G.R. No. 241946 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELEVER JAEN y MORANTE, Accused-Appellant.

Promulgated:

DISSENTING OPINION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

I dissent. I maintain my position in the Decision1 dated July 29, 2019 on the main finding accused-appellant Elever Jaen y Morante (Jaen) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder based on the circumstantial evidence established in this case. Accordingly, the present Motion for Reconsideration2 should not be granted.

Circumstantial evidence may be characterized as that evidence that proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.3 It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence as case law has consistently recognized that it may even surpass the latter in weight and probative force.4 In criminal cases, resort to circumstantial evidence is warranted in the absence of direct evidence implicating an accused for the crime charged. It is sufficient for conviction if there are sufficient circumstances, when proven and taken together, enough to create an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime.5 In this regard, it is well to stress that the determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test and not a quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 6 Hence, case law instructs that "[ c ]ircumstantial evidence is like a 'tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven. ' Each strand cannot be plucked out and scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire picture."7

Rollo, pp. 38-49. 1 ld. at67-7 I.

See A/1110.Juela v. People, 734 Phil. 636, 646 (201 4). See People v. Malito, 468 Phil. 14, 26 (2004); citations omitted.

5 See A/1110.Jue/a v. People, supra note 3, c iting People v. de Quijano, G.R. No. I 02045, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 66, 73-74.

6 See Planteras, Jr. v. People, G. R. No. 238889, October 3, 2018 ; c itations omitted. 7 Bacerra v. People, 81 2 Phil. 25, 38-39(201 7), c iting People v. Ragon, 346 Phil. 772, 785 ( 1997).

Dissenting Opinion 2 G.R. No. 241946

Circumstantial evidence based on the trial cou1is' factual findings are entitled to great weight and authority. The well-settled rule is that "[ when there is] no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to the factual findings of the trial court, [ especially when] affirmed by the [Court of Appeals (CA)]. This is in line with the precept that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon Us. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial cou1i overlooked material and relevant matters, that We will recalibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below."8 As held in Co Kiat v. CA:9

It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and authority and that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals, is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to

it, its findings of facts being conclusive. 10

In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, arrived at factual findings that point to the fact that Jaen was clearly responsible for the death of the victim, Jacob Eduardo Miguel 0. Manzo (Manzo). The circumstances that establish Jaen 's culpability were detailed as follows:

1. [SP03 Freddie Cayot, Jr. (Cayot), Jaen, and the victim, Manzo,] were together that fateful night in a drinking session;

2. After the said drinking session, they left together in a car, [Cayot] drove, the victim was seated at the front passenger seat, and [Jaen] sat at the back;

3. While driving and nearing the house of the victi m, [Cayot) heard near his ear a series of gunshots and saw smoke inside the car which caused him to immediately pull over;

4. Whi le parked, [Cayot] asked [Jaen] what happened and where his gun [was,] to which [the latter] replied that the victim took his gun;

5. Simultaneously, [Cayot] saw blood dripping from the victim ' s head and panicked;

6. [Cayot and Jaen] brought the victim to the [latter ' s] house and informed the fam il y that he committed suicide;

7. At that time, [Jaen] was fidgety. He suddenly interrupted and repeatedly exclaimed "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo"[;]

8. When they brought the victim [to] the hospital, [Jaen] admitted that he was the one who shot the victim;

9. The victim's death was due to the gunshot wounds[;] I 0. The gunshot wounds sustained by the victim were all located at the

[posterior occipital region] of his head; [and] 11. The investigation disclosed that the shots were fired inside the vehicle

and the assailant was positioned at the back seat and which was two (2) feet away from the victim. 11

Medina v. People, 760 Phil. 729, 740(20 15). 9 265 Phil. 4 (1990). 10 Id. at 11, citing Macua v. Intermediate Appella1e Cour1, 239 Phil. 37, 46 ( 1987); and Chan v. CA, 144

Phil. 678, 684 ( 1970). 11 Rollo, pp. 7-8.

Dissenting Opinion 3 G.R. No. 241946

Despite the foregoing, the majority still insists that the "physical evidence and testimony on the bullet trajectory showed that it failed to establish with absolute ce11ainty the relative position of the gun wielder [which consequently,] did not foreclose the possibility that the gun wielder was positioned at the front, where Cayot, the lone eyewitness, was located." 12 In this relation, the majority points out that:

(a) the gun used in the kill ing was Cayot's service fireann which he kept in a bag and placed under the driver's seat, and that he never gave J aen access to the same; and

(b) Cayot's actuations immediately after the incident, his claim that the victim committed suicide, and his act of slapping Jaen twice when the latter repeatedly exclaimed "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo!" in front ofManzo's family, cast doubt on Cayot's credibility as the lone eyewitness. 13

However, it was clearly established during trial that although the service firearm was Cayot's, Jaen had actual knowledge of its whereabouts, and necessarily, had access to the same. As Cayot himself testified: (i) Jaen was inside the car when he placed his handgun inside the bag, and thereafter, tucked said bag under the driver's seat; 14 (ii) Jaen and Manzo went to the car ahead of him in order to sta1i the engine; 15 and (iii) Jaen sat at the backseat, directly behind the driver's seat. 16 In this regard, as the Decision on the main explained, "at the time Jaen was already positioned at the back of the driver 's seat and before Cayot entered the car, Jaen may have already taken the bag containing the handgun which was tucked underneath the driver's seat, thus, giving him access thereto." 17 Further, it was found that "neither Manzo nor Cayot discovered that Jaen already had the handgun, since Manzo was at the front passenger seat, and thus, could not see J aen' s actions at the back, while there was no showing that Cayot checked the whereabouts of his gun before driving his car." 18 Hence, considering the established fact that Jaen knew the whereabouts and had access to the murder weapon, it is of no moment that the firearm used by the latter to kill Manzo was Cayot's.

Anent the majority 's qualms over Cayot's actuations immediately after the incident, it is well to reiterate that Cayot and Jaen are relatives. Because of their kinship, Cayot naturally attempted to make it appear that Manzo committed suicide; and thereafter, slapped Jaen whenever the latter exclaimed "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo!", in an attempt to cover

12 See ponencia, p. 2. 13 See id. 14 See TSN, November 5, 201 3, pp. 24-25. 15 See id. at I 0. 16 See id. at I I. 17 Rollo, p. 45. is Id.

Dissenting Opinion 4 G.R. No. 241946

up his relative's criminal misdeeds. However, as explained in the Decision on the main, "it was only when Cayot had realized that he could no longer contain the truth that he made a turn-around and arrested Jaen." 19 Thus, while Cayot did initially attempt to fabricate a suicide story and silence Jaen when he was about to adm it his crime in front of Manzo 's family, he eventually relented to the truth and turned Jaen in as he could not continue covering up the latter's acts, much more run the risk of being tagged as a co­conspirator or accused of obstruction of justice.

At any rate, the evidence on record - consisting of the testimonies and reports of the forensic officer and the medico-legal officer who conducted the bullet trajectory examination on the incident and the autopsy, respectively - lead to no other conclusion than that the assailant was seated at the back seat, which in this case, was only Jaen.

It is wel l to reiterate that the forensic officer testified that "the possibility was around 80 to 90%" that the shooter was in the rear passenger seat.20 On the other hand, the medico-legal officer's testimony established that there were six (6) entry wounds at the occipital/posterior region, i.e., lower back near the nape, of Manzo's head (with the corresponding exit wounds), 2 1 and that the entry wounds were classified as "distant wounds," being inflicted from a distance of approximately two (2) feet. 22 In light of the foregoing evidence, it was virtually impossible for Cayot, the one driving the vehicle, to be able to angle the gun in such a way as to shoot Manzo at the nape area - all while driving a moving vehicle.23 Further, even assuming arguendo that Cayot was able to angle the gun in such a way that the bullets would have hit Manzo ' s nape while he was seated in the driver' s seat, stil l Cayot would be unable to create enough space to fire the gun at a distance of approximately two (2) feet from Manzo, so as to not create stippl ing or "powder tattooing" on the skin surrounding the entry wounds.24

Veri ly, by these accounts, the ruling reached by the Court in the main Decision should remain. As borne from the evidence, it was factually impossible for Cayot, being the driver of the vehicle, to have shot Manzo. Also, suicide was ruled out as the cause of Manzo' s death. As such, the only reasonable and judicious conclusion is that Jaen, being the sole passenger seated at the back of the vehicle, was the one responsible for shooting the victim. By turning a blind eye away from these factual findings determined by no less than the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, the majority ' s acquittal of Jaen based on a mistaken notion of "reasonable doubt" results into a serious and perpetual injustice to the family of the murdered hapless victim.

19 Id. at 46. 20 Id., citing TSN. April 29, 20 14, pp. 19-20. 2 1 Id., citing TSN, December 17, 20 13, pp. 9 and 11. 22 Id., citing TSN, Decernber 17, 2013, pp. 9- l 0. 23 Id. 24 Id.

Dissenting Opinion 5 G.R. No. 241946

In fine, I vote to DENY the instant Motion for Reconsideration and AFFIRM the Decision dated July 29, 2019 on the main.

ESTELA M.~~BERNABE Senior Associate Justice