DIŞ POLİTİKA - FOREIGN POLICY A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute

Vol. XXV 2000 Nos. 3-4

CONTENTS PAGES

Foreword

Seyfi Taşhan

The Fruitful Legacy Erik Cornell..........................................................................................................4 Turkey’s vision for future should be built on her eventual membership

Mükerrem Hiç......................................................................................................7 Copenhagen Criteria – Minorities – Turkey Pulat Tacar .........................................................................................................12 Turkmenistan and Turkey: Establishment and Development of Fraternal Relations Bayram S. Atayev ..............................................................................................17 About Actuality Aspects of Kazakhstan: Turkish Geopolitical Vector Abylkhozhin Juldusbek .....................................................................................20 Russia and Turkey: Horizons of Developing Policy

Vladlen Martynov ..............................................................................................23 Commonwealth of States Versus Turkey Ayhan Kamel......................................................................................................31 Perspectives for Stability in the Balkans: An Overview Ali Hikmet Alp ...................................................................................................38 The Balkans: Out of the Past Cornel Codita .....................................................................................................49 The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria Ömer Lütem .......................................................................................................62 Turkey and Balkans

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Trajan Petrovski ................................................................................................65 Croatian Foreign Policy: New Times and New Goals Radovan Vukadinovic .......................................................................................67 Cyprus and the European Union: The Relevant Factors Andrew Mango...................................................................................................78 Turkey and Morocco Mohamed Cherti ................................................................................................83 The Genesis and Development of the Nation-State: Some Remarks on the Cases of Spain and Turkey Antonio Elorza ...................................................................................................85 The Mediterranean Clash of Civilizations or Enhanced Cooperation Franchetti Pardo ................................................................................................91 International Security – Latin American Perception Hugo Gobbi ........................................................................................................95 China Reşat Arım........................................................................................................100 New Horizons of Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Beyond Arshad-uz Zaman ............................................................................................104 The Future of Turkish – African Relations Numan Hazar ...................................................................................................107 Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000 and Beyond: Her Opening up Policy to Africa Salih Zeki Karaca ............................................................................................115

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Foreword

The year 1999 was the 25th Anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute. Against the background of a remarkable quarter of a century filled with innumerable conferences, research activity, brain storming sessions, publications, training programs and policy recommendations, we wanted to commemorate the silver anniversary of the Institute with a fairly large international conference that would examine “The New Horizons of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000 and Beyond”.

The conference which was due to be held last year under the patronage of President Süleyman Demirel was postponed to this year because of the catastrophic earthquakes that hit Turkey in August 1999.The actual conference was, therefore, held on 24-25 March this year.

In our previous issue we published the presentations made at the inaugural session, which was addressed by President Süleyman Demirel of Turkey, President Rauf Denktaş of TRNC and several distinguished participants from different parts of the world. The conference continued its work in three workshops; namely, “Turkey and Her Allies”, ”Turkey and her Neighborhood”, and “New Horizons of Turkish Foreign Policy”. The participants to the conference also heard Minister of State Şükrü Sina Gürel and Kamran İnan, President of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Unfortunately we do not have enough space to publish the entire proceedings of the Workshops, which witnessed highly interesting debates. In this volume we only present some of the papers that have been made available. I would like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of the Foreign Policy Institute to all participants and those who helped the conference to be a successful one.

Seyfi Taşhan

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The Fruitful Legacy

Erik Cornell*

It can be said that the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire was divided into three parts: the Middle East, the Balkans and, located between them, the Republic of Turkey. At an early stage Atatürk launched the formula "Peace at home, peace abroad" to serve as the guideline for the policy of the young Republic, which contained not least a counsel to avoid the imbroglio of the Middle East. Expressed in more concrete terms it can be paraphrased to mean that what is ours belongs to us and what belongs to others belongs to them. Whilst imperialist ambitions had characterized the Ottoman period the Turkish Republic adopted the more advanced - and in the 1920's much more advanced indeed - attitude of striving for peaceful and stable relations with its neighbors. As a consequence the last three quarters of a century constitute perhaps the longest period in history when the rulers and inhabitants of Anatolia have not been engaged in wars with their neighbors.

The adherence to Atatürk's principle became the distinguishing quality for Turkey in contrast to the Balkans and the Middle East as well as from the emerging Caucasian region of unrest, which all have been subject to external aggression as well as internal strife. Of course the Turkish path has also had its ups and downs but in the troubled area in question it stands out as a solitary rock of stability. The continuous adherence to Atatürk's guidelines has resulted in a unique respect for the predictability and reliability of Turkish foreign policy, be it appreciated or not.

Now I hear many Turkish friends and colleagues comment that this might well be true, but that it has not led to Turkey receiving any thanks, expressions of appreciation or even compensation when that should have been natural. There exist bitter feelings, expressed in words like "the Turk's only friend is another Turk" or that "the West only courts Turkey when it needs its contribution" - caused by experiences such as the Crimean war, the attitudes of the Central Powers during the First World War, of the lies during the Second World War, the Korean and Gulf wars, whilst negligence or faithlessness quickly has gained the upper hand when the political climate so permitted as proven by the Treaty of Sevres, moments of Cold War detente and the short period between the demise of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War.

These points of view are understandable as well as uncontestable. But can one, in the bottom of one's heart, really expect anything else? Already on the personal level we learn at a young age that if we help somebody in distress, we often do not hear from him until he finds himself in trouble again. At the international level this behavior, frankly speaking, reflects the unavoidable conditions of 'Realpolitik'. Admittedly, due to its geopolitical location and the tumultuous and volatile situation characteristic of its neighborhood, Turkey is bound to draw these experiences more often than most other countries. The obvious conclusion would then be that Turkey would again and again be courted and neglected following the changes of the political temperature. To a certain extent I object to this conclusion because I believe that courting will become more prevalent than neglect. A Swedish Prime Minister during the First World War once commented that the sympathy of foreign countries was a good thing but to enjoy their respect was better. Countries known for oscillating or opportunistic positions may, when conditions are favorable, receive expressions of sympathy but enjoy no respect and will therefore usually are neglected. But Turkey's foreign policy enjoys respect not least by

* Former Swedish Ambassador to Ankara

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offering predictability and reliability. Turkey can consequently count on being courted when other actors again find themselves in trouble - which they certainly will.

Times change, conditions and circumstances change and politics are bound to be influenced. When I took up the post as ambassador to Turkey in the early weeks of 1990 and had my first encounters with my colleagues in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, they drew my attention to the fact that Turkey in reality only enjoyed two quiet frontiers characterized by relative stability - in the southeast with Iraq and in the north with the Soviet Union. Only a few months later the areas beyond these borders quickly fell into turmoil unparalleled by all other neighbors. Soon afterwards followed the eruption of the Balkan wars. I have vivid memories of the difficulties in getting briefing appointments with the overworked diplomats in the Foreign Ministry who were incessantly dealing with one crisis after the other. It was, as we say in Sweden, a consolation for tiger hearts that Turkey more than ever stood out as a rock of stability.

"Peace at home peace abroad" aims at avoiding all forms of adventurism, especially conflicts and aggressive alliances. This, however, does not mean either passivity or isolation but adaptation to prevailing and changing circumstances. Between the Great Wars Atatürk actively cultivated Turkey's relations with its neighbors and the Balkan Entente was established in 1934. His successors continued avoiding risky alliances and managed to safeguard Turkey's peace during the Second World War. When Stalin, at Turkey's expense, wanted to acquire for the Soviet Union that which did not belong to it, membership of NATO became the obvious solution to master the menacing situation. In this case peace promotion meant discouraging somebody else from adventurism, which can serve as a good example of adapting Atatürk's formula when formulating an active foreign policy. Other examples of how Turkey has given proof of being a reliable ally include the Korean War and in later years how Turkey has shared the burden of participating in UN peacekeeping operations in e.g. Somalia and the Balkans. The best-known example of Turkey's own conviction that adventurism must be shunned was probably the cautious acting during the Gulf war - a policy that was not self-evident.

Peace is best served by preventive measures. Negotiations are more constructive than violence. Agreed solutions are always preferable to imposed ones, as the latter foster bad feelings and, at worst, give rise to a policy of revenge. It is easier to preserve peace as long as negotiations take place and Turkey has a remarkable record of furthering regional fora for discussion. The establishment and later enlargement of the ECO (the organization for economic cooperation east- and north-eastwards) should here be mentioned and perhaps even more attention should be paid to the institutionalized Black Sea cooperation. The characteristic feature of the Turkish approach is the universality - nobody shall be excluded, nobody shall feel kept out and fear a conspiracy or a hostile "ganging up". On the contrary, stability, reliability and openness shall be promoted. It lies in the nature of such cooperation that advances in the beginning are made only slowly, perhaps even depressingly slowly - but the process has started, and the institutions can fruitfully be used for informal meetings where politicians get opportunities to talk off the record, to test ideas and read each others' reactions at early stages.

An even better but less observed illustration of the quest for peace and stability is to be found during the early years of the Caucasian crises. In this area the ethnic and religious differences are as pronounced and potentially devastating as in the Balkans, which, in order to avoid similar catastrophes, requires local actors to give proof of an extraordinary tolerance and caution and from the whole international community to show extreme vigilance and

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statesmanship in order to prevent any fire from coming close to a powder keg. Turkey quickly recognized all the newborn states on the condition of existing boundaries, which was accepted by all but one. Nevertheless, in order to promote stable and cooperative relations, Turkey was at the outset prepared to extend assistance in food and energy to all of them without exception. In the same spirit this now goes for the possible transit deliveries of Caspian oil. It bears witness to the conviction that peace is promoted by universality, openness, reliability and predictability.

With the end of the Cold War all the regions around Turkey became the objects of both short- and long-term changes in a number of 'forces of parallelograms'. The value of old balances of power fell in the melting pot and many governments started feeling encouraged to test or reappraise them and perhaps to look for opportunities in finding new combinations. Changing conditions and circumstances of this order leave nobody calm or indifferent and the challenges have to be met in order to safeguard peace and stability. As an obvious regional power the role of Turkey is enhanced and its tradition of being a rock of stability puts it in a special position of responsibility, when embracing the repercussions of these developments for the continued application of Atatürk's legacy "Peace at home, peace abroad"?

The world is observing Turkey and commenting on the increasingly active character of its foreign policy. In my opinion some of the comments do not always pay respect to undeniable facts contained in the changing circumstances. For all of us the end of the Cold War had consequences affecting both foreign and defense policies - for some, life became easier, for others more complicated and for some the consequences were difficult to evaluate. Contemporary and subsequent events are to be seen as reflections of a world not any more in the grip of the Cold War's 'permafrost'. This development has affected all of us in different ways and will continue to do so. We need another yardstick than the one used during the Cold War. We must now make use of a yardstick adapted to measuring the options, actions and reactions not only or even mainly of superpowers but also of states and powers of all imaginable sizes and types. In this part of the world we were caught more or less unawares by tumultuous and hitherto unrealistic events like the tragedies of the Gulf war and the upheavals in the Caucasus and the Balkans - but also by openings such as the emerging peace process in the Middle East which will hopefully contribute to detente and rivalry being replaced by cooperation between a growing number of states in the area. This serves to illustrate the saying that not only outbreak of war but also conclusion of peace brings about unforeseen effects. In this new world we find ourselves again among a mixture of old and new. Mixed age-old and new conditions, hopes, aspirations and fetters present themselves in old or new or mixed appearances. Consequently we are also facing something with which we had got out of the habit of coping, namely an abundance of actors who in an unfamiliar way play their instruments out of tune with their neighbors.

In this new world everybody has to identify himself and analyze his position, challenges and possibilities. Given Turkey's geopolitical location and tumultuous neighborhoods, the makers of Turkish foreign policy are faced with quite a task, which of course attracts the interest of the rest of the world and invites to comments based on a varying degree of insight, understanding, knowledge - and not to be forgotten, competitive vested interests. In this new landscape the old maps may be misleading and the traveler will be forced to rely upon his memory, clear eyesight and a compass free from declination. Turkey possesses such a compass and it consists of Atatürk’s legacy to shun adventurism and be guided by the principle "Peace at home peace abroad" through a continued policy of predictability and reliability. This compass has guided Turkey safely for 75 years and remains the most useful tool for Turkish foreign policy as we go towards "New Horizons".

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Turkey's Vision For Future Should Be Built On Her Eventual EU Membership

Prof. Dr. Mükerrem Hiç*

An Overview of Turkey's Past and Present Problems

Turkey entered the new millennium accepted in the Helsinki summit as candidate for EU membership. This signified a mutual belief that she can fulfill the criteria of human rights, democracy, solve her disputes with Greece and meet economic criteria as well. Optimists estimate that Turkey can and should sit at the table for full membership by 2004. But many believe it could actually take much longer due to difficulties, misinterpretations and, wrong steps, some on the part of EU, and many on the part of Turkey. And she will be the last to be called for negotiations for eventual entry. Thus, Turkey may be likened to a glass more than half full, and less than half empty. And the question is how long it will take to fill it fully or adequately, with some on both sides expressing doubts or undesirability that it would thus be filled.

To be sure, over a large span of years, despite short-lived government coalitions, policy mistakes and omissions made by governments, Turkey strode on to become a major regional player, if not a major power economically, politically and militarily. She has improved her relations with the USA. Caucasian and Central Asian Turkic countries, Middle Eastern and North African Islamic countries, more precisely with the moderate countries in the latter region, with Russia, the Balkans and with Greece as well as with the EU. The more recent years and with the present government, Turkey shows greater hopes for political and economic stability which, when achieved, could prove self-reinforcing.

Though inadequate for EU full-membership, Turkey is the only secular (laicist) and democratic Islamic country, and an example for all other Islamic and Turkic countries in the region. This is precisely why terrorism of all sorts within Turkey was and still is supported covertly by some of Turkey's hostile neighbors. And her economy, its level of technology, her industry and implementation of the market economy, the dynamism of her private sector, her flexibility in taking the first steps into globalization form strong foundations to build upon for the future. To fight inflation, the present government recently launched a comprehensive stabilization policy approved and supported by the IMF and the WB and set 6n with its implementation, including a large-scale privatization program.

A longer retrospective should help to appreciate Turkey’s achievements more fully, in contrast to her present shortcomings. In 1923 when Atatürk established the new Republic, abolishing both the Sultanate and the Caliphate and launched, against great odds, radical reforms for Westernization following the revolution, he has laid firm foundations for Turkey that would eventually lead her to full EU membership. At the time of the revolution, Turkish economy was practically zero if not minus, education was confined to a small, - -privileged group, and the nation had no experience in democracy.

* İstanbul University, Economics Faculty, Former M.P.

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In the seventies Turkey faced a serious threat from Marxist, and separatist terrorism that fueled ultra-nationalistic counter- terrorism; and survived thanks to her military which intervened in 1980, As in the case of 1960 intervention and I971 memorandum, the Turkish military was not interested in taking over the government, but intent on preserving Atatürk's principles and in making democracy work. In the eighties and nineties Kurdish separatist terrorism revived and grew to greater dimensions than ever before. Following successful military operations and Abdullah Öcalan's capture, this terrorism is now diminishing as a threat, giving the Turkish government opportunity for economic development and democratic reforms for the Eastern region. Another and presently a more serious threat come from political Islam, i. e. The attempt to thwart laicist democracy and establish a religious state, Islamic terrorism with the same aim, all base~ on a wrong interpretation of religion. Islamic terrorism by Hizbullah, IBDA-C and others are presently being cracked down effectively by the police force, while there are signs that political Islam is on the decline and in the phase of transformation or else division of thought.

The above coarse survey leads us to two important conclusions. First, Turkey will surely overcome all these threats and will not go under, thanks to Atatürk's firm foundations. It is only a question of time, and of stable, determined and effective governments in the future, as the present one. Secondly, the threat of separatist terror and that of fundamentalist Islam are much more complicated for an ordinary European not well versed in Turkish affairs to grasp and appreciate fully.

This brief survey or overview gives us leads from which we can - draw the basic vision for Turkey and what she must do in the foreseeable future.

The Goal of Full EU Membership

Turkey should put out her best effort to meet EU criteria and conditions for eventual full membership. She should do so with full understanding that such improvements and progress are beneficial for Turkey per se, even if benefits of full membership are reduced considerably in future. Realistically, Turkey's full membership should take long, by which time the EU would be enlarged and its budgetary and voting procedures would likely be changed. This is why Turkey should not look forward to eventual full membership with a view to reaping substantial benefits in terms of agricultural subsidies, subsidies for underdeveloped regions, and free movement of workers. The main benefit; -it should be viewed, is that Turkey's candidacy opens the way for closer and wider economic, political, cultural and social cooperation to the mutual advantage of both parties.

To be sure, the EU, for its part, should comply with the promised financial aid and credit per the decision to enter Customs Union. This, as P.M. Ecevit has noted, is not because this aid is significant for the Turkish economy, which it is not, but as a token of the sincerity of EU in its relations with Turkey. The EU must also make a special provision for Turkey, a strong NATO member safeguarding the West in her region, to have her participate in some form in the European common defense system.

There are two important reasons why fulfillment of EU criteria and conditions is beneficial to Turkey per se even if full membership takes, say fifteen rather than five years. Firstly, the world in general has entered a phase of democracy, market economy and globalization. Globalization includes free movement of financial funds and fixed capital as

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well as industrial goods and freer movement of agricultural goods and of services. Turkey has taken the first steps towards globalization already; so it is easier to accommodate additional steps for EU full membership and economic integration. Secondly, it should not be forgotten that Turkey has already taken a major step of Customs Union with the EU, with apparently no adverse effects on her economy.

One further problem concerns the organization of the work for full membership. The homework to be done is immense and the present government should speed up establishing a satisfactory political and bureaucratic machine to get the work going at full scale.

A. Multifaceted Approach to International Relations

Turkey is in a unique geographical location and at crossroads, with historical and cultural ties and links to many different regions in addition to the EU and the Mediterranean. These include Caucasia and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, the Balkans, Russia and the USA. None of these can be considered as a substitute for her relations with the EU and, in fact, her EU relations could reinforce her relations with all the other regions and countries. Therefore, in this sense, Turkey will have to continue with her multi-faceted approach to her international economic and political relations.

B. Improvements in Human Rights and Democracy

There are many deficiencies in Turkey’s implementation of human rights and democracy, which are criticized by the EU within the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey will have to improve on these as fast as possible both as a prerequisite for entry and also because such progress is beneficial per se to her citizens. The EC has mostly emphasized such questions as abolishing capital punishment ending torture and maltreatment by the police, long detentions in prisons and delays in the justice system, prison conditions, restrictions due to special 1aw enforcement regime in the Eastern region, displacement of population there, freedom of thought and expression, the influence of the military in political decisions etc. While condemning separatist terrorism, the EU authorities emphasize that Turkey should Improve the "minority rights" for the Kurds, a "political and cultural" solution to the problem in addition to "merely the military". This phrase is refused by the Turkish official position because according to the Lausanne Treaty Kurds are "citizens” of Turkey, not minorities. Whatever the terminology used, EU analysis also falls short in many respects. Kurdish citizens enjoy far greater political and cultural rights than is conceded by the EU authorities, for one. The EU seems much less sensitive to choose who have suffered from terrorism, for another. And economic development of the region is a fundamental factor and should now proceed more satisfactorily in view of reduced terrorist sabotages, for still another.

The critical criterion for Turkey in this regard is whether greater human rights and freedoms would lead to an encouragement or to the lessening of both separatism and also of political Islam. Both movements are archaic under the future conditions of the world, but they are pent-up realities and real threats to the existence of the Turkish state and her democracy. The conclusion of the analysis from this point of view is that, fortunately, we can go a very long way in improving human rights without reinforcing, and in many cases alleviating the above movements and threats. Of the many human rights problems raised by the EU only two

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are politically sensitive. One is the abolishment of capital punishment. It is a sensitive point only because this decision was delayed by previous governments and thus the question became critical after Öcalan was captured and sentenced, lawfully and fairly by the Turkish courts, to capital punishment. There is no doubt that a political decision to waive Öcalan's execution would lessen separatist Kurdish terrorism; executing him would increase it. Hut the sensitivity of thousands of families who suffered from PKK terrorism makes it a delicate question. Fortunately the case has been sent to the European Human Rights Court as part of appropriate legal proceedings and this has bought the Turkish government precious time to solve the issue.

Another sensitive issue is dividing carefully the fine line between freedom of thought and expression from that of propagandizing or aiding terrorism, both separatist, and for the benefit of our EU authorities, also Islamic fundamentalist. Given this yardstick, once we get into more concrete legal details, we can, fortunately, find that there is ample scope for improvement of human rights without increasing the risk above.

Thus, Copenhagen criteria may not be met immediately but substantial improvements are possible in the short run and hopefully all criteria could be met in the longer run, particularly in view of the decreasing threat of separatist and of fundamentalist terror.

Other serious problems, not much emphasized by the EU but much more important and essential from the point of view of Turkish enlightened public opinion are improperties in representative democracy, party structures, deficiencies in participatory democracy, incomplete division of the executive, judicial and legislative branches as well as the precarious breakdown of the parliamentary seats. Inept coalitions in the past has led to the dwindling of the total center left and center right votes and seats, and to the expansion of radical parties. Unless this is corrected it will be more difficult for Turkey to enjoy stable governments that can take effective policies on all fronts. Fortunately, the stability of the present government raises the probability of increased stability in future.

Improvements in the Economy

Likewise, in the field of economy, Turkey should not be expected to fulfill Maastricht criteria in any short run. But the Turkish economy; in particular the private sector, has made great strides over the years despite short-lived and ineffective government coalitions, wrong economic policies, unwillingness to fight inflation, corruption, partisanship and populism, huge expenditures spent to fight separatist terrorism, the Iraq embargo, and indirect effects of the recent global financial crisis, particularly the Russian. All throughout and despite all these drawbacks the Turkish economy continued to progress, and economic crises were mostly avoided.

Inflation, however, had become chronic at around 60% having fallen from about 80%; interest rates were much higher at around 80%, having fallen from over 100%. Populism surrounded the social security system. Privatization lacked transparency, was mostly flawed and hence stalled. Surplus employment persisted in government offices and public economic enterprises. Budget deficit was on the rise, accelerating the volume of government debt. Current account deficit was met with precarious short-run financial flows and credit, which, in turn, was lured by the difference between the high interest rate on internal borrowing and the thereby repressed rate of increase in the price of foreign exchange. High inflation

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prevented the realization of the benefits of the market economy; the price mechanism and market forces could no longer lead to efficient production and investment decisions. Corruption also led to inefficiencies by breaching the principle of competition. Neither banks nor financial intermediaries were effectively controlled, giving rise to financial crises and bank failures and it costed further money for the Central Bank Fund to take over such banks. Government guarantees on bank deposits that had become effective in 1994 to stop the financial crisis at the time continued to dilute competition between banks.

The stabilization policies put into effect recently by the present government aims to prevent all of the problems and deficiencies above. It has not only been approved by the IMF and the WB but has also won the support of the private sector. It has already begun to produce positive results. Thus we can expect a fall in the inflation rate, the interest rate, falls in the rises in the foreign exchange rate and the ratio of government debt to the GNP. The government passed a law allowing arbitration and has introduced transparency to privatization. Thus we may expect high privatization targets to be realized in the near future. This should not only increase the dynamism and efficiency of the economy but the net proceeds may also be used to reduce government debt and interest cost further.

I would conclude, therefore, that one can be more optimistic, or if you like, less pessimistic about Turkey meeting the economic criteria for EU membership as compared to meeting the human rights criteria.

Cyprus and Aegean Disputes with Greece

Within the short span of time available. I have decided to omit any detailed investigation of Turkish-Greek relations and the solving of the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes, leaving it to experts in international political relations. Suffice it to note here that it is a great leap forward but only the beginning of a tedious road that the Turkish and the Greek governments have discarded their previous enmity and embarked on a carefully calculated friendship and cooperation. The psychological walls to be torn down and the weighing of diverse interests still loom tall for any immediate solution. But now there exists a chance that these disputes can and will be solved while such a chance was virtually non-existent in the past. The friendship and cooperation between the Greek and the Turkish governments should serve as an encouragement for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to come to a compromise solution acceptable to both. And it is to the benefit of all the four parties and the EU that they do so. The Cyprus question will likely be the most challenging criterion for Turkey's eventual EU membership and would prove to be the Gordian knot.

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Copenhagen Criteria – Minorities - Turkey

Pulat TACAR*

The political criteria for new membership to the European Union as mentioned in the conclusions of the Presidency of the European Union Council of Copenhagen on 21-22 June 1993 are as follows: "Membership to the EU requires that the country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities..."

The European Union has not yet opened the accession negotiations with Turkey, because according to their evaluation Turkey does not fulfill the political criteria put forward by the Copenhagen Summit.

This paper will present an analysis of the "minority" issue, arguably the most problematic Copenhagen criterion for Turkey, and make suggestions to overcome the probable impasse without violating the intent of its authors.

Turkey, which is a candidate for full membership to the EU, does not recognize the existence of minorities in her territory - with the exception of those, which were foreseen by the Treaty of Lausanne and by the Treaty of Friendship between Bulgaria and Turkey.

This interpretation is apparently not shared by the European Parliament and by some member countries of the European Union. According to them the Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin should be given the juridical status of a minority; although such a status is neither requested by nor acceptable to them; because those who opt violently for autonomy would prefer to receive the status of the "people" instead of minority; while the majority of the Kurds is quiet offended by the term "minority ".

One must neither dismiss nor minimize the fact that the aim of the guerilla and the terrorist acts perpetrated by the separatists was - as clearly declared by them - the creation of a Kurdish state in the territories of the Turkish Republic.

We in Turkey continue to remember that those groups were supported by some circles in Europe: that the States concerned did not prohibit in their own countries the actions directed against the territorial integrity of Turkey and did overlook for example the transfer of the sums collected through illegal extortion or racketeering among the Turkish citizens working in Europe; sums which helped to finance the purchase of arms to be used in the guerilla war against Turkey; some circles in European countries even provided heavy arms to the separatist groups fighting or perpetrating acts of terrorism in Turkey and the States concerned tolerated these actions. What happened during the last 15 years in Turkey is still fresh in our memories; this should be taken into account by our European partners when evaluating the attitude of the Turkish Government and the suspicions of the public opinion in Turkey; which is gaining the conviction that their European partners are treating Turkey as a theme park for human rights advocacy while supporting separatism. The statements of some politicians and the analyses of the columnists in the Turkish newspapers as well as in the

* Ambassador

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European media on the minority issue shows that Turkey and the EU seem to be confronted with a problem that needs careful, balanced and equitable consideration.

One of the reasons is that the Constitution of the Turkish Republic does not recognize the existence of minorities other than those I mentioned before; the Constitutional Court also in many of its decisions underlines this fact. I do not think that the Turkish Parliament will amend the Constitution for the recognition of the existence of minorities in Turkey. The argument behind this basic constitutional attitude may be summarized as follows: Turkey does not recognize on its territory the existence of groups differing from each other by racial, linguistic and religious criteria.

Turkey shares the view that all human being are born free and equal in dignity and under the law. The Republic is one and indivisible. Under the Turkish Constitution, all citizens of the Republic are equal. The unity of the Turkish people and the equality of citizens rule out any possibility of a distinction based on ethnic criteria. As for other languages other than Turkish, -the regional or local languages or their slangs-, the Turkish citizens with a different mother tongue are free to talk and write or publish newspapers, books in their second languages. Those familiar with this approach will - no doubt- remember that the legal position of Turkey on this matter is almost identical to the approach of France, which is a member of the EU.

Coming back to the concept of minority I would like to note and especially underline the following:

*There is no internationally agreed definition of minority; the lack of legal definition opens the way to all kind of individual interpretations;

* Ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious differences do not necessarily lead to the creation and recognition of a national minority status;

*For many of those who recognize the existence of minorities the rights attached to them are not group rights but individual rights; the internationally agreed standards emphasize this interpretation and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe rejected a proposal foreseeing the attribution of collective rights to national minorities;

*The political, geographical and the geostrategic situations and constitutional systems are different in every country and no single approach or pattern is generally applicable to find solutions to the cultural, ethnic or linguistic diversity of the citizens. There is no doubt that the values of freedom, human rights and democracy should govern the political and social arena of the citizens; but there are also other aspects which should be taken into account; like the traditional ethical precepts that guided the nation's culture; one may call them social values which are deeply intertwined with what we consider the nation’s culture and characteristics; to mention some of them: Maintaining order and stability in the society, the tendency to respect the political authority, the tendency to support a unified society, the importance -and sometimes the priority- attached to the state to the detriment of the individual etc.

*Recommended solutions or designed theoretical patterns could not be helpful for finding solutions to the problems encountered in every country; so each country should try to find individual solutions suited to his problems;

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*The persons belonging to different cultural groups within a nation - whether they are or not legally recognized as minority- should form an integral part of the society of the State in. which they live; and they should be considered a factor of enrichment for the culture of the State concerned; nobody should be obliged to be treated merely as an individual who belongs to a minority; nobody should be forced to remain a member of a minority. The persons belonging to different groups within a nation; should be free of any attempts at assimilation against their will;

*The persons belonging to national minorities should enjoy the same rights and the same duties of citizenship as the rest of the population;

*The provisions creating standards for the minorities cannot be interpreted on a way of permitting actions against the territorial integrity and the political independence of the States concerned.

Having said these, I would like now to turn to some solutions put forward with regard the minority issues in Turkey:

*There are some suggestions made by some circles in the EU - for example visiting Ministers or members of the European Parliament - that Turkey should sign and ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. On this I would like to point out that not all the European Union members or candidate countries to the EU are Party to the said Convention: for example France and Belgium did not sign the Convention; Greece, Luxemburg, Holland and Portugal who are members of then EU or Poland, Latvia or Lithuania who are candidates to the EU did not ratify it. Those are the reasons why - at this stage- probably the Turkish Parliament will not be ready to ratify the Framework Convention for also I believe that one can hardly request from a candidate to accept norms or criteria which does not receive a unanimous support in the EU:

* With regard the proposal of an eventual amendment of the Turkish Constitution to open the way for granting the status minority to some Turkish citizens, I think that this also is not a realistic expectation. Especially if one takes into account the wording of the French Constitution - a member country of the EU. What the EU finds acceptable for France should not be denied to Turkey. On the other hand we should not forget that the Turks and the Kurds have been living side by side in Turkey for centuries and have become relatives in a large scale because of inter-marriages; how would one differentiate the Turk from the Kurd? The President of Turkey Mr. Süleyman Demirel in a recent statement (19.02.2000) said the following in this respect "In Turkey there exists a voluntary togetherness; the unity of language, belief or race is not a prerequisite for the citizenship; all our citizens remain unified under the roof of that citizenship; they are equal in their rights, liberties as well as in their duties or obligations; the citizens should remain in the framework of the democratic and indivisible society; and nobody is forced to be Turk from a racial point of view."

*Another suggestion is the compliance of Turkey to the Recommendation No, 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which foresees the representation of the minorities in the Parliament of the country and in the Municipalities; the education in the minority languages; the freedom of publication in the media; and the right to make use of the minority languages in the administration and judiciary. In this respect I think that the emphasis should be given to the essence of these recommendations and not only to their wording. The Turkish citizens should fully, enjoy the freedoms and the rights included in the European Human Rights Convention. The said Convention -which covers almost all the

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issues taken up by the Recommendation No. 1201- is an integral part of the Turkish legal system. In this Convention the rights, the freedoms and their limits are not categorized as majority or minority rights. All citizens are equal if a citizen has a different native language than the language of the State he or she should be free to speak and to communicate also in this language.

What remains, is the issue of education in the mother tongue - an issue that I would prefer to call "the learning of the local language in the school ".

If there is sufficient demand, some countries may take -and have taken- measures to accommodate the learning of the regional languages in the primary and secondary schools. This is the case for example of France which; the Legislation called La Loi Deixonne from 11 January 1951 gives the opportunity to learn the native language in the schools. In 1995, the then Prime Minister of Turkey Mr. Mesut Yılmaz suggested that eventually Kırmancı or Zaza - two of the Kurdish languages spoken in Turkey- may be taught by private institutions to those who desire. But taking into account the heavy financial burden caused by the compulsory 8 year education -and the plans to enter the phase - in the near future- of compulsory 11 years education- I have to add that the learning of the local languages should be financed by private sources and not hamper the compulsory education which is given in the official language of the country. To complete this scheme it should be mentioned that study and research on regional cultures must be carried out by Universities in Turkey.

On political representation: Political parties based an ethnic differences are not allow-ed by the Constitution and legislations of Turkey concerning the political parties; this is the logical consequence of the rejection of difference based on ethnicity, language or religion. But candidates of different ethnic, linguistic or religious origins are free to be elected to the Parliament from the lists of different political parties -including from those political parties with strong regional or ethnical support-; moreover in Turkey the elected parliamentarians or local politicians freely underline their ethnic origins. This also applies to local governments and municipalities. As it is known, the mayors of several municipalities are elected from the list of a party, which emphasize the rights of the Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin.

According to the Lausanne Treaty those Turkish citizens who want to make use of their native languages in the oral judiciary procedures can do so.

All kinds of publications in native languages are free. What remains is the TV programs in. the mother tongue. According to some politicians and media reports there are 9 TV stations wlv.ch are de facto presenting TV programs in Kırmancı language in Turkey. The Grand National Assembly now should amend the legislation with regard the TV and radio broadcasting and open the way to the regular broadcast of programs in local languages

Turkey may consider to take same other legal measures with regard the cultural rights of the Turkish citizens with different origins. For example the provisions of articles 26 and 28 in the constitution which gives to the parliament the right to ban languages through legislation should be abolished; no other constitution in the world contains such a provision; the relevant article of the Law No. 2923 on the Learning and the Education of Foreign Languages which prohibit the education of a mother tongue other than the Turkish must also be amended; the reservation of Turkey on the article l7/D of the Convention on the Rights of Children should be lifted; the article 8 of the Law on the Acts of Terrorism with regard the freedom of opinion and expression as well as the articles 5/6 and 6/4 of the Law an the Associations and the article 81 of the Law on the Political Parties should also be amended.

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Other measures already foreseen by the Government and which are actually under discussion are enumerated in a report prepared by the Political Criteria Sub Committee of the Special Commission on Europe -Turkey relations attached to the State Planning Organization. They are classified under the titles of Constitutional proposals other Legal proposals and Administrative proposals. Those will be discussed now by the Government and other competent bodies of the Republic, including the NGO's.

To conclude I would like to add that I consider the minorities issue as a problem of the threshold of tolerance; sometimes that threshold is elevated, mainly as defensive reaction to, planned provocations and sometimes we witness the contrary; in such periods the minorities are well treated and normally contribute to the making of an integrated society with different cultural roots. The denial of one’s identity strengthens this identity; assimilation attempts almost always have an opposite effect.

Finally 1et me underline that the existence of a political will is the prerequisite of all solutions; and there are actually signs to conclude that such will exists in Turkey.

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Turkmenistan And Turkey: Establishment And Development Of Fraternal Relations

Bayram S. Atayev*

In the beginning of my presentation I would like on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on my own behalf to congratulate the Institute of Foreign Policy of Turkey with their 25th anniversary and wish great professional success in their work.

The present Conference takes place on the verge of the millennium and its coverage reflects the spirit of time.

It covers wide specter of Turkish foreign policy directions. The special place is devoted to the New Independent States. In this context this conference is of special interest for the States of Central Asia and Turkmenistan among them. One of the priorities of Turkish foreign policy is the development of the relations with the States of Central Asia, the relations that based on the mutual respect and the unity of the historical traditions. The main priority of Turkish foreign policy in this region is to render the support in the strengthening of the political and economical independence, the transition to the market economy and creation of the legal state.

It's remarkable that in 1933 the great son of Turkish nation Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was foreseeing the break up of the Soviet Union. He was sure that soon Turkic brother-nations, living on the territory of the USSR would become independent and that there was a need to be ready for that, that the time will come arid they will need the full-fledged support of Turkey. The will of Atatürk was that Turkey should consider it as its obligation to render a full-fledged support to the young independent brotherly nations. The prophecy of the great son of Turkish nation has become true. The vivid example to this end is the Turkmen-Turkish relations.

Characterizing the present condition of the Turkmen-Turkish relations the President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Turkmenbashy constantly reiterates: «Two states - one nation». This phrase bears deep meaning, saying for the historical unity of two nations.

Turkmens and Turks are the direct descendants of the Oguz-Seldjuks. By the will of God our nations had inhabited different regions. But ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and spiritual resemblance of our nations gives us the opportunity to become closer to each other. To great regret these historical facts had been hushed up for a long time and still needs to be studied.

The history proves that the territories of the Asian countries, which are the members of the Economic Cooperation Organization, used to be a united civilization, developing within the framework of the united space. The studies of cultural heritage of our countries and countries of the Asian region have a special significance for the present interstate relations. To this end, and with the purpose of the revival of the cultural and civilizational unity of allied nations, under the patronage of the President of Turkmenistan in the October of 2000, the Conference «Cultural heritage of Turkmenistan: inner origins and present perspectives»

* Adviser of the European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan

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will be held in Ashgabat. On our view the topic of the Conference will be interesting for all countries of the world. Using this opportunity we would like to invite everybody to take part in the Conference.

Without any doubts the success of Turkmenistan for the past 8 years in the economic, political spheres and in the field of cultural change of the society are great. It's necessary to underline that there is a great input of brotherly Turkey in all these achievements and successes. In the first months of independence our States have established trustful and indeed brotherly relations.

It's not the secret for anybody that Turkey was the first country to acknowledge the independence of Turkmenistan, the first official visit of the President of Turkmenistan after the gaining of independence in December 1991 was to Turkey. During this visit international agreements and instruments were signed. These were the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Turkmenistan and Turkish Republic, the Agreement on economic and trade cooperation between Turkmenistan and Turkish Republic, signed on December 3d, 1991.

It's necessary to point out that Turkey was the first country to open its Embassy in Turkmenistan. The diplomatic relations between our countries were established on the basis of Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, signed on February 29, 1992. Turkey rendered its support to Turkmenistan in entering of many international organizations. It's also important to underline that Turkey was one of the first countries to support the Resolution of the United Nations Organization on the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan, dated December 12, 1995.

Turkmenistan indeed felt the support and brotherly attitude of Turkey, and we can really confirm that the leaders of Turkey, and Turkish people respectfully fulfill the will of their first president Kemal Atatürk, have been rendering the full-fledged support in the establishment and development of young Turkmen State. In the present time between Turkey and Turkmenistan 50 international instruments have been signed and 48 are acting. For the past years about 20 meeting of the Presidents of two countries were held.

According to the concluded international agreements:

· The foreign relations between two countries are implemented;

· The air flights between Ashgabat and Istanbul were organized

· The transmission of the Turkish TV channel is conducted in Turkmenistan

· Turkey is rendering help in preparation of Turkmen personnel in Turkey as well as in Turkmenistan

Turkish companies are conducting the construction of the national economy objects; with the participation of 15 thousand Turkish specialists the mutual exploitation of the enterprises is held; during the recent years the share of Turkey in the trade circulation of Turkmenistan is more than 17%, and occupies one of the first places among the 64 States - partners of Turkmenistan.

121 objects on cost of 2 billion 247 million US dollars are constructed in Turkmenistan, with the share of Turkish investors 315,23 million US dollars.

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The input of Turkey into the development of the oil and gas sector of Turkmenistan could not be overestimated. As it's well known Turkmenistan is one of the richest states in the world in gas resources. The resources of Turkmenistan are estimated to be 21-23 trillion cubic meters, and oil 12 billion tons. This treasure should be well extracted, transported to the buyers and sold. Turkmen gas is needed in Europe and in Turkey.

The agreement signed on October 29, 1999 in Ankara related to the transportation of gas through the Caspian sea to Turkey was the great impetus for the historical event, which closer united the interests of two brotherly nations.

One of the important aspects of the Agreement was the wish to restrict the political shades, that is the initial position of Turkmenistan during the resolution of the energy transportation to the international market.

In the political circles of Turkey the great importance of the Istanbul Declaration on the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline is underlined. In particular it is pointed out that in 2002 Turkey will receive Turkmen natural gas, which will strengthen Turkmen independence on the one hand, and meet raising demand of Turkey on the other hand.

In accordance with the Agreement in the fields of science, education, culture and sport more than two thousand students are studying in the educational institutions of Turkey. Today 11 joint boarding schools, joint Turkmen-Turkish University, Economy College, 23 Turkish secondary schools are operating in Turkmenistan. Totally more than 600 Turkish specialists in the field of education are working in Turkmenistan.

We can present a lot of examples of cooperation, but the presented data on our mind is enough to demonstrate the developing and broadening brotherly relations between two countries. On the verge of the millennium we experience the renaissance of the interstate relations between two nations, which were broken due to a number of factors many centuries ago. Turkey and Turkmenistan are confidently walking together on the planet, hand in hand. It's their force, it's their history, and it’s the will of two nations. As it's noted by our leaders we are «two states, but one nation”.

And the new page of the development of the Turkmen-Turkish relations will be the visit of the President of Turkey S. Demirel to Turkmenistan planned on March 28 the year 2000, which is being prepared during these days and during which it is planned to sign the agreement on long-term trade cooperation.

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About Actuality Aspects Of Kazakhstan's Turkish Geopolitical Vector

Abylkhozhin Juldusbek*

In terms of traditional geopolitics the world history is considered very often geopolitics as a process of an opposition and mutual influence thellulocraty ("authority by land", "land power ") and thalassocraty ("authority by sea", "sea power "). In the reality one cannot but admit both geopolitical alternatives brought in the rather cardinal corrections to dynamics of social- historical evolution.

In this connection it is possible to recall, for example, thellulocratical empires of Romans or Hunns, Mongols or Osmans. Their "land" expansion neutralized the settled cultural civilizational vectors and passed impulses to the new tendencies, resulting sometimes to positive synthesis those and others.

In the framework of thellulocratical development models the sufficient intensive communications were arisen by which innovations of the most important for this or that historical period were penetrated.

The phenomenon of "The Great Silk Road" proved this to a great extent. Connecting East and West, this cultural artery formed a powerful information field in its space. All regions gravitating to it received more than stronger in comparison with other territories precondition to cultural civilizational "acceleration". Not casually exactly there was a whole circuit of outstanding samples of the urban culture along "The Great Silk Road".

Thalassocraty gave the historical precedents of cultural civilizational integration. In this respect the case with the Mediterranean is indicative. Development of exchange and as a consequence of information communications transformed the region into the original "Pax Economica" (F.Brodel). Nothing could hesitate its consolidation even a break Christian and Islamic worlds penetrating its space.

However soon and the Mediterranean of South Europe thalassocraty conceded its positions powerfully arising North Europe its version. The bourgeois revolutions in Netherlands and England, triumph of Protestantism resulted that iron this moment just in this fragment of Europe new "poles of dews" were arisen, the information impulses from which were informed by means of sea and river (for example, Rhine) communications on the territory bordering to them.

Europe of the period of Reformation directed to an unknown earlier historical evolution, i.e. market economy and forms of political system, alternative to monarchic regimes. Assimilating this development model and its paradigms in breadth and in depth of the continent, the preconditions to formation of "West Europe " phenomenon accrued.

With "opening" of New World historical innovations of the Anglo-Saxon world became to be extrapolated on the East coast of North America. That period when under influence of the "European information" coming through the Atlantic, here there would be

* Professor, Chief Scientific Employee, Institute of Ethnology and History of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, National Academy of Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Almaty)

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soon the dynamical in the economy and social politics coastal line of Washington - Boston. Just from here "the European innovations" would be broadcasted further to West of North America.

Meanwhile the information impulses from Europe passed in one side. But already in the second half of the 19th in the early 20th century New World not only quite assimilated the samples of West Europe, but also succeeded in their further development. From “the susceptible pupil” North America was surely transformed into an innovator of pioneers in economic; political and cultural technologies. The reverse infroconnections already to the European continent side; because to be act more and more intensively.

The Atlantic was transformed into the space of powerful information density. The American and European rimland (the coastal grounds) of this ocean formed an area of the most advanced in the economy and technologies of the western civilization.

"The Middle Ocean" (Midland Ocean) was not any more as a barrier, but a condition of the intercontinental integration. Moreover, according to Spikman, it got a quality of the original "the internal sea" (mare intertnum), within the limits of which the new geopolitical reality - "new Atlantida" is formed. This theoretically existing "continent" is connected by a generality of culture (the West-European genesis), market ideology and liberal democracy. Besides it is marked by identity political, intellectual ethnic and technological history.

"The Atlantic continent” began to be as a center of crossed new information communications, determining the priorities of development of economic, political and cultural technologies in the sphere of improvement of market and democracy institutes. Everybody who this or that way was connected to this information space received the favorable preconditions to more dynamic development.

The universal system of the Atlantic values remained one of the dominant social-political factors of the 20-century. Apparently, it would not lose this quality in 21 century. "The Gold Century" of Atlantic was proceeding.

The attempts of the Asian-Pacific Ocean Region (APR) to create an alternative geopolitical reality, as “The Gold Century of the Pacific Ocean was while inconclusive The recent crisis in the South-East Asia had shown the authoritarian regimes of “the Asian dragons” still didn't demonstrate stable democratic archetypes in many aspects. But only in their frameworks the efficiency of market institutes was opened.

By this it was clear that APR could not be yet as the most attractive geopolitical space, as it did not stand up to a competition with the Atlantic Universum. Moreover ATR continued to be only as innovations compiler of the last one and therefore it was possibly as the secondary information space.

The role that its structures played was evidence of globalization of the "Atlantic continent" information function.

The last events of Far East and the Balkans shown that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had become de facto more priority instance even in comparison with such authoritative international institute as the United Nations. Everything is evident in conditions of "declining " global ideological confrontation (breakdown of the Eastern block)

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function of the "Atlantic" institutes (the European Union, the Council of Europe, NATO and etc.) Grows up to unprecedented parameters in 21st century.

The Republic of Kazakhstan declares multivector orientation of its geopolitical interests. It is precisely traced and in realities of its foreign policy course. Nevertheless taking into account the above-stated, the Republic is considering the problem of integration into the advanced "Atlantic" information space with due attention.

Incidentally this geopolitical vector encounters a number of rather serious complexities. First of all it is connected with interior continental location of the country (for example, there is an equally spaced point from all World oceans near Almaty). In a point of view thalassocraty analysis of the geopolitical space of Kazakhstan is typical Hinterland (territory extending in depth of the continent from coast borders).

"The entrance into "the Atlantic" information space for Kazakhstan is possible only through bordering territories of the western azimuth. Russia always was and in the future will be as the natural historical intermediary in transmission of the "Atlantic" information impulses to Kazakhstan space.

However, Russia being Eurasia already by its geographical location is only the marginal (outlying) component of the "Atlantic" information space. It is retained quality owing a character of its socio-economic and political systems.

Besides at the present period of history Russia itself plays role of a consumer, but not a producer of western civilization values. Since earliest times the struggle between West and East orientation of the Russian public consciousness results that very often the European information standards penetrated in the Russian Heartland (`core land') are either teared away at all or deformed. But therefore their further transmission in depth of Eurasia either is blocked or passed with `obstacles'.

The Turkish geopolitical vector is found the special actuality for the Republic of Kazakhstan at the formed situation. Due to the known symmetries of historical, enthocultural, economic and cultural orders the Turkish geopolitical vector from the very beginning of Kazakhstan sovereign movement was one of the priority values of foreign policy orientation of Kazakhstan (the -Turkish Republic was the first one who officially admitted an independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan). The value of “the Turkish orientation” for Kazakhstan (but enormous sum of all other aspects) will be increased more when Turkey will be considered as the densely integrated part of “the Atlantic” geopolitical space. Turkey is the country capable to transmit “the European impulses” to Kazakhstan in “pure” kind. By the connection with Turkey- - Kazakhstan will obtain the new opportunities if not to be integrated than to be joined closely to the advanced “the Atlantic” information space. But in it we find the additional aspect of multitude of actual aspects of the Kazakh-Turkish relations, which require from our point of view even more intensification.

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Russia And Turkey: Horizons Of Developing Relations

Prof. Vladlen Martynov*

I would like to begin by stressing the starting point of my presentation, which is the following: the beginning of the new century will be marked by Russia's renascence. Indeed, the decade of political and economic chaos, degradation and general decay that Russia went through in the 90s is approaching its end. Russia is finally entering the phase of sustainable political and economic development.

This assumption is based on two basic factors.

First of all, it is political stabilization in my country. The consolidation of the majority of political forces and public opinion around the acting~ president Vladimir Putin has changed the whole political situation in Russia. His forthcoming election to the position of Russia's President is practically predetermined.

Secondly, it is the beginning of economic growth. Last year, for the first time since 1988, the country had annual GDP increase amounting to 3.2%, with industrial production having increased by 10.7%. The economic level of 1990 will hopefully be re-established in 5 to 7 years-which will allow Russia to overcome not only its present state of weakness, but also its politico-psychological complex of humiliation.

It's true, that Russia is still facing numerous complicated problems. The most difficult one is the war in Chechnya (and I will dwell on this issue later). Other problems concern Russia's foreign debt, the investment climate in my country, excessively high percent of credits, the wage arrears, the unacceptable proportion of barter trade and so on. This, however, should be a subject of a special presentation on economic issues.

Some more words about political stability. Vladimir Putin's election as the President is broadly perceived as essential for restoring strong political power in Russia. In many respects, he is a modern type politician. He proclaims his commitment to maintaining and consolidating the legal order in my country, as well as to promoting professional and business competence, rationalism and pragmatism. By and large, he seems to adhere to conservative moral values.

Serious efforts are necessary to strengthen the economic role of the state, primarily by establishing strict norms and laws regulating the economic activity. At the same time the choice we are facing is quite narrow: there is no alternative to putting everything in order, strengthening property rights (which should also concern state-owned property), and struggling with corruption. This will require commitment, determination and resoluteness of the new president.

These positive changes inside Russia will be essential for its future foreign policy. Under Vladimir Putin, it will hopefully become more pragmatic, more coherent and hence

* Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences

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more predictable. It is my deep conviction that there will be no place in Russia's foreign policy for imperial ambitions or attempts to play power games.

In this context, I would like to disagree with some misinterpretations of the notion of "multipolar world"-the notion that was strongly promoted by Yevgeniy Primakov, Russia's former minister of foreign affairs and prime minister (and also the former director of my institute). Adopting the idea of multipolar world does not imply pretending to a status of a power center that would be challenging other poles. Rather, this implies the understanding of the complexity of the world, and the necessity for major actors to cooperate constructively in order to prevent global disorganization and chaos.

On the whole, the development of a multi-polar world is a natural process-but it is also connected with changing correlation of forces and struggle for influence, and hence fraught with conflicts. In this respect, I would like to stress: in spite of all difficulties we are facing, Russia has no intention to challenge others' zones of influence.

Moreover, Russia possesses the potential necessary for gradual transformation into a prosperous and respected center in multi-polar world. This potential includes enormous territory, colossal natural, scientific-technical and human resources, advantageous geographic location, considerable military power, unique cultural heritage, traditions of leadership. Last but not least, Russia's actual or potential role in various regions of the world could have a stabilizing character and in this sense supported by other international actors.

Certainly, we cannot but acknowledge the fact that the USA remains the only superpower. Its role in the world is unique and indisputable; in many respects, its influence is felt in any corner of the world. In the years to come, it will be able to use all the advantages brought about by the economic globalization; all other countries will have to pass through difficult and sometimes hard period of adaptation to new circumstances of global competition. By and large, according to my institute's prognosis for 2000-2015, the USA will preserve its scientific and technical, economic and political leadership in the world.

Naturally, we hope it to be "responsible leadership"-which will be essential both for the world and for the United States itself. And our stand against the US-centrism in international affairs should not be considered as anti-Americanism. Moreover, we believe that imposing domination over the world would cause damage to the Unites States itself, undermining its influence and antagonizing other countries. That's why I would like to draw attention to what Madeleine Albright said recently during her visit to Moscow: "Multi-polar world-with its diversity and creativity among cultures, nations and economies-is exactly the world we believe we can build, the one that will enrich our life and will strengthen peaceful development and creative competition". Many in Russia (at least in Moscow) would be ready to endorse this US State Secretary's formula.

For Russia, relations with the USA are of primary importance in many respects-in terms of our military security, foreign policy, economic interests, as well as in terms of strengthening Russia's position in the world.

It's necessary to stress that in the recent years positive basis for dynamic development of Russian-American relations has been established. To a large degree we have been able to overcome the cold war heritage, to strengthen mutual confidence. Mechanisms of bilateral ties and political dialogue have been established and are actively used. Among them, a special role is played by the practice of top-level contacts. As a result it was possible to settle many

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problems in bilateral relations, to establish close cooperation in addressing a number of key international and regional issues, to promote jointly strategic stability.

The basis for Russian-American cooperation is composed by common interests both in the sphere of bilateral economic relations, and in approach to a number of key issues of international relations - ensuring non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, struggling with terrorism and international crime, finding solution for ecological problems. Of special importance is the absence of ideological grounds, for confrontation.

It is true that recently relations between Russia and the USA passed through a period of difficult tests in connection with NATO's eastward enlargement and NATO's operations in Kosovo. Both parties seem to have learned important lessons from this experience. And the main lesson consists in understanding that partnership has to be preserved.

As far as Moscow is concerned, this fits into its overall orientation towards cooperative interaction and not towards rivalry and confrontation. A number of unambiguous signals have been made to this effect recently such as, for instance, "defreezing" our relations with NATO.

Also, we are in the process of elaborating important conceptual documents related to Russia's foreign and security policies; some of them, like the National Security Concept, have been already adopted, and others, like the new Military Doctrine, will follow soon. In this regard, one can hear sometimes alarmist interpretations. I do believe that they are inappropriate. Indeed, the focus upon protecting Russia's national interests reflects our desire to be pragmatic rather than assertive. As for the widely commented approach to the issue of nuclear weapons, let me underline the following. Very balanced and thoroughly weighted words in the above mentioned documents only point to the eventual use of nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort, and this does not differ at all from the approach of the western countries possessing nuclear weapons.

When mentioning the crucial role of the political stabilization in Russia for its foreign policy, I do not underestimate the factor of Chechnya. The situation in this area is by no means satisfactory, and we are facing there formidable challenges to cure heavy wounds of two recent wars and to build a viable political order that would be both inscribed in Russia's legal space and supported by local population. This is a task for years to come, and Moscow's ability to fulfill this task will be crucial criteria of the effectiveness and maturity of Russia's political regime.

Also, we do understand that the international dimension of this problem is to be treated very carefully. In particular, we have to pay very serious attention to our relations with Moslem countries, in order to minimize eventual negative repercussions generated by the developments in Chechnya. Essential here is the understanding that we should draw a very clear line-between our resolute actions against terrorism and extremist manifestations of fundamentalism, on the one hand, and respectful attitude to Moslems in Russia and to countries with Moslem population, on the other hand. Indeed, these countries represent a very significant (and at the same time a very complex) part of the multipolar world, and Russia's focus upon them is both natural and necessary.

This brings me to the central theme of my presentation, which is dealing with Russia's perceptions of, and Russia's policy towards its southern vicinity in general, and Turkey in particular.

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Turkey and Russia in Post-Soviet Space

Turkey and Russia should enjoy relations of equal partnership between two centers of multi-polar world. Both play the leading role in Black Sea-Caspian region. Both are interested in stability and security of the region, in settlement of highly explosive conflicts there, in preventing the development of extremist fundamentalism in the region.

Russia and Turkey have already developed significant economic, political and cultural ties, while prospects of their mutually beneficial expansion are really great. This could be a solid basis for mutual confidence and further development of cooperation that may evolve into a strategic partnership between two countries.

I believe it appropriate to say a few words about the proposal made by President of Turkey Suleiman Demirel to conclude the Caucasus Stability Pact - a multilateral forum for achieving stability and security in the region in the atmosphere of constructive and stable cooperation. Moving towards this goal is extremely important, and the concrete ideas promoting the development in this direction has -to be -thoroughly studied -also in the context of the already existing mechanisms for cooperation in the area. Vladimir Putin, in his letter to Mr. Demirel, has expressed his position in the following words: "I am convinced that cooperation between Russia and Turkey is the most important factor of promoting harmony between states of the region and achieving real peace and consent".

Also, we do acknowledge the importance of Turkey as a strategic factor in the region. This was significantly promoted by the international developments during the last decade. In particular, after the `Desert Storm' operation, Turkey has become the largest military force in the immediate vicinity of European Russia.

It is true that there are various interpretations and assessments of Turkey's international role among different political forces of Russia. Some are concerned with what the perceived as Turkey's assertiveness and develop alarmist warnings. Others point to the Turkic-Moslem connections of many ethnic groups inhabiting both Russia and other post-Soviet states. Turkey's experience in adopting the western liberal values, norms and patterns to specific conditions of the country is also matter of considerable interest-both with respect to various areas, like management, banking activity, market regulation, and as an overall model of organizing the society.

[This was described by the then President of Turkey Mr. Ozal in the following way: "Main hopes of Central Asian states of the former USSR are connected with opportunity to follow Turkey's example regarding state system. Naturally, the Turkish model cannot be used by all the nations. It will be necessary to introduce there a number of changes... Nevertheless, we can also render assistance in establishing a Turkish style state management system ".]

In any case, our government needs objective analysis of Turkey's new role and has to work out, together with Turkey, an appropriate strategic partnership policy.

New opportunities for developing Turkish-Russian relations emerged after signing of Istanbul Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Bosphorus Statement on June 25, 1992. This allowed to create a framework of cooperation between eleven Black Sea states. . It is important to remember that 6 out of 11 participating countries are former USSR

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republics; in other words, this structure ~ promotes the development of the post-Soviet space, both economically and in terms of international politics.

By signing this important document, Russia and Turkey, along with other participating states, shared the common vision on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation as an integral part of the European architecture based on human rights and fundamental freedoms, prosperity through economic freedom, social justice and equal security. This structure is open for interaction with other countries, regional initiatives and international organizations and financial institutions.

Since than, Russia and Turkey have both actively contributed to the development of the Black Sea economic cooperation. Our two countries have played a crucial role in creating its institutional infrastructure: the Permanent International Secretariat, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Business Council, and so on. 14 working groups have been established and are efficiently working, dealing with trade and economic development, energy, environmental protection, banking activity and finances, communication, healthcare and pharmaceutical issues, agriculture, etc. In fact, the main cooperation activities are carried out through these working groups, and considerable role in promoting their functions and developing coordination belongs to Russia and Turkey.

In October 1996, the summit of the Baltic Sea Economic Cooperation in Moscow adopted a declaration in which the participant expressed their determination promote the development of the region on the basis of the principles of free international cooperation and partnership, democracy and market economy. In November 1999, the summit in Istanbul pointed out that the cooperation between the member states had considerably contributed to strengthening peace and stability in the region and would be an effective mechanism of confidence building, consolidating the basis of new European architecture. Meanwhile, the Charter of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation signed in 1998 formed the legal basis for turning this structure into a full- scale regional economic organization.

I would like to mention that from November 1, 2000 Russia would hold the chairmanship of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and from May l, 2001 the same functions will be performed by Turkey. There are all the grounds to believe that in the course of this calendar year further intensification of Black Sea Economic Cooperation will take place, with Russia and Turkey playing a crucial role in these developments.

Russia's relations with Turkey are important in the context our concerns and interests in the Caspian-Black Sea area, first of all in the Transcaucasian region as well as in Central Asia. Russia wants to have stable security environment and solid borders here. Russia's internal stability will considerably depend upon this. Apart from that, millions of ethnic Russians still live in new independent states. Also, Transcaucasus and Central Asia have always been a large market for Russian industrial products whereas many industrial enterprises of former Soviet republics are oriented towards close ties with their Russian partners. Traditional cultural links between Russia and these states should not be underestimated neither. Both the czarist Russia and the communist Soviet Union caused numerous problems there, which it is impossible to resolve without Russia's participation.

A number of geopolitical factors make these countries interested in strengthening ties with Russia. Most of them do not have access to open sea, which deprives them of cheap transportation ways for exporting and importing goods. External frontiers of these nations

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bear potential threat for their secure existence. Russia can play a role in addressing these problems, which are of key importance for the new independent states.

I would like to stress that we are not talking about Russia's claim to take the USSR's role in the modern world. But Russia's constructive participation in promoting stability in the post-Soviet space is essential. Cooperative interaction with Turkey in dealing with these important problems is in the interest of our both countries, as well as in the interest of international peace and stability.

Russian-Turkish Trade and Economic Cooperation

Russian-Turkish relations are characterized by dynamic cooperation. These two nations maintain intensive political dialogue. In November 1999 there was official visit of Turkish Prime-Minister Mr. Ecevit to Russia. In February 2000 Ankara was visited by Deputy Chairman of Russian Government Mr. Klebanov. Russian-Turkish- consultations are held systematically between foreign ministries of the two states, there are also contacts between various ministries and departments. There are about 60 bilateral contractual-legal acts currently in force between Russia and Turkey. Among them there is a treaty on bases of relations, agreement on trade, scientific and technical, cultural cooperation, on deliveries of Russian natural gas via Black Sea area, on cooperation in energy sphere, in auto-railroad and air communication, memorandum on cooperation in struggle with terrorism, etc.

Economic relations with Turkey are important for Russia also because Turkey joins the EEC as a Southern bridge, connecting Europe with the Orient, it opens new horizons of economic cooperation for Russia. Russia is ready to begin preferential, beneficial for both sides’ economic ties.

In December 1999 Russia ratified Agreements on Avoidance of Double Taxation and on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (They were signed on December 15, 1997). We believe our trade and economic relations will very much change for the better in result of entering these agreements into force.

The volume of Russian-Turkish trade in 1999 amounted to approximately US$ 2.5 billion. Compared to 1998 it has considerably decreased, which was caused to a large extent by the financial crisis in Russia. The basis of our export to Turkey is formed by gas, other raw materials, non-ferrous metals, machines and different types of equipment, whereas our import consists of consumer goods, food and medicines. Certain positive trade balance in favor of Russia is still exceeded by misbalance not in Russia's favor in the sphere of shuttle trade, auto-transportation and tourism.

Russia plays an important role in provision of Turkey with energy resources. We believe, that for both Russia and Turkey of great importance is the grandeur "Blue Stream" project. Its construction has already begun from both sides. Russia ratified the agreement on tax benefits within the framework of this project, and hopes, that the given agreement will also be ratified by Majlis. Russia is ready even before the introduction of the "Blue Stream" to increase deliveries of gas to Turkey along the Western gas pipeline (approximately for 4 bln. cubic meters). Russia also expressed readiness to participate in construction of electric power stations in the Western part of Turkey, which could have been provided with ~as from Western gas pipeline. Russian joint-stock company "United Energy Systems" is also ready to

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deliver electric energy to Turkish Eastern regions via Georgia. All the above proposals are technically and economically grounded, and that's why, from our point of view, are attractive for Turkey and its business.

Turkey carries out a large-scale volume of construction work (more than 7 billion dollars). More than 40 thousand Turkish workers work in Russia. Russian participation in realization of separate projects in Turkey is still a small scale one (it does not exceed ~00 million dollars). According to estimations of Russian specialists, construction workers from Russia could have largely participated in road and bridge construction in Turkey.

Marketing of consumer goods from Turkey was seriously damaged by sharp, more than double according to estimations, reduction of shuttle trade, caused by four time devaluation of ruble in Russia during the financial crisis. Both parties ought to find stimulating means for expansion of consumer goods marketing by Turkish commercial companies.

At the same time, in a number of questions of economic relations between Turkey and Russia different approaches revealed themselves.

The most serious contradictions are connected with Caspian oil transportation problems. Naturally, countries that transit oil are interested in getting profit, while profit depends upon choice of oil transit ways.

These contradictions on Caspian oil transportation came to choice of one of the competing routes: "Northern" one - Baku-Novorossüsk - along Russian territory, and ``Southern" one - Baku-Jeikhan - along the territory of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.

The main drawback of "Northern" route was believed to be it’s passing along the territory of the Chechen Republic, which questioned its security. However, at present the roundabout overpass around Chechnya has practically begun functioning.

Another drawback of this route seemed to be the necessity to transport oil by tankers via Bosporus and Dardanelles. As is known, the Turkish counterpart is against transportation of large oil quantity via these straits due to ecological security reasons. Russia has repeatedly expressed understanding of this Turkey's worry, though our country believes it technically possible to increase transit capacity of the straits. Nevertheless, this problem can be settled after construction of oil pipeline Burgas- Alexandropulis that would have allowed to direct the oil stream roundabout the straits and to remove ecological apprehensions.

As for Baku-Jeikhan project, the problems of which are so widely covered by Turkish and American press, Russia at present does not back, but at the same time also does not object to carrying out of this project. Russia's position is based on two arguments. Firstly, it seems, that this project is not sufficiently remunerative, because the prospected oil resources are insufficient for commercial exploitation. Secondly, there are still serious differences among the participating countries. At the same time Russia, as is known, is not against participation of Russian oil companies in the above project.

Many questions arise in the press regarding Russia's position on construction of gas pipeline from Turkmenia. Yes, Russia is against this construction. However, it's not because Russia intends to monopolize the Turkish gas market. Even if the "Blue Stream" is constructed, Russia's share will hardly exceed 30% of gas deliveries. We are against this

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construction- first of all, because no legal status of the Caspian Sea has yet been determined, secondly, because this project, which is the opinion of not only Russian experts, is dangerous from ecological point of view. Besides, a new Jas deposit has been prospected in Azerbaijan, and the latter will undoubtedly become gas exporter, which changes the situation in the region.

In connection with the question I dwelled on above, I would like to point out, that the talks regarding Russia's alleged intentions to re-export Turkmenian gas, do not correspond to the facts. Only Siberian Jas will flow into the "Blue Stream". Russia does not intend to monopolize the sales market of Turkmenian gas. Russia will obtain only 25 billion cubes. In Turkmenia Russia will probably increase its purchases in future up to 50 billion cubes. Meanwhile Russia is ready to render Turkmenia assistance in construction of pipeline in other directions.

A few words about tender on sale of helicopters to Turkey. Of course, it's a pity, that we've lost it to the Americans. I presume, that not only commercial interests played their role here. K-52 helicopter (modernized "Black Shark") produced by joint Russian-Israel enterprise, has high technical battle specifications, and we are sure, that we shall be able to sell it to other countries.

Relations established between Russia and Turkey in recent years is an important achievement of our governments and peoples. Allow me to complete my report in the spirit of foreign ministers' declaration: "Acting further in the spirit of high mutual respect, constructive nature, urge for mutual understanding and cooperation, expressing our adherence to ideals of freedom, democracy, sovereignty of the people, free market economy, protection and respect of human rights, and also proceeding from necessity to strengthen warm, friendly relations between our countries and peoples, we must urge for and look further for spheres of mutual settlement of problems the region and the humanity on the whole are facing.

For the given purposes Russia and Turkey could have continued to exert every effort to settle controversial issues between our countries through negotiations, to continue to expand working and business relations among citizens of our nations; by joint efforts to confront all the forms of extremism, extreme nationalism and international terrorism, to maximum expand information exchange, to contribute in every possible way to development of cultural ties between the peoples of our two countries, and finally to initiate settlement of ethnic-confessional conflicts and arguments in zones of mutual interests, to act as mediators in their resolution.

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Commonwealth Of Independent States Versus Turkey

Avhan Kamel*

At the outset, I would like to briefly touch upon the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the developments since its creation, and then to elaborate on the relations between the members of this grouping and Turkey as well as their future prospect.

The CIS was established on 8 December 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Initially it consisted of only three members, namely, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine and Belarus. Two weeks later, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and five central Asian Republics joined the CIS. Georgia became the last member of the group in 1993. Three Baltic States opted to stay out.

In taking this initiative, Moscow's intention was obviously to safeguard the former union in one way or another, be it in a loose structure. Indeed, the disruption of relations could have given a big blow on the economic and commercial interests of both sides. Moreover, Russia had minorities in significant numbers in all the former autonomous republics, the highest being in Kazakhstan. The exodus of the minorities from these republics due to the break-up had to be curtailed if not stopped since their return to Russia could have created enormous difficulties. Finally, the protection of the new borders of the Russian Federation, i.e. the creation of the military headquarters and of customs alongside these borders could have presented insurmountable problems. Last but not least, due to the Russian pride, it was not easy for the leadership to absorb the shock of the sudden demise of the former Empire, diminishing Russia from a super power status to a secondary position and thus affecting its strategic interests all over the world.

However, soon after the creation of the CIS, fundamental disagreements came to surface between Moscow and the other members on its goals and purposes. As I stated above, Russia's objective was to bring back the newly independent states into the fall of the Union, albeit with somewhat loose links. For this purpose, hundreds of agreements were made and mechanisms were established in economic, political and military spheres, such as Economic Union, Customs Union, Collective Security Treaty, etc. However, several members either refrained from joining some of these agreements or simply did not implement them. These members, while willing to maintain their bilateral economic and commercial ties with Moscow, had however some misgivings about Moscow's ultimate intentions. They were jealous of their newly gained independence. Thus, within the CIS, different gears were in use for the implementation of the agreements.

By the time, these misgivings were reinforced by their perception of Moscow's role in internal problems in some member countries as well as in regional disputes between certain CIS members. They saw Moscow as being part of these problems rather than part of their solution. With its "near-abroad policy" which was made public in 1993, the Russian leadership considered the southern belt of the CIS, in particular the Central Asia and the Caucasus, as its own backyard. Moscow declaring these areas as number one priority of its foreign policy, asserted to play the role of arbiter, a sort of big brother, in the resolution of the disputes in these regions. * Ambassador

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Thus, the moves by Moscow to tighten its grip over these areas were met with resistance and reaction. In order to create a counterweight against these moves, almost all the members, perhaps with the exception of Belarus, started to open to the world outside the CIS, especially to the West. While becoming the members of the OSCE, they entered into relationship with NATO and signed the agreements "Peace for Partnership". Moreover, the Ukraine, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia (besides Russia) became the members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). By the same token, the countries in Central Asia and Azerbaijan joined the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). They also strove to develop their bilateral ties with the developed countries and invited their companies to participate in the exploitation and marketing of their natural resources, especially gas and oil. Thus, they took some distance in strengthening their political and economic independence.

Here, I should perhaps add that the new leadership in Russia is reported to have taken a conciliatory attitude vis-â-vis the other members at the CIS Summit held in Moscow in January last in order to strengthen its ties with them. However, it remains to be seen whether Moscow has been able to dispel the misgivings of many members while giving at the same time greater weight to its assertive policies, as evidenced in the brutal methods used in the Chechen War and recently announced military doctrine etc. A new Summit is expected to take place in April soon after the presidential elections in the Russian Federation, which will take place tomorrow.

Now, I would like to turn to the relations between the CIS countries and Turkey. I shall approach the subject by taking up the Russian Federation as single and the rest in two categories since there is not sufficient time to consider them individually. First I shall address the countries in the Caucasus and the Central Asia.

Soon after the creation of the CIS, internal strives of ethnic and religious nature emerged in some member countries. In Tajikistan, fundamentalist activities posed a threat to the regime. In Georgia, ethnic problems were fomented in Abhazia and South Osetia. Then again, armed clashes took place between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. For Turkey, all these events taking place at its doorstep and neighborhood were a matter of deep concern. Turkey had a legitimate interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in these regions and took initiatives to contribute to their solution. Ankara, by virtue of being the member of the Minsk Group established by the OSCE, became especially active in the context of efforts for the resolution of the Karabagh conflict.

Meanwhile, having gained their independence, the countries in the Caucasus and the Central Asia turned to Turkey to find their ways and to seek help and assistance in transition to democracy and market economy. They took Turkey as a sort of model. Close historical, cultural and ethnic ties between Turkey and most of them created the strong basis and suitable political environment for the rapid development of relations. Even Georgia, a country though not sharing the same ethnicity, felt itself in the same category due to the shared interests and the same political affinities and perceptions.

As a result, economic, commercial and cultural cooperation between these countries and Turkey fast developed. The trade between them since 1992 totaled up to USD 5.6 billion, the 1998 figure reaching nearly USD 1 billion. Turkish contractors undertook contracts of about USD 3.4 billion and Turkish direct investments in these regions, both public and private, amounted to USD 4.9 billion. Turkey also offered education to more than 10.000 students from these countries.

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In this context, Armenia set an exception. As is known, there were historical inhibitions from the Armenian side in her relations with Turkey. Soon after Armenia gained independence, Turkey recognized her in December 1991 together with the other CIS members. In its years of economic crisis, Turkey offered 100.000 tons of wheat as a grant. An agreement, which was designed to supply energy from Turkey, was also signed. At a time when Turkey was considering establishing full diplomatic relations, the Karabagh conflict erupted. The continued occupation by Armenia of the Azeri territories prevented further developments in the Turkish-Armenian relations. Yet, even after, the two sides took some modest steps during the presidency of Ter-Petrossian, Armenia gradually burying past historical prejudices and Turkey allowing air traffic for Armenia through its airspace. I should however add that these developments came to a standstill during the presidency of R. Kocharian. Turkey is fully ready to initiate cooperation with this country in all fields as soon as the Karabagh conflict is resolved with the ending of the occupation in return for granting highest degree of autonomy to NK.

Now before passing to the Russian Federation, just a few words on the Ukraine and Moldova, the two CIS members situated at the western end of the southern belt. Turkey has strong-shared interests and identical political perceptions with these two countries for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Black Sea region. Moreover, with the Ukraine, Turkey developed large-scale economic and commercial cooperation. The yearly total trade now amounts to USD 1.3 billion. Turkish contractors undertook contracts of about USD half a billion. Turkey also has some direct investments in this country. As a last remark on these two countries, it might be worth to mention that the gas pipeline, which transits their territories bringing the Russian gas to Turkey, is another linkage. The capacity of this pipeline is now being increased from 6 to 14 billion m3.

Under this chapter, I would also like to add that Turkey, while developing its relations with all these countries in the southern belt of CIS, also encouraged them to get in close contact with the democratic institutions of the West such as OSCE, NATO, the Council of Europe, and to develop as well their bilateral relations with the western countries in their efforts to strengthen their democracy and market economy.

Now coming to the Russian Federation, I would first like to say one word on the recent past of our relations, leaving the Ottoman-Tzarist period aside. As you all know, the relations between the Bolshevik Russia and the new Turkish Republic started well. However, during the cold war years as from the Second World War, Turkey faced a direct threat in the north and a proxy threat in the south, both coming from Moscow. As a result, the relations between the two countries were deteriorated. With the relaxation of tensions in east-west relations as from 70's, these relations were gradually warmed up. Important political documents signed during this period. The Soviet Union also contributed to the development of major projects in Turkey. Moreover, Moscow started to export natural gas to Turkey under the 1984 agreement.

When the Russian Federation emerged as an independent entity in the international arena, Turkey recognized the Federation together with the other members of the CIS. The relations between Moscow and Ankara gained a new momentum. During the visit of the then Prime Minister Demirel in March 1992, the two countries signed the Basic Treaty elevating their relationship to a higher level. This document, while containing certain elements from those signed in 1972 and 1978, also included important new provisions. Indeed, the document qualified each party as "the friend" of the other. Moreover, the Treaty provided that the parties hold consultations at times of crises and that if one of them is attacked, the other party would

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make efforts in the UN and other international instances to stop the aggression. During this period, several high level visits took place from both sides, the last ones being the visit of the former Prime Minister Chernomirdin to Turkey in December 1997 and that of Prime Minister Ecevit to Moscow in November last year.

The economic and commercial relations also developed fast over the recent years. The bilateral trade reached in 1997 about USD 10 billion, including unofficial trade, which is somewhat decreased during the last one year or two. The Turkish contractors undertook contracts in Russia, totaling up to USD 10 billion. Turkish Industrialists started to open up to Russia, engaging in direct investments. An agreement was signed to increase the purchase of natural gas by Turkey through the Balkan pipeline from 6 to 14 billion m3. Besides, the Blue Stream Agreement was also signed recently. It will bring the Russian gas through a pipeline down the Black Sea to the Turkish shores. This will add up another 16 billion m3 to the gas purchases of Turkey from Russia. As another important step, the long-drawn-out ratification procedures of - the Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation was recently completed in the Russian Duma. This will make it possible for the Turkish and Russian firms to engage in business in the other party with more competitive prices.

In its turn, Russia is interested in taking part in some major projects in Turkey such as power plants, railroad electrification, joint production of military equipment and hardware, etc. As will be judged from the above, the new era in Turkish-Russian relations offered enormous opportunities to both sides for mutual benefit.

However, the changing circumstances in the Russian Federation, and in its relations with the former autonomous republics, that is the newly independent states, sewed the seeds of some problems and misgivings between Ankara and Moscow, creating new challenges for both sides. In fact, Moscow ill-perceived Turkey's legitimate interests in the region, the rapprochement between Ankara and the newly independent states and its efforts to contribute to the restoration of peace and stability especially in the Caucasus. Moscow took these developments as undermining its foreign policy objectives towards the CIS countries in its "backyard", which was defined in its vocabulary as the "near-abroad", as I have already mentioned above. The Russian leadership felt that its strategic interests in the Caucasus and the Central Asia were being jeopardized. Moscow's sensitivity was especially visible over the question of transport to world markets of the natural gas and oil of the countries in the region. Indeed, amongst them, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are known to have large deposits of gas and oil. Moscow claims to keep the tap of the flow of oil and gas under its own control, whereas these countries want to bypass the Russian territory in reaching the world markets as they are aiming to reduce their dependence on Moscow and thus to strengthen their economic independence.

Turkey, with a view to meet the wishes of these countries and to reduce as well the heavy tanker traffic through the Bosphorus which posed a very serious threat to the 10 million population of Istanbul, came up with two proposals, the first being the Baku- Ceyhan pipeline for the shipment of the Azeri and Kazak oil and the second, a pipeline project for the shipment of Turkmen gas, both planned to cross the Turkish territory. For the transport of Azeri oil, Moscow persistently advocated the usage of the existing pipeline to Novorosisk with its possible expansion at a later stage. Moreover, Moscow made several diplomatic representations to Ankara over the 1994 Decree, promulgated to regulate the safe passage of heavy tankers through the Bosphorous. Hence, the Decree created a row between the two countries as Moscow misconstrued it as a deliberate move designed to undermine the Novorossisk option and to promote instead the chances of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.

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In any case, the Heads of States of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey agreed to implement this project. The main issues were already settled in the recently held intergovernmental negotiations, also with the involvement of the western oil companies represented in the AIOC. The remaining few points are expected to be resolved soon.

For the very same reasons, Moscow has also serious reserves over the pipeline project for the shipment of Turkmen gas. Probably to reduce the chances of this project, Moscow recently increased its efforts to convince Turkmenistan to sell its gas to Russia instead of shipping it through the Turkish territory. Indeed, on the occasion of the last CIS Summit, Moscow has been able to sign an agreement with Turkmenistan to purchase 20-billion m3 gas for one year. Moscow's main objective is to conclude a long-term agreement.

As stated above, these major initiatives by Turkey are not welcomed in Moscow, although Turkey does not have any intention to undermine the legitimate Russian interests in these regions nor has the capacity to do so. Turkey has given assurances to Moscow at highest levels on several occasions in this respect. Ankara proposed Moscow a tripartite partnership to work together with the countries in the region by bringing the resources, expertise and knowledge together. Turkey also expressed its readiness to seriously collaborate with Russia to contribute to the solution of the inter- ethnic problems in these areas since the establishment of an environment of peace and political stability is a pre-requisite for achieving cooperation. The recent Turkish proposal for the conclusion of a "Stability Pact" amongst the countries in the Caucasus like the one proposed for the Balkans deserves serious consideration. Russia already indicated its keen interest in this initiative.

In Turkish-Russian relations, there are also some other sour points, especially over the on-going war in Chechenistan and the PKK activities in Russia. One cannot - deny that Chechen war cast some shadow over these relations. In the past, Moscow included Turkey amongst countries providing aid to the Chechen fighters and thus incriminated her, although the Turkish Government made it clear on several occasions that a peaceful solution should be found to this problem within the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Moscow's displeasure seems to be rather related to the aid, which must perhaps have been made by some private channels, for which the Turkish Government could not be held responsible. In return, Turkey was deeply concerned with the brutal actions taken by the Russian army in Chechenistan not only against the fighters but also civilians, in flagrant violation of international norms of human rights.

Moscow's attempts to play the PKK card against Turkey by mistakenly setting a parallel line between the Chechen war and the PKK terrorism also poisoned the atmosphere of the bilateral relations. Ankara made it clear that tolerance to the PKK's activities in the Russian Federation was inadmissible and that it was incompatible with the commitments undertaken by Moscow under the international instruments as well as the documents signed between the two countries to cooperate in combating terrorism. In the recent visit of Prime Minister Ecevit, the Russian leadership is reported to have given firm assurances to Turkey in this respect.

Before coming to final remarks, I would also like to say a few words on the Straits. Throughout the history, be it during the Tzarist or Communist or today's Russia, in the Moscow's eyes, the geography lying to the South of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, has always acquired vital importance. In the colonial time of 18. and 19. Centuries, the keen interest of Russia in this region was attributed to its intention to come down to "warm waters". This Russian ambition could have been explained at the time with imperialistic designs.

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As from the 20th century, especially today, the things have changed a lot. However, what remains unchanged is the Russia's continued need for an outlet in this region to reach the world markets for its exports and imports in view of the limited use of its northern and far-eastern ports due to the climatic and geographic conditions. And ~ this will never change. Hence, the Straits offer to Russia an extremely important outlet. In fact, today, about 60 % of the Russian foreign trade goes and comes through this seaway. The Russian dependence on the Straits is expected to grow even more in the future in commensurate with the increase of its foreign trade. For this reason, Moscow takes the position to strongly advocate an absolute free passage through the Straits and displays extreme sensitivity on this matter.

Now, turning to the other side of the coin, which has become a matter of profound concern for Turkey, the capacity of the Straits to serve as the seaway has in fact been forced to a great degree in recent years, especially in the transit of the non- solid goods, I mean oil. Heavy tanker traffic has increased to a tremendous extent, threatening the safety of millions of people living on the two sides of the Bosphorous and the environment in this region. As I stated above, for this very reason, the Turkish Government felt obliged to issue the Decree of 1994 to regulate the safe navigation through the Straits.

Taken into account that the dependence of Russia and other coastal states on the Straits will continue to grow in the coming decades, the navigation through the Straits is expected to become unmanageable, say within 50 years from now. In view of this, to plan the future as from today, Russia and Turkey should start thinking of some new land and sea routes which may offer alternatives to the Straits for the transport of solid and non-solid goods, and should work together to develop mega projects to this end.

One may conclude from the above, both Russia and Turkey will gain much from the good neighborliness, as there exists much wider scope for cooperation between them and for collaboration in Caucasus and Central Asia. For this to happen, Ankara and Moscow should strive to:

- better understand their respective positions and legitimate concern,

- see each other as partners but not rivals,

- reconcile their interests on the basis of equity in case they are of conflicting nature.

- approach the issues and problems with an open mind and do their best to resolve them,

- learn how to live together with these problems if they cannot be resolved in the short run,

For achieving these aims, the two countries need to maintain the atmosphere of peace in their relations, and refrain from unilateral actions, which may lead to an escalation of tension and increase of mutual distrust between them. To this end, it is of vital importance for Ankara and Moscow to remain in continuous dialogue by keeping the communication channels always open at all levels. The reciprocal visits from both sides will certainly be very beneficial in this respect.

I would like to wind up my words by saying that notwithstanding the existing problems and disputes, the strengthening of the Eurasian concept in its cultural, economic and

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commercial dimensions amongst the countries in these regions deserves serious consideration. Each and everyone stands to gain from multi-faceted cooperation in the Eurasian geography as the countries located in this region are endowed with rich natural resources, technology and skilled manpower. Such a scheme will certainly improve the position of these countries vis-â-vis other economic blocks in Latin America, Europe and Southeast Asia. Turkey with its prospective membership in the European Union can act as a vital link between the two groups of countries.

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Perspectives For Stability In The Balkans: An Overview

Ali Hikmet Alp*

Introduction

Events of the past decade placed again the Balkans1 under European and World focus. Thanks also to extensive media coverage, the plight of peoples at the heart of Europe could not fail to provoke strong emotions in public opinions and to move the hesitant Governments and international organizations to act more forcefully. Failures of Europe (and of the UN) in managing the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the latest Balkan Wars further exposed the weaknesses of the "International Community" in dealing with the crises of the post-cold war era. However, they also helped, in a regrettable way, a better understanding of the Balkan problems and opened perspectives for long-term solutions.

1. Balkans: A region "hostage of its own history"

It is often said that the Balkan region is "a hostage of its own history". There is a tendency in Europe to explain the root-causes of the Balkan turmoil simplistically by "ancestral " or "ethnic hatred".2 They may be true, but only partly true. Whether it is liked or not, the Balkans are part of Europe and its history cannot be detached from the European history. Discrimination based on religious bigotry, populist nationalism, and its by-product, exploitation of ethnic-cultural differences for political purposes are not peculiar to Balkans.

The perspective of this paper is not historical. However, a brief reminder as a background will help to highlight the two seemingly contradictory trends in today's Balkans: Conflict and Cooperation.

The last two Centuries witnessed the collapse of the three Empires in the Region, namely the Ottoman, Austrian and Russian Empires. All three had their own systems to accommodate multi-ethnic populations, but also self-assigned (sometimes "civilizing") missions, as "protectors" of different peoples, religions, or confessions. Independence movements, helped from abroad, accelerated the inevitable collapse of the Empires and prepared the ground for the emergence of new States. In the Balkans, coincidence of demographics and territory is rare. What made it even more complicated is that their borders were often drawn by major powers whose main concerns were elsewhere. Ambition to build nation states provided fertile ground for excesses in a region where various ethnic communities lived together under a single political authority, at least without major conflicts. All independence movements were heavily influenced by nationalist ideologies, prone to political exploitation and intolerant towards ethnic and religious groups. In their extremist form, which was not rare, they could not fail to prompt discrimination, territorial claims and conflicts, resulting in the now familiar scenes of ethnic cleansing and waves of refugees. At * Ambassador 1 The familiar word of "Balkans" is used in this paper as a drafting convenience, instead of " South Eastern Europe". The Author does not believe anyhow that the choice of terminology would affect the substance. 2 For a detailed analysis, one may refer to the excellent Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, The Unfinished Peace.

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the political level, ambitions (rather frequent) to create "grand" or "greater' states on "historical bases" meant an open invitation to distrust, conflict, and war. There have always been states for or against status quo. Cooperation and alliances among them (usually prompted by territorial issues or by concerns of the protection of their gains) could not be enduring. But neither were the "Great Powers" of the day innocent: If the liquidation of the Empires and the emergence of new states were historical imperatives, the way the great powers contributed to the process was far from being altruistic. Reliance for support on outside help for independence and later, for state building and protection gave strong leverages to Great Powers pursuing conflicting strategies. The "evil forces" came both from within and from without, with the result that the region, a chessboard of the great powers, gained a reputation as the "powder keg of Europe".

2. The communist system

The communist system, which restricted the exercise of fundamental freedoms (including of course the religion which is an important mark of ethnicity in the region), ironically aimed at accommodating and eventually wiping the ethnic question off the agenda. In practice, discrimination was widespread and recognition of the ethnic identity (sometimes with status of "nation" or "nationality") remained on paper. Socialist regimes could only "freeze" and suppress, but not solve such traditional internal tensions, discrimination being in the very nature of the system, if not of the official ideology. As a rigidly organized bloc, they created even more articulate divisions in a region they had deliberately isolated from the rest of Europe. One neighboring socialist regime went as far as implementing their leader's vision of "homogenous people".

Yugoslavia created a more liberal, sui generis system, but it was not an entirely different example. The Serb supremacy was resented. Kosovo, as the poorest region of the Federation without the status of "Republic", received the "lion's share" of the development assistance funds. However, the other units of the Federation were not enthusiastic for involvement in the simmering Kosovo problem, complicated by several factors such as the vicinity of the "motherland", underdevelopment, and pervasive ethnic bias. Even in the best periods of the Federation Albanians justifiably felt they had been discriminated against. The situation of the Albanian minorities in the area will necessitate special attention.

The Balkans of today makes a great effort to be included in the mainstream of the European integration and perceptions are changing. Nevertheless, as it was in the Balkans of yesterday, the prejudiced "image of the other" continues to be a problem, aggravated by the events of the last ten years. Its solution will take time and sustained, systematic effort. Without it, internal and regional stabilities can hardly be consolidated.

3. Signals of change and conflict

Late 1980's generated new hopes. Dissolution of the Socialist Bloc created a unique opportunity for change. It is true that in some parts of the Balkans nationalism is still strong and is still being exploited for political purposes or used to fill the ideological gap of the early nineties. (Even older democracies are not immune against the flare of nationalistic emotions). The legacy of the last ten years is heavy: War, conflicts and the present situation in Bosnia

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and Kosovo, the huge number of refugees and displaced persons of all origins still unable to return to their homes, the trauma of dissolution and the NATO action against Serbia, difficulties of transition and poor economic performance, deep social injustices, etc. are serious risks which threaten the fragile stability. They all witness the fragility of the apparent calm. Despite the progress in pluralistic democracy, there still is resistance by majorities and sometimes also by minorities to consensual cooperation.

However, in this not so optimistic picture, it is also fair to recognize the unfortunate, simultaneous occurrence of exceptionally adverse circumstances. To expect for a peaceful dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation would have been over- optimistic. But the effects of the process (which still continues), including the effects of the sanctions imposed on the FRY, made even more difficult the economic and political transition in the region.

In dealing with the crisis of the dissolution, the Failures and the wrong steps of the UN and Europe too should be recognized. Weaknesses displayed in imposing the policy of "safe heavens" and the arms embargo on the Bosnian side (unprotected and deprived of the means for self-defense) are two striking examples of failure, which caused the death of thousands of people. Such weaknesses and half- measures implemented without a clear strategy and conviction encouraged the Serb extremists.

4. Positive trends

Fortunately, the situation is not as grim everywhere in the region. There are important positive changes and trends too:

First, the approach of the international community towards the region has changed. Peace, security, social and economic development in the SEE is recognized as important for Europe as a whole. Common policies are (although sometimes belatedly) developed and burdens shared. Numerous tools and institutions are adapted to challenges and circumstances; ad hoc arrangements (sometimes with dubious efficiency) are created and put into use.

Second, almost all the peoples of the SEE aspire for democracy and for prosperity through market oriented economic practices. Despite the pains of the transition, social costs of the loss of employment and scarce democratic experience, authoritarianism is rejected.

Third, their aspiration for integration with Euro-Atlantic community of nations and prospects produces a strong incentive for cooperation. These are not of course aspirations motivated solely by "shared values", but also by expectation of a real, material difference in their lives. For success, main responsibility of the effort is of course theirs, but support and assistance in every way are needed: unfulfilled expectations can always create serious disappointments, even backlashes.

Fourth, conflicts, which in the past would eventually have spread to other parts of the region, have been contained. Despite the existence of serious tension areas, general security situation in the rest of the region has improved. Stationing of peacekeepers, manifestation of the will and of military capability for intervention, assistance from international institutions and cooperation schemes are very important stabilizing factors.

Fifth, countries in the region want to be "generators of security” and they see their security within a regional context. They have active foreign policies and consequently,

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bilateral relations as well as cooperation within the region are developing. This second point, which is encouraged by NATO, the EU and others, deserves a special emphasis. Several of the problems are common or are between them. To develop a culture of good neighborliness and cooperation will have a preventive effect and facilitate the search for solutions. Although the handling of some of the problems of the region is beyond their own capability there are areas where searching for solutions together is possible even necessary. The region cannot go on looking at every instance for outside help and support. There is also an increased awareness that the much-desired Euro-Atlantic integration can hardly materialize without a parallel intra regional integration. However, the emphasis is (for understandable reasons) rather on cooperation between Brussels and the individual regional countries (vertically), unintentionally increasing the traditional tendency for competition among them. In the process, the regional cooperation arrangements are somewhat sidelined or are pursued without much conviction or commitment.

5. Assessment of the challenges

Since late 1980’s OSCE, NATO and others have consistently drawn attention to new risks and instabilities, ethnic strife, internal and local conflicts in the OSCE area.3

Predictions were accurate, but political will (and perceptions of national interest) for timely and decisive intervention, including the use of force was not up to the circumstances. The US (which now professes intervention on moral grounds) did not see a "national interest" in a Balkan intervention. It was reluctant to assume a burden in the areas it had considered mainly as of a European responsibility and its military was adamantly against an intervention. Europe was unable to develop a clear strategy and hesitant for an operation without American engagement (also because of Russian opposition). Neither the UN (which cannot be more than the sum total of the SC members) was unable to cope with the situation. At the end, both Europe and the US had to do what they had refused to do in the very beginning. A timely Euro-Atlantic intervention, mainly through NATO, was certainly the best response.

To sustain the positive trends of today, continuation of the Euro-Atlantic cooperation and of substantial international, in particular European support and encouragement are necessary.

Security challenges are only a part of the picture. There are other problems which all or several of the regional countries have to tackle:

Economic transition is not yet over: Industrial production, services and employment, despite upward trends in some, are below pre-1990 levels. Successes are uneven. Albanian situation, complicated by the Kosovo crisis, is probably the worst. Economic liberalization and investment environments are not yet sufficiently developed, due to instability in the neighborhood and the specific national circumstances.

Reforms are not yet complete or reformed structures do not yet function efficiently. The entrenched State bureaucracy is unable to protect the interests of the citizens and in some cases; it even distorts the reform effort. Considerable progress in the revision of the legislation has been achieved, but effective implementation will take time.

3 Such as the occupation by Armenian of the Azeri territory tensions and conflicts in Moldavia, Crimea, Georgia.

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Good governance in general, organized crime; corruption, border controls and customs are still problem areas.

Democratization and political institution building are well in progress, but are threatened by social injustices and other negative factors.

Despite the enormous investment and efforts Bosnia is still far from being a success story. Peace implementation is obstructed (mainly by the "Republica Srpska" and the extremist Croat factions) and the present relative calm is essentially due to the presence of the SFOR. The very complex situation in Kosovo does not give any hope of an early stabilization. What happened in Bosnia (a de facto division of the country by a regrouping of the three main ethnic communities under a nominal central government) is now happening in Kosovo, now UN protectorate. Montenegro, in search of a democratic solution, distances itself from Serbia. But its gradual drifting away from Serbia can provoke serious internal tension and a more open subversion or the intervention of the Milosevic regime. Such major security threats make even a medium term exit strategy impossible.

Ethnic and minority questions will continue almost for all of them. As in the case of Macedonia, ethnic imbalance and non-cooperation within a democratic process may create very serious problems for internal and possibly for regional stability. Besides the Albanians, other Muslim minorities (Bosnians and Sandjak Muslims) in Serbia had attracted the attention of the OSCE, together with the Hungarian minority in Voyvodina. The principle of "self-determination" is interpreted in a way reminding of XIX Century conceptions. Special status on ethnic basis and recognition of "collective rights" is looked at with suspicion, as a first step for separatism, by a majority of the regional countries.

The development and stabilization of Albania (which was almost completely isolated) requires special treatment. The situation in Albania will inevitably influence Kosovo and vice versa.

The present isolation of FRY is not enough but it cannot be ended without the disappearance of the Milosevic regime. Both Serbia and Croatia have the means to influence the development of the State of Bosnia. The approach of the new Government in Croatia created expectations. They have also to tackle their minority and refugee issues.

The Yugoslav economy was basically structured as a single economic space with the exception of Slovenia and to some extent Croatia. Its disruption created fragmented and rarely viable economic spaces.

Economic costs of the sanctions on the FRY, closure of the transportation on the Danube and the disruption of traditional trade patterns caused considerable loss for all neighboring economies.

Social structures and levels of development of the Balkan countries had considerable differences from the start. Strategies, priorities and resource allocation have therefore to be arranged accordingly.

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6. International approach to Balkan stability, the Balkan region and the international institutions.

The perspectives of the EU (and for Bulgaria and Romania NATO) membership, special association agreements, and the recent Stability Pact initiative are clear signals of a new, comprehensive approach towards the SEE (In this case Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania).

All international institutions are actively engaged.

However, dealing even with conflicts and tensions defies the capability and the mandate of any single organization. The "post conflict reconstruction" requires actions in areas as different as external and internal security, democratization, protection of the rights, law and order, economy, public services, the establishment of inter-communal dialogue, far-reaching reforms, etc.

The comprehensive security concept of the OSCE is theoretically the best approach. However, comprehensive mandates or agendas are the most difficult ones to implement. Although the OSCE is playing a very useful role in all tension areas, its decision-making process, institutional structures and resources are not adapted for full array of conflict management tasks. Its resources are insufficient and perceptions of major contributors about its role are significantly divergent, to say the least. The development of its peacekeeping capabilities is opposed by some major European countries and by the Russian Federation.

United Nations, burdened by so many problems, has a central role for wide participation, legal authority, and legitimacy. However, in many instances its efficiency depends on the dubious efficiency of the Security Council. Regional organizations will therefore have to assume even more responsibility and burden, under general mandates. The leading role of NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo in support of civilian implementation has demonstrated an interesting example of institutional adaptation in action. The ad hoc arrangements in Bosnia (The Peace Implementation Conference - Steering Board -the High Representative) and the SFOR, which in practice is under direct authority of NATO, indicate a lessening of the operational role of the UN. However, this new emphasis on regional security organizations is not without drawbacks. Besides the coordination problems, it creates the fear of being used as a precedent for the interventionism of the regional organizations or groupings with unsound democratic credentials.

There are no alternative to a simultaneous involvement of all the relevant European and International Organizations active in Europe in crisis management and stability building. However, a "leader organization", such as the UN or one under the UN is necessary, at least for legitimacy considerations. That is increasingly being done in Bosnia and Kosovo and it is the approach of the Stability Pact for SEE. In principle, they all are independent and bound by their own Charters (without forgetting that their resources and political directives come from the same Governments). However, operations in the field necessitate more than the unity or complementarily of objectives. Coordination difficulties among multiple organizations (as well as between civilian and military decision-makers) should not be under-estimated. Less institutional competition, better division of labor, adequate coordination mechanisms and more flexibility in daily decision-making process are necessary. In practice, they are being developed on the ground.

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Legitimacy is another important issue, in particular when peace enforcement is in question. After the collapse of the Rambouillet negotiations, the existing UNSC resolutions on Kosovo have been considered as sufficient legal basis for NATO interventions, but this interpretation is still challenged. It is doubtful anyhow that all UNSC members will be able to unite even for the adoption of such non-specific decisions in the future. The theory of "military intervention on humanitarian basis”, despite its moral appeal, politically (and militarily) is a very difficult one to apply evenly and everywhere. Outside of Europe, it raises suspicions of a new interventionism. The OSCE’s peacekeeping authority is included in its main documents, but challenged by several Governments on the grounds (or under the pretext) that the OSCE itself is not a treaty-based organization.

7. Distribution of roles for security and stability

Neither the military nor security organizations alone can establish the Balkan stability. In view of the multiplicity of the tasks, or for the implementation of a "comprehensive approach" they have to operate as one of the actors in a larger strategy, as appropriate with a leading role. NATO is increasingly assuming such a role in military security matters, the EU being increasingly active in the rest.

While preserving its "core" functions, NATO proceeded to a radical process of adaptation. In view of the lack of comparable political, military and decision-making capabilities elsewhere, adaptation was the right thing to do. There is no need to repeat here the still ongoing discussion on the "European security architecture" which is overtaken by the real life. However, it is evident that NATO will be at the basis of any future security system due to its credibility as the Euro-Atlantic organization.

A "multi-level" OSCE as a "superior" framework does not have a chance of realization, nor of success. It cannot be expected that OSCE members, some linked at the same time with divergent strategic environments, can unite effectively in the foreseeable future around common policies and implement them. Russia, while seeking "equal partnership", is against NATO's stabilizing role, which was once considered for the OSCE (and preferred by Russia, for different reasons). Its vacillating strategies do not inspire confidence to several states in the OSCE area. However, if the inhibitions and divergences of its major members are overcome, a less ambitious version of this option might be possible. Its "Forum for Security Cooperation" can be upgraded (or at least used) to make it more relevant to security conches of its smaller members. This would provide for the non-NATO countries a deeper involvement in the security dialogue, in particular for those, which do not want to be drawn in other security arrangements.

Although NATO will continue to be a "pillar" of the European security its limitations too should be admitted. NATO, basically a defense alliance, can prevent and even end a conflict but it cannot manage a crisis alone and reconstruct a civilian society (post-conflict reconstruction or, civilian implementation). Its present command structures are not designed for peacemaking activities and there will be problems in integrating the contingents of the non-member states under a single command (as it has been experienced during the formation of the SFOR and KFOR). But even a more important question is the establishment of the link between the political authorities (the NATO Council the Security Council the European

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Council or the "Contact Group"?) responsible of the overall management on one side and the military command on the other.4

In any case, NATO has to operate together with other organizations. There are also concerns that it is inevitably becoming more a "political" and less a defense organization. Besides the command and management issues, autonomous decision about its "exit strategies" can be problematic.

Another important issue (maybe even a challenge) for NATO is defining the limits of the enlargement process. The "projection of security and stability" towards the East is of course a reasonable proposition. However, whether the enlargement was the best way for doing it is still debated. Increased membership may mean more divergences in perceptions and solidarity, is liable to create "graduated security zones" and raises suspicions. In the first years of the Bosnian conflict and recently during NATO action against Yugoslavia, it became evident that public opinions of the member countries might be divided on Balkan issues (difficulties which the EU too will have to face). To be "left out" will have repercussions on the very regions targeted by the projection of security, although security needs of the countries further east are not less pressing. Of course, NATO membership, which is at present a national priority for the SEE Countries, means much more than the Art.V guarantees. NATO is developing imaginative arrangements short of membership as valuable contributions to stability. There is no doubt that the extension of NATO is in the interest of the stability in South Eastern Europe With the already active involvement of the EU, NATO and the OSCE, a subsidiary "Balkan Security Framework" is gradually developing. FRY too may be included "when conditions permit".5 The other two important initiatives, NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and NATO-Ukraine Commission, deserve special attention. Both of them are also relevant for security and stability in the Balkans. The former may play a role, which was missing during the later stages of the Kosovo crisis. In the coming months we may have a better idea of the evolutions of these two institutions, as well of the EAPC (depending in particular on the attitude of the new Administration in the RF).

It seems that in the future the "coalitions of the willing" under the Security Council authorization will be more frequent arrangements in managing operations of smaller scale. They may be more flexible and convenient concerning participation and their political acceptability may be higher.

8. The role of the European Union

In the Balkans, the roles of the European Union and NATO are complementary. There is no doubt that the EU plays an essential role for reconstruction in Bosnia (which practically is an EU protectorate) and other places, and this role is not limited to economic aspects only. Even the mere prospect of EU membership is an important incentive. It has concluded Association Agreements with most of the countries in the region and developed substantial programs for preparation to membership. It also started membership negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania, which are well behind the other candidates in terms of economic development. 4 This may be considered as an argument in favor of a "European Force", operating under the SEC mandate 5 Bosnia, Croatia and FRY are parties to arms control Agreement concluded in accordance with the Peace Agreement. However, they and Albania are not parties to CFE Treaty. The Agreement and the Vienna Documents are not at present operative in the case of FRY.

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The latest EU initiative, the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is another example of the extensive EU involvement in the Balkans. The Pact is based on the comprehensive approach of the OSCE (democratization - security - economic development, the latter being only a conceptual element in the OSCE). It's economic dimension, which raised great expectations, is a very important additional advantage in support of the overall implementation. The earnest hope of the Countries in the region is that the Pact will have the substantial financial and other support, including of course the US, NATO, international financial institutions and private sector participation. However, the Pact, which is a flexible cooperation framework nominally under the aegis of the OSCE but essentially managed by EU, will certainly benefit from NATO's contribution in the fields of arms control and confidence building.

With the development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (and of the European Security and Defense Identity), the EU makes clear its intention for closer involvement in conflict management and stabilization. We cannot discuss here the impressive array of issues, which the EU will have to solve in order to establish a balance between its ambitions and capabilities. This includes an effective common foreign policy, improvements in political decision-making procedures, relations with NATO and the US, involvement of non-EU NATO countries6 and the ability to develop the necessary military capabilities. It seems that conflict management (or peacemaking) will be the first stage of the process of the creation of a common defense capability. In this context, the following delicate aspects need to be addressed:

Legitimacy, the role of the UN, the notion of interference and the principle of sovereignty, the areas in which it might intervene (and together with whom), a doctrine on the use of its forces, etc.7 From the perspective of "burden sharing" too, a deeper and better organized EU engagement is in the interest of the stability. However, in view of the tasks which it has already endorsed, and in particular of the Bosnia and Kosovo experiences, its enthusiasm may in the mean time cool down.

9. Regional cooperation initiatives in the Balkans

In the early-nineties, several regional initiatives have been launched:

SECI (The Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative), on economic aspects with US participation. Although it is not backed by substantial fund, it has the merit of generating efforts from within the region, with private sector participation.

The Stability Pact for SEE, a long-term EU initiative, based on the "comprehensive security " concept of the OSCE, raised high expectations.

SEDM (The Southeast Europe Defense Ministers Meeting), with the participation of the two non-regional NATO members (the USA and Italy), eventually to create a "NATO connection".

6 Looking from another perspective, by asking an almost automatic availability of the NATO assets, the EU in fact asks for an automatic political involvement and support of the NATO, while reserving for itself the decision-making. This arrangement will put the other countries in the position of "sub-contractors" of the EU as the crisis manager, a situation that the EU itself rejects. 7 Quoted from European Defence: 2000 and beyond by Nicole Gnesotto, published in Number 28, Jan.00

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SEECP (The Southeast Europe Cooperation Process), as an indigenous initiative to promote cooperation and good neighborly relations between the regional countries, including the FRY. The SEECP is an institutionalized form of the Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Balkan Countries, started in late eighties and has precedents in the Balkan history. With the exception of the Kosovo situation, the Process could not examine important political questions.

The "trilateral" cooperation arrangements among regional countries, formed according to political and other conveniences, should also be added to the list.

There are several reasons for the lack of impressive results. None of the countries has economic scales to play the leading role, although economic concerns have at present a priority and eyes are turned to Brussels. Greek-Turkish differences too have a divisive effect, although both countries take care for excluding bilateral disputes from this Forum. The return of the FRY and, once formally achieved, its relations with Albania will be problematic. However, the rather modest scale of concrete results should not cast doubt on the usefulness of these initiatives, which, a few years ago, were unimaginable. The SEECP will have an increasing political function in parallel to the improvement of the Turkish-Greek relations (examples of its activity in 1998-1999: consultations on the Kosovo crisis, humanitarian assistance initiative, developing common positions on the Stability Pact, adoption of the Charter on Good Neighborly Relations, etc). Who could have foreseen ten years ago an agreement to establish a "Multinational Force" in SEE?

Conclusions

The Balkan region, despite the present positive trends will continue to be for quite some time a region of tensions. Conflicts have been contained but stability is still fragile.

Situation in the FRY is problematic. Dissolution of the former Yugoslavia prepared a fertile ground for dormant aggressive nationalist currents. The FRY became hostage of the very currents encouraged by its regime. It was unable to make the transition to democracy, which the other countries in the region were able to do.

The International Community was late in developing a strategy and in using force. Neither the European nor the UN responses were sufficient to stop the war, which has further worsened the already complex situation. However, as the Kosovo example has demonstrated, the determination and scale of the international involvement is growing. Regarding the security of the Balkan region, dealing with the crisis and post-crisis situations has naturally a priority. For the consolidation of the stability and the prevention of the conflicts, NATO and other organizations will presumably stay in the Balkans for quite a long time.

For a durable peace and stability in the Balkans, long-term strategies in the following areas are necessary (and in practice they are being implemented):

Democratization and good-governance: Economic and social development and integration: Integration with Euro-Atlantic security structures.

Obviously, implementation should be tailored according to specific circumstances of the countries, which have considerable differences in their levels of economic and structural development. The principle of "conditionality" too has to be observed.

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Countries themselves make a determined effort to overcome the transition, achieve economic development, democratization and modernization.

The European Union and NATO have decided to extend their enlargement towards the Balkans and in many respects their programs for preparation to membership and the general Balkan stabilization are mutually supportive.

The Union at present is discussing the development of its security and defense identity.

However, the so-called "Petersberg tasks" constitute a sufficient base for the implantation of the tasks and responsibilities, which it has already endorsed in the Balkans.

It remains to be seen how the latest institutional development will solve the other problems, including those regarding its relations with NATO, the operational mechanisms and the military capabilities.

The regional cooperation initiatives deserve a special attention and support: They cannot solve the serious problems of tension and conflict in the region, but they can play a preventive role or/and provide the regional contribution necessary for the mid and long term stability.

There is at present a general trend for normalization and development of bilateral relations. This is an indispensable basis for a durable regional stability.

Maybe the toughest problem in the near future will be resource constraints.

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The Balkans: Out Of The Past

Cornel Codita*

The twentieth century must have come into being under the sign of Mars. Two "world wars" set Europe, America, Asia and Africa twice on fire. They resulted in hundreds of million people dead, many other hundreds of million wounded and mutilated and the terrible experience of the Holocaust. "Cold War" has pushed nuclear destruction power to the limits of absurdity as the extinction of mankind and life itself is only a button pressing away. It produced millions of casualties itself as it fueled hundreds of local conflicts and "minor wars". We have seen the world plunging into the most severe, mutilating and degrading totalitarian experiences that ideology has ever inspired, namely Bolshevik communism and Nazism. Despite the fact that beyond the Iron Curtain an open society developed, even there, distortions and traumas brought forth by the totalitarian thinking and practices could not be avoided.

In the twentieth century Europe continued to be the center of a civilization aiming at universality. It has exported its political, economic, military and scientific problems and solutions at the level of the international system that was shaped to its own image: center - periphery dichotomy, hierarchically structured, promoting confrontational behavior and based on the monopoly over the tools of power. The international actors' security and survival is not so much provided by cooperation but by prevalence over the others. Force is the handiest instrument that provides access to power, resources and prestige.

A black century, characterized by the unleashing of a structured "rational" and methodical violence, an orgy of destruction that started in Sarajevo only to close the circle now in Pristine - the Balkans again. In geographical, geopolitical and even cultural terms, the Balkans thus seems to be at the origin of misfortunes marking this twentieth century. It is no wonder then that, under such circumstances, those who hope to break this cycle of misfortunes once and for all cannot focus on "history continuation". They are rather obsessed with escaping from the past, trying to break away with history, or hoping to abolish history altogether as it is bringing up memories that makes us always return to an unfortunate identity.

But, before thinking of solutions though, one must take a closer look at what may be called the Balkan Syndrome and some of the hypotheses that might help us understand it.

Balkans: The clash of civilization

To account for the status of this region in Europe, for its history and especially for its future, the starting point put forward by Huntington's theory is the simple remark that the Balkans is a space of "clash of civilizations". Among the nine civilizations identified by the proposed pattern, the Balkans appears to be a confrontation space for three of them: the

* Ambassador, Romania

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Western, the Orthodox and the Islamic civilization. Huntington8 considers the Western civilization to be the rightful heir of the classical values that gave birth to Europe: Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, the Latin language, Christianity. Western Christianity is identified with the Catholicism - Protestantism binomial, by the multitude of languages originating in Latin or strongly influenced by it, by the separation between spiritual and temporal authority, by the supremacy of law, social pluralism and the existence of a representative group of people, able to express their interests at the political level, by the individual as a landmark of freedom and foundation of the social construct. All these features have shaped the West into the core of a huge modernization project, having sustained Europe since the dawn of the Renaissance until the present day. This project has been drawing its strength from the development of economic, military and political power. Promoting this project actually meant the expansion of the West. An expansion colliding with two other tectonic plaques of the world of civilizations. One of them is the orthodox world, defined by two strong criteria: religion and language. This time, the language is Slavonic, while Orthodox Christianity is considered almost exclusively under the features separating it from the Catholic-Protestant tradition. Even if influenced to some extent by the Western civilization, Orthodoxy as a system of civilization is not grounded in the individual and in individualism, but in the community; it has never totally split temporal from religious power, even if, pro forma, in its 19th century modernization, it was compelled to accept this division; social differentiation is incomplete, often "unnatural", while the supremacy of impersonal law - a child of institutional formalism - could never be ensured, confronted with the existence of "the law of land", of a wide variety of traditions still alive, undermining the western pattern, when its implementation was attempted.

The world of Islam is radically different from the other two civilization spaces, which have been competing to occupy the Balkans. It is pure blasphemy to separate the temporal power from the religious one; the patterns of social organization have nothing in common with western individualism and its institutions - from marriage, to the expression of freedom. The Gods, the Prophets and the Law are more than different, they are in total opposition; this opposition, history has acknowledged by the blood abundantly shed in numerous battles between the armies of the Moslem and Christian worlds, predominantly taking place in the Balkans.

Huntington's outlook leaves no room for too much hope. The three civilizations will continue to exist, while the Balkans will still be - like they are now - the ill fated, restless, unhappy ground where these civilizations will collide. Huntington is not the only one to rely on the concept of civilization in his attempt to account for the world of the past and of the present. There exists another voice, closer to the Balkans' realities, that is to nuances: Neagu Djuvara.9 He believes that humankind has known ten civilizations, among which the Egyptian, the Babylonian, the Cretan, the Hellenistic, the Byzantine, and the Pre-Columbian ones have already disappeared from the contemporary stage. The world today is dominated by the Western, Indian, Islamic and Chinese civilizations.

The Balkans, like other regions in the world, are an area of contact for civilizations; this time, the Western one and the one of Islam. The Byzantine heritage, says Djuvara, was taken over mainly by Russia, but in the crucial moment when Russia itself took over the

8 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order?, Antet Publishing House, p. 101 - 104 9 Neagu Djuvara, Civilizations and historical patterns, Humanitas Publishing House, 1999

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western pattern of modernization; the Byzantine heritage was swallowed by the western system.

What happens when civilizations meet? Following a sociologic and anthropologic approach, Djuvara's pattern places the processes taking place at this level under the sign of "acculturation". Envisaged as a confrontation between cultures, between their specific patterns and values, acculturation can bring about the following reactions:

- either one group accepts the foreign culture, or, in this respect, we can speak about a cultural melting into a receiving space;

- or, on the contrary, there appears a violent reaction of defense against alien influences, which in most cases generates much concern to preserve the local color and traditions;

- or, the solution of syncretism and, ultimately, cultural mixture.

Considering the analytical perspective adopted by Djuvara, the Balkans are the place where two civilizations overlap, while one of them (the Western one) predominantly influences the other (the Arab / Islamic one). The result is affected not so much by the contact processes - they can only bring about local effects, weak transfers of values and customs or weak cultural mixtures). It is the very dynamics of the dominant civilization (in our case the Western one), which determines, in this situation, the data on the evolution of the area. According to his analysis, Djuvara believes that the Western civilization has reached its maturity stage, namely that stage in which its essential concern is the achievement of unity. What should follow now is an age of peace and calm, enabling this civilization to fully exercise its creative capacity, in spirit more than in tools, as it has done so far.

However, reasons to worry do not lack. The hypertrophy of the attention given to "tools", industrialization and even the post-industrial society corrosively attacks not just the freedom of the individual, but also his very social, cultural and spiritual identity. The very foundation of Western civilization undergoes a process of serious erosion, whose name is alienation. Before taking a comfortable seat in an epoch of "academism", the Western civilization finds itself again in motion towards a new cultural change.

The alternative gives birth to radically different solutions:

- "either these signs announcing a new period of middle Ages will disappear for the moment, and we will live one or two centuries of neoclassicism, which could not possibly be more than a pale reflection of the genuine classic epoch of the West;

- or, in case the signs remain, the new Middle Ages period is on its way, while the potential imperial period or era of unity of our civilization will last for a very short time".10

On the long term, the Western civilization seems liable to repeat the Byzantine pattern, namely the one of slow, but certain erosion, consumed throughout long periods of flourishing. The Balkans will follow one of the two possible evolutions; what will choose between them, is more likely to be the inexorable logic of the way in which the Western

10 Neagu Djuvara, Civilizations and historical Patterns, Humanitas Publishing House, 1999, p. 466

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civilization consumes its creative energy and its destiny, rather than the local and historical features of the region.

The Balkans as the backyard of Europe

Another attempt to understand the specific characteristics of the processes in the Balkans and, starting from here, to offer a perspective for the region to exit the ill-fated historical cycle, relies on the following remark: in each situation where large empires or civilization spaces stretched their wings over this area, with no exception, the Balkans were placed "in the outskirts": the outskirts of the Byzantine empire, the outskirts of the West, the outskirts of the Ottoman empire and of the Islamic world and, eventually, the outskirts of the zone of influence Russia held in Europe.

This approach suggests, firstly, that the Balkans draw their specific features from an infelicitous mixture of political, social, economic and even cultural experiences, never taken to an end, neither with a view to developing the local characteristics, nor with a view to borrowing foreign patterns, willingly or imposed. An area frozen not within a project, but at the crossroads of several projects, never finalized. The forced borrowing of institutions which, unable to find natural support either in the local mentalities or in the aspirations, generate the eternal problem of the "form without a background", the ridiculous imitation of the political and cultural behavior of an ever alien world, a never autonomous economic system, always dependent on the foreign source of capital, westernization remains always on the surface, and there is nothing more acid than Caragiale's discourse, in the Romanian culture, to tell the history of this failure.

Starting from the periphery of the Ottoman empire, via the Phanariot reigns, at the periphery of the West, via an imposed modernization, destructive for the local characteristics, incapable at the same time to bring about the domestic accumulation of resources necessary for development. Recurrent in the Romanian political literature, starting with Titu Maiorescu and Eminescu up to modern sociologic analyses,11 the social, political and cultural history of Romania is "inferred', step by step, from this infelicitous change of status, a change which could be emblematic for the entire Balcanic space.

The general schema to explain this perpetual historical unfulfilment was outlined by Eminescu in his political writings.12 The natural state of social structure and development of the "historical people", which had unfolded until the beginning of the 18th century, relying on the ethnic and cultural homogeneity, on the Orthodox faith and church, was seriously upset by the "clash" with the liberal western society, with its ideas and institutions. This "clash" took the form of "invasions". Populations having a different ethnic origin, carriers of different identity values became, even for a short time, the political and economic elite of the country; or, in time, they created for themselves privileged access to power. These groups were carriers of values in total opposition with the values making up the cultural foundation of traditional society, thus seriously and irreversibly damaging it. "The natural evolution" of society was stopped, and forever modified. This process bringing to power "alien" groups and institutions had a direct consequence: the phenomenon of "negative selection", bringing to the foreground 11 Ilie Badescu, European synchronism and Romanian critical culture, The Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, 1984 12 See the summary by N. Henegariu and C. Tomescu in the preface to the volume: Mihai Eminescu, The Pathology of Our Society, political articles, Vremea Publishing House, 1998

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of public life the non-values and the non-value carriers. Obviously, nothing could come from these, which would have restored the cycle of "natural development". Moreover, liberal political organizations, such as political parties, instead of serving as vehicles of the political structuring, like in the west, have become, in this "rotten environment", "exploitation companies". The state and the state positions become means of material support and enrichment for those privileged with power. The consequence of this special type of social degradation is manifest in the appearance of a state of "semi- wildness". This state carries twofold negativity: the nation or the person that has reached it enjoys neither the advantages of wildness, that is the social advantages of natural development, nor the advantages of "civilization". Consequently, Eminescu notices that, under such circumstances, the classical values of liberal culture and civilization: freedom - equality - democracy is not endorsed by the reality of an altered society. Actually this society generates a different kind of absolutism: "the absolutism based on a parliamentary lie means having an exploitation company to rule the country, a company which; hypocritically guarding the exterior forms of parliamentarism, is despotic to the benefit not of the state and of the population, but of a handful of greedy, morally rotten people.13

For the Balkans, even breaking away with communism, more than anything else is threatened by failure. An accurate analysis of the "phantasms of salvation",14 as mythological structures able to render an occult perspective on the critical debate and on the radical separation from the past, brings to light the fact that "fragile democratic structures, with little experience on the procedures, contracts and achievement of consensus, are extremely vulnerable to anti-liberal attacks. The appearance of the new mythologies of collective identities represents a major trend, likely to lead to the mobilization of the masses in favor of nationalist dictatorships. In the Balkans and in the former USSR, more than in Central Europe, the failure and the consolidation of democracy are equally possible.15 Confronted with a dramatic moral crisis, the post-communist society in this part of Europe we call the Balkans seems less likely to tackle this matter by means of a critical breakaway with the past. The "idols" lying in wait for political thinking and action here are "populist nationalism", a new version of the mythology of the "historical people" and of "natural development" (so obvious in the rebirth of Serbian nationalism) and "collectivist millenarianism", of Marxist inspiration, bringing along an important influence to the political milieus of the societies in the Balkans, strongly marked by an anti-Occidentalism they no longer try to hide. "Hateful chauvinism is a degenerated reaction to the human need for national identity and sovereignty, a need totally trampled on by communism. Envious populism is a degenerated reaction to the human desire for rightful social order. The two demons creep into the gap, which the communist ideology has emptied. Like cancer attacking a weak body, they attack the fragile organism of the European pluralist democracy and our market-oriented economy."16 Coming from Adam Michnik, this diagnosis, rather than some critical remark, seems to be a sentence read before the convict, the world forever unfulfilled of Europe, the Balkans.

13 See the summary by N. Henegariu and C. Tomescu in the preface to the volume: Mihai Eminescu, The Pathology of Our Society, political articles, Vremea Publishing House, 1998, p. 16 14 Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Phantasms of Salvation. Democracy, nationalism and myth in post-communist Europe, Polirom Publishing House, 1999 15 Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Phantasms of Salvation. Democracy, nationalism and myth in post-communist Europe, Polirom Publishing House, 1999, p.192 16 Adam Michnik, After the Revolution, New Republic, 1990, and Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Phantasms of Salvation. Democracy, nationalism and myth in post-communist Europe, Polirom Publishing House, 1999, p.196

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The Balkans and the diseases of European civilization

Maybe the Balkans is not really the worst place in the world. Maybe what happens in this human, social and political space is the natural outcome, or sometimes just the illustration of some problems of man as a generic being or of the European in particular, in his historical evolution. Maybe what we can see here and refuse to see that it is happening in numerous other parts of Europe and of the world is only a part of the heritage which History carries along, a part we are ashamed to admit belongs to us. Certainly war was not "invented" in the Balkans, or in the modern age. Violent clashes between human groups with different identities, ending in the destruction of one of them or in its being displaced from a given geographic area are not a monopoly of the Balkans or of recent history. The process of "ethnic cleansing" was turned into a state policy and carried out by the "industrial" means of the concentration camps, gas chambers and mass executions not by some people in the Balkans, but in the very core heart of Europe, by one of the peoples which most contributed to the creation of this civilization space, the Germans. The history - almost impossible to render - of the colonization of America or of Africa is the history of huge processes of "ethnic cleansing", and no empire can conceal, under the folds of its greatness, the "dirty" episodes resulting in the systematic destruction of the peoples that thought it right to oppose their expansion. The nations and national groups in an acute identity crisis are not to be found only in the Balkans, not even primarily in the Balkans. Also, the use of violence in order to impose to the other the acknowledgement of one's own identity is a process still accompanying, even today, the history of "civilized" Europe: Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Ireland, Great Britain are places where phenomena such as these have belonged to the daily equation of politics for tens or even hundreds of years.

In his reflections on the greatness and the decadence of Europe,17 Paul Valery does not hesitate to diagnose what he considers to be the evil digging at the root of Europe's edifice. The extraordinary chance of this cultural and civilization space has been, and still is the capacity of its spirit to wonder and to create. Europe is the happy space which has "combined the passion to understand with the afferent will, has invented a precise and active curiosity, and, by the fierce search for the results which can be compared and added to one another, has created a capital of very strong laws and procedures".18 However, according to Valery's outlook, Europe has lamentably failed the Politics exam. As a domain of human activity, Politics was only left with "the most neglected, easy to neglect and ugly outcomes: instincts, idols, memories, regrets, evil desires (...), everything that science and arts refused, or could not stand;19 as for the people in the politics of Europe, recruited through a weird negative selection process, they nourished themselves only with the past and only built in the past, incapable to develop visions beyond "arguments taking place in the street, in the parish or in a district shop, the jealousies and envies of neighbors"; in brief, far below the means offered by the spirituality of Europe for the achievement of a civilization project. "The pathetic Europeans enjoyed more playing the Armagnacs and the Burgunds, rather than assume, for the entire earth, the role the Romans were able to play in their times. Their number, their possibilities were nothing compared to ours, but they could find in the entrails of their poultry more just, consistent ideas than all our political sciences could possibly contain.20

From this perspective, the Balkans, a "creation" of modern politics, could not hope to have a better fate than the rest of Europe. Moreover, lacking the economic conditions which 17 Paul Valery, The Crisis of the Spirit and Other Essays, Polirom Publishing House, 1996 18 Paul Valery, The Crisis of the Spirit and Other Essays, Polirom Publishing House, 1996, p.6 19 Paul Valery, The Crisis of the Spirit and Other Essays, Polirom Publishing House, 1996, p.6 20 Paul Valery, The Crisis of the Spirit and Other Essays, Polirom Publishing House, 1996, p.6

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made possible the upsurge of the west and kept alive the illusion of progress, the area remains a disinherited one; not because of local reasons, but merely because it has to pay, just like the rest of Europe, the overloaded bill of a policy of bankruptcy, which did not at least give it a chance to welfare.

The idea of a long-term decadence of Europe, the idea of a lack of perspective, widely spread and influential in politics, which we have explored with Valery, is not the only one of this kind in the space - although reduced - of European critical thinking. Jose Ortega Y Gasset, on the lookout for a satisfactory answer to the problems of Spain, essentially unable to retrieve the energy which had once made it a European leader, inevitably arrives at the theme of regionalism, separatism, nationalism, namely at the movements of ethnic and territorial segregation, today falsely considered to be a problem characteristic of the Balkans! In order to find an answer to the problem, its nature had to be explored. Ortega Y Gasset refuses the easy explanation, according to which " a handful of people, led by economic greed, by personal pride, by more or less private envy, perform this act of national hacking, an act which without them and their whimsical efforts, would not exist".21 While refusing this approach, Ortega Y Gasset also refuses directly the solution relying on repression and violence directed towards the groups or individuals identified as "enemies of the people". A solution such as this can do nothing but unleash a cycle of endless repression and violence, a fact confirmed by the history of all attempts to brutally suppress this kind of challenge. Such an approach resembles the clumsy attempt to treat the disease by suppressing its effects, as you do not know, or cannot reach the profound cause of the pain. For Ortega Y Gasset, the solution is to recover the energy capable of formulating and achieving "the great projects". The unification of Spain and its golden century "were primarily and before all, the unification of the two great international policies existent at the time in the peninsula: that of Castillia, towards Africa and the center of Europe, and that of Aragon, towards the Mediterranean. The outcome was that, for the first time in history, a Weltpolitik is conceived: Spanish unity was accomplished in order to experiment it.22 The solution Ortega Y Gasset seems convinced to have found to the "cursed" issue of regionalism and centrifugal tendencies is, metaphorically speaking, that of the power to dream about great projects, and, less metaphorically speaking, of setting in motion nations, peoples, with a view to achieving these projects. Their unity will be a consequence of accepting the project and the "contract" on the basis of which the elite and the masses will share the advantages of its accomplishment.

This hypothesis seems to work flawlessly even in the case of tumultuous, post-communist Yugoslavia. Serbia's communist elite refused to see in the centrifugal movements of the national and state communities making up the federation anything but the hand of the "enemies of the people", rushing to tear the components off the body of the country. Unable to deal with its own failure and especially with the failure of the communist project of organizing Yugoslavia, it rushed towards salvation by repression. This repression did nothing but legitimize its keeping the power, in its new quality, that of "savior of the country". Only, what the country needed was not to be saved, but to be built and rebuilt. Deprived of legitimacy and unable to generate large-scale projects to turn Yugoslavia into one of the most successful experiences of post-communist transition, the hard core of the Serbian communists chose the easiest way to perpetrate power - violence.

Thus, the relation elite - masses in the destiny of nations or peoples is brought under debate. Ortega Y Gasset finds refuge in the simple solution of the great cycles, invoking the

21 Jose Ortega Y Gasset, Invertebrate Spain, Humanitas Publishing House, p.40 22 Jose Ortega Y Gasset, Invertebrate Spain, Humanitas Publishing House, p.40

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Indian concepts of the Kitra and Kali periods, namely the periods of construction and deconstruction. In the Kitra periods, strongly hierarchical social organization, in a perfect system of casts, allows the "virile" elite to impose the great "saving" projects. When the social tissue disintegrates, "the national mass degenerates", while "its disease consists in people refusing to let themselves be influenced, in their non- acceptance to humbly obey".23 The elite loses its meaning and vigor, whereas the masses begin affording the illusion that it is possible to live without the elite". The society collapses up to the point where individual safety is seriously jeopardized. It is only then that the society is ready to facilitate a new contact between the masses and the elite, and, in a Hobbes- like perspective, to reinvent the Leviathan.

The search for an initial explanation - if not unique, at least fundamental in relation to the private explanations - for the sources of chaos, social de-structuring and violence - terms appearing co-generic, if not synonymous with the Balkans - brought about one of the most significant results when classic anthropology was "grafted" with some innovating perspectives, coming from unexpected horizons of scientific or philosophic thinking. One of these grafts is ethnology, and we will take a minute to recall the hypothesis of Konrad Lorenz, the founder of the rebellious discipline bordering on both anthropology and a general theory of behavior in the world of the living. Man, says Lorenz, are the heir and carrier of fundamental information, which the entire animal world, in its evolution, has handed down to him. Besides, totally unlike the animal world, man has acquired the extraordinary freedom to invent spontaneous behaviorist answers, in order to stand up to the exceptional situational diversity, which no other living species is confronted with. In this respect, whether he understands it or not, he is subject to forces coming from his innermost depth, stronger than reason. However, if compelled to answer to these impulses, he has the liberty to invent new answers. One of these forces is aggressiveness. Its role in individual survival and in the survival of the species has been long researched on in biology. The desire to satisfy aggressiveness cannot be fully suppressed, and when it is suppressed for a while, sooner or later it bursts out in aberrant behavior. Upsetting the social-biologic relation, Lorenz believes that people are willing to fight and are aggressive not because they are divided in parties hostile to one another, but, on the contrary, the world is thus structured because this structure represents the incentive - situation necessary to satisfy social aggressiveness. Quoting Erich von Holst, he exemplifies his thesis by the ultimate situation: "if, indeed, a saving ideology would encompass the entire earth, one would immediately reach two utterly opposed interpretations (the true one and the heretical one), while enmity and struggle would continue to flourish, because, unfortunately, humankind is the way it is".24 The reply comes from one of Valery's thoughts: "Peace is a virtual, silent, continuous victory of possible forces against probable evil desires". Evil exists within us, it is necessary, unavoidable, but it can be shaped in less destructive patterns of behavior.

When and where did it begin, the modeling of these forces connecting us, in an indestructible way, to the world underneath us, the world of non- human beings, in order to finally separate us from it radically? Can one identify a structure of the modeling process?

One of the most thrilling answers to these questions, we can find in the approach proposing a new perspective on mimesis.25 This approach completes the uni-dimensional 23 Jose Ortega Y Gasset, Invertebrate Spain, Humanitas Publishing House, p.82s 24 Konrad Lorenz, The So-called Evil. About the National History of Aggression, Humanitas Publishing House, 1998, p.279 25 Rene Girard, About Hidden Things, since the Creation of the World, Research made together with Jean- Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort, Nemira Publishing House, 1999

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perspective on imitation, which Plato and after him, the entire school of western thinking considered to be only a class of those behaviors whose essential function is that of representation. Girard simply remarks that there exists at least one more class of mimetic behaviors whose function is appropriation, taking into possession. These types of behavior can be found both in the animal and in the human world, and represent the basic source of conflict in any community. That is why, in both these worlds, mechanisms to inhibit this kind of mimesis were instituted. What separate the two worlds are the nature and the complexity of the control mechanisms, and, eventually, the amazing cultural results of this process. "What enables us to intellectually abstract the act of violence, identifying it with isolated murder, is the efficiency of legal institutions, transcending all antagonists. If this legal transcendence has not appeared yet, if it has lost its efficiency, if it is no longer capable to induce respect, we are at once confronted with the imitative, recurrent nature of violence: this imitative nature is most obvious at the level of explicit violence, when it acquires a formal perfection it did not have before. At the level of blood revenge, we repeatedly deal with the same act: murder, performed in the same way and for the same reasons, as a vengeful imitation of the previous murder. This imitation spreads step by step: it is imposed to distant relatives, not familiar with the original act - supposing such an act can still be traced -, as an obligation: it breaks through the barriers of space and time, destroying everything in its way, it goes on from one generation to another. The chain of revenge appears like an instance of mimesis brought to paroxysm and to perfection. It reduces people to the monotonous reiteration of the same criminal gesture, turning them into understudies.26

According to Girard, in order to block such consequences, the human species has invented a special manner of solving the mimetic conflict, namely the "passage from appropriation mimesis, raising the community members against one another, to the mimesis of the antagonist, resulting in gathering the community members against one victim, thus making peace among them. Beyond a certain threshold of mimetic force, animal societies become impossible. Thus, this threshold corresponds to that of the appearance of the victim's mechanism; it is the threshold of humanization".27 The human community has found a mechanism radically solving the conflicts generated by the appropriation mimesis - the founding murder, the victim expiating for all! However, as the history of human societies was to prove, this mechanism does not just eliminate violence; it only temporarily releases the community of the tension accumulated by the manifestation of the acts of appropriation mimesis. Actually, the cycle of violence goes on, while humankind, at the historical and cultural level, has been unable to escape it so far. That, in spite of the model embodied by Jesus Christ, who, under the appearance of the "expiating victim", in fact conveys to us another message - the cycle of violence cannot be broken by violence. Another way has to be found to solve the tensions raised by mimesis, and this can only happen by a fundamental change at the level of the principle mastering the behavior of man and his relationship to the world: "You have heard that it was said: <You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy. > But I say to you: love your enemy and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven; for He makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust." (Matthew, 5, 43-45).

Where do all these lead, from the perspective of our attempt to decipher the Balkan syndrome? Evoking repetitive violence, the "blood revenge", a custom so alive, so poignant in

26 Rene Girard, About Hidden Things, since the Creation the World, Research made together with Jean- Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort, Nemira Publishing House, 1999, p.20 27 Rene Girard, About Hidden Things, since the Creation of the World, Research made together with Jean- Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort, Nemira Publishing House, 1999, p. 108

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human behavior even today, as a consequence of exerting the mimesis appropriation behavior, speaks about a world of the Balkans where, obviously, the instruments of impersonal justice are still little efficient, and generally unable to ensure their supremacy as compared to the "natural way" of solving community conflicts. Generally, here, it is easy to notice the weakness of all political, legal, even economic institutional superstructures, as compared to the community institutions. For instance, how Albania continued to "function" even after the actual collapse of its state institutions seems a miracle; anyway, it is hard to explain from a western perspective. From the perspective put forward, the explanation appears at hand. Community mechanisms function faultlessly, and they have been too little affected by the rudimentary modernization policies enforced on this region.

Still, the mechanism of the "expiating victim" presents an unexpected application, if we now analyze things from the standpoint of the relations between Europe and the Balkans. Western Europe recurrently blaming the region - in spite of the fact that the political phenomena and crises here are not unlike the crises in other regions, either in terms of complexity or in terms of content, its throwing the blame, for the tensions existing in the community of the European states, including those in the relations of the great powers in different times, on an almost innocent victim, strikingly suggests the mechanism of the expiating victim. It looks as if Europe itself is trying to get rid of the tensions accumulated by the tireless practices of the "appropriation mimesis", which have filled with corpses the fields and the streets of the most glamorous western states, for hundreds of years, thus choosing a victim whose sacrifice could save it from the ghosts of its own past.

Thrown off the Tarpeian rock outside history, the Balkans expiates not only their sins, but also those of Europe. Salvation can only come when Europe has forever broken "the cycle of violence, generated by the ardor with which it multiplies ad infinitum, like in the reflection of parallel mirrors, the basic gesture of stretching its hand and grabbing for itself that which might belong to someone else, or might be shared with someone else, or, even more humanly, could be the Eucharist taken by both!

The Balkans and Europe - the return to the prodigal son

In our attempt to increase the understanding of what we have called the Balkan syndrome, we have so far followed two classical perspectives. The former has encouraged us to look for specific causes and nuances to explain the whole. Opposite to the former, the latter had us study the anchors linking the object of our research to a universal principle. However, it is time we left the trodden path and started looking at things from a less conventional perspective.

One suggestion comes from the present discourse on change, in our case the change at the level of the international system. After fifty years during which the theory of international relations concentrated on structural phenomena and processes, as if dominated, at the level of the unconscious, by the "categorical imperative" of maintaining bipolarism, with the great thaw at the beginning of the last decade of both the century and the millennium, the themes of change have become predominant. From this standpoint, what is happening in the Balkans today, and, generally, to the world today, is mainly the outcome of a radical change in the way, in which the world exists, of the dominant paradigm (dis) organizing the world.

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The most significant change, often grasped by the research on the evolutions in the post-cold war period, is the massive infusion of uncertainty in the development of social processes - economic, political or cultural. "On the eve of our entering the third millennium, everyone can notice that uncertainty has become the only certainty and a sort of worldwide calamity is spreading, in an environment of general discontent and disappointment".28 The story of restructuring the world order began with a strategy whereby two nuclear superpowers, the USA and the USSR, far beyond the rational limit of their arming, decided that that it was desirable, and it was necessary for the relations between them to change, from exclusive opposition to selective cooperation. Competition was not removed, but it was cooperation that had to become predominant. The demonstration was to be made by successively signing some agreements of effective reduction of nuclear arsenals, while in 1990, on the occasion of the Gulf conflict, by support from Moscow for the US strategy, both politically - by approving the resolutions of the Security Council, defining the nature of the problem and the means to solve it - and regarding the military operation itself, "The Storm in the Desert". What seemed to be the happy beginning of a "new marriage" was to end; very soon, in a sudden political death, that of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the political and geo-strategic map of Europe was modified, by the emergence of new actors, groups and balances of local, regional and global forces. What followed was the "velvet separation" of Czechoslovakia, and the violent mangling of the Yugoslav federation in a conflict prolonged throughout the tenth decade of the 20th century.

Another feature tending to characterize the phenomena of change is "globalization". It is equally an outcome, and one of the ferments of change. The financial markets have already become global, real economies are rapidly approaching the moment of total globalization, the main infrastructures, especially those of communication and transport, are already global, closely followed by energetic infrastructures. However, the evils of modern society also tend to become global - drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism. The "globalitary regimes", as Ramonet calls them, impose a kind of logic leaving no room either for resistance or for dissidence, be it conceptual or ideological, least of all in the economical and political order. According to this version, the end of the world is summarized by "the world conquered through the market and doped through the Internet".29 To complete the picture, we still have to add a spectacular and, for many people, frightening invasion of the irrational in social life, and an equally terrible descent of the identity referential down to the level of tribal-like behavior. From this perspective, the political processes taking place in the Balkans are not at all different from those taking place in any other place on the globe. If there are particulars, they are irrelevant to the nature and direction of the processes. From this perspective, one might say that History is overflowing into the Balkans, erasing, like sea waves, any significant differences among the millions of particles making up the sea sand. But, what if History is preparing to play a trick on us? What if, once at the climax of time, the curve of historical evolution will turn on itself, causing the events to rush downwards, in the direction opposite to the one they have followed so far? It was Jean Baudrillard who had the courage to ask himself and ask us, these apparently strange questions. In an Euclidean space of history, the shortest road between two spots is the right line, the line of Progress and Democracy. But this is true only in the linear space of the Enlightenment. In our non-Euclidean end of century, an ill-fated curve faultlessly deviates all trajectories. This fact is undoubtedly linked to the sphere-like quality of time (visible from the end-of century horizon, just like the sphere-like quality of the earth is visible at the horizon, at the end of the day), or to the subtle distortion of the gravitational field. This is the end of linearity. From this perspective, the future no longer 28 Ignacio Ramonet, The Geo-politics of Chaos, Doina Publishing House, 1998, p.15 29 Ignacio Ramonet, The Geo politics of Chaos, Doina Publishing House, 1998, p.57

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exists. And if there is no future, there is no end. So, there will not even be an end of history. We are faced with a paradoxical process of reversion, an effect of reversion of modernity, which, reaching its speculative limit and extrapolating all its virtual developments, disintegrates into its simple elements, in a catastrophic process of recurrence and turbulence.30

According to Baudrillard, we are doomed to relive history, from one end to another, to see the same wars carried out between the same fighters. Led by a conscience at the same time guilty and revengeful, we will submit the events to a harsh trial and then we will recreate "a clean history", we will clean all the dirty laundry of history.

However unlikely and unreal such perspectives might appear to be, it is enough to look at the realities of the Balkans in the last ten years to start wondering. The reality of the Yugoslav space is one example. Strangely enough, all these years, in Yugoslavia, the past has been much more spoken about than the future. First it was the heritage of Tito, then, the reference point moved to the level of World War II, then it went down to 1920, only to continue plunging more deeply, down to the Byzantine age. But the syndrome does not appear only in Yugoslavia. The past seems to become more and more the object of concern in the Romanian political milieu; in the Turkish-Greek relations, the past - more or less remote - has become a landmark, not to speak about the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and its relations with its neighbors - mainly Bulgaria and Greece - which are based exclusively on history, not on the present or on the future! A world that finds its reference points by going down ever deeper into history, suggests that Baudrillard's hypothesis might explain at least certain sets of events! The Balkans might be a kind of "black whole" of Europe, a strange fact that would completely swallow up history!

Instead of conclusion: What is Romania doing in the Balkans?

Nothing is more appropriate at the end of the road than a range of questions. The first one the reader will justly ask himself is: But, what is Romania doing in the Balkans? Geographically, we are sure not to belong to the Balkans. Geo-strategically, we border on several strategic regions: the Balkans, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe, without fully belonging to any of them. From the standpoint of historical tradition, Romania has manifested itself in the Balkans, but it has never been fully integrated in its specific problems. In terms of mentality and culture, we are more of a synthesis space, as Iorga believed, where the values of the west and those of the Byzantine east respond to one another in an unexpectedly harmonious way; to prove it, we need no more than the amazing paintings in Voronet, Sucevita or Moldovita.

It might be a historical accident or an inconsistency in recent history. There are signs pinpointing to this direction. The main train breaking loose from the ideological girths of "Eastern Europe", when the Berlin wall collapsed, was formed by the countries of the Visegrad group: Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. There existed a chance, if not an invitation for us to join this train, but it only existed for a short while. This train left without Romania and another one entered the station, very late, we might call it the Orient Express. The efforts of Romanian diplomacy before the NATO summit in Madrid to desperately explain to the western world that, for various reasons, we actually belong to Central Europe were made too late. Almost undoubtedly, the NATO summit in Washington, by means of its

30 Jean Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, Stanford University press, 1994

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most important documents, places Romania in the Balkans. This is, maybe, the most important geo-political mutation to which Romania must come up with adequate, quick and efficient answers.

However, in order to be able to do this, we need a radical change in the theoretical and political argument with which we tackle the new situation, we need to completely escape the past.

With a view to this, what exercise could be better than building the sole fatal strategy, the one Baudrillard seems not to doubt - the theory. "Undoubtedly, the only difference between a common theory and a fatal one is that in the former, the subject always thinks he is shrewder than the object, whereas in the latter, the object is always considered to be shrewder, more cynical, more of a genius than the subject, for whom he ironically lurks around the corner."31

31 Jean Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, Polirom Publishing House, 1996

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The Turkish Minority In Bulgaria

Ömer Lütem*

Turkish minorities exist almost in every Balkan country. They are the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Needless to say that those minorities have been a source of conflict between Turkey and the countries where they live in large numbers such as Greece and Bulgaria.

It is believed that before the Russian Turkish War of 1877 the Moslem population of the Ottoman Provinces which correspond roughly to today’s' Bulgaria constituted nearly half of the total population. Ten years after the war, the first Bulgarian census showed that the Moslem population diminished nearly by half of its original size. During and after the war the Moslem population began to immigrate to the Ottoman lands. One can say that, with the exception of some years, this emigration never stopped and continued up to our day. Persons who are familiar with Turkey know well that practically entire Turkish Thrace and Bursa surroundings are populated with Balkan emigrants, especially those coming from Bulgaria. Despite this fact today Bulgaria is still home to 800.000 to 1 million ethnic Turks.

The Bulgarian Principality, which depended nominally on the Ottoman Empire, allowed her Moslem subjects to be organized as a religious community. Under that regime Moslems, through religious foundations, were able to look after their mosques, to run community schools for their children where they learn Turkish, and apply Moslem law to some cases such as marriage and heritage. One can say that this system, even if much restricted in the course of time, remained in force up the end of the Second World War.

At the beginning of the last century much of Bulgaria was influenced by German chauvinistic thinking. Non Bulgarian Christians, like Greeks, Rumanians, Vlaks and Turkish speaking Gagaouzs were put under pressures to Bulgarise themselves. Eventually, during the years, which followed the exchange of population with Greece in 1920 the Bulgarisation of Christian minorities were completed.

Among the Moslems the Pomaks (Bulgarian speaking Moslems) became the first target after the Balkan Wars. Some Orthodox priests with the complicity of the local authorities begun to convert them by force. These events ended after strong Ottoman protests. Pomaks immigrated en masse to Turkey.

After 1934 it was the Turks’ turn when for ten years Bulgaria was governed by fascist governments. Due to the necessity to manage Turkey no changes were made in the legal status of Turks but no occasion that allowed the closing down of Turkish schools and newspapers were missed. The religious foundations also suffered badly. As a consequence emigration to Turkey increased considerably.

After the War, the Communist regime expropriated the religious foundations and the Turkish schools, but opened them for the education in Turkish. On the other hand, although closely controlled, Turkish newspapers began to be published. Soon however, Turks, who were nearly all farmers, resisted collectivization of their land and the regime began to favor their emigration to Turkey. In the years 1950 and 1951 about 150.000 persons emigrated. * Ambassador

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The improvement of the relations of the two countries took place after the cold war and was highlighted by the concluding of an emigration agreement in 1968 for the close relatives of Turks who already immigrated to Turkey. Under this agreement approximately 120.000 persons emigrated.

It seems that in the early seventies the Bulgarian Communist Party took a secret decision to create a "unified socialist Bulgarian nation". This meant that all the minorities of the country would be Bulgarise, if necessary by force. This decision was put in practice for the Pomaks and for the Gypsies in 1973-74 by forcing them to adopt Bulgarian names. This event, although a clear violation of human rights, drew little attention at that time. Turks continued to bear their ancestral names but lost the right to be educated in their own language in 1974.

Ten years later, in mid-December 1984, after a ferocious campaign, which lasted about three months, all the Turks were obliged to adopt Bulgarian names. Those who resisted were severely beaten. There were reports that several peoples were killed by the militia, some by hanging.

At the same time other measures of Bulgarization began to be implemented. Speaking Turkish, listening to Turkish music, wearing traditional Turkish clothing was forbidden and fined. Bulgarian Radio ended its Turkish programs. The only newspaper previously published in Turkish was now published only in Bulgarian.

Caught by surprise the Turkish Government proposed negotiations for concluding a new emigration agreement. Bulgarians refused arguing that there were no Turks in Bulgaria and that the name changes were voluntary. But how, without a single exception, all the people belonging to a minority of more than a million could voluntarily change their names was not explained. On the other hand the Bulgarian thesis alleging that the Turks in Bulgaria were in fact Bulgarians who were converted to Islam during the Ottoman period was found most unconvincing.

Bulgaria's refusal to negotiate obliged Turkey to restrict bilateral relations severely and to bring the issue to the international organizations where she received much support while Bulgaria was left alone as the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries did not intervene in its favor. However President Zhivkov, who already "burned his ships" on that issue did not change his position.

About four years later, in 1989, in a village in northern Bulgaria, a dispute between some ethnic Turks and Bulgarian policemen ended by some killings. President Zhivkov, alarmed and unable to diagnose the nature of the events, in a television speech on the 29th of May, asked Turkey to open its frontiers. As the Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Özal immediately so did, each day several thousand Turks began to immigrate to Turkey.

This emigration created problems for both sides. For Bulgaria it meant lack of manpower during the harvest and confusion and unrest in the some regions of the country due to departure of the Turks. For the shaky economy of Turkey the settlement of all these people in a short period of time was almost impossible. Eventually Turkey stopped the free emigration on l7th of August, when the number of the emigrants exceeded 300.000.

Some Bulgarian opposition groups taking advantage from the confusion created by the departure of Turks begun to organize demonstrations which were very much increased during

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a CSCE meeting in Sofia. President Zhivkov, unable to control the situation, resigned l0th of November, after 35 years in office. Bulgarian Communist Party, under its new leader Mr. Mladenov, lifted on 28th of December, all the measures taken against the Turks.

In the last ten years Bulgaria was governed alternately by the former communists who rebathise themselves as socialists and by some liberal Parties, which formed a coalition under the name of Union of Democratic Forces. The Movement of Rights and Freedom, a party whose members are mainly Turkish, most of the time formed the balance between these two parties. The attitude of the former communists regarding the Turkish minority continued to be very reserved, while the Union of the Democratic Forces remained respectful for their rights. On that subject one should mention the firm stance of the President Petar Stoyanov who in a speech delivered in the Turkish National Assembly on 29th of July, 1997, qualified the changing of Turkish names as "one of the most shameful pages" of the recent Bulgarian history.

In conclusion we may say that we notice from the Balkans Wars up to our day that Turkish-Bulgarian relations always followed the same scheme. When the Turkish minority in Bulgaria fully enjoys its rights the relation between the two countries are good, as today it is the case. On the contrary when the Turkish minority is discriminated against or subject to forcible assimilation the Turkish Bulgarian relations deteriorate rapidly and a period of crisis begins.

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Turkey And Balkans

H.E. Trajan Petrovski*

Turkey as a Balkan and European state is very important factor in the Balkan policy. Stability, peace and prosperity of the Balkans could not be imagined without the active role and influence of Turkey. The past of the Balkan peoples is deeply connected with the Turkish history. The fact that Ottoman Empire ruled the Balkan territories more than five centuries speaks clear enough about its influence and interconnection.

The historical and cultural heritage of the Balkan people contents the historical; cultural heritage and traditions of the Turks. The presence of numerous Turkish minorities in the Balkan states represents one of the clear motifs for the interests of Turkish policy. The phenomenon of the religious factor (Islam), which in my opinion is of specific importance, intrudes objectively in determination of certain processes of the actual Balkan policy.

Republic of Turkey as a state with long history and great heritage, with the unique geography and geostrategic position, with huge resources and human potentials, has all presumptions to play important role in the future of Balkans. Republic of Turkey has own geostrategical aims and interests in the Balkans. In the last years they were realized in the spirit of the Turkish multidimensional, constructive policy, but I would say not always effectively, as a result of internal and external factors.

I agree with the evaluations of some Turkish politicians that 21st century belongs to the Turkish nation. According statistics, after three decades Turkey will be the biggest nation in the Balkans, with hundred million people, which objectively intrudes as a powerful factor.

Balkan region should remain in the priorities of the Turkish foreign policy. Integration in Europe is not possible without stable and prosperous Balkans, and without active role of Turkey in all spheres of common interest.

One of the specifics of the Turkish state is its secular character. Turkish policy can be acceptable and productive if it developed in the spirit of secular principles. This is very important from the perspectives of the other Balkan nations and politics of the Balkan states, which in spite of declared European principles, remain burdened with the prejudices of the past. Within this contexts significant attention and clarification deserves the so-called policy of "Neo- Ottomanism".

The Balkans as a mixture of different people, nations, national minorities, ethnical groups, different religions, after the dramatic events, which happened with disintegration of Yugoslavia, will remain unstable region for a certain period of time. In spite of the new European and world trends it is difficult to expect to overcome easily historical differences, hatred created after the killings and massacres in Bosnia and Kosovo, nationalistic and separatist tendencies, etc.

* Ambassador (Macedonia)

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It is difficult to believe that the great nations can impose solution without constructive role of all Balkan states. Situation in Kosovo is the most illustrative example.

Changing of the borders and adventure for creation new states on the Balkans leads unconditionally to further polarizations, without chances for peace and prosperity.

Generally speaking Albanian factor is one of the most sensitive for the future of the Balkans. Without political solution of Kosovo problem on the basis of the international principles, it will be difficult to work on the process of stability and lasting peace.

Turkey as a state with a great historical heritage can play remarkable role in the creation of the new Balkan climate, on the bilateral level with every country separately, in the regional initiatives and in the Pact of stability. Much more attention in the future should be devoted to the presence of Turkish economy in the region, and on the realization of so-called long-term projects.

I would like to use this opportunity to underline that Turkey in the last ten years in case of dissolution of Yugoslavia demonstrated constructive and prudent policy, which had positive effect to the solution of crisis. The decision of Turkish government for unconditional recognition of the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign and independent state, together with the other former Yugoslav republics, is of great historical importance. Republic of Macedonia with its crucial strategic position and its firm pro- European orientation plays a role of active factor for the peace and stability of the Balkans. It was clear demonstrated during the Kosovo crisis 1999. The friendly relations between Republic of Macedonia and Republic of Turkey built in the last ten years, based on the international principles, are the good example for all regions.

The Balkans in general is faced with many challenges. Process of transformation and economic revival is extremely important. Modern and secular Turkey has capacities to promote many initiatives, and to contribute greatly for the peace and stability of the Balkan region.

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Croatian Foreign Policy: New Times And New Goals

Prof. Radovan Vukadinovic*

Changes that Croatia is facing in the new millennium can already be defined as tremendously significant. The departure of the authoritarian leader, cessation of “single-party democracy", as well as the strengthening sense of the necessity to adopt the European standards of life and behavior, may he seen as principal landmarks of the new development-which will not be achieved neither easily nor quickly - but which is, nevertheless, the only alternative to national confinement and international isolation. A comprehensive process of changes will inevitably have to encompass political, economic social, cultural and scientific spheres, and will represent the beginning of the true evaluation of the recent Croatian achievements in its transformation from single-party, socialist system into the world of democracy.

Croatian Specifics

Differing from other European socialist slates that have recognized in the Great Spring of 1989 their chance for transition from socialism to democratic European societies by relatively simple replacement of state attributes, Croatia, within its fight for independence, has introduced several specifies which are characterizing it even today:

- Impossibility of a Peaceful secession from federal Yugoslavia, uprisal of Serb population in Croatia and imposed military conflict that followed, represent the first such characteristic that has strongly marked the beginning of Croatian path towards independence. All other events end developments an that path: creation and build-up of is military forces; withdrawal of the JNA (Yugoslav National Army) from Croatia; creation of the so called, Krajina; and finally, the fight for liberation of all Croatian territories and their reintegration under sovereignty of Croatian state, were observed by disoriented and unprepared international community. Unprepared for the break-appart of Yugoslavia, the international community was unable to act in a resolute manner in times of fierce attacks on Vukovar, on Dubrovnik, or in times when some 30% of Croatian territory was occupied by Serb rebels.

- Croatia, which was along with Slovenia by the level of economic development and structure undoubtedly the most advanced of all former socialist countries, was, instead of accessing Europe, thrown into the whirlpool of war which resulted in huge number of victims, huge material destruction and enormous expenditures for creation and strengthening of the military, followed by the process of rebuilding the country and return of refugees after the liberation.

- Spread of the conflict into Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Croatian population felt threatened by the new relations, has also entangled Croatia in the conflict with Muslims, which was actually the third military conflict that Croatian military was forced to fight. In first conflict Croatians were defending their homes against Serb rebels and JNA forces, in second it was liberating Croatian territories, and in third it was engaged in the conflict in * University of Zagreb, Croatia

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Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the HVO (Croatian military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina). And it was this, third war, that has led Croatian policy into a very specific situation, since the international community, which has by the time already accepted Croatia as stabilizing factor in the region, was suddenly faced with the new situation, difficult to understand, and especially difficult to justify. The Washington Agreement on relations between Croatians and Muslims, from 1994, has opened the possibility for new mutual relations, but in spite of all international warnings, Croatian side remained engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely in parts populated by Croats, supporting and assisting all those forces that were openly, or conceivably, advocating for division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and inclusion of Croatian parts into Croatia proper.

- HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) as a structure that was by vast majority winning on all elections, and that held a considerable majority in Croatian Sabor (Parliament), became a principal actor in creation of Croatian state. Besides a relatively short period of coalition government, HDZ was governing Croatia, and has had a final word in all activities of political, economic and social character. By that, the so called, multi-party system was to large extent curtailed, and the level of democracy depended fore mostly on HDZ's willingness to accept, or not accept, particular solution, with major mass-media firmly in its hands.

- Croatian foreign policy was not only exclusively the policy of the leading political party, but was strongly influenced by a single person - the President of the Republic of Croatia. All other factors that are in a normal democracy participating in creation of foreign policy were transformed into a sheer transmission of political solutions created in the President's Cabinet by the leading actor.

- Such specific internal and external developments were preventing Croatia to catch pace with other countries in transition. Even more so, it is possible to argue that only now, after recent changes in the direction of stronger democratization, the doors for Croatian transition have been fully opened. In this way Croatia has lost valuable time in comparison with other former socialist states, and its model of internal transition and its present distance from Europe represent a heavy burden for the new policy. Although it might be said that the transition has not been achieved to full satisfaction in none of the former socialist countries, the results in Croatia are probably among the worst ones. Number of employed cut in half, huge unemployment (over 20%), rise of foreign debt (some 9,3 bill. USD), decrease in production and exports, and distance from sources of investment capital, have all resulted not only in difficult economic situation, but have at the same time created a negative image for any serious foreign investment.

- Relations with the international community were also under influence of a strong nationalistic policy led by the HDZ. Following the criticism of the "Storm" military operation, the international community continued to criticize Croatia for violation of human rights, for its relations to the freedom of media, for insufficient independence of judiciary, for lack of control over the activities of security and intelligence institutions, for "wild” privatization and development of economy, lack of transparency in military structures and for constant support to Croatian factors in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were advocating the creation of a third entity, or secession from the Bosnia and Herzegovina. By all this the Croatian policy, which was the favorite of the West in the early days, and for which the Croatian president was stating that represents the "USA regional strategic partner", became isolated and distanced from the European processes. Along with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, Croatia is

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the most distanced country32 from any European and trans-Atlantic integrations, which is to large extent a result of activities of the formerly ruling political establishment. Self-content with its achievements, the political elite was absorbed in creation of national myth on self-sufficiency and on need for preservation of national and state interests, on avoiding any links with eventual new Balkan associations, as well as on highlighting the dilemmas regarding the need and the costs of closer approach to Europe. The ideology of national self-sufficiency has led Croatia into the isolation, at the same time giving the national policy the opportunity to use the attacks on international community in order to defend and preserve its positions at home and to justify the existing situation.

Croatian Foreign Policy Goals

Croatian foreign policy was developed simultaneously with development of the Croatian state, and its primary goals were supposed to be the following: worldwide promotion of Croatian interests, creation of mutually beneficial links, and overall strengthening of the international positions of Croatian state. During the times of fight for independence, Croatian foreign policy was absorbed with issues relating to its internal and international position. Struggle for the statehood, and later for control over its recognized borders, as well as engagement in war in Bosnia and Herzegovina have all imposed on Croatian foreign policy a set of complex political, security and international relations, which were to be solved with the support, and sometimes with the passivity of the international community.

After that early phase Croatian foreign policy is gaining strength, as Croatia is gaining strength itself, and is playing significant role in disseminating the truth regarding the events in these areas, as well as in building correct relations with the principal international factors (USA and Western Europe). Although constantly subordinated to the principal domestic political actor - the President - Croatian foreign policy was promoting the idea of closer approach to Europe. But, in the light of concrete internal development and non-fulfillment of its international commitments, it was very difficult to achieve this task. In the early phases of creation of Croatian foreign policy this author wrote that Croatian foreign policy must be based on the following internal elements: democratic development, Rule of Law, free market economy;33 which were all preconditions for successful activities of foreign policy on international stage. Unfortunately, these preconditions were not met. Internal development in Croatia was far from democratic, there is still a long road ahead to achieving the principles of Rule of Law, and while the free market economy was realized in far lower level than in some other transitional countries. It may be stated that these basic preconditions for successful foreign policy are remaining as principal issues for the new foreign policy as well.

Presuming that the new government will recognize and understand the significance of these basic values, than some longer range goals of Croatian foreign policy could be stated, and which should be reflected in the following:

- further strengthening of the sovereignty,

- creation of favorable conditions for development of the national identity,

32 A lack of democratic transformation is stated as a first obstacle to cooperation. See: A. Tus, “Sigurnost i obrana" in: EGIDA Hrvatska Agenda 2000. ed. Lj. Cucic, Zagreb 1999. p. 32. 33 R Vukadinovic, "Vanjska politika Republike Hrvatske", Politicka misao vol.30, 1993, no.3. pp. 124-125.

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- achieving the external security and creation of optimal environment for social and economic development through accessing the Euro-Atlantic integrations.

Translated into the language of practical political action this would mean that Croatian foreign policy must create preconditions for preservation of Croatian state and for constant promotion of Croatian interests on international plan. Taking into the consideration Croatian geographic location, the size of the country, tradition of relations, as well as present international constellation, the principal directions of Croatian foreign policy should be:

- the EU countries,

- the USA,

- neighboring countries.

a) For all countries that have started the transition process the EU was, and remains, the main direction of their activities. To enter the EU, in shorter or longer time, is a goal of every foreign policy of these states, and the speed of their accession is used as main element for evaluation of their overall success. Croatia has lost considerable time in this, and the current assessments are offering two possible time frames for Croatian approach to the EU. The optimistic one calculates with the year 2010, and the pessimistic one with the year 2015, as possible times of Croatian accession. In any case, as illustrated by the example of some other transitional countries, this is a lasting process that has its own dynamics, and that is inseparable from political and economic aspects. But it remains the only alternative for successful future development.

At the moment, it is essential for Croatian policy to clearly underline this goal, and to avoid linking it with any other, internal political needs, as it used to be done when HDZ was in power. Croatian foreign policy must initiate and promote some internal solutions that will help overcoming serious European objections regarding Croatian development so far, which were a principal obstacle for any closer Croatian approach to the EU. It will depend mostly on Croatian political will how the following issues will be solved:

- recognition and observance of human rights,

- freedom of media, - return of refugees and other displaced persons,

- development of a civil society,

- independent judiciary, accountability of the executive branch of government, stabilization of economic situation,

- strict observance and implementation of the Dayton Accord,

- cooperation with the ICTY in Hague.34

On these grounds it will be possible to develop a new approach to the EU and to suppress any domestic resistance to the process of internal changes and of "europeisation" of Croatia. Although certain preparations for closer Croatian approach have been initiated, at this moment, when such European orientation needs to be clearly stated, it is necessary to increase

34 EGIDA, A New Croatia: Fast Forward into Europe, ed. by. Lj. Cucic, Zagreb 1999. p. 3. ° Ibid. p. 48.

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all political, economic, cultural, scientific and promotional efforts aimed at bringing Europe closer to Croatia and create the preconditions for a new reception of these issues within Croatia itself. The foreign policy must be a main actor in this, by independently preparing new initiatives and by preparing the internal factors for new relations. Having constantly in mind that this is a lasting process, all domestic actors and institutions should be set in motion immediately and in coordination, and every opportunity for accenting results achieved in approaching Europe should be seized.

Differing from the accession to the EU, which remains as a long-range goal of Croatian foreign policy, integration into the Euro-Atlantic security system should be somewhat easier to achieve. This fore mostly goes for the Partnership for Peace (by which, at the moment, only three European states are not encompassed: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia). System of the Partnership for Peace is designed as a core of a system of overall European security and should enable the cooperation among European states on military plan, for decreasing the threats to peace, and preparation for integration into the unique military and political structure of the NATO. Conditioning the membership with the very same requests and principles as in basic EU, Council of Europe and NATO documents, Partnership for Peace is a strong instrument for coordination of activities of European states, and on political level it can be viewed as an expression of certain legitimacy and acceptation within the framework of new European system of political and security relations.

Along with the existing principles of maintenance of democracy, respect of international law, restrain from use of force, acceptance of existing borders and fulfilling the obligations regarding the disarmament and arms control, there are also additional obligations directed at harmonization and balance of military forces, defense planning and military budgets in accordance with the NATO standards, as well as democratic control of armed forces and security institutions, de-politisation of military and participation in peace keeping missions led by the NATO, UN and OSCE. On top of these basic obligations, Croatia was in 1998 faced with additional demands that correspond with EU requests (return of refugees, support to Dayton Accord, freedom of media, change of electoral laws), by which the possible direction and speed of approach to the Partnership for Peace was clearly marked. Those familiar with Croatian military argued that during the former regime the development of democracy was halted, that there was insufficient control over the security and intelligence structures, strong political influence in the army, disputes with neighboring countries and inactivity regarding the implementation of the Dayton Accord. All this was marked with a strong nationalistic ideology35 that was mostly present within the military and security structures. Entering the new phase of its development, the new Croatian leadership has an opportunity to change these relations by relatively fast changes, to eliminate such objections and to open up the possibility for entering the Partnership for Peace. This would represent a significant first step that would demonstrate acceptance of Croatia as a European state and that belief in its transformation exists. On the other hand, it should be remembered that, due to the character of military and security structures, their incorporation into the Partnership would be important both for EU and especially for NATO. By Croatian incorporation into the Partnership for Peace, possibilities for inclusion of Croatia in European system of relations would be opened, and at the same time the level of stability in the Southeastern Europe would increase.

35 Ibid. p. 48.

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Of course, the NATO membership remains as that highest goal, but, differing from the Partnership for Peace, this is much more difficult to achieve. Apart from Croatian readiness for changes and concrete moves in that direction, it should be kept in mind that in case of accession to NATO there are some wider strategic and political considerations regarding the question on which countries will be encompassed by the second, or third, phase of NATO enlargement, and when will these phases take place. In any case, an accession to Partnership for Peace would even now represent a significant impulse and support to Croatia and for its position in Europe, as well as for significance of Croatian security within the European space. Leaving the NATO membership as a future solution, for which some internal and external pre- conditions should be met, at this moment Croatia should intensively act on opening of possibilities for Partnership for Peace membership, which could be viewed as the first and relatively simplest step in approaching the Europe.

b) While in the theory of international relations it can be argued to what extent is the contemporary world multipolar or left to the unipolar leadership, in these parts of the world ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall it was clearly demonstrated that the American policy is the leading factor of changes.

The American policy was the principal factor in stopping wars and creating peace in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, therefore further development of relations with the leader of the today's multipolar world is of utmost importance for Croatian policy. The American policy has demonstrated its interests in Southeastern Europe, even announcing the existence of vital interest in this area, which enabled its military engagement in the war against Milosevic's Serbia.

On that path some analysts in the US are arguing that there were no special American interests behind this military action, rather that it was undertaken as a response to too dearing challenges from the Serbian side. Therefore, viewed through a wider optics, the geostrategic area of the Southeastern Europe may be linked with the neighboring unstable parts. East Mediterranean, Middle East and the areas of Central Asia, where most certainly some new confrontation of interests of principal international actors is bound to happen (USA, China, Russia, Iran) are all in the vicinity of the Southeastern Europe, where it is apparently the interest of the US to have stable and peaceful relations. Any possible conflicts of the Bosnian type, or spreading of new instabilities over the Kosovo, would certainly not fit into determined American interests. The South East of Europe viewed, as a link to the Western Europe is desired to be a peaceful hinterland at the periphery of the European continent. American activities in Macedonia and Kosovo have clearly confirmed the value of such thinking. On top of that, a desire for suppression of eventual Russian influence shouldn't be ignored either, which can also be achieved by stabilization of situation in this area under a close NATO supervision.

Croatia, as a country forming a link between the European parts and the crisis points (Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), has its specific strategic value. Now that extremely nationalistic regime in Croatia, unpalatable to the West, which was undermining all American efforts on development of unity and cooperation and respect of human and minority rights, is replaced, opportunities for creation of new relations not only within Croatia, but in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well, are emerging. Developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina were to large extent influenced by the external developments (in Croatia and Yugoslavia), and the new Croatian government, already announcing full respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina as sovereign state and transparency of its assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina (parts with

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Croatian majority), as well as decrease of such assistance, will most certainly be welcomed by the USA.

Improvements in Croatian-American relations may result in further development of bilateral connections, where the US could financially, economically and politically support Croatian development, thus clearing the path for faster reception of Croatian state in global relations. Besides that, America may help in overcoming of existing difficulties in relations between Croatia and some international institutions (IMF, WTO), and therefore financially strengthen the position of the new Croatian leadership.

The significance of Croatian changes for the immediate neighborhood should also be kept in mind in such observations, and American policy will certainly try to use them. Peaceful changes in Croatia may represent a clear example to Serbian opposition how through a joint effort it could bring down Milosevic's regime. Therefore the assistance and support of Croatian state and its fast exit from isolation could send a strong message eastward. There is also Bosnia and Herzegovina, where both entities should change their nationalistic matrix, and where Croatian example, if successful, could also have its recognizable value.

Former Croatian policy was the main obstacle to American project of build-up of new multi-ethnic relations, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. New readiness of Croatian policy to cooperate and to approach Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state, where fore mostly its own citizen should be deciding on their life and destiny, is an opportunity that must not be missed.

Within such positive development of new American-Croatian relations the term "strategic partnership" will probably not be used any more, but it would be possible to expect more substantial bilateral relations, which could help Croatia in its approach to Europe, and could speed up its accession to NATO. On the other hand, a stable and democratic Croatia could be another important point of stability in Balkan area, which at the eve of expected changes in Belgrade and Sarajevo could certainly have some impact on direction of changes in overall relations in the Balkans.

c) When speaking of the relations with the neighboring countries it can be said that previous regime has had some problems with most of them. This especially goes for the countries from the area of former Yugoslavia, where the obsession with fear of alleged creation of some new Yugoslavia, as well as some previous problems, made the process of creation of new relations almost impossible. At this phase it will be necessary to invest additional efforts in order to calm down and normalize relations, which would be beneficial for Croatia, as well as for the whole area. Besides, in every option of closer approach to Europe neighboring relations remain as condition sine qua non, and the sooner this is realized and applied, the better for Croatian policy.

Italy is important Croatian economic partner, but also as a EU member a country that has great possibilities in supporting Croatian policy in its efforts to enter the EU. Relatively good existing relations should be further developed, at the same time preventing the issue of Italian minority in Croatia to become an obstacle for such development. And it is exactly on this issue that the new Croatian leadership may demonstrate its European orientation and readiness to adopt the European standards. Adriatic Sea, as significant common Mediterranean topic is also offering excellent economic, transport and touristic opportunities, and Italy could easily become principal Croatian trade partner. Since the area of Southeastern Europe holds an important place in Italian foreign policy, it is apparent that the goals of both

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policies are to large extent complementary, and that both countries could profit from mutual cooperation. This relates both to economic and political spheres, where better bilateral relations could have significant impact in a region closest to Italy. At the same time, this would create preconditions for a stronger Italian support for Croatian approach to Europe.

Slovenia and Croatia have left Yugoslavia simultaneously, but their paths went different ways afterwards. While Slovenia was systematically building its European political, economic and cultural structure and image, Croatia was, due to objective and subjective reasons, buried in its domestic difficulties. Problems that have emerged in their mutual relations (Piran Bay, Ljubljanska Bank's debt to Croatian customers, Krsko nuclear plant), in normal bilateral relations should not represent significant difficulties. But, since we are speaking of two new, young states, that were overly eager to demonstrate their sovereignty, these problems were being intensified rather than solved through increased cooperation. Within a new Croatian approach it can be expected that even these problems will be solved relatively quickly and that those links connecting the two states will emerge on surface. Croatian market is very important for Slovenian economy, and Adriatic coast is traditional and closest destination for Slovenian tourists. For Croatia the Europe begins at the Slovenian border, and the shortest and fastest way to Europe, both in political and economic sense, leads through Slovenia. Both countries share similar views on cooperation in Southeastern Europe, on issues connected with succession of the former state, and Slovenia supports Croatian entrance into the CEFTA. Given the proper political good will on both sides, the development of new relations that would be in the best interest of both countries and that would considerably add to Croatian image can be anticipated.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is especially important for Croatia, and it is here that the new policy will have to demonstrate the highest level of changes. Although he has accepted the Dayton Accord, president Tudjman has never abandoned his idea of creation of larger Croatia, i.e. inclusion of part, or parts, of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Croatia. Supporting and assisting the Herzeg-Bosnia, and later its relicts, Croatian policy was annually spending considerable financial means (estimates range between 500 and 600 mill. DEM), on supporting the forces friendly to Croatian policy. By keeping the option of creation of a third entity constantly open, Tudjman was at the same time giving rise to hopes of Croatian nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and weakening their willingness for cooperation within Bosnia and Herzegovina itself. The new leadership has in its very earliest statements made it clear that it will have a different approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on its recognition as a sovereign state, and that it desires to develop good neighboring relations. If such attitude will be implemented it will obviously very quickly weaken positions of those Croatian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were in favor of secession. Development of normal bilateral relations, with appropriate level of care and support for Croatian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, will create preconditions for normalization of relations, which would certainly be welcomed, and possibly even rewarded, by the international community.

Within such circumstances development of intensive economic and political cooperation may be anticipated, as well as creation of preconditions for achieving stability on long border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within this an issue of return of refugees in the Federation, as well as in the Republika Srpska, will have to be addressed, along with creation of mutual approach to concrete cooperation within the Stability Pact.

Hungary is a neighboring country that Croatia has developed solid relations with, and it could be said, un-burdened with any problems. What can be noticed is a disproportion between the Croatian economic presence on Hungarian market and good bilateral relations.

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Hungary is approaching EU in fast pace; it already became a NATO member, and at the same time is included in the Stability Pact. Starting from these facts, it can be said that it is connected to the Southern part of Europe where it should be demonstrating, on its own example, what are the possibilities and values of cooperation with Europe. Croatia should be ready to utilize the potentials arising from such good relations, as well as from Hungarian readiness to continue them, by further developing relations that are closely linking two countries from the Danube Region. Useful lessons can be learned from studying Hungarian path to Euro-Atlantic integrations, and Hungarian voice in Croatian approach to the CEFTA, and later Europe, may be very important.

Yugoslavia is Croatian neighbor with which there are many complex issues opened. First, it was Belgrade that inspired and supported the Serb rebellion in Croatia. The aggression came from that direction along with all the suffering and destruction, and the mass of Serbian refugees is also a result of Milosevic's policy. This is all very recent history that is difficult to forget, although a realistic approach calls for the normalization of relations. But, at the present situation, with Milosevic's regime still in power, and when it is impossible to even imagine development of some new bilateral relations, it is difficult to expect the normalization of relations and beginning of some new connections. At the same time, this represents the greatest obstacle for functioning of the Stability Pact and creation of new relations in the Balkans.

Yugoslavia, with opened questions of Kosovo; of Montenegro which is, although politically and tribally divided, seeking its chances for independence; of Sandzak which is demanding autonomy; and Vojvodina which is also increasingly considering the same, continues to be the source of all instabilities and major impediment for overcoming hostilities and bad memories.

Although, obviously, not all aspects of relations with this area can be neglected, but given the unsolved internal relations and with Milosevic still representing the supreme political power, it would be difficult to continue with any process of further normalization. Solution to concrete issues like return of Serb refugees, minimal opening of mutually useful transport routes and establishment of initial forms of trade, are remaining as those small steps in the direction of normalization. Everything else can be feasible only in some new phase in which Yugoslavia, or rather Serbia, would have its internal problems solved and would start demonstrating democratic and European orientation. Only then possibilities for a wider cooperation will open, either on bilateral or on regional level.

d) When contemplating Croatian relations with its neighbors, it must be accented that, within the new situation, regional connections in the Southeastern Europe will be given specific significance. On many occasions we have accented that regional cooperation is being placed as one of the principle postulates of overall EU activities, and that it actually represents the functional basis of the philosophy of cooperation. It has even greater importance in this area, since the intention is to achieve security in the Southeastern Europe through functional cooperation.

So far, the international community has created a whole list of regional approaches. European and American initiatives aimed at creation of conditions for calming down of the situation, establishment of useful cooperation and on those grounds creation of stability in the area range from the EU regional approach, through Royamont, SECI, West Balkans model, to Stability Pact. Only after this step would be accomplished, in some further time perspective, could these countries start their closer approach to European Union. Each of these projects

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was seen by the HDZ government in Croatia as danger of creation of some new Yugo-, or Balkan federations/associations. Rejecting such concepts of cooperation, or accepting it only formally, it was constantly been argued that Croatia has nothing to do with the Balkans and that it is only interested for individual accession to European and Atlantic integrations.

However, the Pact on Stability represents a more serious Western approach to the Southeastern Europe and, seemingly, has set forth certain parameters that the Europe wishes to see realized in these areas. These are primarily:

- stabilization of relations, creation of precondition for development of democracy, free market economy, Rule of Law and respect of human rights;

- creation of environment for regional cooperation with maximal utilization of internal potentials and resources, in order to decrease the dependence on foreign resources;

- rewarding those countries that demonstrate readiness for cooperation.36

At this moment the Stability Pact is only catching pace. One of the significant limiting factors is exclusion of Yugoslavia from the process, which practically excludes the central Balkan country from transport, trade, ecological and all other forms of cooperation. Nevertheless, this should not prevent Croatia from supporting the regional cooperation. Since no one from outside is advocating for creation of any new Yugo-association, rather seeks the functional cooperation, Croatia, being one of the most developed countries in the region - whether compared to the five countries of the West Balkans,37 or to other countries of the Southeastern Europe - should be the one initiating concrete moves and projects beneficial both to Croatia and its neighbors. It is obvious that great potentials for cooperation are being opened in these areas and that Croatia has good opportunities for economic cooperation in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe. During the recent years Croatian production and exports have dramatically fallen, and although the Balkans cannot be the final solution for this problem, it can certainly be seen as part of the solution. Croatia has lost plenty of time during past years, its economic position in European relations has dropped even lower, and inexistence of some attractive products, objectively speaking, combined with relatively high wages, can hardly open space for competition with other countries. On top of that, it has to be added that the transition of economy in Croatia is only beginning, while the principles of the Rule of Law still have to be achieved.

Reasonable acceptance of the regional cooperation and projects that are being offered is necessity for Croatian policy, since at the moment of the fall of Milosevic's regime, due to the central position of Serbia, its size and depth of the catastrophe that it was led into, significant resources and projects will simply have to be directed in that direction. Therefore the fast seizing of existing opportunities in this area is of utmost importance, both for the future and for the present state of relations in the region. Prejudices (in Croatia) regarding the cooperation with the, so called, developed countries, or on hostilities brought by recent times should be gradually abandoned, since the designers of the policies should be aware that the objective development in European space will inevitably lead to integration, and that anyhow countries of this region will in ten years, or so, be linked with European forms of cooperation, regardless whether they will be set in some sort of European zone of free trade, or, with any luck, through the membership in the European Union. Of course, regional cooperation should 36 R Vukadinovic, Sigurnost na Jugoistoku Europe, Varzdin 1999. pp.155-57. 37 The link between bilateral assistance and regional cooperation of the countries from “Western Balkans" is stressed in almost every document of EU. See for example: Brussels 8.12. 1999. COM/1999/661 final

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be viewed as a primary and only goal, but as a means for achieving the principal goal - entering Europe. And since now the good preconditions on the internal plan exist, as well as strong external incentives, it is becoming obvious that the regional cooperation, and Croatian readiness to participate in it, will be viewed as one of the first expressions of the graduation of the new foreign policy.

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Cyprus And The European Union: The Relevant Factors

Andrew Mango*

Negotiations are continuing between the European Union and the government of the Republic of Cyprus - a government which is composed exclusively of Greek Cypriots and which rules the southern two-thirds of the island inhabited by Greeks. According to a statement made on 19 March by Gunther Verheugen, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, the negotiations are one third complete. At its meeting in Helsinki on 10-11 December 1999, the Council of Ministers of the European Union declared that "the Union should be in a position to welcome new member states from the end of 2002..." The (Greek-controlled) Republic of Cyprus is one of these states, since the EU promised in 1995 "to incorporate Cyprus in the next stage of its development". In the Helsinki declaration the Council of Ministers underlined that "a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union." But, it added: "If no settlement has been reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors." What are these factors at the present time?

The most important relevant factor is, surely, the de facto situation on the island. Contact between the Greek and Turkish communities was severed in December 1963. As a result, for the past 36 years Greeks and Turks on the island have lived separate lives. They do not learn each other's language in school; they do not fraternize; they do not cooperate either in the public or the private sector. Moreover, since 1974, the communities have regrouped in two ethnically homogeneous areas, where they have ruled themselves in a stable and democratic manner. There are de facto two separate states in Cyprus.

The second relevant factor is that there are no examples of the reconstitution of multiethnic societies, after these have broken up into separate ethnic components. True, the international community is currently trying hard to reconstruct multiethnic societies in Bosnia and Kosovo. But results have been meagre.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European Union has set itself a limited aim: to form a weak central government and allow the federated states a maximum of self-rule. But even within one of these federated states, which, to complicate matters, is itself a federation of Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians, the EU has not been able to reunify the city of Mostar. There is some progress, but it is both limited and slow. It is proving impossible to revive the past pattern of ethnic settlement.

In Kosovo, the situation is worse. Not only have the international authorities on the ground been unable to re-establish former settlement patterns, but the geographical separation of the two main ethnic communities is becoming ever more pronounced.

So much for the two attempts to reverse the flow of history - a flow that in the last two centuries has moved steadily in the direction of homogeneous nation states.

* Former Director of South European Section, BBC, UK

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Elsewhere the realities produced by conflict have been accepted: Germans are not returning to Czech Sudetenland or to western Poland, Muslim and Hindu refugees are not moving back across the partition line in the Indian sub-continent; Palestinian refugees are not returning to what has become Israel.

Accepting the reality of the break-up of multiethnic societies does not, of course, mean that one should do nothing in the face of ethnic cleansing. One should prevent it or stop it when it is still possible, precisely because its nature is irreversible.

The third relevant factor is that a federation - the system of government, which the international community has in mind for Cyprus - requires the support of the inhabitants of its constituent parts. Where this is lacking, the federation breaks up. This has happened in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. As President Denktaş has said "a federation is the end of the road - not the beginning". In other words, communities, which are to come together in a federation, must first of all develop the will to federate. The UN formula that any solution of the Cyprus problem must be viable and acceptable to both sides takes cognizance of this fact. The Greek foreign minister George Papandreou has said that he did not want a successful divorce in Cyprus, but a happy marriage. A marriage cannot be valid, let alone happy, without mutual consent. At present this consent in lacking in Cyprus: the Greeks, who violated the 1960 Cyprus constitution in order to gain full control of a unitary state, have accepted a federal solution, at least for the time being. The Turks want a confederation of two sovereign states in Cyprus.

This leads us to the fourth relevant factor, viz. that a confederation of two initially sovereign Cyprus states does not preclude an eventual closer union. If a confederation functions well, it could lead to a federation.

The fifth relevant factor is that the absence of bloodshed in Cyprus, achieved since 1974, is a boon to be treasured. There has been no bloodshed because the island's inhabitants are secure in their lives, homes and property, and because men of violence have been kept apart. To put it crudely, there has been no inter-communal violence because there has been no inter-communal contact. Any settlement, which jeopardizes this security, born of separation, is likely to lead to a renewal of violence.

More specifically, any attempt to reunite Cyprus without a preliminary agreement on the borders of the two national areas, on reciprocal property claims and on the criteria of citizenship would be a recipe for conflict.

The sixth relevant factor is that there is no Cyprus nation, as anyone who has been to the island knows full well. What is called a "Cyprus identity" is nothing more than the fading memory of eighty years of British rule. Otherwise, there is no Cyprus nation any more than there is a Cretan nation in Greece or a Cilician nation in Turkey. There are Greeks and there are Turks, and their two motherlands, Greece and Turkey: two peoples with different languages, cultures and aspirations.

Today Greece is a member of the EU. Turkey has only recently been designated a candidate for membership, with no date set for the beginning of membership negotiations. If Cyprus preceded Turkey in membership of the EU (an outcome which the current timetable presupposes), the two motherlands would have unequal access to the island, and equality between the two communities would be impossible. To give one example, if Cyprus became a member of the EU at a time when Turkey would still not be a member, any Greek from the

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mainland would have the right to go to Cyprus, buy property, settle and start a business there. Turks from the mainland would not enjoy any of these rights, unless there were special provisions, which, however, would be difficult to reconcile with basic EU rules.

This would upset the balance between the two communities established by the 1960 agreements under which an independent Cyprus Republic was set up. According to Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Republic of Cyprus undertook not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever. Article 50 of the Cyprus Constitution gave the Turkish Vice-President the right to veto the membership of Cyprus in any international organization, unless both Greece and Turkey were members. EU lawyers have expended a great deal of ingenuity in arguing that these legal provisions do not invalidate the application for full membership of the EU made by the Cyprus government without the approval of the elected leadership of the Turkish community. But no amount of ingenuity could disguise the fact that the consequences of Cypriot membership at a time when Turkey is not a member of the EU would run counter to the spirit of the 1960 agreements.

Most inhabitants of Cyprus, whether Greek or Turkish, would like to become citizens of the EU. But Turkish Cypriots desire also security and equality. They can achieve both within the EU only if Turkey became a full member.

By designating Turkey as a candidate, the EU has implicitly declared its belief that Greece and Turkey can establish the kind of relationship, which two member states must entertain with each other. A dialogue has begun between the two countries, and, at the time of writing, some peripheral agreements have been reached. It is to be hoped that the two countries will also reach an agreement on Cyprus which would be acceptable to the two communities on the island, or, more properly, that the two communities will be able to agree among themselves and that their two motherlands would thus see their conflict over Cyprus resolved. Until this happens, the best course is for Greece and Turkey to put the problem of Cyprus to one side, and pursue agreement in other areas.

In practice, this is what is happening at the present time. Several years ago, Greece and Turkey had agreed on a similar approach at a meeting in Davos. But "the spirit of Davos" soon evaporated, as the Greek government, for domestic political reasons, tried to link progress on Cyprus with progress in other areas. Now too, in spite of the realistic understanding that the Cyprus problem should not figure in the present phase of bilateral negotiations, there is always the danger that continued disagreement in Cyprus may involve the two motherlands.

Similarly, the problem of Cyprus does not figure directly in the current negotiations between the EU and Turkey. These negotiations concern the text of the Partnership Accession document, which will chart the way for Turkey's convergence with the EU. Cyprus will be taken up in the next stage - the political dialogue that will follow agreement on Partnership Accession. But, as we have already seen, the EU is concurrently negotiating with the Republic of Cyprus on the subject of the island's accession as a full member. Inevitably, negotiations with the Greek Cypriots will have a bearing on negotiations with Turkey. The effect could well be damaging.

There must be consistency in the aims, which the EU sets itself. This, surely, is the most relevant factor, which the Council of Ministers has to bear in mind as it pursues its negotiations with the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus. Accepting Cyprus as a member state in advance of a settlement would create problems both in Greek-Turkish relations and in the new

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relationship between the EU and Turkey. If the EU wants Greece and Turkey to get on, if it wants to see Turkey eventually as a member, and in any case as a constructive partner, it should at least delay accepting the Greek part of Cyprus into the fold of full membership. Otherwise, the EU would negate its own purposes.

A Cyprus settlement needs a great deal of time. Instead of pressing for a quick settlement, the EU (and the international community) should seek preliminary agreements (on borders, property, de facto mutual recognition, etc.), until, with the passage of time, the wish for a closer association develops in both parts of Cyprus.

In his statement on 19 March, Commissioner Gunther Verheugen has again appealed to Turkish Cypriots to take part in the negotiations with the EU, and has warned that there would not be a second set of negotiations. But this is putting the cart before the horse. Turkish Cypriots cannot take part in the current negotiations because this would mean, first, recognizing the validity of the application made by the Greek- controlled government of the Republic of Cyprus and its validity as the interlocutor of the EU for matters concerning the whole of Cyprus. It would mean secondly, accepting the consequences of accession, which, in the present circumstances and in the absence of a preliminary intercommunal settlement, would endanger their security and their title to their homes. Logically and practically, the slow search for a settlement on the island must precede any change in the attitude of Turkish Cypriots.

In the meantime there are steps, which can usefully be taken to reduce tension in Cyprus. One such step would be the creation of a permanent liaison committee on which the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC would be represented. If this were done, meetings between the two sides would not have to be arranged ad hoc by the United Nations. A UN official could, if necessary, chair a permanent liaison committee. The committee would deal with current problems and also seek to eliminate obstacles to closer contact between the two communities. There have been several meetings, organized ad hoc and preceded by laborious preparations, between private citizens from the two communities - businessmen, trade-unionists, politicians (usually opposition politicians), etc. The time has now come for authorities from the two sides to come together on a regular basis. A permanent liaison committee would foster habits of working together without which no federation or even confederation could function.

True, the representation in the liaison committee of the two sets of authorities on the island would imply mutual de facto recognition. But even the current proximity talks carry this implication, for they would have been both impossible and pointless unless Presidents Clerides and Denktaş recognized each other as the leaders of their respective communities. A permanent liaison committee, which would embody this existing implicit recognition, could become with time the nucleus of a confederal and, if inter-communal confidence allowed it, eventually of a federal government.

The reduction of antagonism between national communities requires a great deal of time. Europe has waited for more than fifty years for Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany to begin thinking of an association, which would allow their respective citizens to own property in each other's country. More than a century after the Schleswig-Holstein dispute between Germany and Denmark, there are still restrictions, which apply to Germans wishing to settle north of the border. So the idea that communities, which have fallen apart, can quickly come together again is not only unwise; it is dangerous. It is a recipe for trouble.

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Whole generations must pass, before memories of conflict - particularly if there has been bloodshed - can be forgotten, and a new spirit can arise.

There is no comparison with the reunification of Germany. Germans on both sides of the border were kept apart forcibly by Soviet power. They were one nation, which reunited once the Russian army - the force that had kept them apart - had departed. In Cyprus there are clearly two nations, and the Turkish side wants the continued protection of the Turkish army. So there is no similarity between people who had been artificially kept apart and people who want to stay apart in order to be free and safe in their homes. Two conclusions follow from this premise:

First, any attempt to hurry the process would be self defeating, and any arrangements based on the false presumption that antagonism no longer existed would be built on sand.

Second, transitional arrangements are needed to keep the peace and foster habits of cooperation while antagonism gradually simmers down.

I am not content, however, with the pessimistic observation that Greeks and Turks in Cyprus cannot be reunited today. What I want to stress is that in the meantime one must reduce the danger of antagonism, and set up a mechanism to reduce tension, while recognizing facts on the ground. More generally, one must stop Cyprus from being a bomb, which could explode at any moment. The destructive potential of the Cyprus dispute is greater than its intrinsic value. It is a danger to world peace.

Some years ago a Greek Cypriot politician was quoted as saying "I do not want Cyprus to start a third world war. But if that is the price for winning our just cause, so be it." This is not a price, which any of us should be willing to pay. We do not want Cyprus to start a world war, or even a Greek-Turkish war. So measures are needed now to defuse the bomb. I suggest that the creation of a permanent liaison committee bringing together the representatives of Greek and Turkish authorities on the island would help defuse it.

I believe that the EU should facilitate such transitional arrangements, instead of forcing the issue by conducting accession negotiations with a government, which exercises authority in one part only of the candidate country. Recently there have been some signs of realism: President Denktaş has been received by the German foreign minister; the fact that the government of the Republic of Cyprus does not rule the Turks on the island has been admitted. On the other hand, as we have seen, pressure is continued to be brought on the Turks in Cyprus to enter negotiations against their will and against their interests. The sooner this approach is abandoned, the better.

This does not mean renouncing forever the aim of accepting into the Union the whole island of Cyprus, but postponing it until the population of the island reaches agreement on its future governance. For, in the last resort, the EU cannot decide what kind of Cyprus it is to accept within its ranks. Only the people of Cyprus, Greeks and Turks, defined pragmatically as the permanent residents of the island, can take this decision.

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Turkey And Morocco

Mohamed Cherti*

It is a real pleasure for me to participate in this workshop, and I would like also to congratulate the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute for this excellent organization.

Morocco considers himself as an early friend of Turkey and has always been following with deep interest what is happening in this brotherly thrilling and beautiful country.

So, I think, in this regard, that Turkey has opened a new chapter in her international relations aiming the reinforcement of her already existing relations with the African countries.

This new policy has met a very favorable response in Morocco whose strategic position makes him an ideal gate to the Western Africa region. Morocco wishes also to develop a constructive partnership and develop a triangular co-operation (Turkey-Morocco-Africa) putting together all our common potentials; resources, know-how in addition to the relations built on complete confidence between our peoples.

Historically, Turkey and Morocco are very fortunate to have such a longstanding history of excellent relations, though they had been for a long time immediate neighbors at a time when the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Morocco had common frontiers between Tlemcen and Oujda. Since that time, we do not know of any open conflict or a significant problem between the Turkish and Moroccan nations. Quite on the contrary, occasions were numerous for developing a real and efficient political, civilizational and trade relations.

It is not surprising to find in the cultural heritage of these two nations similarities in many fields: music (fasillar) architecture, culinary art, the way we dress and the way we celebrate family events, and even in giving names to many objects and tools in our daily lives.

Indeed, we are both Mediterranean countries. Each of us is located at an extreme of the Mediterranean Sea. Morocco is at the occidental extreme, while Turkey is at the eastern one.

We are both the gates of entrance and exit to and from the Mediterranean Sea; The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles for Turkey to the Black Sea and Gibraltar for Morocco to the Atlantic Ocean.

Only few kilometers in the case of Morocco and some meters in the case of Turkey separate us from a country member of the European Union.

Both of us, proportionally, have in Europe a hard working community.

We are both partners of the Barcelona process.

We develop more than 50 % of our trade exchanges with the European Union.

* Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco

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We both adopted a liberal social economy and are neither afraid nor disturbed by globalization. We try to do our best to bend the regulations of WTO to the advantage of the less developed countries, and in order not to disturb the efforts for development of the emergent countries.

Turkey accomplished a huge step in the direction of the European Union by obtaining in Helsinki - (December 1999) the agreement of her candidacy, - and allows me to take this opportunity to reiterate, on behalf of Morocco, my sincere congratulations.

We share the same regional and international preoccupations, as we are both members of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) and members of different United Nations organizations.

We are both concerned and interested in the future of the Middle East, and we are determined to contribute positively to the peace process in this region, and really we share the same vision of an intelligent cohabitation of all ethnic elements, religious, historical and political of the region.

There is also, and especially, a strong and common will to strengthen the bonds of friendship and to enhance economic relations, and to encourage both public and private sectors to work together. That was the message delivered by His Majesty the King of Morocco Mohammed VI when he recently received the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, H.E. Mr. Ismail Cem.

That was also the determination strongly expressed by H.E. President Süleyman DEMIREL who is aiming at creating with Morocco a solid bridge of constructive and positive relations based on permanent concertation in all fields of international relations.

An intergovernmental action plan, which is harmoniously included in a legal framework well established, was adopted and has already been put into application between Morocco and Turkey to reinforce inter-sectorial exchange opportunities.

The ongoing conclusion of an agreement for the creation of a free trade zone between Turkey and Morocco follows the same target. In the meantime, the implementation of a triennial program of cultural exchanges covering all aspects of cultural creativity can only reinforce our common march towards more solidarity, more understanding and more human development, I mean our common challenge.

I do not intend to take too much of your time. Let me just say, once again, that I am very delighted to be here, and I wish a happy 25th anniversary and many other fine anniversaries for the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute.

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The Genesis And Development Of The Nation-State: Some Remarks On The Cases Of Spain And Turkey

Antonio Elorza*

There exist abundant data in support of the status of France, Spain or Turkey as nation-States, their deep historical roots being first and foremost. We are not beholding latecomers to statehood, of the sort of Slovakia or Croatia, nor plurinational states that came into being recently, such as former Yugoslavia. Nor are we indeed dealing with Stateless nations, that is, nations without statehood historical tradition (we are talking about tradition and not about continuity, for the purpose of including cases such as Poland, where self-rule was temporarily erased). However, this appraisal should not conceal the fact that almost the entirety of European countries have experienced serious problems in their nation- building process and that these tensions still linger on, under a surface whose main feature is the positive trend towards a unified, or at least an ever-increasing attuned Europe, from Dublin to Ankara, in the economic, cultural and political fields.

To understand this state of conflict, one has to bear in mind that the concept of 'nation" we are dealing with, that stems from Rousseau and the French revolutionary experience of 1789-1792, implies the definition of a new political legitimacy ascribed to society as a whole, precisely constituted in political terms as a nation, on which sovereignty and constituent power reside. In the myriad of political organizations of the Ancient Regime, legitimacy resided on the vortex of power, be it filled by an absolute king of Western Europe or by the Ottoman Sultan. The different groups and identities that might exist under this center of power had no instrument whatsoever to render their uniqueness into some sort of political power. Relations were established from top to bottom, and thus motherland is defined in Dideront and D'Alembert's Encyclopedia itself as a group of people who live in a territory and receive laws from a sovereign. Now, the birth of the nation means to turn the sandglass upside down. The nation is the expression of the political society formally constituted in the social contract, but at the same time configured as a personality throughout history. At the time of its birth, the nation is essentially democratic -soon the concept would be claimed by conservative and even reactionary sectors- and a counterpoise to the sovereignty of the monarch. It is the "Long live the Nation!" of the revolutionary day of August 10, 1792, a cry in confrontation with "Long live the King!" that uttered the latest defenders of the monarchy embodied by I.ouis XVI. The political subject forged in the field of ideas becomes one of the decisive forces of the contemporary world.

Such as Mona Ozouf has expounded, the nation takes over the charge of sacralisation that defined relations between the subject and the power, both political and religious, in the Ancient Regime. The nation, as motherland, was the domain where the individual attained full accomplishment, and, to make atonements, the citizen has to deliver himself heart and soul: "tout francais doit vivre pour elle, pour elle un francais doit mourir", as it goes one of the most beautiful songs of the French Revolution. However, this harmonious nation building does not take place in the void, but in history, in conflict with other similar processes and in conformity with the resorts and obstacles affecting its development. Practically no region in Europe has been spared in this last century of severe competition that has once and again

* Department of Political Science, Madrid University (UCM)

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broken out in war, between the different processes of nation building. The map of the Continent and its surroundings has been redrawn by the use of force once and again. On the other hand, this scenario where nation- States emerge, are consolidated or enter into crisis, is defined to a large extent by the background, both at the time of opening up possibilities as well as of anticipating crisis. It is inaccurate to assign to the modern State, such it was configured in the XVI century, a national content, because the essential component, which is to assign sovereignty to the collective subject, to the politically organized society, is missing. As a counterbalance, the modern State decisively contributes to the genesis of the contemporary nation-State, by progressively creating a general tendency towards a politically and economically unified space within which take shape the collective identities whose political protagonism was reached in the XIX century.

This tendency constitutes a common denominator, but the contents of the different processes vary remarkably from one another. In some instances, such as Italy or Germany, this threshold to national construction manifests itself solely in the form of frustration. The heritage passed on by the great centers of medieval power in Christian Europe, the Empire and the Papacy; block until late XIX century the formation of political nations proper of the contemporary world. Apparently, the avant-guard corresponds to the "aggregate monarchies", or composed monarchies -France, Spain, Great Britain- that under the banner of absolutism -done away for good in England- have been gathering peripheral territories around a central core, and that under the formula of royal sovereignty and religious unity, propped by a tax regime and an army, and the usage of the State language for the administration, haphazardly work out a homogeneity upon which the nation is to rest later on.

If Spain is fundamentally associated with the French model from the viewpoint of the politico-administrative organization, power's sociological and religious grounds suggest other comparison. At the extreme ends of the Mediterranean, for the control of which endless wars will be fought throughout the XVI century, Spain and the Ottoman Empire share the condition of being border societies, whose expansion in the XV century has brought into their fold human groups of different religion to the one professed by the State: Turkish projection from Constantinople/Istanbul to the Danube turned the Sultan into the sovereign of a series of Christian societies, and so did the conquest of the kingdom of Granada in 1492 culminating the process of the so-called Reconquest, by way of which important Muslim communities are encompassed under the union of Crowns guided by the idea to impose Catholic orthodoxy. It is precisely here where the difference arises: while the Ottoman Empire combines the Sultan's absolute power and religious tolerance towards minorities, the Spanish Monarchy proceeds to the removal of these, by way of a compulsory standardization carried out in two phases, a first one of forced conversion, and another of expulsion (for the "morisco" of Muslim descent takes place in 1609, while the integration of converted Jews goes hand in had with harsh discrimination). The survival of the Spanish Jews as a community with its own religious and cultural identity will be fundamentally possible thanks to the welcome given to them by the Muslim States, such as the Moroccan Sultanate or the Ottoman Empire.

Paradoxically, this exercise of intolerance of the Ancient Regime will provide more solid bases for bringing about the contemporary nation-State. It is no use to stress something already well known: the Ottoman conquest is compatible with the survival of communities of other religious and political origins, which will preserve thus their identity till the end of the Empire. The fact that present-day Turkish language had kept the name "millet" applied to these politico-religious communities to designate the nation can not make us think that these were in practice micro-States within the Imperial State: this configuration could be applied to Istanbul, while in the rest of the country its field of action was fundamentally a local one. At

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any rate, whatever the shape, the survival of organized minorities will have important consequences on the approach to the national question when tackling the modernation of the Empire. A problem that the Spain of the Ancient Regime had traumatically overcome since the XVII century.

The resemblance between the Spanish and the Turkish cases reappeared to the extent that both Mediterranean Empires experienced a protracted process of decline between the XVII and XIX centuries, when they both found huge difficulties to become national States, something they painstakingly attend at the expense of sizable territorial amputation. The Spanish stance will be in this regard more favorable for its insertion within the Western European economic space.

Its modernization will be at any rate the one proper of the back wagon of a train set into motion by the two industrial revolutions and its backwardness will render highly costly the transition to a liberal society, from which the configuration of the new nation-State is attempted. From 1808 to 1840 Spain is in the throes of an almost permanent state of war, both because of the failed attempt to preserve the continental American Empire as well as its engagement in civil war or fighting against foreign occupation. New war outbreaks mushroomed in the latter half of the century, in 1872-76 (another civil war) and in 1895-98 (the lost of the remnants of the overseas Empire, in a twofold confrontation against separatists and the United States). This latest defeat will prompt a crisis of national awareness, having significance similar to that of the Balkan wars of 1812-13 in the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The agony was a protracted one because of the influence of the system of alliances between European powers, but it was likewise dotted with conflicts and wars leading eventually to the same outcome: the disappearance of a great Empire.

Again the situation of arrival is corresponding: the last step from Empire to national did not mean that Spain and Turkey attained a political balance, the guarantee of their survival. The background of the problem, as well as its transitional solution, is perfectly known. In the course of world war and the postwar aftermath~, the lingering existence of strong minorities in territories with a Turkish majority was only solved in a traumatic manner and, eventually, after an independence war in the course of which the survival of the Turkish nation itself was at stake. Ever since that time, the Kemalist propositions of a single nation gained ground as an incontestable principle of the Turkish constitutional order. Greeks and Armenians were reduced to insignificant minorities and the only survival of the ancient regime of "millet" was kept by the Sephardic Jews, who had never expressed any aspirations for sovereignty of its own and who were finally peacefully decimated by emigration to Israel.

Throughout the XIX century, the loss of their respective empires highlighted, at different levels, the inability of Spain and Turkey to follow the modernization guidelines set forth by the European pioneer countries. The Ottoman Empire is defined as "the sick man of Europe" and his agony is protracted only because of the concurrence of imperialistic interests of the great powers. Spain will be next termed as "the Turkey of the West", a " moribund country" in the words of the British premier Lord Salisbury, bound to surrender its possession to the emerging powers, such as the United States of America, and even to confront the risk of disappearing.

The conversion of empires into nations takes place thus under highly unfavorable circumstances, so that the nation-State itself, maimed from its remote possessions, will meet great difficulties to survive in the medium term, or even earlier, in order to define their own profiles.

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The seriousness of the diagnoses coincides, although the contents of their respective problems are remarkably different. In the Ottoman case, the twofold difficulty lies on the presence within the empire of communities with well defined identities, such as the European Greeks and Bulgarians, or the Arabs and Egyptians, but also, in the territories where the population is majoritarily Muslim and ethnic Turk, because of the presence of "millets" with a high degree of international cohesion (Armenians and Greeks). The amputation of the peripheral communities will not be a problem, although this process itself will prompt, in intellectuals and military men, an urge to give shape to a national cohesion for the State, either by recognizing the plurality of its components, or by bringing it down to the Turkish denominator. This is the problem faced by the group of Union and Progress that presides over the agony of the empire with a high level of conflictivity. After the Ottoman defeat, as ally of the central Empires, the war with Greece will bring to the forefront the issue of political modernization, of the transformation of the ancient structures into a national State, as a death or life struggle favorably solved by Kemalism. Despite of this, tension with the Islamic element of the new Turkish society will not disappear and the problem of the minorities will be dragged down to our days by the existence of the Kurdish community.

In Spain, the centrifugal currents are of another nature, although this does not presuppose that they have stopped from jeopardizing the survival of the nation-State. After the overseas projection was solved with the amputation of 1898, the different groups with distinct features within the peninsula -Basque, Catalans and Gallicians- are the ones who with more or less emphasis question the centralized structure of the State, triggered as in the Turkish case by the backwardness of both the economy and the State apparatus. Cracks are opened along the lines of "the aggregate monarchy" of the Ancient Regime, claim their own languages and are encouraged by their respective bourgeoisies wherever important capitalist transformations have taken place (Catalonia and the Basque Country). The loss of the empire in 1898 is the starting point of a process that leads to the prohibition of such nationalisms and regionalisms by General Franco's military dictatorship after his victory in the 1936-39 civil war. It will be just a four-decade centralizing hiatus. The challenge of nationalism will resurge with renewed strength in the 1975- 78 democratic transitions. The lesson is a clear one: in such cases, democracy has to find the right political formula to integrate the national pluralism. This is what the 1978 Constitution seeks to attain.

From its very foundation, the Turkish Republic has kept a unitary organization, based on the principle of the indissoluble unity of the Turkish people that Mustafa Kemal set forth. It was a matter, in the words of the Ghazi, of "establishing a new unconditionally independent Turkish state based on national sovereignty". A people, a nation, a State: the Turks. Rarely have its political leaders taken into consideration the specificity of minorities, apart from the viewpoint of condemning Kurdish terrorism. It was the late President Turgut Özal the one who talked about the possibility of tackling the problem bearing in mind the way the Basque issue had been solved in Spain. No doubt, any recreation was out of the questions beforehand, as the Spanish case sought to merge within a decentralized framework a plurality of entities whose existence was recognized from the very beginning of the democratic transition (since 1975). In Turkey, it would only be possible the recognition of a regional or national entity detached from the unitary State framework, and therefore every federal perspective could ran the risk of ending up in the escalation of ever sharpening bipolar tensions.

However, it might be useful to make some reflections on the Spanish experience which constitutes after the Constitution of 1978 an attempt to square the circle, by combining the principle of national sovereignty that resides in a single subject, the Spanish nation -"the Constitution is founded on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation", art. 2- with the

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recognition of the plurality of "nationalities and regions" making it up. At the symbolic level, this recognition is translated into another acknowledgement, which is that of the flags and banners proper of these components of what is for all ends and purposes a plurinational State, with nationalities grafted to the central axis of a Spanish nation, which has become thus "a nation of nations". The State organization reflects this conception: it is not a mere administrative decentralization, but the formation of a sphere of power itself, delimited with regard to the central State by the list of powers envisaged in Title VIII of the Constitution, which can be broadened: the State will be able to devolve the powers which are assigned to the autonomous communities to be established (seventeen in all). It may then be thought of a delegated sovereignty, endlessly broadened, as it is claimed now by the historic nationalities (Catalonia, the Basque Country/Euskadi, Gallician nationalists). The Constitution does not foresee, mistakenly to my view, the final sealing of the power devolution ceiling.

The State of the Autonomies is thus closely conformed to a federal State, but it is not so. Paradoxically, the constituent fathers of 1978 feared federalism and set up a kind of organization more prone to witness centrifugal quests than the federation. The weak piece of the system was in this regard the inoperative Senate, shaped de facto as a defensive bulwark of the conservative forces, in' the face of an eventual victory of the left at the elections for deputies, rather than "a Chamber of territorial representation", as envisaged in art. 69. It does not exist therefore a constitutional organ in the mould of the German Bundesrat and, hence, the emergence of a system of bilateral relations (and disputes) between each one of the communities and the central power, within an endless bargaining process, particularly for the communities claiming broader powers, Catalonia, and the Basque country, from the Government. And the subsequent unfavorable image of the central government created by the respective nationalist movements that blame it for permanently rejecting or restricting the allegedly fair demands of these communities. The number of power disputes between the State and the Autonomous communities is self evident: in less than ten years of existence the Spanish Constitutional Courts has seen ten times more power disputes than in forty years of existence of German Federal Republic. This high level of disputes has been the most outstanding negative feature of our experience as State of the Autonomies.

Other costs, initially envisages as very serious -the duplicity of administrations and the entailing irrational increase of the public burden- has nevertheless have a much lower impact that it was initially feared. From the point of view of democratic development, of the fulfillment of the self-ruling demands of the AA.CC populations, and the blossoming of minority cultures, it can be stated without hesitation that the decentralized democracy has been the most suitable framework for a true modernization of Spain, bringing about an underlying cultural enrichment, both of the "nation of nations: as well as of the Basque, Catalan or Gallician nationalities, which is praised one and again by foreign observers.

However, to draw a little scientific but meaningful parallel, it is a success that may push the State of the Autonomies on the brink of the grave. A new paradox that ' explain this contradictory appraisal: the high level of complacency of the citizens, Basque and Catalan citizens included, with the political formula and its outcome, majoritarily assuming a double identity -Basque and Spanish, Catalan and Spanish-, is counterbalanced by the negative arm of the pair of scales by the pressure put up by the nationalist parties. Against to decades of fruitful self- rule and upsurge of the respective economies and cultures, it comes into being, bolstered even -by the -democratic- nationalist parties (with the backing in the Basque case of ETA terrorist separatism) an anti-constitutional scheme which would allow the respective communities to have access to a position of sovereignty. No opinion polls give to Basque and Catalans beyond 30 percent of separatist willingness, but despite of this pressure to break

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away, particular in the Basque country, is growing. On the other hand, in conformity with the principle of physics of the communicating vessels, the rise in the level of the centrifugal nationalisms has been offset by a drop in the level of the Spanish national sentiment, and therefore, by a dramatic plunge in the willingness to defend the constitutional order which was so dearly gained. ETA's bloody terrorist actions make the rest: democracy has represented what in the analysis of social movements is called "a political opportunity structure".

The outcome of two decades of the State of the Autonomies is, therefore, very positive in the fields of democratic development, economy and culture, but the cost derived from the conflictive bipolarity and the unstoppable increase of the centrifugal nationalisms make of it unfortunately a hardly recommendable model for the consolidation of democratic States fraught with claims and disputes posed by nationalist minorities.

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The Mediterranean Clash Of Civilizations Or Enhanced Cooperation?

Franchetti Pardo*

Samuel Huntington in his recent and celebrated study "The clash of civilizations" maintains that the future of the world will be characterized by conflicts of various "cultures" among which the Western and Islamic ones. At a first reading this thesis appears fascinating due to its broad analysis and the undeniable intellectual brightness of the American political commentator. Still, in my modest opinion, I am not so sure that what he is affirming may be adaptable to a temporal more immediate perspective. Nor am I so sure that his vision as a result of a simplification or sublimation of a various and very complex political and social realities is in particular adaptable to restricted geographical areas where many different elements of "civilization " converge, merge and interact, as it happens in the Mediterranean. And perhaps this theory does not even take into due consideration the role that radio, television, mobile phones and the same mega concerts of the most fashionable singers among the young, have on what regards the passing over of the ideological schemes and barriers based on categories as the ones indicated by Huntington in order to identify the different "civilizations".

But to go back to the Mediterranean, it can be noticed that the picture of reference is really a very complex one that is difficultly adaptable to a very bold operation of schematization. According to me this operation does not seem to attribute the due weight even to the ever increasing phenomenon of the importance that certain issues of the social and economic interaction are assuming in our world, at present characterized by the economic globalization and by the world wide knowledge of the events that daily take place in various parts of our planet. An example, for instance, are the reviving phenomena of hyper nationalism and the ones of opposite sign, like the interventions pushed by concepts of individual or international solidarity, or the defense of human rights on the one hand; and on the other hand the repercussion of the trend of the oil market or more generally speaking of the energetic market, including the very delicate problem of the water resources, are not easily adaptable to the insertion in the rigid schematization (but perhaps it is more precise to define it "extrapolation" because the same author later also refers to various contrasts or breaches within the civilizations indicated by him) on which the political models indicated by Huntington are based. It is not by chance if in defining various cultures he refers to very different elements of identification, such as religion, language, history, habits and institutions. (Incidentally I here wish to remind the audience that these identifying elements had already been quoted when referring to the need of an united Italy, The Italian poet of the nineteenth century Alessandro Manzoni wrote: " One in weapons, in language, in altar, in memories, in blood and heart".

But to resume our considerations on the peculiar aspects of the Mediterranean basin, it is important to ponder mainly on the actual problem of the presence of three main religious creeds: Islamism, Christianity and Hebraism, and that within each of these great groups (or civilizations as they are defined by Samuel Huntington) there are further and not always secondary subdivisions. No wonder then if the international panorama of the Mediterranean, widely speaking shows how the major issues of contrast existing (also if sometimes for

* Former Ambassador to Ankara of Italy

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considerations of opposite tendencies or even for political opportunity reasons or simply for media reasons, they are presented as expressions of rooted religious convictions) are instead mainly based on political, social and economical contrapositions that cannot be regarded only as contrasting religious ideas. Can we in fact concretely state that they are referable to mere religious and ideological issues, burning and delicate themes of such a complex nature as the Arab-Israel conflict, the Cyprus problem or the entangled issues of the Maghreb world? I rather leave this question open. At this point I wish to underline how especially in the Mediterranean, economic issues are becoming more and more important with evident progression of the environment, social and economic themes (beside the political ones) that they all look as if they were pointing towards the need of a common effort and to an active collaboration among the Mediterranean countries in view of a well timed and pacific solution; both if they deal with an Euro-Mediterranean dialogue or with the achievements of common interests as the fight to drugs, to organized crime, to terrorism or the pursuit of improving the environment problems, the sea, air and ground traffic.

Having been personally involved for some years let me mention the cooperation in act between the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean in the fight against the calamity of the increasing desertification. Being Italian I cannot forget that since the time of the European Community composed by six members, Italy has always operated to move South the barycentre of the Community and of today European Union, exactly because my country considers that all the countries of the Mediterranean basin, i.e. all the countries lapped by it or immersed in it, must have their specific weight in determining the Community guidelines. It is therefore symptomatic that in these days the Chamber of Commerce in Milan (a city that is supposed to be more interested in the problems of the continental European area), has decided to host a new structure created by the Ministry of the Italian Foreign Commerce aiming at favoring the economic inter -exchange with countries that overlook the sea that the Romans used to call "Mare Nostrum". I believe that this terminology could today be resumed with another meaning i.e. an area that we Mediterraneans should consider an element of contact and cooperation instead of an area of harsh clashes and bloody fights, which are part of a not too remote past, but which has conversely had the merit to make it possible for worlds with social and cultural different background to meet, giving rise to a productive circulation of ideas and the merit of giving humanity great scientific, artistic, literary and poetic works. Therefore it is not by chance that the European Community through the MEDA Program and other similar initiatives having the Mediterranean as a target (as the project to create a Mediterranean area of free trade within 2010) demonstrates as the shores lapped by the blue sea (Turkish and Arabs call it Akdeniz =white), must not be conceived as borders but more correctly as regions sharing the same sea.

By saying so I do not mean to deny the relevance, indeed the great relevance that is typical of the diverse cultures feeding the peoples of the Mediterranean countries. Instead, I mean that it appears clear that beyond the natural and undeniable differences that characterize the Mediterranean countries, there are today powers and flows based on realities and needs of an order different from those referable only to merely ideological principles, that yet exist, as it is demonstrated by the integralist positions of diverse creed. The migration flows towards North from South or East equally, are undoubtedly originated by the accrued need of some populations to look for better and more peaceful conditions of life, motivations that are beyond ideological and religious aspects. It is under everybody's eyes that the countries on the Northern shore of the Mediterranean (but not the only ones) are today longing for destinations for many individuals or family groups, who emigrating, (and the phenomenon is not new if not for its dimension) aim at reaching a higher level of life in accordance with life standards that cinema, radio and television show to their eyes used to other social realities, even though

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the media sometimes unconsciously offer too rosy prospects therefore nourishing deceptive expectations. Here there is another element that I deem correct to underline in tracing out the panorama of the present Mediterranean reality. And this is the conviction that has kept on spreading among the leaders of the Mediterranean countries, that it is necessary to draw vital lymph from the various characteristics and peculiarities of the diverse Mediterranean peoples, not only in order to favor the growth of an always increasing productive and reciprocal collaboration but also to give a new impulse to societies and cultures with different backgrounds. Neither must we neglect the importance that the economic exchanges (trade, financial, credits) stimulate contacts and drive investors to research advantageous operations in the best combinations of the elements of the production as far as it concerns the industrial entrepreneurial activity. The availability of the most update informatics technologies, the easiness of movement and the relative closeness if not even the territorial contiguity of the various Mediterranean countries, are all elements that make it always easier the interaction among Mediterranean people today. But at a close sight this is a reality immanent in the history of the Mediterranean of which there is evidence since the most remote age of history: be it sufficient to quote the Myth of Jason, not to speak of the Minotaur or of the presence in all the primitive societies and Mediterranean cultures of divinities like the Goddess Mother as first source of fertility and social aggregation. No need to underline that on what above mentioned there is a wide documentation both in the arts and in the use of daily life handicrafts (pottery and the use of obsidian for cutting tools).

But there is a further element on which I would like to draw your attention in outlining the present Mediterranean reality. I have already pointed out few lines above the issue of the migratory flows towards the north of the Mediterranean. Well, one of the consequences of this huge phenomenon is that countries like Italy, France and somehow also Spain and Portugal (I do not name Germany because it is not a Mediterranean country but the phenomenon is very evident there as it is in Austria) in the last decades have been changed into multiethnic societies due to such migratory flows. Evidence against the relevance of new migratory phenomenon is given by the rising up in this or that country of hyper nationalism of racist intolerance that everybody would have wished cancelled forever after the tragedies and the mourning of the past. These aspects must not be undervalued also if I personally hope that it is possible to interpret them under a sociological aspect as a sort of rejection similar to what can happen in transplanting organs in human bodies. They have then to be faced as pathological expressions to which it is certainly necessary to apply the most appropriate remedy from time to time. But I deem it misleading if not even dangerous, drawing a cue and a justification to raise ideological or racist barriers whose result would be to create dangerous "breeding grounds" of resentments and discontent.

Luther King and Mandela - but before them the same Gandi - have taught us that remedy to this issue is not to be found creating ghettos or in the marginalization or on putting the blame on the minorities or alien communities, but in their gradual and quiet fitting in broader social and economic ambits where they can usefully and pacifically operate for a reciprocal advantage. About this problem it must not be forgotten that mainly in Europe are arising energetic forces that work in direction of a political and economical aggregation different from those that in the last century gave rise to the National States, due to the new reality constituted by the always closer transnational and across borders contacts.

And so, in conclusion I would like to trace back my point of view; the idea-power that I tried to infuse into what I have so far exposed i.e. that the future of the Mediterranean must be seen not in the harsh confrontation Huntington hints (I would like to call it a pessimistic view of the future of the world) but in collaborating, while tolerating reciprocal characteristic

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and cultural identities. I am perfectly aware that what I am stating could be easily considered as based on a utopian ironic spirit (but to keep far from a generic pacifism), but it is also true that one is forced to these conclusions when it is ascertained to which aberrant results concepts of intransigence may lead or the inability of recognizing that these attitudes may be transformed in exacerbated nationalism, integralism, and fundamentalism. In Europe there is tragic evidence of what above said in the events that took place in Bosnia and Kosovo, but also in Asia, in Timor Est, and in the region of the Great Lakes in Africa. And we Mediterraneans should act with a great spirit of collaboration and we should give the example, we should be a point of reference for the others, remembering that the Mediterranean has been the cradle of civilizations on which is based large part of the human behavior today. Why then should we not think of a propulsive drive towards a closer and better structured cooperation among Mediterranean countries, taking advantage to this scope from a model that has already, though in a different contest, made its experiences and could be examined for such collaboration? What I am talking about is easy to understand: I am referring to OSCE, as an organization that has been able to aggregate countries of different cultures or political backgrounds as were the ones that composed CSCE, that were able to make the necessary steps to achieve a structured form like today OSCE. The declaration of Barcelona dated 28t" November 1995 has fixed three main targets: contributing to realize an area of stability and peace in the region, creating within 2010 (as I have already mentioned before) an area of prosperity, of economic growth, of sustainable development, of integration between the UE countries and the countries of the other shore; strengthening economic, human, cultural and social relations, between the two shores.

On these grounds the third Euro-Mediterranean conference in Stuttgart (April 1999) has indicated the guidelines that have started up studies to draw up a "Charter for stability and peace".

Even before these recent developments in 1994, "the Mediterranean Forum" had taken place (also Turkey attended the Forum) from which originates the reunion of Funchal of these days.

I stop here not to enter into a long listing of contacts and initiatives even sectorial that Italy has promoted and supported all having the scope of reaching the Mediterranean collaboration. Therefore I will only mention that there has been other forum of study, discussion and reflection on what the future of the Mediterranean ought to be.

It is to be hoped that such reflections will continue, in the interest of us all who know and appreciate the beauty and the potentiality of the Mediterranean, transforming it into a lake of peace and pacific collaboration. Summing up not clash of civilizations but enhanced cooperation.

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International Security Latin American Perception

Hugo Gobbi*

In Latin America prevails the criterion as in Turkey that State and Sovereignty, despite contemporary changes, continue to be fundamental pillars of the International Order. Therefore this leads us to give priority to two very important juridical characteristics legal equality of the states, and non-interference in domestic jurisdiction.

Taking in consideration this appraisal you can understand any reaction when facing policy of power. In other words we could say that it is indispensable to recognize the value of the most important legal instruments including United Nations Charter.

As regards interstate conflicts, the universal tendency towards pacification prevails. At a regional level, Latin America has the great advantage of the absence of serious intra state problems of ethnical or cultural nature. The schemes on domestic conflicts or intrastate disputes appear with peculiarities. This assertion confirms the need to evaluate local problems from a different point of view, and strengthen the zeal for the respect of internal jurisdiction.

From the sociological point of view, our states are created by societies of diverse origin, or, multicultural, however, politically integrated. This broad multicultural or complex society with ethnical and religious differences dilutes the possibility of internal confrontations. The uniting and dynamic factor is the civil nationalism that overcomes the differences derived from the variety of origins.

It would be unthinkable to ignore phenomena of political instability created by social pathologies. However, such phenomena have other sources, and it is not the consequence of the cultural or ethnical differences but of social economic and political reasons.

We cannot ignore the problem created by some Indian population in certain countries where they have indubitable importance. However, more than an ethnical problem with pretensions of free determination, it appears to be like one of the social conflicts mentioned before. If we carefully analyze the paradigmatic and recent Ecuadorian case we can see that its peculiarity does not reside in their racial differences but it is characterized by a search for rights h that have been frequently postponed by society of equalitarian norms but socio economically discriminatory. The Indian population is envisaging an equanimous treatment within the Ecuadorian world. They neither try o fight for self-determination nor search for geographic boundaries within those under state control.

Something similar is happening in Chiapas, where the insurgents consider themselves Mexicans. Likewise in Colombia the guerrilla does not consider the fight a racial confrontation.

They are a political group moved by socio economic reasons, fighting by mistaken means, occupy a higher position in the Colombian Society. In Brazil there is a black racial group that psychologically feels entirely Brazilian, although they are victims of certain economic and social discrimination. It is important to remember a decisive legal fact; there is

* Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Cyprus, Argentina

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no legal difference between races in the Brazilian Society. On the other hand the criteria on the color people is such more flexible than in other parts of the world. Even in Argentina there existed one ancient form of religious discrimination as a result of an old Constitution. A person to be president of the Argentine Republic had to be Catholic. The new constitution eliminated that discriminatory requirement with the support of 95% of the Argentine and mainly catholic, political society.

I will not go into greater length to avoid another type of analysis. However it is necessary to see two basic lines, first, the political integration of the different cultural groups as a consequence, amongst other reasons, of that same diversity. Simultaneously exists a greater social permeability that make the characterization of these groups less rigid and facilitates inter racial integration. On the other hand, as has been mentioned, the Staatnation, or the legal Nation and its consequence civic nationalism are the uniting factor. These traits constitute a peculiarity of these states that mainly permits them to avoid cultural and racial conflicts, so numerous in other parts of the world.

The Law

Another Characteristic of the Latin American countries is their commitment towards international law. This legality has become an essential part that cannot be left aside. Perhaps this legality has not had purely idealistic roots and has been fed by pragmatic reasons easy to understand. Latin American countries can be victims of the power politics. Reason for the interest in maintaining stable legal order. This was how the Latin American law developed under critical circumstances where it was necessary to protect national rule and therefore strengthen the legal equality of states. Nowadays it was not discussion but seemed irrational to the powerful states in the past. They considered it a megalomaniac manifestation of weak and underdeveloped countries.

It was a period of strengthening national identities and overcome internal turbulence. The powerful countries preferred to rule the world according to their own values. As a consequence of the institutional instability and their distrust of national value, they used, amongst other means, the Vattel's principle as a pretext to intervene or interfere in the smaller nations. Colombians where the first to develope the principle of legal equality. But Carlos Calvo was the most eminent defender of the principle. He also contributed on the subject of international responsibility, with the famous Calvo clause today accepted by many Countries in various America

It is interesting to point out that today there seems to be a renewal of doctrines that where thought to be definitely abandoned because lack international legal justification in our time.

For example, General Pinochet' s trial by Spanish judge, Garzon and the Chambers of Lords is an abuse and our ultra vires action replacing Chilean domestic Jurisdiction. It could be true, personally I have no doubts that, Pinochet should be punished for the crimes he committed, but the Chilean authority is the only one legally in condition to take that step, due to the territoriality of the legal code. On the other hand, if Judge Garzon where correct and impartial, he should have the courage to prosecute CIA that committed various crimes during the Chilean Dictatorship. Also if this Garzon criterion is accepted, any Judge of any nation could judge the breeches of the human rights in other latitudes.

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Judge Garzon has the Charles Fifth syndrome with his old transoceanic jurisdiction but his legal arguments are totally without justification. In one of his demands for extradition he pretends to sanction the revolution or the coup of State as if where international problems, when for the Latin American Doctrine and also generally for the international doctrine are domestic issues.

The principle of non intervention in general and especially in what referred to domestic legal cases is part of the firmest and most respectable Latin American traditions and its is also a respected principle of the United Nations Charter.

Today

At the beginning the 21st century it seems necessary to analyze certain political phenomena and strategies of the time, extracted from reality, before entering the imaginary world of theories. At first view we are led to admit that we are in front of well-known phenomena, a new political situation derived from the breaking up of the USSR. As a consequence, the USA and its military apparatus, the NATO, appear as the center of world power, forcing us to evaluate the impact of that unquestionable circumstance in the contemporary reality. This initial observation takes along other considerations and it becomes necessary to point out that the American people and those that compose the NATO are culturally developed communities highly aware of their rights as well as defenders of their own individual security. They are ready to give his life to protect his country but not to patrol or police far off regions of the world. It can be seen therefore that the American military might and of its most important international military force are limited by their own public opinion.

The possibility of stopping conflicts finds two barriers: interventions must be efficient and must not produce large numbers of casualties. On the contrary a costly intervention would make them lose the backing of great part of a population Military activity has an essentially intellectual implication that takes us to the doctrine of nonexistence of casualties. What is called the zero death theory? This special circumstance permits us to see clearly, that the capacity to use their superiority without cost reduces to a great extent the reach of their power. With reference to efficiently and previsibility we have to analyze recent conflicts. It is easy to perceive miscalculations in Vietnam, Somalis and Kosova.

In other words, there still exist a relative balance of power with a lot of states that impedes the US or the NATO reaching success without paying human costs. NATO should be kept as a defensive organization, not like in the past to counterbalance the non existent Soviet Union, but as an instrument to intervene only when the interest of the Americans or the European Union are directly at stake.

In this respect they have to abandon the doctrine arisen as a consequence of the Yugoslav conflict that pretends to turn the NATO, a defensive organization, into a police force destined to solve the domestic conflicts around the world.

The Latin America Nations cannot accept as a doctrine, internal, interference except within the jurisdiction of NATO. In other cases it must abide by the principles of the Charter and avoid the use of force without the agreement of the Security Council. Intervention in internal affairs has an interesting although negative history. The series of unpopular

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interventions have not made positive contributions, had affected legal political processes and the socio economic area of many of our countries.

The world order

From the legal point of view prevailing in Latin America, to transform a regional organization into an instrument of world security clearly implies to totally destroy the legal order in which is based.

In this imaginary world the principle of legal equality of the states would be abolished, because this police force could not put pressure on the strong military states for the reasons mentioned earlier. To intervene in strong military states without human costs is an impossible hypothesis. Therefore only the weaker states would be victims of intervention. The reserved internal jurisdiction would be only a privilege of stronger nations, while it would cease to exist in weaker nations. Russia would have its own invulnerable sphere, as the Chechnya case shows and on the contrary the small nations would not be free from external judgment.

The Charter of the United Nations that authorizes the Security Council to determine the right of military action. As a consequence, states intervention, would cease to exist.

For the Latin American Doctrine, if the political declarations of the members of the NATO were to be taken seriously, the world would have suffered a real legal revolution. A new order will have been created without the use of the mechanisms of legal change in existence at the moment. A pretended new World should appear in which Latin America and the opinion of the greater part of the world would not be taken into account. It is obvious and necessary to accept the presence of powerful countries, but the powerful countries cannot ignore the world.

This doctrine founded in a supposed authority, product of subjective values arising from important politicians, of recent times, replaces the Charter of the United Nations. Political declaration would replace the international legality agreed on by almost the whole world.

Violation of human rights

We cannot ignore that dictatorial governments lead us to certain phenomena of social unrest. These cases, like the rights of minorities must be studied in the light of the new international developments.

It would be necessary to establish objectives guide lines and agreements or more vigorous sanctions to the eventual crimes. The use of force that is the primitive resource used in the past that continuous to be cruel an unimaginative instrument.

On the other hand intervention is not a solution. The racial conflicts survive the military occupation. It is only necessary to see the recent cases of Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo to notice that they don't overcome the essence of the problems. These nations do not have a promising future.

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In this field of internal conflicts there is only one advice. Culturally organized groups have to be given greater margins of self-determination within the respective constitutions.

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China

Reşat Arım*

China used to be called the Middle Kingdom. According to the vision of Confucius, at the center stood the Emperor, around him the Empire and the World was turning around the Chinese Empire.

A historical event, documented by the French Minister and Author Alain Peyrefitte reflects the nature of this conception.

It is the McCartney mission to China in the 18th century.

King George of England sends Lord McCartney to China in 1793 as Ambassador. McCartney makes the journey with ten ships and 800 soldiers in a year and a half. He carries a message from the King to the Emperor. The message reads: "Since I desire to be in peace and in friendly relations with China, I have to appoint a man from my country who would carry my authority and would reside in the region of China to facilitate the control of our men who will come there."

Emperor Qianlong reads the message and tells the Ambassador that it is not the custom to have foreign Ambassadors to reside in China. So he should immediately take the road back to England.

McCartney mission's failure showed that China refused the opening. This is because China was the center of the World. They had everything. They did not need exchange, trade.

China in our day realized that it is not the center of the world. China decided to open to the outside World.

The Chinese people who inherited a glorious civilization, with all the important inventions will be able to make most of this new economic policy. China today refuses to be called a Great Power. But they are striving to make Shanghai the economic and financial capital of East Asia. The whole world is watching with great interest China's gigantic endeavors.

China in the equilibrium of East Asia

China is a major power in Asia. Its relations with all Asian countries are important. I will try to look at China's relations with some countries playing a major role in East Asia: these countries are Russia, U.S., and Japan.

China's relations with Russia have been a most determining factor. During the l9th century China has lost large territories to Russia and was obliged to sign unequal treaties. However after 1949 China needed a strong ally and concluded in 1950 a Treaty of Alliance with Russia. The Soviets relinquished their zone of influence in Manchuria and extended * Ambassador

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assistance to China. Later on Soviet demands caused China to go its own way. China claimed territories lost in the last century. This led to the border clashes in 1969.

China turned towards the United States. In 1971 President Nixon visited China. The famous Sharighai communiqué was signed. In 1978 diplomatic relations have been established between the two countries. The Joint Communiqué issued on this occasion said that the United States of America recognizes the Government of the Peoples Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. The Government of the USA acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Relations between China and US went even further. President Reagan sends a letter to Deng Xiaoping in 1982 and proposes to have a strategical relationship in the face of Soviet threat. Chinese- American relations continued in this vein between 1971 and 1989.

Chinese-Soviet relations on the other hand took a long time to recover from the 1969 incident. It was only in 1985 with Gorbachev that relations normalized. His Vladivostok speech helped the situation. Gorbachev visited China in 1989. Later President Yeltsin also paid a visit to Beijing in 1992.

Chinese-Japanese relations also had to recover from the occupation of China by Japan in the 1930s. However, it can be said that economic interests played as a catalyst in healing the wound of the past. China needed Japanese technology and investment; Japan looked to the huge Chinese market.

Today, security in East Asia depends largely on the balance between China, US, Russia and Japan. Let us see in what direction things are moving at present.

First on the Chinese-American front: starting his new term of office in 1996 President Clinton declared that he would sustain constructive engagement towards China High level visits ensued. President Jiang Zemin visited US in 1997. He spoke of developing bilateral cooperation. Next year President Clinton went to China and spoke about strategic partnership.

1999 started as a bad year in Chinese-American relations following the Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade. However, it ended on a positive note when China and US concluded an agreement to open Chinese economy to foreign competitors. After 13 years of negotiations US was terminating its opposition to China's membership to the World Trade Organization.

The Chinese -Russian front was also quite active. In 1997 the two countries entered into a strategic partnership. President Jiang Zemin visited Moscow and signed a declaration in which the two parties announced a New Multipolar World. Border questions have been solved. In 1999 meetings took place between the Presidents of the two countries and a strategical and cooperative partnership has been forged.

As to China and Japan, relations between the two countries also developed nicely. Last time President Jiang visited Tokyo in 1998 and it was decided on a Constructive engagement. However the US-Japanese strategical alliance and the US declaration in 1999 of their intention to deploy Theater Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan, South Korea and eventually in Taiwan had a negative effect.

This is the outline of China's relations with the major powers in East Asia. In the background of all these developments lies a permanent objective of China: that is economic

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development. China has to respond to the material needs of its population. Also the future power of China will be based on its economy.

In 1958 Mao Zedong has devised the Grand Leap Forward. The plan was to create 26.000 communes each containing 20.000 people in agriculture. This led to the famine in the country.

In 1978 Deng Xiaping did exactly the opposite. The land is given back to the peasant families. Deng says: It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice. This strategy succeeds. This is followed by reform and opening to the outside world. Special Economic Zones are created. First one in Shenzen in the South. It becomes a second Hong Kong. Foreign investment is attracted to these zones. High technology is utilized and the products are exported. Foreign investment in the last 20 years totaled $20o billion. It comes mainly from US, Japan, European Union countries, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. China's trade volume last year reached 350 billion dollars. The estimate is that it will be doubled in the next 10 years. Main trade partners of China are also US, Japan, European Union countries. China exports to US $61 billion and imports $ 19 billion from it.

The opening of China to the outside world received a boost end of last year when a hurdle before China to be a member of WTO was eliminated.

I mentioned EU countries in the field of investment and trade. These countries are very active in China. The President of France visited China in 1997 and the two Presidents have adopted a joint declaration establishing a global partnership for the 2lth century. It seems that France wants to work with China for the construction of a Multipolar World. In 1998 the Prime Minister of France visited China and he said that French firms were investing in China because they saw growth perspectives in that country.

Turkish-Chinese relations

Diplomatic relations between the two countries has been established in 1971. Since then relations developed in a constant way. Highly level visits took place regularly. President Demirel visited China in 1995. This year President Jiang Zemin is expected in Turkey. For many years there has been political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries. In 1997 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed to give this mechanism a permanent character.

There are regular contacts at government level Parliamentarians also visit respective countries.

A large network of agreements provides the necessary infrastructure for a sound cooperation.

Turkey and China are both engaged in a rapid pace of development. This makes a sound cooperation between the two countries possible. Turkey and China signed an agreement on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of investments, an Agreement on Maritime Transportation and also an Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation. Experts and businessmen from both countries have determined that there are many areas, which the two sides can develop to the mutual benefit of our peoples.

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Already 3 meetings of the Joint Business Council took place. They have chosen special fields on which to work. These include major areas related to infrastructure schemes as well as cooperation in specific industries such as textiles, food processing, machinery, and electronics.

Both Turkey and China offer generous incentives to attract foreign investment. Therefore entrepreneurs from both countries can invest more with each other. We learn that some Turkish businessmen are looking for investment opportunities in China. We know that there have been Chinese investments in Turkey. I think these developments should be encouraged.

Trade between the two countries has been growing. Trade volume in 1985 was a meager $100 million. In 1998 it has reached $700 million. However, trade is not balanced. It is very much in favor of China. Turkey mostly exports iron and steel products, copper concentrates; China on the other hand exports a wide variety of products to Turkey, ranging from textile to electrical appliances. The volume of trade is far from representing the true potential of exchange between Turkey and China. There is a need to diversify trade in terms of goods exported and imported.

Another field of cooperation could be between contracting companies. Turkish companies take on construction contracts all over the world. We know that Chinese companies are also very competitive.

An area close to the economy is science and technology. Between Turkey and China there is an agreement of cooperation in this field.

To 'bring the two peoples closer and to let them know each other better, we have to rely on cultural exchange. Both countries are rich in cultural heritage. There is a Cultural Agreement between the two countries. Cultural exchange programs are being implemented. There are also cooperation agreements between Turkish and Chinese Universities. The number of scholars involved in the study of Turkish and Chinese in both countries is increasing.

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New Horizons Of Turkey's Foreign Policy And Beyond

Arshad-uz Zaman*

Turkey has entered the new millennium with a hope and confidence that is unusual for a country of her size and resources. Time will show if these are built on solid foundations.

Turkey is a very ancient country with a long unbroken civilization. Throughout history she has played an important role and left her imprint on the pages of history. One is confronted with great historical events in virtually very part of this beautiful country. The Romans and the Greeks have left indelible marks throughout Turkey. The Pharaohs of Egypt were involved in war with the Hittites of Turkey for supremacy of the area.

In 1453 Sultan Mehmet at the young age of 21 conquered Constantinople and that heralded the end of the powerful Byzantine Empire. In the long history of struggle between Christianity and Islam, this was the downfall of Eastern Rome and the rise of Islam. Christianity is still struggling to come to terms with this epoch making event.

Turks of modern day Turkey originated in Central Asia and the Caucasus and traditionally has moved west. Thus before the conquest of Constantinople (renamed Istanbul) the Turks had already more than a foothold in Eastern Europe. At its zenith the Ottoman Empire spread throughout modern Turkey, stretched to large part of the Balkans including Yugoslavia and even reached North Africa. In east and southeast the Empire spread to the Arab world and the Sultan in Constantinople became the defender of the Faith of Islam and guardian of the Holy Haaram in Makkah al- Munawarah.

Watching current events one is struck by the phenomenon that they almost invariably involve people of Turkish extraction. We have read of the butchery of Yugoslav President Milosevic perpetrated against the Bosnians in Bosnia- Herzegovina. There was an element of racial hatred not to be found in other conflicts. The Serbs called it "ethnic cleansing". This hatred has been nurtured by the Serbs through their long history of occupation by the Ottomans. Of more recent memory is the conflict of Kosovo. Here again it is Serb brutality against minority Turks residing within their borders. And the latest is Chechnya, where people of Turkish extraction have faced the might of the powerful Russian army.

These events illustrate in a graphic manner that Turks, who have lived within borders of other countries like Yugoslavia or Russia, refuse to lose their identity and are clamoring for their place in the sun.

Of course the most dramatic event of our times is the collapse of the Soviet Union barely a decade ago. This has been a traumatic event for the Soviet Union, the largest state on the face of the earth and which following the Marxist-Leninist Revolution in the early 20th century launched the battle cry "proletariat of the world unite". The Soviet Union started a system through her Communist party to bring within its sway the whole world. The dream was nothing short of a world system directed from Moscow. A decade ago the entire edifice fell apart and out of the former Soviet Union raised nearly a dozen independent states, most of who were of Turkic extraction. * Former Ambassador to Ankara, Bangladesh

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For Turkish Foreign Policy this presented the biggest opportunity and equally big challenge. For from a state at the periphery of Europe, Turkey suddenly emerged at the center of a universe, where she had very solid blood, linguistic and religious ties. Turkey was no longer the sentinel guarding the long frontier with the Soviet Union.

A decade ago shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of nearly a dozen independent states, I had the opportunity to travel nearly in all the states as a member of the first ever Bangladesh delegation. I shall never forget the deep depression I noticed in Moscow. It was depression born out of loss of a vast Empire and the authorities in Moscow were still reeling under its impact. In the newly independent Turkic and other states it was confusion all around. In Turkmenistan, for example, I saw the signboard of the Communist party being replaced by the writing "Government building". In Kazakhstan our Aeroflot aircraft rented in Moscow was impounded by the Kazakh authorities, because Russians owed them money. Within a decade Turkey's relations with the newly independent states have gone from strength to strength. For example Turkey no longer feels lonely on the world stage for her Cyprus problem with Greece. Turkey has set up the Black Sea Co-operation Agreement covering the countries around the Black Sea and some other neighbors like Greece. The headquarters of the Organization is located in Istanbul and so far it has been largely financed by Turkey. Turkey has successfully entered the pipeline battle with Russia. The Turkic Republics including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have large deposits of gas and oil and since all their economies were tied to Moscow, these hydrocarbons were carried to world markets through Russian ports on the Black Sea. With the help of giant Western companies and mainly American companies Turkey has managed to get a slice of the action and oil and gas will be carried through pipelines from Baku in Azerbaijan to Ceyhan on the Turkish Mediterranean. Turkey is building bridges daily with this vast new world and the scene in Istanbul is really that of a crossroad where Turks of various extractions are meeting daily.

Turkey has fought successfully a 15-year murderous war in the South East of her country with Kurdish rebels. The rebellion was led by Abdullah Ocalan from his hideout in Syria. The stark failure of the rebellion can be gauged from the fact that it failed to enthuse the local Kurds, who were caught between two fires- the one of the men of Ocalan and the other the powerful Turkish army. Finally the Turkish army controlled the situation and with the capture, trial and death sentence of Ocalan, the sad chapter has been closed. For this fratricidal war proved very costly to Turkey in men, material and especially the virulent anti Turkish campaign in Western Europe. Now that Turkey has put behind her the Kurdish war, she will be able devote her energies to the pursuit of her national goals with more vigor.

Turkey has recently got a toehold in Europe. It is a measure of perseverance and steadfastness of the pursuit of goals set by the nation that Turkey crossed an important milestone recently when the European Union (EU) agreed to include among those prospective countries, which will eventually join this powerful body. Turkey has waited patiently at the door of EU for 36 years. In fact at the Luxembourg Summit nearly two years ago Turkey was nearly thrown out. Now Turkey is back and has not compromised on her national interest nor groveled before the EU for an invitation. Thus the long cherished dream of Turkey to become a part of Europe is on the way to fulfillment. In the past she has gone there as a conqueror and now as an equal partner in a remarkable journey.

It is true that following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and the War of Independence of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk which led to the establishment of the Republic, Atatürk appeared resolutely to turn his face westward. There were sweeping social

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reforms and they changed Turkish society completely. With the departure of the Sultans, Turkey ceased to continue as the defender of the Holy Haaram. The relationship between Turkey and her Arab co- religionists appeared to enter a cool period. With Iraq, with whom she shares a long border and Kurds, she also has common interest in that the Iraq pipeline brings oil from the Kerkuk oilfields to Turkish ports in the Mediterranean. Turkey has undertaken a very ambitious development project of building dams along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and the centerpiece of the development project is the giant Atatürk dam. These development projects are changing the face of Turkish east. Her neighbors like Iraq and Syria have shown periodical anxiety because they too share those rivers. Turkey has maintained relatively cordial relation with Iraq throughout history. With Syria the relations have never really warmed since Syria claims territories in the south of Turkey like Hatay. Syria harbored for long terrorist Abdullah Ocalan, who directed murderous warfare against Turkish forces from his Damascus hideout. However, when Turkey threatened severe reprisal, Syria expelled Ocalan from her territory. Turkey has maintained friendly relations with Iran throughout history.

Turkey has had many ups and downs with her giant neighbor Russia. Turkey shares borders with the Soviet Union. Now that the Soviet Union is dead and gone Turkey has bilateral relations with Armenia, formerly a part of the Soviet Union. For the first time in a long history Turkey does not have a border with Russia except for the connection via the Black Sea. This makes for a healthy relationship for the days of guarding the frontier on behalf of NATO are gone. Turkey has made great strides in economic co-operation with Russia, in her great effort towards transition to market economy from the command economy of the Soviet days. Indeed giant Turkish construction companies are feverishly building the entire infrastructure of Russia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and emergence of nearly a dozen independent Republics was one of the major events of the last century. The fall out continues. To take a small example. Transition from command economy to market economy in a huge country like Russia is mind-boggling. It would be foolhardy to predict the shape of things to come. One thing, however, is certain. During the Russia of the Czars and Turkey of the Ottomans, they used to play what was known as "The Great Game". In that Great Game outside of these two Empires other Empires like the British, the French and not to forget the Austro-Hungarians were involved. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the Great Game has started all over again. After the First World War Turkey found herself diminished in size and strength and played a secondary role on the world stage. From Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on Turkey has been gathering strength. She has been a relatively important player through NATO with US backing. The collapse of the Soviet Union offers her the unprecedented opportunity to take her rightful place on the world stage. Turkey appears ready to play her due role. From time immemorial Turkey has been so placed that she has played a vital role on the world stage. For several centuries she has managed a vast Empire. Now the age of Empires is gone and has been replaced by economic giants parading the world stage. The number one player is the USA, who has absolute sway over world events. It is ultimately her economic muscle backed by industrial and military strength, which gives her hegamonistic situation on the world stage. The European Union is emerging to ultimately challenge the US supremacy. There are other centers of power whose contours can be seen.

There is one thing for sure. Whichever way the power game is arranged the dynamic nature of the Turkish population is bound to propel them to an honorable place in the community of nations.

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The Future Of Turkish-African Relations

Numan Hazar*

Despite the present underdevelopment and poverty as well as instability prevailing in Africa, the African continent has an important place in the Turkish Foreign Policy. Although at the present time the level of Turkey's relations with Africa as a whole is far less than desirable there is a general tendency and strong feeling for the necessity to promote interactions with Turkey and Africa at all possible fields.

Many things have been realized in that sense. There is, however a great vacuum to be filled.

The recent Turkish Policy of opening up to Africa is arisen from the necessity to upgrade Turkey's relations with the Continent as a whole. The implementation of the Action Plan for the policy of opening up has produced substantially positive results.

I will dwell on the ingredients of the Action Plan at a later stage.

First, I intend to shed light on Africa in order to define the Continent or to see what is Africa with its past and present. This will help us to understand Africa. A successful African policy needs such an understanding.

Secondly, I would like to outline Turkey's relations with Africa in its historical context. This will show us the fact that historically Turkey and Turks have always had an interest and connection in Africa.

African continent constitutes 24 % of the earth with a population of 830 millions. The population of Africa comparatively is less than its size. Nevertheless the increase of the population is significant due to the high birth rate despite the threat by epidemics and various diseases.

African countries have developing economies. The following figures will give us an idea:

1995 figures

GNP US Dollars 449 bn as of the World GNP: I .7

GNP/per capita US Dollars 620

Exports US dollars 104.4 bn

Imports US Dollars 119.3 bn

* Coordinator for African Affairs and Organization of Islamic Conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey

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Despite the variety of cases in the individual countries there is a high growth rate.

There are 53 independent states in Africa. This constitutes an important percentage of the UN members.

There are indeed several Africas. Black Africa, Arab Africa, French Speaking Africa, and African countries as members of the British Commonwealth. Geographical definition is also possible. North Africa, South Africa, East Africa and West Africa.

For our purposes we take Africa as a whole without any distinction.

The are various regional and international groupings in Africa:

Union of the Arab Maghreb (UAM)

Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO)

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (LTDEAC)

Economic Union of Central African States (CEEAC)

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Common Market of East and South African States (COMESA)

The Franc Zone

The Lome Convention

The Commonwealth

The African countries were colonized by the European powers with the only exception of Ethiopia.

In Africa international boundaries are artificial. They were drawn along the lines of interests of colonial powers. For that reason, various nations, ethnic groups or tribes are divided by the colonial borderlines separating peoples.

Several hundreds of languages and ethnic groups exist in Africa. Some countries have more than 200 different ethnic groups. This is one of the reasons of instability in the continent.

Islam, Christianity and African religions (Animism) live side by side in Africa. Ethnic belonging is more important than the religious allegiance. Some ethnic groups have both Moslem and Christian peoples such as Yorubas one of the leading ethnic groups in Nigeria.

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Yorubas are 50% Moslems and 50% Christians. In some countries, Christians are also divided as Protestants and Catholics according to the colonial power, which ruled the country.

Islam in Black Africa is tolerant one, despite the request for the implementation of Sharia regionally in some countries.

This religious and ethnic diversity necessitated a secular approach. In particular, Black African countries included in their constitutions the secularism as one of the basic tenets of the state.

Democratic experience has been successful only in aw few countries. Military rules or authoritarian regimes prevailed in most parts of the Continent.

In Africa there are no preconceived ideas against Turkey. Despite the fact that there is a great difficulty for Africans to understand the Turkish case in the Cyprus issue due to the ethnic divisions created by colonialism, Africans in general have sympathy toward Turkey. Moslems see Turkey a great Islamic power and Christians admire Kemalism, secularism and modernization in Turkey. Some African intellectuals propose Kemalism as a viable model for Black Africa.

In Arab Africa also there is sympathy towards Turkey due to historical reasons. This is a different approach as compared to the feelings of Arab countries in the Middle East, because of the French and British colonialism during the First World War. Even during the Crusades European powers created anti-Turkish feeling in the Middle East against Turks through Christian Arabs and other Christians.

Principal actors in Africa are former colonial powers such as Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal. Nevertheless the present economic powers in the world play also an important role such as the United States, Germany, Japan, China and even Malaysia and India. After the disintegration of the USSR Russia has presently a less important role.

France as a former colonial power and leader of the Francophone has a significant influence not only in French speaking countries but also in other major African countries such as Nigeria, Sudan and Ethiopia.

There are sizable ethnic communities in Africa from outside the Continent such as Greek (including Cypriots), Lebanese and Indian (including Moslem or Pakistanis) communities.

There is no presence of Turks in Africa despite a negligible number of Turks living in some countries.

Together with Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa are important regional powers. Nigeria and South Africa are in competition for leadership of Black Africa, Algeria, the Sudan and Ethiopia are significant countries in size to be reckoned with.

Here, I will touch upon the historical context of Turkey's relations with Africa.

The relations of Turks with Africa go back to 16~' Century. Some African countries were totally or partially parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and even Niger and Chad.

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The Ottoman Empire was in Eastern Africa to check the Portuguese colonialism. In North Africa the Turks played an important role to prevent Spanish penetration. In Northern Sub-Sahara the Ottomans were part of the balance of powers' system having friendship and alliance with Kanem Burnu Empire prevailing in today’s Northern Nigeria, Niger and Chad. Kanem Burnu Empire had a defense pact in 1575 with the Ottoman Empire during the time of Murad III. The Ottoman Empire sent military equipment and trainers to Kanem Burnu.

The Ottoman Empire sent imams to South Africa in-the late 19th century upon the request of the Moslem Community.

When the first mosque was built in Lagos in 1894 the Ottoman Sultan sent a special emissary to Nigeria conferring the staff of office, the decoration of the Order of Medjidie as well as the title of Bey, a higher civilian rank in the Ottoman Empire to the leader of the Southern Nigeria's Moslem Community, Mohammed Shitta Bey. The Shitta Bey family is a large family and has presently several members playing an important role in social and political life in Nigeria.

After the occupation of Algeria and Tunisia by France in 1830 and in, 1881 respectively, the Ottoman province of Tripolitania or present day Libya lost its autonomous status and had direct rule from Istanbul. Previously Algeria, Tunisia and Tripolitania had a special local rule.

When the French and the British Empires decided to partition Sahara in 1890 the Ottoman Empire did not recognize the partition indicating that the area partitioned by the British and French Empires was the hinterland of Ottoman Province of Tripolitania and part of the Empire and such a partition was against the decisions of the 1878 Berlin Congress which guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire protested the partition and delivered notes in 1890 in Paris, London and Istanbul against the fait accompli. Ottoman representations in that sense were repeated in 1911. The Hinterland of the Province of Tripolitania, as the map delivered to the French and the British indicated, comprises a large area including parts of today's Northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Northern Cameroon.

Republican Turkey also attached importance to Africa and sent arms and equipment to Algerian freedom fighters during the independence war against France. Turkey also played a role in the independence of Namibia and helped Zimbabwean fighters against the white racist rule in Rhodesia.

When Ghana became independent in 1957 following the struggle for liberation, Turkey recognized Ghana and opened a resident Embassy at a later stage.

With the decolonisation process in Africa started in early 1960's Turkey recognized all newly independent countries, established diplomatic relations and opened resident embassies in some of them.

Turkey tried its best to establish and develop economic, cultural and political relations, in particular, with black African countries. In that sense several strides were made in late; Sixties and late Seventies. Indeed these efforts provided some successes.

Nevertheless we cannot see the level of Turkey's relations with Africa as a desirable one. A country in the size of Turkey must have much more intensified economic, commercial,

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cultural and political interactions. This argument led to the preparation of the new Turkish Policy of opening up to Africa and to the adoption of an Action Plan in 1998 aimed at - reaching a high level of relationship with Africa as a whole.

The Action Plan is implemented for the last 1,5 years producing successful results. I will dwell on these achievements at a later stage.

Before entering in the details of what the Action Plan prescribed, I can tell you that Turkey with its present status of economic and social development has many things to offer to Africa as an economic and commercial partner.

Africans consider Turkey as a newly developed "white” country whose experiences would be much more beneficial to Africa, because, according to Africans, Turkey passed through processes similar to those of Africans. Turkey has no bad reputation as a colonial power. To the contrary, there is sympathy towards Turkey as it is mentioned earlier.

Turkey's development, progress and achievements in modernization as well as her democracy and secularism are considered in African countries as a good and viable model to be followed by them.

Better prices and quality of Turkish goods constitute another advantage for improved trade relations. Despite this fact we should admit the fact that Turkey's competitors in Africa are western countries. Many European countries have their communities in African countries. For successful business relations, Turkish private sector should open offices or establish locally registered companies with staff sent from Turkey and invest in various fields. This will help Turkish businessmen to play the game according to the rules in some African countries where corruption and fraud are serious risks.

Africa needs Turkey for her experiences and Turkey's developing economy needs Africa as a new market.

This state of affairs provides Turkey an advantage in promoting her relations with Africa. On the other hand, the absence of any problem in the Turkish-African relations due to the geopolitics, presents a comfortable situation for both African and Turkish policy makers despite the presence of Greek or Greek Cypriot communities, which can not prevent developed economic and cultural relations of Turkey with Africa.

Improved economic, cultural and commercial relations of Turkey with African countries will constitute a strong basis for close political relations.

The Action Plan for opening up to Africa was prepared following a series of meetings organized in 1998. Representatives of various Ministries and Agencies as well as those of private sector's roof organizations and individual companies having business in Africa were invited to the Meetings. Turkish Ambassadors in Africa and Honorary Consuls of African countries in Turkey also attended these meetings. During the meetings the present status of Turkey's relations with Africa was discussed. The discussions helped to determine outstanding issues. Various measures were suggested in order to develop Turkish- African relations. The Action Plan was made in the light of these discussions.

The Action Plan comprises all imaginable areas.

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First, it was suggested to upgrade the level of diplomatic representation in Africa. First, it was decided to open three new Embassies in Accra (Ghana), Abidjan (Ivory Coast) and Harare (Zimbabwe) in addition to 12 resident embassies. These countries were chosen following a research carried out by the Turkish Embassies in - Africa and Missions to the United Nations. During the last decades three embassies were closed down due to economic reasons (Accra in Ghana, Mogadishu in Somalia and Darussalam in Tanzania).

Another measure in this field was accreditation of Ambassadors directly from Ankara to some sizable African countries where opening of a resident embassy is not possible due to financial reasons. For that purpose 10 countries have been chosen. According to the Plan, Turkish Ambassadors in Ankara would be sent to some African capitals as special emissaries, from time to' time, in order to develop bilateral relations.

Appointment of honorary consuls in some African capitals among prominent local businessmen was also suggested.

The Action Plan prescribed various administrative measures in order to improve the existing infrastructures of the Turkish embassies.

The Action Plan also proposed political measures to develop Turkey's relations with African countries such as:

- Realization of high level visits from African countries (Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs)

- Establishment of political consultations mechanisms,

- Intensification of contacts with African countries within the international organizations.

- Mutual interparliamentary visits,

- Visits of Turkish delegations to various African countries in order to seek ways and means to develop bilateral relations,

- Contributions to various UN technical assistance programs and realization of humanitarian assistance.

Economic measures proposed by the Action Plan are as follows:

- Conclusion of Agreements of Trade, Technical, Economic and Scientific Cooperation, Prevention of Double Taxation and Mutual Promotion and Protection of investments in order to complete the legal framework of economic and trade relations,

- Invitation of technical Ministers from Africa such as Ministers of Trade, Industry, Health, Agriculture and Education in order to determine possible areas of cooperation. Invitation of African Ministers of Trade to Izmir International Fair,

- Organization of short term training programs for African experts in the fields of health, agriculture, pharmaceutical industry, mining, water managements, free zones etc. and sending Turkish experts to Africa on the same subjects.

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- Creation of a special technical assistance fund to be used only for Africa,

- Realization of Turkey's membership in African Development Bank as a non-regional donor country. This will indicate Turkey's political will and interest in Africa and also encourage trade and economic relations, in particular Turkish contractors' involvement in the projects financed by the Bank.

- Realization of Turkey's membership as shareholder in the African Exports and Imports Bank. This membership will expand trade relationship.

- Exchange of visits by businessmen,

- Creation of Joint Business Councils or Chambers of Commerce,

- Promotion of communications, air links and maritime transportation,

- Encouragement of Turkish contractors to enter African markets,

- Cooperation in the field of defense industry,

The Action Plan also proposed several measures to improve cultural cooperation and interaction in the field of education such as conclusion of cultural agreements, contacts between universities, and grant of scholarships. The invitation of African scholars to various international seminars and conferences or to international festivals is among the proposal, contained in the Action Plan.

Cooperation for military training, Turkish contribution to the UN peacekeeping activities, and invitation of Africans to military exercises in Turkey were also suggested.

Creation of an Institute of African Studies is also proposed in order to enlighten the Turkish public on the one hand and to understand Africa and its problems on the other.

The Action Plan also prescribed measures to alleviate the conditions of visas for Africa and suggested bilateral cooperation in the implementation of the Plan with friendly countries such as the United - States, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.

Regional groupings in Africa are also considered as appropriate ways for cooperation such as SADC (with South Africa), COMESA (with Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia) and ECOWAS (with Nigeria and Ghana).

The implementation of the Action Plan ~ produced good results. It proved that direct bilateral individual contacts help developing Turkey's relations with Africa. Indeed, it is observed that during the last two years there were multifold increases in Turkish exports to some African countries with which exchange of visits or contacts are realized.

The contacts with individual African countries also created a mutual understanding as regards respective foreign policy issues.

Visits of Turkish delegations to African countries headed by ~ Ministers or Ambassadors provided an accumulation of experiences.

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At the end of this presentation, it is possible to say that the future of Turkey's relations with Africa is bright, in spite of difficulties stemming from budgetary limitations. These difficulties constitute, for the moment, obstacles on the way of materializing the membership of Turkey in the African Development Bank (which requires the payment of 50 million US dollars), improving the conditions of Turkish scholarships and establishment of a technical assistance fund for Africa.

There is, however; a general tendency and will to surmount these difficulties in time.

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Turkish Foreign Policy In The Year 2000 And Beyond: Her Opening Up Policy To Africa

Salih Zeki Karaca*

At any assessments of Turkish Foreign Policy we must take into consideration her geographical and geopolitical location. Turkey is at the crossroad of three continents: Asia, Europe and Africa She have had interaction in their Continents and their people all through the history. The Situation in not different today, at the age of information, fast communication and transportation making possible than any period of history, all kind of interaction such as political, economic, cultural contacts. We have to look at the Turkish Foreign Policy toward Africa in this perspective.

As for Africa; it is a huge continent having rich and various natural resources, vast agricultural areas and human resources. There are 53 countries in Africa. According to the statistics %12 of the world population live on this continent. Whereas, world’s production of goods and services in the continent is only %3.3 in 2010 the number of the population of Africa is estimated to be more than 1 billion, which would represent % 15.3 of world population. The economic growth rates in Africa in 1996 and 1998 had consecutively been 5.9 % and 3.4 %, which represented more than the world's average growth rates. According to the estimates of IMF, this rate will be in 1999 and 2000 consecutively 3.1 % and 5.0 %, which are also estimated to be more than world's average growth rates. Africa is a very reach continent in natural sources and raw materials need to be exploited. It is a huge market for traders and contractors to do business and to invest. Many countries have strong foothold in Africa. Turkey is not among these countries~ However, in the past, during the period of Ottoman Empire, Turkish rule and influence in Africa extended in the South down to Somalia and Sudan, in the North, along the cost of Mediterranean up to the frontier of Morocco. After centuries of presence in this part of African continent, the Ottomans left its last strong hold, Libya just before the First World War.

It is still fresh in our memory what had happened during the decades before the First, Second World Wars and thereafter in Africa and the African countries. That was a period of history that many important developments took place in the world. It was the age of industrialization of European Countries. The major powers competed for influences and places in Africa and elsewhere in the world when the Ottoman Empire was facing big problems in home from and its relations with neighboring countries. It is a historical fact that the Ottoman Empire had suffered most than any other country from this fierce competition of the major powers. The Ottoman Empire, after witnessing the colonization process in Africa was conquered at the end of the 1st World War and new states created. In this context, one of the most important events was, the emergence of a new, young and dynamic state, The Republic of Turkey, created out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. The Republic of Turkey, as an independent state joining the world community devoted all her efforts to establish a solid political and socio-economic foundation of the Republic and create a peaceful environment in her region fully in compliance with the famous motto of Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK, the Founder of the Republic: "Peace at home, Peace in the world".

* Ambassador

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Even during such a hard phase of her history the interest of Republican Turkey with Africa has never been ceased. From the very beginning of the proclamation of the republic, Turkey continued to develop her relations with and enlarge her interests in African countries struggling for freedom and prosperity. Except with North African Countries, it took a longer time to establish relations with the African countries in the South of Sahara. At the eve of decolonisation process and the access to the International Community of the first independent black African states; Ghana, in late 1950's and Nigeria at the beginning of 1960's, Turkey opened her first official mission, the Turkish General Consulate in Lagos, in 1956.

1 had two assignments during my diplomatic life in the Sub Saharan African countries. First was as second secretary in Accra in early sixties and second in Lagos as Ambassador between 1990-1995.

What myself and my colleagues serving in African Countries noticed was that the competition, which started among big powers in 19th century, still continues. In spite of all its problems, Africa is considered to be the continent of future as indicated by the statistical figures mentioned above. Americans, British, Germans, French, Italians, Chinese, Japanese and many others are going to Africa. Among them the excolonial powers have vested interests and traditional political and socio-economic relationship. No one should expect that they would give up him or her.

But, there are also places for Turkey in most African Countries to establish new contacts and cooperations as well as to further develop all kind of existing bilateral relations for the mutual interests. In this context, Turkey offering her experiences to help to find their own models of political and socio-economic developments. Turkey with its big potential for development has many things to share with friendly foreign countries. The model and level of industrial development of Turkey is more suitable for the economic development of developing and African Countries. There are much to learn by these countries from Turkish experiences in their efforts of industrial station, agricultural and agro-industrial productions and method of economic cooperation with industrialized countries- Turkey is also ready to share know-how at her disposal.

On the other hand, Turkey has always been seen in Africa with admiration and sympathy. It is believed that, this is because most African countries have sympathy to Turkey due to religion. In fact, there are strong historical, cultural and religious bonds with a big number of African countries. In the mind of the Christian people of Africa, there is also sympathy for Turkey because of modernization efforts and progress she realized decades after decades since 1920's. Beside, Turkey is not a colonial power. She is a candidate member of European Union (EU) but she is at the same time an Asian and Middle East Country loyal to her past tradition and International Law and order.

There is no impediment for further development of relations between Turkey and African countries. One of the reasons of this mutual sympathy, I believe, is the existence of various people with African background in Turkey and descendants of Turkish origin people in African countries. These peoples are from, and in Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Algeria and Tunisia. There had and has never been discrimination according to color, religion and ethnic origin in Turkey. The ground is there for the development of relations between Turkey and the African countries. 'We have to cultivate it.

For the sympathy felt for Turkey in Africa I will give two examples. First, in Sudan it is believed that all new ideas and techniques came from the ottomans- Second, is the

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recommendation of an eminent African scholars and politicians among them Nigerian Prof. Chike Obi who believe that Atatürk's ideas or "Kemalism" for Black Africa is a sane ideology.

Although, we had always contacts with all African countries within The United Nations and other international Organizations, Turkey could not manage to develop her economic, trade and cultural relation at a desirable level especially with the South of Saharan countries.

Statistics on trade between Turkey and the African countries show that Turkey has much to do in this field. The share of African countries in the total value of export of Turkey is 6.7 % and in the total value of import is approximately 4 %. To be more precise, Turkish export towards African countries which was 748 million $ in 1990 reached to 1,8 billion $ by the end of 1998. Her import which was around 800 million $ between 1991 and 1994 reached to 1.76 billion $ by the end of 1998.

4n the other hand, between 1994-1998, the increase of the total export of Turkey was 49 % while has total import increased 97 %. During the same period the export of Turkey to African countries increased 115 % and the increase of her import from them was 104 %. At the African import market, the volume of which was 134 billion $ in 1998, the share of Turkish export was only 1 .8 billion $ which indicated that the Turkish share in this market is only 1.4 %. Out of the total export of Turkey to African continent, 83 % was realized in North African countries (Algiers, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco) and the rest, 17 % was directed to the others. To sum up, the volume of Turkish export to North African countries has somehow been increased. Furthermore, statistics tell us that the trade volume between Turkey and some North African and black African countries increased from 100 % up to 300-400 %. But, if we look at the total volume of exports of Turkey to these countries we notice that it has a relatively minor importance. Because the export figures of Turkey to the biggest trade partner of Turkey Algeria in North and Liberia and Nigeria in West Africa are consecutively only 482,2; 36,2 and 23,2 million $ in 1998. The same general pattern exists in connection of import of Turkey from Africa. The value of Turkish imports from Algeria, Liberia and Nigeria in 1998, were consecutively 547,3, 3,0 and 2,7 million $.

These statistics show that Turkey has to make sustained efforts in African countries especially in the Sub Saharan regime to improve and increase her trade transaction and economic cooperation. Similar situations exist with her relations in the field of educational, cultural, technical contacts. No doubt, Turkey must have had much more developed relations with African countries. Now, we are witnessing that the Government of Turkey has decided to implement a new Policy of opening up to Africa to overcome the difficulties and obstacles in promoting its relations with African Countries. According this Policy an Action Plan has been prepared and put into action.

Among the aims of the Plan, there are every aspect of relations to be developed by means of diplomatic, bilateral contacts, exchanges of visits and opening new representations in African countries. The lack of representation of Turkey in the countries South of Sahara is one of the important issues of the agenda of the Plan.

Similar policy was designed in 1970's. And a Plan of Action was put into implementation. The essential instrument of this Plan of Action was the creation of Desk System in the administrative organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. African Desk was the first Desk created in this attempt of reorganization of the ministry, I was the head of

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African Desk about two years. Many activities had been done while African Desk remained in function. However, after the initiators of the system, the Minister of the time and his close collaborators took up different duties, the Desk system was abandoned. One of the reasons of abandoning Desk system was the lack of personal to take care all kind of relationship from political to trade, economic and technical and cultural contacts and affairs. It was impossible to fulfill the duties assigned to the Desks by few officers. While I was the Head of the African Desk, I had one assistant, an administrative officer and a secretary.

The same situation existed and 1 know still exists at the Embassies in African countries with few exception. Permit me to share also with you some interesting experiences of mine at the time of my two assignments in African Countries as a young diplomat in Ghana in the middle year of 1960's and as Ambassador in Nigeria during the first half of 1990.

First, Ghana, as a new independent country wanting to diversify its trade approached Turkish Embassy to import Tobacco. We informed the Ministry. But we were not able to receive any response. The Israel Embassy's trade attaché proposed to do joint trade to Ghana and elsewhere in Africa. We were not able to give any answer to that proposal as well.

Just before I left Ankara to take up my duty to Nigeria in 1990, the first meeting of Joint Economic Commission was he1d in Ankara. The second meeting had to be held in Nigeria. But, it was not possible to organize this meeting during 5 years I served there. There was a standing invitation to our Foreign Minister to visit Lagos. I tried to do my best for the realization of this visit. I was not able make it possible too. Among the decisions of 1st Joint Economic Commission there was cooperation on energy matters and possible import by Turkey Nigerian oil and liquidified natural gas. I tried to get the view of the Government on this matter- Surprisingly I had a reply. It was as follows; "'Turkey is in negotiation with neighboring countries and was not interested with Nigerian oil and gas". However, one year later, Nigerian Gas Company knocked my door and informed me that they were just about to sign a contract with Botaş to supply to Turkey 3 billion cubic meters gas per year by the end of 1999.

My assignments to African countries coincided with two important periods of history. The first was during the beginning of decolonisation process in Africa. The second, was at the post collapse of Soviet Empire and the during the Globalization process in the world.

The last period was also an important period for Turkey. In fact, 1980's 'were the years, when Turkey were busy to reform her political and economic systems. As a result of these reforms the system of market economy was adopted. Macro-economic balances were reestablished. The State encouraged private sectors and started an opening up policy to foreign countries to attract investments and increase trade. And at the threshold of 2000, Turkey has acquired a big economic potential enabling her to promote and enlarge her relations not only with African countries but also with all foreign countries. Turkish interest with African countries must be viewed from this perspective.

Even though, African countries face big political and socio-economic problems they can be solved by their own dynamic and foreign assistance. Turkey, with her present economic potential is in a position to help them and be a good partner. Turkey missed the opportunity to establish close relationship with African Countries of Sub Saharan during the decolonisation period. Now, it is high time for Turkey to compensate the time lost in this respect. The new policy of opening up Lo Africa is very timely and well designed. However, no room should be given for the failure of this policy as the one designed in 1970's and had to

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be abandoned. The institutionalization of this initiative is the most important measure to be taken for the success of the policy. A solid and well-staffed Department, in the central administration, that is to say at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be in charge for the implementation of this policy on the one hand and the problems of personal matters of the Embassies which are understaffed should be solve on the other. Without having known the conditions and the climates of the countries with which you want to improve your economic, trade and all other contacts and relations it would be impossible to be successful. Similarly, mere encouragement of businessmen and international contractors to do business, undertake contract and invest in these country is also not enough. You have to assist them in capital, offer credits and insurance or guarantee far eventual loses. Turkey is strong and economically big enough to provide these facilities if only the necessary legal ground is prepared administrative measures are taken and organization is setup. The new Turkish Foreign Policy of Opening up to Africa should give priority to these aspects in the implementation of the Action Plan.

Before I conclude my intervention, I want to underline the importance of the cooperation in educational and cultural field between Turkey and African countries. Education and culture constitute a significant field of cooperation, since investment on human beings is very important. Friendship among nations is created by human beings. For that reason, the cooperation education and culture must have an important place in the new Policy Of Opening Up To Africa of Turkey. All concerned Turkish authorities should give their full political and financial support for its implementation such as signing agreements and granting scholarships. In that context cooperation and interaction between universities should also be encouraged and promoted. In line with this idea, it has come to my knowledge that the establishment of an Institute of African Studies within the Foreign Policy Institute of Turkey is planed. It is an initiative the most valuable for the mutual benefit of Turkey and African countries. When established it will provide a good ground to exchange scholars and researches to study political and economic problems of African countries and shed light to the area of cooperations.

To sum up, Turkey is ready to offer to African countries her experience of nation building. Since the beginning of the 20th century Turkey is a modern country. She is not a colonial power. Africa needs economic cooperation. Turkey can easily be qualified a feasible economic partner, since she has the model of economic development and technology more suitable to Africa countries, the experiences in solving her socio-economic problems and conducting her relations with outside world which always proved to be for the mutual benefit of all sides.

I believed that the early decades of 21st century will witnessed the success of the new Turkish Policy of opening up to Africa and ever-growing cooperation between Turkey and African countries will bring them closer.

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