defending the institutional status quo: communist leadership of the second russian state duma,...

5Second Russian State Duma

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXVIII, 1, February 2003 5

PAUL CHAISTYUniversity of Oxford

Defending the Institutional Status Quo:Communist Leadership of theSecond Russian State Duma, 1996�99

The 1995 Russian parliamentary elections returned a State Duma dominatedby an alliance of the Communist Party (CPRF) and the Agrarian (APG) and PopularPower (PP) groupings, whose combined number fell just four votes short of an overallmajority. Such a powerful voting bloc might have been expected to undo the power-sharing principles on which the First Duma (1994�95) operated. Rather than challengethe status quo, however, the CPRF defended it on several occasions. In this paper, Iargue that existing arrangements held benefits for the CPRF and its leftist allies. In theabsence of a stable, disciplined majority, the Duma�s rules gave leftist deputies theincentives and flexibility to organize collectively.

Among comparative politics specialists, renewed interest in thestudy of political institutions has returned formal rules to the center ofpolitical analysis. The study of how institutional arrangements and indi-vidual preferences interact to shape political outcomes constitutes theone unifying strand of the �new institutionalist� literature.1 Strategiesemployed by political and economic actors to effect or resist institu-tional change have also received increased theoretical attention overthe last decade (North 1990; Tsebelis 1990). Founded on the belief thatactors have preferences about different institutional arrangements, thisanalysis assumes that rule-makers will act collectively to choose insti-tutions that best serve their political interests and policy goals.

In the postcommunist states of Eastern Europe and the formerSoviet Union, formal political rules and institutions have been radicallyaltered over the last decade. In Russia, some of these new institutionalarrangements have been short-lived, but others have acquired a degreeof stability not expected at the outset. This contrast is illustrated bydevelopments in both houses of the Russian parliament, the FederalAssembly. Although the method for selecting representatives to theupper house of the Federal Assembly, the Federation Council, has beenchanged on not one but two occasions since 1994, in the lower house,

6 Paul Chaisty

the State Duma, there has been no comparable reform of the legislature�sinstitutional arrangements, despite significant changes to the politicalcomposition of the lower house. These different outcomes requireexplanation.

The purpose of this article is to explore the Duma�s organiza-tional stability by addressing one central puzzle: Why was the Commu-nist Party, following its electoral victory in December 1995, reluctant toinitiate�or even support�majoritarian rule changes to strengthen itscontrol over the Duma�s governing institutions? My explanation focuseson the gains that leftist deputies derived from existing institutionalarrangements. The benefits provided by the institutional status quo, Iargue, enabled deputies with heterogeneous preferences to organizecollectively.

The Challenge of the Communist �Near Majority�

The 1995 Russian parliamentary elections appeared to cause aprofound shift in the preferences of Russian legislators. The electionsdramatically increased the representation of the Communist Party(CPRF), the most consistently left-leaning, antireform political groupingat the First Duma (1994�95). Agrarian and leftist deputies elected insingle-mandate constituencies further augmented the CPRF�s number.2These deputies joined with Communist deputies �on loan� from theCPRF faction to form two groups: the Agrarian Party Deputy Group(APG) and Popular Power (PP).3 Together with the CPRF, the groupsformed a leftist alliance that was initially just four seats short of anoverall majority.4 Buoyant with their electoral success and confident inthe belief that the Communist-led opposition could take the presidencyin elections scheduled for spring 1996, this near majority posed the firstserious challenge to the relative calm of parliament�president relationsafter October 1993.5

The prospect of a Duma led by a vigorous Communist factioncalled into question the institutions of governance devised by legislatorsat the First Duma. The CPRF inherited an assembly�composed ofboth majoritarian and power-sharing procedures�that appeared to offerfew benefits to the larger factions. These institutional arrangementswere the outcome of a political conjuncture at the First Duma, when noone faction dominated the rule-making process. In the Council of theDuma, the assembly�s chief ruling and agenda-setting body, all factionand group leaders were entitled to a vote of equal weight, irrespectiveof the number of seats they controlled. Most of the senior posts andoffices in the assembly were also divided up between all factions and


groups by a bargaining process known as the �package agreement.�6

Although the proportional basis on which these posts were distributeddid advantage the larger factions, only the chair of the Duma (a signifi-cantly less powerful post than the chair of the previous parliament, theSupreme Soviet) was elected using conventional majoritarian methods.

At the First Duma, Communist deputies expressed a preferencefor alternative institutional arrangements. During the inaugural debatesof this parliament (January�March 1994), both the CPRF and Agrarianfactions supported measures to strengthen faction control, such as pro-posals to raise the threshold requirement for deputy groups and tointroduce the �imperative mandate,� a procedure that would empowerfaction leaders to remove from the assembly those deputies elected onfaction party lists�50% of deputies in the Duma�who either choseto leave the faction or who persistently violated faction decisions andrules.7 Communist deputies also expressed support for proposals togive committee chairs voting rights in the Duma Council, an arrange-ment that, according to Remington and Smith (1998, 565), continued toreceive support among Communist deputies after the 1995 elections.In addition, other factions at the First Duma, most notably the LiberalDemocratic Party of Russia (LDPR), signaled their opposition to theinstitutional arrangements chosen by deputies.

These early indicators concerning the institutional preferences ofCommunist deputies and of deputies in other factions who werereelected to the Second Duma suggest that a new round of rules changeswas not out of the question. The election of Communist deputy GennadiSeleznev to the post of Duma chair (with votes from Russia�s Regions)demonstrated the capacity of the CPRF to construct majorities on pro-cedural questions early on in the Second Duma. Further, if the CPRFhad the will to change existing arrangements, then there were veryfew formal obstacles that could prevent it from doing so: amendmentsto the standing orders required the same number of votes as the passageof ordinary legislation�a minimum of 226 votes. Thus, with the sup-port of only one faction outside the leftist alliance, the CPRF appearedto have the majority it required to introduce procedural reforms.

Another aspect of Duma governance that might have persuadedthe CPRF to reform existing institutional arrangements was the legisla-tive practice this organizational structure produced. According to JohnAldrich (1995), a majority party that is institutionally strong will endeavorto retain tight control over a parliament�s agenda-setting procedures inorder to ensure the realization of its policy goals, irrespective of whetherits preferences challenge or are satisfied by the prevailing policy statusquo. Yet this model of legislative decision making assumes an institutional

8 Paul Chaisty

structure that rewards the majority. In contrast, the CPRF inheritedinstitutional arrangements�a mixture of majoritarian, power-sharing,and open rules�that divided agenda setting between a variety of forcesin the assembly.

During the First Duma, the Council of the Duma had proved to bemore effective than its predecessor, the praesidium of the SupremeSoviet, in mediating internal conflicts between factions and groups andin fostering links between the assembly and the executive. But thefailure of the council to integrate the legislative work of the Dumaproduced a distinctly uncoordinated legislative process. Committeechairs were denied full voting rights in the Duma Council, but theycontinued to retain, like their predecessors in the Supreme Soviet, asignificant degree of autonomy in the legislative sphere. In practice,legislative proposals in the Duma did not emerge from factions andgroups in the council but from the assembly�s committees. Nor did theDuma Council act as an effective filter for legislation before it reachedthe floor. The council rarely rejected laws introduced by committeechairs and left many political and technical problems for deputies toresolve in floor debates (see Chaisty 2001; Ostrow 1998).

The influence exerted by deputies in plenary sessions was furtherenhanced by the Duma�s open rules on floor procedure. Deputies regu-larly challenged the legislative agenda, prepared in advance by the DumaCouncil, and committees that did not enjoy majority support on the floorhad few mechanisms to prevent their bills from being bombarded bynew amendments or �alternative� projects. During the First Duma, asOstrow (1998) shows, poor linkage between the legislative strategiesof factions and committees was crudely exposed on the floor of theHouse (802�09).

Therefore, the Duma�s institutional and legislative arrangementsseemed to offer few advantages to the CPRF. Despite the CPRF�snear majority, it did not enjoy tight control over the assembly�s agenda-setting procedures: the method for forming the main presiding organ,the Duma Council, was nonmajoritarian, senior posts and offices weredistributed between all political groupings by the power-sharing packageagreement, and the Duma�s legislative practices and open rules frag-mented control over the legislative agenda. Both the assembly�s power-sharing governance structures and its decentralized legislative processimposed significant constraints on the capacity of the CPRF to domi-nate the new assembly. Given these factors, it would not have beenunreasonable to expect the ruling forces at the new Duma to changesome of its organizational features. Yet, the CPRF�s leadership of theSecond Duma had only limited impact on its institutional arrangements.


Proposals for Reform

The Second Duma saw no serious attempt by the leftist allianceto reorganize the internal structure of the assembly. In fact, most effortsin this direction came from either the government faction �Our HomeIs Russia� (NDR) or the liberal faction Yabloko. Only on two occa-sions�the third vote on Sergei Kiriyenko�s appointment to the post ofprime minister and the Duma�s campaign to impeach President Yeltsinin May 1999�did the CPRF show a keen awareness of the benefits tobe derived from initiating changes to the Duma�s constitution.

The first concerted attempt to reform the Duma�s legislative pro-cedures and to create mechanisms for the integration of interbranchlegislative activity was initiated by the Duma�s newly elected first deputychair, Aleksandr Shokhin (NDR). Shokhin�s proposals built on the workof the United Commission for the Coordination of Legislative Activities,which was formed by presidential decree in November 1994 to developa program of priority legislation acceptable to all branches of govern-ment. Shokhin�s recommendations, first presented in May 1996, aimedto raise the effectiveness of the Duma�s legislative practices in orderto expedite the parliament�s consideration of �priority� bills.8 Hisrecommendations included proposals targeted at strengthening thelegislative functions of the Duma Council and, in particular, its role asthe main �filter� of legislation. Other recommendations centered onways to streamline the plenary sessions of the Duma.9

Shokhin�s proposed reforms appeared to offer many benefits tothose deputies who desired a more regulated and efficient legislativeprocess, yet he failed to win over his parliamentary colleagues. Yablokosupported the spirit of Shokhin�s recommendations but had reserva-tions about specific proposals. Conversely, Communist deputies reacteddefensively to what they interpreted as a veiled attempt to discredit theDuma, and therefore its Communist leadership, on the eve of the1996 presidential elections. In debate, the Communist faction�s officialspokesperson, Aleksandr Mikhailov, characterized Shokhin�s proposalsas an unnecessary distraction from the Duma�s work and somewhat�far-fetched� (Byulleten�, No. 29, 23 May 1996, 16). Similarly, NikolaiRyzhkov, the coordinator of the Popular Power group, argued thatproposals to tighten up agenda-setting procedures would curb, notimprove, the legislative activity of the assembly (Byulleten�, No. 29,23 May 1996, 20�21). In the end, only two deputies from theCommunist faction voted for Shokhin�s proposals; one was theCommunists� own rules specialist and the Duma�s deputy chair, SvetlanaGoryacheva.

10 Paul Chaisty

Deputies did, however, agree to give the issue further consider-ation. A cross-party working group headed by Goryacheva convenedto discuss changes to the Duma�s standing orders. Over 480 amend-ments were scrutinized, and the final list of recommendations was puttogether on the basis of cross-party consent. The amendments werethen discussed and passed in a plenary session of the State Duma inJanuary 1998 (Byulleten� No. 149, 22 January 1998). But the impact ofthe new standing orders on the internal organization of the Duma waslimited. Most of the changes introduced were piecemeal in nature,10

and more radical proposals were omitted or incorporated in dilutedform. In presenting the working group�s recommendations, Goryachevastressed that its work had been guided by a desire to preserve both theassembly�s governance structures and its existing legislative practices.The working group, she later revealed, �strove to preserve much ofwhat has been achieved during the four years of the Duma. We did nottry to be too radical� (Nefedova 1998, 20).

The reluctance of the Communist near majority to disturb existingarrangements was highlighted by the rejection of a package of amend-ments introduced by Yabloko during the standing orders debate. Theseamendments sought to strengthen faction rule in the assembly andincluded proposals to prevent deputies elected on the party list fromjoining other deputy organizations, a variant of the imperative mandaterule; to eliminate the formal equality of factions and groups; and toincrease the number of deputies required to form a deputy group from35 to 45. Other amendments of note included a Yabloko proposal tolimit the occasions when �secret ballots� could be used in the chamberand a proposal initiated by a group of LDPR and Communist deputiesthat sought to tighten up the existing rules on committee composition.This last proposal was primarily driven by an ongoing dispute betweenfactions over the size of the Budget Committee and was eventuallydropped with the proviso that deputies would return to the issue at thenext renegotiation of the package agreement. The opposition of theCommunist faction to Yabloko�s amendments, most notably theimperative mandate proposal, is more puzzling. Groups and indepen-dent deputies had a clear incentive to reject proposals that wouldstrengthen factions, but the Communists, together with LDPR, hadpreviously expressed support for such measures.

Within the space of two months, however, the CPRF performeda volte-face on the issue of rule change. Yeltsin�s dismissal of VictorChernomyrdin in March 1998, a prime minister with whom theCommunists could do business, and the nomination in his place of little-known Energy Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, who had close ties to liberal


market reformers within the government, incensed leftist deputies andprovoked a constitutional crisis. The Duma�s refusal to confirm theappointment of Kiriyenko on two consecutive votes, and Yeltsin�s refusalto nominate a compromise candidate, meant that if the Duma rejectedKiriyenko�s candidacy on the third and final vote, then the presidentwould be constitutionally obliged to dissolve the lower house. This threat-ening consequence placed the Communist leadership in a tricky posi-tion. New parliamentary elections would be costly, and the resultunpredictable, but support for Kiriyenko would represent victory forYeltsin over the Communist-led Duma. The Communists, risking newelections, chose to persist with their opposition to Kiriyenko and markedthis decision by initiating a rule change that allowed for the use of openballots in the election of the prime minister. This measure served twopurposes. First, it gave the Communist leadership an important leverover the voting preferences of their deputies and their coalition partners.Second, by making the process of election more transparent, Communistleaders could fend off jibes about deputies being �bought off� by thepresidential administration. As one author of this amendment, CPRFDeputy Ilyukhin, averred:I would have probably withdrawn this initiative if it had not been for thetelevision broadcast by the President of the Russian Federation, where infront of our state, in front of the whole world, he effectively declared that hehad given instructions to Mr. Borodin,11 to the administrative department, todecide all the mercenary, material questions of deputies. (Byulleten�, No. 169,15 April 1998, 22)

This rule change was ultimately unable to prevent the election ofKiriyenko, for reasons that will be explored below, but Yeltsin�s refusalto compromise with the CPRF leadership precipitated a furtherdeterioration in Duma�president relations. In June 1998, the Dumaformed a commission to investigate five charges of impeachment againstPresident Yeltsin,12 and when the Duma considered impeachment inMay 1999, the Communist leadership again backed proposals�thistime introduced by Russia�s Regions, LDPR, and Yabloko�for openvoting on the individual charges. Moreover, on this occasion, the CPRFsupported virtually all of Yabloko�s amendments on ways to strengthenfaction control over the process. In fact, the CPRF added several of itsown amendments to a parliamentary resolution that set out the rulesfor the Duma�s consideration of the impeachment charges. Theseamendments further increased the control of factions over the impeach-ment proceedings (see Byulleten�, No. 258, 12 May 1999).

Thus, the successful introduction of rule changes before theKiriyenko and impeachment votes, with the backing of the CPRF, shows

12 Paul Chaisty

that revision of the Duma�s constitution was possible in this parliament.Nevertheless, the CPRF was clearly reluctant to support more com-prehensive proposals for reform. The question to be answered, then, iswhy the CPRF did not exploit earlier opportunities to reform theassembly.

Interpreting Communist Strategy

Opponents of the CPRF interpreted its reluctance to embraceparliamentary reform as characteristic of a general disregard for legis-lative and procedural questions. The Communist faction, it was argued,provided little leadership on substantive legislative questions and insteadsupported measures such as the resolution repudiating the BelovezhaAccords,13 which had electoral benefits but carried no legal weight.For Victor Sheinis (2000), a leading member of the Yabloko faction, theCommunist faction turned the Duma into �a tribune and platform of theweak patriotic-communist opposition� (75). From this perspective, theCPRF pursued a negative parliamentary strategy: the party had nodesire to take responsibility for governing Russia and instead used theassembly as a platform to rail against Yeltsin�s �anti-people� regime.This strategy was arguably most explicit in the faction�s readiness tocountenance rule change for the Kiriyenko and impeachment votes.

In contrast, Communist sympathizers and deputies maintained thatRussia�s constitutional constraints provided few incentives for the CPRFto engage actively in the lawmaking process. Under Russia�s hybridpresidential constitution, the parliament�s legislative sovereignty is notabsolute. Russian presidents have the power to initiate laws either asstatutory bills through parliament or as presidential decrees indepen-dent of the legislature. Also, the substantial veto powers that the headof state commands further weaken parliamentary supremacy in thelegislative sphere.14 At the same time, the parliament enjoys few leversof control over the legislative activities of the executive branch. Althoughthe Duma approves the appointment of the prime minister and canmove a vote of no confidence in the government, the president has thepower to dissolve the lower house if it rejects his or her preferredcandidate for prime minister on three consecutive votes, if it supportstwo votes of no confidence in the government within a three-monthperiod, or if it fails to support a government-initiated vote of no confi-dence. With only partial control over the composition and survival ofthe government, the parliament possesses few structural mechanismsto bind parliamentary majorities in support of legislative programs.Hence, for CPRF supporters, reform of the Duma�s internal procedures


could not be treated in isolation from constitutional reform. One leadingCommunist deputy neatly summarized this viewpoint:The government is continually formed from political forces that do not enjoya majority in the parliament. In 1993, Russia�s Choice failed to win a majority,but it went on to form the government (without negotiations with other fac-tions). In 1995, NDR also gained the right to form the government, but againwithout a majority in the parliament. So what is the point of the parliamentforming its own legislative program when the government holds differentviews? It would simply produce deadlock.15

Both perspectives fail, however, to encapsulate fully the CPRF�sparliamentary strategy at the Second Duma. The Communist factiondid not distinguish itself in the legislative field, but, in fact, most factions,with the possible exception of Yabloko, were peripheral lawmakers inthe Second Duma. Committees are the principal legislative bodies inthe lower house, and two of the most productive legislative committeesin this parliament�on legislation and on security�were led by Com-munist chairs. It is also misleading to describe the CPRF as an �irrec-oncilable� opposition that could derive little electoral benefit fromcooperating with the Yeltsin regime. The defeat of the CPRF in the1996 presidential elections led Communist leaders to rethink their over-all strategy for dealing with the executive branch (see Peshkov andVasil�tsov 1998). On one level, this recalibration took the form ofdemands for constitutional reform. More specifically, Communistdeputies advocated coalition government based on the parliamentarymajority. On another level, strategic adjustment led to a constructivedialogue between the Duma leadership and the executive. The CPRFused its institutional authority to obtain greater influence within, andconcessions from, the government, thereby allaying fears that the Com-munist faction would seek confrontation with the executive. The Dumaapproved the appointment of Victor Chernomyrdin as prime minister inAugust 1996 with a large majority, and an early attempt by the Yablokofaction to move a vote of no confidence in Chernomyrdin�s govern-ment was blocked by the CPRF. Furthermore, when the CPRF movedtheir own vote of no confidence in October 1997, this act appearedlittle more than a tactic to extract concessions on legislation from thegovernment.16

Similarly, Russia�s constitutional constraints do not sufficientlyexplain the reluctance of the CPRF to change institutional arrange-ments. The available empirical evidence suggests that, in spite of theconstitutional limitations on its powers, the Duma plays a key role in thelawmaking process, and this role was not significantly weakened bythe election of a Communist-dominated Duma in 1995 (Chaisty and

14 Paul Chaisty

Schleiter 2002; Remington, Smith, and Haspel 1998).17 In fact, the left-ist coalition, or certain sections of it, had clear electoral benefits to gainfrom participating in the legislative process. On the question of statefinance, in particular, significant numbers of leftist deputies were ableto further their own particular interests by ignoring the official factionposition in voting for government budgets (Tarasov et al. 1997, 163).Such voting behavior also occurred in other policy areas. Bills onproduction-sharing agreements and land privatization, for example,divided leftist deputies along faction, group, and committee lines.18

It is precisely such internal divisions that lie at the heart of theCPRF�s reluctance to challenge existing institutional arrangements. Inpractice, the Communist near majority was too broad and too diverseto support a governing coalition capable of utilizing majoritarian rules.Facing the problem of ruling within these constraints, the status quoprovided both the flexibility and the institutional incentives needed tokeep this alliance together.

Coalition Politics under Constraints

Although the leftist alliance retained much of its coherence through-out this Duma and its number was not adversely affected by the defeatof its candidate in the 1996 presidential elections,19 the alliance did notconstruct a stable parliamentary majority, nor did it consist of deputieswith homogeneous preferences. The ideological divisions within theCPRF cut across rank-and-file deputies and the party�s leadership.The party was home to many tendencies�patriotic-nationalists,moderate-pragmatists, and orthodox Marxist-Leninists�each withdifferent views on party policy towards the Yeltsin regime (Ishiyama1998, 302�06; Urban and Solovei 1997, 180). During the Second Duma,these divisions came to the surface on a number of occasions. Forexample, in voting on the appointment of Victor Chernomyrdin as primeminister in August 1996, as well as on the 1997 budget, a significantnumber of Communist deputies from different ends of the party votedagainst the official party line (Tarasov et al. 1997, 161�63).

It would also be a mistake to consider deputies in APG and PP asCommunist clones. Deputies in both groups followed the lead of theCPRF on most issues, but internal differences of opinion existed andconflicts arose over the purpose of the groups� strategic alliance withthe Communist faction. In Popular Power, which unlike APG had noextraparliamentary electoral organization, the group�s two main leaders,Sergei Baburin and Nikolai Ryzhkov, were divided over the CPRF�spolicy toward the government.20 While Ryzhkov was willing to go along


with moderate Communists who were prepared to support govern-ment initiatives in return for concessions, Baburin was harshly criticalof any compromise�he called those deputies who voted forChernomyrdin�s candidacy in August 1996 �the disgrace of the CPRF�(Tarasov et al. 1997, 161). Baburin was also less enthusiastic thanRyzhkov about broader electoral cooperation with the CPRF.21 Thesetensions increased in the run up to the 1999 Duma elections, whendeputies from Popular Power joined competing electoral associations.In developments reminiscent of the pre-election maneuvering of 1995,Ryzhkov even tried to form a new deputy group, �People�s Deputies,�on the eve of the 1999 parliamentary elections. Interestingly, similardivisions arose within the Agrarian group between its leaders, NikolaiKharitonov and Mikhail Lapshin, during the run up to the 1999 elections(Mndoyants and Zakharov 2000, 53).

Figure 1 shows the average yearly voting cohesion scores foreach faction and group at the Second Duma. These figures, providedby the apparatus of the State Duma, represent the percentage of deputieswho voted with their faction or group on 4,144 substantive and open

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

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CPRF (F) APG (G) PP (G) LDPR (F) NDR (F) Yabloko (F) Russia�sRegions (G)

Faction (F) or Group (G)

Coh

esio

n sc

ore

(%)

Average score

FIGURE 1Average Voting Cohesion Scoresfor Factions and Groups, 1996�99

Source: Gosudarstvennaya Duma (1999, 79).

16 Paul Chaisty

votes (Gosudarstvennaya Duma 1999, 79).22 For the CPRF, averagevoting cohesion across all four years was 87.4%, but it stood at only76.8% and 72.5% for the APG and PP groups. Within the leftist alliance,dissent was consistently greatest in Popular Power across all years. In1996, average voting cohesion fell to 69.2% for this group(Gosudarstvennaya Duma 1999, 79). Figure 1 also shows that, as arule, groups were less disciplined than factions. The one obviousexception was the government�s faction, Our Home Is Russia, whichhad a lower average score (73.2%) than the Agrarian group.

Figure 2 shows the average voting affinity scores for each factionand group to the CPRF. Voting affinity is registered when the majorityof deputies from one faction or group vote the same way as the majorityof deputies from another faction or group. Clearly, the APG and PPgroups were more likely than any other faction or group to vote thesame way as the CPRF. The groups score an average voting affinityof 90.4% and 88.6% respectively. Outside the leftist alliance, the LDPRwas most likely to vote with the CPRF, but the low levels of voting

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APG (G) PP (G) LDPR (F) NDR (F) Yabloko (F) Russia'sRegions (G)

Faction (F) or Group (G)

Vot

ing

affin

ity (%

)

Average score

FIGURE 2Average Voting Affinity of Factions and Groups

to the CPRF, 1996�99

Source: Gosudarstvennaya Duma (1999, 80).


affinity among other factions and groups in general highlights the problemthat the Communist leadership faced in building coherent voting allianceswith deputies from other parties.

Within the leftist alliance there was, however, variation in votingaffinity across parliamentary sessions. Figure 3 shows the averagevoting affinity scores of the APG and PP groups on 728 votes for theautumn 1997 (September�December) and most of the spring 1998(January�July) sessions.23 The observable patterns of changing affinitycan be correlated with known political issues and events. Lower andmore variable levels of voting affinity during the autumn session and inthe early part of the spring session mirror divisions within the leftistalliance over the CPRF�s more conciliatory strategy toward thegovernment. At that time, the moderate wing of the CPRF, spearheadedby Duma chair Gennadi Seleznev, sought more constructive Duma�executive relations with the aim of securing Communist representation inthe government.24 This strategy was typified by the leadership�s decision inOctober 1997 to drop a vote of no confidence in the government, a move

FIGURE 3Variation in the Voting Affinity of APG and PP to the CPRF,

September 1997�June 1998

Source: www.duma.ru/infgd/infgd.htm (13 June 2002).

0

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120

3-19 Sept1997

24 Sept-24 Oct1997

29 Oct-14 Nov1997

19 Nov-17 Dec1997

21 Jan-13Feb 1998

18 Feb-13 Mar1998

18 Mar-17 April

1998

22 April-15 May

1998

20 May-26 June

1998

Date

Vot

ing

affin

ity (%

)

APG

PP

3 Sept- 19 Sept 1997

24 Sept-24 Oct 1997

29 Oct-14 Nov 1997

19 Nov-17 Dec 1997

21 Jan-13 Feb 1998

18 Feb-13 Mar 1998

18 Mar-17 Apr 1998

22 Apr-15 May 1998

20 May-26 June 1998

18 Paul Chaisty

that received bitter rebuke from leftist radicals like PP leader SergeiBaburin, who continued to demand a no confidence motion.

Relations between Baburin and the CPRF leadership deterioratedstill further at the start of the spring 1998 session. In an open letter tothe CPRF Central Committee plenum in early February, Baburin urgedthe party to abandon its �cynical� and �mendacious strategy� towardthe government,25 and for such criticism Baburin was stripped of hisauthority to supervise Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)issues in the Duma (Mndoyants and Zakharov 2000, 50).

Similar divisions also emerged over the 1998 budget. Despiteofficial CPRF opposition to the budget, critical numbers of leftist deputiesvoted with the government at each stage of the bill�s passage throughthe lower house. Large numbers of Agrarian deputies voted for the bill,and the 1998 budget widened divisions between Popular Power�s twoleaders, Ryzhkov and Baburin.26 In fact, levels of dissent within theleftist alliance were consistently greatest on budgetary matters through-out the Second Duma. The average affinity scores of the APG and PPgroups on budgetary and financial legislation were 85% and 81.1%; onlegal-political, foreign, defense-security, and social policy, scores weremuch higher.27

In contrast, Figure 3 shows that from March through June of1998 affinity scores were consistently higher. This pattern correlateswith the deterioration in Duma�president relations caused by Yeltsin�sdismissal of Victor Chernomyrdin from the post of prime minister inMarch 1998. Although the appointment of Chernomyrdin�s successor,Sergei Kiriyenko, was also a source of division, the new prime minister�ssupport for stringent fiscal measures, coupled with a deteriorating eco-nomic situation, appeared to galvanize the leftist alliance. During thisperiod, the CPRF leadership pursued a more confrontational strategytoward the executive. This strategy culminated in a successful Dumavote on 19 June 1998 to form a commission to draft an impeachmentmotion against President Yeltsin. Meanwhile, the CPRF�s opponentsremarked critically that this action was motivated by a desire to recon-cile divisions within the party.28

A further problem hampering the Communist leadership�s abilityto build stable voting alliances was high levels of absenteeism in theassembly. On average, one-third of all deputies did not vote in plenarysessions (Gosudarstvennaya Duma 1999, 80). Deputies from the leftistalliance registered the highest levels of attendance, but levels of absen-teeism were still significant. On average, 13.3% of CPRF deputies didnot vote, and the figure was even greater for APG and PP deputies:23.8% and 29.1% respectively (Gosudarstvennaya Duma 1999, 80).


Therefore, the Communist leadership at the Second Duma com-manded a bloc of votes that was not entirely disciplined. This fact,combined with the CPRF�s distance from nonleftist political groupingsin the Duma and the problem of absenteeism, deprived the leftist allianceof a stable, working majority. Thus, the constitutional requirement thatlegislative majorities be made up from 51% of all deputies in theassembly,29 gave Communist leaders little room for maneuver; even asmall rebellion within their own ranks could make a crucial difference.In order to accommodate the different interests within the leftist alliance,the Communist leadership had to be flexible, which had a bearing onthe institutional reforms they opposed.

The Benefits of the Status Quo

In the face of these political constraints, the Duma�s institutionalarrangements�nonmajoritarian governance structures, power-sharingpackage agreements, and decentralized lawmaking practices�providedthe Communists with both the institutional incentives and flexibility tokeep the leftist alliance together.

Institutional Incentives

The Duma�s power-sharing arrangements and the equal rightsthey confer on both factions and groups held advantages for all deputieswithin the leftist alliance. By joining groups formed with the support ofthe CPRF, members of the Agrarian and Popular Power groupingsgained many benefits and privileges not open to independent deputies.Benefits included representation in the Duma Council on an equal footingwith all other political groupings; preferential speaking rights in plenarysessions of the State Duma; senior posts, such as committee chairsand deputy chairs, with significant financial and legislative resources;and access to party staff and offices, which formed an important insti-tutional base for electoral associations attached to PP and APG. Withthe backing of the CPRF, Popular Power received three committeechairs�one more than Russia�s Regions, which was the third and largestdeputy group to form at the Second Duma. In addition, PP leader Baburinreceived the position of Duma deputy chair and the portfolio he covetedon Russia�CIS relations (until March 1998). Similarly, the Agrariangroup gained control of its main prize, the Agricultural Committee, whichpromoted its interests in the area of agricultural policy. Through itsclose proximity to the CPRF and its determination to extract conces-sions from the government on agricultural subsidies, the APG also

20 Paul Chaisty

established a key role in mediating conflicts between the Communistsand the executive. Consequently, Agrarian deputies gained greaterinfluence in government circles than independent deputies or theircolleagues in the more confrontational Popular Power grouping. Oneof APG�s deputies, Gennadi Kulik, was eventually appointed to thegovernment during the premiership of Yevgenii Primakov.30

With the support of these groups, the CPRF was, in turn, able toaccumulate significant power within the assembly, as well as influencewithin government circles. The faction controlled the largest numberof senior posts in the Duma: the post of Duma chair, one deputy chairof the Duma, and ten committee chairs. In addition, two committeechairs controlled by the APG and PP groups were held by deputies onloan from the CPRF, including the chair of the Duma�s Standing OrdersCommittee. Most important, however, was the CPRF�s control overthe Duma�s leadership. Through the chair of the Duma, GennadiSeleznev, the CPRF could bargain directly with the executive branch,thereby shaping the political and legislative direction of the lower house.This channel of communication was central to the CPRF�s more con-ciliatory approach toward the executive during the Second Duma. Byreaching compromise on a range of issues, the CPRF secured a num-ber of important concessions, such as those on the law �On the Gov-ernment,� budgetary legislation, and the appointment of Communistcommittee chair, Yurii Maslyukov, as first deputy prime minister duringPrimakov�s government. A satisfied Seleznev summed up such achieve-ments at the end of the 1997 Duma session: �The president and gov-ernment have learned to work with the State Duma. The State Duma,in turn, has learned, as we say, to work with its legal partners andopponents� (Byulleten� No. 145, 26 December 1997, 43).

Thus, the Duma�s constitution, which conferred equal rights onboth factions and groups, provided incentives for Communist, Agrarian,and independent deputies to coalesce. With this factor in mind, theopposition of the CPRF to Yabloko�s faction-strengthening initiatives isless puzzling; it was more than just antipathy towards Yabloko, as somecommentators suggested at the time.31 Instead of bolstering the powerof the CPRF, Yabloko�s recommendation to remove the formal equalityof factions and groups threatened to undermine the very institutionalincentives that helped keep the leftist alliance together. It is not surprising,therefore, that Communist deputies consistently reiterated the need toretain political parity in the assembly and withheld their support,expressed at the First Duma, for proposals to increase the thresholdrequirements for deputy groups and to institute the imperative man-date. Both proposals would have endangered the CPRF�s ability to


propagate political groups in the assembly. By supporting measuresthat restricted the free movement of list deputies between politicalassociations in the Duma, as intended by the imperative mandate proposal,the CPRF risked jeopardizing the very practice that kept its �satellites�together: the loaning out of Communist list deputies.32 Also, as Remingtonand Smith (1998, 563) show, such initiatives were unpopular among groupdeputies and could have caused unnecessary discontent within the alliance.

Likewise, the power-sharing package agreements used to divideup senior posts between all political forces in the assembly providedadditional incentives for coalition building. The five new legislative com-mittees created at the Second Duma gave the Communist leadershipextra resources to accommodate the preferences of their allies. CPRFand PP deputies chaired four of the new committees, and thecommittees� jurisdictions reflected the policy preferences of thesedeputies.33 Package agreements also provided an important lever forbuilding cross-factional alliances. The CPRF secured the prize of Dumachair, with the help of the Russia�s Regions group, only after a deputychair post was created for this group during package negotiations.Therefore, despite threats from Communist deputies to reduce thenumber of Duma deputy chairs and legislative committees and to undothe original package agreement,34 the CPRF resisted change.

Flexibility

While the Duma�s standing rules gave all sides of the leftist allianceincentives to cohere, the task of balancing its different wings and politicalgroupings required flexible and pragmatic leadership. The Communistleadership faced a complex dilemma: how to give its members thefreedom to pursue their policy preferences (even if these policy pref-erences ran counter to the official party line), while maintaining, forelectoral purposes, a united opposition to the Yeltsin regime. In prac-tice, the leadership steered a careful path between firm discipline onthe one hand and tacit sanctioning of dissent on the other. Although anumber of high-profile, maverick deputies were either disciplined orexpelled for dissent,35 the leadership permitted, and even authorized,more powerful interests within the alliance to vote against the officialline on certain issues. For example, Communist deputies from regionsthat had supported Boris Yeltsin during the presidential elections werepermitted to back Chernomyrdin�s candidacy for prime minister inAugust 1996 (Tarasov et al. 1997, 161).

To realize this seemingly mixed strategy, the Communist leader-ship relied on the flexibility of existing rules to minimize or conceal

22 Paul Chaisty

internal divisions. Hence, leftist deputies, along with all other factionsand groups except Yabloko, opposed an amendment moved during thedebate on the new standing orders that proposed restrictions on the useof secret ballots on the floor of the chamber. The secret ballot was, asCPRF rules expert Goryacheva explained, a useful procedural devicefor factions and groups unable to guarantee the voting cohesion of theirmembers or unwilling to declare publicly their position on a particularlycontroversial issue:[O]n very contentious questions there have been instances when we havetaken a principled decision on how to vote�open or secret. And on this orthat issue we have received more than 226 votes. Through the option ofholding a secret ballot, if insisted on by the majority and as stipulated inArticle 88, conflicts have been avoided . . . not all questions may be as open asmy honorable deputy [Nesterov]36 seems to think. (Byulleten� No. 149, 22January 1998, 32)

In fact, the decision by the CPRF to back a rule change permit-ting an open ballot on the appointment of Kiriyenko did not solidifyparty control but rather highlighted the very difficulties that theCommunist leadership faced.37 Pressure from radical forces within thealliance, the CPRF, and the wider Communist electorate forced theleadership to tighten party unity on this issue, although a significantconstituency within the leftist alliance was not prepared to provokeconflict with the government. Those government supporters who chidedthe CPRF for its desperate attempts at �internal party discipline�understood the leadership�s problem (Byulleten� No. 169, 15 April 1998,12). Opposition to Kiriyenko had electoral benefits for the CPRF, but itthreatened to split the alliance wide open. Ultimately, the scenario ofCommunist deputies and their allies voting for Kiriyenko was avoidedin a humiliating fashion. Having voted for a rule change permitting anopen ballot on the appointment of the prime minister, a decisive numberof leftist deputies voted against a CPRF resolution to hold an openballot on the appointment of Kiriyenko. In the secret ballot that followed,Kiriyenko was appointed.

Whether or not the CPRF leadership sanctioned this action isunclear. Party members demanded the punishment of those deputieswho had voted for a secret ballot,38 but the fact that there were noimmediate reprisals is revealing and has led to speculation that theaction was authorized (Mndoyants and Zakharov 2000, 52�53).Nevertheless, the episode shows that internal divisions within the alliancelessened the leadership�s room to maneuver. Even when the CPRFintroduced rule changes that sought to strengthen internal discipline,the pressures on deputies to rebel�caused on this occasion by executive


threats of dissolution�were too powerful. In light of these constraints,the flexibility of the Duma�s institutional arrangements proved preferable.

Conclusion

The puzzle addressed in this article provides an insight into theimportance of institutional arrangements for Russia�s young parliament.In an assembly where stable, working majorities are absent, the Duma�speculiar nonmajoritarian rules provide benefits for deputies withheterogeneous preferences who organize collectively. These arrange-ments also highlight the significant constraints faced by party leaders inthe parliament�s lower house. When events conspired to threaten theinstitutional status quo of the Second Duma, most notably during theKiriyenko �crisis,� the difficulties experienced by the Communist leader-ship in maintaining a united voting bloc were thrown into sharp relief.

By keeping this system, Duma deputies have remained unable totackle many of the problems that face lawmakers in Russia. Thedecentralized process of agenda setting in the Duma continues to frus-trate attempts to rationalize the assembly�s lawmaking activity, and itsarrangements also complicate the coordination of legislative activitybetween the lower house and the executive. In spite of these difficulties,however, the Duma came to play a significant policy-making role dur-ing its second term. The Duma�s institutional arrangements also facili-tated the formation of a near majority that maintained a level of coher-ence unprecedented in Russia�s postcommunist parliamentary history.This power base propelled the Communist Party back to the center ofRussian politics. Rooting its power in institutional foundations, the CPRFachieved a greater level of influence in government than it held at anytime since 1991. In terms of the consolidation of Russia�s new politicalrules, this development was significant.

It is unlikely, however, that the Duma�s system of governancewill survive the emergence of stable party or government-basedmajorities. The coming to power of a more popular and vigorous presi-dent, Vladimir Putin, coupled with parliamentary elections in December1999 that diminished the CPRF�s number and returned a more disci-plined government faction (Unity) has gone some way toward strength-ening the Kremlin�s influence over Duma politics. To date, the mainvictim has been the Duma�s power-sharing �package� regime. A jointeffort in January 2000 by pro-government and Communist factions toexclude several key liberal and centrist factions from the package waspartially successful (see Chaisty 2001, 109�10). Conversely, in spring2002, an anti-CPRF majority successfully unseated seven of the CPRF�s

24 Paul Chaisty

committee chairs and removed the casting vote of the Duma�sCommunist chair, Gennadi Seleznev, in the assembly�s Duma Council.

More fundamental reform of the Duma�s rules, and of itsnonmajoritarian Duma Council in particular, is not on the agenda at thistime, however. The Russian executive has more resources at its disposaltoday than the CPRF leadership had at the Second Duma, but themajority required for wholesale procedural reform does not yet exist.Further, these developments continue to highlight the fractious natureof Duma parties. The refusal of several senior Communist deputies tofollow party instructions and vacate their parliamentary posts in oppo-sition to the CPRF�s exclusion from the new package in April 2002resulted in their expulsion from the party. This number included Dumachair Seleznev and two committee chairs. The actions of these deputiessuggest that the benefits of parliamentary office continue to rival thepull of party discipline as a force in Duma politics.

Paul Chaisty is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics andInternational Relations, George Street, University of Oxford, OxfordOX1 2RL, United Kingdom.

NOTES

I gratefully acknowledge funding for this research by The British Academy andby The Nuffield Foundation, Grant Reference No. SGS/00429/G. I would also like tothank Sophie Elkan, Sonia Alonso, Archie Brown, Jeff Gleisner, Edward Morgan-Jones, Jerry Ravetz, Petra Schleiter, and Stephen Whitefield for their helpful com-ments, as well as Gerhard Loewenberg and the two anonymous referees for theirexcellent suggestions.

1. Within the subfield of institutional analysis there are, however, contrastingviews on what constitutes an �institution.� In some accounts, only formal rules�written rules, regulations, and so on�are observed; in others, informal rules�routines,customs, cultures�are defined as institutional constraints on behavior. In this article, Iam concerned with formal institutional arrangements. For an overview of differentapproaches to institutional analysis, see Peters 1999.

2. In the Duma�s mixed electoral system, one half of the assembly�s deputiesare elected from single-mandate constituencies on a first-past-the-post basis, and theother half are elected from the party lists of those electoral associations that receive 5%or more of the vote.

3. Factions are formed in the Duma from electoral associations that receive atleast 5% of the vote in a general election; groups are independently formed from at least35 deputies within the elected assembly. Both the Agrarian and Popular Power groupshad to �borrow� deputies from the Communist faction to take their number over 35.Other parties at the Second Duma included the government faction �Our Home IsRussia� (NDR) with 66 deputies; the nationalist faction Liberal Democratic Party ofRussia (LDPR) with 51 deputies; the liberal faction Yabloko with 46 deputies; and a


group representing the interests of Russia�s regional elite, �Russia�s Regions,� with 42deputies. These membership figures were registered in 1996 and changed over thecourse of the Second Duma.

4. Out of a Duma membership of 450 deputies, 147 deputies belonged toCPRF, 37 to APG, and 38 to PP. Again, these figures were registered in 1996.

5. President Yeltsin dissolved the Duma�s parliamentary predecessor, theSupreme Soviet, and used force to put down the assembly�s insurgent deputies andtheir supporters on 4 October 1993.

6. The package includes deputy chairs of the Duma, committee chairs and theirdeputies, and the chairs of the Mandate and Audit Commissions.

7. For greater detail on rules debates at the First Duma, see Haspel 1998. 8. Commenting on the first five months of work by the Second State Duma,

Shokhin revealed that of the 140 priority bills included in the Duma�s legislative pro-gram, only 89 (63%) had been introduced. During the same period, the Duma hadconsidered 133 bills not included in the original legislative program (PostanovlenieGosudarstvennoi Dumy, O sovershenstvovanii zakonoproektnoi rabotyGosudarstvennoi Dumy, 22 May 1996).

9. Shokhin�s recommendations included the enforcement of rules regulating theintroduction of alternative bills, the requirement that committees give priority consid-eration to vetoed legislation, reforms to strengthen the filtering functions of the StandingOrders Committee and the Duma Council, and proposals to reorganize the Duma�sweekly timetable. For greater detail, see Shokhin 1997.

10. Changes to the standing orders included procedures for monitoring theprogress of legislation; rules permitting the authors of bills to participate in sessionsof the Duma; procedures regulating agenda discussions on the floor; changes arisingfrom the law �On the Government,� such as rules regulating the right of the Duma toconvene �parliamentary inquiries�; measures to increase the transparency of theDuma�s financial affairs; and rules empowering the chair to extend floor discussionsand to censure deputies for unparliamentary behavior.

11. Borodin is the former head of the Kremlin�s facilities directorate and waslater at the center of a scandal over the refurbishment of the Kremlin by the Swiss firmMabetex.

12. The five charges against Yeltsin were as follows: 1) that by his signature ofthe Belovezha Accords (see note 14) in December 1991, Yeltsin had committed treason;2) that Yeltsin�s dissolution of the Russian parliament in October 1993 was unconsti-tutional; 3) that Yeltsin had illegally committed Russian troops to war in Chechnya in1994; 4) that Yeltsin had destroyed Russia�s military capability; and 5) that the eco-nomic reforms introduced by Yeltsin�s governments had caused genocide against theRussian people. When voting took place on 15 May 1999, the Duma failed to securethe two-thirds majority required for each charge.

13. The Belovezha Accords (7�8 December 1991) were agreements reached insecret between Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk (President of Ukraine), and StanislavShushkevich (chair of the Belarussian parliament) that opened the way for the Com-monwealth of Independent States and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

14. Veto overrides require a two-thirds majority in both houses of the FederalAssembly. Consequently, with as little support as one-third of representatives in eitherhouse of the Federal Assembly, the Russian president can, in theory, govern by decree.

26 Paul Chaisty

15. Deputy Victor Peshkov, interview, State Duma, 13 April 1999.16. This tactic was successful. The Duma secured concessions on the constitu-

tional law �On the Government,� passed in December 1997, that formalized the Duma�sexecutive oversight powers of scrutiny and investigation.

17. The use of presidential vetoes increased only marginally during the SecondDuma. According to Remington (2001, 225), 76.3% of the laws passed in the 1994�95session and 74.4% of the laws passed in the 1996�99 session were approved by thepresident.

18. I develop this point in my forthcoming book, Legislative Politics and Eco-nomic Power in Russia.

19. This achievement refuted those government supporters who predicted thatthe Communist-led bloc would break up following the defeat of CPRF candidate GennadiZyuganov.

20. See Moskovskie novosti, 8�15 February 1998, No. 5.21. During the late Soviet period, Baburin stood as a candidate for the anti-Party

movement Demokraticheskaya rossiya (Democratic Russia) and, despite his activeopposition to Yeltsin�s rule, he remained antagonistic toward the CPRF. While Ryzhkovwas involved in Gennadi Zyuganov�s �People�s Patriotic Movement of Russia� (acoalition of opposition forces led by the CPRF leader), Baburin refused to take part forfear of Communist domination (Urban and Solovei 1997, 185).

22. These figures include votes up to 29 November 1999.23. The Duma�s year is divided into spring and autumn sessions.24. During the autumn session, Seleznev frequently spoke on the need for

coalition government in Russia (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 November1997). He presented his proposals to Yeltsin in January 1998 (RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.2, No. 20, Part 1, 30 January 1998).

25. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 2, No. 31, Part 1, 16 February 1998.26. In the budget�s third reading, on 5 February, Ryzhkov voted with the govern-

ment. In response, Baburin�s supporters within Popular Power voted to dismissRyzhkov from his leadership position. The vote failed (BBC Summary of WorldBroadcasts, 9 February 1998).

27. The affinity scores for these policy areas were as follows: legal-political�90.9% and 89.6%; social�89.9% and 88.3%; defense-security�91% and 93.4%; andforeign policy�95% and 92.4% (Gosudarstvennaya Duma 1999, 81).

28. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 2, No. 111, Part 1, 11 June 1998.29. Article 105 of the Russian Constitution.30. The appointment of Yevgenii Primakov (Prime Minister, September 1998�

May 1999), a prime ministerial candidate favored by the CPRF, was seen as a majorconcession to the Duma in the wake of the August 1998 financial crisis. This crisisseverely weakened Yeltsin, who was forced to concede other government appoint-ments to the Communists. The CPRF chair of the Duma�s Economic Policy Commit-tee, Yurii Maslyukov, was appointed first deputy prime minister, with responsibilityfor economic affairs, and Victor Gerashchenko was made head of the Central Bank.Gerashchenko�s reputation as an opponent of radical economic reform, gained during anearlier stint as chair of the bank, made him another favorite with Communist deputies.

31. Gleb Cherkasov, �Duma utverdila �vnitrennyuyu konstitutsiyu�,�Kommersant� daily, 23 January 1998, p. 3.


32. When this amendment was discussed, five of the nine deputies loaned out toPP and seven of the twelve deputies loaned out to APG were elected on the party list.

33. For example, Stanislav Govorukhin, a high-profile member of Popular Power,gained the chair of the Culture Committee. Before becoming a deputy in 1994,Govorukhin was a popular film director. Other new committees created and controlledby the CPRF faction and PP (e.g., the Committee for Conversion and Science-IntensiveTechnologies and the Committee for Veterans� Affairs) reflected the policy concerns ofleftist deputies.

34. This threat was first issued on the occasion of Shokhin�s replacement as firstdeputy chair in September 1997, then in 1998 over General Rokhlin�s replacement aschair of the Defense Committee, and finally in 1999, when the CPRF voted downNDR�s wish to appoint Andrei Polyakov as the new first deputy chair. For greaterdetail, see Gleisner and Chaisty 1999.

35. In January 1998, Oleg Shenkarev, a maverick Communist deputy, was expelledfrom the CPRF. Other notable conflicts involved Baburin, Vladimir Semago, AlekseiPodberezkin, Vasilii Kobylkin, Leonid Korotkov, and Sergei Falaleev.

36. Goryacheva refers here to the Yabloko deputy who moved this amendment.37. The impeachment vote, by contrast, did not seriously challenge internal

party unity. The two-thirds majority required to file the charge of impeachment againstYeltsin, which the Federation Council also required a two-thirds majority to adopt, wasnever a realistic possibility. Therefore, those leftist deputies normally vulnerable toexecutive pressure could vote openly for the individual charges safe in the knowledgethat their actions would not result in impeachment. Nevertheless, a small number of PPdeputies still did not adhere to the party line. This rebellion was of particular impor-tance on the charge concerning Yeltsin�s role in the Chechen war, which was expected tobe close. On this vote, four deputies did not vote and one voted against (Byulleten� No.261, 15 May 1999, 60).

38. These rebels included two high-profile deputies, Yurii Voronin (CPRF) andGennadii Kulik (APG). Kulik�s action did not prevent his later appointment to thePrimakov government. Nikolai Ryzhkov, the coordinator of PP, did not vote in thedebate (Byulleten� No. 173, 24 April 1998, 45�46).

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