DFA vs NLRC

Facts:On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against Asian Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi.The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.Issues:1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this caseHeld:1.Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law."One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."2.No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private companies. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard topublic acts or acts jure imperiiof a state, but not with regard toprivate act or acts jure gestionis.Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.3.Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community. When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity."In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity. "In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae."In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity."In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved."4.Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has, under special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the questioned order or decision is issuedin excess of or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is apatent nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the present case. When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID. (DFA vs NLRC,G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996)Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge FirmeMUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. FIRME

G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991

Facts:

A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of MacarioNieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including LaureanoBania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.

Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.

Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme ordered defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses.

Private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court, including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.Issue: Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

Ruling:

Non-suability of the state.

The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.

Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

"Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."

Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.

Dual capacity of LGU.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power."

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilianriver to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets."

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

We already stressed in the case ofPalafox, et.al.vs.Province of IlocosNorte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."

After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusionthat the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM, JR.

G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010, Peralta,J:p

FACTS: A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan for collection of sum of money and damages. The complaint alleged that a contract was entered into by Lim Chao and the Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to the Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to P5,820,000.00. However, despite having made several deliveries, the Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim Chaos claim for payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of the said amount, with interest and damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the Municipality. The trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing the sheriff "to attach the estate, real and personal properties" of the Municipality.

The Municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the claim on which the action had been brought was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, pointing out that there was no written contract or document that would evince the supposed agreement they entered into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued, invoking, among others, immunity of the state from suit. The Municipality argued that as a municipal corporation, it is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment. Lim Chao on her part, counters that, the Municipalitys claim of immunity from suit is negated by the Local Government Code, which vests municipal corporations with the power to sue and be sued. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts order.

ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipality of Hagonoy is valid.

HELD: No. The universal rule is that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects.

Sabili vs COMELEC

Facts:

1. COMELEC denied Sabilis Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with the one year residency requirement.

2. When petitioner filed his COC1for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months.

3. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.

4. respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification

5. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.

6. In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.

7. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation42with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.

8. In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,43the COMELECen bancdenied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.

9. Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.

Issues:

1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

Ruling:

1. As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.

2. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty

3. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.

4. Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable.

5. In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

6. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

7. Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation.

8. Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the parties and the COMELECs appreciation thereof.

9. Basically, the allegations of the Petitioner Sabili are tantamount to allege that the COMELEC, in denying his COC committed grave abuse of discretion. The court here defined what grave abuse of discretion is; and by that chose and ruled to review the acts of COMELEC under its jurisdiction.

10. Eventually he was able to prove that he was a resident of Lipa and the SC granted his petition.

11. Aldovino VS COMELEC

12. FACTS:13. Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.14. Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.15. ISSUE:16. WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?17. RULING:18. NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).19. The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.20. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.Talaga vs COMELEC

LUCENA CITYIncumbent Lucena Mayor Barbara Ruby Talaga (Lakas-Kampi) was unseated by the Supreme Court and replaced by her vice mayor, Roderick Alcala (Liberal Party).

In an SC decision dated Oct. 9, 2012 but was only released Thursday, a copy of which was posted on its website, the court affirmed the decision of the Commission on Election en banc on May 20, 2011 that annulled the election and proclamation of Talaga as mayor of Lucena and cancelled the certificate of canvass that declared her as the winner in May 10, 2010 election.

The said Comelec resolution also granted the petition for intervention of Alcala and ordered him to succeed Barbara as provided under Section 44 or the succession rule for elected local officials under Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.

The poll body had reversed and set aside the resolution by the Comelec 2nd Division in January 2011 that ruled Talagas election as valid and legal.

Lucena Councilor Rey Olivier Alejandrino, Alcalas political ally, said the vice mayor received the copy of the SC decision Thursday afternoon.

The vice mayor is a nephew of Agriculture Secretary Proceso Alcala, a close ally of President Benigno Aquino III.

Talagas youngest son, number one Lucena Councilor Ramil Talaga, will replace Alcala as vice mayor.

Questions on the legitimacy of Talagas assumption to office arose when she substituted for her husband Ramon Talaga Jr. then the incumbent city mayor.

In 2010 election, Ramon, while then serving his last term, filed his CoC with the belief that he was still qualified to run for a fresh term because he was suspended for three months and thus failed to serve three consecutive terms in office.

But the Comelec later ruled he was no longer qualified to run for another term. Under existing elections law, a local elected official (councilors to congressmen) can only serve for three consecutive three-year terms.

Ramon had himself substituted by his wife just six days before the elections, a fact that was hidden from their political foes and the city electorate.

In the final tally, Ramon received 44,099 votes while his opponent Philip Castillo, a former vice mayor, earned 39,615.

Based on existing election laws on substitution, the votes garnered by Ramon were automatically considered votes for his substitute, his wife Barbara.

Castillo consequently asked the Comelec to declare him as the winner as he argued that since Ramons candidacy was found by the poll body to be defective and null and void from the start, it meant that he ran unopposed and thus should be declared as the victor in the last election.

In the 26-page SC decision penned by Associate Justice Lucas Bersamin, the high tribunal ruled that Ramons disqualification rendered his CoC invalid and thus, could not be validly substituted.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidatethat a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate, the SC said.

However, the SC dismissed Castillos assertion that he was entitled to assume the city mayoralty post for having obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates.

The high tribunal reiterated its earlier ruling that a candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was not the choice of the sovereign will'.

The SC added: There was to be no question that the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated position. No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.

Although not an original party to the poll protest between Castillo and Talaga, Alcala filed a petition for intervention with the Comelec last July 22, 2010 to implement Section 44 or the succession rule for elected local officials under RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.

The SC said Talagas dismissal has resulted to a permanent vacancy in the office of Lucena mayor and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law of succession as defined under the Local Government Code.

Ramon, who is the current city administrator, will clash with Alcala for the mayoralty post in next year election.

Ramil, youngest son of theTalagas, will be the running mate of his father. The youngTalaga will face opposition from Castillo (LP).

Quinto vs COMELEC

QUINTO vs. COMELEC, 1 DECEMBER 2009

Congress enacted RA 8436 on December 22, 1997. On January 23, 2007. it enacted RA 9369, amending the previous act. Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight.Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. ISSUES:1. Do petitioners have locus standi?2. Do the second proviso in paragraph 3, Section 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and Section 4(a) of RA 8678 violate the equal protection clause? HELD:1. The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling state interest involved in their early resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the government's manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional, issues. The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy.2. It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association.Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369.In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad. First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Quinto Vs COMELEC 22 Feb. 2010This is a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Supreme Court in Quinto vs. COMELEC, 1 December 2009. ISSUES:1. Do the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause?2. Do the assailed provisions suffer from overbreadth?HELD: 1. No. The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken.The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. 2. No. The view that the assailed provisions are overly broad because they apply indiscriminately to all appointive civil servants regardless of position obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power."[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason enough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by such employees or the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto. Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.Mitra vs COMELEC

Certificate of candidacy; residency requirement.

The Omnibus Election Code provides that a certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled if there is any false representation of a material fact.

The critical material facts are those that refer to a candidates qualifications for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence.

The false representation must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office.

Thus, the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results.

The foregoing are the legal standards by which the COMELEC must act on a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.

Thus, in considering the residency of a candidate as stated in the certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC must determine whether or not the candidate deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact about his or her residency that would otherwise render him or her ineligible for the position sought.

The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this case when, in considering the residency issue, it based its decision solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards, such as the nature or design and furnishings of the dwelling place in relation to the stature of the candidate. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010.

Nature: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a resident of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he ran for the position of Governor. Mitra came to this Court to seek the reversal of the cancellation.

Facts:

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan.

This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City.

He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan.

The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 ofBrgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.

Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

Held: YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution.

RATIO:

The election ofAbraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3.

The respondentswere not able to presenta convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC.

Likewise,the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."

Mitras domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor in light of the relatively recent change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial officials he had to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new one within the local government unit where he intended to run; this would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the following:

(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;

(2) an intention to remain there; and

(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

Mitra, presented sworn statements of various persons (including the seller of the land he purchased, the lessor of the Maligaya Feedmill, and the Punong Barangay of the site of his residence) attesting to his physical residence in Aborlan; photographs of the residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he resides, and of his experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm; the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill; and the deed of sale of the lot where he has started constructing his house. He clarified, too, that he does not claim residence in Aborlan at the house then under construction; his actual residence is the mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill building.

Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and has therefore the mandate of the electorate to serve

NOTES:

The minimum requirement under our Constitution and election laws for the candidates residency in the political unit they seek to represent has never been intended to be an empty formalistic condition; it carries with it a very specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s] unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community" from seeking elective offices in that community.

The purpose of the residency requirement is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."

Read and understood in this manner, residency can readily be appreciated as a requirement that goes into the heart of our democratic system; it directly supports the purpose of representation electing those who can best serve the community because of their knowledge and sensitivity to its needs. It likewise adds meaning and substance to the voters freedom of choice in the electoral exercise that characterizes every democracy.

To acquire a new domicile a domicile by choice the following must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must be an animus non revertendi with respect to the old domicile, and an animus manendi at the domicile of choice. The intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time and the acts of the person must be consistent with this intent.