development of an active device for the detection of 137 cs in steel factories j.l....
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DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTIVE DEVICE FOR THE DETECTION OF 137CS
IN STEEL FACTORIES
J.L. Gutierrez-Villanueva, I. Fuente, J.Quindos, C.Sainz, L.S.Quindos
6th Dresden Symposium
HAZARDS – DETECTION AND MANAGEMENT
September 20 – 24, 2010 Dresden Germany
Where we are …
GRUPO RADÓNFacultad de MedicinaAvda. Cardenal Herrera Oria s/n39011 SantanderCantabria (SPAIN)e-mail: [email protected]: +34 942 20 22 07
.- FOUNDED IN 1976 AROUND NATURAL RADIATION MEASUREMENTS
.- 1976-1982: ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
.- 1982-1985: ALTAMIRA CAVE
.-1985-1989: INHALATION TOXICOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, USA
.-1989-TODAY: RADON STUDIES IN SPAIN RADIATION PROTECTION IN STEEL FACTORIES
WHO WE ARE ………...WHO WE ARE ………...
Laboratory validated by Health Protection Agency (HPA, UK) for indoor radon measurements
Laboratory Quality System certified by AENOR (ISO 9001)
RADON GROUP TODAY 11 PEOPLE:
2 Professors 1 Postdoctoral researcher 3 Ph.D. student 5 Laboratory technicians
Relevant instrumentationRelevant instrumentation
• Gamma spectrometry: HPGe, NaI• BERTHOLD Alpha beta counter• Radosys (radon indoors)• Equipments for the measurement of radon “in situ” (soil, air and water): SARAD, Alphaguard• Equipment for X-Ray fluorescence• Radiation monitors
RADIOLOGICAL
PROTECTION IN
STEEL FACTORIES
Radiological Dispersal Device RDD
Courtesy of Sarad GmbH
Classical Threat ScenariosClassical Threat Scenarios
Acquisition of a nuclear weapon Acquisition of nuclear material to construct
a nuclear weapon Acquisition of radioactive material to cause
a radiological hazard (“dirty bomb”)
New Threat Aspects after 9/11:
Terror attacks can be internationally coordinated operations
Time frame for planning an attack can be years Terrorists are willing to commit collective suicide Terrorists are capable of using sophisticated
logistics Non-terrorist threat: orphan sources in steel
factories
LOSS OF CONTROL OVER LOSS OF CONTROL OVER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN USARADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN USA
For material licensed under the Atomic Energy Act (1954):
Up to 2 million devices with radioactive sources have been
distributed to 190,000 US licences
300 reports/year of lost/stolen material
(mostly short-lived or small sources)
US has lost control over about 30,000 radioactive sources
(“orphans”)*
*US EPA (1998)
ACERINOX, Cadiz (1998, Spain), ACERINOX, Cadiz (1998, Spain), Cs-137 incident (Cs-137 incident (120 Ci120 Ci))
Day: 30th of May 1998
Time: 00 Z
Day: 30th of May 1998
Time: 06 Z
"SPANISH PROTOCOL FOR COLLABORATION ON THE
RADIATION MONITORING OF METALLIC MATERIALS"
1998
DETECTION OF SOURCES IN STEEL SPANISH FACTORIES (1998-2010)
MAIN STEEL FACTORIES IN SPAINMAIN STEEL FACTORIES IN SPAIN
(nGyh-1)
240
200
160
120
80
40
ORIGIN OF ORPHAN SOURCES
REASONS FOR THE DETECTION
TYPES OF SOURCES
OPEN SOURCES
SOURCES WITH SHIELD EQUIPMENT
DETECTION OF NORM
ARCELOR FACTORY IN SESTAO HARBOUR ARCELOR FACTORY IN SESTAO HARBOUR ( BIZKAIA, SPAIN)( BIZKAIA, SPAIN)
ARCELOR FACTORY ENTRANCE OF ARCELOR FACTORY ENTRANCE OF SCRAP IN SESTAO ( BIZKAIA, SPAIN)SCRAP IN SESTAO ( BIZKAIA, SPAIN)
RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS IN RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS IN SPANISH STEEL FACTORIESSPANISH STEEL FACTORIES
.-ACERINOX, 30th of May 1998 -----120 Ci
.-SIDERURGICA SEVILLANA, 7th of December 2001 ----- 2.7 Ci
.-DANIEL GONZALEZ RIESTRA, 11th of Auguts 2003, 210 mCi
.-ACERIA COMPACTA DE BISKAIA, 15th of September 2003, 47 mCi
.-SIDENOR INDUSTRIAL, 24th of March 2004, 81 mCi
.-ARCELOR ZUMARRAGA, 31st of May 2004, 20 mCi
.-SIDENOR INDUSTRIAL, 24th of March 2007, 40 mCi .-ACERIA COMPACTA DE BISKAIA, 10th of April 2007, 2 mCi
CS-137 SOURCES & Ir-192CS-137 SOURCES & Ir-192
Scenario Proposed: Scenario Proposed: Radioactive materials in the Radioactive materials in the
scrapscrap
Cs-137 Am-241 Ra-226 Sr-90 Co-60 Ir-192
METAL PHASE
SLAG PHASE
DUST
SMELTING C0-60
1000 Ci
STEEL(3 cm) + CONCRETE(22 cm)
COBALT-60
1 m 2.000 μSv/h
2 m
700 μSv/h
5 m100 μSv/h
10 m
25 μSv/h
130 Tn
FIRST DEVICE:REDIFASE-SODERCAN-U.CANTABRIA
"IN SITU CS-137 MEASUREMENTSIN STEEL DUST"
CLASSICAL DEVICE
SILO FOR steel DUST
200 TONNES
30-40 tonnes per day
Cleaning: 5 days
Accumulated activity:
1 curie of Cs-137
"IN SITU detection OF CESIUM 137
IN STEEL DUST"
GSW (GLOBAL STEEL WIRE)
"IN SITU detection of CESIUM 137 "IN SITU detection of CESIUM 137 in steel dust"in steel dust"
Lower Limit of
Detection:
0.5 Bq/g for a five minutes
counting
NEW DEVICE: In situ detection
NaI NaI
NaI
NaI
Advantages of new system:
• In situ detection of smelting
• Detection Limit ~ 0.1 Bq/g
• In case of accident: Economical
Losses are drastically reduced
System is under developmentWe are open for funding from steel factories (potential patent)
INTERNATIONAL INTERCOMPARISON EXERCISE ON NATURAL RADIATION MEASUREMENTS UNDER FIELD
CONDITIONS
Organized by the Radon Group (University of Cantabria, SPAIN)
SUMMER 2011
Saelices el Chico
(Salamanca, Spain)
www.elradon.comwww.elradon.com
Thank you very much for your attention
Danke Schön
GRUPO RADÓNFacultad de MedicinaAvda. Cardenal Herrera Oria s/n39011 SantanderCantabria (SPAIN)Phone: +34 942 20 22 07e-mail: [email protected]