Definitionofinitiatingeventsincludingprotection

misoperation fordynamicstudiesofcascadingoutages

E.Ciapessoni,D.Cirio,A.PittoRicerca sul Sistema Energetico RSES.p.A.

Milan,Italy

1

Overview

• Challengesinmodelingcontingenciesfordynamicstudies

• Probabilisticmodelingapproach• Examples• Conclusions

2

Modeling initating contingencies fordynamicstudies:stateofartandchallenges

• Nowadays’timedomain-based cascading simulators– Dynamicmodels formost commonprotectionrelays (overcurrent,distance,

under/overvoltage)areincluded,tosimulatecascadingevolution (+)– little attentiondevoted tothedefinitionoftheinitiatingevent (-)

• Dependence inN-kevents (kusually <3)is not considered• Simplified representation ofsubstation configuration («bus-branch»model)

• However,thefollowing factors areimportant toevaluate thefinalimpactofadisturbance inadynamic simulation:– Linking contingencieswithroot causes

• Starting fromthreats todrivetheselection ofmost dangerous N-kcontingencies

– Substationconfiguration• Simplebusbar,doublebusbar

– Primaryandback-upprotection response inearly faultstages• Correct operation,stuck breaker,communication failure• Timesequence ofprotection intervention is important:same«static»contingency canbe

translated into different «dynamic»ctgs

3

Modeling theinitiating contingencies inRSE’sProbabilistic Risk Assessment tool

4

Herecontingencymodels aredefined

fordynamicsimulations!

Approach forcontingencymodeling indynamics

• Aninitiatingcontingency isdefined intermsof:– Fault(type,impedance andlocation)– Outaged components– Timesequence ofprotection interventions inthevery early instants after thefault– Its probability ofoccurrence

• Accountingforprimaryandback-upprotections inearly faultstage– Busdifferential protections– Backupprotections (IIzonedistance relays forlines,overcurrent protections fortrafos)– Breaker failure devices

5

Outaged elements

Timesequence ofprot.interventions

Probability ofoccurrence

Hazard model

Substationconfiguration

Protection responsetype C

TG F

EATU

RES

… used to evaluate …

Hazardmodeltheroot causes ofcontingencies

6

Probabilistic models ofhazardspThr(s,t,x)

Probabilistic models ofcomponentvulnerability

PV(t|s,t,x)

DATAinputs (user,onlinemonitoringsystems, historical dataseries,etc.)

Tuning of models

Component failure probability

Forany component,located at x

Contingency probability

Combining component failure probs

SHORT TERMLONG TERM

Selection of«critical»components

( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫ ⋅=

t

t SThrVF ddsxspxstPtxP

0

,,,,|, τττ

Substation configuration:themodel• «Bus-branch»representation usually available for

substationsmodeling incurrent tools– Lack ofdataonactual substation configuration

• «Bus-branch»modelconverted into «node-breaker»model

– using reasonable assumptions based onbaypower flows

7

Half-busbar

sets

1 Odd elements of LE & TUEven elements of LU & TE

2 Odd elements of LO & TEEven elements of LE & TU

Defining four bay sets:LU (lines with outgoing power flow), TU (transformers with outgoing

power flow), LE (lines with injected power flow), TE (transformers with injected

power flow)Applying the rules in the table above

Contingency Enumeration fromhazard modelsTheinitial setofctgs (tobefurther screened)is given by:- All N-1ctgs- multipleN-kcontingencies

- power plant andbusbarctgs,considering possiblemalfunctioning ofprotection systems

- Multiplebranchcontingencies duetoextensive effect ofacommonthreat (e.g. astorm)

Risk based ctg screening is thenperformed using topological(geodesic length,net-ability)metrics toassess impact

8

Hazard modeling Vulnerabilitymodeling

Calculating probability offailure forpower/ICTcomponents

Identifying setofindividual critical components

Defining N-1,N-kcontingencies(including componentdependencies)

Calculating contingencyprobability

Calculating ex-anteimpact

Calculating «ex-ante»risk

Contingency screeningbased onex-anterisk

Multiplecontingencies:selection criteria

• AnextensiveN-kanalysisis unfeasible– Combinatorial explosion!

• Need forcriteria todrivethesearch

• Selecting componentsmorepronetofail(«critical components»)using cumulativescreeningmethod

9

Criticalcomponents allowidentifying:

– Thecritical branches– Criticalsubstations:if theirbusbars orat least one ofconnectedbranch arelistedinthecritical componentset

– Criticalpower plants:iftheir busbars orgeneratorsarelisted inthecriticalcomponentset

Which dependencies?• Geographical dependency among components inN-kmultiplebranch contingencies– All components affected bythesame root cause

• Functional dependencies in:– Doublecircuit outages– Power Plant (PP)outages

• AFaultonEHVbusbarmaydisconnectedthewholePPconnectedtothebusbar

– Busbar outages• Anincorrectoperationofprotectionsmay tripmorecomponentsthan expected

• Afailureonameasurement transformers andcircuitbreakersmaylead totheoutageofthebusbar theyareconnectedto

10

Protection SystemResponsemodelMultiplecontingencies onbusbars

• Busbar contingencies– different assumptions onprotectionsystem responses:B1)correctfaultclearingwithbusdifferentialprotectionsB2)Acircuitbreakeronabayisstuck.B3)Busbar couplerdoesn’topen

• onlyfortheseparable busbarB4)missedinterventionofbusbardifferentialprotection

• Specifications ofcontingenciesB1andB2arerequired accordingtothesubstation configuration (singleordoublebusbar)

• Probability oftheN-kcontingency is evaluated bycombiningfailure probabilities ofthedifferent involveddevices (branches,relays,circuit breakers,etc.)

11

Protection SystemResponsemodelMultiplecontingencies onpower plants

• Power plant contingencies cansignificantly threatenpower system securityduetothepowermismatch theymay cause

• Tripping ofmany units at atimeis possible incaseof:– Stressed operating conditions– Problems totherelated thermal process (incaseofthermalunits)

– Faultonthebusbars oftheEHVsubstation which connectsthePPtothegrid

12

Assessing theprobability ofoccurrence:Commonmodeevents

• Importantexampleofcommonmodeoutages– E.g.Storm affecting aportion ofthegrid

• Usingthesame threat modeltodetermine failure probs ofinvolvedcomponents is theintrinsic causeofdependenceamongPFj(t)– Thehigher thehazard magnitude,thehigher theprobabilities ofall affected

components• N-kbranchoutages probalso is given by

PCTG(t)=Pj=1…TR PFj(t)*Pk=TR+1…N (1-PFk(t))

TR=nroftripped components, N=total nrofcomps• Incaseofdoublecircuit lines (circuits AandB)theapproachallows toestimate

failureprobability ofthedoublecircuitp(AOUT&BOUT)=C([PA PB],rho)

C is thecorrelationmodel(copula),rhomaybederivedfromanalysisofhistoricaldata(rho=0incaseoftwo lineswithsameterminals but nocommonpathway)

13

From samehazard model!

( )( ) ( )( )

( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )( )( )

( )( )⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥

⎦

⎤

⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢

⎣

⎡

⋅−×

×⋅−−×

×⋅−×−

−

∏

∏

∏

⎭⎬⎫

⎩⎨⎧=

⎪⎭

⎪⎬⎫

⎪⎩

⎪⎨⎧=

⎭⎬⎫

⎩⎨⎧=

Xbusbar -half on theconnectedstrasformer

,

Xbusbar -half on theconnected linescircuit double

ofcircuit singletripping,,,,

Xbusbar -half on theconnectedlinescircuit single

,

1

,,1

11

1

jocCBtrafo

k

ocCBkBkAkAk

iocCBiHB

jj

k

iX

ptp

ptptpCtp

ptptp

ρ

Assessing theprobability ofoccurrence:busbar contingencies

14

OK

Line breaker doesn’t open

F

F

Busbar doesn’t open

F

F

N-k all the

section

N-k faulted half

busbar

N-k faulted half

busbar

Busbar Differential doesn’t trip

N-k all the

section

Initial Condition

Final Condition

Resulting Contingency

Conditions

Tripping the remote end of the lines

C = correlation model; pk,A = failure prob. of circuit A of k-th double circuit

Example (only for substations with separable busbars)Opening bays of half-busbar X (X = 1, 2) of busbar v

Busbar fail. prob increased by including PT’s and CB’sphalf-busbar system = 1 – (1-phalf-bus)*Õi: all CBs (1-pCBi) Õj: all PTs (1-pPTj).

Assessing theprobability ofoccurrence:power plant (PP)outages

• Possible loss ofaPPgiven afaultonEHVside• Similar tobusbar outages but increased failureprobability ofstep-up transformers toaccountforgenerators’failure probability

15

tr_2

~

Set T_G_tr_1

tr_1

HV 1

G1

ptr1’ = 1- (1-ptr1)*(1-ptr2)*(1-pG1)

NO CB’s!

EXAMPLE

Timesequence ofprotection interventionstheadditional protection device models

• Timesequence ofprotection interventionsplayanessential rule toassess ctg impactonpower systemdynamics– Same «static»contingency is translated into different

«dynamic»ctgs• Dynamic studies requiresadditionalmodels toaccount

forfurther protectionresponse types anddeviceswhichmayaffect timesequence

– Missing signal fromprotection relays– Breaker failure device (BFD)operation

• possible toassess theprobabilityofoccurrencealso for«dynamic»ctgs

– see tables innext slides

• IncludesP4andP5multiplecontingencies reported inTable1ofNERCStandardTPL-001-4—“TransmissionSystemPlanningPerformanceRequirements”,lastrev.Nov2014

16

87

21

BFD

KCB

Dynamic definition ofcontingencies

17

CTGID

Description Probability ICT failure/stuckbreaker

Action

1 Busbar fault withcorrect operationof all CBs and BDP

psb/2*prod(1-pCBj)*(1-pK)*prod(1-p_bdpj)*(1-p_bdpK)*(1-pBDP)

NO Intervention of BDP

2a Busbar fault withmalfunction ofone signal to a CB

Psb/2*p_bdpj*(1-pCBj) *(1-pBDP)(forany j)

YES, missing signalto a CB

Intervention of BDP and breaker failuredevice on one CB

2b Busbar fault withone stuck breaker

Psb/2*pCBj*(1-pBDP)(forany j)

YES, one CB stuck Intervention of BDP and back up protectionfor one CB

3a Busbar fault withmissing signal to K

Psb/2*(1-pK)*p_bdpK*(1-pBDP)For any half-busbar

YES, missing signalto K

Intervention of BDP for faulty half-busbar +back-up protections for components of safehalf-busbar

3b Busbar fault withstuck K

Psb/2*pK*(1-pBDP)For any half-busbar

YES, stuck K Intervention of BDP for faulty half-busbar +breaker failure device for components ofsafe half-busbar

3c Busbar fault withBDP out of service

Psb/2*pBDPFor any half-busbar

YES, BDP out ofservice

Intervention of all backup protections forall components at two half-busbars

Source: TERNA (Italian TSO)

K = bus couplerpsb = failure probability (f.p.) at a busbarptr2 = transformer failure probabilitypl = line failure probabilityp_bdpj = BDP signal f.p. at component jp_dsj = distance protection signal f.p.p_ptj = Transformer protection signal f.p.p_BDP = probability of failure of Bus Differential Protection (BDP)

LEGEND

P4 and P5 outagesfrom TPL 001-4

P5

P4

P4

P5

P5

18

CTGID

Description Probability ICTfailure/stuckbreaker

Action

4 Line fault Pl* (1-pCBj)*(1-p_dsj) NO Opening of faulty line with distanceprotections + telepiloting

5 Transfo fault Ptr2* (1-pCBj)* (1-p_ptj)

NO Opening of faulty transformer withovercurrent/differential protections

6 Line fault with stuckbreaker

Plj*pCBjFor any line j

YES, stuckbreaker

Intervention of breaker failure devicefor all safe CBs and backup protectionintervention for faulty CB

6b Line fault with missingtripping signal fromdistance protection(telepiloting)

Plj*(1-pCBj)*p_dsjFor any line j

YES, missingsignal

Intervention of back-up protections forcomponents of the whole substationconnected the faulty component

7 transfo fault with stuckbreaker

Ptr2j*pCBjFor any transfo j

YES, stuckbreaker

Intervention of breaker failure devicefor all safe CBs and backup protectionintervention for faulty CB

7b transfo fault withmissing signal fromovercurrent/differentialprotection

Ptr2j*(1-pCBj)*p_ptjFor any transfo j

YES, missingsignal

Intervention of back-up protections forcomponents of the whole substationconnected the faulty component

K = bus couplerpsb = failure probability (f.p.) at a busbarptr2 = transformer failure probabilitypl = line failure probabilityp_bdpj = BDP signal f.p. at component jp_dsj = distance protection signal f.p.p_ptj = Transformer protection signal f.p.p_BDP = probability of failure of Bus Differential Protection (BDP)

LEGENDDynamic definition of

contingencies

P4

P4

Applicationexamples onrealistic EHVPS

• EHVgrid undertest:220/400kVSicily network

• Contingency setdefinedstartingfroma«storm»scenarioaffectingNorth-Westofisland– Includes 253ctgs (N-1,N-2and

multiple dependent N-kbusbarandpower plant ctgs)

• Two cases:– ScenarioA:telepiloting of

distance relays ON(IIzone=140ms)

– ScenarioB:Telepiloting OFF(IIzone=400ms)

19

0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01 0.012

N-1_CORP211_CRCP211N-1_CORP211_CRCP211SSB1_PRRP211SSB2_PRRP211N-1_BLLP211_CRCP211N-1_BLLP211_CRCP211N-1_CMRP211_PRRP211N-1_CMRP211_PRRP211N-1_PNAP211_PRRP211N-1_PNAP211_PRRP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-1_BLLP211_PRRP211N-1_BLLP211_PRRP211N-1_CMRP211_CRCP211N-1_CMRP211_CRCP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-CRCP211_CMRP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2250SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2251N-1_CORP211_SRGP211N-1_CORP211_SRGP211N-2_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2225SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2224SSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2223SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2222SB_CRCP211_BDP_OOSSB_CRCP211_BDP_OOSSB_CRCP211_HB2_stuck_BusCouplSB_CRCP211_HB1_stuck_BusCouplSSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2250SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2251SSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2225SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2224SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2210SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2210SSB2_CRCP211SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CRCP211A1SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CRCP211A3SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CRCP211A1SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CRCP211A3SSB1+DT_PRRP211_L_251 _stuckCBSSB2+DT_PRRP211_L_250 _stuckCBSSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2223SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2222SSB1+DT_CRCP211_L_210 _stuckCBSSB1_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2250SSB2_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2251SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2211SSB1_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2225SSB2_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2224SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2248SSB2_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CRCP211A1SSB2_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CRCP211A3SSB2_CMRP211SSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CMRP211A2SSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CMRP211A2SSB1_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2223SSB2_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2222SSB2_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2210N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-3_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SB_CRCP211_HB2_MSig_2_BusCouplSB_CRCP211_HB1_MSig_2_BusCouplN-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CORP211A2SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CORP211A2SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2205SSB1_CORP211SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2205SSB2+DT_CRCP211_L_209 _stuckCBSSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2250SSB1_CMRP211SSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CMRP211A1SSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CMRP211A1SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2211SSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2249N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2210N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB2_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CMRP211A2N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2251SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2248SSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2248N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2231SSB2_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2211SSB2+DT_CRCP211_L_212 _stuckCBSSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2250SSB1_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CMRP211A1SSB2+DT_CRCP211_L_249 _stuckCBSSB1_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2205N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2210SSB1_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CORP211A2N-4_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB2_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2248SSB2+DT_CMRP211_L_251 _stuckCBSSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2249SSB2_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2+DT_CMRP211_L_248 _stuckCBSSB2_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2250SSB1_BLLP211SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_BLLP211A2SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_BLLP211A2SSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2251N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB2_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBN-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211SSB2_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2249SSB1+DT_CORP211_L_209 _stuckCBSSB1+DT_CMRP211_L_250 _stuckCBSSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2248SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2211SSB1+DT_CMRP211_L_249 _stuckCBSSB1_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2210N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2251SSB1_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBN-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-6_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2222SSB2_BLLP211SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_BLLP211A3SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_BLLP211A3SSB1_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2248SSB1_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_BLLP211A2N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2211SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2212SSB1+DT_BLLP211_L_212 _stuckCBSSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2223SSB2_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_BLLP211A3SSB1_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2211SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2212SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2222SSB1_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2222SSB2+DT_BLLP211_L_211 _stuckCBSSB2_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2212SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2223SSB2_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2223SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2231SSB1_CRCP211SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CRCP211A2SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CRCP211A2SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2226SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2226SSB1_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2231SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2209SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2209SSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2204SSB2_CORP211SSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2204SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2249SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2212SSB1_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2226N-1_CORP211_SFMP231SSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2209SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2212SSB1_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CRCP211A2SSB1_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2209SB_CMRP211_HB2_stuck_BusCouplSB_CMRP211_HB1_stuck_BusCouplSSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2249SSB1+DT_CRCP211_L_248 _stuckCBN-1_CORP211_SFMP221SSB1_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2212SSB1+DT_CRCP211_L_211 _stuckCBSSB1_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2249SSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2232SSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2209SSB2_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2204SSB1_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2+DT_CORP211_L_210 _stuckCBSSB2_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2209SB_CMRP211_HB1_MSig_2_BusCouplSB_CMRP211_HB2_MSig_2_BusCouplSB_CMRP211_BDP_OOSSB_CMRP211_BDP_OOSN-1_CRCP211_TIMP211SSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2232SSB2_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2232SSB2_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CB

Angle based Instability Impact Index (dt = 10 minutes)Impact value

Con

tinge

ncy

ID

0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01 0.012

N-1_CORP211_CRCP211N-1_CORP211_CRCP211SSB1_PRRP211SSB2_PRRP211N-1_BLLP211_CRCP211N-1_BLLP211_CRCP211N-1_CMRP211_PRRP211N-1_CMRP211_PRRP211N-1_PNAP211_PRRP211N-1_PNAP211_PRRP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-1_BLLP211_PRRP211N-1_BLLP211_PRRP211N-1_CMRP211_CRCP211N-1_CMRP211_CRCP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-CRCP211_CMRP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-2_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2250SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2251SSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2225SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2224SSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2223SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2222SSB1_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_PRRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBN-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211SSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2250SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2251N-1_CORP211_SRGP211N-1_CORP211_SRGP211N-2_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2225SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2224N-3_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB1_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2223SSB2_PRRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2222SB_CRCP211_BDP_OOSSB_CRCP211_BDP_OOSSSB1+DT_PRRP211_L_251 _stuckCBSSB2+DT_PRRP211_L_250 _stuckCBSSB1_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2223SSB2_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2222SSB1_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2225SSB2_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2224SSB1_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2250SSB2_PRRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2251SB_CRCP211_HB2_MSig_2_BusCouplSB_CRCP211_HB1_MSig_2_BusCouplN-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-3_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SB_CRCP211_HB2_stuck_BusCouplSB_CRCP211_HB1_stuck_BusCouplSSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2210SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2210SSB2_CRCP211SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CRCP211A1SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CRCP211A3SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CRCP211A1SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CRCP211A3SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2211SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2248SSB1+DT_CRCP211_L_210 _stuckCBSSB2_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2211N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211N-5_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB2_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2248N-4_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211SSB2_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2248SSB2_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CRCP211A1SSB2_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CRCP211A3SSB2_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2211SSB2+DT_CRCP211_L_249 _stuckCBSSB2_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2210SSB2_CMRP211SSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CMRP211A2SSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CMRP211A2SSB2+DT_CRCP211_L_212 _stuckCBSSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2250SSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2249SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CORP211A2SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2205SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CORP211A2SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2205SSB1_CORP211SSB2+DT_CRCP211_L_209 _stuckCBSSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2250SSB1_CMRP211SSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CMRP211A1SSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CMRP211A1SSB1+DT_CORP211_L_209 _stuckCBSSB2_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2+DT_CMRP211_L_248 _stuckCBSSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2210SSB2_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2249N-6_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_BLLP211-CRCP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CMRP211-PRRP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211_Ln_CORP211-CRCP211SSB2+DT_CMRP211_L_251 _stuckCBSSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2251SSB2_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2249SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2231SSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2210SSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2248SSB2_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2250SSB1_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CMRP211A2SSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2251SSB1+DT_CMRP211_L_249 _stuckCBSSB1_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CMRP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2231SSB1_CMRP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2248SSB1_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2248SSB1+DT_CMRP211_L_250 _stuckCBSSB1_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2231SSB1_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2210SSB1_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2251SSB1_CMRP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CMRP211A1SSB1_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2205SSB1_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CORP211A2SSB1_BLLP211SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_BLLP211A2SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_BLLP211A2SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2211SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2222SSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2211SSB1_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2222SSB1+DT_BLLP211_L_212 _stuckCBSSB1_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2222SSB2_BLLP211SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_BLLP211A3SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_BLLP211A3SSB1_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2211SSB1_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_BLLP211A2SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2212SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2223SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2212SSB2_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_BLLP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2223SSB2_BLLP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2223SSB2_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2212SSB2_BLLP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_BLLP211A3SSB2+DT_BLLP211_L_211 _stuckCBSSB1_CRCP211SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2226SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_T_CRCP211A2SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_T_CRCP211A2SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2226SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2209SSB1_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CRCP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2249SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2209SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2212SB_CMRP211_HB1_MSig_2_BusCouplSB_CMRP211_HB2_MSig_2_BusCouplSSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2204SSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2204SSB2_CORP211SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2249SSB1_CRCP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2212SSB2+DT_CORP211_L_210 _stuckCBSB_CMRP211_BDP_OOSSB_CMRP211_BDP_OOSSSB1_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2212SSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2209SSB1_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2209SSB1_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2249SSB1+DT_CRCP211_L_211 _stuckCBSSB1+DT_CRCP211_L_248 _stuckCBN-1_CORP211_SFMP231SSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_stuckCB_L_PP2232SSB2_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CORP211_no_signal_to_one_CBSSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2209SSB1_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2226SSB1_CRCP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_T_CRCP211A2SB_CMRP211_HB2_stuck_BusCouplSB_CMRP211_HB1_stuck_BusCouplN-1_CORP211_SFMP221SSB2_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2232SSB2_CORP211_BUSFAULT_MSig_CB_L_PP2232SSB2_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2209SSB2_CORP211_stuckCB_FAULT_ON_L_PP2204N-1_CRCP211_TIMP211

Angle based Instability Impact Index (dt = 10 minutes)Impact value

Conti

ngen

cy ID

…Telepiloting OFF

… Telepiloting ON to …

Detect the change in top 10 most severe contingencies passing from …

Conclusions• Need foramoredetaileddefinitionofinitiatingevents forcascadingdynamic

simulations• ApproachdevelopedbyRSEdefines contingencies fordynamicstudiesstarting

from:– Current root causes acting onthesystem– Substation configuration– Different protection response types

• Each initiatingcontingency is characterisedby threeelements:(1)outagedcomponents,(2)probabilityofoccurrence,(3)timesequenceofprotectioninterventions

• Tool able toidentifymostdangerousmultiplecontingencies– Avoiding combinatorial explosion

• Useful tool toinvestigatemultipleevents reported inNERCstandardTPL001-4.

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Contact:Dr.EmanueleCiapessoni,PhDe-mail:emanuele.ciapessoni@rse-web.it