficiaries include PIU staff, LGs, and SGs obtaining capacity building
through a number of training events that will allow them to make better informed
investment choices, as well as the private sector through contracting out of
construction and maintenance of works to local development and contracting
industry. Indirect beneficiaries of this project have been the members of the
Community Technical Committees (CTCs), PSC, and traditional institutions.
1.5 Original Components
16. Seven cities of seven States were selected during the project preparation to benefit
from upgrading of basic infrastructure during a period of two to three years from
effectiveness in what was called Phase I. An Upgrading Fund called Phase II was
intended to follow on Phase I, which would be open to the seven States of Phase I
and six additional ones. The Fund was going to be accessible to all 13 States
conditional on meeting a number of eligibility criteria.
17. Community development in the framework of the CBUDP was understood as
community mobilization and organization in effective CTCs, consultation with
them in selecting subprojects to be implemented and strengthened voice in
communities‟ relationship with the Local Governments.
18. The six components of the project are described below.
Component 1: Upgrading of basic municipal infrastructure in selected settlements in
seven cities of seven states – Phase I3:
19. During Phase 1, this component was meant to finance integrated packages of
multisectoral investments to provide or rehabilitate basic municipal infrastructure
and services. They included water supply, roads, footpaths, drainage, power
reticulation, private and public sanitation facilities, solid waste management,
street lighting, slaughterhouses, markets, recreational facilities, schools, and
clinics.
Component 2: Upgrading Fund (referred to in the Development Credit Agreement as
“Subprojects”) to finance basic municipal infrastructure in select settlements in cities of
13 States – Phase II: 20. An Upgrading Fund was established to support subproject proposals in Phase II.
The Fund was meant to be accessible to all 13 States when they met a number of
3 The beneficiaries of this component covered about 46 percent of the population of those seven cities.
5
eligibility criteria4 and once they had reached the preliminary engineering stages
with their own funds.
Component 3: Capacity building and training, one city development strategy, and
knowledge sharing networks: 21. A first sub-component was to finance project-related training for stakeholders,
including PIUs, SGs, LGs, and CTCs. A second one was to finance broader
training including financial management and M&E. A third sub-component was
to undertake analytical work with stakeholders‟ consultation to develop a City
Development Strategy in the city of Karu. The last one consisted of facilitating
information sharing of experiences between PIUs and its respective states.
Component 4: Implementation support for the Project Implementation Units (PIU) and
the Federal Project Coordination Unit (FPCU): 22. Basic office equipment and facilities were to be provided to assist in the
establishment of PIUs in all States and the FPCU in Abuja, as well as support for
impact evaluations for all subprojects.
Component 5: HIV/AIDS awareness campaign on project sites: 23. This component planned the development and execution of an AIDS Education
Information and Communication Campaign in the project areas, including
construction sites, in project-supported schools and clinics, solid waste collection
sites, and transport and disposal network.
Component 6: A project Preparation Facility (PPF): 24. This was made available to the FGN to enable project preparation in the seven
Phase I States. It was reimbursed from project funds when the project became
effective.
1.6 Revised Components
25. During the 2005 Board-approved restructuring, the scope of the second
component was narrowed from thirteen to eight cities, which were the seven
original ones plus the city of Akure in Ondo State. This was due to the fact that
the remaining States did not manifest an interest to meet the eligibility criteria.
The other components of the CBUDP did not change.
1.7 Other significant changes
26. As indicated above, the 2005 project restructuring modified the PDOs and limited
the participating states to eight. Two subsequent project restructurings (both
Country Director approval) gave time extensions to the implementation of the
4 The criteria included having an urban poverty map of the State, audited accounts of the SG and LGs in the
last year, appointed core PIU staff, and demonstrated financial ability to meet the counterpart fund
contributions.
6
project by a total of 26 months - the first for twenty months (in March 2009), and
the second for six months (in June 2010). These two restructurings allowed funds‟
reallocations and time extensions that permitted completing the implementation of
ongoing activities at the time.
27. Although Phase I was supposed to end in 2005, it ultimately closed in 2007. Phase
II started in 2006 and lasted until project closure, although works did not start
until 2007. With the 2005 project restructuring and the elimination of PDO1, the
main focus on on-site infrastructure was put aside. However, projects were
selected by the PIUs by considering the communities‟ priorities as stated in the
initial project‟ surveys and by interacting with the CTCs. As such, the community
aspect of the project as originally understood (see paragraph 17) was preserved
after the restructuring despite the fact that larger scale trunk infrastructure was
also financed.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
28. There was a clear rationale for the Bank‟s intervention under the CBUDP and it
was in line with the Government‟s priorities. There was a strong commitment
from the States‟ Governments and stakeholders towards the PDOs. A sound sector
analysis had been undertaken. The Bank team provided the required skills during
preparation. Financial and economic analyses were conducted, and safeguards
issues were addressed.
29. The Bank had previously supported community-based urban interventions
through its urban projects in Nigeria. The key lessons from these projects
highlighted by the FMWH were taken into consideration. These included: (i)
ownership by communities is critical, and is best ensured through community
involvement and fostered through strong partnerships between LGs and
communities; (ii) appropriate standards and continuous monitoring are critical for
the success of such projects.
30. The commitment of the States‟ Governments during project preparation was very
solid, both because of the high interest in bringing the project to the States‟ capital
(except for Jigawa where the chosen city was not the capital), and because of the
interest in being the direct implementing actor. However, this commitment was
uneven later on during the project due to limitations in capacity. On the other
hand, the commitment of the FGN was weaker. The project design attempted to
solve this situation by giving the FGN a central coordination role.
31. Preparation took an extended period. The first preparation mission took place in
1999, just after one year after the end of the military regime. The three years that
elapsed until Board approval in 2002 –and one extra year until effectiveness in
2003 - were utilized to reach agreement on priorities and implementation
7
modalities. However, the long period of preparation undermined the usefulness of
procurement and financial management training that had taken place, and
enlarged the gap between the original engineering estimates and final bids for
works contracts. The States‟ PIUs were not located within the urban institutions
(in most cases in the Office of the Governor or the Secretariat to the Governor)
which to some extent undermined their institutional development legacy.
32. Many of the difficulties that the project experienced were identified as high risks
from the outset – with mitigation measures put in place accordingly – including
the risks of SGs and LGs counterpart funds not being made available in a timely
fashion, or the PIUs not getting sufficient autonomy to work efficiently. However,
some of the mitigation measures identified were not fully effective5, and some
risks such as the underperformance of the Federal Government as a key
coordinator (FPCU) were not addressed. The FMWH was restructured at least two
times during the project implementation. The resultant changes in departments
and staff reflected themselves inter alia on the FPCU performance. Changes in the
structure of the FMWH, a key counterpart ministry at the federal level, were
beyond the control of the project.
33. Additional shortcomings at project appraisal included: (i) the second component
of the project appears to have been developed somewhat hastily and inserted into
the project shortly before it went to the Board largely as a result of internal
pressure within the Bank to increase the overall project financial envelope, (ii) the
20% figure of State‟s contribution was too high, as demonstrated by the need to
bring it down to 5% at the restructuring stage, and (iii) including seven States
(and foreseeing thirteen for phase two) as a result of the politics of domestic
regional equilibrium led to an overambitious geographical scope of the project.
34. The above mentioned shortcomings are considered relatively significant but
nevertheless do not make the project objective or design inconsistent with the
FGN and the Bank‟s continuing development priorities in Nigeria.
2.2 Implementation
35. The restructuring took place early enough and contributed to the full utilization of
funds. The following were the key elements of the restructuring: (i) The
geographical scope was reduced from thirteen to eight States, and most eligibility
criteria were eliminated; (ii) The PDOs were modified from three to one to make
it easier to monitor the achievement of PDOs; (iii) The integrity of the bid
evaluation process was strengthened in two ways. First, design engineering
consulting firms were to provide bid evaluation services to the PIUs, changing
past practice of the PIUs undertaking the bid evaluation themselves (which had
left the process open to interference). Second, the role of the Project Steering
Committee (PSC), consisting of the political leadership in each State, was
5 For example, counterpart funding was delayed despite the mitigation measures defined at appraisal.
8
redefined. The PSC reviewed performance of PIUs through post-review of the
activities, and not prior review as was the case before; (iv) The Ministry to which
the FPCU reported to in 2002 had changed from the Federal Ministry of Works
and Housing (FMWH) to the Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban
Development (FMHUD) - this change was reflected in the DCA. Technical
Assistance would be provided to the FPCU to ensure that systematic project
coordination and monitoring, preparation of consolidated reports from States; (v)
Counterpart fund contribution from States was reduced to a 5% requirement for
local costs of civil works, with IDA financing 100% of foreign costs and 95% of
local costs of civil works.
36. The Midterm Review took place in April 2008 and assessed the overall progress
of the project towards achieving its development objectives, with 35% of the loan
having been utilized at the time. This Review confirmed that the restructuring had
improved the project‟ implementation and addressed many of the earlier
challenges. The MTR recommended: i) to have the counterpart funding being
made upfront to avoid delays, (ii) to work on sustainability mechanisms for the
constructed infrastructures, and (iii) to reinforce the project M&E mechanisms.
37. The main factors contributing to overall successful results and achievement of the
revised PDO include:
Relevancy of the project objectives, design and implementation.
High commitment of the States‟ Governments – the counterpart funding problem
diminished as the project moved forward.
Restructuring the project early enough to allow implementation of planned
activities after restructuring.
Having the Task Team Leader (TTL) based in Nigeria from 2005 onward. This
contributed to the closer supervision of the project and to get it back on track, by
ensuring enhanced quality of works and increasing the number of field visits, as
well as by establishing a more fluid interaction with the FPCU, the PIUs, and the
States‟ Governors to solve emerging challenges6.
38. The main factors that gave rise to challenges and delays include:
The initial lack of familiarity of PIU staff with Bank procurement and financial
management procedures necessitated the operators to undergo a learning process
to facilitate effective project delivery.
A high number of procurement contracts to be handled7 (over 130 in Phase I)
before 2005. The restructuring contributed to solve this by opening the CBUDP to
finance large trunk infrastructure subprojects.
6 However, there were some flaws in the formal reporting, such as not having formal Aide Memoires of
supervision missions from late 2005 to mid 2009, while Implementation Status Reports were filed on a
regular basis. 7 The role of communities and CTCs was to express type of project preferences and participate in the
monitoring, but the procurement was handled by the PIUs.
9
Political interference from State politicians in Bank procurement procedures
managed by the PIU caused delays.
The quality of original engineering designs and of the supervision services was
poor, as well as the quality of contractors in some States. This showed a clear
improvement after the 2005 restructuring.
The FPCU was inefficient and did not fully perform its role of supervisor and
coordinator of the States‟ PIUs. As targeted by the restructuring, the FPCU
performance improved however after 2005.
39. An interruption in the project occurred before the 2005 restructuring due to a case
reviewed by the World Bank Integrity Vice-Presidency, which required the team
to revise its implementation and risk mitigation measures. This caused some
delays during that period, which need not be attributed to the Bank‟s performance
but to exogenous circumstances.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
40. The M&E design was adequate. The PIUs were meant to operate and maintain an
effective monitoring and evaluation system that would ensure the capture,
analysis and flow of the information needed to track performance of project
interventions. This was expected to serve as a decision-making tool for project
managers and policymakers. This information would be gathered and analyzed by
PIUs, using key procurement and disbursement progress indicators (included in
the Project Implementation Manual) in formats agreed upon with IDA. Every
quarter, the PIUs were responsible for developing quarterly progress reports, and
submitting them to the FPCU, PSCs, LG community development officers, CTCs,
and IDA. Community development officers, together with CTCs were responsible
for ensuring continuous communication with the communities during the project
cycle to keep them abreast of developments. The CTCs and community
development officers were to ensure that quarterly reports were timely posted or
displayed in at least two prominent and appropriately selected public places in
respective project areas. Public places were going to be selected to ensure that
both men and women of the community could have access to the information.
41. A survey was done at the beginning of the project to gather households‟
socioeconomic data, which was used to develop the initial economic and financial
analysis. However, target values for the CBUDP outcome indicators were not
included in the PAD due to the demand-based character of the investments.
42. During implementation, M&E ratings in the project‟s ISRs ranged from
unsatisfactory to satisfactory, with a majority being on the satisfactory side. Data
was collected but was sometimes inconsistent. Given the challenges of collecting
consistent data for all the States, starting in 2005, a single “deliver basic urban
services” indicator was used and evaluated in each of the 8 States, in which the
PDO was given a rate going from unsatisfactory to satisfactory. Also, ten
implementation progress indicators were evaluated in each state (project
10
management, PSC interference with PMU responsibilities, speed of resolution of
outstanding issues, safeguards, financial management, counterpart financing,
disbursements, procurement, contracts management & quality, and monitoring
and evaluation). Evaluating some of the above mentioned indicators in itself was
an innovative exercise in the Nigerian context, and some of them were
particularly relevant to some of the challenges experienced by the CBUDP before
restructuring – e.g. interference with PMU responsibilities and quality of works.
The M&E aspects of the project improved further in 2009, when an M&E
consultant was hired to gather data at the State level in a quarterly manner until
project closing.
43. The main data sources of this ICR are the M&E completion report, the ISRs, as
well as a questionnaire sent by the ICR team to the eight PIUs after project
closure requesting for outcome information as well as some data inputs to
evaluate the project‟s efficiency.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
44. There were no significant failures to maintain acceptable financial management
arrangements during project implementation. Satisfactory performance was
achieved in complying with FM covenants on submission of periodic financial
reports i.e. unaudited Interim Financial Report and Annual Audit report, there was
no outstanding report. The audit opinion was unqualified throughout project
implementation. However, there were challenges with the timeliness of
submission of IFRs, the quality of same and in some instance their completeness.
There was less than satisfactory performance in the maintenance of timely,
accurate and reliable financial management arrangements, evident in unretired
advances, inadequate documentation for incurred expenditures and ineligible
expenditures observed during Bank's implementation support mission and
external audits. Remittance of Government Counterpart Fund was a challenge: it
was delayed in some states whilst only partial remittance occurred in others.
Despite these difficulties, overall FM performance was satisfactory.
45. Before restructuring, there were many revisions with some procurement
documents with the PIUs which caused implementation delays. In June 2004, the
project was downgraded because procurement of contractors and consultants had
lagged behind the original schedule. Useful training took place late 2004.
However, two challenges persisted: inadequate compliance with Bank‟s
procurement rules, and inadequate autonomy for project staff to advance
implementation after all technical requirements had been met (i.e. political
inference, which lasted until April 2005 at least). The long time between
clearances of contracts and awards was also a problem: the bulk of contracts of
Phase I were signed in January 2005, six to eight months after IDA clearance.
Most of these issues were solved with the project restructuring, with the
procurement ratings being either moderately satisfactory or satisfactory from that
point until project closing.
11
46. The CBUDP was a category B project, and the only safeguard applicable to the
project was OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and it was rated as satisfactory
throughout the project. The overall environmental safeguard performance of the
project is satisfactory. The anticipated potential adverse environmental and social
impacts were limited, site specific and easy to mitigate. At the time of project
preparation, the exact locations of the project‟s interventions were not known. As
a consequence, an environmental and social management framework (ESMF)
detailing the principles and procedures that would be followed to ensure
environmental sustainability and social acceptability was prepared by the client
and disclosed in Nigeria and the World Bank InfoShop. The ESMF also contained
a checklist for screening CBUDP‟s activities for their potential adverse impacts in
perspective of avoiding, preventing, reducing and/or mitigating negative impacts.
During project intervention, project activities were screened and appropriate
safeguards instruments (EIA, ESIA) were prepared in close consultations with the
communities and potential project affected persons prior to the commencement of
civil works as required.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
47. The completed works are functional and have been handed over to the respective
municipalities or pertinent administrations - by signing MoUs – who will be in
charge of the maintenance of those infrastructures. Experience has shown that
assets that generate revenue (e.g. the abattoirs and markets) are highly likely to be
maintained more systematically and as such to remain in operation over an
extended period. Other investments – roads, clinics and schools – are clearly
dependent on the States‟ willingness and practice to adequately fund their
operation and/or maintenance.
48. No specific urban intervention is planned from the Bank‟s side. However, an
urban water intervention to reform the sector and improve access to water services
is currently under preparation. Officials of PIUs have gained knowledge on
community based practices and state of the art procurement and financial
management skills.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
49. The objective of the CBUDP, its design and implementation were relevant
both before and after the 2005 restructuring. Both the original and the post
restructuring project objectives are relevant to Nigeria‟s needs today as (i) the
pressure of rural-urban migration continues to impact the social amenities and
infrastructure in the major metropolitan areas, and (ii) the demand for basic urban
infrastructures remains very high.
12
The original and the post restructuring design and implementation were relevant,
but the original ones had significant shortcomings. These included the somewhat
hastily developed second component of the CBUDP, a counterpart contribution
that proved to be too high, an ambitious geographical scope of the project, and an
oft inappropriate location of the PIU. Many of the above mentioned shortcomings
were addressed during the 2005 restructuring, and a few moderate shortcomings
may have still remained - e.g. eight States were still an ambitious geographical
scope given the recent reengagement in Nigeria after the prolonged period of
conflict.
3.2 Achievement of original Project Development Objectives
50. Concerning the original PDO1, the associated key indicator was: “the partnerships
result in the bulk of project proceeds being invested on-site”. The quality of the
data provided by States on the percentage of investments that was done on-site is
too poor to be used. The amount of contracts and disbursement rates show,
however, that during phase 1, off-site investments only took place if there was a
need for trunk improvements to enable services to reach the settlements. Hence
PDO1 was achieved according to its key indicator. After restructuring, the
proportion of off-site investments considerably increased.
51. The key indicator associated to PDO3 was: “to increase in own source revenue
generation by 5% per annum in real terms for LGs”. For the four States out of
eight for which data is available, the LGs own source revenue increased from 9 to
30% from 2002 to the project restructuring in 2005, which indicates that the
original PDO3 was achieved.
52. The original indicators of PDO2 were: “i) reduced time spent on water collection
and lower unit costs, ii) reduced incidence of flooding, iii) increased use of public
transport, and iv) higher satisfaction levels for services delivered – water, roads,
drainage, solid waste management”. There is no data available for the first three
indicators. However, for the fourth one – which indirectly captures the other three
indicators - a beneficiaries‟ survey report indicated that a vast majority of
respondents was very satisfied with what the project had achieved, particularly
with the roads interventions (see section 3.7 and Annex 5).
53. Based on the above, the achievement of project objectives before
restructuring is rated as satisfactory.
3.3 Achievement of post-restructuring Project Development Objectives
54. The table below gives the result chain for the post 2005 restructuring project. A
number of results were achieved in the water supply, sanitation, roads, HIV-AIDS,
education, economic growth, security, and drainage flooding sectors. These
resulted in providing different type of services to citizens of the eight CBUDP
13
cities, which in turn contributed to achieving the PDO indicator of achieving
access to basic services.
CBUDP RESULTS CHAIN
ACTIVITY INTERMEDIATE RESULTS OUTCOME RESULTS
(additional) PDO
Indicator Value Indicator Value
Increase
access to
basic services
in selected
cities
Water supply Water supply schemes
constructed 39
No. of people with access
to water 912,000
Sanitation
Public toilets constructed 193
No. of people with access
to sanitation facilities 843,700
Refuse collection trucks in
service 38
Incinerators in service 5
Compactors in service 1
Roads
Kilometres of roads
constructed 179
No. of people using
rehabilitated or newly built
access roads
2,171,000 Kilometres of footpaths
constructed 18
Bus shelters built 5
HIV-AIDS
Number of people trained 24,587 Number of people reached
through HIV-AIDS
campaigns
598,020 Condom packets distributed 25,400
Number of individuals tested 29,600
Education
Number of classrooms and
school infrastructures built 315
Number of pupils enrolled
in schools 36,629
Number of classrooms and
school infrastructures
renovated
247
Number of education
equipment items provided 6,412
Health
Number of health centres built 13 Number of people who go
to clinic on a daily basis 360
Number of health centre beds
provided 144
Other activities8:
Livelihood
Number of women‟s
training centres 1
Number of abattoirs 3
Number of fish processing
centres 1
Number of fishmarket stalls 100
Number of community halls 6
Number of poultry markets 1
Number of ICT centres 2
Security
Kilometres of street lighting 8
Number of street lighting
fittings 734
Number of control kiosks 9
Number of transformers 51
Number of poles 110
Flooding Kilometres of drainage 160
Number of ponds 3
8 These activities are not associated with one of the output indicators considered (see paragraph 11).
However, they are in line with the PDO of “increasing access to basic services in selected cities”.
14
55. As can be seen from the results chain table, significant investments in urban
service delivery took place under the project, and access to urban services was
tangibly expanded. All of the subprojects were completed and are functional.
Overall, during implementation, supervision by the Bank team followed closely
the quality of works, which was considered satisfactory. Since significant
infrastructures were delivered, they are functional and increase access to basic
urban services as per the PDO, the post restructuring achievement of
objectives is rated satisfactory.
56. As far as capacity building activities are concerned, the CBUDP provided training
events to more than 11,600 members of PIUs, SGs, LGs, CTCs, PSCs,
community members and other stakeholders over the duration of the project.
3.4 Efficiency
57. The economic analysis developed at appraisal computed a roads cost-
effectiveness ratio, a water headwork cost-benefit analysis, a social benefits ratio
of phase 1 investments, and an economic viability ratio of phase 1 investments.
58. Due to data constraints and the multi-sector nature of the CBUDP, two indicators
have been retained for the ICR economic analysis. First, the economic viability
ratio of investments as defined in the PAD but applied to the whole project (not
only to phase 1), and second, a comparison with similar subprojects undertaken
by the Government. The efficiency of the project is not disaggregated in before
and after 2005 restructuring.
59. Over the estimated life of the project of 20 years, the economic benefit to cost
ratio of the CBUDP investments would be 4.8 (it was 4.5 at appraisal as can be
seen in the PAD), indicating that the investment is economically justifiable9.
60. Compared to similar interventions undertaken by the Government, the project‟s
interventions in each of the eight States have oscillated between 77% and 92% of
what the cost would have been if the Government had financed it. From a sector
point of view, CBUDP roads subprojects have cost 80% of similar Government
interventions. This figure is 81% for water subprojects, 78% for schools, and 68%
for clinics. The Bank‟s intervention hence appears to have expanded the FGN‟s
value for money.
9 (US$ 7.2 per HH per month * 12 months * 20 years) / (US$ 47 per capita * 8 persons per HH) = 4.8).
US$ 7.2 per HH per month is the average monthly increase in the price of households‟ rents over the life of
the project, and US$47 represents the average investment per capita done by the CBUDP in the
intervention areas (see Annex 3 for further details).
15
61. Given the evidence presented in the two paragraphs above, the efficiency of the
project is rated as satisfactory, both before and after restructuring.
3.5 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
62. For evaluation purposes, the pre 2005 restructuring results framework is given the
weight of the total disbursement rate of the project at the time
(i.e. 8.3% or US$ 11.2 million out of US$ 134.4 million disbursed at closure),
while the post 2005 restructuring results framework is given a weight of the
remaining disbursement (i.e. 91.7%). The project is overall rated moderately
satisfactory, as a result of combining the ratings of the relevance, achievements,
and efficiency of the CBUDP.
Rating
Before After
Relevance Relevant (with significant
shortcomings)
Relevant (with moderate shortcomings)
Achievements S S
Efficiency S S
Outcome (combining the 3 elements above)
MS MS
Disbursement % 8.3% 91.7%
Overall MS
3.6 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
63. The appointment of some former PIU members to high level government
positions due to the skills gained in the project illustrates that the capacity
building and activities have had a positive impact.
64. The City Development Strategy (CDS) of Karu (Nassarawa), completed at the end
of 2002, is a successful output of this project. The strategy was utilized to
empower the informal private sector, first by establishing consultations with local
businesses to identify key constraints on their growth. Business representatives
then began to work together, and then formalized their cooperation as a Business
and Economic Development Committee. This Committee has subsequently
obtained funding for two new marketplaces, increased subcontracting, and
initiated a low-cost housing scheme, becoming an unexpected high impact
outcome of the project.
3.7 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey
65. The beneficiary survey undertaken was more qualitative than quantitative. The
consultant used focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, and semi-structured
questionnaires.
16
66. Beneficiaries in all the communities visited highly appreciated the CBUDP‟s
efforts and the subprojects. The subprojects were seen as a welcome relief that has
improved their quality of life and has opened up more opportunities of livelihood.
A vast majority of respondents surveyed using the semi structured questionnaires
judged the project very satisfactory, this figure being consistent across states.
67. In all the states it was observed that the roads subprojects received the highest
accolade from most respondents. The major benefits of these roads includes
increased access, reduced time spent in traffic, better conditions of vehicles,
reduced flooding and time for flash floods and elimination of cesspools on the
roads. Respondents were more satisfied with the quality of roads and drainage
systems constructed in the second round of investment.
68. Other subprojects were also very much appreciated. Respondents in Bauchi,
Ebonyi, Edo, Jigawa and Ogun were full of praises for the Maternity Clinics,
Primary Health Centres, and Dispensary subprojects. Other subprojects received a
lot of praises as well, but these were more location specific. For instance,
respondents in Abakpa in Abakaliki, Owu-Gbagura, Ago-Oko and Ilogbo in
Abeokuta, Oke-Aro, Eyinke, Irowo, Odige and Odopetu in Akure where trunk
drainage were constructed said that the drainages have resolved the annual
flooding experienced in their communities. In Benin City, Edo State residents
around the areas ravaged by gully erosion were extremely satisfied about the
project intervention.
69. Despite the high satisfaction level with the subprojects, the performance of some
subprojects is beyond the control of the managers of the subprojects because of
their dependence on the performance of other external entities. Also, not all the
projects have been very successful. In Akwa Ibom the level of satisfaction of the
water project is more of mere appreciation of the project as the needs of the
people have evolved over the last decade when the project was initially conceived.
Also the public toilets in most of the project sites have suffered from some
management problems, vandalisation, poor revenue generation, and misuse.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
70. The likelihood of the basic urban infrastructure services provided not being
adequately maintained is moderate to significant, and depends on each specific
State and sector. For example, while the abattoir in Nassarawa will be well
maintained by the butchers‟ association, some roads may not be well maintained
by the State governments. As for the impact of some of the infrastructure services
not being operational after a certain period, it would be significant, as it would
imply going back to the pre-project situation, with much worse urban services.
This project‟s rating of the risk to development outcome is thus substantial.
17
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
71. The Bank performance during identification, preparation and appraisal of the
project is rated moderately satisfactory. The team prepared the project in a
challenging context in which the Bank was scaling up operations in Nigeria after
the return to a civilian regime. The Bank identified, facilitated the preparation of,
and appraised the operation so as to achieve the PDOs in a manner consistent with
the Bank‟s fiduciary role. In particular:
The project was consistent with the Government‟ development priorities.
The project took into consideration lessons learned from previous operations.
The poverty alleviation and social development aspects were central to the
project.
The design responded comprehensively to the immediate needs of the sector –
from enhancing the role of LGs to their partnerships with communities.
Many risks were correctly identified and properly mitigated.
72. The Bank performance in ensuring quality during the restructuring preparation
was satisfactory. In fact, the restructuring design successfully managed clearly
improve the following original shortcomings: the pragmatic structure of
component two, the borrower‟s required contribution, limiting the geographical
scope of the project, giving the means to the FPCU to develop its role, and
improving the fiduciary mechanisms.
73. However, the rating is less than fully satisfactory because (i) the PAD results
framework had some shortcomings, (ii) some risks could have been better
assessed, (iii) the pressures surrounding and hasty development of component two
resulted in an ambitious project design. Overall, however, these shortcomings are
moderate and do not make the design inconsistent with continuous FGN‟s or
Bank‟s priorities.
(b) Quality of Supervision
74. The Bank quality of supervision is rated moderately satisfactory. The Bank
identified and resolved challenges during implementation so that the PDO could
be successfully achieved. In particular, the Bank:
Demonstrated detailed and high quality monitoring of the technical and
engineering aspects of the civil works, including consistent, frequent and
flexible support to the client.
Provided support in the areas of financial management and procurement
intensified after 2004 when it became obvious that project capacity in these
areas lagged behind.
18
Prepared a project restructuring in 2005 which was essential to put the project
and funds utilization back on track
Moved the TTL to the field early in the implementation process and improved
the close supervision of the project, and implied a lot of traveling under
difficult logistical conditions to the eight States of the project. The
improvement in the procurement, disbursement rates, and quality of works are
all evidence of good quality of supervision.
Most importantly, the PDO was achieved and access to basic services in the
selected 8 cities improved.
75. However, the rating is less than fully satisfactory because: (i) reporting lagged
behind: between 2005-9 only ISRs were produced for review and approval by
Management, while formal Aide Memoires were replaced with less formal (but
more frequent) communication exchanges between the Client and the field-based
TTL, (ii) No attempt was made during implementation to establish a baseline
which would have improved the M&E aspect of this project. , (iii) Internal
communication within the Bank could have been better. Namely, when TTLs
changed, some of the information was not adequately transferred to the incoming
TTL, resulting in delays in management decisions. Overall, however, these
shortcomings are moderate and do not make the implementation inconsistent with
continuous FGN‟s or Bank‟s priorities.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
76. The ICR rates the overall performance of the Bank as moderately satisfactory.
In line with the harmonized criteria for ICR and IEG evaluations, the rating of
overall Bank performance is based on the ratings for each of the two dimensions
which are both rated moderately satisfactory: (i) Bank performance in ensuring
quality at entry, and (ii) the quality of supervision.
5.2 Borrower Performance10
(a) Government Performance
77. The Government‟s performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The FPCU
and the States‟ Governments contributed to the successful implementation of the
project. In particular:
The FPCU liaised between the FGN and the project, and ensured some aspects
of the overall CBUDP coordination.
The commitment of the State Governments was high and they were proactive
during all preparation stages - and to a lesser extent during implementation as
well.
10 The FPCU (as an extension of the FGN) and the States Governments of the eight CBUDP States are
considered under the Government performance subsection, while the 8 State‟ PIUs are considered under the
Implementing Agencies performance subsection.
19
78. However, the rating is moderately unsatisfactory because of the following
significant shortcomings:
The FPCU started to function early 2005, but without substantial technical
support at the beginning. Throughout the project, the FPCU was at the
bottleneck of coordination problems, failed to provide the support to States it
was supposed to give, and did not effectively develop its monitoring tasks.
Political interference from State Governments happened in almost all PIUs. In
some of them, there were even pressures on PIU staff to be captured by PSC
members to choose certain project over others, or to influence the Bank‟s
procurement procedures.
They FPCU started the project being located in the FMHUD and then changed
to the FMWH. The transaction costs of the location change negatively
affected its performance. Moreover, its staff were often asked by the
Ministries were they were located to work on tasks that were not related to the
CBUDP. Hence political interference was a challenge.
As expressed in the MTR, most stakeholders were of the opinion that some of
the delays experienced on the project resulted from actions attributable to the
FPCU.
The delays in payment of counterpart funding were a constant during the
whole project, creating worries on whether all the works could be completed
on time, and despite the percentage of counterpart contribution having come
down to 5% during the 2005 project restructuring.
(b) Implementing Agencies Performance
79. The Implementing Agencies performance is rated moderately satisfactory.
Although the performance of each PIU varied from one State to another, overall
they were essential in achieving the project‟s PDO and using the Bank‟s fiduciary
rules. In particular:
The PIUs were committed to the project and the PDO;
As project implementation advanced and the PIUs gained experience with
Bank practices and had benefitted from FM and procurement training, the
agencies delivered on their respective roles, which allowed full disbursement
of the loan and successful achievement of the PDO.
80. However, the rating is moderately satisfactory because of the following moderate
shortcomings:
There were some financial management shortcomings as indicated in section 2.4
above.
Some of the State PIUs performance left some room for improvement.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
81. The ICR rates the overall performance of the Borrower as moderately
satisfactory. In line with the harmonized criteria for ICR and IEG evaluations,
20
and considering that one dimension is in the unsatisfactory range while the rating
for the other dimension is in the satisfactory range, the rating of the overall
borrower performance depends on the outcome rating. The moderately
satisfactory rating is given because the outcome is in the satisfactory range.
6. Lessons Learned
82. Carefully evaluating the local capacities and interests appears to be essential to
avoid designing projects with an overambitious geographical scope. A challenge
in Nigeria is that an intended geopolitical equilibrium requires having in most
projects at least one State from each of the six geopolitical zones of the Federation.
Projects should be limited to a scope that is technically and logistically feasible.
83. A sound and achievable monitoring and evaluation system should be put in place
and used since the very beginning of a project, and defining outcome indicators‟
baseline, and where possible - target values, is essential to evaluate the project
later on.
84. Nigeria remains a challenging environment, and having the TTL based in the field
and/or allocating high supervision budgets are examples of measures that can help
overcome these challenges.
85. Despite some States having gained expertise in community based urban
development, it remains to be seen whether the States‟ Governments actually use
this approach in the future. Innovative mechanisms should be developed to ensure
that the expertise gained by States is used after project closing, as well as to
address the critical problem of infrastructure sustainability.
86. Given the Federal governance nature of Nigeria, it is important to ensure that all
tiers of Government are fully on board with Bank‟s interventions to maximize the
impact of projects.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
87. A Project Completion Report was prepared by the FPCU in August 2011. A
summary of the main issues raised in this report can be found in Annex 6.
21
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Components Appraisal Estimate
(USD millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate (USD
millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
Rehabilitation or delivery of basic
municipal infrastructure 31.54 39.20
124.3%
Upgrading fund 64.27 79.52 123.7%
Capacity Building and Training 4.23 4.70 111.1%
Implementation Support and
M&E 7.77 11.88
152.9%
HIV/AIDS awareness Campaign 0.19 0.21 110.5%
Project Preparation Facility 2.00 2.00 100.0%
Total Baseline Cost 110.00 137.51 125.0%
(b) Financing
Source of Funds Type of
Cofinancing
Appraisal
Estimate
(USD
millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate
(USD
millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
Borrower 27.52 N/A N/A
International Development
Association (IDA) 110.00 137.51 125.01
22
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
The table below summarizes the subprojects implemented in each State per thematic area:
Themes Subprojects States
Economic
Growth and
Security
Abattoir Ebonyi, Jigawa, Nassarawa
Fish market & processing centre Jigawa
Street lighting Ebonyi, Edo, Jigawa, Ogun,
Ondo
Education Renovation dilapidated classrooms All except Akwa Ibom &
Ondo
Construction of new classrooms Same as above
Provision of other educational facilities
such as desks, toilets, etc
All except Akwa Ibom
Environment Solid waste management Edo, Nassarawa, Ondo
Reclamation of ponds Bauchi & Edo
Bus shelters Ebonyi
Construction of drainages and channels Bauchi, Ebonyi, Ogun &
Ondo
Health Care Maternity Bauchi
Dispensary/Primary health center Bauchi, Ebonyi, Edo,
Jigawa & Ogun
Recreation facilities Ebonyi
Roads Construction of roads All CBUDP implementing
States
Construction of footpaths Bauchi, Ogun & Ebonyi
Construction of road side drainages All CBUDP implementing
States
Water Supply
and Sanitation
Water supply All CBUDP implementing
States
Public toilets Edo, Jigawa, Nassarawa,
Ogun, Ondo
Construction of concrete pads Edo
23
In the following pages is a table of outputs of subprojects implemented by State and
thematic area:
24
25
State
average investment
per capita (US$)
% increase in own source revenue by
LG between 02 and 05
Jigawa 39 30%
Bauchi 43 20%
Nassarawa / /
Ogun 29 9%
Ondo 28 /
Edo 59 /
Ebonyi 68 20%
Akwa Ibom 61 /
26
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
Providing basic infrastructure in participating communities has lead to an appreciation in
the property values in the settlements. Given the large number of owner occupied homes
with permanent structures in the settlements selected, significant benefits can accrue to
owners from an appreciation of the value of their properties. As many factors affect
property value, a single indicator would not capture all of the benefits. Nevertheless, rent
is a good proxy of benefits arising from appreciation of property value. A rent of US$10
per month is assumed for the beginning of the project (this figure is taken from the PAD),
that is a yearly rent of US$ 120.
Based on information provided by the PIUs, the rent of households increased by US$ 87
yearly on average as a result of the project, and the investment per capita has been of
US$ 47. An estimated life of the project of 20 years is assumed, and the economic benefit
to cost ratio of the CBUDP investments results to be 4.8 (it was 4.5 at appraisal),
indicating that the investment is economically justifiable:
[(US$87 per HH per year x 20 years)/(US$47 per capita x 8 persons per household)= 4.8]
Even if only 25 percent of the households benefited, the benefit-to-cost ratio would be
greater than 1, indicating overall justification of the project.
Increase yearly rent (US$) Investment per capita (US$) RATIO
Jigawa 40 39 2.6
Bauchi 60 43 3.5
Ogun 48 29 4.2
Ondo 120 28 10.8
Edo 40 59 1.7
Ebonyi 240 68 8.8
Akwa Ibom 60 61 2.5
AVERAGE 87 47 4.8
The following information was provided by the PIUs, with averages of all types of
projects taken for each State, as well as the % of the CBUDP subsectors with the most
important proportions of investments:
average % prices similar
projects Government Roads Water Schools Clinics
Jigawa 80% 81% 80% 80%
Bauchi 78% 80% 70% 72%
Nassarawa
Ogun 92%
Ondo 77% 68% 68%
Edo
Ebonyi 77% 78% 89% 76% 64%
27
Akwa
Ibom 92%
Average 83% 77% 79% 75% 68%
28
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending
Supervision/ICR
Amos Abu Sr Environmental Spec. AFTEN
Sunday Achile Acheneje Procurement Specialist AFTPC
Ruth Adetola Adeleru Team Assistant AFCW2
Akinrinmola Oyenuga
Akinyele Sr Financial Management Specia AFTFM
Belinda Lorraine Asaam Program Assistant AFTUW
Mary Asanato-Adiwu Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC
Ernestina Attafuah Senior Program Assistant AFTUW
Bayo Awosemusi Lead Procurement Specialist AFTPC
Joseph A. Gadek Sr Sanitary Engineer TWIEA TTL (2005-09)
Sophie Hans-Moevi Language Program Assistant AFTSN
Jonadab William Ekundayo
Metibaiye Municipal Engineer
AFTU2 -
HIS
Benson Chukwuweike Ojoko Consultant AFTFM
Chukwudi H. Okafor Senior Social Development Spec ECSS4
Comfort Onyeje Olatunji Program Assistant SASDO
Africa Eshogba Olojoba Sr Environmental Spec. AFTEN
Modupe Dayo Olorunfemi Program Assistant INTOP
Edward Olowo-Okere Director AFTOS
Eustache Ouayoro Country Director AFRVP
Adenike Sherifat Oyeyiola Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTFM
Deepali Tewari Senior Municipal Development S MNSUR TTL (2002-05)
Mary Oluseyi Zackius-Shittu Program Assistant HRSSY
Hassan Madu Kida Lead Water & Sanitation Specialist AFTUW TTL (2009-11)
29
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY00 12 136.50
FY01 5 47.12
FY02 22 287.87
FY03 5 6.37
FY04 0.00
FY05 0.00
FY06 0.00
FY07 0.00
FY08 0.00
Total: 44 477.86
Supervision/ICR
FY00 1 3.38
FY01 0.00
FY02 0.00
FY03 35 57.32
FY04 64 154.08
FY05 64 200.03
FY06 51 240.69
FY07 34 132.61
FY08 31 129.07
FY09 17 0.00
Total: 297 917.18
30
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results
The study looked at the level of satisfaction of intended beneficiaries with services
provided using CBUDP funds in targeted areas/sites; the extent to which community
members participated in needs identification and selection of project sites; the short-
comings of the project in service provision and what improvements can take place; and
the level of gender representation in planning and implementation processes – e.g.
community technical committee (CTC) membership. Focus group discussions, in-depth
interviews, and semi-structured questionnaires were used.
Beneficiaries in all the communities visited highly appreciated the CBUDP‟s efforts and
the subprojects. The subprojects were seen as a welcome relief that has improved their
quality of life and has opened up more opportunities of livelihood. In all the states it was
observed that the roads subprojects received the highest accolade from most respondents.
The reasons lean towards its impact on the lives of the respondent, the surprise with the
fact that the selected roads were actually upgraded and the quality of work done. About
175 km of road with different specifications were constructed by this project, providing
smooth flow of traffic, growth in economic activities, easy links to other roads and new
structures been developed as a result.
The major benefits of these roads includes increased access, reduced time spent in traffic,
better conditions of vehicles, reduced flooding and time for flash floods and elimination
of cesspools on the roads. All respondents expressed delight and appreciation.
Dissatisfaction was recorded on width of roads in which a few respondents expressed
desires for the road to be wider and the network expanded to some areas not yet served.
The similar comments about the impacts and quality of the road subproject above was as
expressed 91.3% of respondents in all the 8 States about the quality of the roads and
impact of the road project. In Abeokuta respondents along Ija Offa, in Owu Gbagura
confirmed that before the CBUDP intervention the area was completely cut off from the
rest of the Abeokuta. Even Okada (Motor Bikes) do not come to that area but now the
community is accessible from different areas. Similar, respondents from 6 different sites
in four States expressed appreciations about being reconnected of parts of community to
other parts was received from.
It is worthy of note to say that respondents were more satisfied with the quality of roads
and drainages constructed in the second round of investment. A key reason for this may
be because according to one respondent “…can’t you see that now they have linked all
the roads and drainages that were first constructed together with the new roads. Also, the
new roads constructed are tarred drainage to drainage without any shoulders”
[Participant, FGD, Ondo].
Furthermore, it was observed that community ownership partnership with the Local
Government is demonstrated by the many speed breakers constructed by the LGA and
residents along many of the roads particularly in Akwa Ibom. In Benin City members of
the community engaged the services of labourers to desilt the gutters at the entrance of
College Road from Ikpobai road. The silts have been a major cause of erosion which has
31
damage to the road at that point. “This gutters channel all the water from Aduwawa to
this place and then to the flood re-injection site along this same College road therefore
making the desilting important because now when rainfalls this whole area becomes
flooded because of the blocked gutters. We believe that by clearing the gutters the
flooding will reduce if not eliminated because when the road was first constructed the
issue of flooding did not exist’ [Participant FGD, Edo State].
Despite the high satisfaction level with the subprojects, the performances of some
subprojects are beyond the control of the managers of the subprojects because of their
dependence on the performance of other external entities. For Instance, the performance
of the street light and electrification upgrade subprojects are primarily dependent on the
supply of electricity by the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN). These
subprojects have common characteristics irrespective of their location and they are
further dependent on the ability to set up a functional supply chain for consumables,
maintenance and cost recovery for operation.
Other subprojects were also very much appreciated. Respondents in Bauchi, Ebonyi, Edo,
Jigawa and Ogun were also full of praises for the Maternity Clinics, Primary Health
Centres, and Dispensary subprojects. According to a stakeholder in Bauchi,
In Ebonyi State the Matron of the newly constructed PHC confirmed that the construction
of Doctors Quarters in the second round of investment as really assisted the PHC which
is the only available PHC in Abakaliki LGA. She confirmed that now the LGA provided
staffs and funds the Centre.
Patients interviewed confirmed that they now have better access to health care services.
In Ogun the PHC have been used by several organisations to achieve their health care
objectives. According to the Matron in one of the PHC in Ogun, “NGOs and other
organizations collaborate with us for programs such as HIV/AID campaign and testing,
we are now a main immunization centre for this whole community, In Jigawa the number
of patients treated monthly has been on the increase because the PHC are becoming more
popular.
Other subprojects received a lot of praises but this were more location specific for
instance respondents in Abakpa in Abakaliki, Owu-Gbagura, Ago-Oko and Ilogbo in
Abeokuta, Oke-Aro, Eyinke, Irowo, Odige and Odopetu in Akure were trunk drainages
were constructed said that the drainages have resolved the annual flooding experienced in
their communities
In Benin City, Edo State residents around the areas ravaged by gully erosion were
ecstatic about the project intervention. According to a widow who is a retiree and
business owner resident near the subproject site said that
However, not all the projects have been very successful. Our findings reveal that in Akwa
Ibom the level of satisfaction of the water project is more of mere appreciation of the
project as the needs of the people has evolved over the last decade when the project was
initially conceived. “Now people have found an alternative to public water supply in
private boreholes however the water supply needs of the community has not been met the
32
water supply scheme as constructed is to advance for the CTC or community to
successfully and sustainable operate and maintain” [FGD with CTC Akwa Ibom].
Also the public toilets in most of the project sites have suffered from management
problems, vandalisation, poor revenue generation, poor access and misuse.
33
Annex 6. Summary of Borrower's Project Completion Report11
General comments
The critical factors in the achievement of the broad objectives set for the CBUDP project
were manpower capacity and institutional arrangement for delivery of services. Although,
the project provided for training to improve the quality of manpower, little was put in
place to set the institutions in line with the objectives. The complexity of the civil service
was not put into appropriate perspective in the project design which seeks to forge a more
dynamic collaboration between the public and private sectors for better project
implementation.
The underlying assumptions with respect to resource availability, manpower development
and institutional capacity in the design of the objectives of the project have been put to
test during the eight years of project implementation. The first few years of project
implementation were more of a learning period.
At the State level, the implementations of subproject were to be coordinated by the
agency of government concerned with urban development. Thus, the Project
Implementation Units (PIUs) were to be located in the Ministry responsible for urban
planning and development. However, PIUs were found to be located in Ministries other
than those responsible for urban planning and development. The lack of professional
competence in such cases delayed project implementation and resulted in increased
overhead costs.
Over the period of implementation, the focus of CBUDP has not been on active
community mobilization, but rather “to assist the borrower to increase access to basic
urban services in eight cities”. Although the structure of the Project Implementation Units
(PIUs) in the States includes that of a Community Development Officer (CDO),
sufficient emphasis was not placed on mobilization, sensitization and active participation
in project development and implementation. However, the various communities were
adequately consulted at the beginning and during subproject selection while subsequent
activities were basically determined and executed by the State Governments through the
PIUs. It is pertinent to note that the attempt at the CDD approach has left indelible and
positive legacies in some of the communities.
The major constraints in the achievement of physical works include the following: (i) The
large variety of eligible infrastructure under the project led to selection of small
components of each type of infrastructure thereby spreading the available funds thinly;
(ii) Poor selection and performance of contractors (most of the contracts slipped beyond
completion date by more than 12 months); (iii) Non familiarity of project staff with
complexity of Bank procedure in the selection and appointment of Contractors and
Consultants; (iv) Delay in the issuance of no objection by the Bank from 2003 to 2008
11 This report was produced by the FPCU in August 2011.
34
(however, the situation improved significantly afterwards which enhanced the project
delivery); (v) Bottlenecks in the institutional arrangement for project supervision and
monitoring both at Federal and State levels, (vi) Inadequate and late release of
counterpart funds, and (vii) Initial pre-allocation of project fund to States limited
competition for funds, the warehousing effect did not facilitate quick utilization of funds.
Evaluation of performances
a) Borrower’s performance
The FPCU discharged its roles and responsibilities under the project. A major
achievement was the institutionalization of M & E process into the project, production of
project Video documentary for the 8 States as well as acquisition of satellite imagery and
training of 36 officials of the participating States in the processing and application of GIS
for city wide urban infrastructure planning, delivery and management. The Federal
Ministry of Finance (FMF) collaborated with the FPCU in monitoring project
performance through the level of fund draw-down. The FMF also processed amendments
to the loan agreement and other several requests for extension of project closing dates.
The FPCU participated in all the formal supervision missions with the Bank and its
contributions were quite significant. In June, 2009, the FPCU engaged the services of M
& E consultant to assist in project monitoring and evaluation. This Consultant
substantially improved the quality and timeliness of supervision. However, it failed to
address policy issues such as the National Urban Development Policy to provide
direction in urban development.
On the part of the FPCU, the unit suffered from institutional instabilities that impaired it
from performing at the expected optimum level. The main problem was distortions in
institutional set up of the Ministry which resulted in a change of name of the Ministry of
Works and Housing at least two times with resultant changes in departments and staff.
Another challenge was the non-provision of operational fund at the initial stage of the
project.
Essentially, the CBUDP was State Government oriented. The principal executing agency
responsible for implementing the project at the State level was the Project
Implementation Unit (PIU). The unit was responsible for the coordination of all sub-
project activities, administration, contract management and supervision. In general, the
State PIUs executed the various sub-projects successfully and achieved the desired
objectives in the physical works components and financial record keeping. Jigawa State
had serious difficulties due to poor working relationships between State top officials and
staff of implementation unit. However, none of the States presented a credible project
sustainability plan by the loan closing date.
Major constraints in the performance of the beneficiary States among others include:
initial constraints of payment of counterpart funds, location of the PIU in other Ministry
outside the line Ministry responsible for urban development, bureaucratic inefficiency
within the State Government set-up, interference in day to day management of the project
35
and in procurement process, and dual role performances of PIU staffs between the PIUs
and their respective departments of the line ministries.
b) World Bank’s performance
The CBUDP received tremendous support from the Bank technically and financially. The
relationship between the Bank and the borrower remained very cordial all through the
project implementation period. However, some critical bottlenecks identified at the
World Bank level include the following: (i) Changes of Task Team Leaders (TTL) by
the Bank. Under the project, it was not the same TTL that prepared the project that
implemented it. Also, another TTL came in towards the close of the project; (ii) WB
guidelines on the project were considered too stiff. The series of „no objection‟ to be
given by the Bank resulted in slow and sometimes long delay in project implementation;
(iii) The winding system of the Bank in procurement matters with regards to the series of
„no objection‟ being required at every stage was a major cause of delay in project
implementation, and (iv) the Bank‟s appraisal did not take Nigeria‟s political and
governance situation into account. The Bank agreed to an implementation structure
whose implications they only understood subsequently.
Lessons learned
The lessons learned in the implementation of the project can be summarized as follows:
The project implementation clearly indicated the deficiency in manpower
capacity at the various levels. A major lesson is to emphasize capacity building
to ensure proper project implementation in future projects.
The issue of post-implementation maintenance of projects has been further
accentuated by the project. Almost in all cases, post construction maintenance
has not been given due attention notwithstanding the articulation of such in the
various operational plans submitted. The cases of projects completed more than
one year ago in Akwa Ibom and Nasarawa States underscores the need to focus
on maintenance issues.
It has been shown that for greater impact, effort should be made to address
specific problems within smaller geographical areas rather than spreading little
funds over too many States and urban centers. Future projects should therefore
be issue specific, simple and cost effective with emphasis on city- wide
infrastructure.
The CBUDP project has shown the negative effect of the lack of adequate
incentives to the PIUs. In most cases, the PIUs put extra hours which
necessitated the need to introduce robust incentives to encourage the staff of the
PIUs to boost their moral and enhance their efficiency and effectiveness of their
schedule of duties
In order to avoid long delay in project implementation, institutional
arrangements should be clearly defined and set into context during project
design. The location of the PIU should be in the line Ministry responsible for the
supervision of urban planning and development. Also, the legal documentation
process should be well defined to avoid delay in the start-up of projects.
36
An effective Federal level Urban Development Policy and coordinating Agency
is needed in Nigeria The draft National Urban Development Policy needs to be
finalized to provide the much needed guidelines to urban development issues. It
is recommended that the World Bank should assist in finalizing the policy
document to strengthen urban development in Nigeria and allow both the federal
Government and States to collaborate in this regard.
The institutional capacity of Local Governments Areas (LGAs) to operate under
any form of Community Driven Development (CDD) process is weak and needs
to be strengthened. It is recommended that in future capacity building in form of
sensitization training be organized at the LGAs.
37
Annex 7. ICR Sources and List of Supporting Documents
The first two references of the list below have been the key sources used for the
quantitative analysis of this ICR. The questionnaire sent to PIUs was developed by the
CBUDP team and sent to PIUs in view of the important data gaps to evaluate the project.
Questionnaire sent to Project Implementation Units, see Annex 8 (December
2011)
Evaluation of the World Bank funded Community based urban development
project, Okay Sanni Associates (2011)
Beneficiaries Assessment Report, Okay Sanni Associates (August 2011)
CBUDP Project Completion Report, FPCU, Federal Ministry of Lands, Housing
& Urban Development (2011)
CBUDP M&E Progress Report, Okay Sanni Associates (June 2010)
CBUDP Phase II Baseline Report, Okay Sanni Associates (August 2009)
End of CBUDP M&E framework assignment report, Olukayode Sanni (April
2007)
IDA Proposed Project Restructuring and amendment to the credit agreement for
the CBUDP (June 2, 2005)
CBUDP Project Appraisal Document (2002)
CBUDP Implementation Status and Results Reports (2002-2011)
CBUDP Aide Memoires (2002-2011)
38
Annex 8. Questionnaire sent to Project Implementation Units
INFRASTRUCTURES PROVIDED BY CBUDP 2002 2011
# people with access to water supply
# people with access to sanitation facilities
# people using rehab or newly built access roads
# people reached through HIV-AIDS campaigns
# pupils enrolled in school
# people who go to clinics on daily basis
Please answer the following questions for year 2011:
What is the Unskilled wage rate per day?
How many working days have households gained as a result of the
project, per year? (less sikness such as diarrhea, fiever, pneumonia,
malaria, etc)
And idem for school days, per year?
How much do HHs spend on medical expenses per month?
How many people live in an average HH?
How much has CBUDP you invested in infrastructures in your
State?
How many people have benefited from them?
What is the average investment per capita?
By which % has the rent of households increased as a result of the
project? (between 2002 and 2011)
% of infrastructure investments made on-site (that is not trunk infrastructures)
Phase I
Phase II
TOTAL project
Increase in own source revenue by Local Governments between
2002 and 2005
39
Total cost of Headwork (in Nairas), including:
- 1 headworks and 2 boreholes with 10 nos. standpipes
- 2 Nos. 200 mm diameter boreholes
- 2 Nos. submersible pumps (25 HP)
- Starters, change over switches and miscellaneous
electrical works per headworks
- Riser pipes surface plates, headworks piping and
borehole piping for 2 boreholes including 10 Nos. stand pipes
- 1 Nos. 100 KVA generating sets
- 1 Nos. 100 KVA transformers
- 1 Nos. pressed steel plate (gauge 4 mm) EWT on 10
m stage height (100m3)
- Spares (mechanical and electrical) and
- Generator and services building including treatment
facilities for sites
Annual cost estimate of typical O&M per headwork for water
supply Time frame
Amount
(N)
borehole servicing and redevelopment semi-annually
reservoir and distribution servicing quarterly
electro-mechanical systems servicing e.g. generator and transformer weekly/monthly
service/treatment plant and building servicing monthly
consumables recurrent
spare parts Annually
salaries/wages Monthly
TOTAL
Nairas people pay for 20 litres of water coming from the headwork? (N
2 before intervention, when there was no headwork)
40
Name road
Type of
road Length Population density Cost
Name 1
Name 2
…
Prices of similar projects undertaken by your State Govenrment outside the CBUDP?
CBUDP sub-project name Cost Sub-sector Cost for equivalent Government project
Water
Road
School
…
…
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LokojaLokojaAdo-EkitiAdo-Ekiti
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10°N10°N
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NIGERIA
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
0 50 100 150
0 50 100 150 Miles
200 Kilometers
IBRD 33458
SEPTEMBER 2004
N IGERIASELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
STATE CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
RIVERS
MAIN ROADS
RAILROADS
STATE BOUNDARIES
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES