The Structure of Consciousness in Paramārtha's Purported TrilogyAuthor(s): Diana Y. PaulReviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Jul., 1981), pp. 297-319Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398576 .Accessed: 28/04/2012 04:27

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Diana Y. Paul The structure of consciousness in Paramartha's purported trilogy

From earliest times spiritual liberation in Buddhism has been defined in terms of three requirements: discipline (slla), meditation (samadhi), and wisdom

(prajnd).' The objective of this threefold process of liberation was the elimination of all anxieties, compulsions, and attachments as the source of

suffering. Positively stated, the spiritual path culminated in an internal percep- tion (prajnd) of reality as it is (tathata) and in a direct awareness of one's true self (anatman).2 Liberation was brought about by the development of an

understanding of the true nature of self free from attachments and delusions. This understanding or knowledge is attained by analyzing the conscious

processes which bring about attachments and delusions. To know these conscious processes is to be free from them. The basic problem in all Buddhist

systems is to analyze the conditions which bring about ignorance and delusion in order to demonstrate how the individual has the capacity for developing an

adequate understanding of reality as it is. While all sectarian developments within the various Buddhist traditions

have dealt with the problem of ignorance and attachment in terms of the

tripartite path to spiritual freedom listed above, not all of the theories agree on how to refine the powers of the mind nor how to define and describe the

processes of conscious activity.3 While no Buddhist would claim that merely accepting the right set of ideas or values constitutes wisdom, many Buddhists would differ from each other on the question of what structures consciousness has, and how consciousness is influenced by ignorance.4

Specialists in the field of early Yogacarin literature have virtually glossed over the system of operations or mechanisms necessary for eliminating ignorance.5 The relationship between spiritual liberation and structures of consciousness in some of the more significant early Yogacarin texts translated

by the sixth-century philosopher Paramartha will be presented in this article.

I. THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PARAMARTHA

Paramartha traveled to China in 546 to disseminate, in a systematic way, the

philosophy of early Yogacara.6 He is a key figure in reconstructing the early philosophical development of Yogacarin thought in China prior to the seventh

century when the Yogacarin master Hsiian-tsanga and his disciple Tzu-enb (or

K'uei-chic), both of whom were native Chinese proponents of a later form of

Yogacarin Buddhism (Fa-hsiang), temporarily eclipsed Paramartha's pioneer- ing efforts.

Diana Y. Paul is Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Stanford University. AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to express my appreciation to my colleague Julius Moraucsik,

Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, for criticism and suggestions on a draft of this article, though, of course, the final version is not to be taken as representing any but my views. Research was supported in part by the National Endowment for the Humanities and by the Center

for East Asian Studies, Stanford University. A draft of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion, November 15-18, 1979, in New York City. Philosophy East and West 31, no. 3 (July, 1981). ? by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.

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Paramartha was the first to introduce and to disseminate Yogacarin philo- sophical and religious tenets in a systematic way to China. It is largely because of his extensive translations and exegeses that Yogacarin doctrines were to affect Chinese thought for over three hundred years. Prominent monks from all over southern China traveled to Paramartha's residence to learn of the innovative Buddhist doctrine on the structures of consciousness. While the most prominent treatises of early Indian Yogacara translated by Paramartha have been examined by scholars in the field, most notably, the treatises

Mahdyanasamgraha, the Trimsika, and the Vimsnatika,7 the lesser known but more exegetical works of Paramartha have not been so thoroughly inves-

tigated. In these lesser known works Paramartha puts forth his systematiza- tion of the modes of consciousness as a system of operations which can lead to the realization of spiritual freedom. Three of these texts, originally perhaps comprising a trilogy, will be the materials upon which I will base my discussion of the path of salvation in early Yogacara in terms of Paramartha's

study of the structures of consciousness.

II. SUMMARY OF TEXTUAL MATERIALS

Although Paramartha's largest and most complete works which influenced Chinese Buddhism were his translations of the Mahaydnasamgraha and the

Abhidharmakosavyakhyaisastra, there is a very close relationship between the

Mahayanasamgraha and the purported trilogy, San wu-hsing lund, Chuan shih lune, and Hsien shih lunf which were collectively called at one time the Wu-

hsiang lung.8 These three texts are not specifically dated in any of the catalogs of Chinese Buddhist scripture, but they seem to have been translated during the intervening period of Paramartha's two masterpieces (the Samgraha and the Kosa), between 563 and 567. Hence, these texts would be representative of Paramartha's most highly developed and significant philosophical views. Moreover, this trilogy shares in common the most distinctive feature of Paramartha's thought, namely, the assertion of a transcendent, pure con- sciousness (amalavijfinna).9

A. Chuan shih lun (CSL) 0

The Chuan shih lun is an adaptation from the Trimsika by Vasubandhu.

Although some specialists in the field have labeled the Chuan shih lun a translation of the Trimsika, the former is more accurately described as a

paraphrasing in prose of the thirty Sanskrit verses collectively entitled the Trimsika, together with liberal exegetical comments not found in the Sanskrit

original. 1

All eight evolutionary modes of conscious activity are defined and in-

tegrated with a glossary of terminology for various good, bad, and neutral mental states.12 Discrimination, that is, mental construction through con- ceptualization of phenomena, is discussed in the context of the Yogacarin

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framework of Consciousness-Only. Functional dependency between perceiver and perceived object is also discussed. The reality which is devoid of mental construction due to ignorance and attachment, and which is equated with a

transcendent, pure state of consciousness, is discussed in the conclusion to the Chuan shih lun. This text gives the overall impression of being a self-contained and cohesive outline of Paramartha's philosophy.

B. San wu-hsing lun (SWHL)13

The San wu-hsing lun is the most difficult text in the alleged trilogy, as well as the most detailed and lengthy tract on early Yogacarin thought. In addition, it does not seem to constitute a self-contained discussion of Paramartha's

general schema on consciousness, as do the Chuan shih lun and the Hsien shih lun. As the title San wu-hsing lun (The three naturelessnesses) suggests, this treatise is primarily concerned with the nonsubstantial nature of reality.14 Like the Chuan shih lun, this commentary discusses, but in considerably more

detail, the nature of mental construction and discrimination and expands on this topic by arguing that discriminative acts are language-dependent. Language, in turn, is established by distinguishing functional relationships between perceiver and perceived. This network of operations yields a closed

system unless one breaks the cycle of repeated patterns of conditioning habits

resulting in ignorance and attachment. The spiritual path of the bodhisattva allows for the release from this cycle.

C. Hsien shih lun (HSL)15

In the latter half of the San wu-hsing lun and the entire tract of the Hsien shih

lun, the variety of the seeds of experience is defined. These seeds are the stimuli for conditioning habits of discrimination and misperceptions yielding re-

sponses of ignorance and attachment but also yielding responses of wisdom. The same system can yield two very different sorts of responses. The relation-

ship between this closed system of ever-repetitive habits of ignorance and the release from this system's responding in ignorant ways is centered on the

understanding of the system itself. The operations which are programmed by the structures of consciousness can be terminated by those same structures

through the practice of meditation. The recursive function of consciousness,16 namely, the potentially infinite acts resulting from a finite set of factors, is the

subject matter investigated below.

III. GENERAL DEFINITIONS OF THE STRUCTURES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The Buddhist consensus regarding the phenomenal world of individuals and

things is that everything can be controlled and understood by thoroughly investigating the way the system of consciousness itself works and operates. To control and finally eliminate certain states of consciousness or certain activities of consciousness, one must become aware of the process of their emergence

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and formulation. The mode of operation which affects and influences behavior and perceptions is termed "conditioning" (pratTtya-samutpada).'7 This "con-

ditioning" is an ongoing process of change in a world viewed as impermanent in nature and not self-existent. To understand the structures of consciousness itself therefore requires analyzing the system of conditioning which allows various conscious processes to function. Once the system is understood in terms of its conditioning factors, one will be able to locate the causes for the

functioning of certain structures and their relationship with other structures. While the religious goal of Yogacara, in general,is to attain an internal wisdom of the real through meditation and discipline, this school of Buddhism devotes much attention to the conditioning processes of consciousness which constitute

compulsive acts of ignorance and attachment. The definitions of consciousness and its structures presented by Paramartha

reflect the general Yogacara focus on the functioning of consciousness as

ignorant or deluded. In accordance with the Buddhist framework of in-

vestigating the conditioning apparatus of a given system in order to under- stand the operation of that system, Paramartha defines consciousness in terms of the variety of processes which emerge as perception and behavior. Paramartha describes an eightfold process of consciousness which is catego- rized into three levels or structures according to the factors necessary for each level or structure to operate.18

The Chuan shih lun begins with the statement: "There are two kinds of evolution of consciousness: (1) evolution into sentient beings; (2) evolution into phenomena. Everything which is conditioned must be from these two

[evolutions of consciousness]. These two are really nonexistent but the con- sciousness evolves into these two appearances." 19 From this opening state- ment in the Chuan shih lun we can extract a general definition of the structure of the world of beings and things as mentally constructed; the subjective activity of consciousness evolves into sentient beings and the objective activity into a world of phenomena. Everything, being impermanent and continually under-

going change, is either a sentient being, that is, conscious, or an object, that is, an object of consciousness. The relationship between sentient beings and their world is fundamentally a relationship constructed by consciousness. This mental activity of construction or evolution influences or "conditions" percep- tions and behavior. For the early Yogacara Buddhist, the relationship between sentient beings and their world is continually undergoing a series of changes in a conscious system and is not existent outside that system. This is what is meant by the statement that sentient beings and phenomena "are really nonexistent." Everything conditioned is therefore a by-product or evolved

product of conscious activity. The function of conscious activity is to con-

dition, that is, to be a conditioner or conditioning power, to be affecting or

constructing things. The lines following go on to state: "Next, we will explain the conditioner in

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three ways: (1) as the "retributive" consciousness, namely, alayavijidna; (2) as the "appropriating" consciousness, namely, the addnavijnina; (3) as the sense consciousness, namely, the six [sense] consciousnesses (vijhnna)." 20 The struc- tures of consciousness operate on three levels according to this classification. The retributive structure of consciousness is primarily an ethical domain, the most basic and fundamental function of all conscious activity from the

religious perspective of the Yogacara in general, and of Paramartha in

particular. This underlying structure is to be understood and controlled until the cessation of activity occurs in the highest forms of meditation. We will discuss later the relationship between this structure and meditation in terms of the shift from the structure of consciousness which constitutes ignorance to the structure of consciousness that is pure wisdom.21

Technically known as the alayavijndna, this underlying structure represents the capacity of consciousness to construct future deluded acts based upon past habits and behavior. The alayavijnana is defined functionally as the system of conscious activity which reinforces certain modes of behavior and certain

ideologies or conceptions. In Buddhist terminology, the alayavijnana is meta- phorically called the receptacle for karman, because it conditions future karma as a "seed" (blja) or stimulus, and is the result of past karman as an "impression" (vdsana) or habit.22 Retribution or the compensatory effects of one's actions are the system of operations collectively called the alayavijdana, which is the mechanism that reinforces past habits or "seeds," on the one hand, while in turn being a "clearing house" for latent habit-impressions on the other. These habit-impressions will later emerge as conscious activity of a similar ethical nature. Paramartha states that we can only indirectly know of the existence of this level or structure, that is, by its effects on an individual's behavior.23 A deluded act or thought, in this system, must have had a

preparatory stage in which a latent habit-impression in the clearing house of the alayavijhdna influenced the person to behave in a deluded or ineffectual manner through some kind of previous stimulus ("seed"). For example, take the behavior of a habitual liar who continually exaggerates and distorts the facts of a given incident. For the act of lying to have taken place, there must have been a preparatory stage in which a dormant habit-impression of a past act of lying influenced the person to behave in a similar manner, thus

producing a "seed" to tell a lie sometime in the future. This seed's future

potency or energy will, in turn, become a habit-impression when a new act of lying takes place, provided that the cycle of lying is not broken.

The second level or structure of consciousness, namely, the addanavijana,24 is likewise defined in terms of its function, namely, "to appropriate" or "to

acquire." This level is based upon the alayavijndna and is the structure of

egotism or of appropriating for "me." It conditions all conceptualizations as inherently intertwined with the false identity of the self, that is, with wrongly identifying one's existence in terms of what one acquires or appropriates:

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material possessions, people, and/or values. For example, in the case of our hypothetical liar, he lies because of his past propensity to lie but also because he believes he will gain in status and acquire material benefits. His repeated lying is a result of past habits of a similar nature but also is influenced by his

self-image that who he is must be intertwined with his status and his wealth. The third level or structure of consciousness, namely, the six vijinnas,

functions in sensory and ideational processes. Both sensation and ideation involve the same mechanism. All sense data are, in this categorization, basically mental. Ideas are derived from sense data which in turn are derived from sense objects. For example, from having an abstract idea for the number nine I infer an object "nine" just as from sense data for an object table I infer an object "table." Sensation or ideation takes place when three elements of the

process interact: a sense faculty or intellect (manovijndna), sense data or mental entities ("ideas"), and a consciousness.25 This threefold process of

interacting elements is the evolution of consciousness which simulates an

objectified world of objects and persons. This evolution is shaped by past experiences which have ethical consequences. How we perceive and construct our world is influenced and affected by psychological associations from past experiences and by the languages we use to categorize the world in which we live. For example, a child's fear of the dark may have brought about a

perception of monsters lurking in his room at night. These perceptions of monsters may have been shaped by a past experience in which his parents, threatened that a monster would spank him if he quarreled with his younger sister. Every time he quarrels with his sister he has a fear of the dark. Fear of the dark is associated with fear of his parents' anger and this fear affects his

perceptions, that is, imagining monsters in his room. The word "monster" evokes all of these feelings in the child.

The sensory and ideational apparatus is also interactive with other cognitive states: attention (manasikdra), sensation (vedand), evaluative reason (cetand), and conceptualization (samjna).26 The underlying structures for these states of conscious activity occurring on this level are the alayavijnana and the

addnavijndna; the former is the "current" while the latter are the "waves,"27 disruptive and delusory, predominantly appropriating in function. This third structure of ideation and sensation is always active except in certain states of

meditation, sleep, and unconsciousness.28

IV. DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS-ONLY

The amalavijndna, literally, "Pure Consciousness," is equivalent to Con- sciousness Only. The negative definition of this spiritual attainment is the elimination of all anxieties, habits of delusion, and attachments through dispensing with both the sense object and the sensing, functioning conscious- ness. The positive designation for this same spiritual attainment, namely, the internal perception or wisdom of things as they are, is the "Pure Conscious-

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ness," the conscious activity of one who is no longer conditioned or controlled

by ignorance. Since everything is constructed or influenced by a conscious

process, does the term "Consciousness-Only" refer to this fact or to something else? The Chuan shih lun makes the following statement concerning the

principle of Consciousness-Only: "The meaning [of Consciousness-Only], fundamentally, is to dispense with the sense objects and to dispense with the mind." The text also goes on to say that "separate from consciousness there is no other sense object.... One dispenses with sense objects in order to empty the mind.... [When] both the sense object and consciousness are destroyed, this [state of affairs], is identical to the absolute nature. The absolute nature is identical with the amalavijnana."29

"Emptying" consciousness of compulsive attachments and dependence, of delusions and unethical actions, is described by Paramartha here in much the same way that the term "Emptiness" is used by Nagarjuna.30 "Consciousness-

only" is a neutral term used to denote the understanding of both the arising and cessation of ignorance as merely conscious activity. The cultivation of a meditative state of mind operates in the same system that can bring about

ignorance. Madhyamika Buddhism utilizes Nagarjuna's negative dialectic as a device to break the misconception that phenomenal and mental entities are self-existent things not influenced or affected by others. Paramartha also uses a

negative dialectic to break these same habitual misconceptions but reformu- lates the dialectical method in terms of the conscious activity which evolves into simulating persons and things as self-existent entities.31 Additionally, there is one ethical and essential distinction between the two uses of the

negative dialectic; the distinctively religious intention of affirming a "Pure Consciousness" by Paramartha will be discussed presently.

V. THE DYNAMICS OF THE THIRD LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS: INTERDEPENDENCY BETWEEN CONDITIONING SUBJECT AND CONDITIONED OBJECT

The religious intention of analyzing the third level, as opposed to the second and first levels or structures of consciousness, is to weaken and finally to eliminate the habitual patterns or mechanistic modes of cognizing and ex-

periencing the world as filtered through the five senses and the idea-creating intellect. These are the grossest forms of ignorance and unethical behavior and, therefore, are the easiest to eliminate. The functions of the conscious

process at this level concern Paramartha only with regard to their retributive

impact. That is, the religious intention for analyzing this system of conscious

activity is to explore the ethical consequences of this type of activity as either

increasing one's suffering or releasing one from suffering.32 By no means does all conscious activity have to have a reinforcing effect from past habits; take, for

example, the conscious activity of a bodhisattva. The bodhisattva is no longer shaped by past experiences which have ethical consequences. Freed from past actions and their effects, the bodhisattva experiences the liberating effect of

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understanding reality without conscious effort.33 But the ordinary conscious

activity at this level is a structure which conditions certain types of behavior, leading the person to reap his or her own deserved retribution.

All perceptions and ideations have certain concomitant mental states which, on their most primitive level, have some conceptual (samjna) and affective

(vedana) quality. In other words, all sensations and ideas have mental constructions and depend upon or are conditioned by other factors. Paramartha's objective here is to determine the relationship between mental construction (vikalpa, parikalpita) and the overall system of consciousness. He sets out to illustrate that all sensations and perceptions are really indirect in the sense that they are constructed by categorization; the external object is

merely inferred. The only conscious processes which are without mental construction occur in meditation, even in the early stages, but conceptualiza- tion (samjna) and feelings (vedana) are totally eradicated only in the last stage (nirodhasamdpatti).34

We will begin here with the relationship between the conditioning subject that senses and perceives and the conditioned object that is sensed and

perceived. That is, we will look at the processes of consciousness constituting the perception of an object.35

The relationship of subject (or consciousness) to object (or sense field)36 is described by Paramartha in terms of the correlates "nature of dependence" (paratantra) and "discriminated nature" (parikalpita) respectively. Paramartha also adds a new set of correlative terms "substantive" and "nonsubstantive" for the same process of being conscious of an object:

Third level or structure of consciousness (,J)

subject (i) object (~.) dependence (1{ftt) discriminated (-rtl]j, ) substantive (hf ) nonsubstantive (,E{)

DIAGRAM 1

To discuss the conditioning process between subject and object, first it is

necessary to explicate what Paramartha means by the "discriminated nature." 37 The discrimination of an object is conditioned by the features or

aspects which distinguish and contrast it from other objects. That is, one makes distinctions about an object chair based upon relationships among other things (cabinet, table, and so on) rather than in isolation. The features or aspects of one object in contrast to those of another object allows for the

designation "discriminated nature" and is the basis for constructing names and language in general.

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ri ril hard ~ wooden

world chair square, and so on "chair" consciousness (K) [not table, etc.] [not large, and so on] [name] (4) [attention to [object] (i|) [features or prepare for

aspects] (g) sensation = "intention"] (X)

DIAGRAM 2

These two diagrams describe the dynamics of the relationship between the

sensing, concept-forming, language-using consciousness and the object of consciousness. The process or cycle is interactive, but at this level the conscious agent does not realize that to be conscious is to be conscious of

something which has been already constructed and categorized by the inner

dynamics of the process itself. To be able to apprehend a sense field and then later infer a sense object requires a preparatory stage of being ready for or attentive to an object, of directing or "intending" an object as external to the conscious subject.38

The process of "intention" or of the mental preparation preceding sensation and ideation is not understood at this level of conscious activity. The individual does not know that the objects of consciousness are of a dis- criminated nature solely because of properties or aspects in the objects themselves and in the relations between and among themselves. The awareness of consciousness' input into imputing properties or aspects onto the objects is

lacking or deficient. At first, the discriminated or contrasting nature of objects is assumed to be radically different in nature from the subjective conscious- ness; the subjective consciousness is posited as other than its object, and it is assumed that objects are self-existent yet knowable. Consciousness is de-

pendent upon this "other" or object and is consequently called "dependent in nature," 39 from the perspective of making still another contrast or discrimi- nation. Just as the mind can contrast between tables and chairs, the mind can also make contrasts between itself as a subject and itself as an object. It is of

paramount importance for Paramartha to penetrate the process or system of

evolving things and persons rather than to attempt to analyze in themselves the evolved products or objects, which cannot be known apart from mental construction.

Becoming aware of the power of consciousness to evolve a manifold of objects yields a system of objects which are as subjective or mental in content as one's own self-consciousness. When consciousness reflects upon itself as an

object, that is, becomes "self-conscious," all objects can then be reduced to

objects of consciousness. A world outside of conscious activity can only be

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hypothesized.40 Stated otherwise, everything knowable is knowable because it evolves from or is constructed by conscious activity. What makes this

knowledge religious is the liberating effect that this knowledge has on the individual. To understand that the world of one's experience is mentally constructed and knowable only because of the discriminating and constructing nature of consciousness is to be no longer attached to a world of objects as

having self-existing powers over one's life.41 One is shaped by past experiences in misconstruing a world of objects as totally external to mental construction

yet at the same time necessary for one's personal identity. The nature of one's true self as a self-conscious being is the only appropriate content of knowledge and is the spiritual liberation to be attained in Yogacara Buddhism.

Eliminating both the assumption that an object is a self-existent entity and the assumption that consciousness can know self-existent objects without any mental construction is the spiritual liberation of "Consciousness Only." When the Chuan shih lun states that "The meaning [of Consciousness Only], funda-

mentally, is to dispense with sense objects and to dispense with the mind,"42 this is what is meant. If objects and consciousness were radically different from each other and only contrastive in nature, not dependent on each other, one could not have any type of knowledge whatever, either of objects or of conscious processes (self-knowledge). One could not have consciousness itself as an object, that is, self-knowledge or self-consciousness would be impossible to attain.43 The functions of consciousness would be unknowable, relegating an individual forever to a realm of ignorance of the true nature of self and of existence. In brief, the Yogacara Buddhist wanted to conclude that objects and consciousness cannot be so different from each other if any sort of knowledge is attainable.

VI. THE SECOND TRANSITIONAL LEVEL: OPERATIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND

THE NATURE OF DEPENDENCE

The second level of conscious activity, in which consciousness gains a self-

awareness of its input into the relationship between subject and objective world is a transitional stage in the sense that the religious character of the

discussion on consciousness comes to the forefront of the argument. What

distinguishes consciousness from its contrastive object is the fact that con-

sciousness can enter a relationship with itself. In Yogacara the more refined

and advanced forms of this self-investigation take place in meditation.

However, consciousness and self-consciousness enter a different relationship with each other than the relation of consciousness and its objective world.

Consciousness and self-consciousness cannot differ from each other in the

same way that objects differ from each other. The distinctive feature of

consciousness is that it is contrasted with objects yet is also dependent or

contingent on objects as much as the objects are dependent upon conscious-

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ness in order to be known.44 The relationship is mutual; in Yogacarin terminology, this relationship is "dependent in nature" (paratantrasvabhava). This is similar to Nagarjuna's notion of mutual dependence between subject and object, both having no self-existence.

A. Operations of Self-Consciousness Parallel to Structure of Consciousness-

Only

The understanding of self-consciousness is approached in several ways by Paramartha, not all of them being epistemological. While the first argument to

appear in the Chuan shih lun with regard to the contingency between subject and object is based upon the functions of contrasting and discriminating between and among sense data, the most critical arguments to support Paramartha's position of Consciousness-Only center on the self-generating operations of conscious activity.

This self-generating process of conscious activity is represented by a closed

system of operations, metaphorically represented as "seeds" or impressions that constitute the conscious energy45 from which all sensations, perceptions, and feelings emerge. The metaphor of "seeds" is posited in order to develop the theme that all phenomena-persons and things-derive from the same source, namely, from the seeds of the fundamental conscious structure. When consciousness recognizes itself as a "seed-consciousness,"46 that is, becomes conscious of the true nature of self, then the spiritual path to transforming this seed-consciousness to a pure, "seedless" structure is well underway. Phenomena can be retained in their seed-form inasmuch as the conditioning process of these seeds has been understood and hence capable of being controlled. The assumption, however, is that the seeds are no longer giving rise to ignorance when this self-consciousness is fully developed. We will turn to this presently, but first we need to explain the complex structure of the seeds as a metaphor of Consciousness-Only.

The multiplicity of phenomenal experiences mentioned earlier were de- scribed as ordinarily conditioned by ignorance (or "seeds" of ignorance) in such a way that compulsive tendencies, dogmatic ideological positions,47 and unethical behavior were the consequences. The reinforcement of this entire system of thought and action is repeated endlessly due to the backlog of latent habit-impressions and their imminent effects. These habit-impressions are the latent aspects of "seeds" to which the second function of conscious activity, the addna, responds in an "appropriating" manner. That is, the "seeds" had the energy to be activated in two simultaneous counterparts: the appropria- ting subject or dadna and its objects filtered through the six sensory and conceptual consciousnesses. A diagram of the "seeds" or energy of conscious- ness responsible for the structure of subject-object relationships would be as follows:

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"seed" (if-F) [alayavijnana] (fundamental conscious structure)

"appropriating subject" (dddnavijidana)

sense/conceptual subj. (manovijhnna and other five vijnanas)

dependent in nature

object (visaya)

discriminated in nature

DIAGRAM 3

The next two diagrams show the behavioral effects of a seed in contrast to the

previous diagram which shows perceptual effects. In its dormant stage, the

conditioning process from the accumulation of past karman also reflects this dual structure:

"seed"

attachment (Of~i) influence from past karman (~| )

dependent in nature discriminated nature

DIAGRAM 4

In its active stage, the conditioning process creates future karman (klesa) also in a dual mode of operation:

"future seed"

influential force of aspects48

dependent in nature dependent in nature

gross influential forces I

discriminated in nature

DIAGRAM 5

The significance of this simultaneity of counterparts in the seed structure is threefold:

1. Diagram 3 illustrates the overall structure of the three cycles or structures of conscious activity; the fundamental structure can only be inferred as the underlying, unifying one based upon its dualistic effects.

2. Diagram 4 illustrates a subset of the effects of the underlying structure (Diagram 3) with reference to past karman in order to understand the conditioning process of how an individual's responses are affected by the past. Past appropriation or attachment for the sake of an ego yields future responses of a similar nature.

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3. Diagram 5 also illustrates a subset of the effects of the alayavijhdna (Diagram 3), but with reference to future karman or klesa. Although past karman may have been extinguished, such as in the cessation of the sort of activity described here, there is still future retribution from past karman illustrated in Diagram 4. In other words, this level (Diagram 5), the more readily controlled one, does not preclude the second level (in Diagram 4) which the Arhat has not thoroughly controlled or eliminated.49

To attain the spiritual freedom embodied in a thorough understanding of

Consciousness-Only is to eliminate the misconceptions of the relationship between subject and object and the way those misconceptions affect our lives. In other words, one must get to the source of the conditioning process which

yields attachment to things and to self by eliminating the "seeds" of ignorance which underlie the dynamics of the system. We infer that these seeds exist because the operations of a subject-object interaction are not possible without the ability to contrast and discriminate subject over and against its object. The

ability to do this is the function of conscious structures since only such a structure can take itself for an object. What is ultimately and finally knowable, therefore, is of the very nature of "seeds," namely, the alayavijhnna, which

simultaneously dispenses with the subject, discriminating consciousness and its

objective world. In other words, the nature of the "seeds" is the teaching of

"Consciousness-Only."

B. What Remains in "Consciousness-Only"':5? The "Emptiness" of the Alaya- Vijnina

Since a fixed entity of selfhood is denied by Paramartha, as it is by almost all Buddhist schools, the task set before Paramartha is to give a sufficient account of the notion of self or personhood as a series of effective and morally accountable activity without a permanent substrate. The question addressed is one of the plurality of psychological and physical events within a single, continually changing organism, held together by a name and by an economy of mental procedures. It is the series (samtdna) itself, a sum total of conscious events and evolving processes of conscious activity, which we designate as a

"person" or "self." 51 Each act or event leaves a mental impression (vdsand) which can in turn

discharge its energy or "seed" (bUja) as a future evolution (parinama) in the consciousness-series.52 In the context of morally qualified acts, the seed of any given act remains dormant in the subconscious clearinghouse (alayavijidna) after the act has been committed. Later, the seed will mature as compensation or retribution (vipdka) derived from the previous act, which left a residual

impression (vdsand). In light of the accepted tradition throughout the history of Buddhism that trance-induced states (as well as the unconscious states of dreamless sleep and comas) suspend all normal functions of consciousness, Buddhist philosophers had to account for the retention of retributive seeds, memory, and past habits until consciousness was reinstated.53

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Early Yogacara accounts for the continuity of the "seeds" of retribution, memory, and so forth after normal functioning of consciousness has tem-

porarily ceased, by resorting to the notion of the alayavijhdna, which is, metaphorically speaking, the uninterrupted series of potentially evolving seeds which influence behavior and perception. This series of subconscious moments continues to function in a momentary but steady stream throughout states of unconsciousness. Hence, the "seeds" of past experiences continue to momen-

tarily replace themselves without interruption during meditation, dreamless

sleep, and so on. In view of Paramartha's innovation, namely, the ninth consciousness which

is transcendent and pure (amalavijndna), there is the elimination of the functions of the seed system of the alayavijhcna, replaced by the functioning of the absolute nature of reality, identified with the amalavijndna.54 This new structure of consciousness, also called "Consciousness-Only," is what remains when the seeds of defilement are no longer produced. While the alayavijnana is the subconscious receptacle for karmic seeds stored for subsequent release, the continuum of this karmic cycle and of rebirth ceases when the alayavijidna ceases. After this cessation, according to Paramartha, what remains is the

absolutely real, that is, the amalavijndna, the "seedless" state of consciousness:

If an objective world is nonexistent, what produces any effects? Like seeds which can produce a sprout, if the seeds are nonexistent, how can a sprout emerge? Therefore, there is no production. The nature of absolutely real is called "the natureless nature," because it is without a nature and without naturelessness.55

What this means is that the alayavijinana and its processes of producing "sprouts" 56 of attachment and delusion no longer function once the wisdom of the amalavijnana has been attained. The nature of the amalavijnana is not

ontologically different from the nature of the alayavijnana. One state of conscious activity simply transforms its content (darayaparavrtti or parindma) from misconceived notions to knowledge of reality. Pure consciousness is identified with the nature of reality (parinispanna) or Suchness.57 To know the structures of consciousness as inherently pure is to know that the nature of

reality which is ultimately knowable is an expression of mind. Knowing the nature of mind is knowing reality as such.

The spiritual attainment of the bodhisattva path consists in the process of

understanding the relationship between mind and its world, a process which

thereby eliminates false views and attachments. A detailed account of the elimination of the obstacles of defilement and of the obstacles to knowledge is described in the San wu-hsing lun.58 This process of obstacle-elimination culminates in the nondiscriminative wisdom (nirvikalpajnhna)59 of the ad- vanced stages of bodhisattvahood and finally of buddhahood. Such wisdom, said to require a revolution or transformation (dsrayapardvrtti or parindma) of the basic structure of consciousness, is identical to the shift from an

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alayavijnana mechanism to that of the amalavijhana. The karmic cycle ends when the system of discrimination has ended. This results in "an effortless

seeing of the ground for entering the nature of discrimination";60 stated in another way, the amalavijhana is the mode of operation for one who has the wisdom to understand the source of ignorance and attachment inherent in the

system of seeds and of the alayavijnana. This type of wisdom is brought about

only in meditation. All other structures of consciousness admit some degree of mental construction.

Since the doctrine of action, of karman, is the foundation for the ultimate

explanation of conscious activity, when the alayavijnana as the karmic recep- tacle is eliminated, the introduction of another, nonkarmic conscious activity was felt to be needed on the part of Paramartha. Action or karman had always been essentially construed as thought or volition, able to be qualified mor-

ally;61 each completed action or thought had to have a necessary relationship with some sort of retribution. The entity which received this retribution, the

alayavijinana, explained the continuity of the retributive mechanism without

positing a permanent substrate. For the Madhyamika, actions were never

completed; hence there is no retribution nor a receiver of retribution. For the early Yogacarins like Paramartha, the act when completed influences the alayavijnana through a habitual impression (vasana) of a seed (bTja) in the evolution of the ongoing stream of consciousness (samtanaparinama).

What is called the amalavijnana is the true nature of self devoid of all

misconceptions and defilements. This is the religious state of mind equated with those cultivating meditational insight through the Bodhisattva path, ending in Buddhahood. Amalavijnana is the wisdom of the Buddha, rem- iniscent of the earlier Mahayanist doctrine of Tathagatagarbha,62 and of the Sautrantika prototype found in the Abhidharmakosa that the good or pure seeds (kusalabija) persist throughout the series of consciousness.63 Liberation, since it is inherent in the structure of the mind, becomes accessible to all.

The incorruptible nature of the good seed or intrinsically pure nature of mind has a long history in Buddhist thought, most notably in Mahasamghika (prabhasvara citta),64 Sautrantika (kusalablja), and Tathagatagarbha thought The philosophical and religious purpose for establishing the notion of

amalavijnana appears to have been twofold: (1) to account for the possibility of good habits being produced after bad habits have been formed;65 (2) to account for actions without karmic residue, nirvana without remainder. The alayavijnana, as a structure of consciousness entailing the propensities for habitual ignorance, could not account for the mind devoid of karmic retri- bution, since by definition the alayavijnana represents that system of retri- bution. While other proponents preceding Paramartha had postulated an underlying, fundamentally spiritual character to the mind, none of the earlier theories had developed a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the mind as intrinsically capable of salvation by its very nature. It was only with the

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brilliant compositions of Vasubandhu and his transmitter Paramartha that a new philosophy of mind could develop.

The amalavijhdna, the fundamentally good structure of mind no longer chained to a cycle of retribution, was the expression Paramartha created to account for that most cherished of Chinese Buddhist beliefs, the belief in universal salvation as the natural capacity of the mind to know its own true nature.66

In summary, the structures of consciousness were the paramount object of

study for the early Yogacarin philosophers in general, since the natural evolution of the mind was to gravitate toward its own self-discovery. Mind is capable of knowing its own processes, of understanding the nature of mental constructions through the languages developed in a given culture and through the interdependency between mind and its object. In the final analysis, the only appropriate subject matter which is knowable is mind, since only a world of mind-created symbols is ours to know. For Paramartha this world is opened up to us through philosophical investigation and through meditation. Both

types of inquiry aim at the understanding that being religious, being spiritually free, is developing the ability to ascertain the true nature of mind-the true nature of self-free from those conscious processes which constitute attach- ment and delusion, binding the individual to a never-ending cycle of existence filled with ignorant and unethical habits of behavior.

NOTES

1. Most of the suttas in the Pali Canon describe the training of a monk in terms of these three requirements, beginning with sfla, then samadhi, and ending with prajnd. Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga (Path of purity) describes these three practices to arhatship. Upatissa's Vimuttimagga (Path of freedom) lists five requirements, the above-mentioned three together with freedom (vimutti) and the knowledge and discernment of freedom (vimuttindnadassana) as neces-

sary for eliminating discrimination (compare The Path of Freedom, trans. N. R. M. Ehara et al., [Ceylon, 1961], p. 253). These latter two are usually grouped with prajnd.

2. Although andtman literally means "nonself," more precisely, it is the notion of the nonsubstantial impermanence of an individual comprised of a multiplicity of factors (skandhas) in continual change. This understanding of the nature of self as a nonabsolute, nonmetaphysical series of psychophysical events could be defined as the true nature of the individual or self.

3. A classic study on the universal Buddhist concern with understanding mental processes and their religious implications is "La Negation de l'Ame et La Doctrine de l'Acte by Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Journal Asiatique, (1902-1903): 237-450.

4. The widest theoretical disparities on this issue were those between the Sarvastivada- Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika. These differences in doctrine were the stimulus for the com- position of the masterpiece, the Abhidharmakosa by Vasubandhu in the fourth century. Compare L'Abhidharmakosa, Louis de La Vallee Poussin (Paris: Paul Guethner, 1925).

5. While many of the most significant early Yogacarin treatises written by the brothers Asanga and Vasubandhu have been translated, the elaborate account of the system of operations for reinforcing patterns of behavior given in early Yogacara as opposed to the Abhidharmakosa's

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systematic treatment has not been discussed. I am primarily concerned with Paramartha's views; Hsiian-tsang's have been discussed by others, most notably, his Ch'eng-wei-shih lunh. (See Louis de la Vallee Poussin, trans., Vijnaptimdtratd-siddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang, 6 vols. (Paris: Paul Guethner, 1928-1948.) Hsiian-tsang does not represent early Yogacara, however. The most

complete treatment of an early Yogacarin treatise is Etienne Lamotte's annotated translation of Asafiga's Mahdydnasamgraha entitled La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asahga (Louvain: 1938).

6. The official biography of Paramartha (Chinese name: Chen-tii) is contained in the Hsii kao seng chuanJ (HKSC), T. 50.2060.429c6-431a6. For a partial French translation, see Takasaki Junjiro, "La Sam.khya-Karika," Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient 4 (1964): 60-65.

7. See footnote 5 (herein) for the citations of the French translations. Paramartha's translation of the Mahdyanasaimgraha has been exhaustively studied by Ui Hakuju in Sho-daijo-ron kenkyuk 2 vols. (Tokyo: 1966), and by Sasaki Gessh6 in Sho-daijo-ron' (Tokyo, 1935). Among the most thorough studies of the Trimsikd and Vimsatika (collectively called the Vijiaptimatratdsiddhi) are: Yiiki Reimon, Seshin yuishiki no kenkyum, 2 vols. (Tokyo: 1955); Fukaura Seibun, Yuishikigaku kenkyiu, 2 vols. (Kyoto: 1955); and Sasaki Gessho/Yamaguchi Sasamu's Yuishiki nijfu-ron no taishaku kenkyu? (Tokyo: 1924; reprinted 1978). Fukaura Seibun's Yuishikigaku kenkyu has an excellent discussion on habit-impressions (vasdna) and seeds (blja), 2:390-418.

8. See Kokuyaku issaikyoP, vol. 148 (Yuga-bu)q, pp. 1-2. Tzu-en's student, Hui-chaor, also cites a text attributed to Paramartha entitled the Wu-hsiang lun in his Ch'eng wei-shih lun liao-i tengs (T. 1832.43.659). After the title entry of each of these three texts, there is the statement that each was extracted from the Wu-hsiang lun (compare Taish6 volume 31, numbers 1587, 1617, and 1618.) The difficulties in identifying these three texts are described extensively by Yuki Reimon, Seshin yuishiki, op. cit., pp. 63-164.

9. The question of whether human nature was intrinsically spiritual, that is, capable of enlightenment, particularly plagued Chinese Buddhist clergy in the sixth and seventh centuries. The Ratnagotravibhaga makes an allusion to an amalavijndna. One of the names for the alayavijndna of a Tathagata is vimala-vijnidna. David Seyfort Ruegg, La Theorie du Tathagatagrabha et du Gotra (Paris: 1969), pp. 443-444 (Compare Siddhi, vol. 1, p. 167.) Paramartha, for purposes of clarity, may have distinguished these two modes of the alayavijndna more systematically by discussing the eighth phase or mode in an ignorant state as the alayavijiidna and the ninth state as the amalavijndna. The term amalavijndna does not appear in the Mahdydnasamgraha, but, in my opinion, could have been an accommodation to the controversy between the Northern Ti-lun,t who felt the alayavijndna was partially pure in nature yet superficially involved with ignorance, and the Southern Ti-lun, who felt the alayavijndna was intrinsically and entirely pure. For a brief but lucid presentation of the amalavijndana, see Fukaura Seibun, Yuishikigaku kenkyu (Tokyo reprint: 1977), 1, pp. 188-228.

10. T. 1587.31.61c-63c. 11. The Chuan shih lun is considered the same text as the Trimsikdkarikuas with the addition of

liberal exegetical comments, according to Ui Hakuju, Indo tetsugaku kenkyu" (Tokyo: 1966), vol. 6, pp. 107, 434-435. Fukaura Seibun thinks the entire purported trilogy, Wu-hsiang lun, was developed from the Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lunv, T. 1602.31, attributed to Asanga whereas Yutki Reimon criticizes both Fukaura and Ui in that the trilogy is not simply a derivation from the Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun and is the work of Vasubandhu. See Seshin yuishiki, particularly 1:63-78.

12. There are very few differences in listing the mental states. Hsiian-tsang and the Sanskrit text list eleven good mental states, instead of ten. The eleventh is amoha, "the absence of delusion." Yuki Reimon analyzes the schema of the Abhidharma in Paramartha's Hsien-shih lun and claims that, except for minor discrepancies, Paramartha follows Vasubandhu, whereas Hsiian-tsang follows Asanga more closely. See Seshin Yuishiki, 1:51-55; also, see footnote 5, p. 62 for differences between Yiki and Ui on authorship of verses and commentary.

13. T. 1617.31.867b-878b.. 14. The three natures (svabhdva) are well known: parikalpita, "the mentally constructed" or

"discriminated"; paratantra, "the interdependent" or "dependent on another," and the parinispanna, "absolutely real" or "complete." The nihsvabhdva are related to the svabhdva as the emptiness of the latter, namely, the emptiness of aspects which the mind imputes (alaksana), the

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emptiness of arising or self-causation (anutpdda), and the emptiness of any intrinsic nature (asvabhava). See SWHL, T. 1617.31.867b20-867c28.

15. T. 1618.31.878c-882b. 16. A recursive function is defined in terms of itself, that is, the definition of the procedure

includes the procedure itself. A "loop" or iterative function will indefinitely repeat itself according to a rule or formula involving a finite number of steps unless or until a specified condition is met. We are concerned here with a logical structure presented by Paramartha that is rather similar to the "loop" or recursive functions employed in computer science. A recursive function will continue to call itself indefinitely unless some condition is specified, and this condition is fulfilled at some point in running the program. If that condition is not properly specified or fulfilled, then the "loop" becomes an "infinite loop" and the program will run indefinitely. In the case of the mental "programming" of seeds in the "computer," the alayavijdna--the sequence of habit seeds-is similar to a looping procedure in that each cycle includes the factors necessary to initiate the succeeding cycle. Only in meditation, whereby one can understand the "loop" mechanism, is the necessary condition met for terminating the "program" of seeds.

17. PratTtyasamutpdda is reinterpreted throughout the history of Buddhist thought. The Chinese Buddhist schools of Yogacara tended to fall into two categories: (1) those who claimed that Suchness (Tathata) or reality is the basis for changes in the world and (2) those who claimed that it is the mind which, in its eighth mode or function as the alayavijndna, serves as the basis for changes in the world. Paramartha belongs to the first category whereas Hsiian-tsang and K'uei-chi belong to the second. Their Indian counterparts would be the Nalanda school represented by Dharmapala and the Valabhl school represented by Sthiramati. See Ruegg, La Theorie du Tathdgatagarbha, pp. 439-444, particularly for a possible Tibetan counterpart to some of Paramartha's ideas, namely, Jo-nan-pa. For the meaning of prat7tyasamutpdda in the Chinese Buddhist context, see Whalen Lai's excellent overview, "Chinese Buddhist Causation Theories: An

Analysis of a Sinitic Mahayana Understanding of Pratltyasamutpdda," in Philosophy East and West 27, no. 3 (July, 1977): 241-264, although I would disagree that Fa-tsang was the first to trace pratityasamutpdda to Suchness. Paramartha's introduction of the amalavijnhna certainly maintains the same principle.

18. The threefold structure of consciousness is said to be continually evolving or transforming (vijnhnaparindma) (compare Trimsikdkdrikd, verse 1.) The subjective side of this evolutionary process produces the objective side of the process as animate beings and inanimate things.

19. T. 1587.31.61cl-2. 20. T. 1587.31.61c3-4. Compare Trimsika, verse 2, in which the second level is called manana,

that is, manas. The Ch'eng wei-shih lun consistently uses the terms alayavijniana and iddnavijidna for the first level or structure, corresponding to the eighth function of consciousness. See Shindo jo-yuishiki-ronw, ed. Saeki Join (Nara: 1940), pp. 14-15. The term dddnavijinana, for Hsiian-tsang, refers to the "collecting of the seeds." For Paramartha, dddna appropriates an ego, performing the functions usually attributed to the manas. The Ta-sheng i changx uses the term addnavijnana for the seventh consciousness, in accordance with the system given in the Lankdvatdra-sutra. (See Fukaura Seibun, Yuishikigaku kenkyu, 1:194-195.) Paramartha sometimes uses the term dddnavijndna to refer to the eighth consciousness as well as the seventh although the reason for this remains unclear to me; compare Fukaura, Yuishikigaku kenkyui, 1:332-333.

21. For an excellent study of the Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika/Sautrantika controversy over the causal connections between virtuous acts and ignorant acts, see Padmanabh S. Jaini, "The Sautrantika Theory of Bija," BSOAS 22, pt. 2 (1959): 236-249. In brief, the Theravadins claim that a neutral, intervening factor (avydkrtacitta) between ignorance and wisdom allows for

changes in one's mental states. The Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika put forth a force of attraction (prapti) or repulsion (aprdpti) which either enhances or interferes with the production of a good or bad mental state. The Sautrantika object to both the Theravadin and Vaibhasikan theses, putting forth a seed theory in which latent good, bad, and neutral mental energy or dispositions succeed each other, accounting for the change in mental states.

22. The terms blja and vasana are usually interpreted as synonyms in most instances for the

power or energy (sakti) of the mind. In itself the bija or vdsand is only nominally existent, that is, it is a term used as a metaphor to describe the process of conceptual and attitudinal changes. See

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Jaini, "The Sautrantika Theory," pp. 242-244. Stephan Anacker, Vasubandhu: Three Aspects, (University of Wisconsin, Ph.D dissertation, 1970), makes the distinction between bTja and vdsana, the latter being "the process of everything in past experience entering the consciousness-stream to

help in its transformation" (p. 246), following Asanga's Mahdyanasamgraha, I. 18. Paramartha also makes a similar temporal distinction between bTja and vdsand. The latent habits or influences (hsiin-hsiY) from past karman are the seeds of karman (CSL, 62c22). The energy from these habits

(hsi-ch'iZ) is the defilement. The distinctions are quite refined: past habits or influences (vasand) are the seeds for future karman. The energy (sakti) from these habits, that is the energy of these seeds

(bTja), in actuality becomes an ignorant act [or an act of wisdom], CSL, 63a8. The relation-

ship may have had its prototype in the relationship between latent dispositions (anusaya) and active defilements (paryavasthdna), corresponding to vasand and bTja respectively. See the SrTmalddevTsutra for a striking parallel, cited in Paramartha's CSL, 63c13. The first chiian of the SWHL is devoted to the different types of habits and their perpetuation.

23. See CSL 61c9-62a2. One infers that the alayavijndna exists since we can observe its effects, namely, the behavior produced because of past experiences. That backlog or clearing house of one's past which influences present responses is assumed to exist in order for there to be

"conditioning" between past and present actions. The text gives ignorance as an example, but admittedly an unclear one. The claim is made that one can only infer that there is ignorance because of its effects on one's behavior.

24. The distinction between the first and second level of consciousness is primarily based upon the more specialized nature of the second or addnavijnhna. While all normal conscious states function in a dual manner, as subjective and objective constituents, the dddnavijhdna is the structure of dominant, narcissistic subconscious and conscious energy, viewing the nature of self as a substrate. The dddnavijnana is left undeveloped in both the CSL and SWHL; a definition of the addnavijnhna [or the more common term manas, in Hsiian-tsang's translations] is given in the HSL as the seat of the ego, believed to be the nature of the alayavijndna (T. 1618.31.879b10-11, 15-16). In addition, the ddanavijnana accepts or appropriates (analogous to upddi?) the body, and does not retain any seeds (HSL 879b5). This would be in agreement with the usage of the term dddna in the Samdhinirmocana but not identifying the adina with the alaya. See Stanley Weinstein, "The Alayavijnfina in Early Yogfcara Buddhism," Transaction of the International Conference of Orientalists in Japan, (1958): 56-57. Also see footnote 20.

25. CSL 1587.31.62a6. See Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923; reprinted Calcutta, 1961), pp. 46-7: "The element of consciousness according to the same laws [prat[tyasamutpdda] never appears alone, but always supported by an object (visaya) and a receptive faculty (indriya)." Cf. Abhidharmakosa, iii, p. 143 on the

samprayuktas, quod vide, definition of sensory contact (sparsa): "Concours des trois, trika- samnipdta. La triade est l'organe, l'objet, le Vijinana (indriya, visaya, vijndna).... Ces trois

preexistent a l'etat de Bijas." Examples of this threefold interaction are given on pp. 143-5. 26. The CSL (62a8-11) gives the following metaphor for these cognitive states: "Attention is

like a galloping horse and evaluative reason is like the rider. A horse only gallops straight but cannot avoid or head towards the right or wrong place. Because of the rider, a horse can avoid the wrong and head towards the right place. Evaluative reason is similar. It can enable one's attention to avoid reckless actions." The implications of attention (manasikdra, manaskara) have not been fully appreciated by Buddhologists. Attention is the primitive function of the mind to be prepared to turn toward an object. For the early Yogacara such as Paramartha, this primitive state of mind already starts the process of mental construction, or "intending an object." Compare Abhidharmakosa, iii, pp. 146-147 for sectarian differences in interpretation of manasikdra. See Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, sub voce, dbhujati, dbhoga, and glosses for manasikara (manaskdra), p. 99, for difficulties in defining this state. The most interesting equivalent being "assumed," "effort directed toward something concretely existing" or what I would prefer to call "preparation for assuming an external object," "intending," or "getting ready for sensation." Sthiramati, usually considered of the same Yogacarin tradition as Paramfrtha, supports my claim: dbhujanam dbhogah/alambane yena cittam abhimukhikriyate. Cited by Poussin in the Kosa, p. 147.

27. T. 1587.31.62al11-12.

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28. CSL 62b13-19: "In what instances does this mentation [or ideation, iaa] not occur? Except for these six states-meditation without conceptualization, heavens without conceptualization, dreamless sleep, drunken stupor, unconsciousness, or a coma-the others always have it [mentation]."

29. T. 62c12-14, 17-19. Line 17 could be translated alternately as: "One dispenses with sense objects, yearning for the mind of Emptiness." (i ching wei yii k'ung hsinab).

30. See Frederick Streng, "The Process of Ultimate Transformation in Nfagrjuna's Madhyamika," The Eastern Buddhist 9, no. 2 (October, 1978): 12-32, for an interpretation of Nagarjuna's dialectical method as a therapeutic device for liberation from mental suffering. Note especially pp. 19-21, and verses 18:4, 5, and 7 cited on page 12.

31. A. Charlene McDermott succinctly pleads the case that Madhyamika and, at least, certain theories in Yogacara have a close affinity. The major similarity she brings out is the identity between the alayavijnana and reality (tathatd) when ignorance no longer is operative, that is, when the influences (vesand) from past ignorance, have dissolved. See "Asafiga's Defense of Alaya- Vijfiana," Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1973): 167-174. This identity is given the name

amalavijnina by Paramartha. 32. See Bimal Krishna Matilal, "A Critique of Buddhist Idealism," in Buddhist Studies in

Honour of I. B. Horner, L. Cousins ed. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974), p. 139: "Just as the 'Emptiness' doctrine (siinyavdda) supplies the philosophic basis for the therapeutics of Nirvana so also idealism or vijnaptimdtratd doctrine provides the metaphysical rationale for pursuing the

religious programme to realise Nirvana in the form of pure, translucent consciousness, the 'absolute'."

33. The bodhisattva states of knowledge are equated with the seven kinds of reality (tathata) SWHL 1617.31.873a23-29. This revolution of the basic structure of consciousness

(dsrayapardvrtti) has two stages and five subdivisions: (1) partial revolution for the Two Vehicles and beginning bodhisattvas, (2) active revolution for the seventh stage bodhisattva through the ninth stage, the tenth stage of practice, and the ultimate stage of buddhahood (SWHL 874c3-12). The bodhisattva's use of language and discrimination is described at length in SWHL 875b5-876cl.

34. Mental construction is inherent in all nonmeditative states in the early Yogacarin system as contrasted with the later views of Dignfiga. The first of the three types of insubstantiality of

phenomena is parikalpitasvabhdva, that is, construction by conceptualization. Mental construction

begins to dissipate in meditation but is not totally eliminated until the highest stage, nirod-

hasamapatti, when both conceptualization and feelings cease. See Stephan Anacker, Vasubandhu: Three Aspects, pp. 157-165.

35. The following discussion, together with Diagrams 1 and 2, are based on the following passages from the SWHL: 867b27-cl; 867c29-868b24.

36. The Chinese characters for object (chingac or ching-chiehad) have a variety of possible meanings, depending upon their Sanskrit equivalents. Nagao Gadjin, Madhydntavibhdgabhd.sya (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), gives the Sanskrit equivalents artha, gocara, and

visaya for ching; alambana, gocara(tva), and jneya for ching-chieh. If the CSL is an exegesis of the Trimsikd then we find that in verses II and VIII where visaya occurs in the Sanskrit, Paramartha has translated the term by the less ambiguous character, ch'enae, literally, "dust." The visaya is the

sense-object, the sense data with which the sense organs come into contact. The alambana, appearing in verses V and XXVIII, is translated by yiianaf and yuan (tz'u) chingag respectively. Compare Nagao, Madhydntavibhdga, p. 186 sub voce enkyogaiah: alambane. The alambana is, strictly speaking, an object of consciousness, which may or may not have a referent. In other words, it can be the idea conditioned by an object, suggested by the Chinese term yiian, "to have an affinity to," "be affected by (an object)," or "to affect (an object)." Ching-chieh may simply be used as a gloss for so fen-piehai, "that which is discriminated," yad vikalpyate of verse seventeen, that is, an object of a discriminating consciousness. In this respect, ching-chieh is closer in meaning to an alambana, that is, the objectified content of mind. See La Vallee Poussin, Siddhi, 1: 42.

37. That is, "what is discriminated" or "that which is discriminable." Sanskrit: parikalpita. Chinese: fen-pieh hsingai. Usually this term is translated as the "nature of discrimination" or "the discriminative nature" but the focus of this principle is weighted toward the objectification of the

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world, toward the purported self-existence of the object, imputing characteristics constructed by the discriminating subject on to the objects disciminated.

38. See my article, "An Introductory Note to Paramartha's Theory of Language," Journal of Indian Philosophy 7 (1979), in which I discuss the process of "intention" or being mentally predisposed to sensing an object before sensing or naming takes place.

39. Sanskrit: paratantra, literally, "dependent on another," which the Chinese carefully tran- slated as i-t'a hsingak.

40. Many specialists on Yogacara view the entire tradition as adhering to the idealist's position that external objects do not exist in any way whatsoever. While some later Yogacara such as Hsiian-tsang certainly lead one to that conclusion, the writings of Vasubandhu in particular do not necessarily do so. For philosophical argumentation, Vasubandhu challenges the opponent's complacent belief that he knows the external world and can articulate its reality. He does not necessarily make the logical error that simply because the mind cannot know anything except its own states that what is not knowable to the mind simply does not exist. Stephan Anacker, "Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakarana," (Philosophy East and West 22, no. 3 (July, 1972): 247- 258), and Charlene A. S. McDermott, "Asafga's Defense," are in agreement with the interpre- tation I give in this article of the philosophical force of early Yogacara. The labeling of Vasubandhu's view as "subjective idealism" seems to me to bear the same sort of unjustifiable attack as the label "nihilism" does to Nagarjuna's views. Although Vasubandhu claims that sense objects are dependent upon mind, he also makes the corollary that the mind is also dependent upon objects in normal cognitive states. Asanga, his older brother, is more amenable to the application of the label "idealist," because of his flights into the meditative vision of a world devoid of objects.

41. It is due to the cumulative influences (vasani) from past experiences that an individual develops a highly personal style of constructing one's world yet at the same time views this world as if it were independent of individual interpretation. These vasana are the source for wrong notions that objects have autonomous powers over one's existence. See B. K. Matilal, "A Critique of Buddhist Idealism," pp. 146, 154.

42. CSL 62b22-23. 43. In Paramartha's description of the "seed" structure, a parallel may be seen with svasamvitti

or self-awareness, the underlying unity for projection of a subject over and against an object. See Matilal, "A Critique of Buddhist Idealism," for a brief summary of sva-samvitti; also Hattori Masaaki, Dignaga: On Perception (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 101-106.

44. The entire argument is given in CSL 62b25-c20. The question is raised in that passage concerning the name "Consciousness-Only." If both sense object and sensory ideational con- sciousness are eliminated, how can one say there is "Consciousness-Only?" The answer has two parts: (1) the functioning of consciousness is the only type of world we know. When this system of how consciousness functions is understood, this is "Consciousness-Only." (2) When the inter- dependency of consciousness and its objects is completely understood, this is knowledge of Emptiness. This interdependency is expressed by Paramartha as both the absolute nature (parinispanna), the real, and Pure Consciousness. In other words, knowledge of reality is called "Consciousness-Only" or "Pure Consciousness."

45. The Chinese equivalent for this conscious energy is hsi-ch'i, ch'i connoting "energy," and hsi, "habit." The Sanskrit equivalent is vasana, according to Etienne Lamotte, "Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism," Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner, ed. L. Cousins (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974), p. 91, whereas hsiin-hsi, "latent habits," corresponds to vasand according to Nagao, Madhydntavibhaga, p. 130. Hsin literally means "scent," "vapor," or "perfume," derived from the meaning of vasana as "perfuming" or "infusing" as well as from the metaphor found in the Kosa, namely, that lingering effects of past karman remain in the mind just as a sesame seed perfumed by a flower retains the scent. Compare Abhidharmakosa, chapter 4, p. 249 (Hsfian-tsang xviii, fol. 17a-b). Compare HSL 1618.31.880c 1-15. This metaphor is repeated in the Siddhi, 1:122. Both hsi-ch'i and hsiin-hsi have usually been translated as equivalents, but there seems to be a temporal relationship between them. Hsi-ch'i is the energy produced by hsiin- hsi, via a seed. The hsi-ch'i is, properly speaking, the vasand or energy from past habits which have

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efficacy (bija), lingering in the mind (hsiin-hsi) as an impregnation (hsin-hsi is probably bhdvana), responsible for producing defilement which then in turn has a habit-energy (hsi-ch'i) starting the cycle again. See Siddhi, 2:475 and footnote 22 herein.

46. "Seed-consciousness" is my abbreviated translation for vipdkah sarvabijakam, from verse 2 of Trimsikd, "the retributive result [consciousness], consisting of all seeds." Compare CSL 61c6-7.

47. That is, delusions about selfhood (dtmamoha), and theoretical views about selfhood (atmadrsti) (CSL 62a15).

48. Hsiang hsi-ch'i"a, "influential force of aspects," and ts'u-chung hsi-ch'iam, "gross influential forces" are tentative translations for an obscure concept appearing in both CSL and SWHL. The object discriminated is the gross form of latent habits which generates opportunities for defilement (klesa). The subject who does the discriminating manufactures the content of the delusion, that is, the aspects or appearances of objects in a world. See CSL 62c26-63al7. The SWHL reverses the terms, using hsiang leian for the discriminated object and ts'u-chunga? for the discriminating subject. See SWHL 870c10-16, 871a14-19.

49. Hsi-ch'i, the latent energy from past habits or vdsand, is not defilement (klesa) but the accumulation of patterns of reflexive responses. Lamotte gives some humorous examples of vdsanas monks have retained even though they no longer engage in acts of an unethical nature. For example, there was a handsome monk, Nanda, who still habitually gazed upon women whom he taught even though he no longer had passion for them. See Lamotte, "Passions and Impregnations," p. 93.

50. Emptiness is not always defined in negative terms, traced back to the correlation between Emptiness and interdependent existence (pratTtyasamutpdda) by Nagarjuna and the Prajiapdramitd tradition. See E. Obermiller, "A Study of the Twenty Aspects of Sunyata" Indian Historical Quarterly (March, 1933): 170-187, and Nagao Gadjin, "'What Remains' in Sunyata: A Yogacara Interpretation of Emptiness, Mahdydna Buddhist Meditation, ed. Minoru Kiyota (Honolulu, Hawaii: The University Press of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 66-82.

51. Notions of "self" or "person" have only nominal existence (prajnaptisat). The evolving processes of conscious activity (pravrttivijnhna) function through sensation and are communicable through language. The subconscious processes of the dlayavijnana which shape sensations and conceptualizations together with the sensory and ideational activities of consciousness (pravrttivijhdna) constitute the sum total of the stream (samtdna) of consciousness.

52. Parindma refers to the transformations or changes in the consciousness-series (samtdna) and is the term used to describe the shifts from deluded states of consciousness to enlightened states. See La Vallee Poussin, Kosa, pp. ii, 185.

53. The replenishment of "seeds" occurs on a momentary basis even though normal conscious states have been momentarily suspended during meditation. Seeds of influential events from past experiences also are replenished, to be later retrieved in the case of memory or habitual responses, when conditions associated with the past event are met.

54. The elimination of discriminating what actually has only imputed characteristics is the elimination of the constructing function of the dlayavijndna. This type of wisdom is technically called nondiscriminative wisdom (nirvikalpajndna), that is, wisdom defined in terms of what it lacks. A positive definition of this same knowledge is knowledge of reality, the Suchness (tathata) of all things. This Suchness can also be called the Pure Consciousness (amalavijnina), or the revolution of the basis for discrimination (dsrayapardvrtti). Compare CSL 1588.31.63c4-5; SWHL 1617.31.871c22-24, 873c23-24.

55. CSL 63b21-23. 56. The seed-sprout metaphor is used to suggest the uninterrupted series of conscious moments

and the changes that take place in successive moments of consciousness. See La Vallee Poussin, Kosa, pp. ix, 296.

57. See citations listed under footnote 54, herein. 58. The major part of the San wu-hsing lun is devoted to an analysis of the types of

discriminations based on mental constructs (868c12-871b15) which are the obstacles of defilement (klesavarana) and obstacles to knowledge (jneyavarana). The corresponding kinds of knowledge of Suchness which have eliminated these obstacles are then explained (871b15-873a17). The description of the path toward the final elimination of discrimination and the understanding of dependence between subject and object is described in detail (874a29-878b25).

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59. Both the bodhisattva stages and the buddha stages are the attainment of nondiscriminative wisdom (876c9-10), but the causal realm of the bodhisattva is that of skill-in-means whereas that of the buddha is the result of having benefited both self and other without being attached to either samsdra or nirvana (878a10-b25).

60. SWHL 874bl2-13. 61. Kosa, pp. iv, 1-2. 62. See, for example, the SrTmalddevTsutra, in its discussion of anusaya, or mind-disassociated

defilement. This doctrine was also held by the Vibhajyavadins. 63. P. S. Jaini, "The Sautrantika Theory of Bija," pp. 248-249. 64. See my discussion of Mahasamghika, Sautrantika, and Tathagatagarbha thought in chapter

2 of The Buddhist Feminine Ideal. Queen Srtmald and the Tathdgatagarbha (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1979).

65. The alayavijidna, as a structure of consciousness entailing the propensities for habitual

ignorance, could not account for the mental states devoid of karmic retribution since, by definition, the alayavijnana represented the system of retribution.

66. The notion that mind is capable of knowing its own processes as the natural evolution of mind toward its own self-discovery has been a predominant feature of much of Chinese thought, particularly notable in the analysis of hsingaP or the true nature of things.

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