RESTRICTED

IIKEN R~ T"In COP E Report No. AW-Z8a

This report is for official use only by the Bank Group and specificaDy authorized oroanizationsor persons. It may not be published, quoted or cited without Bank Group authorization. TheBani: Group does not accept responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the report.

INTERNA.TIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

INTERNATIONAL DE'vELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

AND PROSPECTS

OF THE

IVORY GOAST

(Summary and tnree volumes)

VOLUME II

AGRICULTURE

November 9, .97 I

Western Africa Department

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit: CFA Franc (CFAF)

Before August 11, 1969:US$ 1.00 = CFAF 246.85CFAF 1,000 = US$ 4.05

After August 11, 1969:US$ 1.00 = CFAF 277.71CFAF 1,000 = US$ 3.60

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 Metric Ton (t) = 2,205 lbs.1 Kilogram (kg) = 2.2 lbs.1 Kilometer (km) = 0.62 mile1 Meter (m) - 3.28 feet

COMPOSITION OF THE MISSION

This report is based on the findings of a missionwhich visited the Ivory Coast in January and February1971. The mission consisted of:

Cornelis J. A. Jansen Mission ChiefGerrit M. de Wit General Economist (PMWA)Rolf H. Glaeser General EconomistR. A. Bishop Agricultural Economist (FAO)Adrien A. Duncan Transport Engineer (PMWA)Abdallah El Maaroufi Tourism EconomistMelvin I. Loewen Educator/Economist (PMWA)John C. Rietveld Water Supply SpecialistRaymond 'l. Rollet Power Engineer

The report comprises the following volumes:

Summary Report'Volume I - Main ReportVolume II - AgricultureVolume III - Tourism

This volume has been written by R. A. Bishop.

AGRICULTURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No..

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .................................. i

I. TEIE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ............................. 1

II. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR AGRICULTURE. 8

III. RECENT EXTPERIENCE IN AGRICULTURE .10

TV= PROPOSALS OF THEF DRAFT DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1971-1975 ..- 14

() Cripnpi-nl Conniidpratinnq- 14

(b) Commodity Targets ............................... 15

V. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ................................ 32

VI. INVESTMEN'r, PRODUCTION AND EXPORT FORECASTS ... ....... 35

LIST OF MAPS AND ANNEXES

LIST OF TABLES

SUMMBARY AND CONCLUSIONS

i. This report: is based on the work of a mission wnich visited theIvory Coast in January and February 1971. By and large the conclusions ofthis mission confirm the views expressed earlier. I/ Agriculture has maderapid progress over the last ten years. Value added by the primary sectorrose by 5.7 percent per annum and the value of exports by 10.4 percent. Thusagriculture is and will continue to be for some time to come the maitispringof the economy.

ii. Nevertheless agriculture has reached a turning point, which willforce the Government to take various policy decisions if the rhythm ofgrowth is to be maintained.

iii. First, the three main commercial crops and export earners - coffee,cocoa and timber - face difficult problems of various kinds. For coffee, thelimitations on production and exports set by the International Coffee Agree-ment raise serious questions as to the Ivory Coasts's position vis-a-vis theAgreement. The mission believes that, if unchanged, the Ivory Coast's coffeeproduction plans as expressed in the Development Plan 1971-1975 would lead toa collision with the Agreement. If the mission's view is correct, basicquestions arise concerning whether or how to bring about acceptable policymodifications. For timber, export market prospects are bright. However, someof the more valuable species are rapidly approaching exhaustion. At thesame time the vast majority of exports are in the form of round wood, whereasit would be advantageous for the Ivory Coast to promote domestic processingand export of sawn wood or wood products. Any attempt by the Governmenteither to exercise effective control of felling or to force the industry todo more wood processing locally, runs the risk of interrupting the rhythmi ofactivity built up by the hitherto liberal attitude of the Government towardsforeign private sector involvement. For cocoa the problem is to bring theexisting farming structure rapidly to a higher level of efficiency in termsof productivity per man and yields per hectare, so as to be able to copeeffectively with the declines in world market prices which seem likely in thefuture.

iv. Second, agricultural growth in the past has been due not so muchto improvements in technology and a rise in productivity of individual crops.as to a shift in the composition of production, from low-value food crops tohigh-value commercial crops. This trend was favored by the mobility of thepopulation and the availability of immigrants from neighboring countries,which permit:ted rather rapid opening up and development of the south andeast. This was where the high-value crops coffee and cocoa could be grownand where the most valuable resource - timber - was to be found.

1/ See report No. AW-17a, Economic Growth and Prospects of the Ivory Coast,Vol. IL, Agricuiltural Development, July 24, 1970.

v. However, this process may not continue. In the first place al-though there is still land available for further planting of cocoa and coffeein the south and east, new immigrants are now beginning to encroach on the

already established farmers, whose sons even cannot obtain land for them-

selves. Thus the Government has had to open up the new area of the soultlh-west. This is not only costly, but also projects here take a long time to

come into production. Since there has been no general improvement in thetechnology of the subsistence farmers growing food crops in the north, theirrelative position by comparison with the mass of coffee and cocoa growersin the south has become worse. The Government has therefore undertaken a

program of regional development in the north by promoting valuable marketcrops, e.g. cotton and rice. But these crops do not fit into the traditional

husbandry systems and it now seems that what is necessary is a completechange of technology, based on full development of the rural structure. This

also is costly and it is not yet sure that the correct technical solutionsare known. Moreover, a correct balance has to be struck between the effortto develop the north, which may retain labor there, and the need to main-tain the flow of labor to the south.

vi. Third, to implement its development programs, the Government has

deliberately had recourse to a number of semi-autonomous development

societies. Some of these societies have been outstanding successes, as forinstance SODEPALM. However, they have proliferated rapidly (and are continu-ing to do so) to the detriment of financial and policy control at the center

and of proper coordination of activities at the farm level. In the long runthis rather ad-hoc system will need to become better articulated, embracingall aspects of Government intervention in agriculture.

vii. An additional problem is that the semi-automous societies have hadlarge recourse to expatriates in the past. This does not appear to be a

satisfactory long term solution, and there are now signs that properly quali-fied expatriates are becoming more difficult to find. There is thereforea need to formulate a personnel policy covering all government services toagriculture. backed up by appropriate institutions in the way of schools and

training facilities.

viii. Fourth, until now, stress has been laid almost entirely on the de-velopm-ent of commercial and exnort crons. However, the relative decline of

the rural populatioi nmeants thiat, to avoid growing recourse to imports, outtputof foodstutff ner farm family must increase rapidly, in order to release asurplus sufficient to feed the urban population. In spite of this clear needto devote development resources to food crops, it mny be some time before

effective action can be taken, partly because the technical solutions arenot yet known, and partly because there is inadequate information about the

whole structure of food supply including production, farm to wholesale mar-Neke chtannels, and retaaiL food d4str4butio in the t4... The Cover-ment hasVset on foot the necessary investigations for this purpose.

- tii -

ix. The Government's general development strategy axs expressed Iti t:hedraft Development Plan 1971-1975, follows four main lines:

t) Diversificaition of production and exports

2) Increase of productivity in the traditionalcornnercial crops

3) Promotion of food crop pro)(Iuction

4) Development of the north

Diversification involves mainly continuing the programs for oil palm andcoconut development; startinR on development of new products, in particularrubber, sugar, kenaf, and vegetables for export; and reorganizing and im-proving the efficiency of production of some commodities which were alreadygrown on a small scale, such as pineapples and bananas. Concerning rubber,natural conditions appear good and the development proiects envisaged appearto have a reasonable chance of being viable, even at the relatively lowworld market prices expected. For sugar also, natural conditions appeargood but there are still some unsolved economic questions, while kenaf isaltogetlher more problematic on both technical and economic grounds-

Increase of Droductivity will be based mainlv on distribution of improvecLplanting material and better cultural practices. As a result of sustainedresearch efforts over many years; the Ivory Coast is now i n a nosition tl?do this, and. by and large, it appears that the planned increases can beachieved. Eoth food cron productinn and development of the north raise pro-blems which may take time to resolve, as indicated previously.

x. The Goverrnment proposes investments in agriculture (including For-estrv and fishery) totalling CFAF 81 billion in 1971-75. The mission, haw=ever, believes that investments will be CFAF 64 billion. Taking this andother considerations into account, it believes that the value of output atconstant prices will rise by 3.5 percent per year to 1975.

I. THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

1. In the Ivory Coast, the primary industries, i.e. agriculture, for-

estry, fisheries and livestock, contribute about 28 percent of GDP. Ot the

total population, estimated at 5.1 million in 1970, approximately 3.7 mil-lion live in rural areas. Exports of agricultural products and of semi-

processed agricultural products form over 80 percent of total exports. Thus,it can be seen that the economy of the Ivory Coast is to a large extent de-

pendent on the well-being of the agricultural sector. Year to year varia.-tions in agricultural output and exports, and in particular, in the threemain crops: coffee, cocoa and t:imber, have a profound effect on the economyas a whole. This remains true in spite of the fact that over the last tenyears there has been rapid change in the structure of the economy. Although

the value of output at constant prices of the primary sector increased at. anaverage rate of about 5.3 percent per year from 1960-69, the growth of th.e

secondary and tertiary sectors was very much faster. Thus, the proportionof GDP (current prices) contributed by the primary sector fell from nearlyone half in 1960 to under one third in 1970.

Place of Primary Sector in the Economy

(CFAF billion current prices)

1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

GDP 140.7 236.8 257.3 274.5 325.1 362.1 404.5

Value added byprimary sector 61.0 84.4 88.1 86.8 100.7 108.3 114.4

Percentage primarysector 43.4 35.6 34.2 31.6 31.0 29.9 28.3

Source: Nat:ional Accounts and mission estimates for 1970; 1969 provisional.

2. The relative importance of the agricultural population also de-clined. According t:o official estimates, the proportion of those residenit

in rural areas fell from about 80 percent in 1965 to about 70 percent in1970 (Table 1). The proportion of exports originating in agriculture has

also declined, falling from 95 percent in 1960 to 83 percent in 1969, as

follows:

-2-

Prqportion of Expr ts origirating injgriculture(CFAF billion)

1960 1965 1968 1969

Total exports 38.8 68.4 104.9 118.2

Agricultural exports 36.7 60.6 87.1 98.2

Percentage agricultural exports 95 89 83 83

Source: National Accounts.

3. Within the primary sector there were substantial changes also.

The value of output of the primary sector as a whole at constant prices, rose

by nearly 70 percent from 1960 to 1969. However, by far the most rapid growth

took nlace in forestry which grew about three times; in cocoa which nearly

trebled; and in coffee, which about doubled. Thus, within the primary sec-

tor. the relative imDortance of food crops declined, that of forestry great-

ly increased, and that of industrial and export crops just about maintained

its nosition.

Value of Outnut of Primarv Subsectors

(CFAF billion at constant (1965) prices)

1 9 6 0 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 9

Value % Value % Value

Food crops and livestock 40 55 42 51 54 44

Industrial & Export crops 26 36 31 38 42 34

Forestry 7 9 9 11 27 22

Source: National Accounts

4. In spite of these rapid changes, some important features of agri-

culture in the Ivory Coast have remained constant. First, commercial agri-

culture continues to be dominated by coffee and cocoa. The farm gate value

of coffee was about CFAF 23 billion per year on average in 1968 and 1969

and cocoa CFAF 10 billion. The next most valuable commercial crop was bana-

nas, with a value of only about CFAF 3 billion (see Table 2). The total

area under coffee and cocoa is not accurately known but in the draft Plan,

it is estimated that in 1970 it was of the order of 780,000 ha. and 487,000

ha. respectively, as compared with about 70,000 ha. for improved oil plam,

the next most widespread commercial crop and about 7,000 ha. for bananas.

- 3 -

Coffee and cocoa are chiefly grown by smallholders, of whom there areestimated to be about 200-250,000 in coffee, with between one and fivehectares of coffee each, and about 100,000 in cocoa. Some of these farmerscultivate both cropS but even so, nearly one-half of agricultural familiesare concerned with these two crops. Thus, coffee and cocoa are the mainmeans for grafting modern commercial agriculture on to traditional subsis-tence farming. The large cash income from these two crops, and their widediffusion through the farming community means that changes in their economicwell-being have a major impact on a large number of people.

5. Second, in order to implement development policies, the Governmentrelies on the so-called autonomous development societies. 1/ The first ofthese was SATMACI initially charged with promoting cocoa and coffee pro-duction but later also involved in other products. As SATMACI's responsi-bilities enlarged, some were hived off to other development societies whichnow cover a variety of crops, including rice, oil palm, fruits and vegetablesand cotton, as well as mechanization.

6. The decision to entrust implementation of development actions tothe autonomous societies was deliberate and in general has been iustifiedby results up to now. In particular, the close association of research anddevelopment has led to striking results for some crops e.g. oil palm, coconut,and the development societies themselves, free of government red tape, wereable to execute proiects rapidlv and effectivelv.

7. However; the mission believes that the time has now come to ex-amine the situation afresh. In the first place effective action at thefarm level on crops which are not crnwn in monoculture requires integrar.ionof all crop,s in the! rotation rather than independent action by differentagenrieez Pneh rOnrCPntrating on a qingl1e crnno Ptirther- the missinn beLieven

that it is not enough to aim only at raising agricultural production. Al-though this is the key to all rural development schemes, they should a1asoinclude improvement of marketing, building of roads, and provision of villagefacilifitipq srh as Qehools and social centers. These nroblems are espeacallvimportant in the north where the hitherto accepted concept of single croporiented devIlonment soeipties, is nArtiriularlv inannronrinte.

8. Moreover,, even where the development societies operate efecivlyat farm level there seems to the mission to be an urgent need to reexamine andredefine theirrelatlinahip w4t-h t-he M4nistry of Agriculture. On paper,there are adequate arrangements for financial and policy control by theMinistr-. In pract-ice, it appears to the missionth that the control must be

very difficult to exercise effectively.

1/ "Soci•te"s de developpement autonomes", autonomous bod:Les set up and fin-anced by the Government for the development of one or more specific crops.Usually they work in close cooperation with the appropriate French semi-public research organizations. For full list of these companies seeAnnex 2.

- 4 -

9. To carry out its various programs, each society disposes of funds

from different sources, with which it has its own direct relationships (seeAnnex 3). With these funds, the society then makes subcontracts with other

agencies, such as consulting firms, other autonomous societies, sometimeseven government departments, to carry out the work. There is evident com-

petition between the societies, not only for funds, but also for personnel

and project location. The funds are allocated for specific items of work

with a definite cut-off date, whereas much of the work is more in the nature

of continuous on-going programs. This makes forward pianning difficult for

the societies, and is particularly unsatisfactory when trying to build up a

cadre of personnel. Concerning personnel, there is such a mass of arrange-

ments for subcontracting, secondment and lending with outside agencies and

even between the societies themselves, that it is scarcely possible to get

an idea of how many people and of what kind are working on agricultural de-

velopment in the Ivory Coast. Even if the Ministry does not get involved'

in direct execution of projects the mission believes that it would be de-

sirable to reinforce the Ministry's functions in respect of control and

policy making for these societies.

10. Third, incomes in agriculture are still low. A very rough estimate

puts per caput income, including subsistence, of the rural population at

about CFAF 28,000 in 1969. There are large differences, especially in cash

income, between the north of the country, the savannah, where there are few

possibilities for commercial production, and those parts of the south of the

country in the high rainfall forest areas, where commercial crops have been

developed. In 1970, for example, in the draft Plan, it is estimated that

the value of commercial agricultural production per head of rural population,

i.e. the cash income, was only CFAF 8,300 and CFAF 8,500 in the northern and

southwest regions respectively, but was CFAF 28,000 in the south. This low

level of income reflects low productivity, especially in the food crops sec-

tor. But even in the commercialized sector, coffee and cocoa yields, for

instance, are only about 300 kgs./ha, and utilization of inputs is relatively

stagnant (see Table 14).

11. This points to a fourth observation, namely, that until now, the

application of improved technology has been limited to relatively few crops.

The great increases in production have taken place in spite of this. This

was because output expanded in the areas of comparative advantage, i.e., in

the south and east rather than in the north. The expansion was made possible

partly because unoccupied land was available for cultivation, and partly be-

cause of population shifts to the south and east (see Maps 1 and 2).

12. There have in fact been three main population flows in the Ivory

Coast. One from the country to the town, of which the most evident sign is

the extremely rapid growth of Abidjan. The second, the movement of the ruralponulation from north to south and southeast. This movement is partly season-

al and temporary but obviously the greater the need for wage labor in the

forest areas and the greater the difference in incomes. the greater the pres-

sure for the temporary movements to be prolonged and become permanent. Final-

ly, there is the movenment of non-Tuorians to take un rural employment, mainly

- 5 -

in the forest areas. The magnitude of these population movements is notwell-known though a survey is now being carried out which will yield resultsby 19/2.

13. For the future therefore a major factor in maintaining the rhyLhmof agricultural growth is a continuation of the flow of population for set-tlement and bringing new land into production. On the whole, lack of suit-able land is not a constraint. The previous mission estimated that onlyabout one-third of the cocoa land and one-half of the coffee land had beenplanted. However much of the untapped potential is the almost unpopulatedsouthwest to which migration on a large scale has not yet started. in themore densely populated southcenter there also remains some suitable coffeeand cocoa land. However, the present growers are unwilling to see any fur-ther encroachment on the unutilized land, which forms part of the subsist-ence crop/shifting cultivation complex existing in symbiosis with the coffeeand cocoa plantations. There are reports that even the sons of already-established growers are unable to obtain land to set up for themselves. Forthis reason, new areas have to be prospected and immigration carefully guidedand encouraged.

14. Fifth, the increase in forest production has been very largelr inthe form of round-wood exports. In 1960, total wood utilization was onemillion cubic meters, of which 85 percent was exported as logs, 9 percentwas utilized locally, and the remainder exported in processed form. In 1969,total wood utilization was 4.3 million m3 of which 78 percent was exportedas logs and 14 percent utilized locally. Thus, while there has been somedevelopment of processing for local use, processing for export has tendedto stay on the plateau of 360-380,000 m3 round-wood equivalent reached in1966 (see Table 3).

15. rhe very rapid growth of forest exploitation was encouraged by agood infrastructure of roads leading to excellent port facilities in Abidjan.The initial impact of these favorable factors is, however, beginning to fadepartly because of over exploitation of the best species, and partly because,as exploitation moves further and further away from Abidjan, transport costsrise correspondingly. Further, the rapid growth was favored by the liberalgovernment attitude towards private foreign entrepreneurs. The recent at-tempts by the Government to orient forest development along lines more fa-vorable to the Ivory Coast almost necessarily imply more control of theprivate sector. The danger is that such controls, if they are too rigid,could result in a decline in confidence and activity on the part of theprivate sector and would thus become counter-productive.

16. Sixth, by contrast with the major contribution made by agricultureand forestry, livestock and fishery in the Ivory Coast are relatively Lnsig-nigicant. The Ivory Coast is a meat deficit country relying largely on im-ports of live animals from the north. According to estimates made in '1966,out of total consumption of about 43,000 tons of edible meats, only 11.000

- 6 -

tons come from domestic sources. 1/ The deficit is most marked in beef, andin mutton and goat meat, of which respectively one-sixth and one-half comefrom the national herd. Imports of live animals appear to be rising, reach-ing about 170,000 head of cattle and 300,000 sheep and goats in 1969 and1970 (see Table 4).

17. The stagnation in the livestock industry is due to a combination oftechnical, social and economic factors. Starting from the existing base, itwould be difficult to increase numbers and output of large animals substan-tially in a short period of time; Ivorian agriculture, on the whole, is notoriented towards livestock production; and the government fixed-price ofmeat, e.g. stewing steak CFAF 190 per kg. since 1964, does not provide muchincentive to producers.

18. The poultry industry has, however, increased rapidly, the supplyof day-old chicks rising from 531,000 in 1967 to 1,080,000 in 1969. It isbased on high-cost feed which is mainly imported in spite of sizeable do-mestic production of maize feed. Partly because of high prices, poultryoutput is directed towards a restricted market.

19. It is somewhat fortuitous that in recent years the Ivory Coast hasbeen able to fulfill its meat requirements without too much difficulty. Thetwo other main outlets for meat supplies from the interior, namely Ghanaand Nigeria, have had problems which reduced their ability to absorb meatsupplies; and these were therefore available, directly or indirectly, forthe Ivory Coast. It seems unlikely that this situation will continue muchlonger and African meat may thus become more scarce in Ivorian markets.

20. Fishery production now appears to have reached about 70,000 tonsof which some 50,000 tons is commercial production. The fishing fleet iscomposed mainly of obsolete or obsolescent vessels and complete re-equipmentwould seem to be necessary before further progress can be made.

21. The prospects for deep-sea fisheries are directlv or indirectly aquestion of resources throughout the world and there should be no problemspeculiar to the Ivory Coast. The inshore resources are considered to beadequate to support a small domestic fishing industry, but in general thefishery resources of the Gulf of Guinea are not great. More information onthis will become available from the various resource surveys now in progressalong the West African coast. Concerning the inland fisheries, hopes areentertained for large increases; e.g. it is estimated that the potentialsustained annual catch from the lagoon is 20,000 tons compared with thepresent 8,000 tons, but the means for achieving this are still in an experi-mental staee. Concerning Lake Kossou in particular, there may be a possi-bility of a considerable catch, but no decisions have yet been taken as tohow it should be done.

1/ From "Supplying West Africa with Meat", quoted in AID paper on loanapplication for Entente meat market.

-7-

22. Te grwlnS leaLdeficit certainly ra'ses a serious probleru ofT jie gr~owinig meatd ue 1.LL L L L L.L L~Jei~ Xe 1U UU.LCI O

how to fill the protein gap in the future. The mission believes that thePOSSILUX.Lities -fi UUolng thiLs L'UrIo UUoImesLc resoUULrc- dLr vefy A.LUIILLU da

regards meat., but that urgent attention should be given to fishery develop--rient especially the marketing aspects.

23. Finally, the output of people with technical arLd professional qual-ifications in agriculture remains limited in spite of government effortsduring the past decade to expand and improve agricuiturai education.

24. Eciucation and training in agriculture in the Ivory Coast, includinguntil recently the training of veterinary and livestock workers, is the res-ponsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. In general there is a sharpdistinction between professional level training, which is carried out di-rectly by the Ministry of Agriculture, and farm level training, which iscarried out by the various specialized development societies.

25. Over the last ten years there has been a rapid increase in activityin agricultural education. As regards secondary level and above, total capi-tal investment in schools and other physical facilities was of the order ofCFAF 300 million in the period 1960-65, whereas from 1965-/0 it totalled CFAF1,000 million. The number of school places rose from about 140 in 1960 toabout 520 in 1970, and the number of schools from 3 to 7, ranging from sec-ondary level up to post-graduate level training. The number of Ivorianstudents has increased roughly proportionately to the increase in the numberof student places and is now about 420.

26. The Government estimates that this school system, when it is fullyoperative, will be able to supply each year about 210 graduates at vary:Lnglevels of qualification. The major difficulty in estimating whether or notthis output. is adequate is that there does not exist a figure of the toltalprofessional level personnel at present employed in agriculture in the IvoryCoast, nor of persconnel requirements. This lack of information results fromthe use made by the Government of the autonomous societies to execute iesdevelopment plans in agriculture. Each of these has its own professionalstaff not enumerated by the Ministry of Agriculture. In general, however,the output indicated above would seem to be rather small in relation to re-quirements of the Ivory Coast in the future, especially if there is to be aprogram of rapid Ivorization.

27. [n so far as farm level training is concerned, the number offarmers receiving training is directly related to the development projectsfor which finance is provided, and this training is considered to be an in-tegral part of the project. Generally speaking, the development societymakes a sub-contract witlh the specialized commodity organization to providethe training required. For example, SODEPALM makes use of the services ofIRHO to provide technical training for farmers and for field demonstratorsconcerning the techniques and practices which are to be adopted by the farm-ers on the development projects which SODEPALM is undertaking. In generalthis system appears to be working satisfactorily and no major problems havebeen noted.

-8-

II. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR AGRICULTURE

28. The agricultural Development Plan has the following general aims:

(1) diversification of production so as to give a broader baseboth to the economy and to exports;

(ii) greater productivity in coffee and cocoa, so as to maintainthe competitive position of the Ivory Coast in world marketsand, if possible, to take advantage of a favorable economicsituation when it arises;

(iii) promotion of food crop production so as to be able to meet toa large extent the requirements of the growing population withlimited recourse to imports;

(iv) growth of income and output in the north.

29. To achieve these general objectives, the Government proposes pub-lic sector expenditure on agriculture of approximately CFAF 150 billionduring the period 1970 to 1980. This compares with total government expen-ditures of CFAF 524 billion during the same period.

30. In the draft Plan 1971-75, it is forecast that the rate of growthof value added by the primary sector will be 4.1 percent per annum between1970 and 1975 increasing to a higher rate between 1976 and 1980 when numerousprojects for perennial crop development will be coming into production. Therate of growth in the primary sector is expected to be less than that ofthe economy as a whole, expected by the mission to be 5.5 percent a yearduring 1971-75. In other words, as far as the place of agriculture in theeconomy is concerned, the trends foreseen for the next 10 years continuethe experience of 1960 to 1970. At the end of the period, i.e., 1980, thevalue of output of the primary sector will have fallen to iust over 20 per-cent of GDP and the rural population will be approximately 60 percent ofthe total.

31. Within agriculture. the areatest growth is expected in the commer-cial and export sector, with value of output rising by nearly 80 percentfrom 1970 to 1980. Fishery outnut; starting from a low level- is exnected totreble (see Table 5).

32. The Plan proposes doubling paddy and cocoa production between 1970and i1980 inerpeQina nil TIAlm nrndtirinn fivp timpes nearlv trphlin, eotton

output; an increase of nearly 30 percent in coffee production and the de-velopm.ent of relatively n 4ini,satvr4e asih no conuntt, rubber, grounrdnuts

andl oil seed, sugar cane and kenaf, and vegetables for export. Output oftimber ia expected to rem din relatively static in totJ'al v0S-l'me, thg e

would be some shift towards utilization of timber for industry and therewouLU b'e thLe udevelopr.eMCnt of a inew Jpuslp industrLy.

- 9 -

33. The Government expects that the opening up of the southwest will.permit both further expansion of the coffee and cocoa acreage, and diversi-fication onto new crops. As for the north, the Government proposes to starta number of simultaneous development actions on a regional basis there, so asto break the vicious circle of low productivity and low incomes. The region-al development programs would include both specific investment projects Euchas irrigated rice, sugar and kenaf, where modern technology will be prac-ticed, giving rise to high productivity and high per caput income, and iritegra-ted rural development project as at Korhogo. These cover a wide variety oflinked activities, including direct raising of productivity in food cropproduction, by utilizing fertilizers, machinery and other inputs, the inc:or-poration in the farming system of new crops such as vegetables, rice andcotton, and the improvement of marketing through the establishment of coop-eratives and marketing facilities. The specific investment projects and thieintegrated rural development projects, taken together, will, it is hoped:,lead to a significant increase of incomes in the region.

34. In the view of the mission, some of the most controversial propos-als concern the development of the north. For political and social reasonsit would be difficult for the Government to neglect this area, but there aresome obvious immediate economic disadvantages since projects in the nortlh arecostly in terms of money and manpower. However, in the long run, there isprobably adequate justification for developing the north. It seems clear thateventually the Ivory Coast will require the cereals and meat and other productswhich can be produced there. At present, the technical solutions are notknown, but must be discovered. Thus it seems justifiable to devote a limitedamount of resources for development in the north, not for the immediate benefitsthat they will bring, but as preparation for a later stage.

35. The mission, in general, believes that the broad aims of the Govern-ment are well considered and constitute a correct response to the problemsfacing agriculture in the Ivory Coast. However, this is an ambitious programeven though the hope for rate of growth is somewhat less than that achieved inthe past. Before discussing whether the specific targets and objectives arerealistic and likely to be achieved it is worth reviewing recent achievementsfor the light this may throw on future development possibilities.

- 10 -

III. RECENT EXPERIENCE IN AGRICULTURE

36. During 1970, the Government continued the drive for diversification

and increased productivity. Distribution of improved planting material for

coffee and cocoa began; oil palm development continued much as planned and

the first sizeable palm oil exports were made; in the southwest the necessary

field work on soils, topography. etc. was carried on, and in some cases com-

pleted, showing favorable conditions for rubber, coffee and cocoa develop-ment oroiects. Similar preparatory studies also give favorable technical

indications for projects in the north. In general, there is plenty of evidence

of the determination and ability of the Government to implement its diversi-

fication and productivity program.

37. Another feature of 1970 was the recession in the timber industry

due to adverse economic conditions in the main export markets. especially

Europe. The elements in this slump were the existence of substantial stocks

of timber in hand, a recession in buildina activity and a general credit

squeeze. As a result, prices fell substantially and there was a dramatic fall

off in the volume of exnorts during the second half of 1970. In spite of

running at about the same level during the first six months of 1970 as in 1969,

itself a record year, exports are likely to be about 20 percent lower in 1970

than in 1969, taking the year as a whole. During this period of low activity

and low prices, exploitation of the more precious snecies seemed to be intensi-

fied. Although prices for comparable qualities of timber fell, according to

an unofficial estimate, by about 30 nercent in 1970 as compared with 1969,

nevertheless the average unit value of exDorts is not likely to show the same

decline, because of the greater pronortion of valuable snecies exported. This

means that timber export earnings may be less variable than the volume of

timber exports.

4Thl4 A,.d4ing 190, tho weathpr had a mnarked effect on outnut.

Coffee and cocoa production were both higher in 1970 than in 1969, as also

was output of oil palm bunches. Cotton production after rising regularlv

to 1969 fell back substantially in 1970 while paddy production remained at

the same low level in 1970 as in 1969. No official production index is

published but the mission's own estimates suggest that overall production

fell slightly in 1969 as compared with 1968 but recovered in 1970.

Ivory Coast Agricultural Production Index

(Excludes fishery and forestry)

1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

Food 100 119.5 124.4 131.7 135.1 139.5 142.7

Cormnerc ialcrops 100 150.7 185.7 141.4 192.1 179.2 197.9

Total 100 132.4 149.8 135.7 158.7 156.0 165.6

39. Most of the cocoa could be disposed of on world markets, butcoffee exports did not rise parallel with output. Rice imports in 1970are estimated to be 100,000 tons, a record figure. In the case of cotton,the Government firmly believes that the rhythm of growth can be recoveredbut since the setback may have been partly due to lack of labor as wellas bad weather, it is possible that there will be a continuing delay inreaching the Plan rate of development.

40. Guaranteed producer prices for coffee and cocoa were increased,the second time since 1968 (see Table 6). These increases, together withthe large increases in productivity obtainable with the new varieties nowbeing distributed, may lead to a very much higher rate of new planting orreplanting than has been experienced recently or is envisaged in the Plan.

41. Another significant change in price relationships which hasoccurred is the relatively rapid rise in urban retail prices for food-stuffs. Taking 1968 as 100, the index of retail food prices for Africanfamilies in Abidjan was 105 in 1969 and information to date suggests thatit might be of the order of 120-125 in 1970. (Table 7.)

42. Important developments also took place as regards institutionsduring 1970. The "Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Agricole" formallyfunctioning since mid-1969 began full operations. It is expected tomake loans totalling CFAF 3 billion by the end of the 1970/71 financialyear. These cover a wide variety of purposes and borrowers (see Annex I).On the basis of one year's experience of active operations, it is tooearly to draw definite conclusions. Nevertheless the loan proceduresand policies appear to be soundly conceived. In particular, the bankseems to have been able to avoid any harmful legacies of the now defunctCNCA which sufferedi from an excessive number of defaulters and bad debts.The bank has also been able to establish a clear distinction between itsstrictly banking operations and the provision of government funds to farm-ers for social purposes. The mission was informed that the intention isthat in future BNDAI will unify and centralize funds for agriculturalcredit. It, is, for instance,already recognized as the sole channel foron-lending funds for the French Caisse Centrale. However, agencies suchas SODEPALM may continue to disburse credits connected with their ownoperations.. In general the mission believes that there is good promisethat BNDA will become a satisfactory agricultural credit organization.The Govermnent's rice development operations were reorganized in 1970.These have now been entrusted to a new autonomous development agencynamed SODERIZ while earlier rice development was one of the severalfunctions of SATMACI. Although this will at least enable the other SATMACIoperations to be put on a sounder basis there still remain serious problemsconcerning rice.

- 12 -

43. SODERIZ will have two tasks to perform. One is to continue tofoster the growth of paddy production. In this, SATMACI was successfuluntil the last two years, when production fell back to about 300,000 tonsafter having reached 365,000 tons in 1968. The reason was bad weather,but also lack of satisfactory varieties or cultural practices which canbe confidently recommended to the farmers. None of these constraints areeasy to remove.

44. The other task is to put rice marketing operations on a soundfooting. These operations have so far been a signal failure. Privatetraders offer producers higher prices than the government producerpaddy price of CFAF 20/kg, thus cutting out the Government, except wherethe producer is so remote and difficult of access that private traders donot find it worthwhile to compete. As a result average utilization of theeight rice milling factories set up by SATMACI is low. Consequently unitprocessing costs are higher than those of private traders who undercut thegovernment-fixed selling price of CFAF 50/kg for rice.

45. In order to determine whether and how to correct this situationit would be desirable to analyze in depth the economics of rice processingand distribution. If the private sector really does the Job more effec-tively than SODERIZ, it should continue to do so.

46. As regards forestry, the experience of 1970 has reinforced theprevious arguments for more rational exploitation of the forest resources.As a result the Government is considering proposals for continuing thearrangements whereby export taxes bear more heavily on the more valuablespecies, but to raise the average rate and make them more progressive withvalue, and also for collecting information to permit effective control ofthe operations and exports of the forestry companies. In the longer term,the Government is still seeking ways of favoring the development of woodconversion industries rather than relying very largely on round-wood exportsas hitherto. So far, no proposals have reached an operational stage.However, the necessary investigations and studies are being carried outfor the establishment of a pulp factory in the southlwest. This wouldbe associated withi a concession of 250,000 hectares and would initiallv-if it can be shown to be technically feasible, exploit the standing tim-ber. As this was cut-down, a renlanting and felling cvcle on a suffi-ciently large scale would be established to keep the factory fully sup-plied with raw material. There is also an idea that the Covernment miglhtintervene, perhaps through a semi-autonomous society, with the establish-ment of an Integrated forest nneration- lnrltiding thp hibilding nf 2 larg

wood conversion plant, the opening up of unexploited forest areas, of whichthprp nre still some onloon0 ha in the "reQPrue die Tai'f and an adequate

replanting program to maintain sustained yields. It is too early yet to1udge the feasibility of th.is idea.

47. Finally, s4nce the Ist Boan mission, the G-overament hI,s becomeaware of the need to take adequate action to provide for the nutrition ofthe urbLan population. This program 3-0ould include en.our.a6enL- of fod-

- 13 -

crop production, improvement of facilities for transport of these cropsfrom country to towm, and provision of a satisfactory distribution andstorage net;work in the towns themselves. As a preliminary to setting ul?

this program, the Government has contracted with a consulting firm to carryout a study covering:

(a) the sources of supply and amounts of food stuffs disposablein the rural areas,

(b) t:he country-to-town marketing system and facilities includ-:ing such items as market places, transport and storage fa-cilities., and

(c) the wholesale and retail market chains in the towns them-selves.

The first results of this study should become available in the course of1972.

- 14 -

IV. PROPOSALS OF THE DRAFT DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1971-1975

A. General Considerations

48. For the agricultural sector, the draft Plan is largely based onphysical production targets and the inputs necessary to achieve thesetargets. The physical volumes involved have been calculated year by yearin terms of fixed prices relating in general to 1968. In order to com-plete the work it would have been advisable to make complementary analysesconcerning the effects of price changes where these might have been expec-ted to be important. Two are immediately apparent.

49. One is that as costs are likely to rise, the Plan tends to under-estimate the amount of financial resources which will eventually be re-quired for the development program. So far there is no sign of major dis-crepancies between the forecasts of the draft Plan and the subsequentestimates based on detailed updated project formulation, partly becausethe changes fall within the limit of "contingencies" and partly becauseless costly ways of executing projects have been discovered with expe-rience. Furthermore, general increases in the price level are self-adiusting since they bring about an increase in both government revenueand expenditure at the same time as there is an increase in expenditure.

50. However, differential movements of domestic and foreign pricescould seriously affect government tax and quasi-tax resources, where theseare derived from margins between domestic and world market prices. Thisis Darticularly true of coffee. cocoa, rice and, to a lesser extent, ofsugar. Since the producer price for coffee and cocoa and the retail saleprice for rice are under zovernment control, it would have been desirableto analyze expected results at different levels of prices.

51. The second main point is that producer response to changes inprice Incentives could well have a maJor impact in three important agri-cultural products. The level of producer prices for cocoa, coffee andiuvetock W2q mnintained remarkably stable over a number of years. In

fact, the retail price of meat has been stabilized since 1964 while coffeeand coroa nr-rIs- did not change for several years during the mid-sixties.

52. The recent nriep increaPse for coffee and cocoa- for examnle;

may well affect immediately intensity of harvesting and hlave a long-termimpact on productien, through encohuraging more iusp of innDitS and more

planting. For meat, the effect would only be felt over the long-termbut undoubtedly lt -411 bee very diffiult to tincrease otput unless price

relationships are favorable to producers. This kind of analysis of pro-ducer response to price chanrges ud have been desirable.

53 Th lLe quantitative pro targets pi the draft Pla

are set out in Table 8 and the corresponding crop areas are set out inTable 9. T a'kr.ig accou.t ofL crops grow4n.Jir association ar.d the exter.sive

area of fallow utilized with traditional crops, it is estimated in the

- 15 -

rlanL tiat Lhe total amount or land devoted to agricuiture wili increasefrom 7.6 million hectares in 1965 to 10.7 million hectares in 1980. Intotal, tnere seems to be adequate land to meet development requirementsthough, taking into account classified forest as well (about 5 millionhectares), about 60 percent of the available land will have been broughtinto use by 1980. Detailed assessment of land suitability and utiliza-tion for different crops by means of soil and topographical surveys, isnow being carried out in relation to specific projects, but: so far majorconstraints requiring modification of Plan proposals do not seem to haveappeared. On the other hand, it does appear that in limited areas, forinstance, around Abidjan, Korhogo and Bouake, population pressure is appear-ing and fallow land is inadequate.

54. As regards labor requirements the Plan estimate is that by 1980the resident rural population will be able to supply only about 85 percentof requirements in the forest areas, and only about 70 percent in thesavannah areas. However, these somewhat theoretical figures are open tolarge margins of error. The absorption of labor in agriculture whichplayed such a large role in the last decade, is expected to proceed duringthe 1970's at a slower rate than the growth rate of the labor force, whilethe absorption of labor by industry will account for only a small proportionof the growth of the labor force.

B. Commodity Targets

Rice

55. The Plan forecasts rice consumption rising from 177,000 tons in1966 to 375,000 tons by 1981, representing equivalent paddy consumptiorL of625,000 tons. To meet this requirement and eliminate imports, effectivepaddy production, i.e. deducting seed production and waste, is forecastas rising from 250,000 tons in 1965 to 680,000 tons in 1980. This in-crease in production is to come from increasing the area under irrigationfrom 11,000 ha in 1970 to 37,000 ha in 1980, and by increasing the rairLfedrice area on which modern technology is used (i.e. fertilizers, improvedseeds, proper rotations) from 7,000 ha in 1970 to 60,000 ha in 1980. ]nthe draft Plan, the cost of this rice development program is estimated atCFAF 12,500 billion up to 1980.

56. However, these proposals are under review. On the one hand Etconsulting firm on contract to the Government has formulated an alterna-tive rice development program, costing very roughly CFAF 20 billion. Thiscainot be considered more than an all-inclusive list of actions which mightbe undertaken; in both this and in the draft Plan proposals there needs tobe a careful review of individual projects in relation to their technic:aland economic feasibility.

- 16 -

57. On the other hand, some basic lessons of experience need to be

taken into account.

(i) Technical: Paddy production reached a peak of about365,000 tons in 1968, but has since fallen back to

about 300,000 tons. Partly this was due to bad weather,but also to the fact that satisfactory new varietieshave not yet been developed in the Ivory Coast, whileintroduced varieties are subject to disease, and to con-

sumer resistance. Also the program for development ofcrops to be grown in rotation with rainfed rice (e.g.cotton) has suffered checks.

(ii) Institutional: The arrangements whereby SATMACI mar-keted and processed rice in the past, left much to bedesired. The parallel marketing circuit of privatetraders apparently operates much more efficiently, so

that they are able to pay for paddy, it is estimated,20 percent more than the government-fixed purchaseprice and sell milled rice to the consumer for lessthan the government-fixed price. As a result the

SATMACI factories were by-passed and ran much belowcapacity. The total loss of the rice factories isofficially estimated to have averaged CFAF 80 millionin 1969 and 1970. A complete picture of the rice fac-tory situation is not available, but some elements are

given in Annex 5. These seem to suggest that even the

figure of CFAF 80 million is an underestimate to the

extent that depreciation is not included. The Govern-ment has under consideration a proposal whereby the pri-

vate traders would be paid to deliver paddy to the fac-tories, with annronriate adiustment of price differen-tials. SODERIZ would therefore not be involved in theexnensive collection of rice, and it may be expected, if

the differentials were right, that much more paddy wouldbe delivered to the mills. This would obviously allowthem to reduce unit costs, but deeper study is necessaryof the real economic costs of nrivate sector as opnnosed topublic sector marketing.

(iii) Prices: The domestic price is much higher than theworld market price. The unit cost of rice imports

has been CFAF 39.5/kg, CFAF 34/kg and CFAF 26/kg in1968, 1969 and 1970 respectively. This may be com-pared with a government established retail price ofCFF- M/gO A . .ITLhe difference bDetween the iMport an-A

retail price accrues to the Government after allow-Lng for m..erchants marketing cs T hLi s f SorLs a sub-stantial resource officially estimated to have been

apprxim l CF 1 i i 170. Increases T,approximate'Ly CRK'kU I U.L.LiL-on in IIU. irease iLn

- 17 -

domestic production will obviously cut into this (seeAnnex 6). At the same time, the high fixed price forpaddy has been an element in increasing output. Therelative effects on production, consumption and govern-ment resolrces, of changes in producer price, in con-sumer prices and in levels of import all need carefulstudy.

58. For all these reasons, tihe mission believes there should bea careful review of the overall rice development program before anyindividual projects are undertaken. Further, for the reasons indicatedabove, the preliminary conclusion is that the program goes beyond whatis possible or desirable, and that a review of the kind suggested willlead to a fairly substantial scaling down of the production targets.

Maize

59. Production is projected to increase from 200,000 tons in 1965to 336,000 tons in 1980. Of this increase about 60,000 tons will be usedfor industrial purposes including supplying a mill for maize products forhuman consumption and an animal feed stuffs industry. It is proposed tciconcentrate development activities in the areas of Bouake, Seguela andKorhogo. These activities would involve the distribution of improvedseed and extension work on improved cultivation methods, incorporation ofmaize in rotations with other crops, and better storage. Maize productionhas shown remarkable increases in the last few years and in this light, theproduction targets look realistic.

Vegetables

60. Vegetable production is expected to rise substantially partlyto provide for exports, foreseen to reach 10,000 tons by 1980 and nartlvfor domestic consum'ption, estimated at 69,000 tons by 1980. The Govern--ment has set on foot various small pilot proiects, partly through SODEFEL.which show promise for the production of such items as tomatoes, pepper,okra beans, lettuce, cauliflowers, green beans, onions, shallots and soon. SODEFEL is also involved in improvements of marketing involving stor-age, conditioning and transport. These are Dromising beginninaq. but aremuch too small to judge of future possibilities, e.g. in 1970 only 9 hec-tares were supervised by SODEFEL, withi a oroduction of only about 70 tonsof vegetables. Furthermore, while there may be room for expansion on thedomestic ma,rket, the EuroDean markcet shows limited RignR of arowth andexports there will be subject to fierce competition. The best chance ofsuccess here would be through aRsociation with an alrpady establiQhedmajor importer.

Livestock

61. The livestock development program is aimed at an increase ofbeef Drocluction from 3J400 tons to 7,60O tons, of sheep and goat meatfronm 3,800 tons to 8,40, of pig meat from 2,700 to 7,500 tons, of chicken

- 18 -

meat production from 6,200 tons to 23,600 tons and of eggs from 22 millionto 134 million in 1965 and 1980, respectively. The relatively slow rateof increase in beef production implies a fast growing deficit, forecastat 70,500 tons by 1980; poultry meat and eggs are expected to match re-quirements, while there will be a slowly increasing deficit in sheep andgoat meat.

62. Public sector expenditure on livestock development is expectedto total CFAF 7.8 billion in 1971-1980. The most important elements willbe the establishment of production ranches (CFAF 1.6 billion), productionof day-old chicks (CFAF 1.2 billion), research and veterinary services(CFAF 1.0 billion each). The rest will be spent on the establishment ofa new development society (SODELVAGE), an animal pathology laboratory,breeding ranches, development of livestock in the north, "noyaux d'elevage"and poultry extension work. It appears to the mission that much of thisexpenditure can only have an impact in terms of increased output after arelativelv long period.

63. The overall meat deficit situation in the Ivory Coast must beJudged in relation to possible sources of supply which are likely to besubject to severe constraints both at home and abroad. Regarding tradi-tional sources of imports, according to a study made in 1968, by 1980there will be an annual shortfall of meat supplies in West Africa ofabout 260,000 tons (see Table 11), which will certainly be felt by theIvory Coast.

64. On the domestic side there does not appear much scope forstepping up drastically the beef nroduction program of the draft Planthough this is essentially limited to the proposal to establish one neworonduction ranch of 60.000 ha. carrvine 30-40,000 head of cattle. Thecost of this ranch is estimated to be CFAF 800 million, and it is likelyto be ipnlpemented in 1972. financed by FED. Proiect output at full devel-opment might be about 1,500 tons of carcasses per annum.

65. In addition to this, altering meat price relationship.- infavor of the livestock farmer might brint forth some mor houghsupply is probably not very elastic; there may also be room for institut-ing' a more determined drive for feedstuff production as a hasis for morepoultry output.

66. In the long run, however, the future of the livestock industryJ 1s_ T ..-- los __- r_A _l._ I_A APc4 Aei on th ba_ f a vr b_o A con

in1 LIIC X VU XL y %ua: L. LCLL.tJL..y Ut W J lLtL V,it jt CL V - y k U L LAJtL

sideration of general economic policy. If it is believed that the futureof the ivory Coast lies iln developing the secondary and tertiary sectorsas fast as possible, partly based on market opportunities in countries in theirnterior, then the questionU m1ust be sDreU, whiat can thLese countries supplyin return either directly to the Ivory Coast or in a triangular tradingrelationship. One of their major export possibilities, anrd certainly theone with the best market growth prospects, is livestock. From the pointof view of comparative advantage under present conditions, iL wouIU De

- 19 -

preferable for the Ivory Coast to concentrate its development activitieson the crops which can be grown in the south of the country, relying on

imports to cover its meat consumption deficit. Whether the same condi-tions of comparative advantage would still prevail under the impact of

the overall meat deficit expected in West Africa is a subject which would

require careful study.

Coffee

67. The coffee development program proposed in the draft Plan envi-*

sages an increase in output from the present "normal" annual level of

240,000 tons to 305,000 tons by 1980. This will be achieved by planting

156,500 ha with improved material and 34,000 ha with unimproved between1970 and 1980. Planting and initial care of the new varieties will be

closely supervised and it is hoped by this means to achieve yields of 700kg/ha by the fifth year. The total cost of this program is foreseen as

being about CFAF 4,500 billion between 1970 and 1980.

68. According to ICO quota arrangements, Ivory Coast disposals might

be as follows by 1973:

Quota 1/ 183,000 tons

Domestic consumption 5,000 tons

Non-quota markets 26,000 tons

Permitted sales 214,000 tons

69. This position does not leave much room for flexibility. Only

minor adjustments can be made. Some transfer of quota may be possibleunder OAMCAF arranvements (but this is unlikely); there may be some losses

in storage or transport; there may be some increase in non-quota sales, atthe cost of severe price declines; and domestic consumption may increase

faster than anticipated (but domestic consumption is supposed to be in-cluded within the nuota). Stocks are already at 148,000 tons compared

with a permitted level of 143,000 tons (see Table 12). 2/ Thus virtually

there is now no marein for palliating the difference between permittedsales and prodluction. Production reached 280,000 tons in 1970.

1/ 7.5 percent of world market.

2/ In September 1970.

- 20 -

70. Looking further ahead, assuming that the Coffee Agreementremains in force and making reasonable assumptions about the growth ofnon-quota and domestic markets, the following picture results (inthousands of tons):

1975 1980

Quota 188.0 213.0

Domestic 5.5 6.5

Non-quota 30.5 - 58.0 35.5 - 73.0

Total 224.0 - 251.5 255.0 - 292.5

Even if the Ivory Coast's own estimates of non-quota sales of productionsare accepted (i.e. 58,000 tons in 1975 and 73,000 tons in 1980) it is clearthat substantial surpluses will emerge by the end of the period.

71. Furthermore, the mission believes that the Ivory Coast's figuressomewhat underestimate the future growth in production. Making allowancefor the effect of price increases on more intensive harvesting, the sav--ing of 15,000 tons per year expected from the centralized decorticatingfactories which are proiected, and using the Ivory Coast's own estimatesof rate of planting, age of bushes etc., the mission believes that thelevel of nroduction might be 320,000 tons by 1975 and 340,000 tons by1980. This is well above any realistic view of what sales might be ifthe Coffee Agreement remains In force.

72. The G.overnment is well aware that its coffee develonment nlansare liable to lead to production and availability of coffee in excess ofthe TIO arrangements. Tt i,itzifieR itself by the argument that (i) theexisting coffee bushes are becoming aged, leading to inefficient produc-tinn (see Table 13)= Nearly one ntiarter of the hitCuhpe are more than 20years old. Thus, there is an evident need for replanting; (ii) researchin the Ivory Coast has reached the stage where much more productive plant-ing material is available; i.e. under non-intensive conditions (which themission believes will be the method adopted), the flln,i4c bachieved:- 200 kg/ha in the third year, 550 kg/ha in the fourth year and700 kg/l:a after the fifth year. St411 more spectacular results are confidently expected in the Ivory Coast. As replanting lias to be done anyway,

",e 0ov rn en A r gu s _ I | - ; 4 . 1 - A- - . A _ F _ 3 _ _ _ -.. 4 1- L t. _% t 2 1 _ __ _- t I - I __Ci1 Li&CM a L .1 L i.i: Uc Lt:ZL LU UU :3kI Wi.Lii LLL li g [1;Ly LL .U 11ig

material. This will raise the efficiency of the Ivorv Coast coffee industryand put it in a better position to cope with unfavorable deveio_L0P1Uts IL they

occur, in the world coffee economv.

[3. IJnier tiho!w circumst:nces, there appear to be three possibleoptions open to tihe Government. The first is to go ahead with the oro-gram as is with the intention of aggressively competing for as much ofthe world markcet as possible. This will almost certainly make a renewal

- 21 -

of the Coffee Agreement impossible and lead to substantial price declines.Taking into account the present structure, the Ivory Coast might be able!to accept a price decline on world markets to the equivalent of CFAF 150/kg fob while still maintaining the farm price at CFAF 105/kg.

74. The second option is to go ahead with the program as is, withthe intention of destroying sufficient stocks annually to keep within theCoffee Agreement. On the same production and export assumption as men-tioned earlier this might mean a farm price of CFAF 105/kg, costs oftransport and destruction CFAF 17/kg, and quota export prices of CFAF 200/kg in 1975 and CFAF' 181/kg in 1980.

75. However, the mission believes that a third option exists, whichis to check: the increase in production, while at the same time enablingthe coffee industry to become more efficient and competitive.

76. F'irst the rule, abolished in 1969, that improved planting mate-rial would only be distributed as old trees were uprooted, should be re-instated and strictly observed. Although a vast number of trees is over-10 years old and their yields are low, nevertheless they still oroducetogether perhaps 80 percent of total output. Unless they are rooted uprather rapidly, new plantings must inevitably mean a rising level of oul-put over the next few years, without much improvement in overall effi-ciency. Second, farmers should pay a charge for the new high yieldingplanting material based on its cost of production, instead of obtainingit free as at present. Third, the new nlanting material should only hesold to planters whio qualified according to certain criteria such asproven competence or willingness to adont specified cultivation or har-vesting practices.

77. These three measures, taken together, might keep productiondown to abciut 285.000 tons by 1975 and about 315,000 tons by 1980; atthe same time the average efficiency of the industry would be improved.Only small quantities of coffee would have to be destroyed to keep suppLyand disposals in balance. Briefly, option I indicates what might happenif coffee output increases as suggested by the mission, and there is nomaintenance of prices through the Coffee Agreement; option II shows thesame production as in ontion I, but maintenance of prices through theCoffee Agreement, clestruction of excess production to keep exports withinouota limits and export prices forecast on this basis; option TTT sho-wsthe level of output: whiclh might occur if there is an effort to restrainincreases :in production, and exports and export prices are kept with Inthe framework of the Coffee Agreement.

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR A COFFEE MARKET POLICY

1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 t)Thousand F AF/gg CFAF Thousand CFAF/kg CFAF

tons million tolls million

a/!

OPTION I Total sales by CSSPA 320 150 48,ooo- 34( 150 51,0001

CSSPA charges b/ /

Purchbase from farmers 320 105 33,600- 34( 105 35,700

Handling charges on sales 320 20 6 400 v 34() 20 6300

Net return I'M,'>°-

.OPTION II Total sales by CSSPA 251 46, /41 292 49,348-

of which: Quota exports 188 200 37,600 21:3 181 38,553

Ncn-quota exports 58 133 7,'714 731 133 9,709

Dcmest,ic sales 5, /2 200 l,:LOO 6 /2 181 1,086

CSSPA charges b/ b/

Purchase from farmers 320 105 33,$00' 340 105 35,700'

Handling charges, on sales 251 20 5,020 29:2 20 5, 840

Cost of destruction 69? 17 1,173 48 17 /16

Net return T-52 1-6 2

OPTION III Total sales by CS'SPA 251 49,348-

of which: Quota exports 188 200 37,600 213 181 38,553

Non-quota exports 58 133 7,714 731 133 9,709

Domestic sales 5 /2 200 1,100 6 /2 181 1,086

CSSPA charges b/ b/

Purchase from farmers 285 105 29,925- 315 105 33,075-

Handllingr charges on sales 25:L 20 5,020 292 2C 5,840

Cost, of destruction 14 17 233 23 17 391__

Net return 11,231- 10,042-

a/ Receipts of CSSPA (Government's Agricultural Price Stabilization Fund).

b/ Receipts of farm sector,,cj Net return distributable between Government p CSSPA, including return on sales and taxes.

- 23 -

78. It will be seen that total earnings from sales of coffee arenot very different on the three options, but that government earningsare higher while total farm sector earnings are lower on option III. Theexact level of exports, farm income and government earnings of course va--ries according to the assumptions used and this table can be consideredillustrative only. However the mission believes that option III shouldbe the one chosen by the Government.

Cocoa

79. The cocoa development program of the draft Plan envisages anincrease in output 1-rom the present level of about 170,000 tons to about360,000 tons by 1980, with an increase in cocoa area from about 490,000 haat present to about 635,000 ha by 1980. The substantial increase inaverage yie:Ld is to be achieved partly by raising the area under closesupervision and modern cultural teclniques from about 200,000 ha atpresent to about 250,000 ha by 1975, and partly by new plantings, verylargely with new high-vielding varieties, which are to cover 176.000 haby 1980. The expenses envisaged for this program are CFAF 9.8 billionbetween 1970 and 1980.

80. The mission believes that the production targets will not befully realized. It is likely that yields will be slightly lower thanforecast and delays in the high-vielding variety program have nut itback one year. There was some stagnation in the use of inputs from 1965-66 onwards. and this trend needs to he correeted (see Tabhe 14). One ofthe objectives of the ongoing Bank project is to do this. On the otherhand; the recent nrire inrrepses w411 enrnirqee more intensive harvesting;more use of inputs, and a faster planting rate in the future.

81. Cn the side of market possibilities, the Ivory Coast forecastiiare nrobnhlv too s2nguine, being based onT fob pr4ces of CFAF 182/kg for1975 and 1980, compared with a Bank forecast of CFAF 173/kg for 1975.Thus for reasons of both rire alnd olulim of nrodu,ctinn the miss-ion

believes that export earnings from cocoa will be lower than those envisagedby the TvnO-v ynGot.

Oil P-ilm

B 2' The oil palm development program of the draft Plan. envisagesan increase in output from about 0.5 million tons of fresh fruit bunchesin 1970 to 1.5 mIllion by 1980. These ircreases in output wi411 be largelythe result of an increase in modern plantations under the control ofSODPALHM, some of hich be .a as industri4a" locks and othersas villagers' plantations. In the draft Plan, the area controlled bySODEPALM is proposed to rise from .57,000 ha at the end of 1970 to 125,000ha at the end of 1980 (see Table 15). This development will result in anincrease in 1-1- JAr - of palm o.l frL LL2LLL tons iLn 1970 to aboutU

252,000 tons by 1980. The total expenditure of this program is foreseen.:s .... big(AF 2Q 3 blio.o, betwe.-.n 1970 and 1980'.I-II ... * J L)L. LJ.UI UL t1 i 7/I ~J dIU 70Uj.

- 24 -

83. So far SODEPALM has shown itself to be a competent organization

zenerally capable of achieving its program with plantings, yields and

costs as expected. However, some modifications in the planned program

may be anticipated. First, only 17,800 ha of the village plantation pro-

gram were achieved by 1970, compared with a forecast of 20,460 ha. This

slow down was due to more careful preparation, and to more careful screen-

ing of planters.

84. Second, some problems arose with collection of fresh fruit bunches

from village plantations, the solving of which will require better organi-

zation and more expenditure on village roads. Third, it may be that theavailability of land for village plantations is more restricted than was

previously thought. For these reasons, the mission believes it unlikelythat the nrogram of village plantations will be realized or that the total

plantings of SODEPALM will reach more than about 110,000 ha by 1980, of

which 70,000 has industrial blocks. A corresponding adiustment should be

made in investment provisions.

85. Furthermore, the export price forecast in the draft Plan isC(AF 48-5Ikg; whereas the Bank forecast is CFAF 30/kg. For reasons of

both quantity and price therefore, the export projections should be re-

duced.

86. Twno snpifir nroiects; both in the southwest, are now in course

of preparation. One is at Tabou, the other near San Pedro. The Tabouprorn4et invn1ole l0,000 ha of estate oil nalms; estimated cost CFAF 3.3billion, excluding the factory. The project near San Pedro is for 4-5,000

ha of estate oil palm cstimtePd c-ost about CFAF 1.5 billion, excluding

the factory. Both projects would be executed by SODEPALM. For bothpro4ects, 90i. n -l s,urveuy are now aoing Ont to determine the nroiect area

and implementation could start in 1973, if finance can be found. Althoughcor.ditions f or ,ilpalm are sliohtly less favorable in the southwest than

elsewhere in the Ivory Coast, it seems likely that both projects will be

econ.omically and technically lal

CoconLut

87. ~The coconut plantation program has been somewhat revised since

the formulation of the draft Plan, mainly because of greater availability

o Lig-y1Jielding pJlanlt.ng ma-er4.00 *L91 Y. e-UL 1 1W 11~~k LLL..L a .LLI LJ.- ~ fJ~ '~

88. ILt Jis nlow foreseen I.LC-tha thlere -will'l be e-nough. seed for 600 h1ain 1971 rising to about 6,000 ha annually by 1976. This would permit

total plantings oL about 43,000 ha by 1980, but this is probably the

outside limit of suitable land available. All things considered, thle

mission believes tihat by 1980 the total coconut area may ue 35,0001 naofr high-yieldiag, plus 12,000() la of village plantations existing beforeili,iC) / , pit I i, i;( i) h:l 31- jUl)Lt-iiETI; pdlI a -t I o1 L )I e n -7 --- I 1970

- 25 -

89. As a result of this program the total output of copra will risefrom about 6,000 tons in 1970 to 60,000 tons by 1980. Total expenditureon the plantations and farms is envisaged as being CFAF 10.4 billion be-tween 1970 and 1980.

90. The intention is to convert all the copra to oil in the IvoryCoast. By and large the export price of copra oil forecast by the IvoryCoast seems to be in line with Bank forecasts of price and absorptivecapacity of the markets.

91. One specific development project is now being prepared. It isat Tabou in the southwest. A total of 5,000 ha coconuts is envisaged,including both estate blocks and village plantations. The cost of thisproject would be CFAF 1,400 million, including drying kilns. The presentstatus is that soil surveys are now in progress and implementation couldstart in 1973. In general, conditions seem favorable for this proiect.which should prove technically and economically viable.

Rubber

92. The Plan envisages the development of two industrial estatesin the southwest totalling 22,000 ha, plus about 3,500 ha of additionsto existing estates, now about 13,000 ha, and about 3,000 ha in villageplantations. The major increase, therefore, is to come from developmentsin the southwest. Here implementation has not yet started and fieldsurveys are still going on.

93. However. Dreliminarv indications are that conditions arefavorable, with yields that compare satisfactorily with yields in Malaysiaor Cambodia and production costs of the order of USi12/lb fob.

94 Agreement has been reached with Michelin to implement a nroJectcovering about 13,500 ha at a total cost of about CFAF 8 bi:Llion of whichCFAF 0.8 billion would be for the factory. Seed nurseries have hean es-tablished and full implementation is expected to start by 1973 if financ-ing can be arranged. Michelin would manage the plantation and take allthe rubber with a minimum guaranteed purchase price equivalent to USJ17/lbcif New York. The Michelin forecast is that nrices will fall within therange of USU19-21/lb cif New York, equivalent to an fob price of US017-19/lb. which would give a satisfactorv ret-urn on the project.

95. Discussions are still in progress with CGood-ear for the otherproject. A preliminary cost estimate is CFAF 11 billion, including fac-tory. Soil surveys to determine the projert area are expected to startin mid-1971.

- 26 -

96. It seems reasonable to conclude that by and large the Plan

proposals will be carried out, but not much production from the south-

west can be envisaged before 1980.

Banana

97. Only relatively modest increases in output are foreseen, the

main emphasis during the next decade being placed on reorganization and

concentration of the industry so as to raise production efficiency and

reduce marketing costs. The rather small area under bananas is actually

planned to fall slightly, but the reorganization will involve expenditure

of about CFAF 2.0 billion from 1970 to 1980. In spite of increased com-

petition from Central America, it seems likely that the Ivory Coast will

be able to maintain its own share of the market.

Pineapple

98. Production of fresh pineapples for export is planned to rise

from the present level of about 12,000 tons to 80,000 tons by 1980, while

production of nineapples for canning is expected to rise to 220,000 tons

from 80,000 tons in the same period. A delay in opening a third pineapple

processing factory, meant that the targets for 1970 were not realized, but

this will not affect results for 1971. In the long run, implementation

of the program de-ends on market prosnects. For the canning side of the

operation long-term contracts have been entered into and in general there

should he little difficultv in achieving both production and export targets.

For fresh fruit exports, however, there may be more problems and the mission

believes it wouldl be prudent to adont lower targets.

Cotton

99. The draft Plan proposes an increaee in the area under cottonfrom about 50,000 ha in 1968/69 to 130,000 ha in 1979/80 to be brought

about by aSsistance witlh land clearance, intensive sunervision and credit

for fertilizers and insecticides. It was hoped that this would result in

an increase in seed cotton production from about 40 000 tons in 1970 to

130,000 tons in 1980. Total expenditure on this program was intended to

be CFAF 11.8 bl4on during the decade.

1000. Unfortunately the cotton development program, after reaching a

peak of production in 1968/69, suffered a bad year. In 1968/69 acreage

under cotton was 48,000 ha and productlon was 42,000 tons, but in 1969/70

area was down to 32,000 ha and production 32,000 tons. One reason for

this decline in production was bad weather. However, it is also probable

that very strong contributory factors were the increasing difficulties

experienced by peasanL farmers in cultivating and harvesting cotton in

view of competing labor requirements for subsistence crops. The Govern-

ment's reaction nas been to adjust cotton prices so as to make it rmore

profitable to grow cotton of high quality.

- 27 -

101.* The probleam with adding a oorcial crop to a subsiste-ce economyis that farmers tend to give absolute priority to food production. Only

WL heLn LLlda lha IUeen iassurbeU iL % :: W.LLe Lally ca JtlLLe1 L 3L WL vin

crops. Price and income incentives have to be very strong to overcome thisobustace'Le. J.1evertLeless, accoru'nug to the GOvernLmLent , preL r.Lary indic.t40Ls

are that the farmers are again planning to grow more cotton in 1971.

102. The cotton program represents a burden on the Government's finan-cial resourzes. A very roughl estimate by the mUss±oUn 1_L1ULdLt thlaL aL a

level of output of 50,000 tons, the net cost of the program to the Govern-ment would be about CFAF 250 miliion. This is the net difference betweenthe Government's receipts from sales of lint and seed, and of fertilizer tofarmers, and the Government's expenses on purchase or seed cotton, transportand ginning, and seed, fertilizers and insecticide for supply to farmers.It does not include expenditures on research and extension. In return forthis net cost the farmers receive CFAF 1,950 million for a commercial cropwhich otherwise would not be cuitivated in tnese areas. On average, in1967, 1968 and 1969, over 75 percent of the cotton acreage was in the north.

103. In spite of the cost and the moderate success so far, the Govern-ment intends to continue to pursue the cotton development program, but tomodify it so as to integrate cotton more closely with other crops such asmaize, groundnuts and rice, and to encourage more cultivation with bullocks.Although high yields have been obtained, (average 1966-70, 900 kgs/ha),nevertheless labor will remain a constraint unless there is a complete changein the farming system. This is desirable for many reasons, but will take along time to achieve and the long-term target of 1980 must be considereddoubtful.

Sugar

104. The sugar development program envisages production of 45,000 tonsof sugar by 1975 and 60,000 tons by 1980, related to forecast consumptionof 55,000 tons in 1975 and 70,000 tons in 1980. The difference of 10,000tons would be made up by guaranteed imports from Upper Volta. Accordingto present slans, one irrigated sugar plantation of 4,500 ha would be de-veloped using water from a reservoir on the River Bandama. Total cost cfthe project would be CFAF 9 billion in 1971-75, including refinery and cubemaking plant. The Government is engaged in discussions with the Lonrho Companyconcerning tmplementation. So far, the technical aspects of this projectappear promising. Forecast yields are 110 tons of cane per hectare with asugar content of about 10 percent, based on experiments carried out overthe last three years, while ongoing soil, hydrological and geological sur-veys have not yet revealed major problems. However, economic and financialproblems clo not yet appear to have been resolved. In the first place, therehad not at th-e time of the mission been a comparative feasibility study ofirrigated arid non-irrigated sugar cane. Secondly, according to the LonrhoCompany, a Financial viable irrigation project would require the fixing ofdomestic sugar prices at a level 25 percent higher than the prices hithertoprevailing in the Ivory Coast, resulting from the OCAM sugar agreement. Thiscasts doubts on the economic justification of the project.

- 28 -

Kenaf

105. The kenaf program involves an increase in output from nil at

present to 20,000 tons of raw fibre by 1980, according to the draft Plan.Since these proposals were made the figures have been somewhat revisedand now aim at 16,000 tons produced on a 20,000 ha plantation. The costof development of this plantation plus associated retting, bailing, andmanufacturing facilities would be CFAF 5 billion. Of the output 6,000tons would be made into rope, sacks, etc. on the spot; 2,000 tolls sup-plied to FILTISAC for use in Abidjan; and 8,000 tons exported. In viewof the difficulties in obtaining adequate labor for retting or in adapt-ing technically suitable machinery in place of labor and in view of theexport problems which would be encountered on world markets, this projectmight not be successfull. Although the Government has already obtainedagreement in principle on financing from Italian sources, in the opinionof the mission this project should be considered doubtful for inclusionin the development program.

Traditional Foodstuffs

106. Although traditional foodstuffs are assumed to total about 50

percent of the Rross value of crop output, relatively little attention ispaid to their development in the draft Plan, apart from rice and to alesser extent maize. Output of yams, cassava and plantains is assumed togrow by a little over 25 percent between 1970 and 1980. No specific ac-tions are envisaged to bring about this increase. though it does involve,by implication, a fairly substantial increase in productivity per input.In the nresent state of knowledge, the mission feels that it is probablynot possible to make well-founded proposals for increasing output ofthese crops. The survey now being carried out by the Government, mentionedearlier, on food crop production and distribution should give a betterbasis fnr suich proposal-s-

Fnrestrv

107. The mao4r deuv1opment nrnblem in forestrv is to devise a

rational policy which would permit satisfactory exploitation of theforest resources and at t-he anmp time giuv an adpeiirtp rptulirn tn the

general economy in terms of resources required for overall economicdevelopment. At the ratVes nf eplnitationn enperienred in recent years,five species which formed about 40 percent of the volume and 50 percentof the va1ue of ti-ber exprtsc 4n IQAQ veiwlA he oy.hniicf-d in f4xra enfifteen years. At that same time the value of round-wood ekports was

neary 90 percer.t of tChe value of tot--! wood exports.

108. * ILL h UJ ' LLve of te Gover.-mend, asL expresse in Lhe df Plan,

is to aim at a slight reduction in the amount of round wood exported andat a substantial irIcrease in timber milling iLr. the IvoAy CasC, and to

promote other forest industries, such as paper pulp. To achieve this,it is proposed to cnange the system of taxes on rouidU woodu exportedu.

- 29 -

These are already fairly substantial, totalling 19-25 percent on the fivemost valuable species and 17-25 percent on the others, calculated on theofficially :Listed export price (valeur mercuriale) which varies from spe-cies to species but is generally somewhat lower than the unit value ofexports. In the first 8 months of 1970 total taxes paid were about 15percent of the value of exports. The proposal now being considered bythe Government is to make the "valeur mercuriale" correspond more closelyto the unit value, lto have more tax classes, and to make these much moresteeply progressive to the disadvantage of certain species. This wouldbe backed up by the obligation on forest operators to disclose more in-formation concerning their operations.

109. While these proposals, if adopted, are certainly a step in theright direction, many factors besides taxes influence exporters' decisionsconcerning species and volumes. Variations in world market prices are muchwider than the change of a percentage point or two in tax rates. Further,as export prices change, the value of some species may rise above or fallbelow the thlreshiold set by transport costs to Abidjan or San Pedro. 1/ Henceit seems uniLikely that government proposals will do more than marginally mod-ify what would otherwise occur.

110. Concerning other forest industries, the Government has two proj-ects in mind. The more advanced proposal relates to promotion of a pulpindustry in the southwest. This would involve setting aside a concessionof 250,000 ha as the source of raw material for a pulp factory. In thefirst stage, the factory would utilize standing timber, but gradually ccn-vert to the use of quick-growing species to be planted in the cleared areas.Tentative plans envisage a plant with a capacity of 300-500,000 tons at acost of approximately CFAF 30 billion (US-$108 million). Preliminary dis-cussions ha-ve been going on with various financial and industrial groups whomight be interested. Technical investigations are also going on to determinethe most suitable location for the project from the point of view of avail-ability of water, power, transport, etc. Even though an inventory has beenmade, the most difficult problem is still unresolved, namely whether or notutilization of the standing timber for pulp making is technically feasible.Technical reports are available and sample runs have been done, but thereal question, whicih is a matter of judgement, is how uniform the rest ofthe forest is in respect of tree size and species. If this were resolvedfavorably it seems likely that the project could go ahead rather rapidly.Failing this, prospects are doubtful.

11l. The second proposal under consideration is for an integratedproject to include a wood conversion plant, an afforestation program anddevelopment of new forest areas. The afforestation program taken aloneis probably uneconomic but the three elements combined in correct propor-tions could perhaps form a viable project.

1/ Construction of the port of San Pedro and connecting roads has shortenedthe distance from thie southwest to the nearest modern seaport by about160 km. This will be particularly important for the logging industry,since some lower valiue tree SnpeCie wiii marketable.

- 30 -

112. In addition, the Government is proposing to reorganize and con-centrate the existina cnnuerginn industriesso as to make them more capableof competing in export markets.

113. In trying to assess the future of the forest industry a balancemust he struick hetweeppn ~~several- ------- There are the Gvernment'O pol4

cies and actions, outlined above; there is the state of the market, bothexnort and Admomsti, wichL favrs rapld ploitation; there is thel need,

sometime in the near future, to exploit less valuable species, which, atnpresnt princ are not- able to ar-h-ot o xl4ain

114. In the past, rap4d exploitation was favored by the Government'sliberal attitude towards foreign private enterprise. Now, however, theGCvernment- is com,mi4tted to Ivorlza-tlor. ; t. -- p t of- -l.. a n~-*J LL ~~JJLL, LJ.~ LL%JPULt L%LtL VL LVUL LC4LI5 U111IU[I>L

officially recognized forest operators (companies and individuals) hasrisen from 25 out of lng ir. I960, to 24 out of OUL0 71 in 1970. Ther has~~~~~ LI -i L .L&L IdLiWJ L.I ~~tj UU J .JI I JLn i l U iliere iiasalso been some reallocation of forest concessions, while the governmentproposals outlinedA above iply more cortrol ofi tLile industry. All thleseinfluences taken together could mean a change in the general businessatmosphere and pehp a slowin do&. i act.±v.ty

115. The mission therefore tentatively concludes that conipared with1968, which was a good but not a boom year, there is unlikely to be majorgrowth in round-wood exports , anrd there mi ght even be a slight declinebetween 1975 and 1980, more than off-set by growing sawn-wood exports andgreater actlvity for the dormestic market. The pulp factory seems unlikelyto play a major part much before 1980.

Fishing

116. The forecasts of the draft Plan are that fish production willincrease from, the preseat level of about 70,000 tons to 190,000 tons by1980. Public sector expenditure is envisaged as totalling CFAF 1.9 billion

_ an n _r.r,a.A.4r s v's , . .1 -up LU 1970u of wnicn about CFAF 1.5 billion is for the development of fish-ery on the Kossou lake. However, since marine fishery is envisaged asproviding about 'C percent of the total increase in production a majoreffort will be necessary here also.

117. The existing marine fishing fleet in the Ivory Coast consistsof some 80 trawlers, most of which are obsolete or obsolescent. There-fore, a conversion program for the fishing fleet will be necessary. Thiswould involve two different types of vessels; one, inshore trawlers usingice for preserving fish during relatively short voyages; the other, deep-sea boats of 40-45 meters for bottom and pelagic fishery. There would besome tuna fishing for export but most of the catch would be for the domes-tic market. It is estimated that consumption requirements in the IvoryCoast will rise from about 100,000 tons in 1970 to about 180,000 tons in1980, though this assumes that part of the protein requirements will bemet by meat imports, which for reasons mentioned elsewhere, may not bepossible.

-31 -

118. The mission estimates roughly that the cost of the fishing fleetconversion program would be something of the order of CFAF 2--3 billion.To encourage the private sector, the Government has set up a guaranteefund of CFAF 50 million contributed by FED, plus CFAF 20 million per annumfrom the investment budget (BSIE). A fund of this very small size wouldonly be adequate for requirements, if the private sector were to investreadily.

119. In addition to boats, more refrigerated storage and transportfacilities for fresh fish will be necessary. Similarly, facilities fordrying, salting and smoking will be necessary for products aimed at themass market.

120. The Government is also hoping to increase lake and lagoon fishproduction to about 45,000 tons from the present level of 10,000 tons,based on improvement of fishing boats and equipment. and of fish-cultureAs many of the developments, though promising, are in an experimentalstate, it is improbable that these hopes will be realized fully by 1980.

- 32 -

V. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

The Southwest

121. The southwest project was described in the previous report (see

Annex 7). No major changes of concept have taken place as far as agricul-

ture is concerned. An overall development authority has been established

as well as an overall master plan which incorporates individual projects.

These are:

- Develonment of four settlement areas;

- Two rubber estates:

- Two oil-nalm estates:

- One coconut plantation including both estate and village blocks;

- One forestry/pulp factory complex.

Thnese varous proj4ets have been described elsewhere in the text, except

for the settlement areas.

Project: Village Perimeters for Settlement of Imnigrants

122. Four of these perimeters are envisaged at San Pedro, Fresco, Tai

and Soubre. Each one *nuld cover about 130,000 ha and have about 25,000

inhabitants. Each perimeter would include about 15,000 ha of cocoa and

25,000 ha each of coffee, rice and food crons. The remainder of the land

would be held in reserve. In addition to demarcating the farms and doing

initial land cleara-ce, the Government will nrovide roads, extension serv-

ices, planting material, wells, village platforms, administrative centers.

The cost is provisionally given as CFAF 3 billion each, excluding houses.

The first perimeter, near San Pedro, will be ready to accept the first set-

tLlers, fLro.. KXosou, ir: .mid-1971. A Adtn4led proj,ect report for Fresco will

be available in mid-1971 and implementation could begin in 1971/72 if FED,

which will be askedQ , agrees to finance. Field studies for the -erimeter at

Tai are in progress. Implementation may be able to start in 1972. The fourth

perimeter will not Lue implemented till later.

123. The concept of the village perimreters was born out of the need to

resettle the displaced persons from Kossou. There is some doubt now about

the numbers and rate at which the people should come to LLhe southLWest.

Of the first 23,000, due to move in 1971, only 2,000 elected to go to the

southwest. In general it would seem to be better to have a less costly

infrastructure and tailor actions to meet the requirements of people moving

in spontaneously. Nevertheless, the total population involved in these

settlements, plus the estates projects mentioned above, namely about 140,000

people, does not seem unreasonable as a target figure for 19130.

- 33 -

Bandama Valley Project

124. The Bandama valley project was described in the previous report,and relevant extracts, up-dated in some respects, are attached in Annex S.

125. The important changes since the last mission concern the proviEsionsfor agricultural development associated with the Kossou dam and reservoir onthe river Bandama, and the resettlement of the displaced persons. It nowseems likely that a larger proportion than previously estimated will stay inthe Kossou area and therefore a much larger agricultural redevelopment programwill have to be initiated. Up to the present, the agricultural componentsof these plans have not yet reached the stage of specific project proposals.There is a suggestion for two irrigation projects of 10-15,000 ha each intwo neighboring valleys, the Maraoue and the Kan. So far there is littleinformation about water availability, soils, crops or markets. In view ofall the other possibilities for agricultural development in the Ivory Coast!the mission does not. believe that major irrigation projects in the Bandainavalley merit, much serious work at this stage.

126. On the other hand, in order to accommodate the disolaced personsa rural integrated development project covering all the people in the lake-side area (350,000 ha) could offer more possibilities. The nroiect toinvestigate rural migration, proposed by the Government to the United Na-tions. couldl offer valuable insights in this resnect.

Proiects in the North

127. The Governmment's nronosals for develoning the north eonsist of anumber of separate activities, which taken together form, in the Government'sopinion; a coordinated annrnach to development. These at4vit4ies inr4ltde thetwo proposed development projects - sugar and kenaf - and the two ongoingprograms for rotton and rice dpuplopment- already descrihed. IP n ditionnthere are a number of integrated development projects, at Brobo/Diabo,Mankonon Boudiale-Tingrela and Korhogo. With the xcerpntion of Knrhnoeothese are too small to form the basis of an investment project.

128. At Korhogo, a zone of dense population extends in a radius of about5o kcms aroiind the tson. This area has one of the densest in theIvory Coast (50 km ), all deriving their income from relatively primitivea.g.riculture. Ln th.e first in.stance, a resettlemer.t progm for 2,500 fa..i-

ies financed by German aid, was carried out between 1965 and 1969, but re-suits weenot.1 c r.eraing. TI ne1. tenden1cy .now -sJ tl.t4n, 4n teL ofcoordination and promotion of actions in the major programs, backed up byaction- such -s encouragement of ox-Ara-. Im plements, distrti-buton of fer-

tilizers and improved seed for food crops, and improvement of storage. TheCo08t of this progra... is' esti4mate' 4n the draU Dlan aO t'A1 CFAF .5 b Jllon from

1971 to 1980.

- 34 -

Agricultural Processing Projects

129. A number of agricultural processing proiects are envisaged. Theseinclude:

(a) An abattoir at Abidjan with an annual capacity of 12,000tons of carcasses. plus refrigerated storace space for 4 000tons of meat. The feasibility study for this abattoir, whichis estimated to cost CFAF 1,095 million is nearly comnleted,and it is expected that implementation, financed by FAC, willcommence in 1973.

(b) Similarly, an abattoir at Bouake. with a canacitv of 5,000tons carcasses, to be financed by FAC, is envisaged for imple-mentation in 1973.

(c) An oil mill for the processing of nalm kernels, conra, cottonseed and groundnuts is at a fairly advanced stage of considera-tion. The cost would be CFAF 1.000 mi'llion, and narcity 1,000tons/day. At present, financing and management arrangements arebeing worked out between the GCovernment, the private sectorand SODEPALM.

(d) Cocoa butter factories with a capacity of up to 70,000 tonswill be required by 1980, in order to provide an outlet forlow quality beans, which can only be disposed of if processedand mixed with hiaher quality4 produce i4 n th e Ivory Coast. Nodifficulty is anticipated in obtaining private sector finance.

(e) Perhaps the most important proposal for agriculture-based in-dustr- cor.cerns the setting up of centralzed coffeedt-ing. In order to avoid the waste and inefficiency of the-resent s-stem carried outl by smlall pr 4vate traders, the &ov-r .7 ~ ~ ~ ~~~~pL LV2. LLuL LJL1 7

ernment is considering the idea of establishing seven majordecorticating factories at a cost of CFAF 1,200 umillion each.Studies concerning this proposal have been going on for someti'me. From a technical and economic point of view, there wouldseem to be merit in the idea. For instance, elimination oflosses now est'mated at 15,000 tons annually, improvements inquality, and reductions in transport and marketing costs would,it is estimated, reduce the spread between producer and exportprice by CFAF 5/kg. The main difficulties appear to be insti-tutlonal. The examiple of thle rice factories counsels caution.It is true that with coffee the problem is easier to solve than-with rice, since all production must pass through channels con-trolled by CSSPPA on the way to export. Nevertheless very goodliLstitutional arrangements would have to be enforced before thisproject can be considered viable.

- 35 -

VI. INVESTMENT, PRODUCTION AND EXPORT FORECASTS

130. Based on the considerations outlined previously, the mission be-

lieves that public sector investment in agriculture will be as follows:

Mission Estimates of Public Sector Investment(CFAF billion)

1971-75 1976-80

Rice 6.0 6.2

Vegetables & Fruits 1.0 1.0

Livestock 3.3 3.8

Coffee 6.0 6.0

Cocoa 7.5 7.5

Oil Palm 7.3 14.0

Coconut 3.1 6.3

Rubber 8.0 15.5

Banana 1.0 1.0

Pineapple 2.5 2.5

Cotton 2.3 3.0

Sugar 4.0 5.5

Kenaf

Bandama Valley 4.0 4.0

Southwest Settlements 3.0 3.0

Other Area Prolects 2.0 2.0

Forestry 3.0 3.0

Fishery 0.5 0.5

Total 64.5 84.8

- 36 -

131. As regards production increases, for traditional food crops, the

hypothesis of the draft Plan is adopted, namely that output wiil increase

in line with the population increase. Other items are shown below wherethere are significant differences from the forecasts of the draft Plan.

Estimates of Production Targets 1975 and 1980(in thousand tons)

1975 1980Mission Plan Mission Plan

Paddy 400 524 500 680

Coffee 320 260 340 305

Cocoa 220 230 335 365

Oil palm, fresh fruit bunches 800 1089 1200 1500

Coconut (copra) 13 14 60 62

Rubber 17 17 23 23

Banana 180 201 200 229

Pineapple (for canning) 175 175 220 220

Pineapple (fresh) 25 48 45 89

Groundnuts 15 70 22 92

Cotton (seed) 50 97 75 143

Timber Roundwood (million mi) 5.3 3.5 5.6 4.0

Sugar - 450 45 600

132. Based nn the quantities indicated above the mission estimates

that the following exports will arise:

- 37 -

Mission Export Estimates

Quantity Price Value(1,000 tons) (CFAF/kg) (CFAF billion)

1975 1980 1975 1975

Coffee quota 188 213 175 32.9

Non-quota 58 73 116 6.7

Cocoa beans 176 268 143 25.2

Butter and paste /1 44 67 154 6.8

Palm Oil 135 200 30 4.0

Kernel Oil 16 24 45 0.7

Copra Oil 8 38 55 0.5

Rubber 16 20 67 1.0

Banana 140 160 26.2 3.6

P:ineapple (canned) 87 110 54 4.7

Pineapple (fresh) 25 45 45 1.1

T:Lmber Rotndwood /2 3.8 3.6 various )-a4 7

T:Lmber Sawnwood /2 0.7 1.0 various )

Other /3 4.7

Tota] 134.6

/1 Bean equivalent./2 IN Mill iOl r- i ir meters rouindi-wootd equivae1 ,nt-

/3 Includes coffee extract, colanuts, exported vegetables, essential oils,nrnnndnut, i rncahpew nuita -voc rn. fi oh, ctton pineapple 4,u4i a

milling residues.

133. In this talble, it is of course assumed for coffee exports that theCnffee .Agreem.ment w.741l rem.ain in force.

134. By comparison, the draft Plan estimates show an export figure ,fCFAF 143.3 billion for 1975. The chief differences lie in the lower pricesprojected byr t!:e m.ission for coffee, cocoa, pal, oil; th owrqunite

for cocoa, fresh pineapples and cotton; while some items such as paper pulpand kenr are consiCered unlikely to figure at all.

LIST OF MAPS AND ANNEXES

Map 1 Industrial Crops (Production Value in CropYear 1967-68)

Map 2 Population Density

Map 3 Rice Cultivation Development Project (Areasof Specific Operations)

Annex 1 Banque Nationale pour le Developpement Agricole

Annex 2 Autonomous Development Agencies

Annex 3 Financing of Autonomous Development Agencies

Annex 4 Agrari.an Structure

Annex 5 Rice Factories

Annex 6 Results of Caisse de Perequation on Rice and Sugar1968 and 1969

Annex 7 The Southwest Project

Annex 8 The Kossou Project.

) ~~IVORY COAST|

rJ ~INDUSITDI AI ICROPS

_._ ~~~~M A L I ._ Production Value in CroppYeoir 1967-68|A ) (I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~PRODUCTION VALUE |

5 *~~~~~~~ } / ~~~~~~~Depart ent boundaries |t-1 JJ _t } % tJ26 f ; is - -I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~nternatmional boundaries

p ,10 )> ~~~~~~~~ x ~~ U P P E R V O L T A?r ~~~~~~4 33 j

1 4 >4 +' v3 \ ? OOdipnn,e Ko " 'I O-ir- 0 ssd------- --

1 {32 -1 \1 rl.3 4 82 '< < \ |~4 4

\~~~~~~ ' 1r 2 5) 9 |2 <. -. '9r 1 )1(! /jv I> S5( ~ .- -32

)():)7 M _ 319 1 Dnon '261 2991Z4 661 s 58 J

t---%~~~~~~~j 1t°3 222, r3ook -- EX (-1]_ /2\y<

6- 3 ] (t:'1) y ~~ ) tX5,) t AAgbrJVille > // 11 \ 6.l2

L I B E I A \_ t O,96 4,4-$ (5 r -44 .6- >) \\ / ) (\214) 'lodioA >ka (99 < b3 ,)

503 5'17 24,- -' v

if COAST X ||1 _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Srzssondra j r l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i~I5

} S) ||.).-< At/on/c Oceon i MILES ' ' l~~~~124

0 O 20 40 60 BO 400-I209800 160

UNE 971 IBRD-3463A

I ,,- s- j ~~~~~~I VORY COAST

r rPVPUL-ATIOIVN DENSIT 1'0

| r X M ~ ~~ ~ ~~A I <-Estimoted Inhabitants in llousands

) , 1 . * * . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Each dot represents one thousand inhabitants

f.J ( p r r~~~~~~~~~~ ( ,~~~~~gX ._ _ ~~~~~International boundaries

e- . ¢ . ) i -~~~~~t S ~ U P P E R V O L T A le

< .>, ;rikoiru Tjossel *. - ' t I! ... -v

|~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~N T l I 0 N A L PA R KV

G,A t J I N C A 0 F T H Eo er

\ / | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~K 0 20 460 E01010,0i,

t_t | 1 4- KILOMETER5~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~utolJUNE~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~g loke IvRD-3d62

| --< 1- i; - 4 '-^3 .ZSs > - 1- 5 --- .- - IVORY COA'ST

Fs.- ,,9o ;'5' z i, . 1e- RiCE CULIiVATIONi ivEVEIO-PMEN PROiEC I ' : ' j '2 iti-,--J 9 \ _ ~~~~~~~AREA'S OF Sl'ECIFIC OPERATIONS

] *L:, * t J i.iN-r _-1r) u 7. - -# o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 20 40 60 E4D10

;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'C X -\! ILONETERS |

i ' 5 2 , S5t-N < me~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~, Rt VOLTA ._ o |

S t jr g M ex-te-ul 51~~~~SNEMA&Lo

; ,,-,, ~~~~~~6r.'r, -AL' OFERKESSEDOUGOU !I '' I ' _j ,, / ' - /r \ / ~~~~~~~OKORHOGO?,< ,

|~~~~~~~~~ 71 / 3 6 o & TAFIRE L, ON/4

| :G11|N E-A j iI / || " 2 <. tt X oO~~~~~~~~~~~~.IANRA,

I / ,oTOUEA > \ < j o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DABAKALA

44~ ~~~~Oa .i.0re-C oEut ,, \ERDUOO_ _ . , , { s?t. NKOU -t V ,< ,s ., i., o0UAK V t ' i

- - } EANE oMAN 2 - : o k~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0)BAH'IAKRO r 120

| . g J / ) \ - h (< / ' AEiaANGOROULk

! /5ULEFLEU , GuGLO -'- 9

p 2 'r i U \ S + ! S -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2~1000

r 11S - \ R A AKtAb Ur 5mtClolr, oMEyArluNsF ~~~~LAKOTA_ li i W 2 Intnifimbion f rice n ltlism wsds lwded ccmdiions (Odien0 a iDnV

i l lb |i iER reomto luilrc Jtviinitrime ihcrg| ' ; i | f S 1 lliit - 4 Inteuillr=blon oF inirmb d rice cuBi<tion in thw bomdame-ilrugou r gionSS-

I l / 7 D alopr.e: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~of ric.rJ. rtr Ind flooe d .- dii., ( .- eg-

| W / ll 8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ D-velopmen, of rl cie rlBivtior, irn ;he Be.cka arw

SEPTEMbER 1971 PbRD 35"1

ANNEX 1

BANQUE NATIONALE POUR LE DEVELOPPMENT AGRICOLE

I. Financ:ial Operations

1. At September 30, 1970 CFAF 2.071 million of loans had been granted.,

CFAF million

Long Term 188

Medium Term 160

Sl,urt 'erUI 1723U oJ. WCIIh preLs ue soudu-e"CFAF 437 million

2. The growth of business has been as f.ollows :

CFAF million

September 30, 1969 448

July 30, 1970 1004

August 30, 1970 1400

September 30, 1970 2071

3. Loans have been 8ranted for the following cronn:

CFAF million

Cocoa 40.0

Coffee 5.4

Pineanple 6113.

Banana 92.6

Rice 559.1

Citrus 18.0

Coconut 2.2

Cotton 334.2

Livestock 49.4

Others 357.1

Total 2071-3

ANNEX 1Page 2

4. Activities are forecast to expand as follows:

Loans Granted CFAF million

1971 3000

1972 4500

1973 6500

1974 8700

1975 11000

5. It is expected that the required extra funds will be provided by

allocations from the "Caisse de Stabilisation".

II. Types of Loans

6. Roughly speaking BNDA makes three types of loans out of its

own resources.

1') Large individual loans to companies or semi-autonomous agencies

for farm development, e.g. to SOCABO, a pineapple growing coopera-

tive for the development of 2800 has.

2) Loans to cron cooneratives to finance the marketing of members

produce.

3) Loans to individual farmers (or state societies) to finance pre-harvest renuirements (nrets de soudure).

7. F.ates of interest for the first two types of loan vary between

5.1/2 percent and 8 percent and repayment periods from 2 to 10 years. Fortype 3) loans the rate of interest varies from S.1/4 nercent to 9 nercent

and the repayment period is one agricultural season.

8. In addition to the above loans on its own funds BNDA channels ther.....,..'. n ',.-.,.4,, t Ac. Rxc.ni,nuallspmpnf in rpcnprt- nf develocn-

Government' s "Fonds d'Etnir --- de Reovllmn, in-_-__--_ resec of deeo-

ment operations for traditional fishermen, fertilizers for rice, animal-drawr. cu'tvatilon -implements ar.d cocoa developmer.t.

9. ForL al.l lo ans t-o ir,dividualfarmers, th11e collowing securities areUL WUU t.U. .LV L.U* ua'J.IcntC . 69 - .

required:

(i) loans over CFAF 5 million; mortgage on land and engagement tosell export crops, plus rice, through a recognizedu mrketir.g

clhauinel whlich deducts repayment;

ANNEX 1Page 3

(ii) in addition, for loans under CFAF 5 million, collective guaranteeof' a number of farmers in the village; default by one farmermeans that: all the rest are debarred from further loans. De-faulters on loans from the new defunct CNCA are also barred.

III. Personnel and Facilities

10. The Bank has a total staff of 73, of whom 3 are expatriates pr0-vided by agreement with the French Caisse Centrale and 8 are graduates inagriculture, dealing with loan applications. There are at present ninefield agencies.

ANNEX 2

AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT AG7ENCTES

A critical evaluation of the autonomous development agencies wasgiven in the previous report. For information a full list of these agenciesfollows, together with the appropriate institute of applied research.

Produce DeveLopment Agency Date of ResearchFounding Institute

Coffee SATMACI Societe d'Assistance Technique 1958 IFCCpour la Modernisation del'Agriculture de la Cote d'Ivoire

Oil PalmCoconut PaLm SODEl'ALM Societe pour le Developpement du 1963 IRHO

Palmier la Huile(PALMINDUSTRIEPALIIVOIRE)

Fruits and SODEFEL Socikti pour le Developpement des 1968 IFACVegetables Fruits et Legumes

SONACO Societe Nationale de Conditionne- 1964ment (Banana packing)

SOPRODAV Societe d 'Etudes pour le Dive- 1964loppement de la Culture de l'Avocat

COFRUICI Cooperative Agricole de Production 1968Bananiere et Fruitiere de C8ted'Ivoire

Rice SODERIZ Societe pour le Developpement du 1970 IRILTRiz

Cotton CFDT Compagnie Fran,aise pour le 1964 IRCTDeveloppement aes Textiles

Mechani- MOTORAGRI Societe pour le Developpement de 1966zation la Motorisation de l'Agriculture

Forestry SODEFOR Societe pour le l)eveloppement des 1966 CTFTPlantations Forestieres

Rubber SODHEVEA Societe pour le 1)eveloppement de 1970 IR(Ll'Heveaculture

Note: Strictly speaking, SATMACI has a different legal status from the other;levelopiment societies, as also does CFDT. In practice their methods ofoperation follow much the same lines.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture

ANNEX 3

FINANCING OF AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

CocoaAmount

Year Organisation Source (CFAF million) Purpose

1965 SATMACI CSSPA 3011966 SATMACI MSSPA 8241967 SATMACI BSIE 5201968 SATMArT RSET 506

SATMACI CSSPA 1819f0 SLA TMA CT RBTSiE 91tl

SATMACI CSSPA 191RA¶MGM .... PA 18

1970 SATMACI CSSPA 1050rllMMhr.T TP n .Thr

ineapls- for C---Li4

1Q9 6 RAT-GI/ B IE(TL 17 Tc.clAss.

FAC 20 Waterworks1963 SALCI BSIE 29 Tec-i4caI Assistar4,

1964 SALCI BSIE 37 Technical Assistance1965 SALCI Ji 51 TeclhAica.L Assistance

1966 SALCI BSIE 53 Technical Assistance1097 SAT.ATCI I 80 Tec 'I Assi

.L/'~~~ I n~J"4.L UI'.J. hUhJ. L iUU l--- J~1 1 L J. A L to.LU0

IFAC BSIE 18 Cultural TechniqueslInMOTOPT^G SIE 5 Iul rleararlceh1JJIULfULUL".)L. DU1 J.L .LAMJ1U U±LjI'ULULd

SEMA BSIE 5 Market Study1968 °A kiACT i BSAkIEL 9 %J-L 7 T ciInIcal Assistance1969 SATMACI-SODEFEL BSIE 72 Technical Assistance

IFAC BSIE 10 Cultural Tecnniques1970 SODEFEL BSIE 176 Land Clearance

.LrIFAC BSIa-L Ez iO1 Cultural Techniques

/ Societe des Ananas de la C8te d'Ivoire.

Proposed Rice Development Program

SODERIZ IBRD/CCCE 3400 Area of Daloa -- ManGagnoa and the East

SODERIZ FED 2600 Current input for seed. farmsS)DERIZ FED 1800 Irrigation BouakeSODERIZ K(REDITANSTALT/FUZR

WTIEDERAUFBAU 3600 Reservoir construction,K orhogo

SODERIZ COFFEE DIVERSIFICA- ricg-l-lON~~~~, ruNno 150 P4 Cwn-- Deeo-awtYss-

SODERIZ C or U SPA 1700 Financing seed stocksSOUR1-z BSIE 2160 RtcI/Cotton rotatiloSODERIZ BSIE 1500 Rice/Cotton rotation

ANNEX 4

AGRARIAN STRUCTURE

1. The land tenure situation in the Ivory Coast appears to be goingthrough a period of rapid evolution. The point of departure was the tra-ditional system whereby land was held communally by an etlnic group witlits cultivation rights being allocated by the chief; these rights couldnot be alienated during the period that the land was in cultivation. Sucha system is admirably suited to the cultivation of subsistence crops undera system of shifting cultivation; it was not, however, so suitable forsettlement and permanent cultivation. Therefore, superimposed on the tra-ditional system has been the allocation of land by the Government forlarge scale plantation development and the allocation of land by the chiefsto individuals for the plantation of perennial tree crops. In addition,there have been minor modifications as, for instance, the development ofsmall irrigated areas on the basis of security of tenure.

2. A problem is raised by the need of the planters of perennial treecrops to continue to grow food crops. This is on the traditional system,with shifting cultivation. According to the Plan 1971-75 there are two systemsof shifting cultivation, the short cycle (2-4 year cultivation and 3-6years fallow) and the forest fallow lasting twenty to thirty years. As arough approximation, in the Plan, it is estimated that every hectare underannual crops in the forest zone requires 5 ha of natural fallow. Thusthe typical coffee and cocoa planter with two hectares of bushes andtwo hectares of annual food crops would require also 10 hectares of fallow.This need not necessarily be under his control or owned by him, but hewould expect his village chief to keep that amount of land available asand when required, and refrain from allocating it to new-comers. Thus astime goes on the scope for establishment of new family units with cocoaand coffee holdings becomes more and more limited. This preiudices thepossibility even for the sons of existing planters if they want to set upon their own, but, of course, does not prevent existing planters fromadding more coffee and cocoa to the area they already cultivate.

3. A further development now taking place is the spontaneous growthof share cropping whereby the cultivator of a block of nerennial cropsmakes an agreement with his laborers to pay them by means of a share ofthe crop. When the cron has been noor.. the laborers have in some rcases

agreed to accept rights in subsequent crops and these debts have mountedto such an extent in some cases that the laborers, through their share ofthe crop, have become virtual landowners taking the place of the originalcultivators. Because many of the paid laborers are immigrants ("foreigners")this has tended to lead to social tension.

Note: Some of the above text is quoted from the previous report (AW-17a,july, 24, 19q70)

ANNEX 5

RICE FACTORIES

1) Numiber and CostCapacity Year of Entry Capital Cost

Place (tons/hour) into Service CFAF million

Gagnoa + 4 1968 41 + 76Man 1 + 1 1966:1967 41 + 84Korhogo 4 1968 163Bouake 4 1968 140Bongouanoa 4 1970 264Seguelo 4 1970 272Yamoussoukro 4 1970 268

Total 13h9

One factory of 14 tons/hour was planned for Daloa for 1971, but accordingto the Government, this plan has now been cancelled.

Note: The variations in cost are apparently due to the different equip-ment fitted, e.g., capacity of driers. storage, etc.

2) Operating Results 1968/69Costs Tonnage Paddy Unit Cost

Factory (CFAF million) (tons) (CFAF/kv)

Bouake 28.- 7402 3 A5Gagnoa 27.0 5302 5.10Korhogo 17.9 4900Man 32.9 4990 6.60

1064 22 5941

Of uhi ch fi-co 1.8h

vari.able 2Q

- Fi2xed costs include:-Salaries of permanent personnel of the factory-Half the salaries of the central o4f4fice personnel connected ,atl4,

rice production and marketing-.Base chAige for electricity-Insurance on vehicles and buildings-Rents; rate ayid t-axes

- Variable costs include:-Temporary labor

.Electricitv consumntion-Insurance on stocks-Maintenance, fuel, small equlipment etc.-Financial expenses related to stocks-Sacks (18Q/60kg sack of rice};,

Source: '1rC Ansi de Dvelop-meent Agricolej" Mnistr-y of Agricultur, 097Q*

ANNEX 6

RESULTS OF CAISSE DE PEREQUATION ON RICE AND SUGAR,(1968 and 1969)

Rice Sugar15?bo 1969 15'(u .L9bb 1969

(froreoast)

Imports (1000 tons) 47.7 52.3 100.0 37.1 37.5

Receipts (CFAF million) 83 372 1000 279 190

Main Payments: Support rice 24 50

Financial Charges 16 22

Rice subsidy to SATMACI 53

Agriculture Development 100 100San Pedro

Participation OCAM Agreement 34 123

Repayment export industries 45 45

Share of expenses, SOSUCIstudies

Note: "Receipts" is the difference between the c.i.f. value of imports and thedomestic selling price.

Source: Caisse de Pgr6quation.

ANNEX 7

THE SOUTHWEST PROJECT

San Pedro and Southwest

1. This project is located in the triangle formed by the SassandraRiyer, the Liberian border and the sea. The total surface is about 10,000km , with a very low population density of about 2 people per sq. km . Infact, most of the people live on the periphery in small towns and villages,of which the port of Sassandra is the largest. Thus the interior is, orwas until recently, virtually uninhabited. The whole area is covered withdense forest, constituting the last major reserve of forest resources inthe Ivory Coast. Howzever, exploitation is now going ahead rapidly, and Itis likely that within eight or ten years the region will have been cut overat least once at the low intensity now considered economic.* From the pcointof view of soils and climate, the area is similar to the rest of the sout;hof the Ivory Coast, with possibly heavier rainfall, and the same sort ofperennial and food crops could be grown there. However, the topography i.smore brolcen and may pose more problems in regard to mechanized or planta--tion agriculture than elsewhere.

Experience shows that immigration and settlement take place spon--taneously once the area is opened. As soon as the forest penetration roadsare built, families begin to appear along the route and the usual sequenceof rough clearance, followed by rice and food crops, followed by coffee andcocoa begins. The population and land use situation is far from static;the time during which options in this respect are open to the Governmentis limited.

3. The San Pedro protect started at the beginnin8 of 1968 at a nlacewhere there had been a fishing village of 200 people. It consists, in thefirst stage, of the construction of a new nort (auavyi breakwaters, dredcg-ing), the building of 200 km of roads linking San Pedro with the rest ofthe Ivory Coast. and provision of the basic infrastructure for a town of6,000 people.

4. The seconcl stage consists of two main parts. One is furtherdevelopment of thae town and nort. i.e. exnansinn nf thp tonwn tn 25,000inhabitants, provis:Lon of telephones and water supply, building an airport,etc.; the other is development of the interior; inrli,ing fuirthpr nrre-rProads.

5. According to present thinking, development of the interior wouldinclude the following agricultural oroiects:

(1) DeveloDment of five settlement areas; earh epnnahl ofaccommodating 10,000 - 15,000 people.

* One area "the Reserve de Tai" of about 320,000 has not yet beenallocnted in ronces,oanQ hby th-ei, 2 rr.-inmnt-

ANNEX 7Page 2

(2) Two rubber planting projects covering 20,000 - 30,000 lha.

(3) An oil palm project of about 15,000 - 20,000 ha.

(4) A coconut project of 5,000 - 10,000 ha.

(5) Development of 200,000 ha of forest on a sustain yield basis

to support a pulp and/or paper factory.

These projects are described in more detail elsewhere. Here it is suffi-

cient to say that some of these projects are still tentative, while for

others good preliminary studies have been made. However, additional studies

will be necessary for all of them before it will be possible to make firm

estimates of cost and benefits, organizational structure, methods of finan-

cing and whether or not the projects are viable.

6. So far the five settlement areas have been delimited, and in some

places soil surveys have been made. An area of about 100,000 ha has been

surveyed for possible growing of oil palm or hevea, and about 40,000 ha

have been retained as suitable. In the Nero perimeter a detailed survey

is being carried out on 10.000 ha for hevea planting. A preliminary survey

has been made along the coast for areas suitable for coconut palm planting,

and a detailed survey of this area is planned for 1970-71. Practically no

preparatory work has yet been done for the development of forest resources

for the pulp factory.

7. In addition to these agricultural projects, mention should be

made of the likelihood of opening up an iron-ore deposit some 280 km north

of San Pedro. To do this may involve building a railroad to export the

ore through San Pedro. This railroad could have a substantial impact on

agricultural develonment in the areas traversed.

8* The Governmnent expects that by 1980 there will be about 150,000

rural inhabitants in the southwest. This matches reasonably well the assumed

labor reqcuirements of the aoricultural nroiects mentioned above. as can be

seen from the following table (based on minimum size indicated):

ANNEX 7Page 3

Projects 1975 1980Number of Workers

CocoaSettlers 9,000 16,000

Oil PalmEstate, labor 500 1,250Settlers 350 900

CoconutEstate, labor 220 850Settlers 200 700

lHeveaEstate, labor 800 4.800

Sub-totalSettlers 9,550 17,600Labor 1.500 6.900

TOTAL 11.070 24.500

9. Assuming that a laborer's or settler's family has five members:;this will represent a rural population of about 55,000 in 1975 and 125,000in 1980. This does not account for the rural population that will engagremainly in food crop production to supply San Pedro.

Note: This Annex is mostly extracted from the previous report.

ANNEX 8

THE KOSSOU PROJECT

Kossou

1. The Kossou project is located in the center of the country nearYamossoukro, southwest of Bouake. It is a hydro-electric project with abarrage across the river Bandama; the reservoir will cover 174,000 ha.Work started on the barrage early in 1969; filling of the reservoir startedin the first half of 1971 and will, it is estimated, take three to fouryears to complete.

2. Although the Kossou project as such has no agricultural components,its agricultural impact will be substantial and in many directions is not:yet fully comprehended. For the time being, attention may be focussed ontwo aspects, namely the loss of production from the submerged area, and t:heneed to resettle some 20,000 - 25,000 agricultural families, or about 120,000people; other aspects such as fishery possibilities, better accessibility tosome areas, or game parks and tourism, may require more emphasis in lateryears.

3. The loss of production is not accurately known, but a very roughestimate values this at about CFAF 3 billion per year:

Hectares CFAF billion

Annual crops 35,000 1.7

Perennial crops 33,000 1.4

Total 68,000 3.1

Included in this is the loss of production of an estimated 25,000 ha ofcoffee hushes.

4. Cnnrprning the nopulntion likely to be affected; succes8ive esti-

mates have each raised the figure, but the number of 100,000 people now iLsthe generally accepted planning base. The revisions reflect partly 8ucess-

ive improvements in basic data, and partly real changes in the situationbecause people have bepn rcming back to their villages to establish a claimto whatever compensation the Government may give. A breakdown of the popu-Intinn likeiv to be afferted is as fn10nwsc

.Date by which people muist he moved

Mid-1971 Mid-1972 Mid-1973 Mid-;4Inhabitants of village sites

inundated thousands (70)Inhabitants of villages which 23 20 20 37will lose some land thousands (30)

Note: This Annex is mostly extracted from the previous report.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Rural and Urban Population; Foreign Rural Population

Table 2. Tonnage, Unit Price and Value of Output ofSome! Commercial Crops

Table 3. Development of Forest Production

Table 4. Imports of Live Animals and Meat

Table 5. Plan Objectives, Primary Sector

Table 6. Fixed Producer Prices

Table 7. Index of Pri.ces of Food consumed by African Families 1960-1969

Table 8. Plan Product:ion Targets

Table 9. Forecast Crop Areas

Table 10. Forecast Labor Requirements

Table 11. Demand Projections for Edible Meats 1966-1980

Table 12. Coff-ee Purchases, Exports and Stocks of CSSPPA

Table 13. Distribution of Coffee Area by Age Group and Yield

Table 14. Cocoa: Utilization of Inputs

Table 15. Oil Palm Program

Table 16. Coconut: SiLtuation end 1970 and Planned Plantings.

Table 1a: RURAL ANDIE UKjEA POPULATIC)N

1965 1970 1975 1980

Recorded rural population 3,151,900 3,326,500 3,h96,300 3,746,100Rural population

non-resident andnon-recorded 200,000 360,000 465,ooo 5h5000

Total rural population 3,351,9o0 3,676,500 3,961,300 4,291,100of which: permanent residents (3,050,000) (3,220,000), (3,390,000) (3,630,000)

Urban population 9h6,100 1,438,300 2,039,100 2,773,600

Total population 4,298,000 5,114,800 6,000,400 7,064,700

Table ilb: FOREIGN RURAL POFPUIATION

Employed foreign laborers 150,000 250,000 330,000 390,000Unemployed foreign laborers 50,00,0 50,000 o50,0oo 50,000

wives 45,OCK 70,000 85,0(0 100,000children 55,oco 85,000 110,000 125,000

Non-resident foreigners 300,000 455,000 575,000 665,000

Proportion recorded statistically lOCtOc 105 ,000 110 I000 120,000

Balance 2Co 0) 35o,000 465,000 545,000

Source: "Population rurale et urbaine par cI&partment et par sous-prefecture"

Working papier : Di.rection des Etudes de Diveloppernent, Ministry of Planning.

Table 2: TONNAGE, UNIT PRICE, MID VAILUE OF oUTPlDT O; SOME COMERCIIAL CROPS(in thousands of cOFAF1)

Product 19,60 196]. 1962. 196 3 ]L964 1965 '1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

CoffeeTonnage h 133,800 191,060 92,170 198,710 260,250 210,800 272,566 130,759 287,759 210i,12b4 279,610Price CFAn?/kg 98.15 88.15 73.15 73.15 80 & 90 90 75 90 90 90 5CFAF/Va:Lue 13,132 16,842 6,742 14,536 23,2:37 18,162 20,442 11,768 25,898 18,911 26,563

CocoaTonzage 62,ooo 93,6c05 80,998 103,038 98,2:19 147,529 113,2192 149,930 146,640 144,4 76 180,706Price ClFF/Ig 85 & 89 88.75 63.75 63.75 '70 70 55 70 70 70' 80CFAF/Va:Lue 5,394 8,206 5,164 6,569 6,875 10,327 6,327 10,495 10,265 10,113 14,426

Cotton (A1len AMbno)Tonnage 3,005 3,069 3,2'40 4,857 4,524 8,793 :10,316 24,586 33,293 42,306 32,390Price Cl?kF/kg 30 30 30 30 30 30/33.5 30/33.5 30/33.5 30/33.5 30/33.5 30135CFAIF/Va:Lue 90.1 92 97.2 145.8 1'35.7 282.9 341.7 814.2 1,111.3 1,417.3 1,117.7

Palm (R6gimne)Tonnage 23,660 17,713 17,938 18,,406 18,713 18,843 1L9,058 22,530 23,595 25,508 36,417Price cIFAF/kg 3.45 3.45: 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.50) 3.62 3.65 3.85 3.85CFAF/VaLue 81.6 61.1 61. 8 63. 5 64.5 61 .5 67.2 81.4 85.9 98.2 140.2

CopraTonnage 1,700 2,000 2,100 2,200 2,500 2,520 2,966 3,770 4,825 6,500 n.a.Price C]?AF/}cg 38.8 42.5 33.8 37.7 141.2 39.2 142.8 44.5 48.2 41 n.a.CF]AF/Va:Lue 66 85 71 83 10)3 99 127 158 233 267 n.a.

Proc. pineapplesTonnage 12,085 11,816 14,442 19,250 29,400 34,200 46,950 67,600 67,300 68,700 110,000Price CFAF/kg 11 11 11 11 5.5-7-7.5 5.5-7-7.15 5.5-7-7.5 5.5-7-7.5 5.5-7-7.5 5.5-7-7.5 5.5-7-7.5CFAF/Va'Lue 133 130 158.9 211,7 183.2 204.2 2B4.6 412 409 419.9 682.5

Bmanans for e:portToniage 83,ooo 90,714 119,987 140,507 1L4,430 130,784 132,508 129,565 132,467 135,558 n.a.Price CFAF/kg 23.56 21.56 19.50 21.20 24.0 21.5 :17.3 18.33 19.92 25.39 n.a.CFAF/Value 1,955 1,956 2,310 2,979 2,746 2,812 2,292 2,375 2,639 3,442 n.a

i/ Agricultural year ending S;eptember 30.Source: CSSPPA; CFDT; Gonfreville; SO]DEPALM.

Table 3: DED- TP 5IT OF t]VnPvST PPrnDTrCTION

MUM - I'M- - r -

r3calExport consunmp- Total

ti on proAuc+jonSawn wood

4D caw,- w-ood

Years Logs Sawn round-wood plus Round wood Round-woodvvuuu e'.jequivalent rGo;=u,d woodu e q ua i v '. e n tJ u.v

_ 3 - n3 m3 3 3 3

1960 848,00cl 33;,500 67,000 915,000 88,000 1,003,000

1961 1,019,000c 35,500 79,000 1,098,000 163,000 1,261,ooo

1962 1,179,00C0 45h,300 99,000 1,277,000 1)41,000 1,418,000

1963 1,445,ooo 57,800 116,000 1,561,000 199,000 1760,000

1964 1,858,ooc0 96,000 192,000 2,050,000 208,000 2,258,000

1965 1,905,00c) 15 3,200 306,4o00 2,214,000 336,000 2,550,000

1966 1,822,00c) 182,000 3614,ooo 2,186,000 414,000 2,600,0o0

1967 2,172,000c 183;,000 366,000 2,538,000 464,000 3,000,000

1968 2,620,00C0 189,875 379,750 2,999,750 450,000 3,450,0o0

1969 3,326,600i 182d,100 364,200 3,690,800 586,200 4,277,000

Source: "Dix Ans cle D6veloppement Agricole"Ministry of Agriculture

Table 4: IMPORTS OF LIVE ANIMALS AND MEAT

1_967 1968 1969 19Q70

Cattle (1000 head) 123 158 169 172

Sheep and goats (1300 head) 175 2149 300 300

Meat (tons) 1,923 1,983 1,999 1,999

Source: Ministry of Agriculture

Table 5: PLAN OBJECTIVES: VALUE ADDED OF PRIMARY SECTOR

(CFAF billion 1968/69 prices)

1965 1970 1975 1980

- Foodcrops and livestock 40.7 47.6 56.9 68.8

- Industrial and export crops 34.3 44.7 57.0 79.2

- Forestry 9.5 12.5 12.8 16.0

- Fishery 1.9 2.3 4.3 6.9

TOTAL 86.4 107.1 131.0 170.9

Annual Average Growth Rate 5X)

1965-70 1970-75 1975-80

- Foodcrops and livestock 3.1 3.7 3.9

- Industrial and export crops 5.4 5.0 6.8

- Forestry 5.7 0.4 4.6

- Fishery 4.0 13.5 ]0.1

TOTAL . L .15.5

Source: Draft Plan.

Table 6: FIXED PRODUCER PRICES (CFAF per kg.)

Coffee Cocoa Seed Paddy Improved Coconut CashewCotton oilnalm Dalm nuts(Allen) f.f.b. Copra Nuts

white Yellow

graded ungraded

CFAF per kg

1960 90 90 - -

1961 75 65 -

1962 75 65 33.50 18

1963 90 70 33.50 18

1964 90 70 33.50 18

1965 75 55 33.50 18

1966 90 70 33.50 18

1967 90 70 33.50 20

1968 90 70 33.50 20

1969 95 80 35.30 20

1969/70 95 80 35 30 20 h nc 1/ nc 1/

1970/71 105 85 4o 30 20 h 40 5 15

j Not controlled

Source: Ministry of Planning

Table 7: INDEX OF PRICES OF FOOD CONSUMED BY AFRTCAN FLMITRS -1960 - 1969

Februag 1960 100

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 I1965 1966 196 1968 1 J

lo6.5 123.0 118.7 118.3 118.9 122.4 127.6 126.6 134.8 1LI.6

1967 1968 1969 1970

January 130.8 121.9 140.1 155.9

February 127.8 137.8 141.8 155.2

March 129.4 128.5 141.2

April 131.8 131.6 148.3

May 131.6 131.8 147.7 156.4

June 131.7 130.3 158.7 169.5

July 129.3 132.8 151.6 167.7

August 126.0 140.8 141.o 168.9

September 120.0 142.7 139.6

October 118.1 134.6 140.4

November 119.5 139.9 139.2

December 123.5 145.0 1h5.5

1/ In Abidjan

Source: Bulletin Mensuel de Statistiques.

Table 8: PLAN PRODUCTION TARGETS(tons)

1965 1970 1975 1.80

Paddy 250,000 359,000 524,000 6.30,000

Millet and Sorghum 46,boo 52,000 58,000 65,ooo

Fanio 7,000 8,000 9,Q000 1?DOO

Maize 200,000 221,000 2792000 33L22t

Total 503,000 616,000 8372000 1,095,000

Yams 1,300,000 1,432,000 1,578,000 1,79D,000

Cassava ruoO0oO 562,000 635,ooo 71,000

Plantain 600,000 674,ooo 760,000 855,000

Cocoa yam 160,000 172,000 135,000 200,000

Sweet potatoes 20,000 22.000 25,000 28,000

Local peas 13,000 _15,0oo 17,000 20,000

Total 2,593,000 2,877,000 3,200,000 3,607,000

Fruits and vegetables 120,000 160,000 210,000 280,000

Essential oils 8,000 27,000 60,000

Vegetables for export - - 5,00 10,000

Cattle (carcass) 3,380 4,300 5,200 7,600

Sheep and goats (carcass) 3,760 4,160 5,800 8,hoo

Pigs (carcass) 2,660 4,100 5,800 7,50

Poultry (carcass) 6,200 10,000 16,500 23,600

Eggs (millions) 22 46 80 L314

Giame 23,000 18,000 16,000 1h,000

Coffee 213,000 240,000 260,000 305,000

Cocoa 115,000 175,000 230,000 365,000

Palm bunches (selected) 74,000 236,000 8)l,ooo 1,280,000

(natural) 255,000 264,ooo 248,000 260,000

Copra 3,500 6,400 14,000 62,000

Latex 2,900 10,750 17,000 23,000

Bananas (export) 150,000 182,500 189,000 23.6,000

(local consumption) 10,000 11,000 12,000 13,000

Pineapple (tinned) 31,600 120,000 175,000 220,000

(export) 6,4oo 15,000 40,000 ci0,00

(local consumption) 6,000 7,000 8,ooo 9,000

Cola 37,000 4o,ooo 45,o0o 50,000

Karite 2,800 3,000 3,300 3,400

Cotton (Allen) 5,500 52,000 95,000 143,000

(Mono) 6,900 3,000 1,500 -

Tobacco (industrial) 339 350 1,000 2,000

(smallholders) 2,061 3,250 3,800 4,500

Groundnuts (oil) 30,000 I5,o00O

(local consumption) 32,000 35,000 4ho,oo 47,000

Sugar cane 45o,ooo 600,000

Kenaf 500 16,000 20,000

Cashew nuts 3,000 10, 000

Avocados 200 1,000 3,000

Source: Draft P'ln,

Page 2

Table~ 8: PT.AM PpnmOTvTOTr TAl-E'PTq

1 Q96o 1970 19 09on

Fore.+ JJr (1 Mn 1m)

- logs for export 1,905 2,500 2,200 2,300e logc for lclf'&1 faect'ories 7WV0 1, 1,3wI 1 77n

Total 2 A3,50 3,50 1. ,wO

Wood for -pae pulp- - 4211 2150

Total Production 2,605 3,500 3,950 6,150

Fishery

Marine Fishery

- IndustrialTrawling L7,00U 18,00UU LU,UUU 0U0U2

Sardines 28,000 37,000 65,000 90,000Tuna 4ao 1,000 8,000 20,000

Total h44,00 56,000 93,000 130,000

- Traditional 10,000 10,000 15,000 15,000

Total 55,4oo 66,000 108,000 145,wOo

Lagoon Fishery 6,ooo 8,ooo 15,000 25,ooo

River and lake fishery 4,000 4,000 8,000 20,000

Total fishing 65,400 78,000 131,000 190,000Shrimp Fishery

Fishing 800 1,500 1,500Lagoon breeding _ 1,000 3,500

Total 800 2,500 5,000

Source: Draft Plan.

Table 9: FORECAST CROP AREAS

W7Ee if "I07n IQ7c9 198o

1. Coffee 679,680 781,000 865,000 901,500

Cocoa 423,700 487,295 578,410 635,910-o ,.Z,. LaQ ni OA Ai rA iAir)

Oil palm . OUuv

Coconut 11,100 24,435 39,605 64,105

Rubber 10,000 12,835 21,985 I1,335Cashew nut 8,000 18,000 28,000

Sub-total 1,143,080 1,381,915 1,619,61o) 1,807,460

2. Banana 7,500 7,300 6,300 6,500

Pineapple 1,0830 6,885 ll,:L61

Tobacco 8,300 9,225 11,200 13,b90

Kenaf - 5 wLU 16,0U0 20,0

Irrigated rice 8,ooo 11,000 27,000 37,C00O

Sugar cane - - 5,000 6, UV

Sub-total 25,630 34,910 76,660 yu,1.

TOTAL 1 + 2 1,168,710 1,416,825 1,696,27U 1,905,-60

3. Rainfed rice 251,000 292,000 270,000 270,()00Corn 233,000 261,000 275,000 290,000

Yarn 178,000 196,000 216,000 2 45,000

Groundnuts 46,700 54,000 82,000 105,()00

Cotton (Allen) 6,400 58,000 95,u00 1_U,0UU

TOTAL 715,100 861,000 938,000 1,0_40,_(JUU

4. Millet and sorghum 92,000 104,000 116,000 130,000W

Fonio 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000

Cassava 93,000 103,000 115,000 128,000

Sweet potato 8,900 9,800 11,200 12,6)00

Taro 70,000 75,200 80,500 88,oo0

Pea 21,800 25,100 28,600 33,5oo

Plantain 200,000 225,000 253,00o0o 28,0U

TOTAL 568,700 588,100 637,600 97,100

Source: D:raft Plan.

TaLble 10: FOIECAST LBOR REQIUIREMENTS(Thousand man days)

1965 1970 1975 F .190F, S. F. ',. F. S. F. S.

Labor requirements 156,8CO 76,100 18i7,10() 86 ,100 213,200 103,00O 238,900 121,200

Labor available in theresident rural 14i5,20o 93,90C) l57,20(o 95 ,400 :L74;500 90,600 198,300 85,400population

Deficit 11,6c0 2'1 9,90 38,700 12,400 40,60 35, 800

Surplus 17',80C) 9,300

S.ource: D;raft Plan.

F = Forest

S Savannah

Table 11: SUPPLY DEAND PROJECTIONS FOR EDIBLE MEATS - 1966 TO 1980 - (IETFR1C TONS)

Surplus PrDducers ____Deficit ProducersYeaLr Upper Miger Mali Northern S Tot vory Ghana Dahomey Togo Southern SuToa Toa

Volta Nigeria Coast Nigeria

Projected Aggregate Cons,umption of iEdib:1e Meats

1966 42,j710 60,215 95,000 :184,1460 38:2,385 143,270 33,346 17,551 11,411 166,231 27I1.8o9 6514, 9bi1970 46',520 614,1475 1O:L,LOO 207,:115 L19,510 57,528 142,300 20,730 13,923 209,050 3143,531 763,0111975 53,250 77,090 11L,200 239,4195 48-1,035 31,925 71,700 26,120 17,670 271,480 1468, 895 949,930198S0 67,6Lo0 95,500 12:3,700) 2776,9395 563,8335 108,090 99,500 32,800 22,300 356,430 619,12o0 1,182,955

% I:ncr. 58% 59% 30% 50% 47Z 150% 198% 87% 95% 108% 124% 57%

Pro;jected Annual Produc-tion of Livestock (Total)

1966 57,300 100,400 12:L,600 2:18,300 497,600 11,000 16,:i1 16,5oo 9,800 6o,ooo 1059,900( 607,500197'0 63,200 o108,6oo 136,100 235,800 543,700 :12,500 21,700 17,700 10,400 84,500 146,58o0) 690,500197'5 71,000 119,700 157,200 260,500 608,400 .15,200 31,BOO 22,000 13,100 109,000 187,300 795,70019,80 80, 700 130,600 180,70o 289,1o0 681,0oo :18,770 36,500 27,100 16,100 141,100 239,500) 920,600

41% 30% 49% 32% 37% 71% 127% 614% 655 135% 118% 52%

Quantities of Meat Available fo: Export

1966 114,645 40,165 26,630) 33,975 115,415 (34,685) (17,811) (2,016) (2,296)(101,876) (158,6814) (43,269)197'0 16,660 39,710 314,700 29,810 120,880 (145,000) (20,800) (3,100) (3,500)(1214,5oo) (196,90)) (76,020)L97'5 17,760 39,960 45,8 0 :21,y930 125,450 (66,830) (33,700) (4,200) (4,600)(162,b00) (271,70() ( '56,350)

1980 13,C)20 35,o060 57,000 :;2,6680 117,760 (89,700) (63,000) (5,600) (6,200)(215, 000) (379,800) (262,040)

Source: "S;upplying- Middle-West Africa with Meat" (FAC 196B)

Tabe1 12: Cf'O7F77: PURCHASES, EYPORTS MflD STOCKSOF CSSPPA (tons)

CROP YEAR PURCHASES EXPORTS STOCKS-

1958/59 54,220

1959/60 136,620 131,166 50,800

1960/61 191,o80 157,99h 80,920

1961/62 92,071 160,015 9,070

1962/63 194,639 157,384 39,870

1963/64 260,698 214h5h3 81,850

1964/65 202,105 160,511 120,520

1965/66 272,566 177,37h 210,h82

1966/67 130,759 165,116 113,424

1967/68 287,760 197,960 95,575

1968/69 210,124 176,743 84,752

1969/70 279,610 187,341 164,000

'/sdor Septeu.ber

Vote: For a complete plictlre,infnrmation would also be necessarv

on losses and other utilization besides exports. Crop yearstarts 1st October.

Source: Information provided by CSSPA.

Table 13: DISTRIBUTION OF COFFEE AREA BYARE GROUP AND ylDjj TIN 1Q,Q/7n

Age Group; Area Estimated yield1'

Less than 3 years 60,000 -

3-4 years 30,200 300

5-9 years 86,hoo 370

10-14 years 239,100 475

15-19 years 182,500 .440

20-25 years 113,800 430

More than 26 years 68,ooo 330

Total 780,000 Average 390

Zl Quoted in National Coffee Plan

Source: Draft Plan.

Table 14L: 4cCOA: TIrIJZATION OIF INPUT FACTORS

1961 1962 1963 1964 19 65 1966 967 1968 1969

Fertilizer (tons) 1)46 380 2,227 1,233 2,hlO 1,850 1,h77 1,501 1,285

Lindans (Liters) 45,0C 49,,200 143,',80 266,0:L4 396,699 921,115 356,128 375,426 3h8,o8e

Lindans (powder) 49,,200 83,000 105,0D 108,000 64,140 58,525 33,850

Sprayers 45o 414 860 1,350 1,956 2,406 2,112 1,6,62 1,299

Source: Dix Axns cle Diveloppernent Agricole, Ministry of Agriculture.

Table 15: OIL PALM PROGRAM

(Hectares plantedat year end)

SODEPALN 1968 1970 * 19-15 * 1980 *

Industrial Blocks 27,380 36,890 47,210 67,210

Village Plantations 12,460 20,460 38,120 58,120

SUBTCTAL 39,840 57,350 85,330 125,330

Private Pl.antations 10,470 11,000 11,280 11,280

TOTAL PLANTATIONS: 50.310 68.350 96.610 136.610

* Planned.

Source! SODEPALM. Working nanersg.

Table 16: COCONUT: SITUATION END 1970ANID P1F'.MrD PLA- INGS -rLu7S 17f0-'7 1980

(in hectares)

Situation end 1970

Peasant Plantations 18,000SODEPALM Village Plantations 2,600

Industrial Plantation 4,700

TOTAL ivory Coast 25.300

Targets for 1980

Peasant Plantations 18,000SODEPALM Industrial Plantations 26,000

Village Plantations 37,000

TOTAL 81,000

Source: SODEPAIM, "Working papers.