A D-779 566

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS O!? TIlE GUERRILLASTRATEGIES OF MAO AND LAWRENCE

Thomas P. Ranetta

Army War CollegeCarlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

28 Novcmbcr 1973

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A Comparative Analysis of the Guerrilla Student EssayStrategies of Mao and Lawrence 6. PER>ORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

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Colonel Thomas P. Rametta, Field Artillery, USA

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The problem is to compace the guerrilla stzategies of Mao, Tse-tuag

and T. E. Lawrence and to determine whether a broad strategy for guerrillawavfare can be developed. The techniques of Mio and Lawrence were compared,and differences and similarities noted. The techniques were found to beremarkably similar; and the two notable differences, in methods for gainingpopular support and in military objectives, resulted more from differencýes

in environment than in the philosophies of the two men. The Arabs required

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no political indoctrination by Lawrcnce; Mao, howevur, was establishingcommunism in China and, therefore, indoctrinated ali Chinese to accept hisp1A-itical views. Lawrence sought to defeat the T,-Lks through attritionbecause lie had few Arab guerrillas and because the Turks placed high valueon material; Mao sought to annihilate his enemies--Land, unliku Lawrence,jie blcd ample manpower. In all ot!.er respects Mao and Lawrence were muchalike. They both adhered t.o classic guerrilla cot:cspts and their doctrinesere not new. No new concepts for guerrilla warK-mrc need be developed

as the concepts of Mao and Lawrence, themselves, could be expected to besuccessful universally, modified only by such -v,:irtbles as geography andpolitics.

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A CO.PARATT'T - A:;ALYSIS OF THE GUERRILLASTRATEG]IES OF P-IAO AND LA,VREi,CE

"Guerrilla warfare (...) a tyue of warfarecharacterized by irregular forces fighting]small-scale, limited actions, geoerally inconjunction with a large. political-militarystrategy, againot orthodox military forces.The guerrillas (..,) employ highly unorthodoxtactics which (...) embrace all aspects ofpsycholog~ical warfare. (...) Guerrillawarfare (...) may be employed independently,or it may be used to complement orthodoxmilitary onerations in which case it can beemployed insido enemy territory or in thoseareas which I,'ve been seized and occupiedby an enemy.

The broad general strategies of guerrilla warfare are those of

continuous harrassment accompanied by extremely subtle, flexibletactics designed to wear down the enemy while gaining time toeither develop sufficient military strength to defeaT him in

orthodox battle or to subjcct him to political and military

embodies political, social, economic, and psychological factors

to which the military element is often subordinated. In short,

guerrilla warfar6 is based on deceptior and surprise, the avoid-

ance of strength and exploitation of weakness. Guerrilla war-

fare, by its very nature, is dependent on partisan support bythe populace-at-large, or at least by sizable seonents of the

local people. A common objective in many guerrilla operations

has been to senarate enemy forces from their supply lines, cuttheir line3 of communications and, to paraphrase Denis Davidov,

destroy units while their wagons are waiting to join them,

inflict surprise blows on the enemy when they are without food2

or ammunition and at the same time block his retreat.History is replete with countless examples of guerrilla

actions, beginning with independent operations of peasant bands

which were of little consequence and culminating with theseactions which were planned in conjunction with and complemented

the efforts of regular forves. Ir modern days, guerrilla war-

fare evolved feom the loosely knitted bands of riflelen in the

-I

American Revolution, in particular those led by r'ranc 1 (the

"Swa� 1p Fux�) Marion in South Carolina, who wore so effec tive

against the fo�nally trained and regimented British, Since

then, c�uerrVlla warfaro was used successfully by Spanish and

Port�.wese in supuort of Wellington against the French of

Napoleon: by the Ceinese peasants in the rplai P'irig Rebellion;

by John Pomy in suonort. of the Confederacy during toe American

Civi2 War: and by Lenin's Bolsheviks circa 1918, to cite but a

few examples. Many leaders have made their eo�rtributiens to the

art of guerrilla warfare, but few have had more si�:nificant

successes than T. E. Lawrence and i.Iao, Tse-tn'<.

Lawrence, a British officer, led a revolt of Arab tribesmen

in a orolonged zuerril la action durin� WorLd iar T. His men

raided the Turkish rail line between Damascus and Mcdin�., arid

later the railway line from Dar'a in the Yarmuk valley to

Jerusalem. His Arab merrillas never fought a major battle,

but their mosquito raids detained 25,OOC to 3U,000 TurkiTh troops.

The Arabs finished the war in coritro of about 100,000 square

ml Les and there Is no question o� their value to General Alienby's

success in driving the Turks out of Palestine ann Arabia.5

Pao, on the other hand, successfully led an insurgent grouc

of Chinese Communists concurrently against the invading Japan-

ese and the Chinese i'ationalist (Kuomintan.') goverr:mept of

Chiang Kal-shek. Liao was deeply concerned with the fate of his

homeland and fellow Chiucse. lie was borf� a peasant, studied to

be a teacher, and later became a.ctive in politics and joined

forees with Chiang Kai-shek. Mow�ver, he became disenamored Wi th

the 7�ationalists in 1925 and became a communist when he discover-

ed the latent strength of the peasants. He initially took to

conventional, po�iti ora� warl'are against the huowH meg Im�cen

*-�f C� 3.an<, C' WV -� 'P. C'. I �Ci-1K �' \P F�2 1 �

F ' �ojs* Be then shoo: off the Russiann, and proCe deci Ou

his fain'us 6,000 mile " Fang Parch" to Ycoan, s bending m ch ti;n�

in meditation. As a res.�1t, he became convinced toat guorcilla

wariare war; the anN way, lie also became undiseuted leader of

the newly organized Chinese Commu'iist Party during this ceriod.

2

Lawrence did niot righ,,It on hiis homeland. but, during his

years of stud~iin,- archeolog,,y in the mrnid-East, cultured a lovefor the Arabs. Althou5gh he, was considered by many to be a

qluasi- or honorary Arab, mevertholess h remaineod a Dritishofficer. Lawrence was a brilianit scholar with an o;c'L-a-ordinarily cl~ar and iotai~ ~t~~ ,±o was educated at(CNf ovd. Just as [Vao had a period of' meditation, the"ogýN'Iarc," (diflng whlich ho formulated lIAs strate~r-ies of ,,uerrilla

warfare, so too, did Lawrence. Tn the case Of Lawrence, itoccurred durinc, TO d-ys of fri-h-tful feve7-r and ysu~ ' whenhe, also, concluded that, the only way w,_39 throu,-h -uerrillawarfare. While bed-ridden, Lawrence considered that it. was amistake to 1inDose Western conce.tions of war' or) 'LhcAriu .

as c'-_ rritlas th-an as discIplined troops.

The nurpose of this -naper if, to cormTare the -uerrilla

strate:-ies of these two mei- -- their attitudes on pomular

supnort, training, tactical- objectives, the value of I ho.1djr i

orthodlox warfare, iplanniing, l~eacle:,shi5, and -their analyses ofthe concer:ts of -)uerrilla warfare; and to Jeterniine xwrhithrr aconcep.t for g7uerrilla warfare can be develone)d which could becxnccted to be successful reg~ardless3 of where eiouloved.

Wi~~~h -' . ,, le-d

had dif Perent oujtlooks-, nlrim-2rly becaus- of the d f'fc rc it

DOrobleris they raced. Fan relie-d almost wholly oni popi' . arsu'rmor L. Wlithout TJo-,u ar ounrert, h2wa!s Convi\r~rC- that -1o

:ru crr il I a o ocra ti1o!-,, c oudI I r-m.a i s u -ccesýs *'u I f r l ong7. He felt

that ;tcghwa-c not In machir es, I.Dit in theý 1penlt_ ~-_ticounitry neas nt-~)t tlie~cutesd was thR key t")

se"ccess' Tlao reco nized the dnrsof l ocalism, Thcrefore,h o c'l 3r-,-ni-_:z,] hi';- Ccnminu.ist Partly tt trai_'1 local popu-

laces euJliticaliy, ei9to -c:1r!)ort hlin puorrUlas in their base

areas. 5 His military tr_.inin;g was rurliimcrtary and em-phasizrod

usc of ti-e simlclst, often "hoTnei made", meap~onry.

Lawrence also realized he would not be suncess.Vul withou-ta sympathetic population, if' n~t onie totally dedicated to his

1 3

support, lie soughlt at lea~st a populationi friendly enou-.Ii to

not betray his movei.'ients to the Tur]7,. As an ultimate Coal,

he wished for civilians who would die for the ideal of frecdorti.

and he considored tha-t th-' nresence of the enemxy was a secondary

matte~r. 'lie could not, count on suchi widesprocad support. Howevcr,he did note that all Arabs had the commuon desire to rid their

counitry of the i-ivadint:: Turks t and he did riot have to indoctrin-

ate his troops into a 1pr'ecise concoot-ioi of the political --oal,"

as 1'ao did. Lawrence, therefore, merely attemrated to koop the

popoulace friendly to him and limited the 6z:-A nin- C, Ili- t;:cD;p

to use of the simple weaponry deemed necessary for the mission:

elementary demoli-tion-- techniques an.-d iig-ht m-achine guns, with

little concern for political indoctrination.

Another basic area of difference between :.:ao and Lawrence,

considered by this student to be the most significant, is in

the olbjective6 souLght by each. To b~ao, the enemny soldier was

the main objective, .Lao used na iy words to express this view.

In his treatise on the strategic problems in11 fig7htingi the Japan-

ese, he said you shiould "gather a biz: force t,.- strike at a quiall

enemy se.g-,ment, and to annihilate the enemy.,") Ile used essentially

the sarme thesis later, when he sai(L that when t~he enem'.y attacks

_uerrilla base areas one should counter with counter-attacls,

encircle him and cut off his fLood suiuply, t~hen annihilate him.7

To Lawrence, on the other han.-d, the objective was not to

lill the enemy soldier (althoug-h he did very well on this score,

indeed) but, rather, to destroy his machines. In Lawrence's

evaLuat1Don t"U1Le '1-rl~ va-Ie UL requ~ ~ u -iiu~e-' iiia.chliixes, whnereas theArabs needed every available nan. Killing Turks was the least

important task; it was more profitable to disregard their

existence or to miake their lives quietly unbearable. K~illing

was -Dure luxury, expensive and unnecessary. 8Lawvrence believed

that his most valuable idea was to "let the Turks remain at".Tedina and retain the 1leJaz railway, and waste their strength

in a futile and self -destructive .-aTme of maintenarce."1 If h

could spread the Turk~ish de-fecnces so thin as to be irncffective,

and be able to disrupt Turkish lines of communication and supply,

!4

Lawrence felt he would best be able to break the Turks' will

to continue fighting.

Interestingly, the objectives of 1,-ao ard Lawrence cano be used

to illustrate the two concepts of strategic surrender defined

by Paul Kecskemeti: rout and attrition.10 I.ao sought to rout

segments of enemy forces, to render them defenseless, and to

disrupt their organizational structure. To Lawrence, however,

the goal was to defeat the Turks through attrition; by deprivingt•,c, :f th. ez-...ntial me.... of wa:ing war as a result of re-lentless attrition inflicted upon their sources of strength bycutting off their supplies.

Both leaders agreed that to seize and hold territory were

not appropriate objectives for their guerrillas. IP. the w•ordsof iao,

"'o gain territory is no cause for joy, andto lose territory is no cause for sorrow. Tolose territory or cities is of no importance."•I" -,--,...rtant t++ _ s to think up methodsfor destroying the enemy. (...) It is al-to,,gether imnroper to defend cities to the ut-most, for this merely leads q sacrificingour own effective strength."

•L

Lawrence agreed with rIao on the relative merits of holding Eterritory and for ve-y practical reasons: he saw that the Arabs,

because of their lack of organization and discipline, would not

and could not attack places held in strcingth; and they could not

deen apont iterý-I vp ttnEld to ina or holdground.

With regard to mobility, both 1.1ao and Lawrence were classicguerrilla leaders. The very cores of the strategies of eachl

epitomized Sun Tzu's concepts of fluidity ;.n gTuerrilla warfare,

Lawrence developed a small, highly mobile force which he usedsuccessfully at distributed points of the Turkish line; and by

making the Arabs "an influence, an idea, a thing; intangible,

invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas,"' 1 2sth

he felt he could gain five times the mobility of the Turks or,

put another way, the Arabs could be on te1ns with t~t T ,-• "

but one-f.ifth thei2 number. To Lawrence, orthodox aimies wer-e

"like plants, imnnobile, firm-rooted, nourished throug.h long, stems

to the head:" and that a re uilar soldier, being] immobile, owned"only what he sat on" and subjug.ated only what he could "pokehis rifle at,'1 3 Or, in the words of 7Cao, "Guerrilla strategymust be based nrimarily or alertness, mobility and attack.""One must select the tactic of seeming to come from the east andattacking fromq the west: avoid the solid, attack the nollow;

attack, withdraw; deliver a li.ghtning blow, seek a lightning do-

cision."1 Lao wrote that, -as opposed to orthodox warfare, whichis frequentl~y static, guerrilla warfare was characterized by

"constant activity and movement. There is inguerrilla warfare no such thin.rý as a decisivebattle; there is nothing comparable to thefixed, passive defense that characterizes ortho-do:e, war. Tn ,uerri]la warfare, the transforma-tion of a moving- situati?:ý into a position:aldefensive never arises," 1'

For ][ao, the fundamental strategzical fonm of guerrilla warfare isthe war of movement.

Both .-ao and Lawrence recognized that guerrilla warfare could

not be effective unless it suronorted larger-scale, orthodox- w.'arfare;

that guerrilla operations were primarily harrassivg in nature. 1Laowrote many words in his Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla W•arfare) on com-paring -guerrilla warfare with reg ular warfare. lie said,

"the concept that guerrilla warfare is an endin itself and t 1 .at guerrilla activities cai.be divorced from those of regular forces isicorrzect. ( .,.) AOpiiiu tha..... ~

existence of g-uerrilla war, but isolates it,is one that does not nroperlp.estirnate thepotentialities of such war."• 0

To Mao, it was wroný. to exarcrerate the function of guerrillas andminimize that of the regular armies. He disagreed with those w•hoadvocated guerrilla warfare as the prinary war strategy or the onlystrategy possible for oopressed peoples. Ilao, particularly

against the Jaranese, made certain that guerrilla forces werefit into their proper niche; -that they did not attempt toassume resnensibilities that should be carried out by orthodoxforces; and that, above all, the inportant function of coordinat-

U

x~ng activities with re7Jilar forcesi must ni-ot' be i(eglected.1

Thus, thou-,h :.ao used ,;uerrilla forces, independently in thleearly stag.es of his wars against the Japanese and the l-ationallstChinese, hie did so only becaus;e hie did not have an- orthiodox,ar~my for then, to com~ple!ment. After his forces evolved into anorthodox isretarmy, ::'ao's -uocrrillas reverted to the role

of connlene-intiig, the re.:ular force:s. This was, Particularly true-ag-ainst the Jananese, wlicýr M-ao descr:ibed as being- too small inn~umber to oceupy a -territocy as, larL*,u,_ c; Olhita. ThLlinly ~¾-a1

the Japanese left m,,any "pockets" of' are-as in-sufficienltly guarded

and oneir to -guerrilla att,-ccs, and -OLlowed the Chinese g-uerrillasto fghtshculder--to-sheulder wi.th. -egýular frorces instead of

being" limited to a minor role. "hs"accord-inre to .!ao, "lis-new to theTw titCnuy.

Mao sunn-,ed u) t6he relationiship of g-uerrilla to rn:-ularoncratiens by sayin- that althoug7h ,n_,errilla oneratiom., a..ttinstthe Japoanecse annoeared naranouixt at tiines, there was never anydoubuG that the reguilar forces were of primary impi-ortance becausethey, alone, were ca 'pable of *producing the deccision. 1

Lawýsornce did not delude himnself with visions of' grandeur for

his g-uerrilla forces, either, he never lost sig-ht of the fact.

that his Pguerrilla forces were only a part of the total forcefic7htic in- Arba; ad that his guerrillas had the srei:Ucie,

mission of dvrigthe Turkus whnile theli regýular D1ritish army-r3ursued the overall g-oal o-' defeating- the Cemn.Indeed,Law,,rence was so succo;ssf1-ul that. at times -there were -.ore Turkcsorpos in:s his small, elusive f1orces tha3n faced the, entire kn)i ti shforc ss in Arabia. 'iut4 after his gurillas had accomplished theirmission of driv,.ingý the Turks out of Arabia, Lawrence revertedbaclk- to Britishi officer st'atlus and the ort-hodox war con-tinuied.

Bot-h '-ae and Lawrence fully understood the innrll tance o-care ýul o~lanmin - to successful --uerri)i.la o-norations, :.ao, incod5 fyTimp; his thoughjt's on the subject, emphasized plainlnin-, and

went on to say that reg7arules:s of the size Of tlic uniJt involved,Sprudent ola. w,,as. necessary; and that'U those who fougýht without

method did not understand the nature of guerrilla warf~are,

Lawrence put it more succiincti> iii describing uierilr warfajreas., being far more intellectual than a bayonet charg-e. Ile went onIto say that perfect Intelli-,enco was- an absoluLte euifki~iet so

that he could, ola-n in certainty.

Outstanding leadership at all levels is an unusual requirermentof g!uerrilla warfar9- iF' a guerrilla force is to survive andprospeor. ;)oth ::ac and La.,wreonce were well aware of this and they,themiselves- were the einitone of" th-e tecof leaders required:unusual, un-orthodox" nOersonýalities, with civilian baoL-:--rounds (inspite of his armiy com-mission, L~awrence wia,,: a civili-an at heart),and with political philosoprides virtually -inconoxrehensible tothe average professional soldier. They sought, and found, the

sam~e type leadership in- their subordinates. 11ith few exceptions,

most notably Lin Pig~io, .lao's hanid-picked leaders are still the

leas-ders of his Comnmunist rce,-mle. in Lawrence's words, "nine-

tenths of tactics3 were certain enoughj to be teachable in schools;but the irrational tenth was like the kincifisher flashing- acrossthe -nool, and in it lay the test oV- -generals."1 no - sougýht anA~rab leader who possessed t-hat' irrationial tenth, an~d weighed them ers ow --.TS02 ie *v-rea Trie;ý o'ý Prac-,-,a. lIe Zou.nd thie ShrYof - .eccatoo old: and, of the Sher-if's sons, he found Albdu-lla t-oo clever,All too clean, 7eid too cool; 1---+ "'Iqal had t11he n.ecessary fire

21adrealson, and thus wa-s chlosen. 2'eisal did notdiyit

Lawren~ce.'loth, Tlavren.ce and "ao made analyses of-L thie very nature of' their

tierrilla wars. Toth were articulate in their expesitionF. To0TU'ao, g7uerrilla warf'are ultimately resolved liito six1 .nasic pori nciiu-les! 1) Carry out of-fensives in- a defensi-ve war, conduict boattlesof quick deci sion., niari exterior-line orjerations within interior-lin-e o-oeratz'uns,-o 2) Coordinate with the operatio-ns of reg-ularforces; 3) Establish base areas from which ,.uerrillas can operate,4) Undertake strategic deofnsives and 0ofensives;, 5)' Develop awa~r of-ý movome: t ( do not renain static);- anýd 06) __c sure to hiave

good leadershi-n andl a correct reaof:h~ i cuwviands (ortoLshiould be cenitrallyr olalnnod arid c~oordinated, but deco ýtrali zed

*2 "2

Tawrence based his strategy on three elments: "the

algebrc element of thig.s, the biolo.-ical element of lives,

and the nsycholo-jcal clcnc.-_t of' ideas;-"2 3 the sun of which

defined his l-Puorrilla war.

The al~ebraic element was calculable, and dealt with !::knovn

variables of space, time, geographics and force structures.

Lawrence calculated that the Arabs -oal was to recapture approx-

inately 100,00C" to 140,000 square -.iles o. lc.d. he went on to

fi.-are that, with the Arabs on his side, the Tur]ks would r_'equire

a fir,ýificd nost of at least 20 men every four square miles,

or .in.u m of "six huidred thousand men. to meet the illwills

of ci- the Arab-) eorles, combined with the active '%ostilitxr of

a "ew zealots."21

The biological element had to do with leadership, the

rei-htive val.ues of men versus material, the imnol. Iance o2

intelligencc of' the enemy L-i¢, ultimately, developne-.t oI' the

muctical line to be used. Lawrence's views on leadershin.) have

beenr discussed. Tn conisidering,- mei versus material he decided

that machines were more imnortant to the Turks."In Turkey things wc re scarce and precious,

me; less esteemed than equipment. (-'he death of a Tur':ish brid;:e or rail,machine or gust or charge of high ex-plosive, was more proF table to us thanthe dea lh of a Turk,9 ".1

'Pint. Arabls had fe.w ... 'n in corsnariso- to the Turk!,sl moreover, they

were individuals fighting _n irre,- 1lar formations.

",An individual death, L'.ke a pebbledrorO-.edn i-• w-a rI nrght make 'hit n

brief' hole; yet rings u-' sorrowwidened out therefra. We could notafford casualties."

Lawrence thus decided that his Arabs ,nust be sup)erior at the

critical oi~nt and moment of attack- even though they were vastly

inferior ovcrall. He would see to i-, through perfect intelli-

ge-noe, that the deci*sion of what was critical would alwavs be

his "by the silent threat of a vast unkrnowa. desert," not dis-

closing, nihrself till he attacked; and his attacks would be

nominal, directed "not against him, but against his stuff"

which was accessible. 17e would cut empty stretches of rail al.d

9

night even develop a habit of never engaging the enemny. Using

these tactics, Lawrence noted later- that :iaiy Turks never had

a chance throughout the war to fire on Arabs, and the Arab

guerrillas were never on the defensive except by accident ow27in error. In articulatiing his tactical approach, Lawrence

might have been quoting V'ao or virtually any other of history's

noted ouerrilla leaders.

Lawrence's psychological elomont in'volved the use of propa-

ganda, whica is an csse1 ,tial to successful ju-Lierrilla warfare

recognized universally. Althou;h Lawrence was not interested in

inculcating specific beliefs into the Arabs, he realized the

importance of the states of mind of his troops, the rest of the

Arabs, and the Turks, both individually and collectively. he

saw to it that he arranged the minds of his troops "in order of

battle just as carefully and as formally as other officers would

arrange their bodies." (He was interested in mental attitudes,

not military appearances.) "And not only our own men's minds,

we must also arrange the minds of the enemy; (.,.) then

those of the nation supporting us."28

In summary, both Lawrence and ::ao were classicists in their

theories and strategies of guerrilla warfare. Althou-1h their

str-.tegic3 differed in soyie respects, they were much more alike

th-n different. They both relied on well trained guerrillas

csrinr basically s-mple arns; they realized the importance of

mob'lity; of surprise and deception. They were superb planners

and lt rs, and had the foresight to choose outstanding

subordinate leaders. They fully appreciated Sun Tzu's admonish-

ments to know the eneiiy, know yourself; know the ground, know

the weather, avoid strength, strike weakness. They both knew

how important it was to be supported by the local populace,

and sought to gain such support (Z.ao by an active program of

indoctrination, Lawrence more subtly, through the use of pro-

paganda). They knew that with a sympathetic populace their

troops could enjoy safe base areas from which to operate. It

is interesting that both leaders codified their remarkably

similar strategies during periods of personal stress and medi-

tation,

10

Their differences were more in the matter of degree than

of basic philosophy. Although ,l.ao established rather formal,

militaristic organizations and chains of command, Lawrence was

more informal in his approach, recognizing the individuality ofhis Arabs, and their allegiance to their own tribes. However,

it is notable that 'M'ao was setting up a political, as well as

military, organization -- an organization with which he hoped

someday to rule the most populous nation in the world. Lawrence

had no such aspirations, being moved only to intercede (success-

fully) for the independence of the people with whom he fought.Vao's philosophies of seeking to annihilate the enemy and gain

their surrender by rcnt was reasonable because he had ample man-

power. Lawrence, on the other hand, was prudent in attempting

to avoid confrontation with the ene'ny, because the Turks out-

numbered the Arabs by a factor of four or five to one and becauseto the Turks material was more highly valued than were men.

Thus he sourht to defeat the Turks through attrition. Both

leaders recognized that guerrilla coerations were not decisive

in their overall wasbt rather,- aumcntc-.t.--' crai,-ý

regular forces. However, '.-ao's guerrillas were eventually

employed side-by-side with his regular forces. This is a tac-ic

not used by Lawrence or any other guerrilla leader up to that

time.

There is nothing basically new in the doctrine of either

Lawrence or M-ao. Theirs were doctrines of guerrilla warriorseverywhere: doctrines which exnounded of wrinitive warfare.

The newness of Lawrence and Mao was in their elaboration of the

doctrine in terms of Arabia and. China, respectively. Theyaddel. to the lessons learned in guerrilla operation-._ through

the centuries, and carefully recorded their experierc'ýs and

thoughts. Since Mao and Lawrence, many other guerrilla wars

have been fought: some independently, some to complement orthodox

military operations: seme successfully (e.g., Indonesia, Cyprus

and Algeria), some unsuccessfully, such as in M-alaya and the

Phillipines. ::evertheless, the basic strategies of M.-ao and

-1

Lawrence, modified by such variables as geogra.phics andpolitics, are sound and u•.iversal; and could be expected tobe successful regardless of where employed.

.HOASP. RAI ErTAColonel, Field Artillery

.- 12

-i

1. Guerrilla Warfare, Encyclopedia Dritannica, 1973, Vol 10,

2. Otto Heilbrunn, :.%arfare in the Enemy's Rear, p. 21..

3. Lawrence, Thomas Edward, Encyclopedia Dritannica, Vol 13,p. 829-830.

4. Robert Payne, Lawrence of Arabia, p. 74.

5. Mao, Tse--tun,-, StratF$ic Probiems in the anti-Japanese(luerrilla '.iar, p. 28-46.

6. Ibid., p. 12-13.

7. Ibid., p. 43.

8. Payne, p. 72-78.

9. !bid., p. 77.

10. Paul Kecskemeti, Strate:gic Surrender, P. 5-8.

11, r:ao, Dasic Tactics. p. (?-ý"_

12. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of -Tisdom, A Trium h, p. 192.

13. Ibid.

14. ::ao, On Guerrilla Warfare, p. 48.

15. Ibid., p. 52.

16. Ibid., p. 55-56.LI. .ru, 3irateCit Problems in the a)ti-Japanese Guerrilla War,

p.24-27.

18. r7ao, Strateies in Cuerrilla Warfare, p. 3.

1,. I.ao, ýYr rluerrilia W.arfare, p, 56.

20. La•wrence, p. 193.

21. Ibid., p. 8.

22. 1-ao, Strategic Problems in the anti-Japanese Guerrilla War,p. 7-.

23. Lawrence, p. 192.

24. Ibid., p. 192-193.

13

I I=Mimi

25. Ibid., p. 194.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 195.

14

S:LZC1'ED 31 3T~TOGRAP,-Y

1. Toomi~an, Scott A, Tho Protracted Gam~e. 4.'cw York, OxfordUniversity Press, 1969.

(An interorctation of 1L*aoist revolutionary strat~egyr.

2. Dickinson, liilan pC iHis Srate' and Tactics. Thesis. Carlil arcs

US Army War Colleg-e, 1067.

3. Elliott-3ateman, T'ichael. Defeat i -n thM EaFt. Lo.-don,Oxford University Press, 196.7T

(An account c-ý' the contributions of !.!ar, Tse-tun- on wiar.)

4. Tncyclonpedia 7B1ritannica.ý, Widlliam 3enton, Publisher, 1973,Vol 10, pJ. 1000-11005, 'GuerrillaWaar"

5. 7rcyclopedia Dritannica,, Vol 13s 8. 29-030, "Lawrence,Thomas E'dward."1

6. Encyclopedia B3ritan-nica, Vol 14, p. 82.6-217, "1i,.ao, Tse-tungr."

(A biography of' A ilenby, with a good account of theoverall war in Arabia. Chapter 10 is a valuabledissertition on the relationship between General Allenbyand Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence.)

8. Heiibrunn, Otto. '1arfa:_-e in the Enemy'vs Rear. 1:ew York,Frederick A. Prae.;ar, Publisher, 1963.

9. Hoffm-an, Richard G., LTC. T. E. Lawrence - Sp~ecial Wdarf areExpert. Theoijo. Carlisle Barrack-s- US Army aColle,-e, 2.968.

10, Irby, Pierce "TQutler, I/PC. i.ao Ts-unls Contributions to7ilitary rnhoitght on %uer~rlla W,,arfare. Thesis. Car~lisleT1larracliz: US Amny '.'ar Colle,-e, 1963.

11. 17ccslheneti, Paul. Strategic Surrender. 1U.ew York, Atheneum,19 64.

(An interesting account of -tile :trate--ies of surrender.The author defiine3 two types of surrender whi-ch, althoughwritteii to describe lar.-e-scale wars rather than morelimitýed r-,uerri].1a wars, nevertheless serve to illustratethe differences in objectives of llao and L.awrence.)

15

12. Kellar, Robert Stanley, LTC. T. E. Lawrence's Contributionto L'lilt5ry_7trate'w. Thes. BarsleLarrack3: USArmy 'ar Collte, 1968.

13. Lawrence, T. 2. The Essential, Baltimore, Penguin Books inassociation with J. Cope: T956.

(An account of the author's service in the Royal AirForce. Tt gave insight as to his thoughts in later lifeaid to his overall character.)

1-. Tjawrence, T. E. Seve Z Pillars of Wisdom, A Triunph. GardenCity, NT.,., arden Ciry Pu qning Company, 1938.

(A detailed account of the autior's experiences rnArabia and of his ohilosophies regarding guerrillawarfare. An outstanding history of the -merrillawar of the Arabs against the Turks during World War I.)

15, !-ao, Tse-tung. Asoects of China's anti-Japanese Strul1jle.

Bombay, People's Publishing House, 1948.

16, !-ao, Tse-tungi. Rasic Tactics. :,ew York, Praeger, 1966.

17, .ao, Tse-tung. Chinese Communist Revolutionary Stratcegr.Princeton. W.J., 1901.

(Extracts of Itao's selected works. It deals more with"ao's grand str•.tegies than those pertaining specificallyto guerrilla warfare strateýr.)

13. Mao, Tse-tung. On Guerrilla Warfare. (Translation bySamuel B. Grifft m, DG, USC published in P'ew York, 1961.)

(A hii'hly valuable. refeence. it is lao's thoughts onmuerrilla strate..7v. A later translation of reference #25by the same translator.)

19. -Fao, Tse-tung. On Peonle's WTar. Peking, Foreign LanguagesPress, 1967.

20. i-ao, Tse-turn. On Revolution and War. (Garden City, _..Y',

Doubleday, 1969.

21. Mao, Tse-tupn. On the Protr-acted .War. Peking, ForeignLang•uages Press, 159!.

(R1eferences :"19, 20 and 21 were used to .-aii, i;Las to Tiao's basic philosophies. They rwere not used asdirect references to this thesis, but thry did help inthe analysis of M:ao's character.)

22. "ao, Tse-tung. Strategic Problem-s in the anti-jaianeseGuerrilla 'Jar. Pekling, Forei]n Languages Press, 1)54.

(A highly valu.able reference. it is a detailed accountof the author's use of guerrilla tactics against theJapanese.)

23. -ao, Tse-tunt Srate/in Problems of Chinia's :'evolutionaryWar. Bombay, People's Publishing House, 1951.

24. M'ao, Tso-tungl. Strateries in C,,lrrilla Warfare. AirIntelligence Report JR-57-3±.

(A translation by B. J. I.cl]innis, LTC, USA?. The basicpanphlet is believed to have been published in a secondelition in lfong Kong in July 1949. It lists vao's sixnrecepts of guerrilla warfare slirhtly differently thando references #1l"and 25.)

25. Mao, Tse-tunr. Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare). Newport,R.I., The US 1Kaval War College, Departnent of Strategyan-d Tactics, 1950.

(An earlier translation of reference Y18 by the sametranslator, Samuel 5. Griffith II, COL, USC.)

26. Payne, Robert. Lawrence of Arabia. ::ew York, PyramidBooks, 1962.

(A biography of T. E. Lawrence. It contains a detailedaccount of the 10 day ordeal of Lawrence and how, whilehe was wracked with fever and d sentery, he foriaulated

27. Salisbury, "orman, jr, LTC. Miao's StrateS~ and Tactics.Thesis, Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1967.

28. Sun Tzu. The Art of Vlar. Harrisburg, Pa., The M-ilitaryService Publishing Company, 3944. *

29. Thomas, Lowell J. With Lawrence in Arabia. Garden City,P.Y., Doubleday, 1967.

*(A translation by Liondl Silcs of ths oldQt military trkntisein the world, vritten in the 6th CGntury, B.C.)

17