doctrines - annulment cases 2010-13

8/12/2019 Doctrines - Annulment Cases 2010-13

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Republic vs. EncelanG.R. No. 170022January 9, 2013

The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed thatpsychological incapacity contemplates downrightincapacity or inability to take cognizance of and toassume the basic marital obligationsnot merely therefusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the

part of the errant spouse.Article 36 of the Family Codegoverns psychological incapacity as a ground for declarationof nullity of marriage. It provides that [a] marriagecontracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,

was psychologically incapacitated to comply with theessential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise bevoid even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after itssolemnization. In interpreting this provision, the Court hasrepeatedly stressed that psychological incapacitycontemplates downright incapacity or inability to takecognizance of and to assume the basic maritalobligations not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty,much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The

plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridicalantecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of thecelebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of thecondition of the errant spouse.

Sexual infidelity and abandonment of theconjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarilyconstitute psychological incapacity; these are simply

grounds for legal separation.Sexual infidelity and

abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do notnecessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these aresimply grounds for legal separation. To constitutepsychological incapacity, it must be shown that theunfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of adisordered personality that completely prevented the erringspouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. Noevidence on record exists to support Cesars allegation thatLolitas infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of

any psychological illness.

Aside from the time element involved, a wifespsychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply beequated with her professional/work relationship;workplace obligations and responsibilities are polesapart from their marital counterparts.Cesarmistakenly relied on Dr. Flores psychological evaluationreport on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological

incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established


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that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas interpersonal problemswith co-workers, to our mind, does not suffice as aconsideration for the conclusion that she wasat the time of

her marriagepsychologically incapacitated to enter into amarital union with Cesar. Aside from the time elementinvolved, a wifes psychological fitness as a spouse cannotsimply be equated with her professional/work relationship;workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apartfrom their marital counterparts. While both spring fromhuman relationship, their relatedness and relevance to oneanother should be fully established for them to be comparedor to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To

be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared andsubmitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores furtherbelief that Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified areluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a meregeneralization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rashconclusion that this Court cannot support.

Marriage is an inviolable social institutionprotected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved

in favor of its existence and continuation and againstits dissolution and nullity.Once again, we stress thatmarriage is an inviolable social institution protected by theState. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existenceand continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. Itcannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor bytransgressions made by one party to the other during themarriage.

Mendoza vs. RepublicG.R. No. 157649

November 12, 2012

The Supreme Court is mindful of the policy of the1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen thefamily as the basic autonomous social institution andmarriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, anydoubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the

marriage.In Hernandez, 320 SCRA 76 (1999), weruminated that: xxx expert testimony should have beenpresented to establish the precise cause of privaterespondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order toshow that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Theburden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage restsupon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family asthe basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the


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foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolvedin favor of the validity of the marriage.

By the very nature of cases involving the

application of Article 36 of the Family Code, it islogical and understandable to give weight to theexpert opinions furnished by psychologists regardingthe psychological temperament of parties in order todetermine the root cause, juridical antecedence,

gravity and incurability of the psychologicalincapacity.The totality of the evidence proving suchincapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was thecrucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v.

Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694 (2009): By the very nature ofcases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical andunderstandable to give weight to the expert opinionsfurnished by psychologists regarding the psychologicaltemperament of parties in order to determine the rootcause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of thepsychological incapacity. However, such opinions, whilehighly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in grantingpetitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,

courts must treat such opinions as decisive but notindispensable evidence in determining the merits of a givencase. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enoughto sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actualmedical or psychological examination of the personconcerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in anyother given case presented before it, must always base itsdecision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by theparties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the

course of the proceedings.

It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in allthe other cases they try, must always base their

judgments not solely on the expert opinions presentedby the parties but on the totality of evidence adducedin the course of their proceedings.Even if the expertopinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non inthe granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of

marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was tobe dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presentedwas enough to support a finding of his psychologicalincapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of anyform of medical or psychological evidence to show thepsychological incapacity would have automatically ensuredthe granting of the petition for declaration of nullity ofmarriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein,was the presence of evidence that can adequately establish

the partys psychological condition, as the Court said in


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Marcos. But where, like here, the parties had the fullopportunity to present the professional and expert opinionsof psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity andincurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the

opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trialcourts in order to determine and decide whether or not todeclare the nullity of the marriages. It bears repeating thatthe trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, mustalways base their judgments not solely on the expertopinions presented by the parties but on the totality ofevidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less

than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes aparty to be truly incognitive of the basic maritalcovenants that must concomitantly be assumed anddischarged by the parties to the marriage that, as soexpressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, includetheir mutual obligations to live together, to observelove, respect and fidelity, and to render help and

support.We have time and again held that psychologicalincapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not

physical, incapacity that causes a party to be trulyincognitive of the basic marital covenants that mustconcomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties tothe marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of theFamily Code, include their mutual obligations to livetogether, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to renderhelp and support. We have also held that the intendment ofthe law has been to confine the meaning of psychologicalincapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders

clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability togive meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify aspsychological incapacity as a ground for nullification ofmarriage, a persons psychological affliction must be graveand serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehendand comply with the essential objects of marriage, includingthe rights and obligations between husband and wife. Theaffliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage,and must be incurable.

Republic vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 159594

November 12, 2012

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of theFamily Code contemplates an incapacity or inability totake cognizance of and to assume basic maritalobligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or

neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill


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will.Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the FamilyCode contemplates an incapacity or inability to takecognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, andis not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the

performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of:(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials ofmarriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essentialobligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, thecommunity of life and love, the rendering of mutual help,and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) theinability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibilityand duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential

that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing sodue to some psychological illness.

Psychological incapacity should refer to a mentalincapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitiveof the basic marital covenants such as thoseenumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and mustbe characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence andincurability.In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20

(1995), we decreed that psychological incapacity shouldrefer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be trulyincognitive of the basic marital covenants such as thoseenumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must becharacterized by gravity, juridical antecedence andincurability.

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged tobe psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in

complying with his marital obligations, or wasunwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of anatal or supervening disabling factoran adverseintegral element in the respondents personality

structure that effectively incapacitated him fromcomplying with his essential marital obligationsmustbe shown.We held in Suazo v. Suazo, 615 SCRA 154(2010), that there must be proof of a natal or superveningdisabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent

spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations,viz.: It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to bepsychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complyingwith his marital obligations, or was unwilling to performthese obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disablingfactoran adverse integral element in the respondentspersonality structure that effectively incapacitated him fromcomplying with his essential marital obligationsmust beshown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance

of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is


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different from incapacity rooted in some debilitatingpsychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity andirresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a

finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as thesame may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingnessto assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Abandonment is not one of the grounds for thenullity of marriage under the Family Code; Sexualinfidelity is not a valid ground for the nullity ofmarriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.Theonly fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in

her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home tolive with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of thegrounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. Itdid not also constitute psychological incapacity, it beinginstead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) ofthe Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelitywas not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage underArticle 36 of the Family Code, considering that there shouldbe a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation

of a disordered personality that made her completely unableto discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

Kalaw vs. FernandezG.R. No. 166357

September 19, 2011

Psychological incapacity is the downrightincapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume the basic marital obligations; The burden ofproving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff;The psychological problem must be grave, must haveexisted at the time of marriage, and must beincurable.Psychological incapacity is the downrightincapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assumethe basic marital obligations. The burden of provingpsychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff mustprove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her

actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorderthat completely disables him or her from understanding anddischarging the essential obligations of the marital state.The psychological problem must be grave, must haveexisted at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legalseparation, but it does not necessarily constitutepsychological incapacity.Even assuming arguendo that

petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an


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extramarital affair with another man, that one instance ofsexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessiveneed for attention from other men. Sexual infidelityper seisa ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily

constitute psychological incapacity.

Republic vs. GalangG.R. No. 168335

June 6, 2011

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)incurability.In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,

240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Court first declared thatpsychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)gravity; (b) juridicalantecedence; and (c) incurability.The defect should refer to no less than a mental (notphysical) incapacity that causes a party to be trulyincognitive of the basic marital covenants thatconcomitantlymust be assumed and discharged by the parties to themarriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases ofpersonality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter

insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tothe marriage. We laid down more definitive guidelines inthe interpretation and application of Article 36 of the FamilyCode inRepublic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals andRoridel Olaviano Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), whosesalient points are footnoted below. These guidelinesincorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos.

Ting v. Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694 (2009), laid to

rest any question regarding the continuedapplicability of Republic v. Court of Appeals andMolina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997).Our 2009 ruling inEdward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,579 SCRA 193 (2009),placed some cloud in the continuedapplicability of the time-tested Molinaguidelines. We statedin this case that instead of serving as a guideline, Molinaunintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all casesinvolving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by

it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since nopsychological incapacity case can be considered ascompletely on all fours with another. Benjamin G. Ting v.Carmen M. Velez-Ting and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. AngelitoSuazo, 582 SCRA 694 (2009), however, laid to rest anyquestion regarding the continued applicability of Molina. Inthese cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandonMolina. Far from abandoning Molina, Ngo Te simplysuggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We

also explained that Suazo that Ngo Temerely stands for a


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more flexible approach in considering petitions fordeclaration of nullity of marriages based on psychologicalincapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be more than just adifficulty, refusal or neglect in the performanceof some marital obligationsit is essential that the

spouse must be shown to be incapable of doing sobecause of some psychological, not physical, illness.The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a)refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left theirchild to the care of their neighbors when she went out of thehouse; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00

that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole therespondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw themoney deposited in his account; (e) falsified therespondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) madeup false stories in order to borrow money from theirrelatives; and (g) indulged in gambling. These acts, to ourmind, do not per se rise to the level of psychologicalincapacity that the law requires. We stress thatpsychological incapacity must be more than just a

difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of somemarital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. NormaCuison-Melgar, et al., 486 SCRA 177 (2006), we ruled that itis not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet hisresponsibility and duty as a married person; it is essentialthat he or she must be shown to be incapableof doing sobecause of some psychological, not physical, illness.In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disablingfactor in the personan adverse integral element in the

personality structure that effectively incapacitates theperson from really accepting and thereby complying with theobligations essential to marriagehad to be shown. A causehas to be shown and linked with the manifestations of thepsychological incapacity.

If the incapacity can be proven by independentmeans, no reason exists why such independent proofcannot be admitted to support a conclusion of

psychological incapacity, independently of apsychologists examination and report.To begin with,the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived herconclusions exclusively from the information given her bythe respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description ofJuvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, apsychological evaluation based on this one-sided descriptionalone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. Weare of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos that

the person sought to be declared psychologically


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incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as acondition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If theincapacity can be proven by independent means, no reasonexists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to

support a conclusion of psychological incapacity,independently of a psychologists examination and report. Inthis case, however, no such independent evidence has everbeen gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence fromindependent sources who intimately knew Juvy before andafterthe celebration of her marriage would have made a lotof difference and could have added weight to thepsychologists report.

The psychologists report that the spouse lacksthe initiative to change and that her mentalincapacity appears incorrigible are insufficient to

prove that her mental condition could not be treated,or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond hermeans to undertake.In the end, the psychologistopinedwithout stating the psychological basis for herconclusionthat there is sufficient reason to believe thatthe defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to

perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their onlyson. We find this kind of conclusion and report grosslyinadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not evenidentify the types of psychological tests which sheadministered on the respondent and the root causeof Juvyspsychological condition. We also stress that the acts allegedto have been committed by Juvy all occurred during themarriage; there was no showing that any mental disorderexisted at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report

failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys allegedcondition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorderis serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with hermarital duties. Significantly, the report did not evencategorically state the particular type of personality disorderfound. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurabilityof Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvylacks the initiative to change and that her mentalincapacity appears incorrigible are insufficient to prove

that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it wereotherwise, the cure would be beyond her means toundertake.

To be declared clinically or medically incurable isone thingto refuse or be reluctant to change isanother.The psychologists court testimony fared nobetter in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity orincurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she

merely reiterated what she wrote in her reporti.e., that


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Juvy was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong andkuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent;deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her childwithout linking these to an underlying psychological cause.

Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurred during themarriage. The testimony was totally devoid of anyinformation or insight into Juvys early life and associations,how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, andhow the symptoms of a disordered personality developed.Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history ofJuvys psychological condition and to relate it to an existingincapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of

gravity and incurability. In these respects, she merely statedthat despite the respondents efforts to show love andaffection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise,she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to beincurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure.These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravityor incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. Tobe declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; torefuse or be reluctant to change is another. To hark back to

what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refersonly to the most serious cases of personality disordersclearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability togive meaning and significance to the marriage.

Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals asituation where the parties, or one of them, could nothave validly entered into a marriage by reason of a

grave and serious psychological illness existing at the

time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled touphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.TheConstitution sets out a policy of protecting andstrengthening the family as the basic social institution, andmarriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as aninviolable institution protected by the State, cannot bedissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for thedeclaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof toshow the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the

evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where theparties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into amarriage by reason of a grave and serious psychologicalillness existing at the time it was celebrated, we arecompelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

Aurelio vs. AurelioG.R. No. 175367

June 6, 2011


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Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actionsfor annulment of marriage.Before anything else, itbears to point out that had respondents complaint been

filed after March 15, 2003, this present petition would havebeen denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No.02-11-10 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss inactions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after acircumspect review of the arguments raised by petitionerherein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.

Guidelines in the Disposition of Cases InvolvingPsychological Incapacity (Molina Guidelines).In

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 639 (1997), thisCourt created the Molinaguidelines to aid the courts in thedisposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, towit: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriagebelongs to the plaintiff. (2) The root cause of thepsychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinicallyidentified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficientlyproven by experts and (d) clearly explained in thedecision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing

at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (4) Suchincapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinicallypermanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be graveenough to bring about the disability of the party to assumethe essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essentialmarital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband andwife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Codein regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied

marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,proven by evidence and included in the text of thedecision. (7) Interpretations given by the NationalAppellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in thePhilippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be givengreat respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must orderthe prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor Generalto appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall behanded down unless the Solicitor General issues a

certification, which will be quoted in the decision,briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreementor opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the Molina Guidelines, particularlySection 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification ofthe Solicitor General is dispensed with to avoiddelay.This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court

Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above


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pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, statingthat the certification of the Solicitor General required in theMolina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the

prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to be on behalf of theState to take steps to prevent collusion between the partiesand to take care that evidence is not fabricated orsuppressed.

Whether or not the spouses are psychologicallyincapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is amatter for the trial court to decide at the firstinstance.It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner

and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfilltheir marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide atthe first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines wouldshow that the same contemplate a situation wherein theparties have presented their evidence, witnesses havetestified, and that a decision has been reached by the courtafter due hearing. Such process can be gleaned fromguidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered bythe RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too

burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instancewhether the allegations contained in the petition aresufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity.Let it be remembered that each case involving theapplication of Article 36 must be treated distinctly andjudged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,predilections or generalizations but according to its ownattendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on acase-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of

experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and bydecisions of church tribunals. It would thus be more prudentfor this Court to remand he case to the RTC, as it would bein the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hearand weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of theordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by theparties.

Marable vs. Marable

G.R. No. 178741January 17, 2011

Psychological incapacity must refer to no lessthan a mental incapacity that causes a party to betruly incognitive of the basic marital covenants thatconcomitantly must be assumed and discharged bythe parties to the marriage.The term psychologicalincapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under

Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious


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psychological illness afflicting a party even before thecelebration of the marriage. These are the disorders thatresult in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflictedparty to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or

she has contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to noless than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes aparty to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenantsthat concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by theparties to the marriage.

The psychological illness and its root cause mustbe proven to exist from the inception of themarriage.In cases of annulment of marriage based on

Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychologicalillness and its root cause must be proven to exist from theinception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctlyruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the rootcause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. Theevaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusionthat petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social PersonalityDisorder but there was no factual basis stated for the findingthat petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious,

impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.

Personal differences do not reflect a personalitydisorder tantamount to psychological incapacity.Thespouses frequent marital squabbles and differences inhandling finances and managing their business affairs, aswell as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are notmanifestations of psychological incapacity which may be aground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even

admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they hadhappy moments together. Also, the records would show thatthe petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and infact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, mostespecially his children. Their personal differences do notreflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychologicalincapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a

difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance ofsome marital obligations.It bears stressing thatpsychological incapacity must be more than just adifficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of somemarital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concernedparty was incapable of doing so, due to some psychologicalillness existing at the time of the celebration of themarriage.

Ochosa vs. Olano


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G.R. No. 167459January 26, 2011

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by

(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)incurability.In the landmark case of Santos v. Court ofAppeals, we observed that psychological incapacity must becharacterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious suchthat the party would be incapable of carrying out theordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted inthe history of the party antedating the marriage, althoughthe overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage;

and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, thecure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Article 36 of the Family Code does not reallydissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that therenever was any marriage in the first place.It is alsoestablished in jurisprudence that from these requirementsarise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does notreally dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there

never was any marriage in the first place because theafflictionalready then existingwas so grave andpermanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness ofthe duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he orshe was to assume or had assumed.

Article 36 of the Family Code is not to beconfused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bondat the time the causes therefore manifest

themselves.We have stressed time and again that Article36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorcelaw that cuts the marital bond at the time the causestherefore manifest themselves. It refers to a seriouspsychological illness afflicting a party even before thecelebration of the marriage.

Yambao vs. RepublicG.R. No. 184063

January 24, 2011

Court should interpret Article 36 of the FamilyCode on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,the findings of experts and researchers in

psychological disciplines, and by decisions of churchtribunals.Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recentpronouncement that each case for declaration of nullityunder the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the

basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or


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generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, torepeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings ofexperts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by

decisions of church tribunals. Judicial understanding ofpsychological incapacity may be informed by evolvingstandards, taking into account the particulars of each case,current trends in psychological and even canonical thought,and experience.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)incurability; These guidelines do not require that a

physician examine the person to be declaredpsychologically incapacitated; The root cause may bemedically or clinically identified.In Santos v. Courtof Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Court held thatpsychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Theseguidelines do not require that a physician examine theperson to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,the root cause may be medically or clinically identified.

What is important is the presence of evidence that canadequately establish the party's psychological condition. Ifthe totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain afinding of psychological incapacity, then actual medicalexamination of the person concerned need not be resortedto.

For a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 ofthe Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated

spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental(not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to betruly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.Theintendment of the law has been to confine the application ofArticle 36 to the most serious cases of personality disordersclearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability togive meaning and significance to the marriage. Thus, for amarriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code,the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to

suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity thatcauses him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic maritalcovenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as todeprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilitiesof the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability totake cognizance of and to assume basic maritalobligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or

neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill


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psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,juridical antecedence, and incurability can be dulyestablished.In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20(1995), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity

must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridicalantecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no lessthan a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a partyto be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants thatconcomitantly must be assumed and discharged by theparties to the marriage. It must be confined to the mostserious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrativeof an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning andsignificance to the marriage. We laid down more definitiveguidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals (theMolina case) x x x These guidelines incorporate the basicrequirements we established in Santos. A later case, Marcosv. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000), further clarified that thereis no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouseshould be personally examined by a physician orpsychologist as a condition sine qua nonfor the declarationof nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.

Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expertopinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code ifthe totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacityexists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurabilitycan be duly established.

Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193 (2009), did notabandon Molina (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268SCRA 198 [1997])far from abandoning Molina, it

simply suggested the relaxation of its stringentrequirements Ngo Te merely stands for a moreflexible approach in considering petitions fordeclaration of nullity of marriages based on

psychological incapacity.A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,579 SCRA 193 (2009), declared that it may have beeninappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, asthe one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychologicalincapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a guideline,

Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing allcases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and bebound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of thelaw but unrealistic as well because, with respect topsychological incapacity, no case can be considered as onall fours with another. NgoTe, therefore, put into questionthe applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina.Ting v. Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694 (2009), and the fairlyrecent case of Suazo v. Suazo, 615 SCRA 154 (2010),

squarely met the issue and laid to rest any question


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regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, weclarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far fromabandoning Molina,it simply suggested the relaxation of itsstringent requirements. We also explained in Suazothat Ngo

Temerely stands for a more flexible approach in consideringpetitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based onpsychological incapacity.

The intent of the law has been to confine themeaning of psychological incapacity to the most

serious cases of personality disordersexisting at thetime of the marriageclearly demonstrating an utterinsensitivity or inability to give meaning and

significance to the marriage.These exchanges duringtrial significantly constituted the totality of the petitionerstestimony on the respondents supposed psychological ormental malady. We glean from these exchanges thepetitioners theory that the respondents psychologicalincapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness toperform certain marital obligations, and a number ofunpleasant personality traits such as immaturity,irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view,

do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that thelaw requires, and should be distinguished from thedifficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in theperformance of some marital obligations that characterizesome marriages. The intent of the law has been to confinethe meaning of psychological incapacity to the most seriouscases of personality disordersexisting at the time of themarriageclearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity orinability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party atthe inception of the marriage should be a malady so graveand permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the dutiesand responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she isabout to assume.

If a psychological disorder can be proven byindependent means, no reason exists why suchindependent proof cannot be admitted and given

credit.We do not suggest that a personal examination ofthe party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated ismandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcosthat theperson sought to be declared psychologically incapacitatedmust be personally examined by a psychologist as acondition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If apsychological disorder can be proven by independent means,no reason exists why such independent proof cannot beadmitted and given credit. No such independent evidence


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appears on record, however, to have been gathered in thiscase.

Insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional

immaturity, and irresponsibility, do not by themselveswarrant a finding of psychological incapacity under

Article 36 of the Family Code.Dr. Patacs PsychiatricEvaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity orseriousnessof the respondents condition. He simply madean enumeration of the respondents purported behavioraldefects (as related to him by third persons), and on thisbasis characterized the respondent to be suffering frommixed personality disorder. In the Background History

portion of his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patacmentioned that the respondent employed one of her siblingsto do the household chores; did not help in augmenting thefamilys earnings; belittled the petitioners income;continued her studies despite the petitioners disapproval;seldom stayed at home; became close to a male border;had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual dateof her departure to Taiwan; threatened to poison thepetitioner and their children; neglected and ignored their

children; used her maiden name at work; and consulted awitch doctor to bring bad fate to the petitioner. Except forthe isolated and unfounded statement that Erlindas lack ofmotivation and insight greatly affected her capacity torender love, respect and support to the family, there wasno other statement regarding the degree of severity of therespondents condition, why and to what extent the disorderis grave, and how it incapacitated her to comply with theduties required in marriage. There was likewise no showing

of a supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychologicalcondition that effectively incapacitated the respondent fromcomplying with the essential marital obligations. At any rate,the personality flaws mentioned above, even if true, couldonly amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotionalimmaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not by themselveswarrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36of the Family Code.

Admittedly, the standards used by the Court inassessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluationreports may be deemed very strict, but these are

proper, in view of the principle that any doubt shouldbe resolved in favor of the validity of the marriageand the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing thesufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may bedeemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the

principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the


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validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the maritalvinculum. Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by theState, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties,especially where the prices of evidence presented are

grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravityand incurability of the condition of the party alleged to bepsychologically incapacitated to assume and perform theessential marital duties.

Baccay vs. BaccayG.R. No. 173138

December 1, 2010

The phrase psychological incapacity is notmeant to comprehend all possible cases of

psychosesit refers to no less than a mental (notphysical) incapacity that causes a party to be trulynoncognitive of the basic marital covenants thatconcomitantly must be assumed and discharged bythe parties to the marriage which, as expressed by

Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutualobligations to live together, observe love, respect and

fidelity and render help and support.The Court held inSantos v. Court of Appeals that the phrase psychologicalincapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases ofpsychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical)incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of thebasic marital covenants that concomitantly must beassumed and discharged by the parties to the marriagewhich, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,include their mutual obligations to live together, observe

love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. Theintendment of the law has been to confine it to the mostserious of cases of personality disorders clearlydemonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to givemeaning and significance to the marriage.

Guidelines in Resolving Petitions for Declarationof Nullity of Marriage.In Republic of the Phils. v. Courtof Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), the Court laid down the

guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity ofmarriage, based onArticle 36 of the Family Code, to wit: (1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of themarriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should beresolved in favor of the existence and continuation ofthe marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and ourlaws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the

Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It


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decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protectingit from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both thefamily and marriage are to be protected by the state. TheFamily Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and

the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolabilityand solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychologicalincapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven byexperts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must bepsychologicalnot physical, although its manifestationsand/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence mustconvince the court that the parties, or one of them, was

mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the personcould not have known the obligations he wasassuming, or knowing them, could not have givenvalid assumption thereof. Although no example of suchincapacity need be given here so as not to limit theapplication of the provision under the principle of ejusdemgeneris, nevertheless such root cause must be identified asa psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fullyexplained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified

psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacitymust be proven to be existing at the time of thecelebration of the marriage. The evidence must showthat the illness was existing when the parties exchangedtheir I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not beperceivable at such time, but the illness itself must haveattached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Suchincapacity must also be shown to be medically orclinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may

be absolute or even relative only in regard to the otherspouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of thesame sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must berelevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,not necessarily to those not related to marriage, likethe exercise of a profession or employment in a job.Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosingillnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure thembut may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,bear and raise his/her own children as an essentialobligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be graveenough to bring about the disability of the party to assumethe essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mildcharacteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasionalemotional outbursts cannot be accepted as rootcauses. Theillness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In otherwords, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the

person, an adverse integral element in the personality


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structure that effectively incapacitates the person fromreally accepting and thereby complying with the obligationsessential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligationsmust be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well asArticles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard toparents and their children. Such non-complied maritalobligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven byevidence and included in the text of the decision. (7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate MatrimonialTribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while notcontrolling or decisive, should be given great respect by ourcourts. x x x x x x x (8) The trial court must order the

prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General toappear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handeddown unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating thereinhis reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case maybe, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with theprosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court suchcertification within fifteen (15) days from the date the caseis deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor

General shall discharge the equivalent function of thedefensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

Psychological incapacity must be more than just adifficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the

performance of some marital obligationsanunsatisfactory marriage is not a null and voidmarriage.The Court emphasizes that the burden fallsupon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent

suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that suchpsychological disorder renders her truly incognitive of thebasic marital covenants that concomitantly must beassumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.Psychological incapacity must be more than just adifficulty, a refusal,or a neglect in the performance ofsome marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not anull and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos,343 SCRA 755 (2000): Article 36 of the Family Code, we

stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts themarital bond at the time the causes therefor manifestthemselves. It refers to a serious psychological illnessafflicting a party even before the celebration of themarriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as todeprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilitiesof the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Toring vs. Toring

G.R. No. 162025


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August 3, 2010

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of theFamily Code must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)

juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to besufficient basis to annul a marriage.In the leadingcase of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., 240 SCRA 20(1995), we held that psychological incapacity under Article36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity,(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to besufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychologicalincapacity should refer to no less than a mental (notphysical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly

incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantlymust be assumed and discharged by the parties to themarriage.

The psychological illness and its root cause musthave been there from the inception of the marriage.Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacityapplied these basic guidelines to varying factual situations,thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos.

In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, whatshould not be lost in reading and applying our establishedrulings is the intent of the law to confine the application ofArticle 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases ofpersonality disorders; these are the disorders that result inthe utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to givemeaning and significance to the marriage he or shecontracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and itsroot cause must have been there from the inception of the

marriage. From these requirements arise the concept thatArticle 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve amarriage; it simply recognizes that there never was anymarriage in the first place because the afflictionalreadythen existingwas so grave and permanent as to deprivethe afflicted party of awareness of the duties andresponsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was toassume or had assumed.

Court has long been negatively critical inconsidering psychological evaluations, presented inevidence, derived solely from one-sided sources,

particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of themarriage.We are in no way convinced that a merenarration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson,coupled with the results of the psychological testsadministered only on Ricardo, without more, alreadyconstitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita

suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court


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has long been negatively critical in considering psychologicalevaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking thenullity of the marriage.

The law does not require that the allegedlyincapacitated spouse be personally examined by a

physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine quanon for the declaration of nullity of marriage under

Article 36 of the Family Code.To be sure, we haverecognized that the law does not require that the allegedlyincapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physicianor by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the

declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of theFamily Code. This recognition, however, does not signifythat the evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should beany less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by itsnature, requires.

Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in theperformance of marital obligations or ill will on thepart of the spouse is different from incapacity

rooted on some debilitatingpsychological condition orillness.Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was asquanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, findRicardos characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitutepsychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability totake cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations.Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performanceof marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is

different from incapacity rooted on some debilitatingpsychological condition or illness.

In order for sexual infidelity to constitute aspsychological incapacity, the respondentsunfaithfulness must be established as a manifestationof a disordered personality completely preventing therespondent from discharging the essential obligationsof the marital state; There must be proof of a natal or

supervening disabling factor that effectivelyincapacitated her from complying with the obligationto be faithful to her spouse.Teresitas alleged infidelity,even if true, likewise does not constitute psychologicalincapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order forsexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, therespondents unfaithfulness must be established as amanifestation of a disordered personality, completelypreventing the respondent from discharging the essential

obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a


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natal or supervening disabling factor that effectivelyincapacitated her from complying with the obligation to befaithful to her spouse.

Article 36 of the Family Code requires that thepsychological incapacity must exist at the time of thecelebration of the marriage, even if such incapacitybecomes manifest only after its solemnization.Ricardo failed to prove that Teresitas alleged charactertraits already existed at the inception of their marriage.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychologicalincapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of themarriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only

after its solemnization. In the absence of this element, amarriage cannot be annulled under Article 36.

Ruling in Barcelona does not do away with theroot cause requirement; the ruling simply meansthat the statement of the root cause does not need tobe in medical terms or be technical in nature, as theroot causes of many psychological disorders are stillunknown to science.Contrary to Ricardos position,

Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 412 SCRA 41 (2003), doesnot do away with the root cause requirement. The rulingsimply means that the statement of the root cause does notneed to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as theroot causes of many psychological disorders are stillunknown to science. It is enough to merely allege thephysical manifestations constituting the root cause of thepsychological incapacity.

What the Rules really eliminated was the need foran expert opinion to prove the root cause of the

psychological incapacity.As we explained in Barcelona,the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition forannulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was notdispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rulesreally eliminated was the need for an expert opinion toprove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. TheCourt further held that the Rules, being procedural in

nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at thetime of their adoption.

Camacho-Reyes vs. ReyesG.R. No. 185286August 18, 2010

Courts should be extra careful before making afinding of psychological incapacity or vicariously

diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where


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there are none; Blind adherence by the courts to theexhortation in the Constitution and in our statutesthat marriage is an inviolable social institution, andvalidating a marriage that is null and void despite

convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trencheson the very reason why a marriage that is doomedfrom its inception should not be forcibly inflicted uponits hapless partners for life.This case is, again, aninstance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extracareful before making a finding of psychological incapacity orvicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouseswhere there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence

by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution and inour statutes that marriage is an inviolable social institution,and validating a marriage that is null and void despiteconvincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on thevery reason why a marriage that is doomed from itsinception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its haplesspartners for life.

The factors characterizing psychological

incapacity to perform the essential marital obligationsare: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3)incurability.Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20(1995), solidified the jurisprudential foundation of theprinciple that the factors characterizing psychologicalincapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are:(1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability.We explained: The incapacity must be grave or serious suchthat the party would be incapable of carrying out the

ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted inthe history of the party antedating the marriage, althoughthe overt manifestations may emerge only after themarriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it wereotherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the partyinvolved.

The lack of personal examination and interview ofthe respondent, or any other person diagnosed with

personality disorder, does not per se invalidate thetestimonies of the doctors, and neither do theirfindings automatically constitute hearsay that wouldresult in their exclusion as evidence.Notwithstandingthese telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, thetestimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsaysince they never personally examined and interviewed therespondent. We do not agree with the CA. The lack ofpersonal examination and interview of the respondent, or

any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does


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notper seinvalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neitherdo their findings automatically constitute hearsay that wouldresult in their exclusion as evidence. For one, marriage, byits very definition, necessarily involves only two persons.

The totality of the behavior of one spouse during thecohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinelywitnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the expertstestified on their individual assessment of the present stateof the parties marriage from the perception of one of theparties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during theirmarriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience,respondents pattern of behavior which she could thenvalidly relay to the clinical psychologists and the

psychiatrist. For another, the clinical psychologists andpsychiatrists assessment were not based solely on thenarration or personal interview of the petitioner. Otherinformants such as respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified ontheir own observations of respondents behavior andinteractions with them, spanning the period of time theyknew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctorsassessments.

Within their acknowledged field of expertise,doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a

person based on a number of factors culled fromvarious sources.Within their acknowledged field ofexpertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make upof a person based on a number of factors culled from varioussources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder willnot necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this

case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested ina pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondentconsisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separatediagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannottrump the clinical findings of experts.

A recommendation for therapy does notautomatically imply curability.The CA declared that,based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the

psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable. Theappellate court is mistaken. A recommendation for therapydoes not automatically imply curability. In general,recommendations for therapy are given by clinicalpsychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. InKaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis ofPsychiatry, treatment, ranging from psychotherapy topharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personalitydisorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans

recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy


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does not necessarily negate the finding that respondentspsychological incapacity is incurable.

In the field of psychological incapacity as a

ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to saythat no case is on all fours with another casethetrial judge must take pains in examining the factualmilieu and the appellate court must, as much as

possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for thatof the trial court.All told, it is wise to be reminded of thecaveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in hisseparate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals andMolina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997): x x x Each case must be

judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,predilections or generalizations but according to its ownfacts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground forannulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is onall fours with another case. The trial judge must take painsin examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must,as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment forthat of the trial court.

Ligeralde vs. PatalinghugG.R. No. 168796April 15, 2010

The incapacity must be grave or serious such thatthe party would be incapable of carrying out theordinary duties required in marriage.Psychologicalincapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a)gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The

incapacity must be grave or serious such that the partywould be incapable of carrying out the ordinary dutiesrequired in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of theparty antedating the marriage, although the overtmanifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It mustbe incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would bebeyond the means of the party involved.

Guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of

nullity of marriage based on psychologicalincapacity.The Court likewise laid down the guidelines inresolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Courtof Appeals, 603 SCRA 604 (2009), Relevant to this petitionare the following: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullityof the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause ofthe psychological incapacity must be medically or clinicallyidentified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by

experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the


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clarified that there is no requirement that thedefendant/respondent spouse should be personallyexamined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sinequa non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on

psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longernecessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition underArticle 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidenceshows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,

juridical antecedence, and incurability can be dulyestablished.

doctrines - annulment cases 2010-13

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