the structure and management of conflict: fighting or defending the status quo

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RelationsGroup Processes & Intergroup

DOI: 10.1177/13684302080906462008; 11; 331Group Processes Intergroup Relations

Carsten K. W. De Dreu, Esther S. Kluwer and Aukje Nauta

The Structure and Management of Conflict: Fighting or Defending the Status Quo

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Group Processes &Intergroup Relations

2008 Vol 11(3) 331353

The Structure and Managementof Conflict: Fighting or Defendingthe Status Quo

Carsten K. W. De DreuUniversity of Amsterdam

Esther S. KluwerUtrecht University

Aukje NautaUniversity of Amsterdam and Randstad HR Solutions

Although conflict and negotiation studies have examined symmetrical structures in whichboth parties want change, or asymmetrical structures in which one party wants change and theother to maintain the status quo, no research provided a direct comparison of both structures.Two experiments were conducted to fill this void. Results show that in asymmetrical structureschallengers engage in more problem solving and more contending, have less of a loss frameand perceive less control than defendants, and are perceived be less successful. In symmetricalstructures, behavior and attitudes of parties are more alike and there is more reciprocation ofproblem solving and yielding. Furthermore, findings reveal that challengers see their defendantas less friendly and more dominant than defendants see their challengers. Finally, no evidencewas obtained that social value orientation moderates these effects. Implications for conflicttheory and research, and for third party interventions in symmetrical versus asymmetricalconflicts, are discussed.

keywords conflict, conflict management, negotiation, power, status quo

Authors noteAddress correspondence to Carsten K. W.De Dreu, Department of Psychology,University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15,1081 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands

[email: [email protected]]

Copyright 2008 SAGE Publications(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore)

11:3; 331353; DOI: 10.1177/1368430208090646

wife need to decide where to have dinner orhow many children to aim for, or when laborand management decide about a downsizingstrategy.

In his 1986 address to the American PsychologicalAssociation, Coombs (1987) argued that someconflicts arise because opposing individuals wantthe same thing and must settle for differentthings, as when leaders from different teamsclaim the same excess budget, when childrendesire the same toy to play with, or when neigh-boring states desire hegemony of the samegroup of islands. Other conflicts arise becauseindividuals want different things and must

settle for the same thing, as when husband and
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Although Coombs notes that these two broadclasses of conflict structures exhaust the domainof conflict (p. 362), it is important to note thatin both types of conflict a further distinction

can be made, namely between symmetrical andasymmetrical structures. We concur with Coombs(1987) that individuals, in spite of how they mayassess their status quo in any absolute terms, aremotivated to improve on the status quo and toavoid worsening it (p. 358). However, we arguethat many conflicts are asymmetrical in thatone party (defendant) is primarily motivated tomaintain the status quo whereas its counterpart(challenger) is primarily motivated to changeit. Thus, the Falkland War was about Argentina

contesting Britains colonial hegemony overthe group of islands just off the ArgentineancoastArgentina attacked the status quo andthe United Kingdom defended it. Martin LutherKings dream was about changing the status quothat was induced and defended by the Whitemajority. Many union-led strikes are motivatedby the desire to block managements desire tochange the status quo in terms of job securitiesand fringe benefits, and some marital conflictsare not about how many children to aim for,

but about one spouse desiring children andthe other wishing to maintain the quiet andpeaceful (in terms of children-caused noise)status quo.

Despite decades of social psychological re-search into conflict and dispute resolution,little systematic research has been invested incomparing symmetrical and asymmetrical struc-tures.1This is unfortunate because there is goodreason to believe that the structure of the conflictin and by itself has important implications for

the way parties manage their conflict, perceivetheir counterparts, and thus for the probabilityof the conflict escalating into intractable disputes.However, we do not exactly know the differencesbetween symmetrical and asymmetrical conflicts.Symmetrical conflicts are primarily examinedin the (laboratory) context of interpersonalnegotiations (De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel & VanKleef, 2007; Pruitt, 1998). Asymmetrical conflictsare primarily examined in the (field) context ofmarital relations (Christensen & Heavey, 1990;

Heavey, Layne, & Christensen, 1993; Klinetob &

Smith, 1996; Kluwer, 1998; Kluwer, Heesink, &Van de Vliert, 1996, 1997, 2000), and judicialdisputes and liability negotiations (Fobian &Christensen-Szalanski, 1993, 1994; Garcia, Darley,

& Robinson, 2001; Peirce, Pruitt, & Czaja, 1993).Furthermore, work on asymmetrical conflict isconstrained by the fact that a partys position(challenger vs. defender) covaries with otherrelevant variables, including one partys gender(female vs. male, respectively) or occupationalstatus (district attorney vs. public defender,respectively). It thus is difficult to tell whether,first of all, systematic differences between sym-metrical and asymmetrical conflict exist and,second, whether such differences should be

attributed to the partys specific position in thedispute, some covarying variable, or both.

The present study was designed to redress thissituation, and we present a series of experimentalstudies in which we tested predictions about theeffect of conflict structures on conflict-relatedcognition, interpersonal perception, and con-flict management. Predictions were derived fromwork on gain-loss framing and the endowmenteffect (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1990;Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), work on the status

quo bias (Ritov & Baron, 1992; Samuelson &Zeckhauser, 1988; Schweitzer, 1994), and studieson power relations and interpersonal perception(Fiske, 1993).

Cognitive, motivational,and behavioral consequencesof different conflict structures

In symmetrical conflicts each side desires a

change in the status quo and needs the otherside to consent or even work along. Most nego-tiations have such a symmetrical structurebothnegotiators want something their counterpartshas, and both negotiators only want to give upwhat they have in exchange for some alternativenot in their possession. Thus, negotiators ex-change their used car for money, an increase insalary in return for higher production targets,arms reduction in return for market accessibility,extra work effort in return for better career

prospects, and so on. In short, both parties


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De Dreu et al. conflict structures and social interaction processes

give up something in return for something elsedeemed more desirable, or less undesirable.

In asymmetrical conflicts one side desires achange in the status quo and needs the other

side to go along, but this other side desires tomaintain the status quo. Many judicial disputesand liability negotiations have this asymmetricalstructure, with the district attorney seeking tochange the not-guilty status quo into a guiltyverdict, and the plaintiff seeking to maintain thenot-guilty status quo. In the workplace, asym-metrical conflicts emerge when managementwants change resisted by the workforce, or whencustomer complaints require service personnelto change their work practices and routines.

Thus, whereas in symmetrical conflicts bothparties seek change, in asymmetrical conflictsone seeks change and the counterparts does not.This symmetrical versus asymmetrical structureof the conflict has several important implicationsthat reside at the cognitive, the motivational,and the strategic level.

Cognitive and motivational consequences ofconflict structuresWork on human decision making has argued

that those who face a choice between adoptinga new strategy versus maintaining the statusquo, as defendants in asymmetrical conflictsdo, have a strong tendency to prefer the statusquo to alternative options. This is commonlyreferred to as the Status Quo Bias (Samuelson &Zeckhauser, 1988).

Schweitzer (1994) provides several reasonsfor the Status Quo Bias, including the notionthat giving up the status quo may be felt as a loss,whereas improving upon the status quo, as chal-

lengers try to do, feels more like establishing again. Because losses are more averse than gainsof identical size are attractive (loss aversion;Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), people have moredifficulty giving up the status quo (incurring aloss) than giving up the goal of changing it (notacquiring a gain) (cf. Bottom & Studt, 1993;De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van de Vliert,1994; Neale & Bazerman, 1985). Another reasonfor the Status Quo Bias is that people desire tohave and maintain control over their situation.

In asymmetrical conflicts defendants control theoutcome of the conflict more than challengersdo (Keltner & Robinson, 1997; Robinson &Keltner, 1996). By giving up the status quo de-

fendants give up a highly valued asset, namelycontrol (also see Garcia et al., 2001).

All in all, these tendencies suggest that inasymmetrical conflicts defendants more thanchallengers will perceive more control, aremore likely to adopt a loss-frame, and will berelatively stubborn and difficult to be persuadedto take action. In other words, it seems quitereasonable to propose that defendants have agreater sense of power than challengers, and assuch may be more likely to endorse and employ

power tactics to get their way. In the next sectionwe explore such possible consequences for theways parties in symmetrical versus asymmetricalconflict manage their dispute.

Strategic considerations, conflict

management, and interaction sequencesAlthough exceptions can be readily identified,most individuals involved in social conflict arestrongly concerned with their own outcomes.Indeed, high concern for own outcomes

seems the default in interpersonal negotiation(De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), and concernfor own outcomes tends to have little varianceacross conflict participantsit is high and stableacross people ( Janssen & Van de Vliert, 1996). Areasonable assumption thus is that participantsin both symmetrical and asymmetrical conflictsdesire to reach good outcomes, at least forthemselves.

To safeguard or promote self-interest, conflictparties resort to a number of tactics and stra-

tegies. Although an infinite number of conflicttactics and strategies may be conceived of,conflict research and theory tends to converge ona four-way taxonomy that distinguishes betweenproblem solving, contending, avoiding, andyielding (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu,Evers, Beersma, Kluwer & Nauta, 2001; Rahim,1983; Thomas, 1992; Van de Vliert & Kabanoff,1990). Problem solving tactics are oriented towardan agreement that satisfies both own and othersaspirations as much as possible, and involve an


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exchange of information about priorities andpreferences, showing insights, and makingtradeoffs between important and unimportantissues. Contending tactics are focused on im-

posing ones will on the other side, and theyinvolve threats and bluffs, persuasive arguments,and positional commitments. Yielding tactics areoriented toward accepting and incorporatingothers will, and involve unilateral concessions,unconditional promises, and offering help.Avoidance tactics involve reducing the import-ance of the issues, and attempts to suppressthinking about the issues.

Dispute resolution involves an exchange oftactics, and the sequence of exchange typic-

ally takes one of two forms (Olekalns & Smith,2000). Interaction sequences can, first of all,be reciprocal, in which case negotiators matcheach others strategies exactly or in kind. Thus,problem solving tactics are reciprocated withproblem solving or yielding tactics (reciprocalcooperation), and contending tactics are reci-procated with contending tactics (reciprocalcompetition). Second, interaction sequencescan be transformational, in which negotiatorsmismatch strategies by pairing a cooperative and

a competitive strategy. For example, problemsolving tactics are reciprocated with contendingtactics, and contending tactics are reciprocatedwith avoiding and withdrawal tactics.

Work on symmetrical conflicts, like inter-personal negotiation, generally finds reciprocaltendenciesproblem-solving tactics are reci-procated, as are contending tactics (Weingart,Bazerman, Thompson, & Carroll, 1990). Recentwork further indicates that in symmetricaldisputes participants start out with contend-

ing tactics, trying to persuade their counter-parts to give in, and switching to problem solvingtactics when continued use of contendingappears to lead to costly impasse rather thanone-sided victory (Brett, Shapird, & Lytle, 1998;Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck, De Dreu, &Van Vianen, 2000; Olekalns & Smith, 2005).In other words, in symmetrical conflicts wherepower is balanced among parties we expect rela-tively high levels of contending and problemsolving among both parties, and no differences

between parties in the amount of contendingand problem solving.

Work on asymmetrical conflicts, in which de-fendants may perceive themselves to be relatively

more powerful, generally finds transformationaltendenciesproblem solving and yielding tacticsare paired to contending tactics, or to avoidingand withdrawal responses (and vice versa). Forexample, both survey and observation studiesof marital interaction where husband andwife discuss the wifes desire to change and thehusbands desire to maintain the status quo reveala so-called demandwithdrawal pattern in whichthe wife demands change (through problemsolving or through contending tactics) and

the husband withdraws from the interaction(e.g. Christensen & Heavey, 1990; Heavey et al.,1993; Kluwer, 1998). In other words, in asym-metrical conflicts we expect among challengershigher levels of contending and problem solv-ing tactics than among defendants, who in turndisplay relatively high levels of avoiding tactics.This is quite consistent with work on the StatusQuo Bias reviewed earlierdefendants wereexpected to experience more control, to be morelikely to adopt a loss-frame, and to be relatively

stubborn. These conflict-related cognitionsundermine their tendency to reciprocate in kindtheir challengers attempts at problem solvingor at contending.2

Hypotheses and overview of thepresent experiments

Past work either focused on symmetrical or onasymmetrical conflict structures, and we areunaware of studies that directly compared the

two structures in one single study design. Ourgoal was to fill this void, and to test several pre-dictions about conflict management strategiesand outcomes. Based on the above analysisand on results from past studies, we tested thefollowing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Challengers in asymmetrical con-flicts employ more problem-solving tactics thantheir defendants; in symmetrical conflicts nodifferences in problem solving between challengersare expected.


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Hypothesis 2: Challengers in asymmetrical con-flicts employ more contending tactics than theirdefendants; in symmetrical conflicts no differencesin contending between challengers are expected.

Hypothesis 3: Challengers in asymmetrical conflictsemploy fewer avoiding tactics than their defendants;in symmetrical conflicts no differences in avoidingbetween challengers are expected.

Hypothesis 4: Challengers in asymmetrical conflictswill feel less successful than their defendants; insymmetrical conflicts no differences in felt successbetween challengers are expected.

We tested these four hypotheses in two ex-perimental studies in which participants engaged

in free face-to-face interaction to solve a dispute.In both experiments we manipulated conflictstructure through role instructions. In Experi-ment 1 we audiotaped the interaction processand coded conflict behavior. In Experiment 2we relied on retrospective self-ratings of conflictbehavior using a validated instrument. In add-ition, Experiment 2 assessed motivation andcognition through questionnaire measures,and addressed the moderating influence ofindividual differences in the inclination to

cooperate or compete with ones counterpart.These issues will be introduced in more detailafter Experiment 1 has been reported.

Before moving on, it is important to notethat in contrast to many studies on conflict andnegotiation we did not use a conflict task that ledto scorable outcomes. This was done for tworeasons. First, point-value tasks used in most bar-gaining and negotiation research often allowsparticipants to closely monitor who is gettingwhat, and we felt this interferes with proper

testing of some of our predictions regardingconflict cognition (e.g. about loss-frame; seeExperiment 2). Second, while objective out-comes are certainly relevant, long-term effectsof conflict relate more to perceived success andfailure, and the softer psychological outcomessuch as hurt relationships and feelings of angerand spite (De Dreu et al., 2007). Thus, wedecided to test our hypotheses regarding out-comes in terms of perceived success, rather thanobjective, economic outcomes.

Experiment 1

MethodDesign To test the hypotheses, the experiment

employed a role-playing methodology that wasdeveloped in a pilot experiment and was basedon our past research (e.g. De Dreu, Nauta, &Van de Vliert, 1995, Experiment 3). Participantswere provided with background information inwhich a conflict situation was described, andthen freely interacted with each other to discussthe issue. This interaction was audio taped andrated afterwards by four judges.

The conflict situation yielded a challenger whowanted to change the status quo coupled with

either another challenger (symmetrical con-flict condition) or a defendant who wanted tomaintain the status quo (asymmetrical conflictcondition). The design was 2 2 factorialinvolving Conflict Structure (Symmetrical vs.Asymmetrical) and Role (Party A, challengervs. Party B, challenger/defendant) with ConflictStructure manipulated between dyads and Rolemanipulated within dyads. Dependent variableswere conflict behavior and outcomes.

Participants and procedure Seventy-eightpsychology students (30 males and 46 females:2 did not indicate their gender) at the Universityof Groningen participated in return for theequivalent of US $5. They were randomly assignedto dyads. The mean age of the participants was22 years, ranging from 19 to 26 years. Initialanalyses revealed no differences between maleand female participants, nor between dyadscomposed of same or different gender.

Participants came to the laboratory in groups

of four and care was taken that participants inone session were unacquainted. Participantswere seated and given 10 minutes to read theirrole instructions (see below). Hereafter, par-ticipants were paired and seated in separaterooms where they engaged in an audiotapedconflict resolution process (see below). After 15minutes, the experimenter entered the roomand handed out a short questionnaire used toassess conflict outcomes. Hereafter, participantswere debriefed and dismissed.


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Conflict task The instructions described asituation in which the participant cooperateswith a fellow student on a research project.3The original schedule of activities for the next

week was that the students do statistical an-alyses together. In both the symmetrical and theasymmetrical condition, Party A (challenger)is told that s/he will start a full-time job andtherefore wants to change the schedule so thatthe other student does the statistical analysesalone. Party A further received some backgroundinformation supporting the idea that changingthe original schedule was justified and that, all inall, s/he has reason to be quite dissatisfied withthe way things were going. In the symmetrical

condition, participants in the role of Party B(challenger) read similar instructions: Party Bwanted to change the schedule so that theother student does the statistical analyses alone,because (s)he will have an oral exam at the endof the week. Arguments were given why Party Bfelt that changing the original schedule wasjustified and that s/he has reason to be quitedissatisfied with the way things were going. Inthe asymmetrical condition, Party B (defendant)wanted to maintain the original schedule for

that weeks/he wanted to do the statisticalanalyses together with Party A. Arguments weregiven why s/he wanted to maintain the originalschedule and that s/he felt quite satisfied withthe with the way things were going.

After reading the instructions, participantswere told that they had 15 minutes to discusstheir preferences and to reach agreement ontheir schedule of activities.

Dependent variables

Conflict management The negotiations wereaudiotaped and coded by four trained observersunaware of the goals of the experiment. Duringtraining, observers were provided with de-finitions of conflict management strategiesalong with prototypical examples of behaviorswithin a particular strategy. They also coded,in practice sessions, randomly selected timeintervals and discussed their observations andratings to establish a consensual perspective.Hereafter, observers independently rated the

conflict behaviors of each of the two parties

within a dyad. Using electronic beeps, the 39audiotaped conversations were divided into timesamples of two minutes (N= 212 time samples,M = 5.4 time samples per dyad). For every

two-minute interval, two observers rated theextent to which four conflict tactics (problemsolving, contending, yielding, and avoiding;1 = demonstrated not at all, to 4 = demonstrated toa great extent) were present for Party A and theother two observers did so for Party B. Inter-observer agreement was sufficient to good,with Cohens Kappas per time-interval varyingbetween .67 and .98 (average Kappas for Party Aand Party B were .75 and .81, respectively).An alternative assessment using correlational

analysis likewise indicated sufficient to goodinter-rater agreement (.56 < r< .85). To accountfor mean differences between observer dyadsoriginal ratings of all four conflict behaviors weretransformed to z scores, using the means andstandard deviations computed per observerdyad, across all 212 time samples.4

Perceived success Participants were given a briefquestionnaire to fill out immediately follow-ing the conflict resolution process, to indicate

(1) whether they got what they wanted (1 = notat all, to 7 = completely), and (2) whether thesocial relationship with their interaction partnerwas disturbed (1 = not at all, to 7 = very much).The ratings on these two items were correlatedfor both Party A (r= .69) and Party B (r= .58).Accordingly, ratings were aggregated into aperceived success to Party A and a perceivedsuccess to Party B index. Scores were recodedso that higher scores indicate more perceivedsuccess.

ResultsDescriptive statistics Table 1 summarizes themeans and standard deviations for all dependentvariables, and gives zero-order correlations.Because asymmetrical conflict structures weresupposed to evoke less reciprocal cooperationsequences, and more transformational sequences,we present zero-order correlations separately forthe asymmetrical (above the diagonal in Table 1)and symmetrical conflict condition (below the

diagonal in Table 1).


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A number of interest ing insights derivefrom Table 1. First, in the asymmetrical con-flict condition, perceived success to Party A(challenger) did not correlate with anythingbut perceived success to Party B (defendant).Party Bs perceived success, in contrast, isbetter the less Party B engaged in problemsolving (r= .40) and yielding (r= .44), andthe more he or she engaged in contending(r = .58). This suggests that in asymmetricalconflicts defendants determine, throughproblem solving and contending behavior,not only their own but also their counterpartsperceived success. In symmetrical conflicts adifferent pattern emerged. Here, both Party Aand Party Bs perceived success was positivelycorrelated with Party A and Party Bs contendingbehavior (.55 < r< .71), negatively correlatedwith Party A and Party Bs problem solving(.30 < r< .62), and negatively correlated with

Party A and Party Bs yielding (.17 < r< .49).This suggests that in symmetrical conflictschallengers determine together through prob-lem solving, contending, and yielding boththeir own and their counterparts perceivedsuccess. These results are consistent with theidea that defendants exert greater control andinfluence over the negotiation process, anddetermine the perceived success to a largerextent than challengers do. That problem solv-ing and yielding were negatively correlated,

and contending was positively correlated with

personal outcomes, may reflect the rather dis-tributive nature of the task and the fact that weassessed personal (not joint) outcome.

Another interesting observation from Table 1is that in symmetrical conflicts the correlationsbetween both parties problem solving (r= .47),between both parties yielding (r= .64), andbetween one partys problem solving and thecounterparts yielding (r=.60, and r= .73) tend-encies were all high, positive, and significant.This may reflect reciprocal cooperation. Acomparison with the same correlations in theasymmetrical conflict condition shows lower andnonsignificant correlations (i.e. r= .14, r= .44,r= .03, and r= .23, respectively), which mayreflect a lack of reciprocal cooperation.

Conflict management (Hypotheses 13)Problem solving Hypothesis 1 predicted that chal-lengers in asymmetrical conflicts employ more

problem-solving tactics than their defendants; insymmetrical conflicts no differences in problemsolving between challengers are expected. Totest this hypothesis, we created two indices forproblem solving (separate for Party A and Party B),and submitted these to a 2 (Symmetrical vs.Asymmetrical Conflict) 2 (Role: Party A vs.Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the lastfactor within-dyads.5 Results revealed no overalleffects for conflict condition (F(1, 37) = 1.41, ns),but a significant conflict condition party

interaction (F(1, 37) = 4.67,p< .05). As can be

Table 1. Zero-order correlations for asymmetrical conflicts (above the diagonal) and symmetrical conflicts(below the diagonal): Experiment 1 (N= 39)

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

1. OutcomeA .49 .07 .22 .34 .10 .04 .17 .24 .09

2. OutcomeB .73 .06 .40 .37& .58 .27 .32 .26 .44

3. Problem solvingA .36 .32 .14 .37& .03 .11 .04 .39 .03

4. Problem solvingB .51 .62 .47 .39 .58 .15 .02 .23 .85

5. ContendingA .63 .58 .44 .48 .59 .14 .30 .23 .16

6. ContendingB .56 .70 .26 .58 .28 .12 .26 .39 .49

7. AvoidingA .32 .40& .01 .54 .48 .32 .45 .10 .15

8. AvoidingB .19 .41& .19 .18 .19 .39& .13 .05 .28

9. YieldingA .48 .44 .50 .60 .23 .19 .03 .15 .44

10. YieldingB .35 .18 .73 .48 .15 .12 .17 .25 .64

&p< .10; p< .05; p< .025.

Note: Subscript A = Party A; B = Party B.


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seen in Table 2, and consistent with Hypothesis 1,Party A challengers in asymmetrical conflictsengaged in more problem solving when theircounterpart was in the defendant role; in the

symmetrical conflict condition no differencesamong challengers were observed.

Contending Hypothesis 2 predicted that chal-lengers in asymmetrical conflicts employ morecontending tactics than their defendants; insymmetrical conflicts no differences in con-tending between challengers were expected. Totest this hypothesis, we created two indices forcontending (separate for Party A and Party B),and submitted these to a 2 (Symmetrical vs.

Asymmetrical Conflict) 2 (Role: Party A vs.Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the lastfactor within-dyads. Results revealed no overalleffects for conflict condition (F(1, 37) = 2.29,

p< .14), but a significant conflict condition party interaction (F(1, 37) = 4.98, p < .032).As can be seen in Table 2, and consistent withHypothesis 2, Party A challengers in asymmetricalconflicts engaged in more contending thantheir counterparts in the defendant role; in thesymmetrical conflict condition no differences

in contending between challengers wereobserved.

Avoiding Hypothesis 3 predicted that chal-lengers in asymmetrical conflicts employfewer avoiding tactics than their defendants;

in symmetrical conflicts no differences inavoiding between challengers were expected.To test this hypothesis, we created two indicesfor avoiding (separate for Party A and Party B),

and submitted these to a 2 (Symmetrical vs.Asymmetrical Conflict) 2 (Role: Party A vs.Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the lastfactor within-dyads. There were no significanteffects involving conflict condition( allF(1, 37)< 2.21, allp> .14). However, and consistent withHypothesis 3, in asymmetrical conflicts PartyA challengers engaged in less avoiding thanParty B defendants (M= 0.62 vs. M= 0.59;t(18) = 2.03,p< .10).

Yielding We had no specific hypothesis regardingyielding. For exploratory purposes, we createdtwo indices for yielding (separate for Party A andParty B), and submitted these to a 2 (Symmetricalvs. Asymmetrical Conflict) 2 (Role: Party Avs. Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the lastfactor within-dyads. No effects involving conflictcondition were found (allFs < 2.00,ps > .21).

Perceived success (Hypothesis 4) To testHypothesis 4, we submitted the perceived success

of Party A and the perceived success of Party Bto a 2 (Symmetrical vs. Asymmetrical Conflict) 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-modelANOVA with the last factor within-dyads. Resultsrevealed no main effect for conflict condition(F(1, 37) = 1.85, ns), but a significant conflict

Table 2. Means for perceived success and conflict management as a function of conflict structure and party role

Conflict structure

Asymmetrical Symmetrical

Party A Party B

Party A Party B(challenger) (defendant)

Perceived success 2.03a (1.02) 2.95b (1.32) 2.55ab (1.15) 2.50ab (1.48)

Problem solving 0.80a (1.62) 0.37b (1.69) 0.02a (1.45) 0.08ab (2.16)

Contending 0.14a (1.56) 1.54b (1.83) 0.57ab (1.60) 0.54ab (2.07)

Avoiding 0.62x (1.40) 0.59y(1.79) 0.03xy(1.30) 0.16xy(1.48)

Yielding 0.18a (1.21) 0.35a (1.32) 0.60a (1.44) 0.12a (1.27)

Notes:a,b Means not sharing the same superscript differ, according to between-subjects ttests, atp< .05.x,yMeans not sharing the same superscript differ, according to between-subjects ttests, atp< .10.Standard deviations are in parentheses.


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condition role interaction (F(1, 37) = 5.50,p< .025). As can be seen in Table 2, challengersin asymmetrical conflicts perceived themselvesto be less successful than their counterparts in

the defendant role did; in symmetrical conflictsno such difference in perceived success was ob-served. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is supported.

DiscussionExperiment 1 provided support for several ofour predictions. Challengers in asymmetricalconflicts engaged in more problem solving,more contending, and (somewhat) less avoidingthan their counterparts in the defendant role(Hypotheses 13); Also, challengers in asym-

metrical conflicts perceived themselves to beless successful than their counterparts in thedefendant role (Hypothesis 4).

Experiment 2

In Experiment 2 we aimed, first of all, to repli-cate the results of Experiment 1. We make oneimportant amendment, however, in that wereplace the self-reported measure of perceivedsuccess by observer rating of success. We did

so to exclude the possibility that self-servingtendencies on behalf of the conflict partiesbiased perceived success ratings and, second,to reduce validity threat in terms of common-source variance. Also, because Experiment 1revealed no systematic differences across time(see note 3) for conflict management behaviorwe chose a more efficient way of assessing con-flict management behavior. Thus, in contrastto Experiment 1 we relied on a well-validatedself-report measure of conflict management (for

further detail see the method section below).Once again, it is important to note that possiblecorrelations between self-reports of conflictmanagement on the one hand, and observerreports of conflict outcomes cannot be attributedto common-source bias.

Our second goal with Experiment 2 was tofurther our understanding of the psychologicalprocesses underlying the behavioral results ob-served in Experiment 1. In the introduction, weargued that the behaviors of challengers and

defendants in asymmetrical conflicts may bedue to the Status Quo Bias. Notably, we arguedthat defendants would have resistance to changebecause they were more likely than challengers

to have a loss frame (Hypothesis 5), and toexperience more control over the situation(Hypothesis 6). We also expected defendantstendency to be relatively stubborn and intransientto translate into person perception. Specifically,we predicted that challengers in asymmetricalconflicts would see their counterparts in the roleof defendant as less friendly (Hypothesis 7a) andmore dominant (Hypothesis 7b) than defend-ants in asymmetrical conflicts would see theircounterparts in the role of challenger.

Our third and final goal was to examine apotential moderator of the effects of conflictstructure. Thus far we assumed that conflictparties were motivated by a high concern fortheir own outcomes, and we left unspecifiedwhether parties were, or were not, concernedabout their counterparts interests and outcomes.Ample research in social and organizationalpsychology has, however, shown that peoplediffer in their so-called social value orientation,with some being pro-self and concerned about

their own outcomes only. Others, in contrast, arepro-social and concerned with own and othersoutcomes, as well as with fairness (McClintock,1977; Van Lange, 1999). This distinction be-tween dispositional pro-self versus pro-socialorientations explains a wide variety of behaviors,including cooperative decision making in socialdilemmas (e.g. Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, &Suhre, 1986), concession making in negotiations(De Dreu & Boles, 1998; De Dreu & Van Lange,1995; Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996), and

problem solving in conflicts between organ-izational departments (Nauta, De Dreu, &Van de Vaart, 2002). These works suggest thatchallengers and defendants with a pro-socialorientation will be more likely to engage inproblem solving and yielding, and less likelyto engage in contending and avoiding thanchallengers and defendants with a pro-selforientation.

Few studies have considered heterogeneity ofvalue orientation within conflict dyadswhat


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happens when a pro-social is paired to a pro-self rather than another pro-social. Pro-selfindividuals tend to behave non-cooperatively,whereas pro-social individuals tend to trust

others and approach them in a cooperativeway (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Van Lange, 1999).When their counterpart is pro-self, however,pro-social individuals change their pro-socialinclination into non-cooperation to defendthemselves against others non-cooperativestance (e.g. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), andalso because of the moralistic desire to teachthe other a lesson (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004;Van Lange, 1992). Thus, we expected dyadsto engage in more cooperative problem

solving when both parties have a pro-socialorientation, than when at least one has a pro-self orientation.

Challengers are, by nature of their position,concerned with their counterparts goals, inter-ests, and outcomesthey need to understandtheir counterparts to be able to persuade themor to work together toward a mutually satisfactoryagreement. In contrast, defendants need notbe concerned with their counterparts goals,interests, and outcomesthey do not need to

understand their counterparts to maintain andsecure the status quo. However, we expect thisto be true especially for pro-self defendantsand less for pro-social defendants whose valueorientation drives them toward a cooperativeattitude vis-a-vis their counterparts. In otherwords, we expected that the results observedin Experiment 1 would be especially true whenthe defendant is pro-self rather than pro-socialin orientation. Put differently, we expectedthe effects predicted in Hypotheses 14 to be

stronger when parties had a pro-self, rather thanpro-social orientation.

MethodDesign Experiment 2 employed a similar role-playing methodology as in Experiment 1.Participants were provided with backgroundinformation in which a conflict situation wasdescribed and then freely interacted with eachother to discuss the issue. A third student ob-served the interaction and rated the outcomes

of both parties.

Like in Experiment 1, the conflict situationyielded a challenger who wanted to change thestatus quo coupled with either another chal-lenger (symmetrical conflict condition) or a

defendant who wanted to maintain the statusquo (asymmetrical conflict condition). Thedesign was 2 (Conflict Structure: Symmetricalvs. Asymmetrical) 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B)with Conflict Structure manipulated betweendyads and Role manipulated within dyads. Thedependent variables were the observed conflictbehavior and outcomes.

Participants and procedure Ninety-six psych-ology students (36 males and 60 females; mean

age = 21.4) at Utrecht University participatedin this experiment as part of a workshop ongroup conflict and negotiation. Initial analysesrevealed no differences between male and femaleparticipants, nor between dyads composed ofsame or different gender. Because six participantsfailed to make consistent choices in the socialvalue orientations measure (see below), theywere dropped from the analyses, leaving a totalsample size of 90.

Participants came to the classroom, were

asked to complete a measure of social valueorientation (see below), and received generalinstructions about the workshop. Participantswere randomly assigned to groups of threestudents, two conflict parties, and one observer.Participants in the role of conflict party had10 minutes to read their role instructions (seebelow). They were to imagine that they were inthe described situation and to prepare a con-versation with the other participant. They thenfilled out the pre-conversation questionnaire.

In the meantime, participants in the role ofobserver received rating instructions. Groupswere then seated in separate parts of theclassroom where conflict parties engaged in aconflict resolution process. After 15 minutes,the observer ended the discussion. Conflictparties then completed the post-conversationquestionnaire and observers filled out theconflict rating form. Upon completion of thequestionnaire, participants were debriefed andreceived additional information about group

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Assessment of social value orientation Socialvalue orientation was assessed using the Kuhlmanand Marshello (1975) decomposed gamemeasurea measurement technique which

has been demonstrated to have good internalconsistency (e.g. Liebrand & Van Run, 1985),testretest reliability (Kuhlman, Camac, &Cunha, 1986) and construct validity (De Dreu &Boles, 1998). Parks (1994) and Kuhlman andMarshello (1975) reported moderate negativecorrelations between this measure and a meas-ure of generalized distrust, i.e. the F scale(Robinson & Shaver, 1973). The measure wasintroduced by the following instructions:

Below you see nine decisions in which you have tomake a choice. Your choice influences the amountof points you and some other person will get.Think of the points as something that is valuableto you, to which you attach great importance. Theother person also attaches great importance tothe points. Think of the other person as someoneyou do not know, and you will never meet.

Participants were subsequently asked tomake decisions in nine so-called decomposedgames.

In each decomposed game, participants couldchoose from different distributions of out-comes to themselves and a another (hypothetical)person. Outcomes were presented in terms ofpoints which were said to have value to boththemselves as well as to the other person. Par-ticipants were given a choice among threealternatives, each corresponding to one of thesocial value orientations under study. In total,there were nine decomposed games, derivedfrom prior work of Kuhlman and Marshello

(1975). An example of the decomposed gamesused in the current study involves a choice amongOption 1 (50 to Self; 20 to Other), Option 2 (45to Self; 45 to Other), and Option 3 (40 to Self;0 to Other). Option 1 represents the individualisticchoice because ones own outcomes are larger(50) than are those in Option 2 (45) or Option 3(40). Option 3 represents the competitiveoption, because it provides a greater advantageover the others outcomes (40 0 = 40) thaneither Option 1 (50 20 = 30) or Option 2

(45 45 = 0). Finally, Option 2 corresponds to

a pro-social choice because it provides a largerjoint outcome (45 + 45 = 90) than either Option 1(50 + 20 = 70) or Option 2 (40 + 0 = 40).

To be classified into one of the three social

value orientations, participants had to chooseconsistently at least six of the nine trials. Usingthis criteria, 55 (27 in the to be assigned roleof Party A) were classified as pro-social, 9 ascompetitive, and 26 as individualists. Consistentwith past work in this area, competitive andindividualistic participants were put togetherin the pro-self category (18 in the to be assignedrole of Party A). Six participants failed thecriterion of making six consistent choices(were unclassifiable) and were dropped from

the analyses, leaving a total sample size of 90participants.

Conflict task The task was the same as the oneused in Experiment 1.

Dependent variables

Conflict management In the post-discussionquestionnaire, we included the Dutch Test forConflict Handling (Van de Vliert, 1997). Thisscale measures inaction, contentious behavior(contending), concession making (yielding),and problem solving. De Dreu et al. (2001)showed moderate to strong correlations betweenpost-negotiation self-reports on inaction, con-tentious behavior, concession making, andproblem solving on the one hand, and observercodings for these strategies on the other.Sample items included during the negotiationI avoided discussing certain issues (inaction;Cronbachs = .63), I fought for good outcomes

for myself (contentious behavior;

= .72),I made concessions to accommodate the otherparty (concession making; = .81), and I triedto find solutions that satisfied my own andthe other partys interests (problem solving; = .79) (all items: 1 = not at all, to 5 = very much).Ratings were averaged into indices of inaction,contentious behavior, concession making, andproblem solving, respectively.

Framing and perceived control Following the

measure of conflict management, participants


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were asked to fill out several items intended tomeasure their framing of the conflict (achievingmy goal would be a gain, and not reaching mygoal would be a loss; both 1 = definitely not, to

7 = very much), and the amount of experiencedcontrol over their outcomes (I have morecontrol over the outcome of the conflict thanmy counterpart, and my counterpart candetermine the conflict outcomes more thanI can; both 1 = certainly not, to 7 = definitely).In each case ratings on the second question werereverse coded and within constructs aggregatedinto one index for framing (r= .67 for Party A,and r= .61 for Party B; higher scores indicatingmore loss frame) and perceived control (r= .75

for Party A, and r= .68 for Party B; higher scoresindicating more perceived control).

Person perception This was measured by askingparticipants to rate on a 5-point scale theircounterparts on a number of adjectives. Four ofthese related to others friendliness (cooperativecompetitive; friendlyhostile; trustworthynottrustworthy; pleasantunpleasant) and weregrouped together into one index of friendliness(Cronbachs = .81 and .82 for Party As per-

ception of others friendliness, and Party Bsperception of others friendliness, respectively).Three adjectives related to others dominance(dominantsubmissive; bossyobedient;directiveeasy-going), and were grouped togetherinto one index of dominance (Cronbachs : .81and .82 for Party As perception of othersdominance, and Party Bs perception of othersdominance, respectively).

Conflict outcomes In contrast to Experiment 1,in which outcome measures were based onself-report, we used observer ratings to assessconflict outcomes. Each discussion was rated by

an independent observer (N= 45). Observersrated the conflict outcome for each party onthree 5-point scales (Party A(B) got what s/hewanted; Party A(B) achieved his/her goals;Party A(B) was successful in satisfying his/herwishes; always 1 = not at all, to 5 = to a great extent).Ratings were within party aggregated into oneindex for outcomes to Party A and outcomesto Party B.

Results

Conflict management (Hypothesis 13)Problem solving Party As problem solving andParty Bs problem solving were submitted to a 2(Symmetrical vs. Asymmetrical Conflict Struc-ture) 2 (Party A is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2(Party B is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Role: Party Avs. Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the lastfactor within-dyads. Results showed, first of all,an interaction between conflict structure androle (F(1, 82) = 4.94,p< .03). As can be seen inTable 3, Party As challengers in asymmetrical

conflicts engaged in more problem solvingthan their counterparts in the defendant role;in symmetrical conflicts no difference betweenboth challengers A and B were significant. Thisreplicates the results obtained in Experiment 1and implies new support for Hypothesis 1.

Second, results showed a trend toward a maineffect for Party Bs value orientation, so that dyadsengaged in more problem solving when Party

Table 3. Means for conflict outcomes and problem solving as a function of conflict structure and party role:Experiment 2

Conflict structure


Party A Party B


Conflict outcome 56.21a (9.08) 70.30b (10.32) 64.82ab (9.15) 67.70ab (11.48)

Problem solving 5.08a (1.62) 4.41b (1.69) 4.92ab (1.45) 4.67ab (2.16)

Notes:a,b Means not sharing the same superscript differ, according to between-subjects ttests, atp< .05.

Standard deviations are in parentheses.


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B was pro-social rather than pro-self (M= 4.97vs. M= 4.53,F(1, 82) = 2.94,p< .10). No othereffects involving social value orientation weresignificant. Thus, social value orientation does

not moderate the influence of conflict structureon conflict outcomes.

Contending Party As contending and Party Bscontending were submitted to a 2 (Symmetricalvs. Asymmetrical Conflict Structure) 2 (Party Ais Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Party B is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B)mixed-model ANOVA with the last factorwithin-dyads. Results showed, first of all, a maineffect for conflict structure (F(1, 82) = 4.97,

p< .03). Asymmetrical conflicts produced morecontending than symmetrical conflicts (M= 4.57vs. M= 4.33). However, because there was noqualifying interaction with role (F(1, 82) < 1), wedo not replicate the results in Experiment 1.

Second, results showed a main effect for PartyBs value orientation, so that dyads engaged inless contending when Party B was pro-socialrather than pro-self (M = 4.32 vs. M = 4.57,

F(1, 82) = 7.40,p< .01). No other effects involvingsocial value orientation were significant. Thus,

social value orientation does not moderate theinfluence of conflict structure on contending.

Avoiding Party As avoiding and Party Bsavoiding were submitted to a 2 (Symmetrical vs.Asymmetrical Conflict Structure) 2 (Party A isPro-social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Party B is Pro-socialvs. Pro-self) 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor within-dyads.Results only showed a main effect for Party Bsvalue orientation, so that dyads engaged in more

avoiding when Party B was pro-social rather thanpro-self (M= 3.57 vs. M= 3.30,F(1, 82) = 6.94,

p< .01). No other effects involving social valueorientation were significant. Thus, social valueorientation does not moderate the influence ofconflict structure on avoiding.

Yielding Party As yielding and Party Bs yield-ing were submitted to a 2 (Symmetrical vs.Asymmetrical Conflict Structure) 2 (Party Ais Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Party B is Pro-

social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B)

mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor within-dyads. Results showed a main effect for Party Bsvalue orientation, so that dyads engaged inmore yielding when Party B was pro-social

rather than pro-self (M = 4.20 vs. M = 3.89;F(1, 82) = 6.86,p< .01). Similarly, there was amain effect for Party As value orientation, sothat dyads engaged in more yielding when PartyA was pro-social rather than pro-self (M= 4.10vs. M= 3.84,F(1, 82) = 5.67,p< .02). No othereffects involving social value orientation weresignificant. Thus, social value orientation doesnot moderate the influence of conflict structureon yielding.

Conflict outcomes (Hypothesis 4) Party As out-comes and Party Bs outcomes were submittedto a 2 (Symmetrical vs. Asymmetrical ConflictStructure) 2 (Party A is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Party B is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2(Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-model ANOVAwith the last factor within-dyads. Results showed,first of all, a main effect for conflict structure(F(1, 82) = 8.94, p < .005), and a qualifyinginteraction between conflict structure and role(F(1, 82) = 4.91,p< .03). As can be seen in Table 3,

Party A challengers in asymmetrical conflictsachieved lower outcomes than their counterpartsin Party B in the defendant role. This replicatesthe results obtained in Experiment 1 and impliesnew support for Hypothesis 4.

Second, results showed a main effect for Party Bsvalue orientation, so that dyads achieved higheroutcomes together when Party B was pro-socialrather than pro-self (M= 66.00 vs. M= 59.48,

F(1, 82) = 8.52,p< .005). No other effects involv-ing social value orientation were significant.

Thus, social value orientation does not moderatethe influence of conflict structure on conflictoutcomes.

Loss framing and perceived control (Hypotheses56) Loss framing by Party A and loss framingby Party B were submitted to a 2 (Symmetricalvs. Asymmetrical Conflict Structure) 2 (Party Ais Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Party B is Pro-socialvs. Pro-self) 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor within-dyads.

The only significant effect was an interaction


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between conflict structure and role (F(1, 82) =11.13,p< .001). As can be seen in Table 4, Party A(challenger) experienced less of a loss-framethan Party B (defendant) in the asymmetrical

conflict condition, whereas Parties A and B didnot differ in the symmetrical conflict condition.This supports Hypothesis 5 and our reasoningthat defendants are relatively resistant to changebecause they are in a loss-frame more than theirchallenger is.

Perceived control by Party A and perceivedcontrol by Party B were submitted to a 2 (Sym-metrical vs. Asymmetrical Conflict Structure) 2(Party A is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Party B is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B)

mixed-model ANOVA with the last factorwithin-dyads. Results revealed a significant maineffect for conflict structure (F(1, 82) = 19.71,

p< .001), and a qualifying interaction betweenconflict structure and role (F(1, 82) = 8.40,

p< .005). As can be seen in Table 4, Party A(challenger) experienced less control thanParty B (defendant) in the asymmetrical conflictcondition, whereas Party A and Party B did notdiffer in the symmetrical conflict condition. Thissupports Hypothesis 6 and our reasoning that

defendants are relatively resistant to changebecause they are in a more powerful positionthan their challenger is.

Person perception (Hypotheses 7a7b) Othersfriendliness perceived by Party A and othersfriendliness perceived by Party B were submittedto a 2 (Symmetrical vs. Asymmetrical Conflict

Structure) 2 (Party A is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2 (Party B is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) 2(Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-model ANOVAwith the last factor within-dyads. This revealed

a main effect for Party As social value orien-tation, showing that Party A perceived party Bas friendlier when Party A had a pro-social ratherthan a pro-self orientation (M= 4.77 vs. M= 4.06;

F(1, 82) = 5.89,p< .025). A similar, albeit lessstrong, main effect for Party Bs social valueorientation showed that Party B perceived party Aas friendlier when Party B had a pro-socialrather than a pro-self orientation (M= 4.42 vs.M= 3.93;F(1, 82) = 3.07,p< .084) (marginal).Finally, results revealed a trend toward an

interaction among conflict structure and role(F(1, 82) = 3.24, p < .075) (marginal). Cellmeans in Table 4 show that party A (challenger)perceives party B (defendant) as less friendlythan party B perceives party A in asymmetricalconflicts, whereas there appears to be nodivergence in perceptions of friendliness insymmetrical conflicts. This matches our notionthat defendants may be more stubborn, evasive,and resistant to change than challengers, andprovides support for Hypothesis 7a.

Others dominance perceived by Party A andothers dominance perceived by Party B weresubmitted to a 2 (Symmetrical vs. AsymmetricalConflict Structure) 2 (Party A is Pro-socialvs. Pro-self) 2 (Party B is pro-social vs. pro-self) 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-modelANOVA with the last factor within-dyads. Thisonly revealed an interaction among conflict

Table 4. Means for conflict-related perceptions as a function of conflict structure and party role: Experiment 2

Conflict structure


Party A Party B


Loss-frame 2.97b 3.30a 3.20a 3.04ab

Perceived control 3.78c 5.13b 4.19a 4.36a

Others friendliness 2.39b 2.99a 2.71a 2.61ab

Others dominance 4.17c 3.47ab 3.68a 4.06bc

Note:a,b,c Means not sharing the same superscript differ, according to between-subjects ttests, atp< .05.


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structure and role (F(1, 82) = 7.09, p < .01).As can be seen in Table 4, Party B is perceivedas more dominant in asymmetrical ratherthan symmetrical conflicts, and Party A is per-

ceived as less dominant in asymmetrical ratherthan symmetrical conflicts; this supportsHypothesis 7b.

DiscussionResults replicated and extended those ofExperiment 1. Again, and consistent withHypothesis 4, we found that challengersachieved lower outcomes when paired to adefendant (asymmetrical conflict) than toanother challenger. Consistent with Hypoth-

esis 1, we found once again that challengersin asymmetrical conflicts engaged in moreproblem solving than their counterparts in thedefendant role, than with another challenger.Importantly, we did not replicate the resultsregarding contending and avoiding obtainedin Experiment 1. Although we cannot excludethat this failure to replicate effects is partly dueto the fact that we used self-report instead ofobserver ratings of behavior, this may suggestthat conflict outcomes are primarily the result

of asymmetries in problem solving. We returnto this in the general discussion.

In addition to Experiment 1, we includedperceptual measures in Experiment 2. We foundthat in asymmetrical conflicts defendants arein a loss-frame more than their challengers.Also, defendants perceive more control overthe situation. Finally, defendants are perceivedas less friendly and more dominant than theirchallengers. These three findings togetherstrongly support the notion that those defending

the status quo are better positioned than thosechallenging the status quo, and corroboratesspeculations in other research reports (e.g.Keltner & Robinson, 1997; Robinson & Keltner,1996; Garcia et al., 2001; Kluwer, 1998).

Social value orientationsIn Experiment 2 we included both partiespro-self versus pro-social value orientation asa potential moderator of the conflict struc-ture effects. However, no interaction between

social value orientation, conflict structure,

and participant role was foundthe effects ofconflict structure on perceptions, motivation,and conflict behaviors hold for both pro-self andpro-social individuals. At the same time, we did

find a number of effects for parties social valueorientation that merit discussion.

Results for conflict management showedthat Party B engaged in more problem solvingand less contending when s/he was pro-socialrather than pro-self, and that Party B and Party Aengaged in more yielding when they were pro-social rather than pro-self. Also, dyads achievedhigher outcomes when Party B was pro-socialrather than pro-self. Finally, Party A and B saweach other as friendlier when they were pro-social

rather than pro-self. Because no interactionsinvolving conflict structure were observed, wecannot conclude that the stronger effects forParty B were due to the fact that Party B wasthe defendant in half of the cases. Furthermore,means for Party A went in the same directionbut did not reach significance. For some reason,effects for social value orientation were strongerwhen participants were in the role of Party B,but not qualitatively different when participantswere in the role of Party A. We believe this points

to the fact that role descriptions have providedParty B with a slightly weaker situation thanParty A, allowing person-based tendencies tocome out more in Party B than in Party A.

We reasoned that dispute resolution pro-cesses are more constructive when parties havea pro-social rather than pro-self orientation.Furthermore, based on the so-called trianglehypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Steinel &De Dreu, 2004; Van Lange, 1992), one wouldexpect constructive processes only when both

parties are pro-social. This is because pro-socialstend to adapt to, and adopt, the less constructivebehavior by their pro-self counterparts. The lackof interactions between Party A and Party Bssocial value orientation on any of the measuresin Experiment 2 goes against this trianglehypothesis. This may indicate that the trianglehypothesis is limited to specific situations, suchas prisoners dilemma type of games (Miller &Holmes, 1975) and does not necessarily gen-eralize to negotiation and dispute resolution

(cf. Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007).


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Indeed, close inspection of the relevant liter-ature suggests rather limited evidence for thistriangle hypothesis. While initial evidence hasbeen provided using prisoners dilemma games

(Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), follow-up work usingslight variations of this game failed to providesupportive evidence (Miller & Holmes, 1975).Studies into cooperative behavior in so-calledchicken dilemma games and trust games likewisefailed to provide asymmetrical adaptation of pro-socials to competitive behavior by their counter-part (Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel, & Wolters, 1986),and there is little evidence for the underlyingproposition that pro-social individuals havemore heterogeneous beliefs about others value

orientation than those with a pro-self orientation(e.g. Iedema & Poppe, 1999). Work by Parks andRumble (2001; also see Parks, Sanna, & Berel,2001) found behavioral assimilation by pro-socials more than by pro-selves but only aftersubstantial delay. In short, it appears the trianglehypothesis has some validity in rather specificcircumstances (i.e. prisoner dilemma games)and that in other social decision making settingssymmetrical adaptation is the rule rather thanthe exception. Clearly, however, more systematic

research into this issue is greatly needed.

Conclusions and general discussion

Although conflict research and theory hasdeveloped in the past three decades, few studiesdealt with the fact that the mere structure ofthe conflict can have important implicationsfor parties cognitions, motivational goals,social perceptions, behavioral interactions, andconflict outcomes. Granted, in some areas,

such as negotiations, symmetrical structureshave been studied extensively, and in otherareas, such as marital interaction and judicialdisputes, asymmetrical structures have beencovered in quite some detail. Yet as far as weknow the current research is the first to dir-ectly compare, in an experimental setting, thepossible consequences of symmetrical versusasymmetrical conflicts. Below we discuss thesefindings, along with some suggestions forfuture research and implications for conflict

and negotiation research. We also address the

results for social value orientation obtained inExperiment 2 in some more detail, and we endwith some general conclusions.

Conflict structuresSeveral findings were consistent across thetwo experiments. In both studies, we found nodifferences in problem solving, contending,yielding, avoiding, and conflict outcomes be-tween both challengers A and B in the sym-metrical conflict conditions. Clearly, specific roleinstructions, however minor, had no meaningfulinfluence on the course and outcome of thedispute resolution process. Similarly, in thesymmetrical conflict condition of Experiment 2

no differences among challengers were foundin loss framing, perceived control, and personperception. However, and consistent with ourpredictions, meaningful differences in conflictbehavior, perceptions, and outcomes betweenchallengers and defendants were found in theasymmetrical conflict conditions. As predicted,challengers engaged in more problem solv-ing and contending, and in less avoiding,had less of a loss-frame, perceived lower con-trol, and obtained lower outcomes than their

counterparts in the role of defendant. Thesefindings are consistent with our reasoning thatin asymmetrical conflicts challengers need tobe pro-active and approach their defendantwho, because of the Status Quo Bias, is relativelystubborn, evasive, and domineering. In short,asymmetrical conflicts are less likely to runa constructive course, and are more likely toescalate into impasse or winlose outcomes,compared to symmetrical conflicts.

At the outset we noted that recent work indi-

cates that feeling powerful may instigate ap-proach motivation and concomitant actiontendencies (cf. Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson,2003). At first blush this seems to go against ourreasoning, and findings, that defendants withconcomitantly more power are less pro-active ininitiating and reciprocating problem-solving andcontending tendencies than their challengersand are, in fact, more likely to remain inactive.However, it may very well be that defendants witha greater sense of power than challengers are

initially predisposed to act and move but that


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this basic and habitual tendency is overruled bysophisticated strategic analysis of the pros andcons of (not) acting. That parties to a conflictcan and do overcome their initial and habit-

ual tendencies has been shown in work on thesocial functions of emotions in conflict andnegotiation, which revealed that contagion-likeprocesses emerge but do not affect behavior;behavioral responses to others emotionswere grounded in a strategic analysis of theinformation contained in the counterpartsemotion (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead,2004a, 2004b). This work also indicates a wayto test this possibility, namely by varying theextent to which defendants and challengers are

able and motivated to process informationif they can, strategic considerations (not) to actwill overrule their habitual tendencies; but ifthey cannot, habitual tendencies take preced-ence over strategic inclinations and defendantsmay become even more pro-active than theirchallengers.

Although our predictions and analyses werefocused on differences in psychological processesand behavioral tendencies between challengerand defendant in asymmetrical conflicts, our

design allows us to examine whether conflictstructures influence dispute resolution pro-cesses because it impacts challengers or defend-ants, or both. In neither Experiment 1 norExperiment 2 did find we overall main effectsfor conflict structure. Inspection of cell meansin Table 2 (Experiment 1) and Table 3 (Experi-ment 2) shows that with regard to conflict out-comes and conflict management challengersin symmetrical conflicts take positions that areintermediate and not-significantly different

from those taken by challengers and defendantsin asymmetrical conflicts. Similar patternsemerged in Table 4 (Experiment 2) wherewith regard to framing, perceived control, andperson perceptions, challengers in symmetricalconflicts took positions that were intermediateand not-significantly different from those takenby challengers and defendants in asymmet-rical conflicts. These findings together allowthe cautious conclusion that conflict struc-ture has no meaningful impact on the overall

group-level processes and outcomes but does

exert meaningful influences on the within-group, between party processes and outcomes.Furthermore, we have no evidence that it is eitherthe challenger or the defendant who is primarily

responsible for the different processes and out-comes observed in asymmetrical compared tosymmetrical conflictsboth challenger anddefendant seem to have an impact and jointlydetermine the course of action and ultimateoutcome of the dispute resolution process.

In Experiment 1, where we worked with ob-served instances of conflict management, wefound circumstantial evidence for reciprocalcooperation in symmetrical conflicts, and lack ofreciprocal sequences in asymmetrical conflicts.

This was based on correlations and thus re-presents a rather crude assessment of behavioralinteraction sequences. Future research intosymmetrical and asymmetrical conflicts wouldbenefit tremendously from the type of sequentialanalyses employed by Weingart and Olekalnsand their colleagues (e.g. Olekalns, Brett, &Weingart, 2003; Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, &Genovese, 1999). The rather broad codingintervals used in Experiment 1 and the use ofretrospective self-report measures in Experi-

ment 2 do not allow the Markov-chain type ofanalysis that these scholars offer. The currentfindings and conclusions may, however, serveas the basis for specific predictions to be testedusing such more fine-grained coding of behaviorat the level of speaker turns.

Current findings suggest that it may not onlybe the objective structure of the conflict, butalso the way it is perceived, that affects howparties approach and respond to each other. Forexample, it could be argued that sellers and buyers

in trade negotiations are actually in an asym-metrical conflict, with the seller defending thestatus quothe selling price askedand thebuyer challenging it (cf. Kahneman et al.,1990; see also Donohue & Taylor, 2007).This asymmetrical conflict structure accountsfor the differences in gainloss framing, perceivedcontrol, and differential outcomes achieved byseller and buyers. Related, it may well be thatthe objective structure of the conflict has lessimpact than the subjective experience of con-

flict structures, with objectively symmetrical


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structures being perceived as asymmetrical byone or both parties. Such subjective perceptionsmay turn out to be more critical in drivingconflict cognition and behavior. Obviously,

future research is needed to test these ideasmore systematically.

Thus far we have implicitly assumed that con-flicts are either symmetrical or asymmetrical.However, in many cases, such as negotiations,multiple issues are dealt with in a more orless simultaneous fashion and it is quite likelythat on some issues symmetry exists whereason other issues asymmetry exists. For example,during contract negotiations, managements toppriority is to increase labors upfront costs for

prescription medications, whereas labor wants itto stay as is; labor wants to win the ability to adoptflexible start and stop times, but managementhas no interest in discussing this. Examiningsuch mixed situations is of great interest andimportance, and the current research mayprovide a basis for such more complex analysesboth of strategic choices participants make andof the quality of the agreements they ultimatelyreach.

Before moving to some practical implications

of our results, we should acknowledge that theuse of relatively short-lived role simulationswith individuals not knowing each other and notanticipating future interaction provides highinternal validity, but not necessarily high externalvalidity. In many conflicts, parties do share ahistory and a future, conflict issues may haveimportant repercussions, and conflict outcomesmay have vital consequences for parties well-being and economic prosperity. While theseaspects were not part of the role simulations used

in the current research, the pattern of resultswe obtained closely follows those obtained inreal-life disputes among married couples (e.g.Kluwer et al., 1997) as well as in judicial disputesbetween district attornies and public defenders(Garcia et al., 2001). Whereas this other workmay be higher in external validity, and at the leastshows challengerdefendant patterns in specificapplied contexts, the current work contributesto these and other literatures by establishingcausal direction as well as by showing that specific

context does not necessarily moderate the more

basic dispute resolution tendencies that emergeas a function of conflict structure.

Implications for third party intervention

Our findings have implications for third partyinterventions. Third parties should be awareof the structure of the conflict when theyengage in mediation between two conflictparties. Our results suggest that asymmetricalconflicts are more difficult to mediate thansymmetrical conflicts, because of their higherchance of escalation and stalemate due to lessreciprocation of problem solving. Moreover,the results show that challengers receive lowerconflict outcomes than defendants, which can be

a risk for long-term (working) relations becausechallengers may experience injustice. Workby Jehn, Rupert, and Nauta (2006) has indeedshown that asymmetry of conflicts is negativelyassociated with satisfaction with mediation.Third parties should therefore acknowledgeand address asymmetries in conflict. However,this is not an easy task because for a mediationto succeed, it is important that both parties per-ceive the mediator as impartial and unbiased.By giving differential attention to one of the

partiesfor example allowing the challengermore speaking time than the defendantathird party runs the risk of being perceived aspartial and biased. Tactics that may be usefulfor mediators are, first, to ensure equal speakingtime for both parties. Another tactic may be tolet the parties redefine their conflict issue inmore symmetrical terms. For example, whenan employee and his or her supervisor argueabout working hours that an employee wants tochange whereas the supervisor does not, a third

party may ask about the underlying interests andhelp both parties redefine the conflict issue interms of these interestse.g. supervisor lackingcapacity, employee wanting more time to spendwith his or her family. Underlying interests areby definition goals that parties strive for, andtherefore reflect change for both parties ratherthan a status quo of one of the parties.

ConclusionsIn two experiments we showed that in asymmetrical

conflicts challengers engage in more problem


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solving and, to some extent, more contendingand less avoiding than their counterparts in therole of defendant. These strategic choices cametogether with less perceived control, less loss

framing, and lower personal outcomes. Thesefindings are consistent with previous conclusionsthat were based on correlational designs andoftentimes did not allow a clear-cut separationof structure effects and gender (as in maritalconflict interactions) or occupational status (asin judicial disputes). However, together withthese previous works we can conclude thatregardless of the specific issues being addressed,or the specific context within which the conflicttakes place, defendants of the status quo are

in a much better position during asymmetricalconflicts than their challengers are.Recall that Coombs (1987) argued that some

conflicts arise because opposing individualswant the same thing and must settle for dif-ferent things, whereas other conflicts arisebecause individuals want different things andmust settle for the same thing. We agreed withCoombs that these two broad classes of conflictstructures exhaust the domain of conflict(p. 362), but argued that a further distinction

between symmetrical and asymmetrical struc-tures was needed to fully understand howconflict structures affect cognition, motivation,and conflict behavior. The current researchsupports our argumentit matters whetherparties together seek to establish change, orinstead have to decide whether to change thesituation or not. The latter question appears tobe more difficult and is about situations proneto conflict escalation.

Notes1. In the present context asymmetrical versus

symmetrical structure refers to the extent towhich one or both disputants seek change. Insome work concerned with group negotiation,the terms symmetrical and asymmetrical havebeen used to describe situations in which allmembers opposed each other (symmetrical), orin which some members had aligned preferencesthat deviated from those of a minority member(e.g. Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; Polzer, Mannix,

& Neale, 1998; Ten Velden, Beersma, &

De Dreu, 2007). Also, the terms asymmetricalversus symmetrical have sometimes been used torefer to differences in dependency and poweramong disputants. Again, this is a differentsituation that is orthogonal to the current focus.

2. Note that this reasoning is in contrast toresearch and theory suggesting that feelingpowerful induces an approach motivation andtendency to act (e.g. Keltner et al., 2003;Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead,2006). We return to this in the generaldiscussion.

3. Readers familiar with the negotiation literaturemay be interested in whether the tasks weused had so-called integrative potentialthepossibility for parties to integrate seeminglyopposed aspirations into solutions that providedboth with relatively high outcomes. Our tasksdid not have this possibility explicitly builtin (as in most point-value negotiation tasks;see De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003), but suchcreative solutions were neither excluded norprohibited. However, because our focus was onconflict cognition, interpersonal perceptions,and interaction processes, we did not examinein-depth the type of solutions parties reached,and limited this part of the analysis to felt(Experiment 1) and observed (Experiment 2)success.

4. Exploratory analyses were performed to seewhether across time behavioral patterns changedin interaction with conflict structure and role.This was not the casewe only found that overtime dyads engaged in more problem solvingand less forcing; the prevalence of avoiding andyielding did not change over time. The firstauthor may be contacted for further detail.

5. We decided to analyze each conflictmanagement strategy separately, rather thanas one single analysis for two reasons. First,strategies are not necessarily correlated and

theoretically it is possible that effects show onone strategy but not others. Second, such anoverall analysis could reveal that some conflictmanagement strategies are preferred more thanothers, but since we had no predictions thatwould complicate interpretation.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by a research grantawarded by the Van der Gaag Foundation to

Carsten K. W. De Dreu and Aukje Nauta, and by


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an Aspasia Grant awarded by the NetherlandsOrganization for Scientific Research (NWO) toEsther Kluwer.

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