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DEFENSE A PUBLICATION OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY | dau.edu July-August 2020

ACQUISITIONFIAR 2020

The NEXUS Between Acquisition

and Audit Remediation

The Adaptive Acquisition FrameworkBetter, Faster, More Tailored

20 Questions Every Product

Support Manager Should Be Prepared

to Answer

System Integration Enabling Capability

Through Connectivity Part II: Expeditionary

Warfare and Battlespace Management

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 FIAR 2020 The NEXUS Between Acquisition and Audit Remediation Mobola A. Kadiri, Anna N. Smith, and Stephen M. Speciale The Department of Defense has not yet passed a required financial audit. Financial

Improvement and Audit Remediation (FIAR) focuses on transparency, accountabil-ity, and process improvement.

8 The Adaptive Acquisition FrameworkBetter, Faster, More Tailored

Jim WoolseyAn interview and a closer look at the Adaptive Acquisition Framework

with Stacy Cummings, who spearheaded the transformative devel-opment of its six varied pathways.

12 20 Questions Every Product Support Manager Should Be Prepared to

Answer Bill Kobren A product support manager who can answer

all 20 questions—with supporting data—will be well on the way to becoming that trusted, highly successful subject-matter expert who is needed and required.

17 SYSTEM INTEGRATIONEnabling Capability Through ConnectivityPart II: Expeditionary Warfare and Battlespace ManagementEugene A. RazzettiDo everything you have to do—but do it

faster. Often, “Fight with what you have” is a briefing room cliché that becomes the unhappy battle cry at the front.

2

8 12 17 22 29

DEFENSEACQUISITION | July-August 2020 | 1

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Vol XLIX No. 4, DAU 275

Published by theDEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

Ellen Lord

DAU PresidentJames P. Woolsey

DAU Chief of StaffJoseph Johnson

Director, DAU Operations Support GroupLeo Filipowicz

Chief, DAU Visual Arts and PressNorene L. Johnson

Defense Acquisition Editorial StaffManaging Editor/Senior Editor, DAU Press

Benjamin Tyree

Art DirectorTia Gray

Online Content Editor Collie J. Johnson

Production ManagerFrances Battle

Online SupportNina Austin

Copy Editor/ Circulation Manager

Debbie Gonzalez

Editorial SupportMichael Shoemaker

DEFENSEACQUISITION

22 Best Value Awards Steven E. Moore, Ph.D. Some uses of Value Adjusted Total Evaluated Price in source selections are

simple implementations in an existing plan. Others require detailed market research effort and analysis.

29 Sea Power in the Gray Zone James M. Landreth, P.E. The Gray Zone involves actions below the threshold for conventional military

conflict. Moreover, the proliferation of low-cost automation and unmanned systems are eroding undersea dominance.

34 Moving From Risk-Averse to Innovative Opportunity Seekers Brian Schultz Risk management’s value is in the ability of a program manager to employ

critical thinking and adopt a culture that influences sound decisions.

38 UNIVERSITY AFFILIATED RESEARCH CENTERS Revolutionizing Acquisitions Steve Waugh The Pentagon already asks such Centers to perform analyses because of

their independence from regular operations—and when the government cannot do so within specified constraints.

43 Aesop’s Guide to “Acquisition Laws” All the Worthwhile Bits, Including 89 Laws, Two Rules, and One Paradox John Krieger The Bat and the Weasel story tells us that it is wise to turn circumstances

to good account—just as acquisition professionals should try to turn laws to their advantage.

ALSO37 MDAP/MAIS Program Manager Changes

48 Defense Acquisition Wins Two Publication Awards

34 38 43

2 | July-August 2020 | DEFENSEACQUISITION

FIAR 2020

The NEXUS Between Acquisition

and Audit RemediationMobola A. Kadiri n Anna N. Smith n Stephen M. Speciale

Kadiri is the Director for Financial Improvement and Audit Remediation (FIAR) Director-ate within the Department of Defense (DoD), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)). She is DoD Financial Management Level III certified, a Certified Defense Financial Manager (CDFM), and a graduate of the Federal Executive Institute. Smith is a staff accountant within the DoD’s FIAR Directorate Office (OUSD(C). She is DoD Financial Management Level III certified, a Certified Defense Financial Manager (CDFM), and leads the DoD Consolidated Audit. Speciale is a Senior Acquisition Specialist support-ing the DoD and is a former Professor of Financial Management at the Defense Acquisition University. He is DoD Financial Management Level III certified, a Certified Defense Finan-cial Manager–Acquisition and a Certified Fraud Examiner.

AGILITY, ADAPTABILITY, AND AFFORDABILITY—THESE words have a great deal in common. Not only do they start with the letter “a” but they also are themes of the Depart-ment of Defense (DoD) 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and necessary considerations for DoD entities con-

ducting business through various acquisition processes. Furthermore, these words shape DoD’s current initiatives and undoubtedly will drive DoD’s future objectives and performance.

All DoD entities have been conducting separate, yet much related, efforts that will remain woven into the DoD’s DNA. These efforts, referred to as Financial Improvement and Audit Remediation (FIAR), focus on transpar-ency, accountability, and process improvement to enhance operations. The DoD has received record-high annual budgets to maintain a national-security advantage and to achieve crucial modernization objectives.

While the DoD clearly demonstrates success in its warfighting mission, it has been unable to pass a financial audit in accordance with law. A key pillar of the NDS is to “reform the Department for greater performance and affordability.” This objective is equally associated with acquisition as it is with audit remediation. The DoD’s immediate and future success will be directly measured by acquisition outcomes. In addition, success will depend largely on DoD’s ability to transform its business practices and provide audited documentation—proof—to Congress and U.S. taxpayers


that DoD is appropriately using, and can be accountable for, the substantial resources received. Let us outline the relationship between DoD’s acquisition and audit reme-diation efforts and review some valuable information on DoD’s latest FIAR efforts and future expectations to suc-cessfully achieve a favorable audit position.

Acquisition—TodayThe 2018 NDS has driven DoD’s transformational acquisi-tion activities to support the Warfighter. Specifically, the NDS acknowledged that the United States must enhance its lethal force, strengthen alliances, and modernize business practices to sustain an unmatched competitive advantage. It also explains that longstanding bureaucratic approaches result in immense unresponsiveness and prevent the DoD from capitalizing on opportunities in a timely manner. DoD entities implemented timely ac-tions in recent years to support the NDS. For example, the Army established Army Futures Command in 2018 with the objective of completely modernizing the Army in view of the present environment and expected threats. The Navy created an innovation office in 2019, known as “NavalX,” to develop partnerships and networks to enable improved collaboration on Warfighter needs. In addition, the Air Force hosted innovational “pitch day” events in 2019 and 2020 to attract new partners to support the DoD and help deliver state-of-the-art military solu-tions. The ultimate Air Force objective is to expand the DoD industrial base while conducting business in highly flexible ways. Finally, in January 2020, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustain-ment released official policy and a handbook centered on DoD’s Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF). The AAF is intended to help DoD entities deliver Warfighter capabilities at the speed of relevance since there is no universal acquisition roadmap for all defense-related procurements. While these examples illustrate some of DoD’s impactful initiatives relative to acquisition activi-ties today, it is highly likely that additional changes will continue in future years.

FIAR—TodayFIAR is synonymous with accountability and transparency. It also is a large and ongoing DoD-wide effort that neces-sitates proper internal controls and risk management. At the broadest level, FIAR efforts require every DoD entity, regardless of size or mission, to provide confidence to U.S. taxpayers and Congress that: (1) financial information is accurate, complete, and fairly presented; and (2) internal controls allow for efficient and effective operations that prevent and deter fraud, waste, and abuse. The effort en-compasses many areas, including but not limited to:• Verifying the location, count, and condition of military

equipment, general equipment, inventories, and real property

• Evaluating the methods and documentation used to value DoD’s military equipment within major systems

• Testing DoD’s business systems to assess data integrity and the risk of security vulnerabilities

• Validating the existence and accuracy of personnel records documentation

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptrol-ler) (OUSD(C)) FIAR Directorate is the lead DoD office spearheading the FIAR efforts across the enterprise. The OUSD(C) coordinates with each DoD entity’s senior lead-ers and provides guidance and support to ensure that the FIAR objectives are met. The OUSD(C) also directly sup-ports the Secretary of Defense and regularly engages with Congress on FIAR-related efforts. Beyond DoD organiza-tions, and their personnel and external service providers, the efforts also involve thousands of independent public auditors (IPAs). IPAs perform audits and examinations and assess the effectiveness of corrective actions implemented in response to audit findings and recommendations.

Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 is an important year for the DoD and its FIAR efforts as the DoD builds on the results of the extensive audits conducted in FYs 2018 and 2019. The DoD proactively identified priority areas and will continue completing remediation efforts to address the audit find-ings and recommendations.

Intersection Between DoD Acquisition and FIARThe DoD’s acquisition and FIAR efforts are different but very much related. Acquisition typically applies to DoD personnel and entities involved with acquisition programs or other functions directly supporting the Warfighter. These efforts account for the majority of DoD’s overall workforce and annual budgets. Alternatively, FIAR applies to all DoD entities and all personnel supporting those entities. This includes the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, DoD’s Fourth Estate (civilian) agencies, DoD’s field activities, and industry partners. Since FIAR efforts and associated outcomes apply to the entire enterprise across the globe, FIAR efforts remain a priority for all entities ultimately pursuing an unmodified (i.e., clean) audit opinion. As an example, the DoD acknowledged Government Furnished Property as a material weakness and a priority area for remediation in FY 2020.

FIAR efforts include collaborating with the acquisition community to discuss and further understand audit re-quirements and working closely with industry partners to provide what is needed to support the audit. The benefits of the audit go beyond good stewardship of taxpayer dol-lars. The audit can improve business operations among acquisition activities and enhance national security by


mitigating cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The DoD also assumes risks by not obtaining a positive audit opinion. For example, the DoD could lose the confidence and sup-port of U.S. taxpayers and experience enterprise-wide or program-specific budget cuts that could affect competi-tiveness and Warfighter lethality.

The DoD spent approximately $900 million on audit-related efforts in FY 2019. This amount included the costs of audits, examinations, financial systems, remedia-tion efforts, and personnel supporting the audit. Since DoD’s FY 2019 budget was $687.8 billion, the DoD spent roughly 0.13 percent of its total budget on audit-related efforts last year. Although the dollar amount spent to support the audit is similar to how much DoD organiza-tions could spend on some acquisition programs, the percentage spent on audits is comparable to percentages spent by private sector and non-profit entities on audit efforts in relation to total revenues or operating bud-gets. Additional funding for FIAR efforts will be required beyond FY 2022 pending the DoD’s improvements made or outcomes reached. Congress is closely monitoring the DoD’s progress on FIAR efforts, and the DoD’s inabil-ity to obtain an unmodified audit opinion could directly impact the DoD’s ability to complete sound acquisition efforts now and in the future. More time will be needed to complete the changes—the financial management issues were not created overnight.

The DoD’s mission remains critical and the primary driver for budget requirements will be based on Warfighter needs. Accordingly, Congress must give careful consid-eration when making funding decisions so the Warfight-ers and their operations are not impacted negatively. A favorable audit position will provide immense benefits for DoD’s FIAR and acquisition efforts, ultimately fostering efficient processes, better decision making, greater trans-parency/accountability, fewer audit findings, and better Warfighter support.

FIAR—How We Got HereFIAR efforts officially began in 2010, but actions to improve the federal government’s financial management pro-cesses and systems have been ongoing since 1990. The Chief Financial Officers Act (CFO) of 1990 was enacted to improve the federal government’s financial management practices. Specifically, the law required the implementa-tion of enhanced accounting systems and internal controls to produce reliable financial information. The law also required that financial statements of all federal execu-tive agencies, including the DoD, be audited annually. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 required that DoD’s financial statements be prepared for an audit by end of FY 2017. From FY 2010 through 2017, FIAR efforts were associated with “audit readiness” initiatives since the DoD

was prepping itself to successfully undergo its first and highly anticipated audit in FY 2018. FIAR’s theme changed from “audit readiness” to “audit remediation” after the DoD underwent its first audit year. Remediation reflects the DoD’s efforts to address the Notices of Findings and Recommendations (NFRs) as well as the unfavorable audit opinion issued by the IPAs.

The DoD remains the only executive agency that has not yet obtained a favorable audit opinion. In addition, the Gov-ernment Accountability Office (GAO) has reported DoD financial management on its high-risk list since 1995 and the DoD’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported DoD financial management as one of its top management chal-lenges for FY 2020. Findings from prior year FIAR efforts reveal the severity of material weaknesses and how neces-sary the audits are from a business standpoint. IPAs issued more than 3,400 NFRs and 2,300 NFRs from the audits performed in FY 2018 and FY 2019, respectively. During the audits, some DoD entities uncovered property, such as weapons systems or facilities, not previously recorded in property management systems or for which proper docu-mentation was not available to support purchases. The DoD received 25 material weaknesses from its FY 2019 audit. The sidebar below identifies the weaknesses.

Types of Material Weaknesses from FY 2019 Audit• Financial Management Systems and Information

Technology • Interdepartmental Eliminations and Intragovernmental

Transactions• Universe of Transactions • Legal Contingencies• Fund Balance with Treasury • Beginning Balances• Suspense Accounts • Unsupported Accounting Adjustments• Inventory and Related Property • Gross Costs• Operating Materials and Supplies • Earned Revenue• General Property, Plant, and Equipment • Reconciliation of Net Cost of Operations to Outlays• Real Property • Budgetary Resources• Government Property in Possession of Contractors • Service Providers• Joint Strike Fighter Program • Entity-Level Controls• Military Housing Privatization Initiative • DoD-Wide Oversight and Monitoring• Accounts Payable • Component-Level Oversight and Monitoring• Environmental and Disposal Liabilities

Source: OUSD(C) FIAR Directorate.


While the financial management challenges and material weaknesses are significant, the DoD has made meaning-ful progress toward its goal of obtaining an unmodified audit opinion. For instance, the DoD closed more than 600 (approximately 25 percent) of NFRs issued in the FY 2018 audit. Most of those corrective actions taken to close NFRs were related to business systems and infor-mation technology. Furthermore, the DoD ascertained that all major military equipment was successfully verified for existence and completeness, no significant problems were found with payments made to military or civilian personnel, and no evidence or instances of fraudulent activities were found.

The FIAR efforts have resulted in immediate value and en-hanced operations across the DoD. Table 1 outlines some of the success stories.

Where We’re Going and How You Fit InFIAR efforts remain a top priority in FY 2020 and the following years among DoD leadership and all DoD enti-ties. The efforts are accompanied with exceptionally high interest and continuous scrutiny from Congress, the GAO, and the OIG. The DoD began the FY 2020 financial state-ment audits in January 2020 with the OUSD(C) provid-ing regular updates to Congress on the audit efforts and corrective action plans to better position the DoD toward attaining an unmodified audit opinion. The OUSD(C) expects that the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) will alter the timing and scope of the FY 2020 financial statement audits and delay DoD’s remediation activities (particularly those requiring physical access to assets). As a result, the OUSD(C) and the Office of Management and Budget are assessing the full impact of the pandemic relative to financial reporting. The DoD will continue to work with its IPAs to explore alternate testing procedures

Table 1. DoD FIAR Success StoriesDoD Organization Benefits or Positive Outcomes

DoD-Wide Began reducing the overall footprint of business systems, primarily legacy systems. The deadline to com-plete the planned business system reduction process is FY 2023.

DoD-Wide Used advanced analytics to complete reviews of dormant accounts. Actions resulted in $316 million being used for other higher-priority requirements.

Air Force Developed and deployed a robotics and process automation solution to monitor and manage user access. Actions allowed the Air Force to improve its cybersecurity for business systems and comply with IT require-ments.

Army Automated reviews of accounting transactions to ensure appropriate data when compared to the U.S. Stan-dard General Ledger. Actions resulted in faster processing times with an expected savings of about 15,550 labor hours.

Navy Identified and recorded $280 million of assets not previously tracked within a property management sys-tem. Actions resulted in the increased availability of materials totaling about $81 million and the reutilization of space totaling 200,000 square feet.

Navy Conducted a 100 percent physical inventory of all materials and supplies. This improved the Navy’s property records and identified materials totaling $167 million to be added to Navy’s supply chain.

Navy Modernized its ERP system by changing databases and migrating to an analytic, cloud-based platform. These actions, likely the largest ERP cloud migration in North American history, enhanced system access and performance for 72,000 users across six Navy commands.

Navy Completed actions in response to the real property-related NFRs from the FY 2018 audit. The efforts en-tailed a 100 percent physical inventory of the Navy’s entire 115,000+ real property assets across 98 instal-lations. Actions allowed the Navy to become compliant and improve its accountability of critical assets that support Sailors, Marines, civilians, and families.

DLA Efficiently cleared suspended stock, which allowed for the timely filling of 59,000 backorders totaling $287 million.

DLA Partnered with five of its top vendors to ensure compliance with electronic data interchange standards and implement more efficient processes to provide more reliable financial data. Actions allowed DLA to reduce inventory variances by $358 million and increased the efficiency and reliability of receipting, issuing, and physical inventorying processes.

WHS Deployed business process automations, which resulted in significantly fewer problematic transactions and a 77% faster processing time.

Key: DLA = Defense Logistics Agency; ERP = Enterprise Resource Planning; IT = Information Technology; NFR = Notice of Findings and Recommendations; WHS = Washington Headquarters ServicesSource: OUSD(C) FIAR Directorate.


and adjust as necessary to maintain critical momentum on this important effort.

The NFRs and material weaknesses will not go away on their own and will not be resolved overnight. Improve-ments will only be made if DoD organizations continue to enhance financial management operations, systems, and other supporting activities that link to the FIAR efforts. Personnel in financial management, along with those in contracting, program management, engineering, logistics, information technology, human resources, and other areas play an intrinsic role to reach the desired end state. The OUSD(C) expects the FY 2020 audits will demonstrate valuable progress across the enterprise, including eliminat-ing and/or downgrading of material weaknesses, improving audit opinions for individual entities, and driving continued cultural changes to help the DoD improve and sustain its progress. Figure 1 shares DoD’s “roadmap” based on its current audit strategy and plans.

In addition to continuous engagement with Congress, the OUSD(C) will take other actions to ensure that the DoD follows its outlined strategy. Specifically, the OUSD(C) will lead financial management events with DoD’s senior leaders and comptrollers. The ultimate intent is to identify

and mitigate significant FIAR-related issues and prioritize corrective actions based on resources.

Conclusion“You are not responsible for the past, but insofar as you do nothing, you are complicit in the present created by it” (Jonathan R. Miller, popular author). It is vital for every-one supporting the DoD to be aware of the FIAR efforts and associated initiatives that will drive future actions for continuous performance improvement and compliance with laws and regulations. The future of DoD acquisition must be accompanied by agility, adaptability, and affordability to achieve the NDS objectives; however, efficient and effec-tive acquisition efforts will be possible only if the entire DoD meets the accountability requirements through its ongoing FIAR efforts. The major efforts planned to reach an ac-ceptable financial state unquestionably will involve all DoD entities, supporting industry partners, and IPAs. The efforts also will remain a team sport since the roadmap to success is not solely dependent on financial management person-nel. Collectively, the DoD owes it to the Warfighter and U.S. taxpayers to reach that acceptable state so that the DoD can soundly deliver, and continue to deliver, on national defense.

The authors can be contacted at [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected].

Figure 1. DoD’s Long-Term Audit Strategy

Source: The OUSD(C)’s DoD FY 2019 Audit Results Briefing to the Professional Members of the House Appropriations Committee (Subcom-mittee on Defense), November 2019.

*FY 2019 Operational Priorities Real Property--Existence & Completeness Inventory and Operating Materials and Supplies Government Property in the Possession of Chontractors IT--Access Controls

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mailto:[email protected]



The Adaptive Acquisition Framework

Better, Faster, More Tailored


An interview with STACY CUMMINGS, Principal Deputy for Acquisition Enablers in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.

* * *

THE ADAPTIVE ACQUISITION FRAMEWORK OR AAF (Figure 1) is a major advancement for mod-ern defense acquisition. It is more than a policy update. It is policy re-envisioned and restructured in a framework that encourages critical thinking

by program managers in selecting and tailoring the best-suited approach or pathway for a particular acquisition. It facilitates more rapid delivery to the point of need.

The AAF is a powerful tool the Defense Acquisition Workforce can use to ensure that the Warfighter has the systems and services they need. Given the ever-changing environment, made even more unstable by the COVID-19 pandemic, it is critical that Defense Acquisition Workforce members not only familiarize themselves with the AAF resources available to them—especially the interactive AAF website—but stay cur-rent and continuously seek out resources and opportunities to help improve acquisition.

Stacy Cummings—Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Enablers for Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord—spear-headed the AAF effort, and she will be the first to say it was a team effort. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) was one of the organizations involved in the process—assist-ing in writing the policy with input from the military Ser-vices and developing an interactive AAF website. DAU also assisted in the rollout—conducting a series of roadshows with Ms. Cummings and other AAF subject-matter experts, engaging directly with the Defense Acquisition Workforce, and producing numerous AAF-oriented webcasts to inform Defense Acquisition Workforce members of the sweeping policy changes and the tools and resources available to them.

Recently, Ms. Cummings and DAU President Jim Woolsey met virtually to talk about the AAF rollout and what it means for the future of the AAF and defense acquisition. The following is an excerpt from their conversation.

Jim Woolsey: To start, can you give us a brief recap of what the AAF is and why Ms. Lord calls it the most transformational policy change in decades?

Stacy Cummings: I believe Ms. Lord summed up the AAF well when she noted that the hallmark of this policy is how it embraces delegating decision making down to the program offices so they can tailor their approach to delivering capability. This enables them to do so unencumbered by non-value added bureaucratic delays that manifest when excessive approvals are


required from senior leaders who don’t fully understand the challenges program managers face day to day.

The AAF enables program managers and designated deci-sion makers to move away from the one-size-fits-all model used in the past. The AAF recognizes that every program is unique and needs to be planned and executed based on its individual merits. This is where the philosophy of “tailoring in” versus “tailoring out” really makes a differ-ence. Start with the basics, such as statutory requirements, and consider the unique risk profile of the capability being acquired—this guides the addition when necessary of regu-latory elements based on sound management measures.

Jim Woolsey: The AAF has been out for a few months now. What have you been hearing from the field? Are people using it as intended, and is it making a difference?

Stacy Cummings: The response from the workforce has been overwhelmingly positive. In the first few months fol-lowing its release, we conducted several roadshows and talked to as many workforce members as we could to hear their questions and concerns. We then used that feedback to improve the guidance. As you know, Jim, DAU has led a

number of Rapid Deployment Training webcasts, and all of them have been well attended and provided the valuable feedback we need to expand and mature the AAF.

Since we started prototyping the policy for Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) initially in November 2018, we worked with the Components to expand their use of the pathway from zero programs to 68 MTA programs today. We also established an interim policy for software acquisition via a collaborative process that included the Services, pro-grams that want to be early adopters, and industry. Many programs helped shape this interim policy, and many are making plans to transition to the software pathway. Just as we did with the middle tier policy, we will learn from these software programs—and they will inform our final software policy.

Jim Woolsey: Do you think the workforce has the re-sources needed to understand the AAF and apply it to their programs?

Stacy Cummings: The biggest single resource for the workforce is the AAF website, https://aaf.dau.edu/aaf/. It integrates all of the new acquisition policies with the latest

Figure 1. The Adaptive Aquisition Framework

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.

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guidance and hundreds of additional resources and is a single, interactive and easy-to-navigate website. One of the most valuable things about the site is that the workforce can navigate the six pathways with curated insights to determine what is required via policy and statute—and the most effective business practice for each.

The AAF site also is a place for Services, agencies, and functional leaders to add their specific policies, guidance, and resources for acquisition professionals to develop a complete and integrated solution. Overall, the AAF web-site has received a great response from the workforce.

Ms. Lord and I have both been very appreciative of all of the efforts from DAU. The collaboration between our office, the Services, and DAU has made this rollout successful. Our continued collaboration will ensure that the AAF and the website remain current and relevant far into the future.

Jim Woolsey: Have there been any surprises or “ah-ha” moments as you’ve talked to people, or seen the things they are doing through the available authorities in the AAF—things that they just weren’t doing before?

Stacy Cummings: Based on our roadshows and presenta-tions to DAU classes, the biggest takeaway has been a new understanding of how to implement the authorities Congress has given us. The brilliance of the AAF is that it lays out the authorities in a clean, understandable frame-work. The framework also is unique in that it supports and facilitates the use of multiple pathways as programs are developed.

Jim Woolsey: What has been the Services’ reaction to AAF, and what is their role?

Stacy Cummings: The Services lead the execution of pro-grams within the Department of Defense. They have been involved from the beginning and have provided significant input into the overarching policies, while also creating and/

or updating their own implementing policies to align with those in the AAF. At the end of the day, the successes of the AAF and our programs belong to the Services.

Jim Woolsey: What do you hope the long-term impact of AAF will be on defense acquisition?

Stacy Cummings: We strongly believe that the AAF will allow our program managers to innovate and require them to think critically while creating unique, tailored programs based on disciplined risk assessments. This will empower acquisition leaders, enhance the skills of our managers, and contribute to more successful programs that can deliver capability faster and more effectively to their customers for years to come.

Jim Woolsey: So what’s next? Has all the policy been released, and can we now just sit back and see what happens?

Stacy Cummings: We should think about policy the same way that we are now thinking about software. That is, policy is never done. We continue to learn as we execute the policy, Congress directs items that can amend our policy, and defense strategy evolves—all of this has to be taken into consideration. So we will continue to commu-nicate with the workforce, observe what is going well and what needs some work, and, of course, stay in constant communication with Congress to ensure our policies are relevant and helpful to our acquisition community.

Jim Woolsey: Stacy, thank you for taking the time today. I know you’re incredibly busy leading the COVID-19 Joint Acquisition Task Force. Unveiling a major change to acquisition is hard enough on its own, but to do so during a pandemic while also focusing Acquisition and Sustain-ment support to the emergency response is just incredible. Thank you so much.

Stacy Cummings: Thank you, Jim. It has been a pleasure.

Stacy Cummings (above), who led development and rollout of AAF, is interviewed by DAU President Jim Woolsey (right).


20 QUESTIONS Every Product Support Manager Should Be Prepared to Answer

Bill Kobren

Kobren is Director of the Logistics and Sustainment Center at the Defense Acquisition University, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

While the majority of operating and support costs are incurred after a weapon system has been produced and fielded, they result in part from program deci-sions made earlier in the acquisition process—during system development—and are generally set before production begins. In 2009, as part of legislation aimed at improving the life-cycle management of major weapon systems, Congress required DOD to as-sign a product support manager (PSM) to each major weapon system program. The principal responsibility of the PSM is to develop and implement support strat-egies for weapon systems that maintain readiness and control life-cycle costs.— Government Accountability Office Report

GAO-17-744R Weapon Systems Management: Product Support Managers’ Perspectives on Fac-tors Critical to Influencing Sustainment Related Decisions

IN THE DECADE SINCE CONGRESS ENACTED, AND the president signed into law, the requirement that “each major weapon system be supported by a product support manager,” the Department of Defense (DoD) has made major strides in implementing the life cycle

management and product support requirements outlined in what is today Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 2337. This includes perhaps the most critical requirement of all: developing and implementing a comprehensive, effec-tive and affordable product support strategy for the weapon system.

This is no easy feat considering the complexity, ambiguity, and challenges of the task that DoD product support managers (PSMs) face every day. Not to mention the myriad factors that lie outside of the PSM’s control, including evolving service life requirements, rapidly changing operational and environments and threats, emerging technologies, aging systems, wide vari-ances in operational tempos and funding profiles, industrial


base, obsolescence and diminishing manufactur-ing sources and material shortages, structural and corrosion issues, physical and cybersecurity supply chain risks, among a range of others.

The good news is that DoD PSMs have ample resources at their dis-posal to craft and execute successful product sup-port strategies. Whether they be statutory re-quirements such as 10 U.S.C. 2337 Life-Cycle Management and Product Support, 10 U.S.C. 2443 Sustainment Factors in Weapon System Design, or others (Figure 1), Congress has given PSMs the authorities they need to successfully execute this vitally important mission. The DoD and the Services have, in turn, implemented a range of product support policies to further facilitate that success.

The DoD also has crafted comprehensive guidance to provide powerful in-sights into how to successfully develop, test, implement, execute, refine, and modify successful product support strategies. A “baker’s dozen” of the most impactful can be found n the DoD Product Support Guidance Suite at https://www.dau.mil/tools/p/integrated-Product-Sup-port-Guidebook-Suite, including the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, the DoD Product Support Manager’s Guidebook, DoD Public-Private Partnering Guidebook, DoD Performance Based Logistics Guidebook, and DoD Operating and Support Cost Management Guidebook, among a range of others (Figure 2). And, of course, the military Services provide ample supporting policies and guidance of their own to backstop and reinforce.

At each level, the focus is consistently on crafting and executing well-thought out, affordable product support strategies to achieve warfighter readiness and cost require-ments. Common themes at all levels include early sustain-

ment planning, system availability, readiness, supportabil-ity, reliability, maintainability, cross-functional integration, and ultimately affordable combat capability across the system life cycle.

That said, zeroing in on our cadre of highly skilled, highly trained DoD PSMs, we have to ask ourselves a few pointed questions: Are you doing everything you can to achieve these requirements for your program? How have you and your team influenced system design for affordability and supportability? Does your program man-ager view you as a highly valued thought-leader during requirements determination, design trade discussions, configuration control boards, technical reviews, and independent logistics assessments? How about when conducting program-level market research, Analysis of Aternatives, crafting the program acquisition strategy, or making source-selection decisions?

Figure 1. Product Support Statutory Framework

Source: Defense Acquisition University (DAU) (for additional details, see https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia/

pages/articledetails.aspx#!622).

Title10 U.S.C.§2320

Technical Data Rights


IntellectualProperty

Title 10 U.S.C.§2437

Replaced SystemSustainment

Title10 U.S.C.§24693M Rule


50-50 Rule


Acquisition Functions


Public-PrivatePartnerships Title

10 U.S.C. §2464

Core LogisticsCapabilities


Depot Maintenance

Title 10 U.S.C. §2563

Industrial Facilities’Sales to PersonsOutside of DoD


Working Capita Funds

Title 10 U.S.C. §2443

Sustainment Factors inWeapon System Design


SustainmentReviews

Title10 U.S.C.

§2337aOperating &

SupportCosts &

ILAs


Life Cycle Mgmt& Product

Support

Title10 U.S.C.§2366 a+bMilestones A&B

Approval Certi�cations

https://www.dau.mil/tools/p/integrated-Product-Support-Guidebook-Suite




In a question that may hit close to home, do your program executive officer, program manager, functional commu-nity peers, life-cycle logistics staff, and supporting sus-tainment organizations implicitly trust you as an integral part of the program team? Or are you—and, by extension, product support writ large—generally an afterthought? The time to be concerned, I would contend, is not when the phone is ringing too often but rather when it stops ringing entirely.

Now to “get down to brass tacks,” I would encourage you to ask yourself a few tough questions, starting with: How well do you know the details of this extremely complex product support business? Are you a master of your craft? Do you intuitively understand the big picture across your program? Are you the program office go-to product support expert? Are you viewed by your peers as a trusted teammate? Are you perceived as being able to put the needs of your program above your own? Have you established a reputation for positive leadership, trust, rap-port, and successfully delivering results? Is “can-do” your byword? Is “yes if,” rather than “no because,” your credo? Is mission-focused “servant leadership” your approach? Are character, collaboration, communication, and integ-

rity your watchwords? And perhaps most important: If not you, who? If not now, when?

If after careful consideration your answers are “no,” “not entirely,” “they’re not quite where they need to be,” or “I honestly don’t know,” permit me to encourage you to begin by taking stock and undertaking a concerted effort to hone your acquisition, life-cycle logistics, and product support skills. I might suggest reviewing the myriad resources, training, and references available through the DAU Life Cycle Logistics Func-tional Gateway at https://www.dau.edu/training/career-devel-opment/logistics/. In addition to online, instructor-led, and virtual instructor-led logistics training courses and modules, commu-nities of practices, job support tools, ACQuipedia articles, videos, podcasts, blogs, and even a comprehensive Life Cycle Logistics Professional Reading List, you will find easy access to a range of key DoD product sup-

port statutes, policies, and guidance documents.

Next, I would recommend taking the time to build trust, rapport, and communication with your internal and exter-nal stakeholders, particularly your program office peers and functional community counterparts in the Systems Engineering, Business and Financial Management, Cost Es-timating, Contracting, Test and Evaluation, and, of course, Program Management arenas. Take time to learn about their business, and appreciate the issues they face. Seek to expand your understanding of the challenges they’re deal-ing with, as well as to understand how they align with—and impact—programmatic life-cycle logistics considerations. To paraphrase a longtime colleague, “If you don’t have someone from another defense acquisition workforce functional community as a best friend, go get one”!

In addition, I encourage you to invest what I somewhat sardonically call “your copious spare time” and energy into becoming your program’s go-to subject-matter expert for all things product support. No matter how good we are (or might think we are), each of us can always be better. To assist in this endeavor, think back to the parlor game called “20 Questions.” This game is designed to encourage

Figure 2. DoD Product Support Guidance

Source: DoD Product Support Guidebook Suite (for additional details, see https://www.dau.mil/tools/p/integrated-Product-Support-Guidebook-Suite).

Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP)Product Support

Strategy Documentation

IPS Element Guidebook

12 Product Support Elements

MIL-HDBK-502AProduct Support

AnalysisSupportability

Analysis Process

Corrosion ManualCorrosion

Prevention &Control

RAM-C ReportManual

Design for Supportability

CBM+ GuidebookMaintenance

Enablers

PPP GuidebookPartnership

Development

ILA GuidebookProduct Support

Readiness

PBL GuidebookProduct Support

Arrangements

DAG Chapter 4Life Cycle

Sustainment

PSM GuidebookProduct Support

Key Reference

O&S Cost MgmtGuidebook

Cost Guidance

BCA GuidebookCOA Guidance

DMSMS GuidebookSD-22 DMSMSMgmt Program

https://www.dau.edu/training/career-development/logistics/




participants to leverage innovation, logic, initia-tive, deductive reason-ing, and creative think-ing. Running through this game in your own mind affords you a microcosm of more broadly based product support considerations.

If I may be so bold, per-mit me also to suggest a list of “20 Questions” you should consider asking yourself—and readily be prepared to answer if you’re ever asked by your program manager or Service leadership. When you can easily and candidly answer all 20—along with being prepared to provide supporting data, compelling fact-based rationale and context—you will be well on your way to becoming that trusted, highly successful product support subject-matter expert that Congress envisioned, your leadership demands, your colleagues expect, and your team members require.

1What is our product support strategy? Are we certain it is the right approach? How do we know?

2How are we leveraging system test and evaluation and demonstrations to assess and affirm the veracity of our

product support strategy?

3What are our key program product support metrics? Why were they selected? How well do they align with

Sustainment Key Performance Parameter, availability, reli-ability, maintainability, and affordability requirements?

4When was our Life Cycle Sustainment Plan last up-dated? What has changed since? When will it next be

revised?

5How effective is your interface, alignment, and integra-tion with the Systems Engineering community? How do

you know? Does the product support team have a seat at the table during program technical reviews, configuration control boards, and material improvement program review boards?

6What is our intellectual property strategy? How was it determined? Can we afford it?

7What are our primary product support risks—and what are our mitigation plan(s)?

8What product support should-cost initiatives have we implemented? What were the results? How do we

know?

9When was our most recent Independent Logistics As-sessment (or for fielded systems, post-initial opera-

tional capability sustainment reviews)? What were the results? What are we doing to resolve shortfalls? When is the next one scheduled?

10When was our Product Support Business Case Analysis last updated? Results?

11Who are our product support integrators (PSI) and product support providers (PSP)? Why and how were

they selected?

12What kind of product support arrangements do we have with our PSIs and PSPs? How are we incentiviz-

ing desired outcomes? How are we flowing down program-level metrics requirements to the PSIs and each PSP?

Figure 3. DoD Product Support Business Model (PSBM)

Key: DLA=Defense Logistics Agency; DPO=Distribution Process Owner; ICPs=Inventory Control Points; OEMs=Original Equipment Manufacturers; PSA=Product Support Arrangement; PSI=Product Support Integrators

Source: DoD PSM Guidebook (for more details, see https://www.dau.edu/tools/t/Product-Support-Manager-(PSM)-Guidebook, Para 2.1).

Inherently Governmental War�ghter

Product Support Arrangement (PSA)

Responsibility/Authority Program Manager

Accountability Product Support Manager

PSAIntegratedIndustrial Base: Product Support IntegratorsCommercial andGovernment PSI PSI PSI

PSA

Product Support Providers

Depots DLA ICPs OEMs DPO Tier X

Requ

irem

ents

Perf

orm

ance

Dat

a &

Met

rics

Alig

ns s

usta

inm

ent c

apab

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ycle

pro

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and

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-driv

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13How do we mitigate risks in instances where we decide to transition sustainment workloads to a new

PSI and/or PSPs?

14What is our depot source of repair strategy? What are the core logistics assessment results? Where

applicable, do we have an executable, statutorily compliant plan to maintain and repair our system within 4 years after initial operational capability?

15Does our maintenance planning include public-private partnerships? Why or why not?

16Are we leveraging an affordable and effective perfor-mance-based logistics product support strategy to

meet user performance requirements? Why or why not?

17What is our Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages and obsolescence mitigation

strategy? Is it effective? If not, why not?

18What is our Supply Chain Risk Management strat-egy? Does it include—but also extend beyond—

cyber threats? Is the entire program team on board?

19What is our product support funding profile? Does it meet projected support requirements over the

Future Years Defense Program?

20What are our dependencies on—and working relationships with—key stakeholders, including in

particular, DoD, Service, international, industry, and (where applicable) interagency sustainment organizations?

Permit me to also add an additional bonus question for your consideration; and perhaps it just might be the most important of all: How satisfied are our Warfighter customers with our product support strategy, planning, and execution?

As the DoD stated in its response to the GAO report cited earlier, “… the establishment of this leadership position and its responsibilities within the program offices has strength-ened the planning for and consideration of sustainment in defense acquisition programs.” To ensure this is reality and take this to the next level, I would encourage you to join your fellow product support managers across the depart-ment in playing (and replaying) this game of 20 Questions!

The author can be reached at [email protected].

c Defense AT&L: May-June 2017

One SiteOne Sourcefor Scientific and Technical (S&T) InformationThe single entry-point to the Department of Defense S&T information resources

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SYSTEM INTEGRATION

Enabling Capability Through Connectivity

Part II: Expeditionary Warfare and Battlespace ManagementEugene A. Razzetti

Razzetti, a retired U.S. Navy captain, is a management consultant, auditor, military analyst, and frequent contributor to Defense Acquisition maga-zine and the former Defense AT&L magazine. He is the author of five management books, including Fixes that Last—The Executive’s Guide to Fix It or Lose It Management.

RECENTLY, I ATTENDED A BRIEFING BY A MAJOR THEATER COMMANDER ON THE STATE OF READI-ness of his area of responsibility. He used present-day terms like: “Battlespace”, “Expeditionary Warfare”, “reach-back,” and “lethal weapons” but then sprinkled in discomforting, but not unfamiliar, expressions like “fight with what you have,” “no space uncontested,” and “no safe havens.” Warfighters live with these terms and expressions every day; program managers and contractors, however, may lose sight of them and may

need to be reminded.

In my first article on system integration and program management (in the November-December 2019 issue of Defense Acquisition magazine), I stressed the need to incorporate:• Risk management and gap analysis• Operator/Warfighter participation in program management• Meaningful feedback, follow-up, and accountability


• Modeling and simulation, to include tabletop exercises and/or wargames

• Non-materiel solutions for materiel shortcomings

This is Part II, linking system integration and program management with expeditionary warfare and battlespace management. It is here where we emphasize the sense of urgency. Put another way: Do everything you have to do—but do it faster. As is often the case, the troops have been waiting too long already.

By way of review, system integration is the process of bringing together the component sub-systems into one system. It is an aggregation of subsystems cooperating so that the resultant system is able to deliver an overarching functionality or capability, by ensuring that the subsystems function together as one system. In information technol-ogy, it is the process of linking together different computing systems and software applications physically or function-ally, to act as a coordinated whole. An integrated system streamlines processes, reduces costs, and increases efficiency.

System integration connects multiple discrete subsystems from different sources to work as one. Some subsystems are old, some are new. Program managers usually find that putting the subsystems together as early as possible in the program’s development improves mission effectiveness and helps to ensure seamless connectivity, enabling com-

manders at the front and at the rear to better execute and evaluate strategic and tactical accomplishment.

Figure 1, partially from the first article, graphically displays system integration as an essential subset of program man-agement. It summarizes system integration well enough (I think), including the need for Warfighter involvement. It goes on to show the linking of system integration to the battlespace. This direct and unimpeachable linking may be missing (and/or presumed lost) on contractors and program personnel.

Please note again in Figure 1 the need for “Warfighter in-volvement,” “technological yield,” and “connectivity.” They are essential, in the beginning and throughout a program’s life cycle. They often are neglected in a program’s early stages, but are indispensable not only for managing the program, and for ensuring that subsystems and compo-nents successfully address the mission, but for integrating those subsystems into a viable end product (e.g., a weapon system, with all hardware, software, training simulators, and logistic support).

Expeditionary Warfare and Battlespace ManagementExpeditionary warfare means deploying our fighting forces abroad, normally away from established bases. Historically, U.S. ability to project forces into distant areas has served as an effective diplomatic lever, influencing decision-

Figure 1. The System Integration Process and the Battlespace

Key: C4/ISR = Command, Control, Communications, Computers/Intelligence, Survelliance, and Reconnaissance; CONOPS = Concept of Opera-tions; CONUS = Continental United States; MEDEVAC = Medical Evacuation.Figure and table by the author.

Mission,Concept, or LegacyCapability

DesignPlanning

Engineering*War�ghter Input

Contractors/SubcontractorsMaintainabilityHuman Factors Redundancy & Sustainability

Supply SupportSystem Security

Modeling/SimulationPerformance/Yield

Con�guration Mgmt.C4/ISR

Process IntegrationInnovation

Analysis

BattlespaceManagement

Situational awarenessCONOPSdevelopmentOver-the-horizontargetingGun�re supportMEDEVACSurface actiongroup operationsAntisubmarinewarfareClose air supportCONUS ReachbackPreventive/CorrectivemaintenanceWeather/terrainpredictionExercise conduct

System Integration&

Connectivity

Subsystems(Design, Security,

Architecture,Maintainability)

Yield/Validation/Feedback

Yield/Validation/Feedback

*All applicable general and specialty engineering disciplines (including safety and environmental)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/System

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computing

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_application


making processes and acting as a potential deterrent on other states’ inappropriate behavior or adventurism.

The aircraft carrier strike group, strategic bomber, ballistic missile submarine, and strategic airlifter are all examples of power projection platforms. Military units designed to be light and mobile, such as airborne forces (paratroop-ers and air assault forces) and amphibious assault forces, are utilized in power projection. Forward basing is another method of power projection, which, by pre-positioning military units or stockpiles of arms at strategically located military bases outside a country’s territory, reduces the time and distance needed to mobilize them.

Expeditionary forces are the precursor of the rapid de-ployment forces. They must be (at least initially) self-sus-taining, with a viable logistics support capability and with constant and undeviating Stateside connectivity.

As the distance between a fighting force and its directing headquarters increases, command and control inevitably become more difficult. Modern-day power projection requires high-tech communications and information tech-nology to succeed. Ships at sea in surface action groups (e.g.; an aircraft carrier and assigned cruisers and destroy-ers), capable of communicating with each other, must now coordinate with supplementing forces of other nations and with rear echelons. Missions, as well as forces, must be coordinated. Information, the one weapon that can be in more than one place at the same time, must be dis-seminated—rapidly and precisely. And you cannot do that if communications systems are not totally integrated and uncompromisingly reliable.

Strategy in the briefing room becomes tactics at the front; and “fight with what you have” —the unfortunate cliché in the briefing room becomes the unhappy battle cry at the front.

Table 1, like Figure 1 above, expands the original table in Part I to include expeditionary warfare and battlespace

Table 1. Comparing Systems Integration With Program Management—Then Extending to Expeditionary Warfare and Battlespace Management

Requirement Program Mgmt.

System Integration

Expeditionary Warfare

Battlespace Mgmt.

Mission planning; concept development

Design/development (including hardware/software)

Modeling/simulation

Research and development

Risk management plan

Gap analysis

Core team developed; responsibility/accountability assigned (including decision makers)

Warfighter involvement

Performance-oriented; metrics developed/consistent/actionable

Test plans developed; tech yield identified

Contract in place; executable Connectivity/feedback Configuration/change management process defined/in place Internal/external security procedures inplace Life-cycle management plan

The unfortunate cliché in the briefing room

becomes the unhappy battle cry at the front.


management. The requirements are the same, and a short-coming at the beginning carries through to the end.

Having (notionally) brought operating forces into the theater, the next step is to organize, manage, and optimize operations in the battlespace.

The military operational environment has transformed from primarily a time and space-driven, linear understand-ing (a “battlefield”) to a multi-dimensional system of systems understanding (a battlespace)—a system of sys-tems. Battlespaces are more complex, primarily because of the information age. Today, militaries are expected to understand the effects of their actions on the operational environment as a whole, and not just in the military domain of their operational environment.

Battlespace management describes a unified military strategy to integrate and combine expeditionary and allied armed forces in military theaters of operations; includ-ing land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace, to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. Our Warfighters must work with allied forces and often within different chains of command and spans of control. Artillery fire, Naval gunfire, and close air support, (e.g.; during amphibious landings), often delineated with imaginary boundary lines, challenge compatibility and connectivity. Similar goals and objectives must be achieved using dissimilar forces and resources.

Superiority in the battlespace also means that the speed at which the warfighting organization develops and trans-forms knowledge into actions for desired effects in the

battlespace must be faster than the opposition at doing the right actions at the right time and place.

Battlespace agility depends upon the quality of situational awareness and holistic understanding of the battlespace, in order to determine the best actions—a logic that has be-come a driving force behind a renaissance of interest in the quality of military intelligence. It is also about executing the most effective actions in the most efficient manner relative to achieving the desired impact.

It is worth remembering that, if a weapons system or plat-form has reached the battlespace, it had better reflect the absolute best tenets and efforts of Department of Defense (DoD) program management. It may be impossible to fix a problem in theater, with any degree of timeliness.

Once the system or platform is in theater, reach-back sup-port must be structured, streamlined, and responsive, to ensure optimum performance. Unfortunately, even in the cyber age, connectivity between key nodes of the supply chain Stateside and the Warfighters in the battlespace continues to be sluggish, erratic, and bordering on dysfunc-tional. This after more than 18 years in Afghanistan and twice that long in the Middle East.

Again, the Theater Commander in his briefing used the terms: “No safe havens,” “no uncontested spaces,” and “lethal weapons.” DoD has serious limits on where, how much, and how often it can exercise forces in advance of actual operations. And we need to consider all weapons as lethal. Therefore, training exercises, especially in advance of a unit’s deployment, must be up to date, and as realistic as possible, consistent with safety. Lessons learned from the exercises must be comprehensive and meaningful— with maximum dissemination and with realistic, measur-able, corrective action plans.

Weapons systems and platforms (e.g., HUMVEEs [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle]), once in the battlespace, must have all compatibility issues resolved; and range and depth of replacement parts equal demand. Quantities of consumables (e.g., gas masks and cannis-ters) must reflect normal and surge requirements, and be subject to periodic review and verification.

Tactical decisions in support of battlespace manage-ment (e.g.; in a surface action group) must address all of the above, under fluctuating conditions of infrastructure, weather, terrain, and the electromagnetic spectrum; and reflect threat assessments, intelligence, and situational awareness within the operational areas and areas of focus.

Optimally, in-theater tactical decisions should reflect pre-deployment fleet and/or logistics exercises, wargames,

Unfortunately, even in the cyber age, connectivity

between key nodes of the supply chain Stateside

and the Warfighters in the battlespace

continues to be sluggish, erratic, and bordering on

dysfunctional.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare


and tried and true concepts of operations, using tried and true weapons and platforms, in accordance with well-developed concepts of operations (CONOPS). This may no longer be possible, as we run out of both time, space, and opportunity to practice core competencies. And there never seems to be sufficient funding to support meaning-ful training. Funding for mission essentials such as training schools, software, and simulators—which should be fenced or consigned to these uses only—often is expended during the building phase to solve a problem, and no longer avail-able when needed for its original purposes.

Deploying units replacing their counterparts in-theater re-quires a comprehensive pre-deployment turnover strategy, one that reflects months of connectivity and interaction before the actual turnover takes place.

SummarySystem Integration is an indispensable subset of Program Management. Programs become products, and products find their way to the Battlespace. They must perform as required (and sustainably) in the Battlespace; U.S. lives and missions may depend on it. If that product, be it a weapons system, platform, or a piece of communication equipment, fails—someone may not make it home alive.

If a weapon system or platform has reached the Bat-tlespace, it had better reflect the absolute best doctrines and efforts of proactive DoD program management.

“Fight with what you have,” the unfortunate cliché in the briefing room remains the unhappy battle cry at the front.

Program managers and contractors must recognize and support what warfighters already know all too well, that: • Weapon systems or platforms have vital end uses in sup-

port of mission commitments.• Successful end use requires urgency of arrival in-theater,

and sustainability of operations in-theater.• U.S. lives and U.S. missions depend on those weapons

systems and platforms.

And rapid deployment does not mean rapid conclusion. There are currently no short-term involvements and there are not likely to be any. Eighteen-plus years in Afghanistan proves that. Please see my articles on Afghanistan Re-construction in the January-February 2020 and May-June issues of Defense Acquisition magazine.

I have spent more than 50 years in direct or indirect sup-port of the DoD. If one of my programs showed signs of failure and I did not act, I would rather have faced a dozen unhappy flag officers in the Pentagon than one unprotected 19-year-old Service member at the front.

The author can be reached at [email protected].

For more information and advice on how to submit your manuscript, check the writer’s guidelines at https://www.dau.mil/library/defense-atl/p/Writers-Guidelines or contact the managing editor at [email protected].

We’re Looking for a Few Good AuthorsGot opinions to air? Interested in passing on lessons learned from your project or program? Willing to share your expertise with the acquisition community? Want to help change the way DoD does business? Write an article (1,500 to 2,500 words) and Defense Acquisition magazine will consider it for publication. Our readers are interested in real-life, hands-on experiences that will help them expand their knowledge and do their jobs better.

What’s in It for You?First off, seeing your name in print is quite a kick. But more than

that, publishing in Defense Acquisition can help advance your career. One of our authors has even been offered jobs on the basis of articles written for the magazine.

Now we can’t promise you a new job, but many of our authors:• Earn continuous learning points• Gain recognition as subject-matter experts• Are invited to speak at conferences or symposia



Best Value AwardsSteven E. Moore, Ph.D.


Moore is assigned to Defense Acquisition University as professor of Pro-gram Management for almost 3 years. Prior to joining DAU, he was a leader in Orbital ATK’s Defense Group for 27 years and served 10 years as an active duty Air Force Acquisition Officer. He has a Ph.D. from Capella University, a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Air Force Academy and an M.S. degree from the Air Force Institute of Technology. He is a certified Project Management Professional.

SECOND IN A SERIES

The first article in this series (Defense Acquisition magazine, July-August 2019) examined the background behind the creation of VATEP (Value Adjusted Total Evaluated Price) and why it was created. That article also explored how VATEP was envisioned to help the Source Selection Authority (SSA) sup-port choosing the best value alternative in lieu of the lowest-cost option.

LET’S REVIEW VARIOUS IMPLEMENTATIONS OF VATEP in source selections completed around the Department of Defense (DoD). In some cases, these were simple implementations intended to be incorporated into an existing procurement plan.

Others required specific market research effort and detailed analysis regarding their utility to the Warfighter.

The final case details the most complex and ambitious imple-mentation of VATEP ever executed.

These examples demonstrate the breadth of recent VATEP implementations conceived and executed within the DoD, and are illustrations for programs that may be considering, or should consider, using VATEP to facilitate a best value competitive source selection. These examples should serve as “bookends” to illustrate the extremes of complexity in the implementation of VATEP.

The simplest of all the VATEP implementations I found in my research is one that almost everyone can understand because it involves hardware to which most DoD acquisition profes-sionals can easily relate:

The JMPS Case StudyThe Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst, NJ, has a requirement for a minimum quantity of 500 and a maximum quantity of 3,000 commercially available laptop computers that serve as mission planning computers in


the aircrafts deployed to the fleet. ... This IDIQ will be issued to the most responsible offeror within the guidelines of the Value Adjusted Total Evaluated Price (VATEP) method, which denotes that award will be made on the basis of lowest price technically acceptable with an evaluated price trade-off. — Department of the Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division Lakehurst; “Joint Mission Planning Computers” Request for Pro-posal (RFP) Presolicitation Notice, Solicitation Number N6833518R0035; December 21, 2017.

The simplest implementation of VATEP was the procure-ment of ruggedized, standalone laptop computers for the Joint Mission Planning Systems (JMPS) Program. In this case, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Strike Planning and Execution Systems (PMA-281) program of-fice, in conjunction with the Naval Air Warfare Command, Aircraft Division (NAWC-AD) requested suppliers bid for the opportunity to supply up to 3000 “high-end, mobile computer systems.”

The VATEP content of this RFP was exclusively applied to an option that the customers desired in the form of three

levels of performance and capacity for a solid-state drive (SSD) in lieu of less rugged spinning disc hard drives. The technical specifications of the three levels are beyond the scope of this discussion, but were referred to as Level 1 (threshold), Level 2, and Level 3 (objective). The terms “threshold” and “objective” were used in the typical DoD acquisition sense that the minimum performance required was threshold and the highest performance desired was objective.

The VATEP decrement associated with the three levels was defined very simply as the capacity and capability of the SSD for each level is shown in Table 1.

In this source selection, the price for each computer was decremented by the appropriate VATEP decrement only for the purpose of evaluation, based upon the stated capacity of the SSD. This example of VATEP implementa-tion serves as the simplest “bookend” among all VATEP implementation.

The USMC Enhanced Combat Helmet The Marine Corps Systems Command executed a more complex implementation of VATEP for the Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH) Program. The two primary techni-cal challenges for a combat helmet are the ability to stop the penetration of typical battlefield projectiles (bul-lets and shrapnel) and the weight on the soldier’s head necessary to accomplish this objective. Logically, all of us probably can agree that the former must be a pass-fail requirement, with the weight being a variable. This was the scenario for the ECH Program. Weight as a function of the size of the helmet is an important complication, since each soldier has a different size head and ability to sup-port a helmet-covered head with his or her neck bones and muscles. Minimizing weight in the various required

helmet sizes becomes a logical measure of merit, and as such, was the singular factor incentiv-ized for the ECH VATEP implementation.

The VATEP decrement associated with the four sizes of helmet as a func-tion of their weight for each size is shown in Table 2. In this scenario, each of the four sizes could conceivably earn different decrements based upon the actual weights for each design. In this case, the ECH Program

Table 1. VATEP Decrements for JMPS Laptops

SSD Capacity (X) VATEP Decrement

< Level 1 Unawardable (Did not meet Threshold)

Level 1 ≤ X < Level 2 $0

Level 2 ≤ X < Level 3 $500

X ≥ Level 3 $1,000Source: The author.

Table 2. ECH Decrement vs. Weight by Helmet SizeSize TEP

AdjustmentSmall Weight

(lbs)Medium

Weight (lbs)Large Weight

(lbs)X-Large

Weight (lbs)

Unacceptable N/A >2.94 >3.06 >3.31 >3.88

Max Acceptable $0 2.94 3.06 3.31 3.88

1% Reduction $5 2.91 3.03 3.28 3.84

2% Reduction $10 2.88 3.00 3.24 3.80

3% Reduction $15 2.85 2.97 3.21 3.76

4% Reduction $20 2.82 2.94 3.18 3.72

5% Reduction $25 2.79 2.91 3.14 3.69

6% Reduction $30 2.76 2.88 3.11 3.65

7% Reduction $35 2.73 2.85 3.08 3.61

8% Reduction $40 2.70 2.82 3.05 3.57

Key: TEP = Total Evaluated Price.

Source: Kathy Hurd, Contract Specialist, presentation to Marine Corps Systems Command, Dec. 7, 2017


simplified the procurement by making the earned decre-ment for the entire lot of production helmets to be the lowest of all the decrements for the various sizes. For example, if the decrements for the Small, Medium, Large, and X-Large helmets earned by one offeror were 4 per-cent, 4 percent, 5 percent, and 8 percent, respectively, the decrement by that offeror for all their configurations would be 4 percent.

The ECH example was a more complex implementation than the JMPS process, but the T-X Program serves as the final, most complex bookend of our example executions of VATEP.

The T-X Case StudyThe largest procurement that has used VATEP so far has been the Advanced Pilot Training Program, yielding the aircraft systems known as “T-X” (since renamed the T-6A Red Hawk). To their credit, the T-X Program Office de-cided to incorporate the VATEP process into the source selection. The U.S. Air Force original estimate for the T-X Program was $19.7 billion, and in the RFP released Dec. 30, 2016, the Air Force fixed the Source Selection Affordability

Cap for the T-X Program at $16.3 billion. On Sept. 27, 2018, a Boeing and Saab partnership won the program with a bid of $9.2 billion. On Oct. 11, 2018, Defense News reported that both Lockheed Martin/Korean Aircraft Industries and Leonardo DRS, the two losing teams, both decided not to protest the award of the contract to Boeing. The T-X procurement creates an excellent case study to examine the most complex implementation of the processes and requirements of VATEP so far.

The T-X RFP was very clear in its assertion that the pro-curement was seeking the best value to the government, and that there were two factors in the selection criteria: (1) Technical Performance and Risk and (2) Price. All other combined evaluation factors, were judged approximately equal to price. Therefore, the technical evaluation and the potential adjustments to the offeror’s Total Proposed Price (TPP) weighed heavily on the SSA’s selection.

Before we look at the details of the T-X procurement VATEP adjustments, it is appropriate to understand how the T-X Source Selection Team (SST) applied VATEP ad-justments to the various offerors’ proposals.

Figure 1 shows the process by which each offeror’s VATEP adjustments were decremented from the offeror’s proposed price. It is not the purpose of this article to comment upon the quality of the T-X RFP, the evaluation process, or the Source Selection Deci-sion but rather to illustrate the process that the T-X procurement used to determine the VATEP dec-rement for each offeror. Ultimately, the objective of this series of articles is to evaluate VATEP’s effec-tiveness in delivering the best-value hardware solu-tion to the Warfighter.

First, we can only assume that all of the offerors survived the Affordability Gate, which is a pass-fail assessment based upon the TPP of the contrac-tor’s bid. Next, the Source Selection Evaluation Board

Figure 1. T-X VATEP Functional Flow Diagram

Key: SE/PM = Systems Engineering/Program Management; SSA = Source Selection AuthoritySource: Derived by the author from a similar graphic in the T-X Request for Proposal, Dec. 30, 2016.

Yes

Award Decision

SSA

RFP and Contract Requirements

A�ordability Gate

Factor 1Technical Performance and Technical Risk

Sub-factor 1.1System

Integration

Sub-factor 1.2SE/PM

Sub-factor 1.3Training

Sub-factor 1.4Operations & Support

Sub-factor 1.5Tech Readiness

Assessment

Technial RiskRatings

Risk Indicator Decrement

Sub-factor 1.6Aircraft

Performance

Sub-factor 1.7Small BusinessParticipation

Acceptable?

No

Unawardable

Sub-factor 1.8Utility Above

Threshold

TotalPerformanceDecrement

Factor 2Price

Reasonableness

Balance

Performance Decrement

Risk Decrement

VATEPAssessment


(SSEB) evaluated the technical proposals in accordance with the RFP, which included both a technical evaluation of the offeror’s approach and their understanding of the requirements, as well as a separate Technical Risk Assess-ment. We should start by looking at the latter of these two assessments—the Technical Risk Assessment.

The SSEB judged each offeror’s proposal for technical risk, seeking to identify potential weaknesses that could disrupt the schedule, increase cost or degrade performance. Table 3 shows the definitions of weakness at the “Weakness” and “Significant Weakness” levels from Federal Acquisition Regula-tion (FAR) 15.001. The specific risk criteria provided to the offerors in the T-X RFP to establish the SSEB’s thresholds between “Low,” “Moder-ate,” “High,” and “Unacceptable” is shown in Table 4.

In addition to the risk assessment, the SSEB also performed a techni-cal evaluation of the proposals and judged how well each of the offerors understood the requirements, and provided a color/adjectival rat-ing for each of the subfactors 1.1 through 1.7. The common Color/Adjectival rating specified for all DoD source selections is provided in Table 2A of the DoD Source Selection Procedures, April 1, 2016, and repeated here in Table 5 for reference. The SSEB used these colors, along with the details of any strengths and weaknesses identi-fied during the technical evaluation process to communicate the Tech-nical Performance of each offeror’s proposal to the Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) and the SSA. These color ratings, strengths and weaknesses of each proposal, combined with the technical risk ratings described above, comprise the total Technical Performance and Risk assessment identified in Sec-tion M of the RFP.

So far, based upon the Techni-cal Performance and Risk factor evaluation, this source-selection evaluation process was inherently just like any other best-value source selection. However, the program

Table 3. Definitions of T-X WeaknessesType Definition per FAR 15.001

Weakness A flaw in the proposal that increases the risk of unsuccessful contract perfor-mance

Significant Weakness

A flaw in the proposal that appreciably increases the risk of unsuccessful con-tract performance

Source: T-X Request for Proposal, Section M, Dec. 30, 2016.

Table 4. T-X Technical Risk RatingsRating Description

Low Proposal may contain weakness(es) which have little potential to cause disruption of schedule, increased cost, or degradation of performance. Normal contractor effort and normal government monitoring will likely be able to overcome any difficulties.

Moderate Proposal contains significant weakness or combination of weaknesses likely to cause significant disruption of schedule, increased cost, or degradation of performance. Special contractor emphasis and close government monitoring will likely be able to overcome any difficulties.

High Proposal contains a significant weakness or combination of weaknesses which may potentially cause disruption of schedule, increased cost, or degradation of performance. Is unlikely to overcome any difficulties, even with special contractor emphasis and close government monitoring.

Unacceptable Proposal contains a material failure or combination of significant weak-nesses that increases the risk of unsuccessful performance to an unac-ceptable level.


Table 5. The Technical Rating MethodColor

RatingAdjectival Rating Description

Blue OutstandingProposal indicates an exceptional approach and un-derstanding of the requirements and contains multiple strengths.

Purple GoodProposal indicates a thorough approach and under-standing of the requirements and contains at least one strength.

Green AcceptableProposal meets requirements and indicates an adequate approach and understanding of the requirements.

Yellow MarginalProposal has not demonstrated an adequate approach and understanding of the requirements.

Red Unacceptable

Proposal does not meet requirements of the solicitation, has one or more deficiencies, and is thus unawardable.

Source: DoD Source Selection Memo, Appendix B.


office’s decision to incorporate the VATEP process into this source selection made this procurement stand out as a perfect opportunity to fully understand and assess the VATEP process. Additionally, this case allows us to study whether VATEP, as executed for T-X, satisfied the former Acquisition, Technology and Logistics office’s objectives of informing Industry of the value of system performance above threshold and reducing the subjectivity of the associ-ated best value trade-off.

Determination of VATEP DecrementsBased upon the risk definitions and levels above, the SSEB evaluated each of the proposals for technical risk. For the purpose of the VATEP evaluation, the SSEB determined technical risk assessments for each of the five subfactors identified on Figure 1 as Subfactor 1.1 through Subfac-tor 1.5. Table 6 shows the VATEP risk criteria based upon the SSEB’s risk assessment of each of the five subfactors. Based on Section M of the RFP, the Air Force only assessed Subfactors 1.6 and 1.7 for risk on an acceptable/unaccept-able basis. The results of this risk assessment defined the risk decrement earned by each offeror as identified in Table 6. Section M specifically stated that if the SSEB assessed that any offeror proposed an approach with “High or Unac-

ceptable Risk” for any of the technical subfactors, that proposal was unawardable. In this case, there is no public evidence that the SSEB eliminated any offeror from the competition for technical risk.

Similarly, the SSEB evaluated the eight VATEP techni-cal performance criteria in order to calculate the VATEP decrement associated with evaluated system performance “Utility Above Threshold.” Five of those criteria (Terrain Avoidance and Warning, Ground-Based Training System (GBTS) Connectivity, Aerial Refueling, Targeting Pod, and Ground Support Station) were awarded “all-or-nothing” decrements based upon clear criteria included in Section M. In these cases, if the offeror met the published criteria, they earned the decrement of $27 million, $67 million, $13 million, $17 million and $24 million, respectively. The remaining three criteria, High-G Value, High AoA (Angle of Attack) Value, and Turn-Around Time (TAT), were awarded a decrement based upon the value of that per-formance parameter. In these cases, the $0 (zero dollar) award was fixed at the threshold value for that parameter, and the maximum decrement for that parameter was set at that parameter’s objective value. The maximum value for each variable parameter was $88 million, $51 million and

$51 million, respectively. The decrement award amounts are provided in graphi-cal form for the High-G value variable award decrement parameters in Figure 2. Similar variable decrement awards were available for High AoA and low TAT. Notice that the associated decre-ment award curve for High-G Values is not linear. Similarly, the curve for High AoA Value is not linear (Figure 3), while the award reduction for TAT is linear (Figure 4).

If any offeror provided objective utility in all of these areas, and also provided “Low Risk” solutions in each of the sub-factors, they would earn the maximum VATEP decrement of $685 million. The

Table 6. T-X Risk Assessment Criteria and Associated VATEP Decrement

# of Low Subfactors

# of Moderate Subfactors

# of High and Unacceptable

Subfactors

Risk Indicator VATEP Risk Management

5 0 0 A/1 $350 million

4 1 0 A/2 $275 million

3 2 0 A/3 $200 million

2 3 0 A/4 $125 million

1 4 0 A/5 $50 million

0 5 0 A/6 $0

0-4 0-4 >0 Unacceptable N/A


... the program office’s decision to incorporate the VATEP process into this source selection made this

procurement stand out as a perfect opportunity to fully understand and assess the VATEP process.


composite curve representing the overall picture of the T-X VATEP decrement potential to be earned normalized to a percentage of the decrement available is shown in Figure 5.

In parallel with the SSEB Technical evaluation, the price evaluation team performed a price analysis of each of the offerors’ cost, assessing the reasonableness and balance of the proposals. Unlike most procurements of this scope, cost realism was not evaluated. In this case, the RFP also included two skillfully crafted Microsoft Excel spreadsheets as Attachments to Section L for each offeror to provide de-tailed pricing information in exacting formats to aid in the assessment of the pricing 74 contract line item numbers (CLINs) of the proposals. This highly structured and consis-tent pricing format undoubtedly simplified the process to accurately determine, by CLIN, the VATEP decrements from overall TPP of each offeror.

Once the SSEB completed its Technical Performance and Risk assessments of the three competing offers for the T-X award, the price evaluation team took each earned VATEP decrement and subtracted it from each offeror’s TPP to yield the Total Evaluated Price (TEP). Both the TPP and TEP were presented to the SSA for a source-selection decision. The lack of a protest from the two losing offerors suggests that the SSA made a source-selection decision that was well supported and aligned to the RFP criteria and source-selection plan.

ConclusionThis article reviewed VATEP implementations that were successfully executed. The first was simple, the second more complex, and the final example from the T-X pro-gram pushed the boundaries of previous VATEP imple-mentations to the benefit of the Warfighter. I offer these examples as potential templates to illustrate the breadth of options available to implement VATEP in upcoming best-value competitive source selections.

The next article in this series will focus on the perspectives of those who have implemented VATEP, especially with respect to how their programs determined the “value to the Warfighter.” We also will include the rationale behind those who chose not to include VATEP. Anyone who would like to contribute to future articles on this subject as either a implementer (government), benefactor (industry), or contribu-tor, please contact the author at the e-mail address below.

The author can be contacted at [email protected].

Figure 2. T-X High-G Value VATEP Decrement

Source of Figures 2-5: Source Selection Evaluation Board.

Figure 3. T-X High AoA Value VATEP Decrement

Figure 4. T-X Turn-Around Time VATEP Decrement

Figure 5. T-X VATEP Decrement Summary

6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

100

80

60

40

20

0

6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33

60

40

20

0

60

40

20

0

$700

$600

$500

$400

$300

$200

$100

$00% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ground Support Station

Targeting Pod

Aerial Refueling

GBTS Connectivity

Terrain Avoidance & Warning

Aircraft Turn-Around Time (10%)

Proposed High-AoA Value

Proposed High-G Value

Technical Risk Assessment

Perf

orm

ance

Dec

rem

ent (

$M)

Percentage/Objective Obtained

6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

100

80

60

40

20

0

6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33

60

40

20

0

60

40

20

0

6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

100

80

60

40

20

0

6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33

60

40

20

0

60

40

20

0



Sea Power in the Gray Zone

James M. Landreth, P.E.

Landreth, a Professional Engineer, is a Systems Engineer for Naval Information Warfare Center Atlantic. He was named in National Society of Profes-sional Engineers’ 2019 list of Top 10 Professional Engineers in the federal government. The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Government.

IMAGINE THIS HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE: AS THE CHINESE-OWNED CONTAINER SHIP moves inside Mexico’s territorial waters, six diesel engines shudder to life somewhere aft of the ship amidst the darkness of a moonless night. The container vessel has effortlessly towed six self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSSs) from well outside the exclusive economic zone.

Joint U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) surface patrols combined with Mexican marine patrol recon-naissance aircraft blanket the area with reconnaissance sensors, but the fiberglass SPSSs were previously silent and invisible beneath the waves.

As the diesels rumble steadily, the SPSSs’ auxiliary power units start the newly installed autonomous guidance system and simple logic controllers disconnect the tow cables. The SPSSs’ guidance system passively monitor and then repeat the con-


tainer ship’s automatic identification system course while its onboard global positioning system (GPS) acquires a trian-gulated signal. With a clear GPS signal, the autonomous systems assume primary control and begin steering each SPSS toward its pre-programmed way points. Without emit-ting any electronic signals, the six unmanned SPSSs maneuver independently toward Marina Puerto Salina, 45 miles south of Tijuana. When they slip into their berths just before dawn, the autonomous SPSSs break the record for the largest shipment of Asian-manufactured fentanyl to the Mexican drug cartel’s continental smuggling network.

* * *Back to the present reality: Mahan’s elements of sea power effectively model a nation-state’s potential to rival other nations for maritime dominance, but poorly ap-proximate a nation’s ability to counter adversaries and transnational criminal organizations (TCO) in Gray Zone operations. The Gray Zone encompasses the range of ac-tions below the threshold for conventional military conflict. Furthermore, the proliferation of low-cost automation and unmanned undersea systems (UUSs) are eroding the current leading indicator of sea power, dominance in the undersea domain. Today’s rapidly evolving operational environment present three undeniable realities for securing the U.S. territorial waters: Adversary nations will combine efforts with TCOs to threaten the Homeland, UUSs will become ubiquitous; and all adversaries will fully exploit the Gray Zone. To maintain the preeminent U.S. sea power status, the Sea Services must evolve maritime strategies to meet operational realities, expand the focus on the under-sea and lead a whole-of-government response.

Defining the Operational Environment: No Safe SpacesTwentieth-century U.S. security strategies and associ-ated maritime acquisition priorities leveraged the U.S. geographic endowment and legacy of dominance in the Western Hemisphere established by the Monroe Doctrine. This time has passed. The arrival of Gray Zone conflicts in the maritime domain directly threatens the Homeland, and the Sea Services must be ready. Friendly neighbors and large ocean moats previously meant that the only credible maritime threat came from a few advanced nations, which allowed the Sea Services to tailor defensive strategies and acquisitions over extended time horizons. However, the first two decades of the 21st century bore witness to the accelerating deterioration of this safety net. Today, the na-tional military balance of power between nations is shifting, and the relative share of power held by non-state actors has risen dramatically. As the power, influence and wealth of TCOs has risen in real terms, the cost of dual-use tech-nologies associated with UUSs has collapsed as predicted by Moore’s Law. When the previously manageable number of adversary nations combine forces with TCOs, a startling number of threat permutations appear.

The September 2019 unmanned aerial system (UAS) at-tack on Saudi facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais highlighted two instructive lessons for the Sea Services. First, com-mercially available unmanned systems (UxS) pose credible threats to advanced military defenses. The Iranian-made UAS swarm bypassed decades of U.S.-led investment in missile defense and counter-UAS systems. The undersea poses a more technically challenging environment for new entrants, but Neptune’s domain offers significantly fewer layers of man-made defense than the air. Second, despite motive and forensic evidence of Iranian components at the scene of the attack, the Houthis claim of responsibility shielded Iran from any accountability.

The destruction wrought by Iranian UASs pales in com-parison to the threat potential of proliferating UUSs. Like manned submarines, UUSs are difficult to detect and ca-pable of delivering significantly larger payloads per vehicle than UAS. In the Gray Zone, UUSs could carry illicit drugs designed to poison U.S. communities, kinetic payloads for attacking marine infrastructure, or a host of other cross-domain effects. For example, when the USCG interdicted an SPSS in June 2019, the SPSS carried 17,000 pounds of cocaine worth $569 million. If the TCOs upgrade manned SPSSs to UUSs, these toxic payloads will be able to reach the Homeland with even greater efficiency, profitability and anonymity. Similarly, should SPSSs trade drugs for detona-tors, the explosive yields would be devastating.

Beyond hypothetical technology applications, evidence of intent exists that adversary nations are partnering with TCOs to weaken the United States. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) annually presents overwhelming evidence that identifies Chinese manufacturers as the top produc-ers of fentanyl for the U.S. illicit drug market. However, Chinese fentanyl is most commonly interdicted in regional TCO distribution networks. Chinese government officials publicly condemn TCO activity, and the TCOs’ obvious involvement buffers China from meaningful accountability measures. Should Chinese drug manufacturers transfer Chinese UUS capabilities to SPSS platforms, the problem will scale dramatically.

Similarly, Iranian paramilitary actors have a well-docu-mented past of coordinating with Western Hemisphere TCOs. Aside from the alleged coordination with the Houthis during the UAS attack at Abqaiq and Khurais, the Iranians have transferred unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to the Houthis. In 2017, an explosive-laden USV detonated against the Saudi Frigate Al Madinah. With their demonstrated willingness to transfer UxS to the Houthis, Iran could repackage and export these same technolo-gies on UUS platforms. If Iran were to transfer UUSs to its Western Hemisphere associates, the maritime threat to the Homeland would scale in yet another dimension.


Space, Force, and Time ChallengesTo meet these challenges, the USN, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and USCG (collectively known as the “Sea Ser-vices”) have developed joint and service-level maritime strategies that enable resiliency from undersea attack. The USN and USMC Service Chiefs’ strategic plans focus on decentralized operations, which enable resiliency in the Gray Zone. Similarly, the USCG Commandant emphasized the complex and rapidly evolving maritime challenges posed by adversaries in his Guiding Principles. As joint maritime planners and acquisition professionals execute strategic-level plans, all must maintain an awareness of the unique space-force-time challenges associated with UUSs.

SpaceSince before the Achaeans landed at Troy, the sea has imposed a “tyranny of distance” that complicated space, force, and time calculations. In the 20th century, undersea targets of interest typically were limited to submarines and support vessels, and national militaries could concentrate intelligence-gathering assets accordingly. However, the entry of TCOs into the Gray Zone makes commercial and private vessels potential carriers of UUSs. As a result, the tyranny of distance that once simplified undersea calcula-tions has collapsed.

Satellites, ships, and radars successfully monitor the oceans’ surface, but the sensor-per-area ratio on the ocean’s surface poorly approximates undersea monitor-ing. Even with the most advanced sensor assigned, the oceans’ attenuation characteristics prevent full exploitation of a given water column. Thermal strata, ocean depth and other factors offer layer upon layer of shadow for UUSs in a single water column. Historically, expensive manned submarines could only occupy relatively shallow layers of the abyss, but the simplified technical requirements of UUSs drop the cost for entry and expand the operational envelope by an order of magnitude.

ForceIndependent of partnership with a near-peer adversary, TCOs possess tremendous technical resources, funding and human networks. For example, the Mexican Zetas cartel owns and operates its own cellular communica-tions infrastructure along the U.S. border. According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of

the Inspector General, current U.S. strategy aspires to interdict a paltry 10 percent of smuggling revenues in the maritime domain, and even this goal was unmet in 2018. In addition to technical and financial resources, TCOs have sophisticated and expansive human networks across the entire North American continent that penetrate all levels of society.

TCO partnership with near-peer adversaries could further erode U.S. sea power. For example, China manufacturers more commercial UxSs than any other country. China com-mands as much as 75 percent of the commercial UAS mar-ket and lacks any meaningful competitors in commercial UUS manufacture. Also, Russia has exported submarine technologies for decades. As demand increases for UUSs, Russian private military contractors like the Wagner Group likely will enter the undersea domain.

TimeSince before President Reagan’s declaration of the war on drugs, TCOs have demonstrated persistence. Healthy profits and millions of recruitable hard-core criminals and hitmen from failed states ensure that the threat posed by TCOs will remain as long as the drug market persists. Given the long-term nature of the threat, the Sea Services must identify affordable ways to counter UUSs without degrading readiness or repurposing assets needed for high-end warfare.

Similarly, the adversary nations named in the 2018 Na-tional Defense Strategy (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) have agitated U.S. maritime planners for decades. All of these countries regularly partner with TCOs, and any of them could partner with TCOs in the undersea domain. If the endurance and resources of adversary states com-bine with the lasting challenges posed by TCOs, then the threat resiliency will only increase unless the United States takes decisive action.

SolutionsStrategic CommunicationsThe Sea Services must articulate a compelling narrative that addresses the imminent maritime threat posed by UUSs. It is of particular importance that senior leaders ensure their narrative successfully extricates maritime se-curity issues from intractable debates on U.S. immigration

Like manned submarines, UUSs are difficult to detect and capable of delivering significantly larger payloads

per vehicle than UASs.


policy. Vessels interdicted on the sea present clear evi-dence of illicit activity. As emphasized in P.W. Singer’s book LikeWar, effective communications campaigns are just as critical as high-end capability in the 21st century. Vio-lence such as the 2019 LeBaron family murders, crippled communities, and hard evidence of TCO drug smuggling provide ample opportunity for daily media engagement.

AlignmentThe Sea Services must reinforce relationships with military counterparts in the U.S. Army (USA), National Guard Bureau (NGB), and U.S. Air Force (USAF). Also, the Sea Services must coordinate with U.S. Northern Command to develop inherently agile, geographically mobile planned responses. Finally, the majority of the Sea Services’ personnel belong to the active duty com-ponent, but Joint Domestic Operations mission sets pro-vide excellent opportunities to align the Rserve Forces to operational tasking.

To ensure that there is resiliency against the UUS threat, the Sea Services must seek deeper alignment with local agencies, industry and civilian institutions. The Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security provides an excellent example of how the Sea Services can engage in advance with local communities to map potential demands, threat response, and informa-tion sharing capabilities. The Sea Services should resource these pre-planned responses with flexible Memorandums of Agreement (MOA), and Service-level acquisition chiefs must create contracting vehicles similar to Other Transac-tion Authorities that can rapidly equip various organiza-tions for unplanned scenarios.

AuthoritiesThe Sea Services need additional legal authorities to pur-sue TCOs and UUS within domestic waters. As measured by body count, TCOs pose a significantly greater threat to the Homeland than many of the organizations currently designated by the United States as Foreign Terrorist Or-ganizations (FTOs). TCO drug smuggling via the maritime domain kills far more U.S. citizens every year than oc-curred on September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the U.S. national security apparatus needs authorities commensurate with the threat. And more aggressive pursuit of TCOs in the maritime domain will reduce the viability of partnerships between adversary nations and TCOs such as the Iranian government and Western Hemisphere TCOs.

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 formally ended the post-Civil War military occupations and ensured the states that military forces would no longer be used to enforce the federal government’s will, but this legisla-tive legacy requires urgent updates. The Sea Services must have the needed legal authorities to defend the

Homeland’s maritime approaches against UUSs. Under current policy, only the USCG has the full spectrum of legal authorities needed to defend the Homeland in U.S. territorial waters, despite the USN’s larger fleet. The Sea Service Legislative Affairs teams must coordinate with the NGB, DHS, and appropriate congressional committees to recommend the needed adjustments in the next National Defense Authorization Act.

AcquisitionsA well-resourced strategy is needed to counter the TCO forces, but linear increases in military ships and aircraft will not eliminate the maritime threat. The Sea Services need a systems level approach capable of delivering network effects to counter the exponentially increasing threat posed by adversaries, TCOs, and UUSs. Lessons learned during land campaigns against non-state actors in Afghanistan are directly applicable. Since 2001, the U.S. military has deployed many thousands of personnel with advanced weaponry like the USAF’s F-22 air superiority platform to target heroin processing facilities. While the F-22 effectively neutralized targets, Afghanistan remains the world’s largest heroin producer, and the Taliban lever-age these revenues to control the majority of Afghan ter-ritory. Aside from not achieving strategic success, the use of high-end assets consumed fantastic financial resources and conflicted with the strategic intent of fielding an air superiority platform.

The United States has accrued significant experience fighting Gray Zone conflicts in the post-9/11 campaigns, but fighting TCOs undersea will have noted differences. Ex-tremists groups such as al-Qaeda primarily were funded by a global network of charity organizations, but FTO activi-ties rarely were financially self-sustaining. The staggering wealth of TCOs, organic technical capability, and potential partnership with adversary nation states offer an alarm-ing comparison. Given the maturity of commercial UUS technology and its dual-use nature, the Sea Services must act aggressively to ensure a firm hold on sea power in the domestic maritime approaches.

The USN’s capital ships are designed for power projection far from home, but are ill suited to combat the specter of Western Hemisphere TCOs equipped with UUSs. In contrast, the USCG National Security Cutters (NSC) have measurably raised the efficacy of the USCG’s interdiction efforts at sea. The NSC’s concept of operation (CONOP) includes deployment with other smaller craft. In addition to conducting its own missions, the NSCs act as mother-ship for helicopters, UASs, and smaller surface craft by providing fuel, communications relays, and other capabili-ties to assigned units. Also, the NSCs receive interdicted contraband and detainees, which extends the endurance of smaller craft. The USCG has continuously upgraded


NSCs to ensure maximum interoperability with DoD as-sets, such as modifications for USN SH-60 helicopters and UAS. The Sea Services must integrate resources under a similar framework to enhance the CONOP cham-pioned by NSCs. In particular, the USN should seek to provide undersea capabilities and the USMC add counter-UxS capabilities to this network approach. The USN and USCG National Fleet Plan’s Navy Type Navy Owned (NTNO) equipment plan provides an excellent model for integration and life-cycle support.

The Sea Services must expand the development of remote sensor platforms with counter-UUS capabilities. Counter-UUS should launch from existing host platforms, and any incompatible host platforms should be upgraded to ensure interoperability. Ideally, integration efforts should be coordinated with Submarine Development Squadron-5 (COMSUBDEVRON-5), the USN’s tactical development authority for UUS. COMSUBDEVRON-5 will provide guidance to the Sea Services, and program execu-tive offices should receive clear guidelines and funding priorities to counter the UUS threat. Host platforms can be military or civilian craft based on the mission and re-quired authorities. Presently, USNS designated platforms use civilian personnel to perform surveillance towed-array sensor system missions. Also, the role of the USCG Auxiliary could be expanded via carry-on/carry-off assets enrolled in the NTNO program. NTNO expansion could rapidly increase the number of sensor platforms deployed at a substantially lower price than additional military platforms. Today the network of 26,000 Auxiliarists could provide 1,800 vessels, 160 aircraft, and 1,400 radio facili-ties to any counter-UUS acquisition program.

While a vast number of government activities are involved in securing the U.S. territorial waters, most maintain inde-pendent logistical support models optimized for their his-toric mission set and operational tempo. To fully leverage the array of available authorities, personnel, and platforms in a whole-of-government solution to the UUS threat, Sea Service planners must identify ways to enable greater participation without bankrupting the readiness models of smaller agencies. Since operational commanders typically provide limited sustainment support for assigned assets, the Sea Services must facilitate increased participation in DoD’s logistics enterprise. Codified access to Defense

Logistics Agency assets and contract vehicles would pro-vide enhanced platform support while limiting equipment sparing requirements for smaller agencies. Additionally, purchasing or contracting via the General Services Admin-istration would enable greater participation from state and local activities. For any enduring missions like the counter-narcotics Joint Interagency Task Force, the equities of all participating agencies should be explicitly articulated in the Joint Theater Logistics plan.

Family SupportTo fully prepare for domestic maritime threats, the Sea Services must update their family support framework. In recent decades, family preparedness has been focused on natural disaster avoidance and basic operational security measures. However, the 2019 defeat of the Mexican Army by the Sinaloa cartel signaled the cost of participation in hostilities against TCOs for Service members’ families and personal property. Since TCO-induced violence likely would require mobilization of Service members with family residing in joint operating areas, the family support frame-work must be inherently resilient. Examples of resilient family readiness models exist at U.S. Embassies and do-mestic law enforcement agencies, but significant resources are needed to scale these models for the large number of Service members.

ConclusionTraditional models for maintaining sea power are vul-nerable to disruption by adversaries operating in the Gray Zone. Commercially available UUS technologies present threats to the Homeland from illicit trafficking, underwater sabotage, or other cross-domain effects. The combination of adversary nations, TCOs, and proliferat-ing UUSs require the United States to evolve its maritime security strategies if it wishes to remain the preeminent sea power. In order to meet the demands of the opera-tional environment, the Sea Services must lead a whole-of-government response to secure the nation’s maritime domain against a multiheaded Hydra. Through strategic communications, alignment, authorities, acquisitions, and an improved family support framework, the Sea Services can maintain U.S. sea power despite new entrants in the undersea domain.


The United States has accrued significant experience fighting Gray Zone conflicts in the post-9/11 campaigns, but fighting TCOs undersea will have noted differences.



Moving From Risk-Averse to Innovative Opportunity-Seekers

Brian Schultz

Schultz is a professor of Program Management and an executive coach in the Defense Acquisition University’s Capital and Northeast Region at Fort Belvoir, Virginia

“Pearls don’t lie on the seashore.

If you want one, you must

dive for it. —Chinese proverb

RISK MANAGEMENT IS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROCESSES in defense acquisition. Some would argue that managing risk is a good way to describe the role of Department of Defense (DoD) integrated product teams chartered to plan and execute acquisi-tion programs. The DoD Risk, Issue, and Opportunity (RIO) Manage-

ment Guide of January 2017 states that the value of risk management is not adherence to policy. Rather, the value is the program manager’s (PM’s) ability to employ critical thinking and adopt a risk management culture to influence sound decision making.

DoD’s PMs thus are very familiar with risk management because it receives extensive leadership attention. Risk assessments can drive everything from


investment decisions to acquisition strategies, including risk funding levels and type of contract. The acquisition system will prevent programs from moving forward if risks are assessed as too great or inadequately mitigated. But the landscape around risk is changing dramatically.

With the mandates to go faster and deliver at the speed of relevance, senior leaders are suggesting that our culture is too risk averse and must change. Gen Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, in 2017 said, “I think we’re overly centralized, overly bureaucratic, and overly risk averse, which is the opposite of what we’re going to need in any type of warfare, but in particular the warfare that I envision.“ Even our 2018 National Defense Strat-egy discusses fostering a culture of experimentation and

calculated risk taking. As in the case of financial investments, taking on greater risks can result in greater rewards.

There are several root causes of this risk averse culture. The most severe risks typically are linked to mission success, force protection, and safety. But other factors such as oversight, funding instability, and statutory/regulatory compliance cannot be overlooked. Defense acquisition is en-cumbered with countless rules that can severely restrict the available courses of action. And the list of rules grows every year as evidenced by the 3,000 plus page Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act.

Changing the risk culture must involve all as-pects and stakeholders of acquisition. It should involve congressional oversight, DoD strategic guidance, policy, organizational strategies, structures, processes, techniques, and train-ing. The recently published Adaptive Acquisi-tion Framework empowers PMs to develop a strategy that leverages the flexibility and responsiveness the pathways can provide. The change from tailor out to “tailor in” is also an opportunity to foster the culture change to a less risk averse organization. But, losing the risk averse mentality must also involve new ideas and tools that help the workforce implement actions that embrace this preferred culture. One enabling tool that PMs can leverage is opportu-nity management.

The RIO Management Guide provides practical guidance for acquisition teams and is a great place to start for guidance on opportunity man-agement. Consistent with a risk averse culture, the guide devotes most of the content to risk management. Opportunity management is ad-

dressed in the context of the Better Buying Power initiative of Should Cost, a regulatory requirement to proactively target cost savings goals below the program’s will cost estimate. The guide is clear that opportunity management applies across a program’s life cycle and that it requires active management effort to be effective.

Risk and opportunity management have several common threads. Both follow a similar process for planning, identifi-cation, analysis, and subsequent actions to either manage a risk or exploit an opportunity. Both involve the upfront expenditure of resources to plan and manage the efforts. In my experience with Defense Acquisition University (DAU) mission assistance efforts, I often find that acquisition teams spend a great deal of time managing risks but spend


very little time or emphasis working opportunity manage-ment. We can actually use both of these processes to become greater risk takers seeking high payoff rewards.

Teams that succeed at opportunity management typically embrace some of the following characteristics:• Opportunity management is a priority for the entire

organization, including strong support from leadership. The organization has an opportunity seeking culture that becomes ingrained in the environment at all levels.

• It is incorporated into teams’ strategic rhythm, similar to risk management. This includes discussions with industry and prime contractors who can offer ideas and participate in opportunity deliberations.

• Finally, teams are good at critical thinking—and train and practice to develop these skills. The teams ensure that members use a common framework to avoid confusion.

In the commercial world, we can observe the behaviors of venture capitalists, start-up companies, and experienced innovators. Industry must take risks in order to succeed. Risks often are viewed in the same context of opportu-nities, since the investment risk is made based on the potential sales and return on the investment. Investment capital is carefully managed though—usually starting with relatively small investments to gauge market potential, followed by growth and expansion into new products and new markets.

DoD acquisition professionals can learn valuable lessons from industry on the power of opportunity management and its relationship to risk. Industry must be effective at opportunity management that leads to increased sales, new markets, new customers, and other business benefits. When I was an industry manager, I spent most of my time working opportunity management. High payoff opportunities don’t just happen by chance. Without significant effort to manage and sometimes create new opportunities, it can be difficult for a company to grow its business. That is why companies

invest their own money in research and development and hire business development, marketing, and sales staffs and implement robust opportunity management processes.

Students in DAU classes and workshops often ask how to do something and provide an example. Let’s address both, starting with how we might become more aggressive risk takers, seeking high payoff opportunities. The how-to that follows is an example of many that one could use to identify high payoff opportunities that involve taking more risks. The use of good critical thinking skills is necessary for complex tasks such as this. One of the basic tenets often used in critical thinking is to break away from normal thought patterns. Relying solely on these routine thought patterns can inhibit good thinking because we tend to restrict thinking to easy and well understood paradigms. A tool to help break this pattern involves what we will call thinking in reverse.

An example of a method we can use is taking a “reverse-risk” approach. As seen in the model (Figure 1), we start with our typical risk management process. After a planning effort, we identify risks (Step 1) associated with the pro-gram. Risks are categorized based on a future root cause and mapped to a risk cube based on the probability (or likelihood) of occurrence and the consequence if it occurs. Rather than mitigate lower (the normal pattern), we then identify how we can increase the risk (Step 2). For exam-ple, assuming we have a high risk prototyping effort, what else could we do to increase the risk of this prototype? This could involve reducing the timeline, adding unproven technology to the design, using advanced materials, adding

Figure 1. Risk Taker—Opportunity Process Model

Source: The author.

5

4

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2

1

1 2 3 4 5

5

4

3

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1 2 3 4 5

LikelihoodLikelihood

Consequence

Bene�t

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Moderate

Low

• Identify Risks

• Assess Actions to Increase Risk

• Assess Feasibility of Risk Actions

• Determine Benefits of Taking Higher Risks

• Identify Best Payoff Opportunities

• *Pursue High Payoff Opportunities

*Back to Risk Management Process


new features, or other risky experimentation ideas. In Step 3, we assess the feasibility of actually pursuing the idea and then analyze (Step 4) the potential benefits.

The benefits could spark opportunity identification so we use the existing opportunity model to assess the likelihood and benefit of opportunities (Step 5). Finally, we pursue the best value opportunities (Step 6) or iterate back again to explore other options. Once we decide to pursue the opportunity, we can use the risk model to help manage the new risks that are now associated as a result of pursuing the opportunity.

Using the Section 804 Middle Tier of Acquisition author-ity pathway for Rapid Prototyping, we can envision an example of taking on higher risks to pursue high payoff op-portunities. In a notional example, a PM initially pursues an acquisition strategy using the traditional DoD Instruction 5000 series process. The strategy thus includes develop-ment of mature technologies to meet a desired capability.

In using the reverse risk model, the PM reconsiders a new technology that looks promising but is not mature enough to include in an engineering and manufacturing phase design baseline. The PM proposes rapid prototyping of this new technology to assess performance in a relevant envi-ronment. The technology is not proven and, therefore, the risks are very high that it will not perform as expected. The PM still decides to pursue building and testing this proto-type because the potential payoff is significant. Rather than delay the traditional program, the use of virtual prototyping is conducted, followed by some hardware in the loop tests. This could lead to rapid incorporation of the technology feature, and could inform other possible opportunities. It could also lead to transition to a fielded project or a revised prototyping effort.

My organization did something similar several years ago on an international cooperative development program. The risk taking involved prototyping a new sensor on a “bor-rowed” operational aircraft that was made available by the operational command. The test effort was invaluable in providing operational feedback, technical data, feasibility, and confidence in structuring a follow-on full up design and deployment program.

Risk aversion is not necessarily a bad thing. We have many good reasons to avoid severe risks, especially those that

threaten mission success, safety, and large investments. We can learn from the recent Coronavirus outbreak. While the likelihood of infection initially is assessed as low, the consequences could be life threatening for us, our families, and co-workers. Thus, it is prudent to make a significant effort to avoid the risk of infection. Meanwhile, if we look at investment portfolios, a strategy of higher-risk, high payoff stocks was generally working great with significant returns over the last 10 years. How quickly that changed when fear and uncertainty mounted. A diversified investment strategy would help mitigate the unexpected events that can turn a nice return into big losses.

In using the Risk Taker—Opportunity Process Model discussed above, we can also identify opportunities, even in the current volatile environment. Stocks of some of the most valuable companies worldwide now are available at prices that look like bargains when compared to previous highs. Many investors will take advantage of this oppor-tunity, even though risks could still be high in the short term. Taking a longer-term view though, like investors who bought the sell-off in the 2008 financial meltdown, could be attractive and result in big payoffs! They took the deep dive for the pearls and found some exquisite ones that were worth the risk.


MDAP/MAIS Program Manager Changes

With the assistance of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Acquisition magazine publishes the names of incoming and outgoing program manag-ers for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and major automated information system (MAIS) programs. This announcement lists two such changes of leadership for both civilian and military program managers for March 2020.

Navy/Marine CorpsCAPT Holly B. Shoger relieved CAPT Todd D. St. Laurent as Program Manager for Naval Undergraduate Flight Training Systems (PMA-273) on March 26.

CAPT Eric M. Gardner relieved CAPT Anthony E. Rossi as Program Manager for Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance (PMA-290) on March 30.

In using the reverse risk model, the PM reconsiders a new technology that looks promising but is not mature enough to include in an

engineering and manufacturing phase design baseline.


UNIVERSITY AFFILIATED RESEARCH CENTERS

Revolutionizing Acquisitions

Steve Waugh

Waugh is the acting chief scientist of an engineering group at a University Affiliated Research Center. He served 20 years in the Marine Corps as an AV-8B pilot, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel and deputy program executive officer at NAVAIR (Naval Air Systems Command). He holds a bachelor of science degree in Aerospace Engineering from the U.S. Naval

Academy, an MBA in Technology Management from the University of Phoenix, and is a candidate for a Doctor of Business Adminis-

tration degree at the University of Maryland Global Campus. He was a member of the Maryland State Senate in

2014-2018.

ACQUISITION HAS BEEN GETTING SLOWER, MORE EXPENSIVE, AND increasingly risk averse. Strategic competitors of the United States such as Russia and China cannot outpace American innovation, so they are forced to fast-follow and embrace risky, disruptive technologies but are unencum-bered by 200 years of acquisition regulation.

Sustained evolution of acquisition and logistics is necessary because our nation’s life depends on it. The National Security Strategy acknowledges that China and Russia chal-lenge American power, steal intellectual property and seek to replace U.S. leadership on the global stage. They have been matching our quality while beating us in speed to fleet, and quantity.

In 2017, Congress mandated the creation of a Chief Management Officer with the mis-sion of managing the business operations of the Department of Defense (DoD), and that position is the Number 3 in the DoD. The former Office of the Under Secretary Defense for


Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics was divided. Acquisition and Sustain-ment was set up along with co-equal Research and Engineering within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Strategic Goal 3 of the National Defense Business Operations Plan is to reform business practices for greater perfor-mance and affordability.

The new Adaptive Acquisition Framework, with its provision of six possible pathways will certainly make changes at the macro level of the acquisition strategy. But it will not alter the thousands of processes that iteratively and recursively feed them (e.g., the source selection process). To whom can DoD turn for help?

If we are to “identify more savings to put back into lethality” as the Secretary of De-fense has directed, we must acknowledge that engineering a 5 percent improvement in cost or schedule is as important as engineering a 5 percent performance improvement in precision or range. However, it is difficult for a DoD agency or program to get world-class expertise to research business process or supply chain improvement because of the strictures in contracting services or buying products; it almost never happens. By virtue of its isolated regulatory environment, the largest industrial process in human history is sheltered from commercial advances in business process and logistics—WalMart can hire the best business researchers, quicker than can the DoD.

Main Points• Acquisition is slow and expensive.• Adaptive Acquisition Framework is a partial fix.• Sustained evolution is necessary.• How similarly important problems were solved.• How a potential solution might work (with supporting examples and data). • Recommended Solution (and its evaluation, sustainment, and budget).

Assign It an Appropriate Importance Acquisition and Sustainment processes can be improved if given the same attention as engineering the material solutions. Improvement in acquisi-tion business processes are more likely to replicate across the DoD and federal government because they are more generally applicable and unclassified. Such improvements come through evolving and modernizing simple, deck-plate level DoD business processes, not just by changing the Federal


Acquisition Regulations (FAR). One approach is to estab-lish a nonprofit research organization within a university or college to provide and maintain essential research, en-gineering and/or development capabilities in a long-term strategic relationship with DoD. This organization could provide responsive, cutting-edge researchers, and practi-tioners to DoD agencies, offices, and programs to advise on business and sustainment practices without conflict of interest. It could be capable of diagnosing problems or designing and prototyping solutions, but strictly prohib-ited from competing with industry for production or ser-vice contracts that provide those solutions. Conveniently, University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) can be chartered for this express purpose.

Section 835 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 directs the establishment of an acquisition research organization within a civilian college or university to provide academic analyses and policy alternatives for innovation in defense acquisition policies and practices. It might be focused more on the Executive Branch levels of policy and legislation—and not deck-plate business processes, logistics, or training.

Programs bring a UARC into an engineering problem when it is so complex or so high risk that it is beyond the experi-ence of anyone in the program office, or when data rights and licensing issues are less problematic compared to industry solutions. The Pentagon regularly asks UARCs to perform Analyses of Alternatives partly because of their independence from the systems commands and program offices. The government calls on UARCs when its own labs and/or their support contractors cannot do the job—at least within the specified time or other constraints.

Industry constantly is leveraging the latest research on business intelligence (BI) and business process manage-ment (BPM), deploying advanced tools to continue ac-celerating and outpace the competition. Staying the same in Logistics and Supply Chain Management (LSCM) is a sure road to failure at UPS when Amazon Prime is deploy-ing its own delivery fleet. The finance industry considers it mandatory to invest in Governance, Risk and Compli-ance (GRC) systems to avoid complex regulatory and legal complications. Can commanders track aircraft engines

as well as the pizzas they order online? How much time and money could be saved making travel claims 1 percent easier and/or accurate?

DoD employees need to become familiar with BI or GRC as terms, as well as the associated tools. DoD is changing policy at the top, but adaptation at the ground level is slow. The mere existence of blue ribbon panels like the Section 809 Panel proves that the problem exists, but the number of times that such boards have had no effect is remarkable: Five years ago, such a panel titled its report, “This Time Must Be Different.” Congressionally mandated panels of distinguished executives are impressive, but by virtue of their very nature have little effect. The conclusions are profound, the recommendations serious, but impossible for any one person, program, or office to implement.

In 1940, the United States faced an existential threat from Germany and Japan, particularly in the form of power-ful air forces that our Services were ill-equipped to shoot down. The Office of Scientific Research and Develop-ment mobilized the nation’s engineers and scientists, and the Navy assigned that problem to a Carnegie Institute physicist, Merle Tuve, who built a small team of scientists and engineers that managed to put a proximity fuse (that detonates when close to but not in direct contact with the target) in an anti-aircraft shell in a matter of months. Tuve’s team was administered by the Johns Hopkins University (JHU) and became the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). The air-burst fuse data rights were owned by the Navy and licensed to industry for mass production. They became a UARC focused on solving critical problems quickly, with executable results—not replacing government labs or displacing industry. By augmenting government laboratory capabilities, engaging academia and industry, UARCs serve as an enduring national resource for independent analysis and innovation.

What They Are, How They Work DoD has 14 UARCs, each chartered to provide technical excellence in unique disciplines that do not overlap, such as the Georgia Tech Research Institute Applied Systems Laboratory (GTRI) that develops high-tech missile sensors, while the University of Southern California Institute for Cre-ative Technology (USCICT) develops hardware and soft-

A Business Research Lab affiliated with an educational institution ... will be rapidly available to any program, office, or agency that desires help and welcomes the expertise (therefore

likely to implement its recommendations).


ware for virtual reality immersion. UARC staff are objective subject-matter experts and leading researchers in their fields. They are answerable only to the DoD and the public interest, so these independent and highly experienced practitioners can be trusted advisors and honest brokers in performing essential research for the DoD. Researchers at the University of Maryland (UMD) will not compete with Raytheon or Booz-Allen.

UARCs are alert to evolution with comprehensive exper-tise in their chartered area. They are given broad access to government information and maintain deep core knowl-edge in their operational areas. UARCs must maintain their independent and objective nature, unlike a profit-motivated service or product contractor. UARCs offer quick response to government needs: Sole-source authority allows agen-cies, offices, and programs to get them on contract in just weeks, if not days. That same contract limits their actions to temporary analysis or development and specifically pre-cludes production and contract service support. The UARC contract requires them to be free of organizational and per-sonal conflicts of interest, thus able to assess government and contractor information (prime and support, sensitive, and proprietary).

UARCs do not compete for contracts against industry; they only perform research, development, and prototyping. JHU built a prototype spacecraft for satellite navigation, but not the constellation of five. Because UARCs must only do work they are chartered for, they generally do not use subcontracts. The government cannot contract with Penn State to pass the work to KPMG International. The UARC must protect classified and proprietary information in order to support inherently government functions.

ExamplesThe oldest, JHU/APL, has eight chartered competencies from submarines to spacecraft. After inventing the VT proximity fuse, APL developed guided missiles, phased array radar, battle management systems, sonars, and more. APL is building a nuclear quadcopter for NASA to explore Titan, a moon of Saturn.

The Stevens Institute of Technology (SIT) Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC) is chartered for research in systems engineering, systems architecting, and open systems standards. It is focused on trusted systems (cyber security), systems engineering trans-formation, human capital development, and enterprise systems of systems.

The UMD Center for Advanced Study of Language has four competencies: foreign language, linguistics, critical thinking, and sharing of information. The list goes on. The 14 UARCs have 82 distinct competencies. No UARC is

chartered to do business or logistics research into practical BPM or LSCM applications.

DataTextbooks on business process management cite a Gart-ner research note that 80 percent of companies conduct-ing BPM projects see a return on investment greater than 15 percent. The survey of 20 companies showed that 95 percent of the companies experienced 90 percent success improving processes, and all successful projects returned at least 10 percent. Organizations with an identi-fied BPM center of excellence achieved a return on invest-ment that was 5 times greater than average. Similarly, a 2002 text on SCM described a “supply chain revolu-tion and a related logistical renaissance,” but a Vietnam veteran would feel completely at home in a modern depot repair facility. The depot repair cost for a T-44 Pegasus training aircraft actually exceeds the price of a new plane (which is why there are no civilian depots, just repair and overhaul). Conversely, the same vet would be surprised to see every artisan in a guitar factory using Microsoft Dynamics at the work bench.

Closer than 10 miles from the Pentagon, the UMD Busi-ness School alone has 13 centers of excellence that cover the gamut from complexity in business, digital innova-tion, global business, to analytics and data science. All are directly applicable to DoD operations. An organization can collect and focus such research onto practical DoD problems, not only understanding the research and having experience applying it but also bringing these experts to bear—only for as long as necessary to solve the problem.

DoD expenditure on BPM/LSCM research is almost non-existent and very difficult to justify in a Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System/Planning, Program-ming, Budgeting Systems environment. Corporations know and research shows there is a positive and signifi-cant relationship between BI system implementation effectiveness and key business analytics (BA). But few people in DoD acquisition could define either BI or BA—they just know that source selection takes too long.

SolutionDoD should establish a research organization within a university or college with identified core competencies of BPM and LSCM to provide essential engineering, re-search, and/or development capabilities through a long-term, strategic relationship with DoD. This can enable en-during improvement through evolutionary change at the lowest levels that propagates organically if it succeeds. Available to any level of program, office, or agency, it will define and prototype necessary change (not implement, produce, or compete).


A Business Research Lab affiliated with an educational institution with one of the finest business schools will be a trusted agent for DoD. With a sole source task-order con-tract, it will be rapidly available to any program, office, or agency that desires help and welcomes the expertise (and therefore likely to implement its recommendations). With a tightly focused charter, this UARC would not duplicate existing competencies or conflict with industry.

Scoping the charter to BPM and LSCM can help find or create an entity that DoD can become aware of and em-ploy. If we can identify existing work to characterize as BPM/LSCM research, this will clear the path to establish a new charter and spin off a new lab. Or, we can iden-tify a college or university to establish such a lab and slowly develop the $6 million in annual sole source tasks necessary to warrant designation, or take several years to compete it outright.

Staffing a UARC is the responsibility of the lab, not the government. DoD incurs no risk nor obligation to use this staff, as opposed to the entirely different federally funded research and development centers’ mandated and funded personnel. UARC’s employ world-class researchers (often Ph.D.’s) and practitioners, with either recent operational experience or remarkable academic backgrounds. One of the benefits of a UARC is its ability to bring experts to bear on a task only as much as necessary, often part-time and for months or perhaps only for weeks. Contrasted with contract service support where the government is forced to hire staff full time for years, it is higher cost by the hour but considerably less over the time of the contract. A new lab would be wise to structure itself with the intent of having few permanent staff and maximum access to researchers and practitioners on a part-time, ad hoc basis to selectively engage scholars at institutions around the country.

EvaluationEvaluating such a BPM and LSCM lab should consider its effect on BPM and LSCM metrics. The supply chain operations reference model (SCOR) is a management tool used to address, improve, and communicate supply chain management decisions, and a lab’s ability to affect these metrics would be measurable and reportable. BPM research is replete with performance metrics that a lab could measure and report its contribution to DoD mission

accomplishment, even on a micro scale. Ultimately, after a statistically significant period, economic analysis should allow estimation of improved program success. If the new lab cannot report measurable impact, it could be shuttered at no additional cost to the DoD.

SustainmentThe educational institution and the government make a mutual commitment to a long-term, strategic relationship when they establish such a lab. DoD agencies are encour-aged to use UARCs, and collaborate as needed to define and prioritize their work so that it is responsive to DoD priorities. But DoD is not obligated to sustain it: The UARC must find its own work.

BudgetUARCs are sometimes budgeted by programs when they can forecast the need for specific expertise, but are more often engaged with redirected funds when a critical prob-lem emerges. PMs frequently list a lab by name in budget requests. Offices within systems commands do as well, but less frequently. Any Component or DoD agency can Mili-tary Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) funds to the sponsor of the contract. The lab is bound by the FAR and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplements like any other entity.

Revolutionary change in business process usually fails. Evolutionary changes that are small and diverse can blos-som and spread organically if effective. Evolution is only possible if DoD enables easy access at the lowest levels to cutting-edge experts without lengthy (and profit-driven) contract support service. This is how we can change from the bottom-up, rather than a blue ribbon panel requiring Congress to change the FAR. The United States can avoid losing the next war with slow, unresponsive acquisition and logistics to a more agile, less regulated competitor. We can beat emerging powers at agility—our business entrepre-neurs do so regularly. We can save taxpayer dollars. Let’s bring the DoD into the 21st century with scientific manage-ment tools built after the Internet arrived on cell phones. We can make the DoD the best place to work with cutting-edge BPM and LSCM resources. Our government servants can feel like NASA in the 1960s: an organizational culture driving broad change.


If we can identify existing work to characterize as BPM/LSCM research, this will clear the path to establish a new

charter and spin off a new Lab.


AESOP’S GUIDE to “Acquisition Laws”

All the Worthwhile Bits, Including 89 Laws, Two Rules, and One Paradox

John Krieger

Krieger is a professor of Contract Management at the Defense Systems Management College at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He also is an independent consultant for Acquisition Consultation, LLC, and a Leader/Facilitator for The FAR Bootcamp, The Source Selection Bootcamp, and the course Critical Thinking for Acquisition Professionals. He has 40 years of experience in contracting and acquisition.

IN PRIOR AESOP’S GUIDES (THE FORMER DEFENSE AT&L MAGAZINE, MARCH-APRIL 2015, AND DEFENSE Acquisition magazine, May-June 2020) we considered The Tortoise and the Hare (Space Acquisition) and The Doe and the Lion (Litigating Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Other Transactions, Parts 1 Protest and Part 2 Disputes). Although each of the fables in some way addresses laws—of man and nature—this article relies on The Bat and the Weasels. For those who are unfamiliar with the story, a bat captured by a weasel that hated birds

therefore claimed to be a mouse and was released. Later, when captured by a weasel that hated mice, it claimed to be a bird. The moral of the story: It is wise to turn circumstances to good account. In the same fashion, as Acquisition Professionals we should always try to turn the laws to our advantage.


Acquisition LawsIn the world of federal acquisition, we have a great many laws to follow. We have the United States Statutes at Large, the collection of laws passed by the United States Con-gress, in chronological order, going back to the 1st Con-gress in 1789. We have the United States Code (U.S.C.), the consolidation and codification of the Statutes at Large by subject matter. The U.S.C. is prepared by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the United States House of Representatives. These comprise our statutory laws. And then we have Executive Orders, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circulars, and Office of Federal Procure-ment Policy Letters and Memoranda.

We don’t, however, do federal acquisition directly from the statutes, Executive Orders, and OMB Circulars. They must be interpreted and implemented. So we have regulations, such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The FAR is supplemented by other regulations, such as the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). Even the supplements have supplements (e.g., the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS), the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS), the Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supple-ment (NMCARS), Defense Logistics Acquisition Directive (DLAD), Special Operations Federal Acquisition Regula-tions Supplement (SOFAR), and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Acquisition Regulation Supple-ment (DARS)). Many of those supplements are supple-mented at lower levels until you actually reach the level of the “worker bee.”

All of that is apparently not enough, so we have case law to interpret each and every one of all those words. We have case law from the Comptroller General, the boards of contract appeals, and the courts. Sometimes, a case comes down to the meaning of a single word. One of the more interesting cases came down to the meaning of the word “a.” The FAR is 2,008 pages long and the DFARS is 2,073 pages long, so there are lots and lots of words open to interpretation.

Still not enough. We have Department of Defense Direc-tives and Instructions. Still not enough. We have guidance of all sorts (e.g., guides, guidebooks, guidelines, hand-

books, and procedures). Still not enough. We have policy letters and memoranda. Enough.

This article isn’t really concerned about any of the above, it is concerned the real “Acquisition Laws.” What are those? Read on.

Actual “Acquisition Laws”The real “Acquisition Laws” are those that affect the way that we actually do things within the greater context of acquisition and acquisition laws.

My brothers and I, all of whom became contracting of-ficers during our careers, began to learn these “Acquisition Laws” from our father when we were youngsters. Dad had learned them in his career in the Philadelphia and Long Beach Naval Shipyards and at China Lake. For example:

Krieger’s First Law of Shipbuilding: When the weight of the paper equals the weight of the ship, it’s time to launch.

Krieger’s First Law of Ship Modification and Repair: If it doesn’t fit, don’t force it, you need a bigger hammer.

Krieger’s Second Law of Ship Modification and Repair: Beat to fit, paint to match.

The one we learned before all others was one that had nothing to do with ships, “When the Klieg is up, every-one’s up!”

The real “Acquisition Laws” are those that we need to keep in mind when we are trying to implement the acquisition laws discussed previously. They are the ones that help us focus, make things work, and hopefully prevent us from doing dumb things. Most important, perhaps, they help us maintain our sanity. The discussion of the laws includes some that are general in nature and others that are specific to acquisition.

[Note: Some of the laws are extensive in nature, and we have limited space. They should be read in their entirety to receive the full impact. For those, short discussions are provided, and references to where more detail may be found.

Sometimes, a case comes down to the meaning of a single word. One of the more interesting cases came

down to the meaning of the word “a.”


The Razors Occam’s Razor: Entities should not be multiplied without necessity. Also called the Law of Parsimony, it is named after the Franciscan friar William of Ockham, a 14th-century philosopher. The meaning may seem a bit obscure, but, essentially, it means that the simplest explanation is the best. Hence the “razor” that cuts off what is not needed.

Closely related to Occam’s Razor is the Pareto Principle. Pareto’s Principle is that 80 percent of the effects come from 20 percent of the causes. There are multiple vari-ants of the Principle, particularly as they relate to software development (e.g., the Ninety-Ninety Rule).

Hanlon’s Razor: Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity.

The attribution is to Robert J. Hanlon, who contributed it for a book on Murphy’s Law. The sentiment, however, existed long before the 20th century.

The Paradox, UnexplainedAccording to the second definition of “paradox” in the Oxford English Dictionary, “A statement or proposi-tion which on the face of it seems self-contradictory, absurd, or at variance with common sense—though, on investigation or when explained, it may prove to be well-founded (or, according to some, though it is essentially true).” An example would be Zeno’s famous Paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise as described in Aristotle’s Physics. (Not to be confused with Aesop’s considered The Tortoise and the Hare.)

Cobb’s Paradox: We know why projects fail, we know how to prevent their failure—so why do they still fail?

Cobb’s Paradox was named after Martin Cobb, chief information officer (CIO) of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. He came up with the Paradox while attending the Standish Group’s CHAOS University. Studying the most complex information technology projects of the year, he noted a high level of failures, and developed the Paradox.

If you can explain it, please do.

Other Laws, ExplainedCheops’ Law of Project Management: No project is ever completed on time or within budget. (Code of Federal Regulations under Lashley’s Laws). This probably is the oldest of the laws, but probably not formulated as such at the time. It is named after the Pharaoh Khufu, whom we generally refer to as Cheops. Cheops is credited with responsibility for the building of the Great Pyramid of Giza, one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, in the

26th century BC. The pyramid may have taken 20 years to construct. Estimates of what it would cost to build now range from $250 million to $300 million, material only, to a whopping $5 billion.

Parkinson’s Law: Work expands so as to fill the time avail-able for its completion.

Parkinson’s Law of Triviality: The time spent on any item of the agenda will be in inverse proportion to the sum [of money] involved. (cfr. Sayre’s Laws)

Both of the above Laws come from C. Northcote Parkinson, British author and historian. The original appeared in Par-kinson’s Law: Or The Pursuit of Progress. The Law of Triviality was a corollary to the first, and has particular application to software development, where it is often referred to as “bike-shedding,” or some variant thereof.

Murphy’s Law: If there are two or more ways to do something, and one of those ways can result in a ca-tastrophe, then someone will do it. This is arguably the most widely known and quoted. The original was coined by a McDonnell Douglas test engineer, Edward A. Mur-phy, Jr, when each of 16 sensors in an experiment were incorrectly wired. Murphy’s Law is probably the most misquoted. The standard misquotes are, “Whatever can go wrong, will go wrong” and “Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong.” The misquotes are the proof of Murphy’s Law.

Sayre’s Law: In any dispute the intensity of feeling is in-versely proportional to the value of the issues at stake (cfr. Parkinson’s Law of Triviality). This law is named after Wal-lace Stanley Sayre, a professor at Columbia University. It is based on his comment concerning departmental politics at the university, “The politics of the university are so intense because the stakes are so low.”

Meskimen’s Law: There’s never time to do it right, but always time to do it over. I learned this one my first year as a contract negotiator on a satellite program. It was taught to me by our configuration management specialist, refer-ring to the rush to get on contract, followed by the series of modifications required to fix all the problems created by the rush to get on contract.

Lashley’s Laws:• You can have anything you want.• You cannot have everything you want.• You decide what you want by what you are willing to give

up to get it.• If you are unwilling to give up anything, what you will get

is nothing that anyone would want.


For a fuller discussion of Lashley’s Laws, see Seth D. Shep-herd’s article “Lashley’s Laws: You Can Have Anything You Want,” in the May-June 2019 issue of Defense Acquisition.

Battle’s LawsBattle’s Laws were written by Air Force Col C. Lee Battle, Jr., then director of the Discoverer/Corona Program, the nation’s first satellite imagery reconnaissance program, to explain how he operated his organization. He wrote, “We operate more or less along the following guidelines, listed more or less in their order of importance.” He then pro-ceeded to list the first 10 of what became known as Battle’s Laws. His 17 Principles of Program Management expand Battle’s Law, including greater detail.

They are included in their entirety here, as they are often hard to find, particularly the expanded Principles of Pro-gram Management. These were modified, slightly, from his original Sept. 5, 1961, memo by Battle for inclusion in Robert A. McDonald’s Beyond Expectations—Building an American National Reconnaissance Capability: Recollections of the Pioneers and Founders of National Reconnaissance.

The 10 Laws1. Keep the program office small and quick-reacting at all

cost.2. Exercise extreme care in selecting people, then rely

heavily on their personal abilities.3. Make the greatest possible use of supporting organi-

zations. You have to make unreasonable demands to make sure of this support.

4. Cut out all unnecessary paper work.5. Control the contractor by personal contact. Each

person in the Program Office has a particular set of contractor contacts.

6. Hit all flight and checkout failures hard. A fault uncor-rected now will come back to haunt you.

7. Rely strongly on contractor technical recommenda-tions, once the Program Office has performed its function of making sure the contractor has given the problem sufficient effort.

8. Don’t over-communicate with higher headquarters.9. Don’t make a federal case out of it if your fiscal budget

seems too low. These matters usually take care of themselves.

10. Don’t look back, history never repeats itself.

Principles of Program Management1. Be schedule-oriented.

a. If you don’t start that way, you will end that way anyhow.

b. Haste does not make as much waste as foot-drag-ging in this business.

c. Decision time is critical.d. A tight schedule avoids letting anyone off the hook.e. Early launch testing shortens time to fix.f. Only in the Program Office does schedule motiva-

tion exist.2. A good Program Office is oriented to the technical side

of the problem. Don’t kid yourself—the program payoffs come upon results. That means when it works.

3. Recognize the contractor’s role and live with it:a. The contractor is in the driver’s seat, technically

speaking.b. At same time, make sure you hold the contractor

fully responsible.c. The Program Office concentrates on evaluating

the amount of effort and quality of people, and on problems you think are important.

4. The direct personal involvement of all Program Office members is vital.a. The Program Director must be held personally

responsible for all aspects. (This automatically becomes the case.)

b. In turn, the Program Director holds individuals under him in same status, etc.

5. (Corollary to 4) The Program Office must remain small. Parkinson can kill you.

6. (Corollary to 5) Use all other offices you can. Apply Principle 4 to this. Always make unreasonable de-mands.

7. Never ask for help. You might get it.8. Comply promptly with all report requirements in the

most meager fashion that will pass inspection.9. Restatement of 8. Don’t over-communicate with

higher headquarters.10. Financially, it is the same story. You have to live with

the contractor. Never let him get behind; keep a finger on his status. Incurring unpredicted overruns is bad, but overrunning without knowing it is disastrous.

11. Troubles: Hit them hard and instantly.

Don’t make a federal case out of it if your fiscal budget seems too low. These matters usually take

care of themselves.


a. Unfixed troubles will bite you again.b. There is no such thing as a random failure.c. Personnel mistakes are far more frequent than

design defects.12. System integration is very important.13. Insist that all principles herein apply to all contractor

activities.14. Don’t generate paperwork. There are plenty of people

willing to do this for you.15. Committees are the world’s most useless activity.

Avoid “let’s-have-a-meeting-ers” like you avoid poison.a. They never accomplish anything.b. There is always some individual who has the

responsibility for doing what the committee thinks it is doing.

16. Management surveys are punitive. Recognize it and employ them (if ever) accordingly.

17. Examine closely the tie between the Home Office and the field. There’s many a slip here.

Augustine’s LawsAugustine’s “Acquisition Laws,” written by Norman R. Au-gustine, are by far the most famous. Unlike Battle’s Laws, Augustine’s Laws are easy to find. So, we suggest that you go find them, and read them in all of their subtle beauty. Augustine saw acquisition from both sides, contractor and

federal government. At the time the Laws first appeared he was the Vice President of Martin Marietta Aerospace, where I was privileged to meet him. He eventually became Chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin.

The Defense Acquisition Review Journal published “Augus-tine’s Laws and Major System Development Programs” in January 2015. The article includes the complete “Augus-tine’s Laws and Major System Development Programs” from the Defense Systems Management Review (Spring 1979, Volume 2, Number 2), covering Laws I-XV, and from Concepts, The Journal of Defense Systems Acquisition Man-agement (Winter 1982, Volume 5, Number 1) covering Laws XVI-XXIII. The count of Laws now extends to LII.

For those interested in a hard copy, various editions, hard-cover and softcover, are available.

Notes: • Don’t expect what you find at Wikipedia to be a match,

number for number, for the above. • If you decide to buy one of the book versions, don’t get

the one someone is trying to sell for $952.95; it doesn’t include shipping.


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Defense Acquisition Magazine Wins Two More Hermes Awards! DEFENSE

A PUBLICATION OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY | dau.mil September-October 2019

ACQUISITION

The Next RevolutionNAVAIR Systems Engineering Transformation

Model-Based Systems EngineeringNext Big Thing or a Fad?

Second-Party AuditTen Areas for No-Nonsense Contractor Auditing

DoD Financial ManagementMore Money, More Problems

DEFENSE

A PUBLICATION OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY | dau.edu November-December 2019ACQUISITI

ON

Protecting

Critical DoD Information

Intelligence

Acquisitions

Policy Complexity Drives

Critical Thinking

Disasters in

the MakingWhen Critical Thinking

and Ethical Persistence

Do Not Converge

Learning at the

Speed of Relevance

The Quest for

Rapid AcquisitionThere Are Some

Who Call Us … Test?

The Defense Acquisition magazine recently won two more gold Hermes Awards from the Association of Marketing and Commu-nication Professionals (AMCP) for 2020. The awards were for the graphic design of the magazine’s September-October 2019 issue and the overall quality of the Novem-ber-December 2019 issue.

The current two awards bring the magazine to 14 awards in a 5-year streak of recogni-tion by various national professional and business associations, including Awards for Publications Excellence from Communi-

cations Concepts, Inc., of Alexandria, Virginia, and the National Association of Government Communicators, Min-neapolis, as well as previous awards from Hermes and AMCP of Dallas.

AMCP includes of several thousand marketing, communication, advertis-ing, public relations, digital media pro-duction and freelance professionals. AMCP oversees awards and recogni-tion programs, provides judges, and issues awards for outstanding achieve-ment and service to the profession.

This recognition is highly salutary, especially coming at this time when we are functioning during the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis. The issue that you now are reading was prepared entirely in the homes of the staff, teleworking under the government’s COVID-19 lockdown.

The award specifically mentions managing editor Benjamin Tyree and art director Tia Gray as well as the pro-duction, editorial, and graphics staffs of the DAU’s Visual Arts and Press office headed by Norene Johnson. Staff contributors include copy editor and circulation manager Debbie Gonzalez; production manager Frances Battle;

Nina Austin for online support; and Mi-chael Shoemaker for editing support. Collie Johnson adds extra information to our online site. Staff members of our sister publication, the Defense Acquisi-tion Research Journal, contribute to prepublication review.

The award is a great tribute to the substantive contributions of our authors, our subject-matter experts, among the DAU faculty and the military Services, other DoD agencie, as well as our private industry and academic partners.

The magazine is an excellent forum for sharing experiences and lessons learned in the acquisition arena. We encourage our readers who have not already done so to become writers, too, and join in the colloquy. Let us especially hear from you about work-ing with the new Adaptive Acquisition Framework and its six pathways..

So a toast to us all, and best wishes for our nation’s speedy recovery from COVID-19. Stay healthy and safe out there!

—The staff of Defense Acquisition magazine


DEFENSEACQUISITION

WRITERS’ GUIDELINES IN BRIEFPurposeDefense Acquisition is a bimonthly magazine published by DAU Press, Defense Acquisition University, for senior military personnel, civilians, defense contractors and defense industry profession-als in program management and the acquisition, technology and logistics workforce.

Submission ProceduresSubmit articles by e-mail to [email protected]. Submissions must include each author’s name, mailing address, office phone number, e-mail address, and brief biographical statement. Each must also be accompanied by a copyright release. For each article submitted, please include three to four keywords that can be used to facilitate Web and data base searches.

Receipt of your submission will be acknowledged in 5 working days. You will be notified of our publication decision in 2 to 3 weeks. All decisions are final.

DeadlinesNote: If the magazine fills up before the author deadline, submis-sions are considered for the following issue. Issue Author Deadline January–February 1 October March–April 1 December May–June 1 February July–August 1 April September–October 1 June November–December 1 August

AudienceDefense Acquisition readers are mainly acquisition professionals serving in career positions covered by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) or industry equivalent.

StyleDefense Acquisition prints feature stories focusing on real people and events. The magazine seeks articles that reflect author experiences in and thoughts about acquisition rather than pages of researched information. Articles should discuss the individual’s experience with problems and solutions in acquisition, contracting, logistics, or program management, or with emerging trends.

The magazine does not print academic papers; fact sheets; techni-cal papers; white papers; or articles with footnotes, endnotes, or references. Manuscripts meeting any of those criteria are more suit-able for DAU’s journal, Defense Acquisition Research Journal (ARJ).

Defense Acquisition does not reprint from other publications. Please do not submit manuscripts that have appeared elsewhere. Defense Acquisition does not publish endorsements of products for sale.

Length Articles should be 1,500–2,500 words.

FormatSend submissions via e-mail as Microsoft Word attachments.

GraphicsDo not embed photographs or charts in the manuscript. Digital files of photos or graphics should be sent as e-mail attachments. Each figure or chart must be saved as a separate file in the original software format in which it was created.

TIF or JPEG files must have a resolution of 300 pixels per inch; enhanced resolutions are not acceptable; and images downloaded from the Web are not of adequate quality for reproduction. De-tailed tables and charts are not accepted for publication because they will be illegible when reduced to fit at most one-third of a magazine page.

Right to Use IllustrationsNon-DoD photos and graphics are printed only with written per-mission from the source. It is the author’s responsibility to obtain and submit permission with the article. Do not include any clas-sified information.

Author InformationContact and biographical information will be included with each article selected for publication. Please include the following infor-mation with your submission: name, position title, department, institution, address, phone number and e-mail address. Also, please supply a short biographical statement, not to exceed 25 words. We do not print author bio photographs.

CopyrightAll articles require a signed Work of the U.S. Government/Copy-right Release form, available at https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/Lists/PageContent/Attachments/6/DATLcopyright-release_032217.pdf. Fill out, sign, scan and e-mail it to [email protected] or fax it to 703-805-2917, Attn: Defense Acquisition.

Alternatively, you may submit a written release from the major com-mand (normally the public affairs office) indicating the author is releasing the article to Defense Acquisition for publication without restriction.

The Defense Acquisition University does not accept copy-righted material for publication in Defense Acquisition. Articles will be considered only if they are unrestricted. This is in keep-ing with the University’s policy that our publications be fully accessible to the public without restriction. All articles are in the public domain and posted to the University’s website, https://www.dau.edu.

http://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/p/Writers-Guidelines

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