Diplomacy TheoryDiplomacy (from Latin diploma, meaning an official document, which in turn derives from the Greek meaning a folded paper/document) is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of groups or states. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations through the intercession of professional diplomats with regard to issues of peace-making, trade, war, economics, culture, environment, and human rights. International treaties are usually negotiated by diplomats prior to endorsement by national politicians. In an informal or social sense, diplomacy is the employment of tact to gain strategic advantage or to find mutually acceptable solutions to a common challenge, one set of tools being the phrasing of statements in a non-confrontational, or polite manner.

Development of Diplomacy

Ancient ChinaOne of the earliest realists in international relations theory was the 6th century BC military strategist Sun Tzu (d. 496 BC), author of The Art of War. He lived during a time in which rival states were starting to pay less attention to traditional respects of tutelage to the Zhou Dynasty (c. 1050–256 BC) figurehead monarchs while each vied for power and total conquest. However, a great deal of diplomacy in establishing allies, bartering land, and signing peace treaties was necessary for each warring state, and the idealized role of the "persuader/diplomat" developed.

In the 11th century during the Song Dynasty (960–1279), there were cunning ambassadors such as Shen Kuo and Su Song who achieved diplomatic success with the Liao Dynasty, the often hostile Khitan neighbor to the north. Both diplomats secured the rightful borders of the Song Dynasty through knowledge of cartography and dredging up old court archives. There was also a triad of warfare and diplomacy between these two states and the Tangut Western Xia Dynasty to the northwest of Song China (centered in modern-day Shaanxi). After warring with the Lý Dynasty of Vietnam from 1075 to 1077, Song and Lý made a peace agreement in 1082 to exchange the respective lands they had captured from each other during the war.

Long before the Tang and Song dynasties, the Chinese had sent envoys into Central Asia, India, and Persia, starting with Zhang Qian in the 2nd century BC. Another notable event in Chinese diplomacy was the Chinese embassy mission of Zhou Daguan to the Khmer Empire of Cambodia in the 13th century. Chinese diplomacy was a necessity in the distinctive period of Chinese exploration. Since the Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD), the Chinese also became heavily invested in sending diplomatic envoys abroad on maritime missions into the Indian Ocean, to India, Persia,

Arabia, East Africa, and Egypt. Chinese maritime activity was increased dramatically during the commercialized period of the Song Dynasty, with new nautical technologies, many more private ship owners, and an increasing amount of economic investors in overseas ventures.

During the Mongol Empire (1206–1294) the Mongols created something similar to today's diplomatic passport called paiza. The paiza were in three different types (golden, silver, and copper) depending on the envoy's level of importance. With the paiza, there came authority that the envoy can ask for food, transport, place to stay from any city, village, or clan within the empire with no difficulties.

From the 17th century the Qing Dynasty concluded a series of treaties with Czarist Russia, beginning with the Treaty of Nerchinsk in the year 1689. This was followed up by the Aigun Treaty and the Convention of Peking in the mid-19th century.

As European power spread around the world in the 18th and 19th centuries so too did its diplomatic model, and Asian countries adopted European diplomatic systems.

Ancient IndiaAncient India, with its kingdoms and dynasties, had a long tradition of diplomacy. The oldest treatise on statecraft and diplomacy, Arthashastra, is attributed to Kautilya (also known as Chanakya), who was the principal adviser to Chandragupta Maurya, the founder of the Maurya dynasty who ruled in the 3rd century BC, (whose capital was Patliputra, today's Patna, the chief city of Bihar state). Arthashastra is a complete work on the art of kingship, with long chapters on taxation and on the raising and maintenance of armies. It also incorporates a theory of diplomacy, of how in a situation of mutually contesting kingdoms, the wise king build alliances and tries to checkmate his adversaries. The envoys sent at the time to the courts of other kingdoms tended to reside for extended periods of time, and Arthashastra contains advice on the deportment of the envoy, including the trenchant suggestion that 'he should sleep alone'. The highest morality for the king is that his kingdom should prosper. It is also good to note that Lord Krishna, in the epic Mahabharata, acted as a divine diplomat and statesman between the Kuru and Pandava dynasties.

Modern AsiaDiplomatic relations within the Early Modern era of Asia were depicted as an environment of prestige and Status. It was maintained that one must be of noble ancestry in order to represent an autonomous state within the international arena. Therefore the position of diplomat was often revered as an element of the elitist class within Asia. A state's ability to practice diplomacy has been one of the underlying defining characteristics of an autonomous state. It is this practice that has been employed since the conception of the first city-states within the international spectrum. Diplomats in Asia were originally sent only for the purpose of

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negotiation. They would be required to immediately return after their task was completed. The majority of diplomats initially constituted the relatives of the ruling family. A high rank was bestowed upon them in order to present a sense of legitimacy with regards to their presence. Italy, the Ottoman Empire, and China were the first real states that perpetuated environments of diplomacy. During the early modern era diplomacy evolved to become a crucial element of international relations within the Mediterranean and Asia.

Ancient EuropeThe ability to practice diplomacy is one of the defining elements of a state, diplomacy has been practiced since the inception of civilization. In Europe, diplomacy begins with the first city-states formed in ancient Greece. Diplomats were sent only for specific negotiations, and would return immediately after their mission concluded. Diplomats were usually relatives of the ruling family or of very high rank in order to give them legitimacy when they sought to negotiate with the other state.

The origins of diplomacy are in the strategic and competitive exchange of impressive gifts, which may be traced to the Bronze Age and recognized as an aspect of Homeric guest-friendship. Thus diplomacy and trade have been inexorably linked from the outset. "In the framework of diplomatic relations it was customary for Byzantine emperors and Muslim rulers, especially the 'Abbāsids and the Fātimids, as well as for Muslim rulers between themselves, to exchange precious gifts, with which they attempted to impress or surpass their counterparts," remarks David Jacoby, in the context of the economics of silk in cultural exchange among Byzantium, Islam and the Latin West: merchants accompanied emissaries, who often traveled on commercial ships. At a later date, it will be recalled that the English adventurer and trader Anthony Sherley convinced the Persian ruler to send the first Persian embassy to Europe (1599–1602).

The Greek City States on some occasions sent envoys to each other in order to negotiate specific issues, such as war and peace or commercial relations, but did not have diplomatic representatives regularly posted in each other's territory. However, some of the functions given to modern diplomatic representatives were in Classical Greece filled by a proxenos, who was a citizen of the host city having a particular relations of friendship with another city – a relationship often hereditary in a particular family.

Modern EuropeIn Europe, early modern diplomacy's origins are often traced to the states of Northern Italy in the early Renaissance, with the first embassies being established in the 13th century. Milan played a leading role, especially under Francesco Sforza who established permanent embassies to the other city states of Northern Italy. Tuscany and Venice were also flourishing centers of diplomacy from the 14th century onwards. It was in the Italian Peninsula that many of the

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traditions of modern diplomacy began, such as the presentation of an ambassador's credentials to the head of state.

From Italy the practice was spread to other European regions. Milan was the first to send a representative to the court of France in 1455. However, Milan refused to host French representatives fearing espionage and that the French representatives would intervene in its internal affairs. As foreign powers such as France and Spain became increasingly involved in Italian politics the need to accept emissaries was recognized. Soon the major European powers were exchanging representatives. Spain was the first to send a permanent representative; it appointed an ambassador to the Court of England in 1487. By the late 16th century, permanent missions became customary. The Holy Roman Emperor, however, did not regularly send permanent legates, as they could not represent the interests of all the German princes (who were in theory all subordinate to the Emperor, but in practice each independent).

During that period the rules of modern diplomacy were further developed. The top rank of representatives was an ambassador. At that time an ambassador was a nobleman, the rank of the noble assigned varying with the prestige of the country he was delegated to. Strict standards developed for ambassadors, requiring they have large residences, host lavish parties, and play an important role in the court life of their host nation. In Rome, the most prized posting for a Catholic ambassador, the French and Spanish representatives would have a retinue of up to a hundred. Even in smaller posts, ambassadors were very expensive. Smaller states would send and receive envoys, who were a rung below ambassador. Somewhere between the two was the position of minister plenipotentiary.

Diplomacy was a complex affair, even more so than now. The ambassadors from each state were ranked by complex levels of precedence that were much disputed. States were normally ranked by the title of the sovereign; for Catholic nations the emissary from the Vatican was paramount, then those from the kingdoms, then those from duchies and principalities. Representatives from republics were ranked the lowest (which often angered the leaders of the numerous German, Scandinavian and Italian republics). Determining precedence between two kingdoms depended on a number of factors that often fluctuated, leading to near-constant squabbling.

Ambassadors, nobles with little foreign experience and no expectation of a career in diplomacy, needed to be supported by large embassy staff. These professionals would be sent on longer assignments and would be far more knowledgeable than the higher-ranking officials about the host country. Embassy staff would include a wide range of employees, including some dedicated to espionage. The need for skilled individuals to staff embassies was met by the graduates of universities, and this led to a great increase in the study of international law, modern languages, and history at universities throughout Europe.

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At the same time, permanent foreign ministries began to be established in almost all European states to coordinate embassies and their staffs. These ministries were still far from their modern form, and many of them had extraneous internal responsibilities. Britain had two departments with frequently overlapping powers until 1782. They were also far smaller than they are currently. France, which boasted the largest foreign affairs department, had only some 70 full-time employees in the 1780s.

The elements of modern diplomacy slowly spread to Eastern Europe and Russia, arriving by the early 18th century. The entire edifice would be greatly disrupted by the French Revolution and the subsequent years of warfare. The revolution would see commoners take over the diplomacy of the French state, and of those conquered by revolutionary armies. Ranks of precedence were abolished. Napoleon also refused to acknowledge diplomatic immunity, imprisoning several British diplomats accused of scheming against France.

After the fall of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna of 1815 established an international system of diplomatic rank. Disputes on precedence among nations (and therefore the appropriate diplomatic ranks used) were first addressed at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, but persisted for over a century until after World War II, when the rank of ambassador became the norm. In between that time, figures such as the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck were renowned for international diplomacy.

Middle EastSome of the earliest known diplomatic records are the Amarna letters written between the pharaohs of the Eighteenth dynasty of Egypt and the Amurru rulers of Canaan during the 14th century BC. Following the Battle of Kadesh in c. 1274 BC during the Nineteenth dynasty, the pharaoh of Egypt and ruler of the Hittite Empire created one of the first known international peace treaties which survives in stone tablet fragments.

Relations with the government of the Ottoman Empire (known to Italian states as the Sublime Porte) were particularly important to Italian states. The maritime republics of Genoa and Venice depended less and less upon their nautical capabilities, and more and more upon the perpetuation of good relations with the Ottomans. Interactions between various merchants, diplomats, and religious men between the Italian and Ottoman empires helped inaugurate and create new forms of diplomacy and statecraft. Eventually the primary purpose of a diplomat, which was originally a negotiator, evolved into a persona that represented an autonomous state in all aspects of political affairs. It became evident that all other sovereigns felt the need to accommodate themselves diplomatically, due to the emergence of the powerful political environment of the Ottoman Empire. One could come to the conclusion that the atmosphere of diplomacy within the early modern period revolved around a foundation of conformity to Ottoman culture.

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Functions of Diplomacy

Diplomacy has existed since the beginning of the human race. The act of conducting negotiations between two persons, or two nations at a large scope is essential to the upkeep of international affairs. Among the many functions of diplomacy, some include preventing war and violence, and fortifying relations between two nations. Diplomacy is most importantly used to complete a specific agenda. Therefore without diplomacy, much of the world’s affairs would be abolished, international organizations would not exist, and above all the world would be at a constant state of war. It is for diplomacy that certain countries can exist in harmony.

There has not been a documented start of diplomacy; however there have been instances ranging back to the 5th century where diplomacy arose in certain nations. Dating back to 432 B.C, the Congress of Sparta was an “illustration of diplomacy as organized by the Greek City States” (Nicolson 1). The origin of the word “diploma” comes from different sides of the earth. In Greece diploma meant “folded in two”, while in Ancient Rome the word was used to describe travel documents. Often times the word diplomacy is given many meanings. Many times will the words “policy” and the word “negotiation” be seen as synonyms; hence the word “diplomacy” and “foreign diplomacy” are deemed to be similar (Nicolson 3). These “synonyms” of diplomacy are all faulty. While they may be very similar in some cases, they are not the exactly the same. Sir Harold Nicolson who was an English Diplomat born in Tehran, Persia, states that:

“Diplomacy is neither the invention nor the pastime of some particular political system, but is an essential element in any reasonable relation between man and man and between nation and nation” (Nicolson 4).

For the upkeep of the International System, diplomacy is used in every corner of the world. Without it many nations would not be able to conduct successful negotiations.

While many are not able to find a clear beginning or creation of diplomacy, modern diplomacy has become much more advanced and many aspects have changed over the years. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 created the first modern diplomatic congress in addition to creating a new world order in central Europe based on state sovereignty. Much of Europe began to change after the introduction of modern diplomacy. For example, “France under Cardinal Richelieu introduced the modern approach to international relations, based on the nation-state and motivated by national interest as its ultimate purpose” (Kissinger 17). The New World Order began to bloom in all of Central and Western Europe. Great Britain argued for the “balance of power” which kept European diplomacy alive for the next 200 years (Kissinger 17). Every country in Europe contributed a little to the diplomacy the world has today. The balance of powers theory that many famous realists such as Francesco Sforza, Machiavelli, and Guiciardini

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argued was and still is an essential component of modern diplomacy. Many could argue that diplomacy is a product of society and history itself. As countries progress different aspects are added to diplomacy. Separation of powers, national interest, and a country’s sovereignty are only a few elements that were added to modern diplomatic history. Therefore, diplomacy can be seen as an ever-changing concept, the same way International Relations between countries fluctuate. Author of The Pure Concept of Diplomacy José Calvet De Magalhães stated that “continuity of the diplomatic institution throughout thousands of years and in all known civilizations shows that diplomacy is an institution inherent to international life itself, one that may undergo transformations or may be used with more or less intensity, but cannot be dispensed with” (Szykman). As Henry Kissinger states “By pursuing its own selfish interests, each state [is] presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for eac state assured well-being for all” (Kissinger 22), In the course of all diplomatic history

“[…] no country has influenced international relations as decisively and at the same time as ambivalently as the United States. No society, has more firmly insisted on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, or more passionately asserted that its own values were universally applicable. No nation has been more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its diplomacy, or more ideological in the pursuit of its history moral convictions. No country has been more reluctant to engage itself abroad even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented reach and scope” (Kissinger 18).

The United States headstrong tendencies to succeed have made it one of the most influential countries in the course of diplomacy. “The most famous of all peace proposals following World War I was the program of Fourteen Points, delivered by President Woodrow Wilson in 1918” (Szykman). Most can argue that without the United States, much of modern diplomacy would be gone.

There are in fact many functions of diplomacy that make diplomacy an essential ingredient for any peaceful and efficient change. The reason to negotiate with other persons has always been the same, to have better relations. Over the course of diplomacy being in existence, the structure of diplomatic posts has changed from a loose one to an organized institution made for a specific purpose. While the structure of diplomatic posts has changed, the functions always remained the same. There are four functions of diplomacy. The first function involves “representing a state’s interests and conducting negotiations or discussions designed to identify common interests as well as areas of disagreement between the parties, for the purpose of achieving the state’s goals and avoiding conflict” (Ameri 1). Representations of a state as well as negotiation are the most important functions of diplomacy. Negotiations between two representatives are a key component in diplomacy, because in doing so the representatives find

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a common interest. Finding a common interest is vital in conducting negotiations because with a common interest representatives are able to devise a solution that is in the interest of both sides. G.R. Berridge that negotiation

“can produce the advantages obtainable from the cooperative pursuit of common interests; and it is only this activity that can prevent violence from being employed to settle remaining arguments over conflicting ones” (Berridge 1).

The second function of diplomacy involves “the gathering of information and subsequent identification and evaluation of the receiving state’s foreign policy goals” (Ameri 1). Diplomatic posts are concerned with gathering information; however when the information is sent back to their native country a Foreign Ministry analyzes the data and determines what foreign policy should be enacted. Political leaders choose what path is right for their country then. The third major function of diplomacy is expansion of political, economic, and cultural ties between two countries (Ameri 2). For example, after WWII countries such as the United States and Britain aimed their foreign policy at the extermination of communism. In present day, the United States State Department engages international audiences to speak about politics, security, and their values to help create an environment receptive to US national interests. In addition, “the State Department annually sponsors more than 40,000 educational and cultural exchanges” (Diplomacy). Finally, the fourth function of diplomacy is that “diplomacy is the facilitating or enforcing vehicle for the observation of international law” (Ameri 2). It is the diplomat’s job to promote the country’s national interests and keep ties with other countries open. The emphasis put on diplomacy is not just dominant in today’s world, however it was a developing concept in the Renaissance as well.

Great thinkers such as Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Grotius, Richelieu, Wicquefort, Satow, Nicolson, and Kissinger had a profound impact on diplomacy. For Machiavelli diplomacy was a tool of deception to grant more power to the state (Beridge 24). Machiavelli’s impact on leaders was a major one because he argued for leaders to be headstrong as well as reserved. Guicciardini promoted the upkeep of good relations; to be careful with whom one deals with and that reputation is key in a negotiation (Berridge 43). His contribution to diplomacy was that diplomatic posts are given to people who can be trusted and can promote their country’s state interests. What these great thinkers contributed to diplomacy was immense. All of them contributed a different element to the ever-growing concept of diplomacy. Since the subject of diplomacy is always growing and changing, it can be said that because of its vast effect on the world, everybody needs diplomacy to survive. It has become such a vital part of everyone’s life that is indirectly becoming a trait for survival.

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Throughout the course of history diplomacy has been a paramount element in the upkeep of peace and in the creation of positive change. Without diplomacy much of the world’s affairs would not exist. There are many examples of how diplomacy has affected countries, and even individual citizens. An example of how negotiation positively can affect someone is Clinton’s negotiation with Kim Jung Il in North Korea. Their peaceful negotiation resulted in the release of two American citizens. An example of how power can corrupt diplomacy is Libya and Switzerland. With the introduction of power, in other words oil, countries such as Libya with the leader Ghaddafi are able to have a stronger presence in the world and say things that can normally not be said. Power corrupts, however diplomacy seeks to rid corruption and reinforce the international system as well as international law. It is for diplomacy that international organizations can exist. In a diplomatic way, an international organization is merely a many members finding a common ground on a particular subject. In the United Nations for example, all the members try to find a common interest for positive change. Although it is sometimes perceived to be slow change, the method of diplomacy causes fewer casualties than any other one. If diplomacy were not in existence, international organizations would not exist. The world would be at a constant state of war, and war would in fact never end because they normally end with diplomatic negotiations.

Modern Diplomacy

Since the end of the Cold War, a growing number of researchers have paid attention to

diplomacy. However, in comparison with related fields, the concept of diplomacy has not been

studied profoundly. As Paul Sharp points out, “the study of diplomacy remains marginal to and

almost disconnected from the rest of the field”. Barry H. Steiner makes an even harsher

statement, arguing that, “ no area of world politics has reflected a greater gap between

experience and theory than diplomatic statecraft”.

Although scholars continue to break a lance on diplomacy and the diplomat’s role in the future,

few authors can afford to dispute the fact that diplomacy nowadays has become amorphous.

Above all, there are more questions than answers.

The collapse of the USSR was the end of the bipolar division of the world that characterized the

Cold War years. Changes of international agendas were determined by growing hopes for

benefits of diplomacy.

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Thus, for example, the end of the Gulf War in 1991 not only illustrated successful cooperation

mechanisms among the US-led coalition forces of regaining Kuwait from Iraq, but it also

symbolized the hope of using this model in the future. But during ethnic conflict in the former

Yugoslavia most hopes died. The international community was not able to effectively prevent

the humanitarian crisis and restore peace. Preventive diplomacy failed due to the international

organizations dependence “on external constraints, including interests of their leading

members”. Moreover, as Raimo Väyrynen admits, “their division of labour was too primitive to

permit an early and effective action”.

By the end of the Cold War, international agendas changed considerably- changing with them

the character of diplomacy. As Brian White says, diplomacy has become more global,

complicated and fragmentary. Thus, changes in diplomacy are especially visible by the

involvement of many new actors in the area of international cooperation. A fast developing

international system opened doors to many new actors, including international organizations,

transnational corporations, and important interest groups. Diplomacy that, from the middle of

the 15th century, was known as an important tool of foreign policy became wider in the post-

Cold War era. In fact, the transformation of diplomacy has not been completed yet. Nowadays,

for instance, governmental diplomacy must deal with various non - state actors that shape its

agenda. As Giandomenico Picco points out, “diplomacy, one of the last monopolies of a

government, is now accessible to and performed by NGOs as well as individuals who have one

main characteristic: credibility‟.

At the same time it would be a big mistake to consider that the role of governmental diplomacy

has declined. “Although the entry of these new players has ended the effective monopoly

diplomats once enjoyed over international relations, governmental diplomacy continues to

have an important role”.

Despite the growing importance of non - state actors, countries still can change and make

international agendas as global actors – thus directly or obliquely influencing the stability of

security. That is why it would be wrong to say that the role of the country has lessened due to

growing importance of non - state actors or that the of governmental diplomacy has declined.

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It is important to ment ion governmental diplomacy‟s capacity to react adequately to non -

traditional threats, risks and vulnerabilities. For example, foreign affairs institutions, considering

actual regional and international questions, must urgently develop a proactive role, re -

modelling traditional methods and adjusting them to new conditions. Foreign ministries and

diplomats need to reinvent themselves – and to strengthen security in all levels of analysis.

These global issues have not traditionally been in their purview. They should be.

In the future, we expect the discussion of whether diplomats need to be on top of the

substance, not simply relying on the experts, and applying their creative genius and negotiating

skills to responding to security issues, to continue. The environment is changing in other ways,

however, beyond the impact of technology and the new agenda. Of course, the most important

question is how to keep pace with this reality. One method for all countries does not exist.

However, the main idea is to promote a faster transition to the new, or modern, form of

diplomacy. First of all, foreign affairs institutions must try to adjust to new Trans – institutional

cooperation and nets of coordination (on the national/super - national level). This especially

concerns the adoption of advanced information technologies. Secondly, foreign affairs

institutions should delegate a part of their functions to other stakeholders which are able to

contribute constructively to the formulation and implementation of security policy (e.g. branch

ministries). Anyway, this does not mean that the importance of foreign affairs institutions will

lessen. Thirdly, we should provide (a part of countries provide already) new specialists in

foreign affairs institutions, changing the balance between n specialists and generalists. For

example, diplomats are more often taking part in anti - terrorist policies. Diplomats- generalists

of foreign affairs offices are usually unprepared for such assignments. Maybe this is the reason

for points of view such as “foreign ministries and diplomatic services are not as useful as once

they were.”

Although the diplomatic mission, which is a participation in the country's foreign policy

formulation and implementation, remains unchanged, diplomatic functions have become more

diverse. In addition to the usual features (for example, compiling and evaluating available

information, communication, negotiations and dispute resolutions, participation in multilateral

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institutions, economic development), a diplomat must also be a kind of entrepreneur, manager

and coordinator. In short, there is clear orientation and adaptation to diplomacy which could be

described as “the model of coordinated synergy”.

One could highlight the following components of this model:

The delegation of functions of share representation to other actors;

Movement to redefinition of the balance between generalists and specialists;

Active cooperation between businesspeople and diplomats;

The growing role of specialists in fields such as business, power industry and IT;

The global information environment is defining the work of the foreign office;

The ways of communication have been diversified;

Development of innovative information technologies;

Fast exchange of information minimizes the importance of previously planned policy;

The focus on immediate solutions, growing importance of multilateral cooperation formats.

This term should be understood from the point of view of a narrower definition of diplomacy to a wider one. Talking about requirement and changes in the actions of foreign affairs machineries, it is important to mention Shaun Riordan’s statement: “The economic and social, as well as physical, security and welfare of a country and its citizens depends on its ability to navigate the interconnected and interdependent geostrategic challenges of the new millennium.

Summarizing, we can say that the transformation of diplomacy happens at high-speed. If we take three basic features of diplomacy as the starting point (representation, negotiations and exchange of information) we see major changes.

Twenty years ago, the essence of diplomacy was described with the following components: state-centric environment; dominant formats of mutual cooperation between countries; ministry of foreign affairs as the exclusive institution for foreign policy implementation; exclusiveness of diplomatic institution in representing important governmental issues; c ontrolling of local international events; communication by traditional ways of information exchange and presence of generalists during dialogs. However, we now see the following changes: ministry of foreign affairs has delegated some functions to other actors; the role of non - governmental actors has increased; multilateral cooperation formats become more important; the structure and functions of diplomatic institutions are redefined; the balance between generalists and specialists is redefined; the influence of information on agendas of

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foreign affairs is growing; global information environment is defining the work of foreign office; the ways of communication are diversified; innovative information technologies are introduced; fast exchange of information minimizes the importance of previously planned policy, fast decisions are emphasized; experts‟ role in negotiations becomes more important.

Considering the aforementioned discussion, I want to even argue that the role of diplomacy will be even more important in the future than it has been during the last twenty years. As Paul Sharp has recently written on the role of diplomacy and diplomats, „the demand for both is currently on the rise”

Small-state DiplomacyWhen Malta’s turn came to assume the Presidency of the Council of Europe a few years ago, some of its diplomats privately expressed worries about the magnitude of the task. Even if that small state were to devote its entire diplomatic service to the project, only half the required positions could be filled. This is the sort of problem that any small state – here we will use a population of 5 million or fewer for a benchmark – faces in dealing with global politics. Whatever the skill of its diplomatic service (and Foreign Ministry officialdom) there simply aren’t enough people to go around. Fortunately there are enough examples to show that though small states certainly cannot have the impact that the great powers do, they can do more than merely survive. Under the right circumstances they can prevail against far larger powers and can even have palpable influence on the world stage. How is this done? The more adept small states have managed to join bodies, regional or global, and maneuver to promote their interests within frameworks established by and for larger powers.

Among the earliest small states to do so were the Venetian Republic and Vatican in the 17th century. The text of the Peace of Westphalia, the wellspring of the current state system, credits Venetian diplomats for bringing an end to this general war in Europe. And the 1962 Vienna Diplomatic convention includes the designation nuncio as co-equal to ambassador, in part a recognition of the centuries-long role played by the Holy See’s diplomats and diplomatic practice. In more modern times some small states, notably Switzerland and the Nordic countries, have shown how a focused and well-informed diplomacy can produce remarkable results, especially when vital economic or security interests are involved.

One of the first major decisions of the UN’s International Court of Justice was the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case. Although this in itself could be considered a victory for a small state on the world stage, it was an even smaller state, one only 7 years independent, that seems to have made the most of the decision.Iceland’s government immediately saw a trend in world affairs and notions of sovereignty and promptly extended its own fisheries limits from 4 out to 12 miles. Nor were the Icelanders finished yet. Over the next quarter of a century this smallest of the small states that had chosen to join the world’s major bodies aggressively and progressively led the way in extending protected fisheries limits out to the now universally accepted 200 miles.

Iceland accomplished its aims against the efforts of much more powerful states, notably the UK and later Germany as well, taking advantage of several factors such as its geo-strategic value to NATO and

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clever use of media characterizations of a David versus Goliath. The principal asset this state—with fewer than a quarter million people—took into its three so-called Cod Wars, however, was the skill, persistence, and thorough grounding in facts of the issues of its diplomatic corps.

Having spoken with many of the principals on the Icelandic side of the disputes, this writer can only marvel at the depth of knowledge of all matters relating to international law, fisheries, historical factors and the cod itself that Iceland’s diplomats and ministry officials possessed and brought into play. As an example, in the last Cod War, 1975-76, when Iceland and the UK actually broke diplomatic relations, an Icelandic diplomat, Helgi Agustsson, remained in the UK to look after his country’s interests as best he could. So extensive was his knowledge of the dispute and the matter of cod fishing generally that in short order the BBC regularly turned to him in its broadcast reports on the issue rather than to officials of Her Majesty’s government.

Activities of another small Nordic state reveal a similar case of knowing better than larger powers how the game is played and which issues can most benefit the small state. In this case it was re-assignment of security responsibilities for the Baltic area within the NATO overall command framework. A 1993 reorganization after German re-unification involved the UK, Germany, Norway, and Denmark. As Thomas-Durell Young notes in his analysis of the outcome of the negotiations, the UK, Germanyand Norwayall lost some of their earlier control. The only ‘winner’ was the country with much the smallest military force, Denmark. The Danes accomplished their gain by their better “understanding of NATO’s staff culture and influence on its eventual agreements.”1

Nor is it only Northern European small states that have had an impact on events out of all proportion to their size. It was a Maltese UN diplomat, Arvid Pardo, who introduced the concept of the “common heritage of mankind” into the Law of the Sea section dealing with rights to resources on the deep seabed. This idea, which looked to the interests of all small states, was extended into the Law of Space where the sharing of data includes micro-states with no hope of themselves participating in any space exploration.

Though the idea of an International Criminal court had been talked of for some decades after the UN’s establishment, the spur for the effort that actually led to the Court’s establishment was begun by Trinidad and Tobago in the early 1990s as a way to deal with drug traffickers. And the Court became official when Malta became the 60th country to ratify the establishing treaty. In the UN,Singapore has led the formation of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to deal with issues of development and the environmental vulnerability of island states.

Size does count, however. Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War gives us the Melian Dialog between Athens and the Melians to show what happens when the perceived vital interests of a large power and a small state collide directly. Though formally allied with Sparta, Melos had no real hope of rescue and its dependence on the Athenians adhering to Hellenic values to behave properly proved fruitless. Things are better for small states now, at least sometimes.

Consider the response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991. Clearly a violation of international norms, this open aggression was dealt with under the aegis of the United Nations by a coalition of states

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to which Kuwait appealed successfully for help. Contrast this with the Italian invasion of Ethiopiain 1936 and the inaction of the League of Nations. More than mere survival, however, small states can now, from time to time, with an educated foreign affairs establishment and astute diplomats (and luck) prevail on issues of vital interest to them. Structures are now in place that simply did not exist in times past.

Small states cannot work miracles in the globalized world still dominated by great powers, but they can study what has worked in the current world order for fellow Lilliputians. Major successes for small states in the face of globalization as yet are relatively few. What has given small states their occasional successes against the agendas of larger states however is concentration of limited resources in the most critical arenas, the ability to focus on key goals, better knowledge of the issues than larger powers, and an exquisite sense of when to act.

Alternative Theories

Coercive DiplomacyCoercive diplomacy is one of the most intriguing and common practices of conducting inter-state relations and embodies the essence of the art of diplomacy: achieving political objectives and fostering a state’s national interest without waging a war.

The present essay will first offer a theoretical framework on the notion of coercive diplomacy, outlining its most prominent features and the aims it can obtain; secondly, it will analyse the variables that affect this kind of diplomacy and have a look at Kenneth Schultz’ s approach, which upholds that the use of coercive diplomacy has its own peculiarities in democratic regimes; thirdly, it will test the framework provided through the analysis of two case-studies, one of which accounts for the success of coercive diplomacy, while the other for its failure; in conclusion, it will be argued that this variant of diplomacy is a viable instrument to obtain foreign policy objectives under specific circumstances, provided that the coercing power is aware of the limits of this practice and adheres to strict principles of crisis management, in order to avoid the opposed outcome of the escalation of a crisis.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Alternative to Military Action and Plurality of ObjectivesYou can claim to be really successful not when you obtain one hundred victories in one hundred battles, rather when you seize your enemy without even fighting.

This aphorism pronounced by the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu (VI-V cent. B. C. ) summarizes perfectly the meaning and the aim of coercive diplomacy, that is to make an enemy stop or undo an action without resorting to military action, but through issuing a specific demand backed by a threat of punishment for non-compliance with it. Clearly, the threat must be

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credible and potent enough to persuade the opponent that it is in his interest to comply with the demand.

A state can coerce its adversary threatening political consequences, such as the expulsion from an international organization, economic sanctions, such as an embargo and the suspension of an economic agreement, or the use of force.

It should be remarked that coercive diplomacy offers an alternative to reliance on military action; it is based on the threat of force rather than the use of force in order to get other actors to comply with one’s wishes. If force is used at all, it takes the form of an exemplary or symbolic use of military action, to demonstrate motivation and resolution to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary. Hence, in coercive diplomacy, force is not employed as part of conventional military strategy, but as a component of a political-diplomatic strategy aimed at persuading the adversary to back down. It is a more flexible, psychological instrument in contrast to the ‘physical, quick and decisive’ use made in military strategy.

Furthermore, unlike conventional military strategy, the threat and use of force in coercive diplomacy is coupled with clear communication, signaling and bargaining in order to make the opponent aware of one’ s intentions, motivation and credibility at every step of the ongoing crisis. Interestingly, the notion of coercive diplomacy can be distinguished by other related concepts.

First of all, coercive diplomacy is regarded as a defensive strategy, thus distinct from blackmail – an offensive strategy – which occurs when a threat is employed to coerce a subject to give up something of value without putting up resistance.

Coercive diplomacy has also to be distinguished from deterrence, i. e. a strategy that makes use of threats to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an encroachment of one’ s interests not yet initiated. On the contrary, coercive diplomacy is directed at stopping an action already undertaken.

The term compellance (strategy that employs threats to make an opponent stop an action already undertaken) is often used to encompass coercive diplomacy as well. George and Simons, however, suggest a difference between the two concepts, arguing that the use of “compellance” entails an exclusive reliance on military threats to wear down the enemy’s resistance. Rather, states employing coercive diplomacy have a broader range of threats to employ and, above all, may couple threats of punishment with positive inducements and assurances in order to influence the adversary; this variant of coercive diplomacy is referred to as “carrot and stick” approach. This approach greatly enhances the flexibility of the strategy, as long as the inducements and assurances offered are credible as well. This variant was famously

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employed by J. F. Kennedy in the Cuban Missiles Crisis, unlike, for example, G. Bush in the First Gulf War.

The strategy of coercive diplomacy can take a variety of forms along a continuum and pursue very different objectives. At the extremes of the spectrum of available strategies are the “try-and-see” approach and the ultimatum. The former occurs when the coercing power takes one threatening step at a time, waiting for the reaction of the adversary before making additional threats. This strategy avoids putting pressure on the counterpart and, thus, prevents the crisis from escalating sharply. The latter consists in making a specific and detailed request backed by a rigid time limit. The conditions included in the ultimatum are presented as final and require unconditional and categorical acceptance by the opponent. The terms of compliance can range from several days to only a few hours: for instance, the Italian ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire in 1911, with regard to the surrender of Libya, had a deadline of twenty-four hours, while the U.S. ultimatum to Germany in 1916 demanded compliance ‘immediately’.

A state employing coercive diplomacy can achieve a wide range of objectives. The most limited one is to make the enemy stop an action already undertaken; a more ambitious one is the reversal of what has been already accomplished, namely the opponent is forced not only to stop its enterprise, but also to give up the advantages that its action had previously gained; finally, the most difficult one, as Bruce Jentleson notes, is the cessation of the opponent’ s hostile behaviour through a change in the composition of his government or in the nature of the regime. It could be argued, however, that this last variant stretches coercive diplomacy at its outer limits as it closely resembles the practice of blackmail: the use of threats is made in an offensive rather than defensive fashion, while the request of the coercing power exceeds what would be sufficient to protect its national interest.

2.2 Risks of Coercive Diplomacy and Key-variablesCoercive diplomacy is, in fact, an attractive strategy because it offers the possibility of achieving political objectives without resorting to the use of traditional military force and with less bloodshed and political costs. In the history of international conflict, it has proved to be particularly efficient to intimidate, with little risk, weaker adversaries[12]. Nevertheless, it is also a dangerous option as it can backfire, quicken the escalation and lead to an unanticipated war. This happens when the coercing power boxes into the corner a highly motivated adversary which is inclined to escalate the crisis in order to avoid a humiliating defeat. Moreover, the opponent can reject the request thinking it is a bluff, and challenge the coercing power, especially in the case of ultimatum. Thus, two key-variables of coercive diplomacy are the magnitude of the demand made on the opponent and his motivation not to comply with it; these two variables are strictly connected as the strength of the adversary’ s reluctance to comply with the request is deeply sensitive to the magnitude of the request advanced by the coercing power[13].

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Overall, it is possible to identify a number of conditions that favour the successful use of coercive diplomacy in a dispute between two states[14]: clarity of the objective, efficient communication of intentions and signalling of interests at stake, symmetric information about each side’ s willingness to escalate[15], strength of motivation, strong leadership, asymmetry of motivation in favour of the coercing power, sense of urgency, adequate domestic and international support, unacceptability by the adversary of the threatened escalation, unilateral coercive diplomacy[16], isolation of the adversary. In my opinion, a key-variable that underpins all these is, however, a balance of power in favour of the coercing state: its availability of massive material capabilities is more likely to persuade the counterpart to back off, as it will perceive the threat as sufficiently credible and potent. These conditions rest, obviously, on the assumption of a “rational” opponent who correctly evaluates whether the danger and risks of not complying outweigh the costs and gains to be expected from yielding to the demand of the coercing power[17].

3. Democracies and Coercive DiplomacyIn his contribution to the debate, Kenneth Schultz upholds that democracies have their own peculiarities in the use of coercive diplomacy, due to their institutional bonds[18]. First, he rejects Quincy Wright’ s argument that democracies are ‘ill-adapted to the successful use of threats and violence as instruments of foreign policy’ as governments are susceptible to domestic opposition[19]. Indeed, he contends that the two most important features of democratic states, open political competition and public debate about governments’ policies[20], can have a twofold effect on the use of coercive diplomacy: restraining and confirmatory[21]. The former occurs when there is domestic dissension about the use of coercive diplomacy: the credibility and efficacy of the threats are undermined as the government may not be willing to pay high political prices in order to carry them out. The latter, instead, occurs when there is a strong domestic consensus about the decision of employing coercive diplomacy: free (as opposite to coerced) support from opposition parties in democracies can send a signal of resolve that is much more effective that the one sent by a non-democratic government serving as the only voice of the state. The threat made by the government proves to be very credible as the opposition generally has little incentive to collude in a bluff [22]. Schultz concludes that, due to their institutional constraints, democracies are very selective in making threats: however, it makes them more credible and, thus, less likely to be resisted. He estimates that, if a state switches from a non-democracy to a democracy, the probability that it will initiate a crisis which escalates to war decreases by 40-60 per cent. It should be noted, in conclusion, that Schultz’s arguments seem to be closely related to the so-called “democratic peace” theory.

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ConclusionThe practice of coercive diplomacy is widely employed by states in the international system as it proves to be a viable means to achieve political objectives without resorting to war, which is costly also for the winner. However, its successful use is conditional to a favourable strategic environment and to the presence of a number of circumstances for the coercing power, such as higher interests at stake than the opponent, clear communication of its intention to escalate and availability of material capabilities in order to make its threats credible, as showed by our two case-studies.

In conclusion, I would argue that the art of coercive diplomacy could be defined as one of ‘brinkmanship’, i. e. the ability to coerce an adversary through a constant management of the common risks, showing enough resolution to persuade him to back off, but at the same time stopping its coercion on the “brink” before the crisis escalates into war.

Cultural DiplomacyWhat is the role of Cultural Diplomacy (hereinafter called CD) in contemporary and future International relations? The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, ICD, has declared that the ultimate goal of cultural diplomacy is promoting peace and stability through intercultural relations. CD is the important “soft” alternative to a more “belligerent” type of diplomacy. And CD utilizes the many instruments of cultural and artistic life in a way which may make “hearts and souls” meet across borders.

Most cultural counselors, cultural attachés or directors in embassies or cultural institutes around the world are probably not (yet) aware that they are doing “cultural diplomacy”. They have a job description asking them to promote arts, artists and the “cultural scene” of their home country, through exhibitions, concerts, lectures and other means of “cultural exchange”. Their success or failure is measured in the response from authorities and media and in number of visitors at the events. Some few, mainly European, diplomats may also have a word about “intercultural dialogue” in their job description. This advice is usually interpreted in the following way: We should be open for a dialogue or an exchange of experiences with the host country and various communities of the host country on issues regarding multiculturalism or integration of immigrants. European countries / EU-members obviously have much to discuss and compare and will benefit from such discussions.

The ICD ultimate goal – peace and stability – is a very ambitious goal. But it could be seen as a continuation of an old diplomatic tradition. The role of a diplomat was often to prevent war and try to preserve peace. The challenges in this role remain the same. There will always be conflicts between nations, regions or groups and they can be solved either peacefully or violently. Europeans (EU) have succeeded since 1945 to live in peace and cooperation and could therefore be called pioneers in soft politics. In 2012 the EU was awarded the Nobel Prize in

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Peace. But it was Mahatma Gandhi who taught us how to achieve a very important political goal (India´s independence) through non –violence!

To me “cultural diplomacy” is in a way the 21st Century version of the “peaceful coexistence” between the two blocs during the cold war 1947-1991. Peaceful coexistence between “East” and “West” or between communism and capitalism became necessary when both sides realized that they could destroy each other completely with their nuclear weapons. The coexistence was based on the so-called “terror balance” between the super powers. But the coexistence became an important basis for a considerable cultural exchange, which at times could even include exchange of ideas. There were some limits of tolerance or taboos, e.g. oppositional authors in the Soviet Union and – in certain periods – suspicion of “communists” in the United States, but generally speaking the area of exchange was rather broad and many programs successful. The relations were based on a considerable amount of mutual respect for each other. Important was that the Artists and other “cultural actors” felt that in music, dance or visual arts there are no – or only few – national or ideological borders.

When the Berlin wall and the iron curtain fell and the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the cold war was over. From 1991 we have a new world order. Professor Fukuyama called it “the end of history”. But Professor Huntington a few years later saw the new “vacuum in conflicts” to be filled by a “clash of civilizations” (Samuel Huntington: The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order, The Free Press 2002)

I see CD as an intelligent response to Huntington. Cultural Diplomacy has an important role to play. The question is, however: what role?

Some Options for Cultural Diplomacy:

It seems that Intercultural Dialogue between cultures and religionscould be the most important dimension of CD, with a considerable potential for further development, both in practice and in research,

Conflict solution certainly could be seen as one aspect of CD, but we should be aware that there are many other well established international actors and research fields regarding conflicts, for instance the Peace Research Institutes like SIPRI, www.sipri.org and the International Crisis Group, www.crisisgroup.org

Non-violent solutions to conflicts is mainly a UN task, but certainly need the backing of the soft power of CD,

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Human Rights, including rights of women, is a field with many actors and lobby groups, but the angle of CD certainly adds an important dimension in a field which, unfortunately, has seen too little progress in recent years.

CD, not least an Institute like ICD, Berlin, could and should provide a forum for dialogue between diplomats, artists, politicians, media and civil society.

CD should create intellectual meeting places for various cultures. Starting point: “The other” can be very intelligent. You may hate what he/she says, but he/she is not stupid. This goes for communists, tea party members, islamists, liberals, Chinese politburo members, European social democrats, African half-dictators or whatever group of human beings. We will not agree, we might hate what “the other” says, but a dialogue could still be helpful.

CD as Nation Branding has a bright future. Many “young” nations have particular needs to develop strategies for a convincing nation branding based on CD (see above!).

Some Challenges:

“Peace and Stability” is a complicated and sensitive combination, since stability is often achieved on the expense of opposition groups or freedom of expression. Most recent examples: Mubarak was considered a “stability factor” in the Middle East. And so was Gaddafi for the African Union. Both Russia and China are putting Stability as political top priority. Stability can sometimes be the opposite of Human Rights…

How do you defend Human Rights through cultural diplomacy in countries like China or Russia, which are known to be rather allergic against the concept? Wouldn´t they consider any efforts in defense of Human Rights as an “intervention into their internal affairs”? So the goal “stability” is complicated in a CD context.

And how do we advocate equal rights for women through cultural diplomacy towards talibans or extreme islamists?

One more word of caution: Very often artists will be happy to take part in manifestations of nation branding or CD in general, but we have to be aware that they might sometimes not like to be “instrumentalized” for the sake of CD.

Further Development of Cultural DiplomacyThe potential for CD is great. The more the concept becomes accepted globally, the greater the need will be for institutes (like ICD) or scientific institutions worldwide to promote and analyze the role of CD in creating meeting places, in editing books and journals, as a main subject for

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research and comparing experiences and good practices. In official diplomacy, policies and practices of governments and embassies, the role of CD will continue to grow.

Case Studies

LibyaDue to the fast-changing nature of events in Libya, one aspect of the following analysis was outpaced by a new development before the article’s published: the Libyan government accepted an African Union-mediated peace plan. For the sake of intellectual accountability, the section of this article dealing with the African Union (AU) mediations—and the Gaddafi regime’s conduct towards these—has not been substantively altered following this news. However, this AU peace plan cannot yet be assumed to form the basis of a durable peace treaty, because Libyan opposition leaders are insisting on the condition that Gaddafi and his sons step down from power. The rebels have thus refused the AU peace proposal, on the grounds that it does not meet this basic demand.[1] Additionally, as noted by BBC news correspondent Jon Leyne, “neither government nor opposition appear under enough pressure yet to sue for peace.”[2]

Since the Libyan crisis began, a storm of commentary has questioned the legality, legitimacy, desirability, necessity, and morality of the international intervention in the North African country.[3] A question that is less frequently asked is that of preventability. While recriminations over the present international intervention in Libya have only begun, it may help to clarify the parameters of the debate to focus on what alternative options were available to the international community in response to events in Libya. What were the alternatives to an international show of force? Were soft-power tools exhausted before resorting to hard-power sticks? Could the United Nations have successfully practiced preventive, as opposed to reactive and coercive, diplomacy? Could—or should—the world have negotiated with Gaddafi? These are important questions, insofar as they may help us to make sense of the ongoing Libyan war.

Alternatives?Firstly, could the international community have avoided the use of force in Libya via alternative diplomatic means?[4] If diplomacy is to be understood as “the management of international relations by negotiation”, then a failure of negotiations to find a peaceful solution to conflicts of interest qualifies as a failure of diplomacy.[5] But if diplomacy is defined in realist terms as “peaceable coercion” in pursuit of states’ self-interested objectives,[6] or in the more explicitly zero-sum and militaristic view of the “continuation of war by other means,” then we can arrive at divergent explanations of whether diplomacy has succeeded or failed.[7] To get around this problem, we will judge the success or failure of UN-sanctioned (multilateral and coercive) diplomacy, in the lead-up to the use of force in Libya, first and foremost in relation to the alternatives available to policy-makers, and their credibility and cost-benefit trade-offs.

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There were certainly other options at hand for the United States, the United Kingdom and France—buttressed by an Arab coalition—short of the use of force. One of these, the weapon of choice in many contentious international issues, was to enact a policy of “strategic patience”. This approach, practised in international conflicts on the Korean peninsula[8] and in Georgia,[9] may mean nothing more than condemning belligerents, calling for international engagement, and observing how the situation develops. This was a possible alternative to international intervention in Libya. Strategic patience may have stood a chance in the Security Council, were it not for the ghosts of international failures past—most notably the world’s bystander role in Rwanda.[10] It was indeed the ghost of Rwanda which reduced the appeal of strategic patience, at least for key U.S. actors such as UN Ambassador Susan Rice and Samantha Power.[11] Theoretically, the Permanent Five members of the UNSC could have avoided the dangers of military involvement in the Libyan conflict by staging a stereotypical show of disunity, or else a symbolic joint declaration expressing the Security Council’s “grave concern” at events in Libya. This was a distinct possibility. As is well known, however, on 17 March the UNSC approved a No-Fly Zone to protect Libyan civilians by “all necessary measures”.[12] The logic of resolution 1973 can be seen to support the view, expressed by Jim Murphy on e-IR, that international anger about Iraq did not trump the shame of Rwanda.

As we saw, a policy of doing nothing was a clear alternative. Short of this extreme policy of inaction, however, we may question whether the United Nations was too quick to approve violence to combat violence. Sending a UN-led buffer force to separate the rebels and government soldiers was a possible alternative, but the three pressing constraints of UN peacekeeping shortfalls in military assets,[13] the political horse-trading and quiet diplomacy Ban Ki-moon needed to engage in to secure troop commitments and another UNSC resolution,[14] as well as the sharp time constraints meant that the Libyan crisis would have been ‘solved’ militarily before the UN could have formulated a coherent peacekeeping strategy. Additionally, even if it had been deployed on time, it is unlikely that such a UN force could have kept out of the fray. As in Ivory Coast, where UN and French forces engaged in a coercive peace enforcement mission,[15] UN troops on the ground would have been compelled to impose the peace by force. The result would have still been the international community’s use of force in Libya, only via troops on the ground rather than a No-Fly Zone. Nevertheless, did the UN miss a chance to negotiate with Colonel Gaddafi? Empirical facts suggest that Gaddafi was less interested in a peaceful compromise with his domestic challengers than their total submission.

Negotiations?Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni, for one, critiqued the intervention of Western powers in the Libyan conflict for undercutting an eleventh-hour African Union (AU) mediation attempt between Tripoli and the rebel movement—a mission which was called off when French and British missiles began raining down on Libyan military targets.[16] According to Jean Ping, the

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head of the Commission of the AU, the diplomatic intervention had been over-ruled by the UN Security Council, on the grounds that it was too dangerous for the mediators.[17] But how successful the AU mission would have been is questionable. The UN (resolution 1970) had already employed the alternative sanctions of an arms embargo, a travel ban and assets freeze of Libyan officials, and a referral of Libya to the International Criminal Court. Despite these punitive measures—and irrespective of the condemnation of the Arab League, the AU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Western powers[18]—Gaddafi’s troops marched on Benghazi.

If Western media and intelligence reports were accurate,[19] then Libya’s unilateral cease-fire declaration (on 18 March) was an attempt to gain time, complicate the enforcement of a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone, and potentially present the world with a classic fait accompli in Benghazi. Gaddafi said as much in his speech. The Libyan leader warned of a house-to-house “slaughter” in rebel-held communities, and called for his people to “capture the rats”, and “cockroaches”, and “sick” groups rebelling against his rule—who were allegedly drugged by evil Western powers spiking their Nescafé (!). According to early warning systems designed to avoid the repetition of a Rwanda, Gaddafi’s use of dehumanising rhetoric to vilify target groups by likening them to animals or a disease—“vermin or rats, cancer or plagues, or…cockroaches”, in the case of Rwanda[20]—triggered alarm bells of potential large-scale massacres to come. Moreover, Gaddafi explicitly stated his intention to imitate the Russian (Yeltsin’s shelling of the Duma in 1993) and Chinese precedents (1989 Tiananmen massacre), which had successfully “snuffed the rats out” before the world could effectively react.[21] What exactly would have occurred to Libyan rebels in Benghazi in the absence of coalition airstrikes—and precisely what Gaddafi had in mind when warning that his troops would “find you even in your closets”—is a counter-factual question that no historian will ever be able to answer. But there was a clear intention behind the government military advance on eastern rebel strongholds, which aimed to change the military facts on the ground by killing rebels en masse, banking on international disunity and Western rhetoric and diplomacy not being backed by the credible threat of the use of force. Gaddafi miscalculated. The UN Security Council served its stated purpose: “to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace…”[22]

Which brings us back to the question: How successful could the AU peace-making mission have been? The AU mediation mission, backed by Gaddafi’s few international friends, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Cuba’s Fidel Castro,[23] and potentially funded by the European Union,[24] seems to have been pushed by Tripoli at two precise moments: On the 5th of March, and twenty days later. These dates are interesting, as they correlated with two reversals of fortune for pro-Gaddafi forces, including a large-scale rebel counter-attack (the battles of Ras Lanuf and Bin Jawad, 4-5 march), after resolution 1973 was implemented in Libya, and the intensification of coalition air strikes against government military targets, and NATO taking

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control of the air and naval missions (24-25 March).[25] If we can deduce anything from these dates,[26] without making exaggerated causal claims, it is that Muammar Gaddafi has supported the idea of AU mediations only when the tide of battle turned against government forces.

Hence, we can see that Gaddafi did not seriously commit to third-party mediation as a matter of policy, but instead as a form of tactical retreat—only after events on the ground had begun shifting against the Libyan regime. This suggests that Colonel Gaddafi, in the time-honoured tradition of military strategists, perceived dialogue and negotiations in utilitarian terms as a cover for military plans and manoeuvres,[27] rather than the means to finding a mutually-acceptable solution to the Libyan civil war. Like Spartan leaders before him, Gaddafi sought negotiations out of tactical considerations, “meanwhile we can employ the time gained in perfecting our preparations…”[28] Dialogue could be used to gain relative gains and military leverage over the enemy. This also implies that Tripoli’s offers of “conditional compromises”[29] to the rebels and foreign powers are signs that Gaddafi is bargaining from a weak—and weakening—position.[30] This can also be seen in Gaddafi’s (5 April) letter to President Obama (whom Gaddafi refers to as his “son”), in which he boils down the two problems facing Libya to: 1. NATO’s military involvement in the conflict; and 2. the presence of Al Qaeda operatives among Libyan rebels. If this letter, conveniently leaked to the media, is the original and whole correspondence, then Gaddafi seems to be suggesting that problem #1, with Obama’s help, can be traded for an end to problem #2: i.e. an end to NATO operations in exchange for an end to Al Qaeda’s (alleged) activities in Libya.[31] This tacit quid-pro-quo, which the U.S. has publicly rejected, demonstrates the limited leverage of the Gaddafi regime, exhausted after Libya’s defiant return to pariah status, despite having re-emerged from international isolation to become a de facto U.S. ally in the war on terror in the early 2000s. Hence, the regime is now isolated and bargaining for its very survival.

This does not mean that the African Union’s ongoing attempt to broker peace talks between Gaddafi and the rebels are worthless or doomed to fail. To the contrary, they should be sustained to encourage the Libyan leadership to perceive negotiations as a viable alternative to the continued use of military force against their own people. The AU can continue to offer Gaddafi a way out. But the fact remains that the escalation of internationally-sanctioned military force on the Libyan battlefield, which halted the pro-government advance on Benghazi and induced a stalemate—rather than an all-out victory by Gaddafi forces—was a necessary precondition for the Gaddafi regime to be persuaded of the need for negotiations. Western commentators have expressed concerns over a protracted Libyan stalemate,[32] which may risk draining domestic support for the military intervention. Unfortunately, however, mutually-hurting stalemates are often required to bring about a mediated solution to violent conflicts.[33]

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In other words, although China and other international observers may criticise the intervening powers, and urge them to “give peace a chance”,[34] a stable peace in Libya would have had no chance of surviving without the Security Council’s diplomatic backing and military enforcement. The possibility of genuine and lasting peace for Libyan civilians—as opposed to a Tiananmen-inspired Carthaginian peace which Gaddafi openly intended—was only made possible by the diplomatic battle leading to resolution 1973 and the subsequent UN-mandated intervention in Libya, both of which China and Russia passively approved by withholding their veto power. This is the paradox of Libya, and humanitarian intervention broadly speaking. Although all wars may represent a failure of diplomacy, war is often the last resort of diplomacy.[35] This paradox results from two competing ideas of what the supreme objective of diplomacy should be: peace at any cost, or peace by any means. More than a definitional paradox, this is a moral dilemma.

The Paradox of DiplomacyDid diplomacy succeed or fail in Libya? The international military intervention resulted from a mixture of an arguably ‘successful’ strategy of coercive diplomacy at the UN, framed as a case of preventing democide—a government’s mass murder of its own citizens—and a failure of third-party mediations. This crisis demonstrated the tension at the heart of international initiatives to prevent violent conflicts and massacres, namely that the multilateral and UN-sanctioned use of force is a legitimate tool of conflict prevention.[36] At this point, our consideration of diplomacy can no longer remain divorced from the broader debate about the role of morality in international affairs, which has been reignited by the Libyan crisis. Diplomacy itself is a paradox: although it has historically been idealised as an antidote to power, it may more accurately be conceived of as an instrument of power.[37] Like any instrument, diplomacy is morally neutral. It is neither good nor bad, and the morality or immorality of its outcome ultimately depends on who is wielding it, when, why, and how. One may agree, with Benjamin Franklin, that there never was a good war or a bad peace. But what of the grey areas between both moral absolutes? There is scarcely anything inherently good about the kind of peace which Tacitus described: “they make a wasteland and call it peace”. Just as there may be nothing inherently bad about the targeted use of military force to stop large-scale massacres of unarmed civilians by their own governments, or to enforce peace between warring factions.[38] Similarly, diplomats are neither messengers of the Gods, in the image of their Greek patron Hermes, nor are they necessarily “just as essential to starting a war as soldiers for finishing it,” as Will Rogers joked.[39]

The present debate about whether President Obama’s backing of the intervention in Libya vindicated the amoral theory of realism, or the values-based worldview of Wilsonian idealism, is overly reductionist.[40] The tensions between interests and values, between peace and justice, and between national and global priorities routinely confront heads of state and policy-makers every waking and working hour—particularly the representatives of democratic polities, who

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must worry about such things as opinion polls, popular opinion, and elections.[41] Simplifying the complexity of the Libyan crisis to two moral poles exposes us to what Harold Nicolson saw as the terrible danger of self-righteousness. “Diplomacy is not a system of moral philosophy,” warned Nicolson.[42] The conduct of diplomacy must not be judged by the moral beliefs it confirms, but by the crises it avoids, the conflicts it manages, and the lives it saves. To the extent that these can ever definitely be known, as in the case of Benghazi, successful diplomacy must be benchmarked against the internal and external validity of intentions, the legal and political legitimacy of actions, the correspondence between rhetoric and reality, the existence or lack of credible alternatives and, ultimately, by its outcomes. By these measures, it is too early to provide a definitive post-mortem of the Libyan operation. But we can see that the use of multilateral coercive diplomacy, through the UN Security Council system—in distinction to unilateralism—was surprisingly effective in providing the legal and political legitimacy for international intervention in Libya. Whether this was good or bad, smart or stupid, desirable or mistaken, and exactly what NATO will now do with the UN-sanctioned legitimacy it has inherited (i.e. use it or lose it) are important questions, but they will only be answerable once the dust of the Libyan mission settles.

Those who argue that, to the contrary, the Libyan intervention has “weakened the UN as a body operating within the constitutional framework of the UN Charter,” are right to point to the contradicting imperatives at the heart of the UN system: saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war, whilst uniting in strength to suppress, contain and remove acts of aggression and threats to international peace and security; the self-determination of peoples vs. the sovereign integrity and equality of member-states.[43] But resolutions 1970 and 1973 were not the final nail in the coffin of the United Nations; they demonstrated the relevance and necessity of multilateral diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century. Whether the international use of force, legitimised by the UN and enforced by NATO, ultimately succeeds in bringing about a peaceful and stable political settlement in Libya (and indeed in Afghanistan) remains very much to be seen. At minimum, multilateral diplomacy was efficiently employed by the intervening powers. Libya does not belong in the same category as the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, but is comparable to the UN-backed use of force during the First Gulf War (1990) and in Korea (1950).

In conclusion, analysing the role of diplomacy in the present Libyan crisis may help to ground the debates about morality versus Realpolitik, and humanitarian intervention versus the principle of non-intervention in the civil wars and massacres of other states. If politics is the art of the possible, diplomacy is the art of taking the possible to a global scale.[44] Hence, proponents of intervention in Libya under the umbrella of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) must weigh up the long-term limitations and diplomatic constraints of the UN engaging in humanitarian interventions in every crisis, from Yemen to Bahrain, and from Côte d’Ivoire to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The critique that R2P represents Western double-standards

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in humanitarian garments and the realist point that might makes right is a vexing one, which R2P advocates have not yet answered satisfactorily. Proponents of the increasing use of R2P in world affairs must respond to the question: ‘could R2P ever be used in Iran, or China, or Russia?’ But those who argue for inaction, strategic patience and not meddling in tyrants’ internal affairs, must also assess the costs of these choices—because choices they are—relative to the short-term safety of doing nothing. Critics who argue against Western military interventions as a matter of principle must begin by recognising that interventions in the affairs of other states out of perceived or alleged humanitarian concerns is not a neo-colonial policy, but has been practised by such diverse states as Iran (support of Kurds in Iraq until 1975), Cuba (1975-1991, in Angola), Vietnam (1978 intervention in Cambodia), arguably Tanzania (1979 intervention in Uganda), Rwanda (1998, in the DRC), Ethiopia (2006) and Kenya (2011) in Somalia, Russia (2008, in Georgia; 2010 in Kyrgyzstan), and more. Finally, those who argue that the Libyan intervention was a strategic and political mistake, no matter the initial humanitarian necessity and UN-sanctioned legitimacy, must consider the question: What were the credible alternatives?

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BibliographyAdam, Watson,. Diplomacy the dialogue between states. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1983.

Berridge, G. R. Diplomatic Theory From Machievelli to Kissinger. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

“Diplomacy – The U.S. Department of State at Work.” U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs, June 2008. Web. 2 Sept. 2009.

Kwong, Maj Tang Mun. “The Roles of Diplomacy and Deterrence in the 21 st Century.” Journal V27 N1 Jan-Mar (2001).

Freedman, Lawrence, ed. (1998), Strategic Coercion. Concepts and Cases (Oxford University Press).

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