'~ilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, pp. 155-169, in Workin~ Papers from "the Urban & Regional Development Vniversity of California-~erkeley, 1973.

Dilemmas in a General Theory oi Planning*· HORSI' W~ J. Rm'EL . "-l-•1* Scia« of Dailrf, Ulli~y •I Cllllifonio. &ruky

MELVIN M. WEBBER l'rrl/astK of Cily ,__., Ulfillenily of 01/ifonUQ. llnuky

ABSTJtACT

Tk x:udl f« ICialti6&: buts f« coafroalia& probtems o( social polic:y is bouDd to fait, beamt: o( the DatiiR of lilac problc:ms. Tiley are ~- problems. wllaa.s ICicDcz has developed 10 deal with "'WDc" problam. Policy problems c:aaor be ddiDitiwl)' describecl. Moreower. ill a pluralist&: IOCicty thcR is IIOtbilla like the mdisp9cable public aood; thcr'e is DO otljectM cldinitioa of lqllity; policies tbal rapood to IOCiaJ problaas CUIDOC be me:aniqfully aJmiCl or fabc; ad it lll&bs eo ICIISe ro Wlc aboul "optimal solutions" to social problems .Jess sew:rc qua!jfic:a•iaas are imposed 6nt. E._ -. rlleft art no '"soluliaas" in lhc - of dc6nitiYc ad ob,ieatne ~

. . George Bernard Shaw diagnosed the case several years aao; in more reecnt times popular protest may have already become a soc:ial movemcDL Shaw averred that .. every profession is a conspiracy apiDst the laity." Tbe contemporary pablics are respondin& as though they have made the same discovery.

Few of t.be modem professionals seem to be immUDe from the popular attack--whether they be social worJccrs. educators. bowers, public health oftic:ials. policemen. city pla.nnen. bilflway aJiDecrs or physicians. Our restive clients have been tdlinf us that they don't like the educatioaal pro,rams that schoolmen haw been ofrerinr. t.be Rdevdopmcat projects urban rc=Wal al'tftcies have been proposiq. t.be Jaw. CDfon:emeDt styles of the police. the admiDistrati¥C behavior of the welfare qencies, the locations oC the bipways. and 10 OD. ID the courts; t.be streets. and the political c:ampaips. we'Ye heeD hearias ewr-IOuder public protests apiDSt the proCcssioDS' diaposes ot tbt c:licats' problems. apinst professioaally designed ~ prosrams. qaiast professionally certified standards for the public scnices.

It does *Z!l octd that this attack should be comiDa just when professionals ia

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tile social scrvica are lqinDina to .:quire prore:ssioDal c:Ompetencics. It aupt seem that our publics are bcia& pencnc. haviD& condoned professionalism when it was rally only clrateMp amalellrism and CODdcnlniq profcsslonaJism when - finally IICJII to IJc .W. JOOCI at our jobs. Pa waae thoup the laity may be. surely the profasioaals thcaadwa ._'WC bcCD behind this attack as well.

Sollie of tile .-raton of the c:oafrontation ha'WC beCu intdJcctuaJ in oripn. The aati-professioaaJ JDOI.olallalt sacms in part from a -recoDCCptualizatioa of the pro-f'asioufs task. Otbcn are more in the characcer or bis&oric:al imperatives. i.e. con-

. ditiolls ha'WC bcca tbrowD up by the coune or soc:i Ul C'WCDIS that call for dill'eran _.. or ildcrw:ntioD.

The protessioul's job was oDCC seen as solviD& an assortment or problems that appeared to IJc dc6aable. UDdersCandablc and consensual. He was hired to eliminate daose c:oDCtitioDs that predonrinmt opinion judpd undcsirablc. His record has been quite spec~KU~ar, of counc; the contemporary city and contemporary urban society iland as c:lcaD C'ridcDc:es of professional prowess. The streets ha'WC ~ pawd. and roads DOW conDCCt aU plac:cs; houses shelter vinually ncryonc; the dn:ad diseases are vinuaDy aooe; deaa water is piped into acatfy ncry buildin&; sanitary sewers c:any wastes from them; sc:bools and hospitals scr'WC vinually C'WCf)' district; and so on. The accomplishments of tile past ca~tury in these RSpCCU ba'WC bcCD truly pheDO-mcnal, howe'WCr short oC some persons' aspirations they might ha'WC been.

But DOW that these rdativdy easy problems ha'WC bcaJ dealt with, WC ha'WC IJcen tUI'IIiq our attcDticm to others that arc much more aubbom. The tests for cffic::icftq, that were aacc so uaef'uJ u measures of accomplisbmcat; arc beina cbaDeoJCd by a racwed prcoccapacioa with coasequeaccs for equity. The sccmift& coasensus, that mialu aacc ha"WC allowed distributional problems to be dealt with, is being eroded by tbc.-powiq awarcecss or tbc Dation's pluralism and of tbc difl'eraltiatioa of values that aa:omplllics dilfacntiatioa of publics. The profcssioaalized copiti'WC and oc:capaticmal styJcs that were refined in tbc first half of this century, baed in NewtoaiaD mcch•rristic physic:s, ate DOt radiJy adapccd to contemporary conc:cptions of iJdc:ractiD& opali)'Slalls and to contemporary CODCCrDS with equity. A powiag aensitivity to tile ~ o( ~ons that ripple through such systemic DCtWOrts and to tbc Yalue coaseqUCDCeS of those ~OilS has pncraled tbc recet~t re-aami!"tioD or recciwd Yalues aad the recent search for national JO&Is. Tberc seems to be a JrOwiDa rcalizatioa that a weak strut in tbc professional's sappon. SJSUm lies at the juDcture wbcre pi-formulation, ·problem-definition and equity issues JDeCt. We should lite to address these matters in tum.

I. Goal Formalatioa The leU'Cb for capliCit JOIIs was iaitiated in force with the OpaUDJ of tbc 1960s. Ia a 1960 RAND pubticatioa. Cbadcs J. Hitch ufll!d that •we must lc:aril to look It tlflt' tlb)«tha as aiticaDy and as pro(essioaaJiy as we look at our models and 011r otbcr ilrpats." 1 The sablequa:at wort iD 1JStC1DS ualysis Rd&rmcd that injUDctioD.

I a.rla J. Rilcb, "'On die~~ ill $,._ Stailia• CSaala Naaica, Calilonia: 'l1lc &AND Calpnaiaa. JMO; P-WS). p. 19.

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Men in a wide array of fields 'WCt'e prompted to redefine the systems they dealt with in the sy11tu of verbs rather than nouns-to ask .. What do the systems do'!" rather a !\;In .. What are they made of"! -and then to ask the most difficult question of all : .. What shtnlld these systems do'r Also 1960 was inaugurated with the publication of Gt~t~ls for ArMrictlfU, the report of President Eisenhower' s Commission on National Cioals.Z There followed then a wa~ of similar efforts. The Committee for Economic De\'Clopment commissioDed a follow-up rc-eum ination. So did the Brookinss lastitution, the Americ:an Academy of Arts and Scienc:es, and then President Nixon throo.1gh his National Goals Research Staff. But)hese may be only the most apparent attempts to clarify the nation's direc:tions.J

Perhaps more symptomatic in the .. U.S . . were the efforts to install PPBS. v.-hich requires explication of dniru outcomn; and then the more m:ent attempts to build systems of social indic::~tors, v.·hich are in effect surrogates for statements Clf desired conditions. As we all now know, it has turned out to be terribly diffic:ult, if not im-possible. to make either of these systems oper:ltional. Although there are some small success stories ru:ountcd in a few civilian •ncies. successes are still rare. Ciool-findin!! is tuming out to be an extraordinarily obstinate task. Bec::~use &;oaJ-finding is one of the central functions of pbnnin&, we shall shortly w:~nt to ask why that must be so.

At the same time that these formalized attempts were being ~r.adc: to disco .. -er OiJr latent aims. the nation was bulfcted by the revolt of the blacks, then by the: revolt of the students, then by the widespread revolt apinsl the war, more recently •ith a nev.· eonsumerism and conservationism. All these movements were striking out at the underlying S)'Stemic processes of contemporary American society. In a style rather different from those of the systems analysts and the Presidential commissioners, participants in these: revolts were seeking to restructure the value and goal systems th:u affect the distribution of social product and shape the directions or national policy.

Systems analysis, pis commissions, PPBS, social indicators. the several revolts, the poverty program, model cities, the current concerns with environrnenul quality and with the qualities of urban life, the search for new r-eli&;ions among contemporary youth, and the increasing attractiveness of the pbnning idea-all seem to be dri"-en by a common quest. Each in its peculiar way is asking for a clarification of purposes,

· for a redefinition of problems, for a·re-orderin!! ofpriorilies to match stated purposes. for the design of new kinds or goal-directed actions, for ~ n:orienution or the pro-fessions to the outputs of professional activities rather than to the inputs into them, w then Jor a redistribution or the outputs of !!overnmental pr~ms among the competing publics.

A ~running current of optimism in Americ:i'ln thought seems to h&\': been propdlin& these diverse searches for direction-finding instruments. But at the s:ame lime, the Americans' t~~....; ;;dlh in a paranteed Pro~ is being eroded by the same W&\'CS that aR wearing down oJi1 beliefs in the 5.x:ial order's inherent JOOdDCSS and ia hist~ry's intrinsic bcDcvolenc:e. Candide is dead. His place is being

J The rqtOt1 - published "" $clecUulllloob. Prauiae-HaU. 1960. , Ac the - time co lie Aft. counter wooicla -uDCOmlonablc to many~ daimiac tbac the

-..ciocl's 4irec:&ioft- praenu 1a0 aanial(ul rd'etaK:CI)'Sian ac an. owina co the worldwide dla~ ollllc PfObbns and cbc CMf'SPiD of crilcs across nalioaal boun4aric:s.

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OCQJpied by a new conception o( future history that, rejecting historicim~, is searching for ways of exploiting the intdlectual and inventive eapabilities of men.

This belief comes in two quite contradictory form~ On the one hand, there is the belief in tbe .. makcability," or unrestricted malleability, of future history by means of the planning intdlect-by reasoning, rational d iscourse, and civilized negotiation. At the same time, there are ¥OCal proponents of the .. feeling approach," of com-passionate enpgement and dramatic aaion, e\~ of a revi,-al of mysticism, aiming at overcoming The System which is seen as tbe evil source o( misery and suffering.

The Enlighten~• -:-~:· be coming to full maturity in the late 20th cc:.tury, or it may be on its deathbed. Many Americans seem to believe both t~t ·~ can perfect future history-t~t we can deliberately shape future outcomes to accord ·•ith our wishes-and that there will be no future history. Some have arrh~ at deer pcssimil>ln and some at resignation. To them, planning for lar;e social systems ~s proved to be impossible without loss of liberty and equity: Hence,· for them the ultimate goal of planning should be anarchy, because it should aim at the elimination of govern· mcnt over olhc~ Still another group has arrived at the conclusion that liberty and equity are luxuries which cannot be afforded by a modem society, and that they should be substituted by .. cybernetically feasible" values.

Professionalism has been understood to be one of the major instruments for perfectability, an agent sustaining the traditional American optimism. Based in modem science, each of the professions has been conceived as the medium throu~h which the knowledge of science is applied. In effect, each profession has been see'n as a subset of engineering. Planning and the emerging policy sciences are amonr the more optimistic: of those professions. Their representatives refuse to believe that planning for betterment is impossible, however grave their misgivings about the appropriateness of past and present modes of planning. They have not abandoned the hope that the instruments of perfectability can be perfected. It is that view that we want to eum.ine, in an effort to ask whether the social professions are equipped to do what they are expected to do.

n. Problem Defi.Ditioa During the induwial age, the idea of planning. in cc,mmon with the ide.a of pro-fessionalism. was dominated by the pervasive idea of r/ficirncy . Drawn from 18th century physics, c:1assic:a1 economics and the principle or least-means, cllic:iency was seen as a condition in which a specified task could be performed with low inputs of resources. That bas been a powerful idea. It has long been the avidin& concept of civil engineering, the sc:ieDtific management JDO\'CmeDt. much of coatemporary operations research; and it still pervades modem sovemment and industry. When altiCbed to the idea of planning, it became dominating there too. Pluming was then SCCil as a proc:as or desipina problem-solutions that miaht be installed and operated cbeaply. Jec:auie it was fairly easy to act consemus on the nature of problems during the early industrial period. the wk could be assigned to the tec:hnicaDy Wiled, who in tum could be tnasted to accomplish the simplified end-in-view. Or, in the more work-a-day scniDg, we could ieJy upon the cfticiency expert to diaposc a problem

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and then solve it. while simuhaneou51y reducin~ the resource inputs into wfl:uever it was we were doiftl.

We have come to think about the planning task in very different ways in recent ,cars. We have been learning to ask whether what we arc doing is the ritht thin& to do. That is to say. we have been leamin& to ask questions about the outputs of actions and to pose problem statements in valuative frameworks. We have been leamin& to sec social proc:csscs as the links tying open systems into large and interco~ed DCtworks of systems, such that outputs from one ~me inputs to others. In that structural framework it has become less apparent where problem centers lie. and less apparent ·~ and how we should intervene nen if we do happen to know wt..at aims we seek. We are now sensitized to the waves of repercussions generated by a problem-solving action directed to any one node in the network. and we arc DO longer · s\1,.-j,rised to find it inducing problems of ueater severity at some other aode. And so we have been for=! to expand the boundaries of the systems we deal with. trying 'o intemalize those .externalities.

This was the professional style of the systems analysts. who WCT'e commonly seen as forebearers of tbe universal problem-solvers. With arropnt confideuc:e. the early systems analysts pronounced themselves ready to take on anyone's percei\'ed problem, diagnostically to discover iu hidden character, and then, having exposed its true nature, skiDfully to excise its root causes. Two decades of experience have wom the self-assurances thin. These analysts are coming to realize how valid their model really is. for they themselves have been caught by the very same diagnostic difficulties that troubled their clients.

By now we arc all beginning to realize that one of the most intractable problems is that of defining problems (of knowing what distinruishes an observed c:oDdition from a desired condition) and of locating problems (finding where in the complex causal netWorks the trouble really lies). In tum, and equally intractable. is the problem of identifyina the actions that might effectively narrow the pp between what-is and what-ouJht-to-be. As we seek to improve the effectiveness of actions in punuic of val~ outcomes, as System boundaries JC1 stretched, and as we become more sophisticated about the complex workings of open societal systems. it bec:ome5 ever more diftlcult to make the planninc idea operational.

Many now have an image of ltt~t~• an itkaliud planning system would fUDCtion. It is bcin1 seen as an on·aoing. cybernetic process of governance. inc:orporatinc systematic proczdures for continuously searching out aoa.Js; iclentifying problems ; forecasting uncontrollable contextual chanees: inventing altemative stiatqies, tactics, and time-sequenced actions; stimulatinc alternative and plausible action sets aDd their coo-sequences; eva.luatift& altematively forecasted out~mes; swistic:aJly mOnitoring those tcmditions of the publ~ at.d oi S)'SlCmS that arc judged to tte &erm≠ feeding beck information to the simulation aad decision clwtne1s so that errors can be corrected-all in a simuhancoasJy.(unc:t.ioning JOvcnUng process. Tbat let of steps is familiar to aD of us. for it comprises what is by now the modet~Klassical model of planning. And yet we all know that such a planning system is unattainable, eveft as we seck more dosdy to approximate it. It is nen questionable whether sud! a plan-DiD& system is desirable.

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m. Pl•nninc ProWems are WICked Problems A put many barriers keep us from perfecting such a planninJ/&ovnnin~ system : theory is inadequate for clccent forecastin&: our intcUisenc:e is insufficient to our tasks; plUrality of objectives hcJd by pluralitieS of politics nWc5 it impossible to pursue unitary aims; and so on. Tbc diftic;ultics auachcd to rationality arc ten:~cious. and we have .:. :-..- Lecn unable to act untan&)cd from their web. This is partly because the classical paracii&m of scicnc:c aad cnJinecring-thc paradipn ata:lt has UDdcrwn modern professionalism-is DOt applicable to the problems of open S4Xieul systems. One: reason the publics ha~-e bcctl attackinclhc social professions. we bclie~-e. is that tbC COJnitive . and . occupational. styles of the profcssions-rnimickin! the cocnitive style of scienc.c and the oa:upational style of engineering-have just not worked on a wide array of social probkms. The lay customers arc complaining because planners and other professionals ha\·e not succeeded in solving the problems they claimed they could solve. We shall want to suggest that the social professions were misJecl somewhere alon& the line into assumin& they could be applied scientists-that they could solve problems in the ways scientists can solve t.hcir sorts of problems. The error has been a serious one.

The kinds of problems that planners dc:aJ with-societal problems-are inherently dift'erent from the problems that scientists and perhaps some classes of engineers deal with. Plannin& problems are inherently wicl.:cd.

As distin&uishcd from problems in the natural sciences, which are de6ru:ble and scpa_rable and may have solutions that are finclable, the problems of go\-emmental plannins.:-..aad espcciaUy thOse of social or policy planning-.re ill-defined: :lnd they rely upon dusivc political judpnent for resolution. (Not "solution. •• Social proOicms are never solved. At best they are only re-solved-over and over apin.) Permit us to draw a cartoon that will help clarify the distinction we intend.

The problems that seicntists and engineers have usually focused upon are nlOStJy '"tame" or .. benisn" ones. As an cumplc. consider a problem of mathematics. such as solvin& an equation ; or the task of an orpnic chemist in analyzing the structure of some unknown compound ; or that of the chcssplayer attemptins to accomplish checkmate in five moves. For each the mission is dear. lt is clear. in turn. whether or DOt the problems have ~ solved.

Wicked problems, in contrast. have neither of these clarifying traits; and they include aarly -all public policy issues-whether the question concerns the location of a freeway. the adjustment oC a tax rate. the modification of school curricula. or the confrootation of crime.

'Ibm are at least tea distiapishina propctties of plannin&·typc problems, i.e . .ncbd oaa. that plannen had better be alert to and which we shaU coaunent upon in tum. As you wiD see. we are callina them '"wickecr not because these properties are themselves ethically depJorablc. We usc the term ""wicked .. ia a meanin& akin to that of""malipant" fm contrast t~ .. bcnipj or ""vicious" Oikc a cirde) or ""tricky .. (lib • leprechaun) or .. qpasive" (like a lion. in contrast to the docility or a lamb). We do Dot mean to personify these properties of social systems by implying nWicious

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iatent. But then, you may apec that it becomes morally objectionable for the planDCr to treat a wic:bd problem as thoup it Mre a tame one. or to lame a wicked problem prematurely, or to refuse to ra:opize the .inherent wickedness of social problems.

~I. 1"Mft is 110 ~n f...aatioa ora wickt4 proWem For any aiven tame problem, an ahausti~ formulation can be stated c:ontaining all the information the problem-solwr needs for undcntaading and solvift& the problem -provided be knows his .. art," or course.

This is DOt possible with wicbd-problcms. The iafOI'IIIItion needed to lllttkntt~nd the problem depends upon one's idea for so/rinK it. That is to say: in order to describe a ~ked-problem in sufficient detail, one has to develop an cxhausti~ inventory of all conceivable solutions ahead or time. The reason is tlw ~ question asking for additional information depends upon the understanding of the problcm-:and its resolution-at that time. Problem understandin1 and problem resolution are c:on· c:omitant to each other. Therefore, in order to anticipate all questions (m order to anticipate aU information required for resolution ahead of time), knowlcd,e of all conceivable solutions is required.

Consider, for example, what would be necessary in identifying the nature of the po~)' problem. Docs po~y mean low income? Yes, in pan. But what arc the determinants of low income? Is it deficiency of the national and regional economics,

. or is it deficiencies of c:ogniti~ and occupational skills within the labor force? If the latter. the problem statement and the problem "solution" must encompass the educa· tiona! proc::csscs. But, then, where within the educational system docs the real problem lie? What then miJht it mean to "impro~ the educational system"? Or does the po'-crty problem reside in dcfteient physical and mental health? If so, we must add those etiologies to our information pac:kagc, and search inside the health services for a plausible cause. Docs it include cultural deprivation? spatial dislocation? problems of CJO identity? deficient political and social skills ?-.nd so on. If we can formulate the problem by tracing it to some sons of sourc:cs-such that we can say, .. Aha! That's the locus of the difficulty," i.e. those arc the root causes ofthedift'erenc:es betv.un the .. is .. and the .. ought to be •• c:onditions-then we ha"C tbueby also formulated a solution. To find the problem is thus the same thing as finding the solution; the problem can•t be defined until the solution has been found.

The formulat ion of a wicked problem is the problem! The process of formulatinr the problem and of c:onceivin& a solution (or re-solution) arc identical. since C"Cry specification of the problem is a specification of the direction in which a tn;&tment is considered. Thus. if we I'CCIOiftizc deficient mental health services as part of the problem, then-tnvially cnough-.. impro~nt o • mental health services" is a IPCCification of solution. If, as the DCXt step, we dedare the lack of community centers ODe ddiciency .of the menl!l health scrvic:n system, theG ~t or COJDaiUDit)' centers" is the next specification of solution. If it is inadequate tlaUDent within commUDity centers. then impro~ therapy trainin& of staJI' may be the locus of solution, &Dd so on.

This property sheds some liJf\1 on the usefulness of the famed .. I)'StemS-appr~ch"

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for treating wicked problems. Tbe classical systems-approach of the military and the space ~ is based on the assumption that a planning project Qll be orpnizcd iauo clistinct phases. E~ acxtbook of systems engineering starts with an CDJimcration of lhae phases: ""understand the problems or the mission," .. pthcr information," ... D&Jyzc information, .. .. synthtsm information and wait for the creati-wc leap," ""work out solution," or the like. For wicked problems. howner,this type of scheme does DOl work. One caDnot UDderstand the problem without knowing about its COIIIat; one c:anaot meaniftl{uUy search for information without the oriemation or a solution concept ; one c:anJM.t first understand, then solve ,. '"ystems-approach .. of the first sencratioR" is inadequate for dealing with wicked-problems. Approaches .r the .. second aeneration" should be based on a model of planning as an arrunen-tati-wc proc:css ia the course of which an irnaae of the problem and of the solution

. aneJ'FS sradually amona: .the panicipants, as a product of incessant judament, . subjected to critical arzgment. The methods of Operations Research play a prominent role in the systems-approach of the first aeneration; they become operational. how-eYer, only tft~ the most important dccWons have already been made, i.e. after the problem has already been tamed.

Take an optimization model. Here the inputs needed include the ckfiftition of the solution space, the system of constraints, and the performance measure as a function of the planning and contextual variables. But setting up and constraining the solution space aDd constructing the measure of performance is the wicked part of the problem. Very likely it is more essential than the remaining steps of searching for a solution which is optimal relative to the measure of performance and the constraint system.

_2. WkUI prelllla.s un • stoppiac nle In solving a chess problem or a~mathematical equation, the problem-solver knows

wbUI be has done his job. There are criteria that tell when tilt or 11 solution has been found.

Not so with planfting problems. Because (according to Proposition I) the proc:as of solving the problem is ideatical with the process of understanding its nature, because there arc no criteria for sufficient understanding and because there are DO ends to the causal chains that link uneracting open systems, the would-be planner can always try to do better. Some additional in~tment of eft'on might increast the chances or Mding • better solution.

Tbe planner terminates work on a wicked problem, not for re&soDS inherent in the .. Iogie" of the problem. He stops for considerations that arc extemal to the problem: he ruas ovt ·of time, or J'DOney, or patience. J:le finally says, .. That's Jood enough ... or ""This is the best J can do within the limitatioDS of the project, .. or .. I like this IOivtioD." etC. . .

1 Sohltioas to wicked )II'OIIIcas ue 80t tne-or-false. .. , &oocl-or.W

There are coa¥CD~ criterii for objectively deciding whether the otrered solution to an equation or whether the proposed structural formula of a chemic:al compound is c:omct or f'alse. They can be independently checked by other qualified

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·persons who arc familiar with the established criteria ; and the answer will be normally una.mbipous.

For wicked planning problems, there arc no true or false answers. Normally, many panies are equally equipped, interested, and/or entitled to judae the solutions, although none has the power to set formal decision rules to determine corm:lncss. Their jud,menu arc likely to difrer widely to accord with their aroup or personal interests, their special vaJuNets, and their ideological predilcctioM. Their assess-ments of proposed solutions arc expressed as .. lood" or .. bad" or, more likely, as .. better or wone'' or .. satisfying" or ''cood enough:"

4.. T'Mre is 110 Immediate ucl ., ··-··f lest or • solutialllO • wick~ proWma For tame-problems one can determine on the spot how good a solution-au~mpt

has been. More accurately, the test of a solution is entirely under the control of abe few people who arc invol~ and interested in the problem.

With wicked problems, on the ot her hand, any solution, after being implemented, wiD aenerate waves of consequences over an extcnded-vinuatly an unbounded-period of time. Moreover, the next day's consequences of the solution may yield utterly undesirable rcperc:ussions which outweigh the intended advantaaes or the advaataaes accomplished hitherto. In such cases, one would have been better oft" if the plan had never been carried out. ·

The fuJI consequences cannot be appraised until the waves of rcpcn::ussiom have compleieJy run out, and we have no way of tracing Gil the waves throu&h 1111 the afrected lives ahead oftime or within a limited time span.

5. EftfJ tol111ioa to a wicked problem is a "GDe-Shol operatioa"; llcnuse tbtft Is 110 oppol'mtily to lana •y trial-aDIHrror, ntry altcmpt C'Oallts slplflcutly

In the sciences and in fields like mathematics, chess, puzzle-solving or mcc:hanic:al engineering design, the problem-solver can try various runs without penahy. What-ever his outcome on tlaese individual experimental runs, it doesn't matter much to the subject-system or to the course or societal affairs. A lost chess pme is seldom consequential for other chess games or for non-chess-players.

With wicked planning problems, however, 'rrry implemented solution is con-~equcutial. Jt leaves "'traces" that caMot be undone. One c:annot build a freeway to sec how it works, and then easily correct it after unsatisfactory performance. l...arge pubJic.works are cft'cctively irreversible., and the consequences they ICDCtatc ha~ lon& half-lives. Many people's li"VeS ~ill have been irreversibly iaft~ ud larJC amounts o( money wd1 have beeo spent-another irrevemblc ac:L The same happcos with most other larJe-scale public works ud with virt.wty aD publiC«nicc pro-pams. The cll'ccu or an uperimcrltal curriculum wiD foDow the pupils ioto their adult lives. _ · ·

Wllclle\'Cr actions are drcc:tively i~rsible and wheaever the half.Ji"VeS or the consequeoca are loll&. ~Y trill/ CtN~~~ts. ADd ncry attempt to reverse a decision or to correct for the undesired conscqueoccs poses another set of wicked problems, which are in tuni subject to the same dilemmas.

16:

_,

' · Wiebe~ prolllems clo 1101 111ft -~ (or .. eu .. stinly clescl'iMble) set of ,.._.., .......... is dleft a ·•·•scri'bed set or penais.sl"bbe opentioiiS tat may .......... * ....

Tbere arc no criteria which enable one to prove that all solutions to a wicked problem have been idellti6ed and considered.

It may happen that 110 solution is found, owing to logical inconsistencies in the "'picture" or the problem. (For aample, the problem-sol vet' may arrivc at a problem ~ption requiring that botb ~ "",. ~ot-A should happen at the same time.) Or it might result from his failing to develop an idea for solution (which does not mean that someone else might be more suc:cessful). But normally, in the pursuit of a wickeo plaaDing problem, a host or potential solutions arises; and another host is never thought up. It is then a matter of jwlzmmr whether one· should .. uy to cnlar&e the available set or not . And it is, of course, a matter of judgment which of these solutions should be pursued and implemented.

Chess has a finite set of rules. ac:c:ounting for all situations that can occur. In mathematia, the tool chest of operations is also explicit; so, too, although less rigorously, itt chemistry.

But not so in the world of social policy. Which strategies-or-moves arc permissible in dealing with crime in the streets, for example, have been enumerated nowhere. "Anything goes," or at least. any new idea for a planning mcasu~ may become a serious candidate for a ~Jution : What should we do to reduce street crime ? Should we disarm tbe police, as they do in Engbnd, since even criminals a~ less likely to shooc unarmed men? Or l'q)e&l the laws that define crime, such as those that make marijuana use a criminal act or those that make c:ar theft a criminal ac:t? That would reduce crime by c:banJing definitions. Try moral ramwncnt ·and substitute ethical self-control for police and coun control ? Shoot all criminals and thus reduce the numbers who commit crime? Give away free loot to would-be-thieYeS. and so reduce the incentive to C:rime? And so on.

In such fields of ill-defined problems and hence ill-definable solutioas, the set of feasil?le plans of action relies on ralistic judgment, the capability to appraise .. exotic" ideas and on the amount o( trust and credibility between planner and dientclc that will lead to the conclusion, ""OK. let's try that."

7. £ftrJ wicUt problem is eneetieUy aaiqae

or course, for ~y two problems at least one distinguishinJ property can be found (just as any number of propenies can be found which they sha~ in common). and each of them is therefore UDique in a trivial sense. But by .. UMiftitllly unique" we mean that, despite Joq lists of similarities between a current problem aDd a prnious ooe. theR always might be an additional distinpishing property that is of owrriding impona~cc. Part o( the art of dealin& with;widted problems is the art of not knowin& too early which type ot aolution to apply. .

'Ibcre arc ao dtu.sel ot wicbd problems in the sense that principles of solution can be dndoped to 6t till members of a class. ID mathematics there arc rules for c:lassifyiog f'amilics or problems DJ, of 10Jving a class ·of equations whcDe~ a )64

...Wn, qWt.........,.a6al "' or chanotmst;., .,......, th< -. n.... ., ! explicit dwacteristics of tame problems ttw define similarities among them, in , scch fashion that the same set of techniques is likely to be eft'ecti'YC on all of them. '

Despite seeming similarities amonJ wicked problcm5. one can ne¥Cr be t"rrtom that the paniculaB of a problem do not override its commonalities with ocher prob-lems alrady dealt with.

The conditions in a city c:onstnacain& a subway may look similar to t.1e conditions in San Francisco, say; but planners "-ould be in-advised to transfer the San Francisco solutions directly. Dift'ermces in commuter habits or raidential patterns may far outweiJh similarities in subway layout.· downtown layout -and the rest: In til .. .,:,ore complex world of social poliq planning. C'YCrY situation is likely _to be one-of-a-kind. If we are riJ)lt about that, the direet transferenc:e of the physical-science and engineer-ing thou@htways into social poliq might be dysfunctional, i.e. positively harmful . .. Solutions" miJ)lt be applied to seemingly familiar problems which are quite in-compatible with them.

I. E''UJ wicked problan cu be coasidcnd to be a symptom of uodter prolllem

Problems can be described as di~pancies between the "state of atrail'5 as it is and the state as it ought to be. The process of resolving the problem starts with the search for causal explanation of the di~panq. Removal of that cause poses another problem of which the original problem is a .. symptom." Jn tum, it can be considered the symptom or still another, .. higher level" problem. Thus .. c:ritne in the streets" ca.n be considered as a symptom of general moral decay, or permissiveness, or deficient opponunity, or wealth, or poverty, or whatever causal explanation you happen to like best. The level at which a problem is settled depends upon the self-confidence of the analyst and cannot be decided on logical grounds. There is nothing like a natural lc'YCI of a wicked problem. Of course, the higher the level of a problem's formulation, tbe broader and more general it becomes : and the more difficult it becomes to do something about it. On the other hand, one should not try to cure symptoms: aDd theref~re one 5hould try to settle the problem on as hilh a level as possible.

Here lies a difficulty with incrementalism. as well . This doctrine advenises a policy or small steps, in the hope of contributing systematically to overall improvement. If, however, the problem is auacked on too low a level (an increment), then success of resolution may result in making things worse., because it may become more difficult to dal with the higher problems. Marginal improvement does not cuarantee O\'Crall improvement. For cumple. computerization or an administrative process may result in reduced cost, case of operation, etc. But at the ~me time it becomes more diffic:ult to incur structur:al changes in the organization, because· technical perfection reinfoi"Ce\ orpnizational patterns and normally increases the cost of chan~. The newly acquired power or the controlle1'5 of information may then deter later modifications of their roles.

UDder these circwnstances it is not surprising that the memben of an orpllizatio" tend to see the problems on a level below their own level. If you ask a police chief what the problems or the police are, he is likdy to demand better hardware.

16S

'· 'Be~., a .,,,.Fe, ..... 'W& a~ ......... cu - rq' . • ill - u... wa)'So 11le dleice of tqllaatioll lletlnaiMs die ..a.e ol 1i11e ,...... •, ........

"'Crime iD the streets" can be explained by not eaoup police. by too many aiminaJs. by iudcquate laws, too many poticc, cultural deprivation, deficient opponuaity, too many JUns, phrenolocic abcrratioas, ae. Each or these olrers a directioa for attaetina crime in the streeu. Whidl one is riJht? Thcte is DO rule or procedure to clecenniA.: the .. comet" cxplanatK-!! ~: :..r..bination of them. The rasoo is tbat in clcalin& with wicked problems there are sewraJ more ways of refuting a laypothcsis than there are pcnrUssible in the sciences.

The mode of dealina with cooftictina cvidmcc that is customary in science is as follows : ·uDder CODditiolls'C ud assumina the validity- of hypothesis H, c&ct E must occur. Now, p'Val C, £does not occur. Consequently His to be refuted." In the coatcxt of wicked problems, howncr, funhcr modes arc admissible: one can deny that the dl'ec:t E bas DOl occurred, or one can explain the nonoc:currcnce of E by im~n& processes without having to abandon H. Here's an example: Assume that somebody chooses to explain crime in the streets by .. not enouJh police." This is made the basis of a plan, and the size of the police force is increased. Assume funher that in the wbsequent years there is an increased number of arrests, but an increase of olfeDSCS at a rate sliJhtly lower than the increase of GNP. Has the elfect E occurred? Has aimc in the streets been reduced by iDCreasina the police force? If the &nSWCr is DO, sewn) nonscicDtific explanations may be tried in order to rescue the hypothesis H \IDcreasiDa the police fort~C reduces crime in the streets"): .. If we bad not increased the number of ofliccrs, the inctQSC in crime wouJd have been ~n pater;" '"This case is u exception from ruJe H because there was an irregular illflux of criminal elcrncnu;" ""Time is too shonto feel the dfects yet;" etc. But also tbe answer .. Yes, E has oc:cumd" can be dd'eDdcd: '"The number of amsu was increased," etc.

1ft dealina with wicked problems, the modes of rasonina used in the arawnent are much ric:ber than those permissible in the scieftti&c discourse. Because of the essaltiaJ UDiquenc:ss of the problem (sec Proposition .7) and Jaekina opponunity ror riaorous experimentation (sec Proposition 5). it is not possible to put H to a c:rucia.l test.

That is to say, the choice of cxpJanalion is arbitrary in the loJical sense. In actuality, attitudinal criteria JUidC the choice. People choose those explanations which are most plausible to them. Somewhat but not much eugcratcd, you miJht say that everybody picks. that explanation of a discrepancy which fits his intentions best and which conforms to the ac:tioo-prospec:ts that are available to him. The analyst's "world view" is the lliOqest clelcrmiDiq factor in explaiDin& a d~ and, therefore, in raolvin&• wicked problem.

... 11le ,.._..,-...... - wr-c • As Karl Popper arpcs in 1M U,ic of Sdmlific Diseomy,• it is a principle of

a::icnct that IOiutioas to problems are oaJy bypot.beses olf'eted for refutation. This

• ScicMz Editioas. New YCIIt. 1961.

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habit is based on the insipt that there are no proofs to hypot~ only potential rc{utations. The more a hypothesis withstands numerous auempts at rc{utAtion, the better its .. corroboration .. is considered to be. Consequently, the sc:icatifie community docs not blame iu mcmbcn for postulating hypolhcscs that arc later muted-so lona as the author abides by the nalcs of the pmc. of course.

In the world of planning and wicked problems no such immunity is tolerated. Here the aim is not to find the truth, but to impro~ some eharactmstic:s of the world where people Jive. Planners are liable for the consequeoc:cs of the actions they JCIIU&lC; the effcc:ts c:an matter a pat clcal to those people that arc touc:hcd by those actions.

We arc thus led to conclude that the problems that planDerS must deal with are wieked and ineorrigiblc ones. for they defy efforts to delineate their boundaries and to identify their c:auscs, and thus to expose their problematic nature·. The plaMcr who worlcs with open systems is c:aught up in the ambrguity oftbeir c:ausal webs. Morco~r. his would-be solutions arc confounded by a still furthe~ set of dilemmas posed by the powing pluralism of the contemporary publics, whose valuations of his proposals arc jud~ apinst an array or different and contradicting scales. Let us tum to these dilemmas next.

IV. 1be Social Context There \\as a time during the 'Fifties. when the quasi-sociological literature was pre· dieting a Mass Society-foreseen as a rather homogeneously shared culture iD which most persons would share values and beliefs. would hold to common aims. would follow similar life-styles, and thus would beha~ in similar ways. (You wtll rcc:all the popular literature on s"burbia of ten yean ago.) It is now apparcat that those fore-casts \\'ere wrong.

Instead. the high-scale societies of the Western world arc becoming increasingly hctero~neous. They arc becoming increasingly differentiated, comprising thousanc1s of minority groups, ttzch joined around common intcrc:sts, common value systems, and shared stylistic prcferenecs that differ from those of other aroups. As the sheer volume of information and knowledae increases, as: technoloJi

loin& tO be I Jona-run phenomenon or DOt. One could write sc:cnarios that ,.-ould ~ · cquaUy plausible either way. But one thin& is dear: larp: population siu will mean

that small minorities can comprise loar;e numbers of people: and, as we have been leCinJ, neD smaJJ m.iDOritics c:an swin& lar;e political inftuenc:e.

Ill a scttiaa iD which a plur.ality of publics is politically pursuing a diversity of pb, how is the larpr aoc:iety to deal with its wicJced problems in a planful way? How arc pJs to be set, when the valuative bases are 50 diverse? Surely a uniuary conception o( 11 unitary .. public: Wf'lfare- is an anachronistic: one.

We do not ncn h:ave a theory that teUs us how to find out -.it.at mi;nl be considered a societally best state. We have no theory that tells us what distribution or the wc:i:ll product is bcst-wbdhcr those outpull arc expressed in thc.coinagc of money income, information income, cuhural opportunitic$, or whatever. We have come to realize that the concept or th~ 50Cial product is not very mcaninsful; possibly there is no agreptc measure for the welfare · of a hi&hly diversified society, if this measure is claimed to be objective and non-partisan. Social sc:icnce has simply been unable to uDC:Over a soc:ia.J-wclfarc function that would sugJcst which decisions Yo'ould contri-bute to a societally best state. Instead, we have had to rely upon the axioms of in-dividualism that underlie economic: and political theory, deduc:in&. in effect, that the ltugn--public welfare derives from summation of individualistic choices. And yet, we know that 1his is not necessarily so, ·as our current experience with air poll:.aion has dramatized.

We also know that I1WIY societal processes have the character of zero-sum prnes. As the population becomes incrusingly pluralistic:, inter-group differences arc likely to be rdlcacd &S inter-Jroup rivalries of the zero-sum sons. If they do, the prospects for inventing positive non-uro-sum development stratesics would become increasin&IY difficult. ·

Perhaps we c:an illustrate. A few years ago there was a nearly universal consensus in America that full-employment, high productivity, and widespread distribution of consumer durablcs fitted into a development strategy in which all would be winners. That consensus is Dow bcina eroded. Now, when substitutes for wages ~re being disbursed to the poor, the coiJeae student, and the retired, as well &S to the more traditional recipient of oonwaae iocomes, our conceptions of .. employment" and of a full-employment economy arc havin& to be revised. Now, when it is ftCOgnized that raw materials that enter the economy end up &S residuals polluting the air mantle and the rivets, many are becoming wary of risin& manufacturing production. And, when some of the new middle-clus religions are exon::isins worldly pocls in favor of less tangible communal ••aoods." the consumption-oriented society is beinr c:hal-lenaed-oddly cnoup, to be sure~ by those who were reared in its afftuencc.

What was ooc:c a dear

Our point, rather, u that diverse values arc held by different lfOUps of iDd.ividuah-that what satisfia one may be abhorrent to another, that what comprises problem· solution for one is probJcm.,eneration for another. UDder such circu.mstances. and ill the abscDCC of an overriding socia1 theory or an overriding soc:iaJ ethic. there is no pinsaying wiUc:h IJ'Oup u riJht and wbic:h 5hould have its ends scrwd. ..

One traditicmal approach to the m:oociliation of social values and individual choice is to entrust th f«to decision-making to the wise and knowlcdpble professioaaJ apcns and politicians. But whether one finds that ethically tolerable or DOl, we hope we have made it clear that nen such a tactic only bqs the question, for there are no value-free, true·false answers to uy of the 1ric:kcd problems JOYCnUDeDts must deal with. To substitute expert professional judgment for those of contending ·political groups may make the rationales and the repercussions more explicit, but it would not acc:es.sarily make the outcomes better. The one-best anWter is possible with tame problems, but not with wicked ones.

Another traditional approach to the reconciliation of social values and individual choice is to bias in favor of the latter . . Accordingly, one would promote wideDed differentiation of goods, services, environments, and opportunities, such that indivi-duals might more doscly satisfy their individual preferences. Where large-system problems are J!CDCrated, he would seek to ameliorate the efl'ccu that be judges most deleterious. Where latent opportunities become visible, he would seck to exploit them. Where positive non-zero-sum developmental strategies can be desiJned, be would of course work hard to install them.

Whichever the tactic, though, it should be clear that the expert is also the player in a politic:al pme, seeking to promote his private vision of goodness over others'. Planninr is a component of politics. There is no escaping that truism.

We are also suggesting that none of these tactics wiU an5Wer the difficult questions attached to the soru of wicked problems planners must deal with. We have neither a theory that can locate societal goodness, nor one that might dispel wickedness, DOt one that might resolve the problems of equity that rising pluralism is provoking. We are inclined to think that these theoretic dilemmas may be the most wicked conditions

· that confront \IS.

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