document of the world bank...document of the world bank report no: icr00003584 implementation...

Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003584

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-46480)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 42.2 MILLION (US$65.54 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN

FOR A

FERGHANA VALLEY WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PHASE-I PROJECT

May 16, 2017

Water Global Practice Europe and Central Asia Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective January 19, 2017)

Currency Unit = Uzbek Som (UZS)

UZS 1.00 = US$0.0003 US$1.00 = UZS 3,250

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AMC Administration of Main Canals BISA Basin Irrigation System Authority CPS Country Partnership Strategy CFP Country Financing Parameters CPF Country Partnership Framework DP Demonstration Plot EFA Economic and Financial Analysis EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return EMP Environmental Assessment and Management Plan FIRR Financial Internal Rate of Return FM Financial Management FV Ferghana Valley FVP Ferghana Valley Program FVWRMP-I Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Phase-I FWOP Future Without Project FWP Future With Project GDP Gross Domestic Product GOU Government of Uzbekistan GWL Groundwater Level GWM Groundwater Mineralization HGAE Hydrogeology and Amelioration Expedition I&D Irrigation and Drainage ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IP Implementation Progress M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MAWR Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources ME Ministry of Economy MFERIT Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Investment, and Trade MTR Midterm Review NPV Net Present Value O&M Operations and Maintenance

PAD Project Appraisal Document PAP Project-Affected Person PDO Project Development Objective PIU Project Implementation Unit PSD Pump Station Department PY Project Year RAP Resettlement Action Plan RF Results Framework RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SCNP State Committee for Nature Protection SHD Surface Horizontal Drainage SSL Soil Salinity Level TTL Task Team Leader UNDP United Nations Development Programme VDW Vertical Drainage Well WCA Water Consumer Association

Senior Global Practice Director: Guangzhe Chen

Sector Manager: Michael Haney

Project Team Leader: IJsbrand H. de Jong

ICR Team Leader: Talimjan Urazov

COUNTRY Project Name

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................................. 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................................... 12 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................................... 19 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................................... 19 6. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................................ 21 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ........................... 22 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................................... 23 Annex 2. Outputs by Component.................................................................................................. 25 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................................. 29 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............................. 33 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................................... 35 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................................... 39 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................................... 40 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................................... 42 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................................... 43 MAP .............................................................................................................................................. 45

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A. Basic Information

Country: Uzbekistan Project Name: Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Phase-I Project

Project ID: P110538 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-46480

ICR Date: 03/20/2017 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 42.20M Disbursed Amount: XDR 33.76M

Revised Amount: XDR 37.30M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 01/24/2006 Effectiveness: 03/03/2010 03/03/2010

Appraisal: 06/22/2009 Restructuring(s): 04/30/2015 12/28/2015 07/27/2016

Approval: 09/24/2009 Mid-term Review: 10/01/2013 11/11/2013

Closing: 07/31/2016 12/31/2016 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance:


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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments (if

any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:


D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Major Sector/Sector

Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry

Irrigation and Drainage 89 89

Public Administration

Public administration - Agriculture, fishing and forestry 11 11

Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme

Environment and Natural Resource Management

Environmental policies and institutions 5 5

Renewable Natural Resources Asset Management 1 1

Biodiversity 1 1

Landscape Management 1 1

Water Resource Management 63 63

Water Institutions, Policies and Reform 63 63

Finance

Finance for Development 1 1

Agriculture Finance 1 1

Urban and Rural Development

Rural Development 27 27

Land Administration and Management 1 1

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 27 27

Rural Markets 1 1 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Cyril E Muller Shigeo Katsu

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Country Director: Lilia Burunciuc Motoo Konishi

Practice Manager/Manager: Michael Haney Peter D. Thomson

Project Team Leader: IJsbrand Harko de Jong Mahwash Wasiq

ICR Team Leader: Talimjan Urazov

ICR Primary Author: Talimjan Urazov F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project is to improve agricultural production in areas affected by water-logging, and to reduce damage to housing and infrastructure from rising ground water levels and salinity in the Project Districts. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) Project Development Objective was not revised. (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Increased crop yields for major crops

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

Cotton 2.4 tons per ha; Wheat 3.5 tons per ha; Vineyards 12.5 tons per ha; Fruits at private farms 3.0 tons per ha; Fruits at dekhans 6.0 tons per ha; Vegetables 20.0 tons per ha;

Increase of 40+%

-

Cotton 2.7 tons per ha (+11.2%); Wheat 5.8 tons per ha (+65.7%); Vineyards 28.1 tons per ha (+124.8%); Fruits at private farms 11.5 tons per ha (+283.3%); Fruits at dekhans 24.7 tons per ha (+311.7%); Vegetables 34.7 tons per ha (+73.5%)

Date achieved 03/03/2010 03/03/2010 04/30/2015 12/31/2016 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Targets achieved for most of crops, particularly for fruits and vegetables (non mandatory crops), reporting on which is more accurate.

Indicator 2 : Decreased groundwater level (GWL) (meters below surface)


1.5% of area has GWL < 1.0 m; 18% of area has GWL between 1.0 m and 1.5 m; 43.5% of area has

0.1% of area has GWL < 1.0 m; 9 % of area has GWL between 1.0 m and

0.1% of area has GWL < 1.0 m; 7% of area has GWL

0.0% of area has GWL < 1.0 m; 7.7% of area has GWL between 1.0 and 1.5

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GWL at a level more than 1.5 m but less than 2.0 m

1.5 m; 50% of area has GWL at a level more than 1.5 m but less than 2.0 m

between 1.0 and 1.5 m; 52.5% of area has GWL at a level more than 1.5 m but less than 2.0 m

m; 33.1% of area has GWL at a level more than 1.5 m but less than 2.0 m


Target values for this indicator are achieved in all ranges.

Indicator 3 : Reduced flooded settlement areas


67.4% of settlement areas are flooded

6%

0%

13.1%


Target is 80 percent achieved. Some margin of error is possible due to the fact that measurement is done through survey.

Indicator 4 : Decreased area with high ground water mineralization (GWM)


Non-saline - 38.2% of all area Low saline 51.37% of all area Mid-saline 10.27% of all area High saline 0.1% of all area

-

Non-saline - 42% of all area; Low saline - 57% of all area; Mid-saline - 0.99% of all area High saline 0.01% of all area

Non-saline - 41.5% of all area; Low saline - 57.7% of all area; Mid-saline - 0.7% of all area; High saline - 0.0% of all area


This is a new indicator that was added after project restructuring. Target was achieved.

Indicator 5 : Direct project beneficiaries, including female beneficiaries


0

0

535,000, of which 30% are female

583,300, of which 49% are female


This is a new indicator that was added during restructuring. Target is achieved.

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(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target

Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Client-days of training provided

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0

0

135

141


This is a new indicator that was added during project restructuring. Target is achieved.

Indicator 2 : Client-days of training provided for female beneficiaries


0

0

Target was not set

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This is a new indicator that was added during project restructuring. No specific target was set. About 10 percent of all client-days provided were for female beneficiaries.

Indicator 3 : Land users adopting sustainable land management practices as a result of the project


0

1,000

1,000

796 adopted out of 1,953 trained

Date achieved 03/03/2010 03/03/2010 04/30/2015 12/31/2016

Comments (incl. % achievement)

This indicator was re-worded during restructuring. Previously it was worded as "Adopt new improvement practices in sustainable agriculture and improved water resource management by farmers." Target was 79 percent achieved.

Indicator 4 : Length of irrigation canals and drains rehabilitated and functional (km)


0

3,400

1,394

1,394


Target was revised downward during restructuring. Revised target achieved.

Indicator 5 : Increase use and discharge in quantity of drainage water m3/sec


7.00

13.00

-

-

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This indicator was dropped, as quantity of water discharged varied throughout the year and could not indicate drainage system efficiency

Indicator 6 : Decrease of groundwater table (m) and gradual reclamation of 1,180 ha of water-logged area (ha)


0.00

0.00

-

-


This indicator was dropped, as it became repetitious to the “Decreased groundwater level” indicator that covered project districts of 28,000 ha

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual Disbursements

(USD millions) 1 04/28/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 01/31/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.35 3 10/07/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.32 4 06/25/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 12.51 5 02/08/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 19.35 6 06/28/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 24.84 7 12/29/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 29.35 8 06/28/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 34.08 9 12/29/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 41.05

10 06/24/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 44.07 11 10/28/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 47.15 12 05/16/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 49.63 13 07/26/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 49.72 14 12/23/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 50.60

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved PDO

Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

04/30/2015 N MS MS 42.85

This restructuring was done to formalize the agreement that was made during the MTR to address inconsistencies and discrepancies in the project's RF.

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Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved PDO

Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

12/28/2015 N MS MU 47.27

This restructuring was done to allow a small reallocation of funds from unallocated category to 'Cash Compensation and Other Assistance'.

07/27/2016 N MS MS 49.72

This restructuring was done to allow a five-month extension of the project closing date.

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) had followed a gradual approach to economic reform to minimize the social costs of transition. Market-oriented reforms have been slow and have focused on a few areas, particularly current account convertibility, adjustment of energy services, privatization through leaseholding of collective farms, gradual improvement in business environment, and modernization of the Treasury.

2. At the time of project appraisal in 2009, agriculture constituted 32 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and was Uzbekistan’s major source of employment and income. Sixty-four percent of citizens lived in rural areas and had livelihoods dependent on agriculture and related subsectors. Furthermore, as a result of the country’s arid climate, almost all agriculture depended on irrigation and drainage (I&D) infrastructure. The irrigated areas were located in the valleys and plateaus near the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, and covered about 4 million ha. Of this, more than 25 percent is within the Ferghana Valley (FV), a region shared among Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan.

3. While the FV had abundant surface water resources and large quantities of good- quality groundwater resources, the FV lacked drainage facilities. Therefore, the area suffered from water-logging and soil salinization. Both of these constrained agricultural production, degraded the environment, and damaged housing and public infrastructure. Soil degradation, low water-use efficiency, over-irrigation, weak infrastructure and institutions, and a lack of farmers’ incentives were the main factors impeding the productivity and sustainability of irrigated agriculture in the area and these factors tended to reinforce each other.

4. In Uzbekistan, shallow groundwater levels (GWLs) had developed in a cumulative process as a consequence of long-term underinvestment in drainage infrastructure in irrigated areas and over-irrigation. In turn, upper layers of soil have become salinized through capillary action, accumulating a heavy load of salt that threatens agricultural productivity and the environment. This process had operated with particular severity in the FV, where recent deterioration of the drainage system, combined with the area being naturally swampy before its conversion by the Soviets into irrigated areas, had caused water-logging in most areas. Some areas have developed standing water as a result; elsewhere, shallow GWLs cause flooding in settlement areas, damaging houses and infrastructure.

5. The World Bank was well positioned to support the GOU in addressing the issue of water-logging given its experience working in the water sector in Central Asia. Since the early 1990s, the World Bank has provided leadership in the water sector in the Central Asia region through the Aral Sea Program and other programs for I&D systems rehabilitation and environmental management. The Drainage, Irrigation, and Wetlands Improvement Project, one of the largest World Bank investments in Uzbekistan at a time, was supporting major works to improve drainage and environmental conditions in South Karakalpakstan, the region adjacent to the Aral Sea. The World Bank has also played a significant role in the development of the Ferghana

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Valley Program (FVP), which was active in all three countries of the FV (Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan).

6. The GOU recognized the World Bank’s technical excellence in the water sector and had requested the latter’s involvement in preparing and supervising the proposed investment because it allowed more productive transfer of knowledge and skills than through analytical work alone. More important, the World Bank’s support was essential for enhancing Uzbekistan’s capacity in I&D management and for strengthening the managerial and financial capabilities of water management institutions to plan and implement large and complex infrastructure projects. The proposed investment represented the first phase of program implementation in the territory of Uzbekistan, and was designed to address the severe drainage and water-logging problems in the most affected area of the FV.

7. The ultimate objective, achievement of which the project was designed to contribute to, was supporting key priorities of Uzbekistan’s Welfare Improvement Strategy, developed jointly with the GOU and discussed with the Board in January 2008. Those priorities include poverty reduction and improvement of the living standards of the population, protection of the environment, and provision of I&D services. Specifically, the project, being a part of the FVP, was supposed to (a) improve integrated water resources management and provide models for other parts of the FV and for other I&D systems in Uzbekistan; (b) increase the supply of irrigation water during summer when demands are the highest downstream; and (c) strengthen water resources management institutions and build their capacities for improving water-use efficiency and implementing investments in I&D systems. Further, the project sought to contribute to achieving the broader goal of poverty reduction through increased productivity and incomes of small and marginal landholders and increased employment for the rural population in the FV.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

8. The PDO was to improve agricultural production in areas affected by water-logging, and to reduce damage to housing and infrastructure from rising groundwater levels and salinity in the project districts. The objective was planned to be achieved through the rehabilitation of the I&D system and through institutional capacity building in sustainable water resources management and agricultural production.

9. The following were the project’s original outcome indicators:

Decreased groundwater level (GWL) Increased crop yields for major crops Reduced flooded settlement areas

10. The following were the project’s original output indicators:

Length of irrigation canals and drains rehabilitated (km) Increase use and discharge in quantity of drainage water m3/sec Decrease of groundwater table (m) and gradual reclamation of 1,180 ha of water-

logged area (ha)

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Number of staff from public institutions and farmers trained in sustainable agriculture and improved water resource management practices

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

11. The PDO remained relevant throughout implementation and it was not changed. Along with this, during the Midterm Review (MTR), a need to revise the Results Framework (RF) was brought up and eventually, some key indicators were revised during the first restructuring in April 2015 to address inconsistencies and discrepancies in the project’s RF. Some of the revisions were needed to improve the precision of the original baseline and target values in response to the stronger database that the project had access to, following the completion of the Baseline Survey and strengthening of the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. Other revisions were required to clarify the definition of indicators and improve methodology for the monitoring of certain indicators. Finally, the restructuring was seen as an opportunity to bring the RF in line with the World Bank's corporate requirements by incorporating several core indicators (listed in the following paragraph), which were not formally integrated in the Financing Agreements, but have been monitored since the start of the project.

12. The following modifications were made to the project outcome and intermediate outcome indicators:

Reduced flooded settlement areas - The baseline value was revised up to 67.4 percent from 30 percent based on the findings of the Baseline Survey;

Direct project beneficiaries including female beneficiaries (number) - Introduced as a core indicator to fulfil the corporate requirement of being a gender-informed project;

Decreased groundwater level - Mode of measurement was changed from meters to percentage as the baseline study showed that only 19 percent of land in the project districts has a GWL depth of 1.5 m or less, which was the original baseline in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD);

Decreased area with high groundwater mineralization - Introduced to measure the level of water mineralization;

Increase use and discharge in quantity of drainage water m3/sec - Dropped, as quantity of water discharged varied throughout the year and could not indicate drainage system efficiency;

Client-days of training provided, of which for females (number) - Introduced as a newly added core corporate indicator to measure the gender aspect of the project;

Number of staff from public institutions and farmers trained in sustainable agriculture and improved water resource management practices - Re-worded as “Land users adopting sustainable land management practices as a result of the project” to better correspond to a corporate core indicator;

Decreased groundwater table (m) and gradual reclamation of 1,180 ha of waterlogged area (ha) - Dropped, as it was repetitious of the “Decreased groundwater level” indicator that covered project districts of 28,000 ha;

Length of irrigation canals and drains rehabilitated and functional (km) - End target reduced to 1,349 km from 3,400 km as it was found that the original total amount referred to the substantial volume of inter-farm and on-farm earth canals that were

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proposed in the Feasibility Study but were in satisfactory condition; the final project design had a significantly smaller number of works on concrete canals, which were in worse conditions and costlier to repair but less length, however that was not properly reflected in the RF.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

13. Although the PAD did not explicitly discuss a specific group of beneficiaries, ordinary inhabitants of three rayons in the Ferghana region covered by the project, namely Rishtan, Bagdad, and Altyarik, with a total population of about 583,300 people, were the main beneficiaries. They benefited from the lower GWL and as a result of that, from better living conditions. Individual farmers in those rayons also benefited from the improved soil quality and increased agricultural productivity. About 2,000 people including individual farmers, members of Water Consumer Associations (WCAs), personnel of different Government organizations, and so on, benefited from the training sessions organized by the project. Other beneficiaries included public water management institutions including the Basin Irrigation System Authorities (BISA), Administration of Main Canals (AMC), Pump Station Department (PSD), state water laboratories, and staff in the Hydrogeology and Amelioration Expedition (HGAE). These institutions and their members benefited from training sessions and purchased equipment. Others include a number of farmers who provided their land for organizing demonstration plots (DPs) and installation of drip irrigation facilities. The project also provided business opportunities to local consulting companies and suppliers that gained the unique experience of participating in an international project which in turn allowed them to enhance their capacity and expand their business.

1.5 Original Components (total project cost US$81.85 million1: IDA US$65.54 million, GOU US$16.31 million2)

Component A: Improvement of Irrigation and Drainage Network (total cost US$71.6 million)

14. This component sought to address the problem of high GWLs by financing improvements in surface I&D network as well as installation of subsurface horizontal drainage wells and vertical drainage wells (VDWs). The component included the following main activities: (a) improvement of irrigation network; (b) improvement of surface drainage network; (c) improvement of vertical drainage network and groundwater development and management in the field and in settlements, including improvements to the dilapidated drainage system in Rishtan town; (d) investments in nature protection according to the Environmental Management Plan; (e) cash compensation and other forms of assistance, including provision of alternative plots, for 37 individual leasehold farms affected by the construction of new, open interceptor drains and loss of crops and trees, and other farms identified during implementation, in accordance with the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) and Specific Resettlement Action Plan (RAP); and (f) consultancy services for the engineering designs, construction supervision, and contract management of works to be carried out by an international consulting firm.

1 Including contingencies. 2 Cofinancing from the GOU-included tax and customs payments as well as various fees related to the IDA Credit.

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Component B: Institutional Strengthening and Agricultural Development Support (total cost US$6.1 million)

15. This component sought to finance institutional strengthening support to public institutions and private farmers’ organizations involved in water management and utilization. The support included supply of operations and maintenance (O&M), laboratory, information technology, and office equipment and training and study tours. Main activities included the following: (a) institutional strengthening of public institutions through provision of training to regional and local staff of water management institutions as well as institutional strengthening and training support to the oblast and rayon offices of the State Committee for Nature Protection for environmental management and monitoring with respect to the I&D systems; (b) dissemination of modern agricultural and water management practices to members of the Water Consumers Associations (WCAs) and small dekhan farmers through provision of training and establishment and operation of field DPs, including pilot drip irrigation, on-farm water management, and integrated pest management; and (c) provision of technical assistance for drafting a new Water Code and the legislation and regulations related to WCAs establishment and operations.

Component C: Project Management and Audit, and Monitoring and Evaluation of Project Impact (total cost US$4.5 million)

16. This component sought to support strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR) and the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) for project management and M&E through the provision of goods, consultant services, including project audit, and training, and financing of operating costs. This component also sought to finance operational expenditures of the PIU in Tashkent and Rishtan; provision of consultancy services for project management, M&E of project impacts, and services of independent auditors for auditing of project accounts; and provision of equipment and goods for overall project management. It also planned to finance technical assistance for the preparation of future priority projects in the water resources management sector.

1.6 Revised Components

17. No formal revision of the components’ structure was made. Modification of intermediate outcome indicators explained earlier was done without changes in component activities.

1.7 Other significant changes

18. Apart from modification of the RF, there were some changes related to the structure of construction works and schedule of the implementation of construction works. Most of the changes were done at the stage of project detailed design and were technical in nature, such as the following: (a) replacement of rehabilitation of earth irrigation canals with new concrete canals; (b) cancellation of rehabilitation of some collectors because of their acceptable condition; and (c) construction of 1411 pressure wells that were not included in the original project design. The schedule of implementation of some types of construction works was changed as well. In some cases, this was done to minimize the impact of construction works on famers’ crops. For example, construction of surface horizontal drainage (SHD) works was rescheduled in accordance with

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wheat harvest time. Some activities were delayed for various reasons (discussed in section 2.2), which affected the overall implementation schedule. An activity from Component B, specifically, the provision of technical assistance for drafting a new Water Code and the legislation and regulations related to WCA establishment and operations, was not financed by the project. This is because, in 2010, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided technical assistance to support the GOU in improving the national water legislation and the WCA regulation. The draft Water Code was developed from 2010 to 2013 by an interagency group comprising 16 ministries and agencies. At the moment, the document is ready and is expected to be submitted to the Parliament. Also, there were important changes in the resettlement impact under Component A, as, by the end of the project, 467 farmers were affected against only 37 project-affected persons (PAPs) that were identified initially. Finally, a decision was made to extend the project for five months until December 31, 2016, to complete outstanding rehabilitation works during the construction season.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

19. The project was strategically relevant, and the technical justification was comprehensive. A thorough economic and financial analysis (EFA) estimated an economic rate of return of 29.3 percent with a net present value (NPV) of UZS 127.8 billion and a benefit-cost ratio of 2.5:1. These estimates assumed both higher crop yields and increased cropping intensity resulting from the better drainage as well as mitigation of the extensive damage to housing and infrastructure and the cost of subsequent rehabilitation and repair that result from inundation and flooding. An extensive two-phase process of social assessment and an environmental review were also conducted, helping to identify potential risks and challenges. The project design was based on a thorough analysis of the latest sector studies and consideration of important lessons learned from the World Bank’s experience in the I&D sector in Uzbekistan and other countries (Mexico, India, Kazakhstan, and so on) as well as from other donors, including the European Union-UNDP Enhancement of Living Standards Program.

20. The PAD identified a broad set of lessons learned in other operations that were used to design project activities. The project was prepared in close collaboration with several Government agencies and civil society that represented local communities which were suffering from existing drainage issues. Several alternatives were considered and rejected after careful consideration. The institutional arrangements were thought through, with the primary responsibility for implementation being assigned to the PIU, which is functioning as part of the MAWR, including fiduciary responsibilities such as financial management (FM) and procurement. Within the MAWR, the Deputy Minister in charge of the irrigation sector acted as the Project Head and had overall responsibility for the project. An additional Project Office was established in Rishtan to manage field activities and collaborate with local authorities and project beneficiaries. Coordination among different Government agencies including different ministries, oblast authorities, and basin administrations were ensured by the Project Steering Committee that also provided policy guidance and monitored project progress. Activities that required specialized skills like M&E and technical supervision were to be outsourced to qualified consulting companies on a competitive basis.

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21. The project was closely aligned with the Government’s own strategies and priorities and, consequently, enjoyed strong Government support. The project was critical to ensure that integrated water resources management in the Syr Darya Basin reflects national priorities as it is a part of the FVP. Specifically, the project aimed to contribute to the development of agricultural services, improvement of public service provision in I&D, and improvement of environment—all items that were high in the GOU agenda.

22. The identification of critical risks was comprehensive at appraisal and included reasonable corresponding mitigation measures. Overall, project risks were rated Substantial with High rating assigned only to the complicated and non-transparent domestic procedures and low capacity of local contractors that indeed materialized later on. Most of other risks were regarded as Moderate and mitigation measures that were identified were sufficient to eliminate any negative impact on project implementation.

2.2 Implementation

23. Severity of the water-logging problem in the project districts had risen to a level that significantly affected the quality of life of its residents and could not be further ignored. Inundation and flooding in urban areas became widespread, and local authorities started to receive large numbers of complaints from inhabitants. So any delay in resolving the issue could threaten social stability. The Government at the national level felt the pressure from the region and actively supported project implementation by various means, including administrative leverage when/if necessary as explained in detail in the following paragraphs. Strong Government support facilitated prompt clearances of the project’s Financing Agreement and annual budgets as well as the successful completion of most of the project activities.

24. Nonetheless, even with a strong support from the Government, the project could not avoid significant delays in implementation of some activities. These delays were caused by a systemic reason that affected projects across the portfolio—it was the long registration of contracts by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Investment, and Trade (MFERIT). MFERIT is mandated to scrutinize every contract with a nonresident to prevent contract excessive amount. MFERIT’s review terms are not transparent and most big contracts across the entire portfolio including this project suffered many months of delays in registration. In fact, registrations by MFERIT were completed only after direct intervention by the Ministry of Economy (ME). Although the Country Partnership Strategy for FY2012–15 emphasized the need to work closely with MFERIT and the ME to reduce contract clearance time, progress on resolving this issue is still limited.

25. Procurement packaging for the project was relatively straightforward with one big contract (ICB-1) covering 65 percent and a few other big contracts covering another 25 percent of the project total cost. This allowed less time to be spent on procurement procedures but made project implementation progress (IP) dependent on the performance of a few contractors. Overall, the project IP rating reflected progress on ICB-1 and other big contracts, and their successful completion defined the project outcome. In retrospect, this approach proved to be effective because despite delays in clearances and implementation issues, the performance management of a large number of smaller contracts would have been extremely challenging.

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26. The ICB-1 contract being the biggest in the project was very critical for the project’s success. It was closely monitored by the GOU and the World Bank, which eventually ensured its successful completion. Still, civil works under the project were notably delayed because of several factors. Besides the initial delay related to the clearance in MFERIT, the contract was hampered by a long customs clearance of some heavy equipment that the contractor needed to bring into the country. Because the equipment was exempt from customs duties, its clearance needed to pass a certain administrative procedure that the contractor failed to observe in full. The issue was resolved after more than half-a-year delay when the GOU exercised its administrative leverage in view of the contract urgency and importance. In some cases, works were postponed due to the seasonality to allow farmers to complete their field works. Despite all delays, successful completion of the ICB-1 contract brought the major benefit of lowered GWL across the project districts.

27. Implementation of two other international competitive bidding (ICB) contracts (ICB-2 and ICB-3) for rehabilitation of the on-farm and inter-farm irrigation networks experienced more serious delays and actually were terminated at project closure for not fully completing the works that were originally planned. The ICB-2 contract that covered rehabilitation of the on-farm irrigation network failed because of apparent financial difficulties and legal procedures faced by the contractor in relation to another contract. Dire financial conditions of the contractor were concealed at the bidding stage by a partnership with a foreign company that had withdrawn from the contract later on. The contractor’s capacity to mobilize was severely hampered and eventually only about 50 percent of the originally planned facilities were rehabilitated. Under the ICB-3 contract, rehabilitation of the inter-farm irrigation network was planned. The contractor showed low responsiveness upon contract signing and procrastinated contract execution until the last year of the project for reasons not clearly spelled out. Finally, the contractor managed to mobilize and complete some amount of work. Fortunately, the effect of their nonperformance on the project outcome did not prove to be so significant as the on-farm irrigation network rehabilitation was partly fulfilled by farmers with their own means and, in many cases, was not urgent, so could be included in the follow-up project or planned for rehabilitation by the Government’s own resources. Still, these issues made project results in rehabilitating irrigation network to be below its potential.

28. Despite major delays in implementation of the ICB-2 and ICB-3 contracts, the GOU was not willing to terminate them even though the World Bank team was strongly advising to do so. It is partly explained by reputational considerations in the Government and a belief that issues with local contractors could be certainly resolved. Therefore, the MAWR was always convinced that works under the contracts would eventually catch up if more time and administrative support was given. It should be noted that the MAWR was indeed active in the behind-the-scene discussions with contractors and their stakeholders, yet there was an excessive reliance on the administrative command approach rather than market-based tools. Apart from that, there were procedural difficulties that discouraged termination, including a legal uncertainty of a possibility to recover the advance payment and an alleged need to carry out a project restructuring that would require a long justification to be presented at a very high level.

29. An MTR of the project was done in November 2013 that summarized progress to the MTR date and identified actions that were needed to rectify various deficiencies in implementation of contracts and safeguards measures. An important recommendation to update the RF was made during the MTR, including revision of the methodology for monitoring

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of certain indicators, clarification of the definition of indicators, and adjustment of the baseline and target values.

30. The project was formally restructured three times in 2015–16. All of them were Level 2 restructurings and did not involve revision of activities or change in component structure. The first restructuring was done in April 2015 to formalize agreement that was made during the MTR to address inconsistencies and discrepancies in the project’s RF. Delay in processing was caused by a late arrival of the formal request from counterparts because of lengthy procedures within the Government, which required approvals from all involved ministries and agencies. The second restructuring was done in December 2015 to allow a small reallocation of funds from the unallocated category to ‘Cash Compensation and Other Assistance’. The third restructuring was done in July 2016 to allow a five-month extension of the closing date for completion of activities under the ICB-3 contract. As the World Bank team and PIU observed a good progress in implementation of the ICB-3 contract, a few months’ extension until the end of the construction season to maximize project benefits for farmers’ community seemed to be justified. The extension somewhat improved project disbursement indicators and added to the satisfaction of project beneficiaries.

31. During project implementation, the GOU initiated several waves of ambitious agrarian reforms that involved farm restructuring and redistribution of agricultural land. Reforms undoubtedly affected results of the project activities under Component B: Institutional Strengthening and Agricultural Development Support. At first, reforms aimed at the consolidation of farms to eliminate inefficient entities but the second wave of reforms meant either increase or decrease in farm’s land area as decided by farmers or local authorities. The third wave of reform tried to regulate this process at the national level. Changes in farm structure disrupted stability in farm production and mixed up WCA composition, changing the number of their members. The net effect is difficult to assess as in some cases trainees that worked in the WCA had to change their profile; however, there was some beneficial effect as well because of greater flexibility that reforms brought to crop production. It allowed application of knowledge gained during trainings and maximized benefits brought by the lowered GWL by diversifying into orchards and vineyards.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

32. The RF and M&E design were relatively simple and straightforward. This partly reflected the project’s component structure, yet it did not aim to capture all outputs of the various activities that were implemented within the components, particularly Component A. That seemed to be not feasible anyway, as, in many cases, exact technical solutions and detailed design were done after the Feasibility Study approval and some of the assumptions that were made earlier during preparation, especially with regard to the on-farm irrigation infrastructure condition, proved to be incorrect or were overtaken by farmers’ own efforts. Although it sounded significant in the project objective, there were no direct indicators to assess “reduction in damage to housing and infrastructure”; rather, it was assumed that the decreasing GWL would lead to such a reduction. This was expected to be confirmed by a survey of households in settlement areas, which, in general, seemed to be a good proxy measure that allowed to avoid expensive alternatives. Apart from that, in some cases, methodology for data collection was not clearly explained and numeric targets for some activities, notably length of canals to be rehabilitated, were not updated, which was questioned later during project implementation. Lack of availability of monitoring facilities

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did not allow the monitoring of some good indicators that could show a huge positive environmental impact of the project, including increase in total water outflow from the project districts.

33. The M&E of the implementation of the project was outsourced to a consortium of consulting companies with local and international experience. This arrangement proved to be effective in pursuing data collection and analysis. A comprehensive Baseline Survey was conducted upon project launch and continuous effort was made to keep monitoring results up to date. The M&E consultants were active in discussion of the RF design and made a number of suggestions to improve the RF that were incorporated later during project restructuring. This allowed to clarify the definition of some indicators and improve methodology for the monitoring of others. Nevertheless, despite efforts spent by the M&E consultants, data related to wheat and cotton productivity, both from official statistics and from farmers’ survey, were questionable as respondents seemed to have an apparent incentive to understate productivity, which is not the case for other crops.

34. The project’s M&E system allowed collection of a great deal of technical data related to water quantity and quality that will be utilized in designing future projects related to water management in the area. The project also contributed to improving data collection and analysis of water quality by providing laboratory equipment and training to regional offices of the HGAE. Information gathered to monitor effectiveness of training was utilized in identifying technologies that were more favored by farmers and should get more financial support. It also showed that the demand for drip irrigation equipment proved to be lower than forecasted because of cropping pattern peculiarities and associated cost of maintenance.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

35. Three safeguards were triggered under the project—Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), and Projects in International Waterways (OP/BP 7.50). The last one was triggered due to the project’s location in Syr Darya River Basin, which Uzbekistan shares with its riparian neighbors. To comply with the notification requirement contained in OP 7.50, the GOU sent notification letters to the Governments of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan. Upon receipt of positive responses from the Governments of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and no response from the Kyrgyz Republic, this safeguard compliance was regarded as satisfactory. The Environmental and Social Assessments disclosed in May 2009 confirmed that the project did not trigger any of the remaining safeguard policies.

36. The project has been assigned an environmental Category B rating because rehabilitation and modernization of the I&D systems were not expected to involve any significant or irreversible adverse environmental impacts. An EMP was developed in 2009 and identified main areas of implementation: impact mitigation, environmental monitoring, and institutional strengthening. At the MTR stage, the environmental safeguard compliance rating was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory due to serious shortcomings in the implementation of the EMP, particularly in relation to the mitigation measures to be undertaken on construction sites. However, contractors jointly with the Project Unit, managed to address issues raised by the World Bank mission, and later on, the rating was upgraded to Moderately Satisfactory. The Moderately Satisfactory rating has been maintained until the project end as some shortcomings in

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implementation of mitigation measures were persistent, including delays in removal of garbage from construction sites and incomplete documentation. Overall, the project was implemented in compliance with the World Bank and national environmental assessment guidelines.

37. The Involuntary Resettlement safeguard was triggered as rehabilitation of drainage infrastructure required permanent or temporary acquisition of agriculture land used by a number of farmers as well as removal of trees planted along roadways, canals, collector drains, and so on. To comply with the requirements, an RPF and initial specific RAP were prepared before project appraisal (disclosed in May 2009). However, as project implementation started and rehabilitation sites were clarified, it became clear that more resettlement-related impacts should be expected. Although the RAP was updated in 2011 to reflect a farm optimization process, it covered 37 farmers only. It was planned to update the RAP regularly to include additional farmers as it was clear that the number of affected farmers will be much more. However, the RAP update did not happen regularly because local authorities were not willing to approve updates as and when they come but waited for the list to be finalized. Hence, between 2012 and 2014, 338 farmers were affected by the project activities, and land acquisition took place without the RAP being updated, which constituted a noncompliance with the World Bank OP 4.12, causing overall downgrade in the safeguards compliance rating. The rating was subsequently upgraded once the list of farmers was eventually approved and the RAP was finalized. The PIU also operated a project-level Grievance Redress Mechanism, which farmers made good use of, and it de facto turned into a comprehensive mechanism covering issues beyond resettlement.

38. Compensation payments were done with delay after land acquisition and/or civil works started. The delays were often related to administrative reasons such as invalid bank requisites or suspension of bank accounts. Eventually, deficiencies were rectified and all outstanding payments were paid before project closure. In most cases, the PAPs did not receive any cash as compensation was used to settle outstanding tax arrears; however, this did not seem to cause any unhappiness in the farmers’ community. Interestingly, some farmers who were identified as PAPs initially and received payments were in fact not affected by the project as exact sites and the volume of work were modified; however, there was no mechanism to recover payments in such cases. Nevertheless, it did not seem to cause much concern to the World Bank or the GOU.

39. Procurement performance under the project was considered Moderately Satisfactory most of the time. Although the procurement capacity of the Project Unit was Satisfactory, processing of procurement packages was experiencing delays due to factors beyond the control of the implementing agency, for example, long registration by MFERIT. The World Bank had to declare misprocurement when purchase of vehicles for the Project Unit was never cleared by MFERIT, and the contract had to be cancelled. Apart from that, albeit with some delay, most of the procedures under the Procurement Plan were satisfactorily completed. The filing system was adequate, and no major issues were noted.

40. The FM arrangements under the project, including accounting, budgeting and planning, reporting, internal controls, external audits, funds flow, and organization and staffing were considered to be Satisfactory and acceptable to the World Bank. The FM staff was experienced in the World Bank’s procedures. The internal control system had been assessed as capable of providing timely information and reporting under the project. The issue of ineligible expenditure

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was raised during the MTR as a part of the IDA proceeds was used to pay income taxes. However, the issue was resolved later on by changing the Country Financing Parameters (CFP) for Uzbekistan, effective from December 9, 2014. According to the new CFP, income tax payments became an eligible expenditure. Audit reports were received as planned with unmodified (clean) opinion on the project financial statements.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

41. The project design included preparation of the Feasibility Study of the Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Phase-II Project, which is expected to build on the results of the Phase-I project, expand to other areas of the FV, and focus more on farmers’ productivity and irrigation system rehabilitation. The follow-on project should consolidate farmers’ productivity gains and take forward the WCA institutional strengthening reforms that were started with Component B activities. All institutional arrangements for project implementation set up by the Phase-I project remain fully in place, as the Project Unit under the MAWR continues to manage other water management projects in Uzbekistan financed by the World Bank. The World Bank team will need to ensure adequate budget and staffing of the Project Unit as the GOU reportedly tried to optimize its size.

42. The GOU is committed to provide an adequate budget for the maintenance of the I&D system that was rehabilitated under the project. However, some facilities like the VDWs require not only a maintenance budget but power supply for uninterrupted operations. At this point, there is not enough power to keep all the VDWs operating continuously; however, local authorities assured the Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) mission that additional power supply facilities were under construction and power supply would not be a problem in future. Water management authorities are advised to utilize the M&E system in full to monitor the GWL and groundwater quality for signs of any deterioration due to climate change or other unforeseen reasons.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

43. Relevance of Objectives (High): Relevance of project objectives remained high as confirmed by the Government priorities as well as the recently approved Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY2016–20. The project objective of improving agricultural production is clearly aligned with CPF Focus Area 2 “Agricultural competitiveness and cotton sector modernization” and contributes to the achievement of two CPF

objective indicators: “Cotton productivity increase” and “Increase in areas

under horticulture, fodder crops, and other crops (non-cotton/wheat).”

Reduction of damage to housing and infrastructure is consistent with CPF Focus

Area 3 “Public Service Delivery”. Raising of agricultural productivity, land

reclamation, and modernization of irrigation and drainage systems are

specifically mentioned in the GOU approved Program of Action for 2015 and

subsequent years to achieve its strategic objectives for economic development.

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44. Relevance of Design and Implementation (Substantial): The project’s design and implementation was strategically relevant. Large amount of planned civil works activities somewhat complicated implementation and caused delays but all project components were aligned to the PDO and addressed the key issue of water-logging by rehabilitating old drainage system and modernizing irrigation network. As mentioned earlier in para 2.1 the project design was based on sector studies and stakeholder consultations as well as lessons learned in previous projects. Implementation arrangements were adequate and design of the RF reflected corresponding aspects of the PDO. Minor shortcomings of the RF were identified during the MTR and were addressed by a project restructuring.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating: Substantial

45. The objectives of the project—to improve agricultural production in areas affected by water-logging and to reduce damage to housing and infrastructure—were substantially achieved as confirmed by the project outcome indicators. Although the impact of all project activities is not feasible to quantify, there is a clear indication of success in key project activities related to the improvement of surface and vertical drainage networks, institutional strengthening, and others.

(a) Improvement of agricultural production in areas affected by water-logging, rating: substantially achieved

46. According to the project M&E reports that are based on the official statistics, there is a noticeable increase in yields for all crops, particularly for fruits, vegetables, and vineyards as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Change in Yields in Different Crops during Project Lifetime

Crop Baseline

Data Tons/ha

Year 1 % Increase to Baseline





Target (in %) — — — 5% 10% 20%

Cotton 2.4 2.8

(16.7%) 2.7

(12.5%) 2.6

(8.3%) 2.6

(8.3%) 2.7

(11.2%)

Wheat 3.5 5.8

(65.7%) 5.9

(68.6%) 5.9

(68.6%) 5.9

(68.6%) 5.8

(65.7%)

Vineyards 12.5 22.0

(76.0%) 28.0

(124.0%) 28.9

(131.2%) 28.8

(130.4%) 28.1

(124.8%) Fruits at private farms

3.0 8.0

(166.7%) 8.6

(186.7%) 9.8

(226.7%) 10.7

(256.7%) 11.5

(283.3%) Fruits at dekhan farms

6.0 14.7

(145.0%) 17.9

(198.3%) 19.9

(231.7%) 20.6

(243.3%) 24.7

(311.7%)

Vegetables 20.0 31.0

(55.0) 32.0

(60.0) 33.5

(67.5%) 34.7

(73.5%) 34.7

(73.5%) 47. Significant increase in yields of vineyards, fruits, and vegetables confirm improved soil and water conditions in the project districts. However, for cotton and wheat, the statistics show increase in yields that happened in the first year of project implementation. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute the yields to the project as 2011 crops (first year of the project implementation)

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were either harvested or already in the ground at the time the project commenced. Cotton and wheat are mandatory crops in Uzbekistan and the reported increase in yields is likely to be related to farm optimization that happened in 2010. After that, farmers were not encouraged to officially report increase in yields, although data collected by the M&E consultants through household surveys of a sample of farmers did find a 25.2 percent increase in wheat yield and 15.4 percent increase in cotton yield. Farmers and authorities met by the ICR mission also confirmed yield increase and were confident that better yields are directly related to the improved soil and drainage conditions. Along with this, it should be acknowledged that yield data for mandatory crops like cotton and wheat are inconclusive and point to a possible inconsistency between actual and reported yields. Better incentive structure for farmers can help address this issue; however, it was beyond the scope of the project.

48. Improved agricultural production is also confirmed indirectly by increase in the area planted by non-mandatory crops, like fodder (258 percent) and vegetables (80 percent), over the project implementation period as environmental conditions improve. Increase in area and reported yields for non-mandatory crops strongly suggest overall improvement in agricultural production, and, hence, confirm achievement of the project’s primary objective. Additional data supporting the robustness of the conclusion that agricultural production has improved in the project districts are given in annex 3.

49. A set of activities implemented by the project in the DPs contributed to the increase in yields. The DP yields consistently over-performed the average in the area, which was not left unnoticed by other farmers. About 2,000 farmers participated in the DP field school training sessions and about 64 percent of all farmers in the project districts visited DPs to familiarize themselves with innovations. According to the survey, about 80 percent of farmers who visited DPs confirmed that they started to apply improved cotton and wheat production techniques, which were simple and did not require costly investment. This strongly suggests increased production capacity through raised farmers’ awareness. On the other hand, the number of farmers who applied main DP technologies, such as drip irrigation or deep ripping, turned out to be much less because of associated costs.

50. Achievement of the intermediary indicators. According to the project reports, the following results were achieved:

Client-days of training provided - 141 (target was 135); client-days of training provided for females - no data. This indicator was introduced at project restructuring and was not monitored initially. Anecdotal evidences show that approximately 10 percent of training participants were female.

Land users adopting sustainable land management practices as a result of the project - 796 adopted out of 1,953 trained (target for adoption was 1,000). This indicator was not fully achieved because according to the survey results, many farmers considered the demonstrated technologies to be expensive.

Length of irrigation canals and drains rehabilitated and functional (km) - 1,394 (revised target achieved). This indicator was revised downward significantly during restructuring as original total amount referred to the substantial volume of inter-farm and on-farm earth canals that were proposed in the Feasibility Study but were in satisfactory condition. The final project design had a significantly smaller number of

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works on concrete canals, which were in worse conditions and costlier to repair but less length.

(b) Damage reduction to housing and infrastructure from rising GWL and salinity, rating: substantially achieved

51. Decreased groundwater level - the project has reached its Project Year 5 (PY5) target for reducing areas with shallow groundwater in each depth category and, generally, has met or surpassed the PY7 targets as well. According to the latest monitoring data, the project districts have virtually no areas with GWL of less than 1.0 m. Only 7.7 percent of the area has a GWL between 1.0 m and 1.5 m compared to the PY7 target of 7.0 percent and 33.1 percent of the area has a GWL between 1.5 m and 2.0 m while the PY7 target is 52.5 percent. The data were obtained through measurement with specialized equipment (piezometer) and confirm results of the survey that showed reduced flooded settlement area.

52. Reduced flooded settlement areas – 1,394 km of improved irrigation and drainage network has clearly led to reduction in the incidence of flooding and water-logging in settlement areas, having brought the percentage of households affected down, from 67.4 percent in 2011 to 13.1 percent in 2016. Data were obtained from annual surveys of households in the project districts. The surveys determined the subjective opinion of the respondents on whether there was an impact of the GWL and soil salinity on houses and infrastructure buildings, whether there was an increase or decrease in impact, and what kind of negative impact they had, which helped to clarify the nature of damage such as damage to basement, damage to house walls, or being dank or filled with groundwater. Rainfall in 2015 was above average in the project districts and this may account for the slight increase in reported flooding compared to 2014. However, an additional survey on the impact of the GWL on houses and buildings that was held in July 2016 has shown that the percent of households affected by the high GWL in the project districts is decreased to a level, which is very close to the project’s end target—12.9 percent. About 70 percent of respondents in the project districts confirmed a decrease in the GWL, and most of them attributed it to project implementation. This shows high awareness of the community about project activities. Data from these two indicators (“Decrease in groundwater level” and “Reduced flooded settlement areas”) seem to reinforce each other and strongly suggest decreased water-logging, hence, indirectly confirm achievement of the second aspect of the project objective—reduction in damage to housing and infrastructure.

53. Decreased area with high groundwater mineralization (GWM) - this is a new indicator that was added after project restructuring. It was important to watch soil and water salinity as it directly affected agricultural productivity in the area. Although the project did not have specific activities to desalinize groundwater, it was assumed that lowering the GWL would lead to lower level of mineralization, as an improved drainage system should efficiently discharge saline water. Indeed, monitoring data indicated minor increases in the percentage of areas with non- and low-GWM, while the percentage of areas with less than 3 g per liter (high) of GWM diminished to zero or near zero in all three districts. The decrease in the GWM is occurring in tandem with the decrease in the GWL. Therefore, the diminishment (or near elimination) of the GWM levels greater than 3 g per liter in all three districts is expected to have a positive effect on crop yields. Also, monthly HGAE observations of the soil salinity level (SSL) in the project

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districts in four ranges of soil salinity, (0–0.3 g per liter, 0.3–1.0 g per liter, 1.0–2.0 g per liter, and less than 2.0 g per liter), give indications of decreases in the SSL during the period of project implementation, 2011–15. The 2015 survey results of the project districts and non-project districts show that the respondents’ subjective opinion is that the SSLs have decreased as well.

54. Direct project beneficiaries, including female beneficiaries - this indicator was fully achieved (583,300 people, including 49 percent female) as the project is considered to be beneficial for the whole population—the residents of the project districts. The increase in number of beneficiaries compared to the target is because of population increase in the project districts. Although this indicator is not directly related to the project objective, it was included to fulfill the corporate requirement and shows magnitude of project impact on the ground.

55. Overall, it is clear that most of the numerical indicators were substantially achieved, and this strongly suggests that project investments for improvement of drainage network did cause decrease in the GWL and subsequent improvement of conditions for agricultural production. Along with this, the project delivered below its potential in improving irrigation network, leaving about 25 percent of the total credit amount undisbursed and failing to achieve in full the original Feasibility Study objectives related to rehabilitation of the irrigation system.

3.3 Efficiency Rating: High

56. The EFA showed that the project investments were both economically viable and financially profitable for farmers. To make it consistent with the PAD, the following main economic benefits were taken into account: (a) improved crop productivity and increased cropping intensity; (b) avoidance of a gradual loss of production because of an increase in water-logging and salinization which was anticipated in the ‘future without project’ (FWOP) situation; and (c) mitigation of the damage to housing and civil infrastructure, resulting from inundation and flooding, particularly in the urban areas. Based on an opportunity cost of capital of 12 percent, the project’s financial internal rate of return (FIRR) is estimated at 48.5 percent and the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) at 51.7 percent in the long run, although this figure is reduced to about 28 percent if we assume that all project benefits are reduced in the long run to 90 percent of our realistic estimations. Economic NPV is estimated at UZS 444 billion. Benefit-cost ratio is also at a favorable level of 4.65:1. These are very good and are driven by the increased cropping intensity and diversification to higher-valued crops.

57. Cropping pattern of private farms and dekhan farms in the baseline year was compared to the ‘future with project’ (FWP) case. The actual cropping pattern in the three project districts at the end of the project and the FWOP case, for which actual data of the Ferghana Province as a whole, were taken. The data showed increase in percent of cropped area for secondary and perennial crops in the FWP case and, hence, increased cropping intensity. The data corresponded with increase in total production in the project districts, which amounts to 179,000 tons (or 46 percent increase). Increase in production led to greater net farm income, which in the FWP case is 21.3 percent higher than in the FWOP case. As such, increased agricultural production that included improved crop productivity and avoidance of a gradual loss of production is estimated to account for 80 percent of the total project benefits with economic NPV of about UZS

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451.5 billion. Benefit from reduced damage to housing and infrastructure is estimated at UZS 114.6 billion.

58. A sensitivity analysis was undertaken to examine the effect of changes in benefit assumptions on economic viability at ICR. However, even with a 40 percent decline in incremental agricultural benefits, the EIRR was moderately sensitive to a change in assumed benefits falling from 51.7 percent to 33.9 percent. The EIRR was less sensitive to decrease in total incremental benefits by 20 percent with simultaneous increase in project cost by 20 percent as it fell to 37.2 percent.

59. Administrative and operational cost of the project was mostly in line with the project design. In spite of the delays in some project activities project was extended for only 5 months, which did not add significantly to the project cost.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

60. Based on the relevance, achievement of development objectives, and efficiency, the project’s overall outcome is regarded as Moderately Satisfactory. The development rationale behind the project remained relevant throughout implementation, project objectives were substantially achieved, and economic efficiency is high.

61. A split evaluation has been conducted to determine the overall rating. The overall outcome MS rating takes into account levels of disbursement before restructuring in April 2015, and until project completion (see table 2). Even though the project’s PDO and key outcome indicators did not change since they were focused on productivity, there was a significant reduction in the length of on-farm irrigation canal drains rehabilitated. Full achievement of that output indicator could led to higher increase in agricultural productivity.

Table 2 Overall outcome rating based on pre- and post-project restructuring

Pre-restructuring Post restructuring Relevance of objectives High High Relevance of design Substantial Substantial Efficacy PDO1: Improve agricultural production PDO2: Reduce damage to housing and infrastructure

Modest Substantial

Substantial Substantial

Efficiency High High Rating MS (4) S (5) Weightage 80% 20% Overall 4*80%+5*20%=4.2 (MS)

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3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

62. Comparisons of end of project poverty impacts with those estimated at appraisal are not possible because of insufficient data. Furthermore, monitoring data were not gender disaggregated, although a need for disaggregation was specifically introduced for some indicators during project restructuring. As it was shown above, in section 3.2, there was some increase in yields and, hence, the farmers’ income registered it. However, the project impact evaluation survey showed that cropping constitutes only about 10 percent of the household income in the project districts, so its impact on the overall household welfare is not that significant and demonstrable. However, some non-income social indicators point to a conclusion that, in general, the project has had a distinct positive effect on some key social conditions, particularly related to drinking water sources, perceived quality of drinking water, and water-borne diseases and health. The monitoring team registered notable improvement in those indicators although they were not included to the project RF.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

63. In general, the data indicate that the project had a positive impact on WCA performance and effectiveness. The survey conducted by the monitoring team recorded high marks by respondents for WCA performance and effectiveness, which was not the case in the project beginning. This is indirectly confirmed by a steady raise in fees collected by the WCA from 2011 to 2014. However, collection rates showed a precipitous drop later, which is likely to be caused by factors outside of the project control (for example, the GOU’s agricultural policies, drought, and so on). This should be taken into account during preparation of the follow-on project. The WCA representatives noted that farmers’ satisfaction from trainings was so high that the MAWR decided to extend them to non-project districts and increase their number.

64. As was mentioned earlier, in section 1.4, a number of public water management institutions like the BISA, AMC, PSD, and, particularly, the HGAE benefited from the project and were institutionally strengthened. The HGAE significantly improved their capacity to monitor mineralization of groundwater and soil salinity owing to the equipment purchased and training organized by the project.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

65. Although it was not a project objective, a positive impact on public health has been recorded by comparing results of the Baseline Survey of 2011 with the survey done at the end of the project. The most recent survey demonstrated the reduction of the level of waterborne diseases since 2011, and, in particular, cases of hepatitis decreased from 12.6 percent to 1.5 percent.

66. Decreased water-logging brought tangible environmental benefits. It was noted that the total area affected by pests and treated by pesticides has been reduced by half since 2011. The M&E consultant has also analyzed the level of application of pesticides and concluded that pest management practices and introduction of integrated pest management principles has improved during the project implementation period.

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67. General improvement in living conditions is strongly demonstrated by the increase in price of land and houses in the project districts. Real estate price increase was mentioned by a number of respondents among farmers and households. Many people who seemed to have left the area earlier started to return back and household gardens showed better yields because of improved soil conditions, contributing to the increase of land price. Some irrigation outlets that were rehabilitated by the project are located in close proximity to communities providing an excellent recreation facility for children, especially in the hot summer days.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

68. The project carried out the final beneficiary survey, results of which are summarized in annex 5.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Moderate

69. The risk to development outcomes is assessed as Moderate and mainly related to the factors beyond control of the project stakeholders. The main risk is related to funds availability to allow proper maintenance of the drainage system, including power supply for the VDWs. This risk is likely to persist in future although it is mitigated by the strong commitment of the central and local authorities to ensure smooth operations of water drainage and prevent water-logging from happening again as well as additional power supply facilities that are already under construction in the project districts. A follow-on operation in the FV shall reduce this risk further and reinforce agricultural and social benefits achieved during the implementation of this project. This operation includes further rehabilitation of irrigation system and technical assistance with focus on farmers’ productivity. In the long term, the rise in agricultural productivity will strongly depend on Government policies in agriculture, including evolvement of farm restructuring reform described earlier, in section 2.2, and the correspondent incentive structure in agricultural production in Uzbekistan.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

70. As discussed in section 2.1, all aspects of the project were well worked out, and the project was designed to address key water management issues in the area. The previous CPS and current CPF and Government strategy confirm that the objective continues to be relevant. Implementation arrangements were well thought through and all relevant project agents were engaged in accordance with their capacity and competencies. The PAD is clear and covers all aspects of the project design.

71. In retrospect, the monitoring arrangement and data collection instruments of the original project RF do not seem to be thoroughly discussed and recorded, which caused some confusion later on. It turned out that some indicators were not feasible to measure and

20

baseline/targets for others were not technically justified. Although the project design was straightforward, from an engineering perspective it seems that a bit more effort could have been spent on detailed design and baseline studies during preparation to make the need for project restructuring less likely. In view of these issues and the weaknesses in the project RF, the quality at entry is considered to be Moderately Satisfactory.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

72. The World Bank team made a significant effort to ensure timely implementation of the project activities. Location of the Task Team Leader (TTL) in the field was very beneficial and allowed quick visits to Government agencies and project districts when needed, in addition to formal implementation support missions that were conducted semiannually. The PIU was appreciative of the available technical and fiduciary support from the TTL as well as the World Bank’s Country Office, and the pro-active approach to problem solving. Aide Memoires were informative and supportive to PIU decision making. Supervision of safeguards issues was strong as well with the Environmental and Social Specialists reporting regularly on the progress and using ratings effectively to highlight outstanding issues.

73. A comprehensive MTR was carried out in November 2013 that mobilized all team members, including environment, social, and fiduciary members, facilitating implementation by clearing existing bottlenecks. The MTR mission extensively discussed the weaknesses in the project results monitoring framework and agreed on the action plan to rectify that. The team was client oriented and most of the client’s proposals were supported. However, the World Bank team did not seem to be firm enough in following up on some recommendations that were made during the MTR and subsequent missions, particularly with respect to revision of RF, which happened after significant delay, and the failing ICB contracts. The project team’s recommendations to terminate those contracts were not fully utilized at subsequent meetings at different levels, including discussions on the country portfolio. As a result, the issue persisted for an extensive period of time.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

74. The rating is based on the Moderately Satisfactory rating on the quality at entry and the Moderately Satisfactory rating on the quality of supervision.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

75. The project came about as a result of the strong Government interest in resolving water-logging issues in the region and improving living conditions for inhabitants. Government agencies and local authorities strongly supported the project and showed willingness to cooperate to achieve desired results. This is confirmed by eventual resolution of the customs clearance issues that delayed operations of some critical equipment under the ICB-1 contract of the project. However, lengthy procedures of different agencies, particularly contracts clearance by

21

MFERIT, put pressure on the project and the World Bank teams and did affect project performance in negative way. Considerable amount of time was wasted because of the Government’s unwillingness to accept failure in the ICB-2 and ICB-3 contracts, which reduced the project output results. In general, the Government’s performance is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory for procedural complexity that led to protracted implementation issues and rigidity in making the decisions that were needed.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

76. Both the PIU and the MAWR showed strong commitment toward achievement of the project results. They met regularly with the World Bank’s project team, openly discussed project issues, and followed up on the agreed actions in line with their authority and competence. Performance of other agencies involved in project management including consulting companies for technical supervision and M&E was adequate as well. Moderate shortcomings in the PIU performance are related to recorded instances of noncompliance with environmental and social safeguards, as discussed in section 2.4. Although environmental performance was rectified in due time, issues related to approval of the RAP and delays in payments to the PAPs persisted for some time, causing the downgrade in relevant performance ratings. It should be noted, however, that the PIU team did not feel it had sufficient manpower to follow up on time on the RAP activities, as all work had to be fulfilled by the accountant in addition to her daily routine. On the other hand, fiduciary aspects of implementation were well handled by the PIU with only issues related to the long clearances by MFERIT, which was beyond their control.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

77. The rating is based on the Moderately Unsatisfactory rating of the Government and Moderately Satisfactory rating of the performance of the implementing agencies, and takes into account Moderately Satisfactory rating of the project’s overall outcome.

6. Lessons Learned

78. The project confirmed the importance of the M&E systems that need to be established and tested before project effectiveness or within the first year of the project. Lessons have been drawn from the inconsistency in the methodology for monitoring of certain indicators that required restructuring. On the other hand, outsourcing of the project monitoring function to a qualified consulting company proved to be a right decision that allowed proper reporting and timely evaluation of the project results.

79. Proper evaluation of the bidding companies is critical to spot potential performance issues. Although the financial statement of the ICB-2 winning Slovenia-Uzbekistan consortium seemed to be adequate, in retrospect, the real strength of the consortium seems to be doubtful as it allowed the masking of the financial problems of the local company without revealing the real intent of their foreign counterparts. In addition, it appears that timely action regarding the problem contract could have allowed enough time to rebid the tender and enhance project outputs.

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80. Serious performance issues in the ICB-2 and ICB-3 contracts highlight the need for better contract management. Legal provisions for penalties and immediate actions in case of non-delivery could be an important element to improve that. For example, disbursement targets could be set in the contract. If the contractor fails to meet these targets, then liquidated damages shall start and after the total of the liquidated damages reaches the maximum amount, the contract shall be terminated without delay. This should be complemented by blacklisting for a number of years, those contractors whose contract was terminated. Better contract management should help to strengthen safeguard compliances as well, which should be pronounced stronger in the bidding documentation. At the moment, one can observe the limited capacity of contractors to comply with safeguards requirements, particularly on contracts where the main contractor sublets work to the local contractors. In general, the subcontractors did not attend to the EMP implementation requirements, and use of personal protective equipment by the labor remains a major challenge.

81. Close work with local authorities is needed to ensure smooth operations of the large- scale infrastructure works. The feedback of the local authorities of the project districts showed that the detailed design was not really discussed with the beneficiaries and that caused some delay later on because of the need to adjust to farmers’ seasonal activities. Local authorities mentioned that they could have made suggestions to minimize such delays. Besides, some adjustment had to be made to the design anyway and that caused additional expenses that included, among other things, compensatory payments to farmers who eventually were not affected by the project at all.

82. The project confirmed that introduction of innovative technologies in agriculture requires a broad support program. Overall, the DP areas showed very positive results because of the introduction of drip irrigation, deep ripping, and other innovative demo activities. However, farmers were cautious to immediately adopt new activities because of associated cost and their ability to diversify, given the mandatory state orders for some crops. More flexible agricultural policy and additional financial support could significantly increase the adoption rate.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

Not applicable.

(b) Cofinanciers

Not applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

83. Local communities were prominent stakeholders of the project. Subjective evaluation by the ICR mission showed that all communities were appreciative of the successful results of the project and hopeful for further support of the communities’ development by international financial organizations.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (US$, millions equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(US$, millions) * Actual/Latest Estimate

(US$, millions) ** Percentage of

Appraisal Component A: Improvement of Irrigation and Drainage Network

59.24 42.05 71%

(a) Improvement of Irrigation Network 11.97 3.55 (b) Improvement of Surface Drainage Network 22.10 17.16 (c) Improvement of Vertical Drainage Network and Groundwater Development

19.73 16.66

(d) Investments in nature protection as per EMP

0.49 0.00

(e) Cash compensation and other forms of assistance

1.11 1.17

(f) Consultancy Services for the Engineering Designs, Construction Supervision and Contract Management

3.84 3.51

Component B: Institutional Strengthening and Agricultural Development Support

5.2 3.35 64.4%

(a) Institutional strengthening of public institutions

0.97 0.16

(b) Dissemination of modern agricultural and water management practices

3.92 3.19

(c) Provision of technical assistance for drafting a new Water Code

0.31 0.00

Component C: Project Management and Audit, and Monitoring and Evaluation of Project Impact

3.8 3.63 95.5%

(a) Project Management 1.20 1.50 (b) Project Audit 0.15 0.10 (c) Project Monitoring and Evaluation 1.42 1.18 (d) Preparation of the Phase II 1.03 0.85

Total Baseline Cost 68.24 49.03 71.8% Physical Contingencies 6.26 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 7.35 0.00 0.00

Total Project Costs 81.85 49.03 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00

Total Financing Required 81.85 49.03

* Including VAT, Customs Payments, and Non-Residents Income Tax estimates of 20% of the total base cost ** Excluding VAT, Customs, and Non-Resident Income Tax estimates of 20% for which exemption was granted as Borrower’s in-kind contribution

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(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(US$, millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(US$, millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 16.31 0.21 1.29%

International Development Association (IDA) 65.54 48.82 74.50%

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

1. This section supports the discussion in Section 3: Assessment of Outcomes of this ICR and provides a summary of what has been achieved by the project under each of the main components. The qualitative and quantitative information on all outputs that have been realized is linked with the project-specific monitoring indicators as shown in the following tables.

Component A: Improvement of Irrigation and Drainage Network

Activities as Specified in the Procurement

Plan

Outputs (Items Rehabilitated)

Units Completed Monitoring Indicators

(a) Improvement of irrigation network Increase in crop yields for major crops; Direct project beneficiaries, including female beneficiaries; Length of irrigation canals and drains rehabilitated (km)

Rehabilitation of inter-farm irrigation canals ICB-3-1

Concrete canals km 17.3

Regulators and outlets Number 41

Rehabilitation of on-farm irrigation canals ICB-2

Earth canals and concrete canals km 38.32 Flumes km 0.48 Regulators and outlets Number 487 Hydroposts Number 303

Drip irrigation DPs ICB-3-3

Drip irrigation equipment installation

Ha 301.4

(b) Improvement of surface draining network

Decreased groundwater level (meters below surface); Reduced flooded settlement areas; Increased crop yields for major crops; Decreased area with high groundwater mineralization; Direct project beneficiaries, including female beneficiaries; Length of irrigation canals and drains rehabilitated (km)

Rehabilitation of drainage systems ICB-1

On-farm open horizontal drainages km 778.1 On-farm collector structures Number 266 Closed horizontal drainage km 101.9 Inter-farm collectors km 170.0 Inter-farm collector structures Number 66.00 Inter-district collectors km 65.0 Inter-district collector structures Number 4 Intercepted drainages km 25.2 Structures on intercepted drainages Number 30

Flushing of SHD NCB-3-2A

Flushing of SHDs km 100.17

Rehabilitation of SHD NCB-3-2B

Rehabilitation of SHD Number 151

(c) Improvement of vertical drainage network and groundwater development and management in the field and in settlements

Rehabilitation of Drainage Systems ICB-1

Observation wells (piezometers) Number 34 Pressure relief wells Number 1,414 Artesian wells Number 10 VDWs Number 242 VDWs for Rishtan town Number 34 Deep ripping ha 6,000 Conjugation structures no. 760

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Component B: Institutional Strengthening and Agricultural Development Support

Activities as Specified in the

Procurement Plan Equipment Purchased No. of Units

Amount in US$

Monitoring Indicators

(a) Institutional strengthening of public institutions

Equipment and software list purchased for the BISA/ISA/HGAE

Current meter 6 8,335

Direct project beneficiaries, including female beneficiaries

Office equipment for the BISA and HGAE

6 sets 9,279

Conductometer 6 1,568 Leveling equipment 6 sets 8,610 Drain flushing equipment 1 98,255 Laboratory equipment 1 set 31,208 Office furniture for laboratory 1 set 3,550 Laser leveler PL-5 8 148,598 Universal agriculture tractors CASE IH Puma-180

8 727,200

Deep ripping GR 270-370 6 31,300

Trainings Delivered Participants No. of People Trained

Full list of trainings and seminars held under Component B of Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Phase-I (FVWRMP-I) Project for Institutional Strengthening of Public Institutions

Organizational and legal issues of WCAs

WCA Development‖ and FM of WCAs

WCA field specialists

175 Increased crop yields for major crops; Direct project beneficiaries, including female beneficiaries; Client days of training provided, including for female beneficiaries; Land users adopting sustainable land management practices as a result of the project

O&M of WCA I&D network and WCA water resources management

WCA field specialists

350

WCA Development‖ and FM of WCAs

WCA directors and accountants

42

New legislations and laws in water management

Integrated water resources management

Planning and distribution of water resources

Organization of practical hygrometry

Tools and structures for water measurement

O&M of canals

BISA and ISA specialists

62

Organization and tasks of monitoring of ameliorative condition of lands

O&M of collector-drainage systems

Evaluation indicators of the technical condition of the I&D system and the ameliorative condition of irrigated lands―exercises on preparation of general and particular water-salt balances of irrigated areas

HGAE specialists

18

27

WCA development and FM of WCAs for WCA directors and accountants

WCA directors and accountants

50

Operation of new laboratory equipment for the HGAE

HGAE specialists

24

Organizational and legal issues of WCAs

WCA development

WCA personnel of project districts

96

O&M of WCA I&D network WCA water resources management Gender training Forced labor issues

WCA personnel of project districts

289

Water management and effective use of water resources

BISA and ISA specialists in project districts

35

Total number of participants 1,141 Participation rate 90.1%

(b) Dissemination of modern agricultural and water management practices to members of the WCA and small dekhan farmers through provision of training and establishment and operation of field DPs

Establishment of the DPs

DPs established Number 9 Fields prepared for cropping,

including high-quality surface layout and deep ripping of the soil in the depth of 60–80 cm

—

Provision of manure at the rate of 30 tons per ha

—

Phenological observations conducted for cotton and wheat to fix the date of sowing, germination, and the onset of the development phase (for example, measured the height and density of position, the number of the reproductive organs, and so on)

—

Farmers’ field school/specialized training sessions (number of people participated)

Farmer field school trainings Number 200 Soil structure Crop rotation and application of

mineral fertilizers Plant protection Farming, green manure crop Wheat cropping management

Number 162

Farmers’ field school trainings at the DPs in Bagdad and Rishtan districts

Number 25

Farmers’ field school trainings at the DPs in Bagdad and Altyarik districts

Number 23

Drip irrigation in project districts Number 114 Organization and production of

intensive orchards Number 142

28

Application of mineral fertilizers and land preparation

Efficient water usage Plant protection FM of farms Presentation of DP activities Child and forced labor, gender

issues Farmers’ field school trainings for

farmers in project districts Number 57

Total number of participants 723

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

Methodology

1. To make it consistent with the PAD, the following main economic benefits were taken into account: (a) improved crop productivity and increased cropping intensity; (b) avoidance of a gradual loss of production due to an increase in water-logging and salinization which was anticipated in the FWOP situation; and (c) mitigation of the damage to housing and civil infrastructure resulting from inundation and flooding, particularly in the urban areas. Increased agricultural production, which includes improved crop productivity and avoidance of a gradual loss of production, is estimated to account for 80 percent of the total project benefit with economic NPV of about UZS 451.5 billion. Benefit from reduced damage to housing and infrastructure is estimated at UZS 114.6 billion.

Increased Agricultural Production

2. For calculation of crop productivity and increased cropping intensity, crop budgets were prepared for nine crops in some detail, namely cotton, wheat, maize, rice, potatoes, vegetables, fodder, orchards, and vineyards. Abbreviated crop budgets were prepared for another three crops—melons, oilseeds, and legumes—due to lack of data. Yields and production data were obtained from the Statistics Department of the GOU. For cotton and wheat, detailed information on input use (that is, seeds, manure, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides), labor requirements, machinery utilization, as well as output and input prices were made available by the Statistics Department, and this was cross-checked with results of the primary data collection efforts of the M&E consultants at baseline (covering 2011) and during early 2016 (covering 2015). For the remaining crops, the original Feasibility Study model data was used as a basis, with prices updated to 2011 levels using the GDP deflator for Uzbekistan. Input quantities were scaled to yields by some factor when appropriate. Information was also collected from the Government offices in each district, as well as the Central Government agencies and other secondary sources.

3. As was done at the Feasibility Study stage, given the very significant contrast between private farms and dekhan farms with respect to both labor inputs, machinery requirements, and crop productivity, crop budgets were prepared for both types of farm. The base year was considered as 2011and the final data for 2015 were taken for both the FWOP and the FWP cases. The latter, of course, is what has actually been observed and officially recorded for 2015 in the three project districts. The FWOP case also draws on actual data—that of the Ferghana Province as a whole. The three project districts of Altyarik, Bagdad, and Rishtan represent about 20 percent of the total cropped area of the Ferghana Province’s 15 districts.

4. Cropping intensity, defined as the ratio of total cropped area to net cultivated area multiplied by 100, has notably increased and farmers have significantly diversified their production with high-value crops—vegetables and vineyards that are particularly important in the project districts than in the FV overall. Cropping intensity data are shown in table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Cropping Intensity in Project Districts (%)

2011 (Base Year) Future (2015) Without

Project Future (2015) With Project

30

Leaseh

old Farm

Dehkan Farms

Overall

Leasehold Farm

Dehkan Farms

Overall

Leasehold Farm

Dehkan Farms

Overall

Main annual crops: Cotton 41.4 0.0 34.8 35.2 0.0 29.2 40.3 0.0 33.4 Wheat 43.5 26.9 40.9 38.8 24.9 36.4 43.8 17.9 39.4 Maize 0.1 3.3 0.6 0.5 7.3 1.7 0.3 6.5 1.4 Rice 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.0 0.8 0.1 Potatoes 0.6 6.2 1.5 1.0 17.5 3.8 1.0 11.8 2.9 Vegetables

1.4 54.6 9.9 2.4 45.1 9.7 2.6 64.3 13.2

Melons 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.8 3.1 1.2 0.7 1.9 0.9 Secondary crops: Fodder 1.4 7.0 2.3 12.2 9.4 11.7 5.0 7.9 5.5 Oilseed crops

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4

Legumes 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.4 0.4 0.1 1.4 0.3 Perennial crops: Orchards 12.2 7.4 11.5 13.6 11.6 13.3 13.3 6.9 12.2 Vineyards

0.4 12.2 2.3 0.6 8.0 1.8 0.8 11.3 2.6

Cropping Intensity (%)

101.8 118.6 104.5 106.3 129.8 110.3 108.3 130.9 112.2

5. Crop productivity in tons per ha is presented in table 3.2. Yields are generally, though not always, higher in the ‘with project case.’

Table 3.2.Crop Productivity in Project Districts

Leasehold Farms Dekhan Farms

Base Year 2011

Future Without (2015)

Future With (2015)

Base Year 2011

Future Without (2015)

Future With (2015)

Cotton 2.9 2.7 2.7 Wheat 5.6 5.9 5.8 7. 3 7. 7 7. 5 Maize 5.5 6.3 6.7 7.0 8.2 8.0 Rice 2.9 1.6 2.8 3.8 3.5 3.9 Potatoes 15.3 32.0 33.4 25.7 25.9 27.8 Vegetables 28.0 36.2 35.4 29.2 33.7 32.6 Melons 13.8 27.8 24.4 28.3 21.3 19.2 Secondary Crops: Fodder 25.1 26.3 25.8 25.0 25.8 25.8 Oilseed crops

0.0 2.0 1.9 0.0 1.7 1.5

Legumes 3.0 1.8 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 Perennial Crops: Orchards 5.5 7.1 7.9 14.6 22.8 24.2 Vineyards 11.8 11.2 10.1 14.1 22.9 23.5

6. Table 3.3 shows that total production in the project districts has increased by more than 179,000 tons between 2011 and 2015. This is a 46 percent increase as shown in the table.

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Table 3.3. Annual Crop Production (tons)

Base Year

2011 Future

Without (2015) Future With

(2015) Increment over Base

Year (tons) Increment over Base

Year (%) Cotton 46,777 35,529 42,719 −4,059 −9 Wheat 110,735 101,795 112,771 2,036 2 Maize 2,025 5,953 5,197 3,172 157 Rice 184 612 263 78 42 Potatoes 15,266 47,296 40,289 25,022 164 Vegetables 134,471 151,022 208,741 74,270 55 Melons 4,688 13,290 10,157 5,469 117 Fodder 26,607 140,542 67,737 41,130 155 Oilseed — 0 360 353 353 Legumes 36 511 432 397 110 7 Orchards 34,535 57,360 55,252 20,717 60 Vineyards 14,568 16,771 25,175 10,607 73 Total 389,892 570,681 569,093 179,192 46

7. The net farm income has increased substantially between 2011 and 2015 (table 3.4), but the critical comparison is between the FWP and the FWOP. With the project, private farms with orchards saw an increase of 3.5 percent in net farm income compared to the estimate of what would have been their income without FVWRMP-I Project. Private farms without orchards saw a marginal increase of 0.9 percent and dekhan farms saw the greatest benefit from the project with an estimated 21.3 percent increase in their incomes in 2015.

Table 3.4. Net Farm Income (UZS, thousands) 2011 Prices

Base Year

2011

Future (2015) With Project 1/ FWOP (2015)

% increase FWP vs. FWOP No I&D Fees O&M Fees only

Leasehold farm (with orchard)

53,412 84,870 83,751 81,963 3.5

Leasehold farm (without orchard)

34,834 46,567 45,448 46,161 0.9

Dekhan farm 2,135 3,823 3,818 3,152 21.3

8. In 2015, in the FWP situation, the annual expenditure required to operate and maintain the on-farm infrastructure was estimated at UZS 74,000 per hectare (in 2011 UZS). Thus, the O&M fees amount to less than 2 percent of net farm income for private farms with an orchard, about 3 percent for private farms without orchards, and less than 1 percent for dekhans. This clearly shows that farmers should be able to meet the O&M fees, and there is a strong incentive to maintain the on-farm I&D infrastructure through their WCA. With an effective system of O&M cost recovery, this improved farm profitability would also help to establish sustainable and self-financing WCAs.

9. Sensitivity analysis was undertaken to examine the effect of changes in benefit assumptions on economic viability at ICR. However, even with a 40 percent decline in incremental agricultural benefits the EIRR was moderately sensitive to a change in assumed benefits falling from 51.7 percent to 33.9 percent. The EIRR was less sensitive to decrease in total incremental benefits by 20 percent with simultaneous increase in project cost by 20 percent as it fell to 37.2 percent.

Mitigation of the Damage to Housing and Civil Infrastructure

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10. The financial benefits of mitigating damage to housing and civil infrastructure are estimated at UZS 17,791 million (in 2011 terms) during the 2015 year and the annual level of savings from prevention of damage is expected to rise further following project completion. Table 3.5 shows that the number of households suffering damage has declined by 40 percent and the cost of repairs per affected household has declined by 8 percent. Thus, the incidence of damage has declined sharply and the extent of damage where it occurred has diminished somewhat as well.

Table 3.5. Damage to Houses Due to Water-logging and Salinity (Cost of Repair)

Description 2011 2015 Percent of respondents having some damage 67.4 39.3 Total number of households in 3 districts - farmers and dekhans 106,080 106,993 Number of households in the project districts (economic model) 75,670 78,282 Number of households in the project districts having some damage 51,002 30,765 Annual average cost of repair per household, in UZS, millions (nominal) 0.80 1.10 Annual average cost of repair per household, in UZS, millions (2011 UZS) 0.80 0.74 Cost of repairing damage in the project districts In UZS, millions (2011 prices) 40,569 22,778

Conclusion

11. Running an economic model with assumptions and results outlined above and based on an opportunity cost of capital of 12 percent, the project’s FIRR is estimated at 48.5 percent and the EIRR at 51.7 percent in the long run, although this figure is reduced to about 28 percent if we assume that all project benefits are reduced in the long run to 90 percent of the realistic estimations. Economic NPV is estimated at UZS 444 billion. The benefit-cost ratio is also at a favorable level of 4.65:1. These are very good and are mainly driven by the increased cropping intensity and diversification to higher valued crops.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team Members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending

Mahwash Wasiq Senior Water Resources and Agricultural Economist

ECSSD TTL

Janis Bernstein Senior Social & Environment Specialist ECSSD Ohn Mynt Irrigation & Drainage Engineer Consultant Yuling Zhou Senior Procurement Specialist ECSPS David Colbert Senior Environmental Officer FAO John Ogallo Senior Financial Management Specialist ECSPS Wolfhart Pohl Senior Environmental Specialist ECSSD Walter Klemm Senior Water Resources Engineer FAO Thomas Muenzel Senior Economist FAO Kseniia Malenko Financial Analyst LOADM Liudmila Mazai Program Assistant ECSSD Supervision/ICR IJsbrand de Jong Lead Irrigation Specialist GWA06 TTL Jeren Kabayeva Agricultural Specialist GFA03 Blaga Djourdjin Procurement Specialist GGOGI Procurement

Djamshid Iriskulov Consultant GGO21 Financial management

Antonio Cristian D’Amelj Senior Counsel LEGLE Dilshod Khidirov Senior Agricultural Specialist GFA03 Ekaterina Romanova Social Development Specialist GSU03 Safeguards Gulana Enar Hajiyeva Senior Environmental Specialist GEN03 Safeguards Javaid Afzal Senior Environmental Specialist GEN03 Safeguards Jasna Mestnik Finance Officer WFALN Disbursement Ma Dessirie Kalinski Finance Analyst WFALN Disbursement Nikolai Soubbotin Lead Counsel LEGLE Olivier Durand Senior Agriculture Economist GFA03 Giovanni Munoz Land and Water Development Engineer FAO Oydin Dyusebaeva Program Assistance ECCUZ Valencia Copeland Program Assistance GFA03 Talimjan Urazov Senior Agricultural Specialist GFA03 ICR

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of Staff Weeks US$, thousands (including travel and consultant costs) Lending

FY08 9.59 55.96 Total: 55.96

Supervision/ICR FY09 31.95 187.18 FY10 8.26 41.50 FY11 31.78 117.69

34

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of Staff Weeks US$, thousands (including travel and consultant costs) FY12 32.22 109.43 FY13 21.17 76.91 FY14 25.00 106.15 FY15 38.25 189.80 FY16 29.25 150.53 FY17 28.35 104.03 Total: 1,083.22

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

Methodology

1. The Final Households and WCA Survey was conducted during February 4–26, 2016. In total, about 610 households, including about 130 farms were surveyed in the project districts. In addition, 150 households including 10 farms (maximum available farmers living in that area) were surveyed in the non-project districts (area within the project districts, but not covered with project construction activities). In 2016, unlike in 2012, the survey was also held in neighboring Kushtepa district (district located to the northeast of Altyarik district), which was selected as the control district with the closest possible land area conditions to the project districts.

Table 5.1. Number of Surveyed Households and Farms in 2012 and 2016

No. District Baseline Survey 2012 Annual Survey 2016

Surveyed Households

Including Farms

Surveyed Households

Including Farms

1 Altyarik 182 26 180 25 2 Bagdad 213 86 214 73 3 Rishtan 214 24 217 30

Total in project districts 609 136 611 128 4 Non-project districts 150 21 150 10 5 Kushtepa district — — 172 70

Total 759 157 933 208

2. Later, according to the request of the World Bank, the M&E consultant conducted an additional survey on the impact of the GWL on houses and buildings with the same respondents surveyed in February 2016. The follow-up survey consisted of only four questions related to the impact of the GWL and was held in July 2016.

3. During the socioeconomic surveys followed by the Baseline Survey, as much as possible, the same households and farms were surveyed again. Based on the above criteria, district-wise lists were prepared for the three project districts, according to the sampling of the Baseline Survey. If the farmer or householder was not available at that time, then another neighboring farm or household was selected for the survey. The percentage of such households and farms was about 10 percent to 15 percent of the total number of respondents each year. To conduct the survey, the same enumerators were involved in 2012 and later, but in 2016, seven of the enumerators were new. Before the surveys, special trainings were conducted for interviewers each year.

4. A total of 15 interviewers, divided into three groups, were hired to conduct the survey in 2016. Almost all involved interviewers had high education and were working as teachers, in local administrative divisions, or had experience in conducting surveys. A member of the M&E consultant’s team was assigned as the Supervisor for each group. The Supervisor was the responsible person for organizing and conducting the survey and ensuring the reliability of the collected data.

5. Before conducting the farm survey in project districts, the questionnaire and instructions for interviewing and sampling procedures were field tested to improve and adjust the research

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instruments. Evaluation of the compliance of the questionnaire with the study goals and objectives was implemented at three levels:

At the level of the questionnaire, that is, to what extent the questionnaire makes it possible to collect required information in general—whether information contained in different sections of the questionnaires are contradictory and whether some indicators are duplicate in terms of coverage, and so on;

At the level of the sections of the questionnaire, that is, to what extent the indicators of every section of the questionnaire are necessary and sufficient for obtaining the required information—whether the questions within and among sections are cross related, and so on; and

At the level of certain questions of the questionnaire, that is, to what extent the questions are clearly worded—whether ambiguous answers can be given to a question, whether alternative interpretations of the questions and proposed answer options are probable, whether the answer options for close questions exhaust all possible options and to what extent they do, whether the questions can be misinterpreted, whether the questions are offensive in nature or jeopardize the personality of the respondents, and so on.

6. To control the quality of the interviewers’ work, the following activities were overseen by the field Supervisor: supervision and control of sampling procedures with local self-governance bodies, visiting 10 percent of randomly selected surveyed households, and visual revision of the questionnaires for completeness and correctness of filling. After the interviews, questionnaires were checked and the following mistakes were corrected: (a) omitted answers were recorded, (b) inconsistencies and contradiction of answers were cleared out, and (c) unclear sentences and indistinct writings in the open questions were clarified.

7. A special data input spreadsheet was designed for inputing information and cleaning the database, with options for controlling the quality of data input: (a) setting the limits of the range of admissible values, (b) checking the correctness of skipping questions, (c) checking questions for cross-consistency, and (d) control over misprints done by data input operators. The final database was processed using the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) standard statistical package.

8. As an agreed principle, secondary data has been obtained from all three districts in the form of tables that the M&E consultants have officially requested from the relevant agencies. Such data have been used for comparison with the results of the primary data in some cases; however, in some cases, where the information cannot be obtained from the primary data sources, secondary sources have become the sole sources of information; for example, the HGAE for GWLs, groundwater salinity, and so on.and the Statistical Department for demographic and district-wide agricultural production information.

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Key Results of the Survey

9. Acording to the final survey results, it is concluded that agricultural production has improved in the project districts, especially those previously affected by water-logging and from high GWL, GWM, and SSL. The key performance indicators to measure achievement of these objectives are lowering of the GWL, crop yield increases, and reduction of land area flooded in settlements.

10. All crops’ yields (except cotton and, essentially, wheat) trend upward with decreasing GWL in the project districts. The crop yields most sensitive to the GWL are fruit and vegetables and they increased significantly by 66 percent for dekhan fruit, 44 percent for fruit production on private farms, 45 percent for vineyards, and 13 percent for vegetables over 2011–15. Other crop yields also had a positive tendency, but the range was not as high.

11. The cropping intensity of private farms in the project districts increased from 101.8 percent in 2011 to 108.3 percent in 2015. Major crops like cotton and wheat did not change their share of the cropping pattern over 2011–15. The average share for these two crops combined amounted to 84 percent of total cropped area or 46,100 ha over the period (cotton at 22,100 ha and wheat at 24,000 ha). The crops seeing the greatest increase and having the greatest impact in cropping intensity in absolute terms were fodder, vegetables, and potatoes. These crops saw increases in area planted of 258 percent, 80 percent, and 76 percent, respectively, over the period, as environmental conditions improved.

12. The project has clearly had an impact on reducing the incidence of flooding and water-logging in settlement areas, having brought down the percentage of households affected, from 67.4 percent in 2011 to 39.3 percent in 2015 (up slightly from 33.2 percent in 2014). Later, according to the request of the World Bank, the M&E consultant conducted an additional survey on the impact of the GWL on houses and buildings of the same respondents surveyed in previous years. The results of this survey, held in July 2016, have shown that the percent of households affected by high GWL in the project districts has decreased to 13.1 percent.

13. The project’s impact on WCA performance and effectiveness was also monitored during the project implementation and the data indicate that the project has had a positive impact. In all indicators of WCA effectiveness (for example, irrigation water distribution, reliability of irrigation water supply, WCA governance, and so on), there were improvements noted from 2011 to 2015, sometimes dramatically so. After steadily climbing from 2011 to 2014, some of the WCAs showed a precipitous drop in collection rates. It is possible that factors outside the control of the project were the major contributors to this drop (for example, rural economy in Uzbekistan, government agricultural policies, drought, and so on).

14. In the data describing the present condition, in all cases, the sample respondents and the WCA staff gave the project WCAs high marks for effectiveness, for example, for water equitably distributed in summer, 70 percent of respondents said ‘yes’; for water equitably distributed in the winter, 78 percent said ‘yes,’ and so on. In no cases did positive responses fall below 50 percent. In all cases, the sample respondents and the WCA staff reported improvements in the indicators for WCA effectiveness, for example, when asked whether they were fully satisfied with the WCA services, 38 percent of respondents said ‘yes’ in 2011 and 69 percent said ‘yes’ in 2015. In all the

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indicators of WCA effectiveness (for example, irrigation water distribution, reliability of irrigation water supply, WCA governance, and so on), there were improvements noted from 2011 to 2015, which were sometimes drastic improvements.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Not applicable.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

In response to the World Bank letter dated April 24, 2017 #0172o/17 regarding draft Implementation Completion and Results Report for the “Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Phase 1 Project” we would like to inform following comments, which should be incorporated to the report.

1. In para 9 of Annex 3 “Economic and Financial Analysis” of the report (page 35) it is mentioned that “…farmers should meet 100 percent of the on-farm rehabilitation costs, while the Government would cover the full cost of upgrading the main and inter-farm systems. It was therefore planned that the GOU, through the WCAs, would recover the rehabilitation costs by charging a levy over a period of 20 years starting after the works have been completed. It was also assumed that an interest rate of 5 percent per year”.

However, in Chapter 19 “Credit, terms of provision and repayment schedule of the loan” of the project FS that is approved by the resolution of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated January 19, 2010 # ПП-1265 it is mentioned that “…loan repayment will be made with state budget funds”.

Therefore, we suggest to exclude para 9 of Annex 3 of the draft report (page 35) as all expenses for rehabilitation and construction of irrigation and drainage system will be paid from the state budget.

2. In para 55 of Chapter 2 (page 17) it is said “… about 25 percent of the total credit amount was left undisbursed”.

For rehabilitation of inter-farm and intra-farm irrigation systems the project envisaged about US$ 9.43 million, which is 14 percent of the total credit amount. Contractors of two contracts disbursed US$5.4 million, didn’t disburse US$ 4 million, or 6 percent of the total credit amount.

Considering this it is proposed to change “25 percent” to “6 percent.

3. In line 9 of the table Component B “Institutional Strengthening and Agricultural Development Support” (page 29) it is mentioned “Laser leveling techniques PL-5 costed US$ 3,112”.

As this information is not correspondent to the factual indicators, it is necessary to change above mentioned words for “Laser leveler PL-5 with set cost US$19,450 and contract amount of US$148,598”

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Not applicable.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Appraisal Document of July 28, 2009 (Report No. 49393-UZ)

2. Financing Agreement between Republic of Uzbekistan and IDA, 4648-UZ February 9, 2010

3. Project Restructuring Papers:

Restructuring Paper of April 30, 2015 (Report No. RES18465)

Restructuring Paper of December 28, 2015 (Report No. RES22339)

Restructuring Paper of July 28, 2016 (Report No. RES23660)

4. Aide Mémoires for the missions of

October 2–21, 2011

April 2–21, 2012

October 1–19, 2012

November 10–22, 2013

May 19–23, 2014

October 8–23 and November 20–December 5, 2014

November 30–December 11, 2015

May 30–June 10, 2016

5. Implementation Status and Results Reports (Sequence No. 1–13)

6. Country Partnership Strategy for Republic of Uzbekistan for the period FY2012–15 (November 1, 2011; Report No. 65028-UZ)

7. Country Partnership Framework for Uzbekistan for the period FY2016–20 (May 19, 2016; Report No. 105771-UZ)

8. M&E Consultancy Services for FVWRMP-I Project- Preliminary Project Impact Evaluation Report, July 2016

9. M&E Consultancy Services for FVWRMP-I Project- Baseline Survey Report, March 2012

10. M&E Consultancy Services for FVWRMP-I Project- Report on Demonstration Plots, December 2015

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11. M&E Consultancy Services for FVWRMP-1 - Quarterly Reports

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MAP