decentralizing tvet in a federal philippines
TRANSCRIPT
University of Calgary
PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository
Graduate Studies Master of Public Policy Capstone Projects
2018-09-11
Decentralizing TVET in a Federal Philippines
Cuenco, Glecy C.
Cuenco, G.C. (2018). Decentralizing TVET in a Federal Philippines (Unpublished master's project).
University of Calgary, Calgary, AB.
http://hdl.handle.net/1880/109316
master thesis
Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca
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MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY CAPSTONE PROJECT
Submitted by:
Approved by Supervisor:
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of PPOL 623 and completion of the requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree
Decentralizing TVET in a Federal Philippines
Glecy C. Cuenco
Dr. Beverly G. Dahlby, 11 September 2018
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Acknowledgements I wish to thank Dr. Beverly Dahlby for his supervision and expert guidance that helped me to understand how fiscal federalism principles can be applied to the situation in the Philippines – now at a crossroads: should it remain a unitary system or test the unchartered waters of federalism? I am also grateful to Ms. Ma. Susan de la Rama, TESDA Director, for her invaluable support in my research; And to my husband, Sonny, and our three children – Justine, Michael and Dominique, I thank them for for their constant love and support.
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………….......................1
Rationale of the Study…………………………………………………………………………………………………..1
The Philippines: A Backgrounder…………………………………………………………………………………. 3
FEDERAL SYSTEM…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….10
Characteristics of a Federal Government…………………………………………………………………….10
Expenditure Assignment……………………………………………………………………………………………..11
Revenue (Tax) Assignment………………………………………………………………………………............16
TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING (TVET)…………………………………………21
Importance of TVET……………………………………………………………………………………………………21
Current TVET System in the Philippines……………………………………………………………………..22
TVET System in Federal Countries………………………………………………………………………………25
METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..31
FINDINGS……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….32
Patterns of TVET Decentralization in Eight Federal Countries……………………………………32
Summary of Findings………………………………………………………………………………………………..36
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, CONSULTATION,
COMMUNICATION & IMPLEMENTATION………………………………………………………………….38
REFERENCE LIST…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….45
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Capstone Executive Summary
By 2022, a change in the form of government from unitary to federal will likely happen in
the Philippines, a nation of 104 million. Although decentralization is not new to the country owing
to the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, the transition will have major policy
implications on the assignment of expenditure and revenue (taxation) responsibilities for
government functions. This study focuses on the technical and vocational education and training
(TVET), an important component of the Philippine Government’s national strategy for economic
development and poverty alleviation.
TVET governance in the Philippines is placed under the authority of the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), an agency attached to the national
government which operates a network of over a hundred TVET training schools and institutes.
With the impending shift to a federal system, TESDA needs to formulate a decentralization
strategy, determining which sub-functions of TVET governance should be retained at the national
level, devolved/transferred to subnational governments, and shared between the two levels
government.
This paper maintains that in addressing these policy issues, the Philippine Government
should be guided by the principles of fiscal federalism and informed by existing TVET
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decentralization models in federal countries worldwide. This paper utilizes comparative
institutional analysis, an analytical framework that examines existing institutional arrangements
in some jurisdictions to inform policy formulation elsewhere.
TVET governance in eight federal countries are analyzed by answering this question:
Which sub-functions are assigned to what level of government? The sub-functions of the TVET
system are: a) policy formulation and planning, b) standard-setting and regulatory, c)
financing/contracting and d) provision of TVET services to clients.
Based on the findings of the study, policy makers in the Philippines are enjoined to
consider the following policy recommendations on decentralizing TVET under the proposed
federal system:
a. TVET policy formulation, planning, standard-setting and regulatory functions
should be assigned solely to the national government so that TVET governance is
harmonized across jurisdictions, and to be consistent with the national
government’s equity goals;
b. Financing/contracting for TVET can initially be assigned as a “shared function”
between the national and subnational governments; however, in the long term,
the subnational governments should develop their local revenue generation
capacity and eventually be responsible for TVET financing/ contracting in their
jurisdictions. Policy makers should also explore alternative models for TVET
financing such as inclusion of TVET in the existing Special Education Fund (SEF) and
establishing a TVET Training Fund;
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c. Provision of TVET training services can initially be a “shared function” between the
two levels of government; however, as experiences of federal countries clearly
show, the primary responsibility of providing TVET services to clients should rest
with the subnational governments.
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V. INTRODUCTION
A. Rationale of the Study
The Proposed Shift to Federalism in the Philippines. Decentralization is not new to the
Philippines owing to the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 which devolved four
national government functions to provinces, cities/municipalities and “barangay” or villages -
collectively referred to as “local government units” (LGUs). The devolved functions are
agriculture, environment, health and social services. The Code grants power to LGUs to create
their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges. The LGUs share in the national
taxes which are automatically released to them from the annual national budget, and are called
internal revenue allotments (IRA). They are also entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds
of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas.
(Brillantes, 2017).
Citing gains from the Local Government Code, proponents of decentralization are advocating
a shift from the current unitary presidential to a federal system (debating yet whether it should
be presidential or parliamentary). Since the election of Rodrigo Duterte as President of the
Philippines in 2016, the national government has launched a vigorous campaign to inform and
persuade Filipinos to be open to the idea of a federal Philippines which was part of Duterte’s
campaign platform. In his campaign speeches, Duterte argued that the country’s highly
centralized system had resulted in inequitable distribution of public resources among
administrative regions and contributed to the long-running Muslim secessionist rebellion in
Mindanao Island in the south (Ranada, 2016).
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In September 2017, Duterte appointed a 25-member constitutional commission (Con-
Com) which will serve as the advisory body to Congress in drafting a new charter for a federal
government (Valente, 2017). Inevitably, the Duterte administration has to contend with some
hard policy choices as the country prepares for transition, for example: a) delineation of
geographic boundaries for federated (subnational) regions, b) determination of how to divide
government responsibilities and allocate taxation powers between federal and subnational level
of government, and c) determination of federal grants to impoverished regions, among other
transition issues (Araral, 2017).
Due to the sheer complexity of the transition process, this paper focuses on just one area of
study, i.e. the determination of how to assign government responsibilities between federal and
subnational government – and how this policy issue impacts a national agency, the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), which is mandated by law to oversee and
regulate the technical and vocational education and training (TVET) system in the country.
Policy Implications of Decentralizing TVET under a Federal System. This paper will examine
how the shift to a federal system will impact TESDA’s governance functions, specifically
addressing the following questions:
1. What functions of TESDA should be retained at the national level, and why?
2. What functions should be assigned to subnational governments, and why?
3. What functions should be concurrent or shared by both national and subnational
governments, and why?
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By addressing the foregoing questions, this writer hopes to contribute to an evidence-based
policy process on decentralizing TVET in the Philippines under a federal system.
B. The Philippines: A Backgrounder
B.1. Country Profile
Located in Southeast Asia, the Republic of the Philippines is an archipelago of over
7,000 islands spanning more than 300,000 square kilometers of territory. It comprises three main
island groups: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The country’s population of 104 million (as of 2017)
is predominantly young, with a median age of 23.5 years. Population growth rate is 1.6 per cent,
one of the highest in the Asia Pacific Region. There are over a hundred different ethnic groups
and dialects in the country.
The Philippines is a unitary presidential constitutional republic. The President of the
Philippines serves as both the head of state and the head of government. The country proclaimed
its independence from the Spanish Empire in 1898, following the culmination of the Philippine
Revolution. It is a founding member of both the United Nations (UN) and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (National Government Portal, 2017).
The Philippines is considered one of the fastest growing economies in Asia with an annual
GDP growth rate of 6.8 per cent in 2017. However, despite an impressive economic performance,
the country has a relatively high poverty incidence rate at 21.6 per cent of the population
(Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016). The Asian Development Bank (2009b) cites inequality
across income brackets, regions and sectors, as well as unmanaged population growth, as part of
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the reasons why the Philippine Government’s poverty reduction efforts have not been quite
effective in recent years.
B.2. The Current Unitary Presidential System
The Philippines has a unitary presidential system. Executive powers are vested in the
President and Vice President who are elected by direct popular vote and serve a term of six years.
The legislative branch is a bicameral system composed of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The judicial branch is made up of the Supreme Court and lower courts. These
three branches of government are co-equal and have strict separation of powers.
Power is centralized at the national government. All administrative divisions or local
government units (LGUs) exercise only the powers that the central government chooses to
devolve. The national government has the power to create, abolish, broaden or narrow the
powers of local government units (National Government Portal, 2017).
Local government units (LGUs) are divided into three levels: province, city/municipality
and “barangay” (village). The province is the primary political unit (not a subnational
government) in the Philippines. There are currently 81 provinces. A province is further
subdivided into cities and municipalities. As of 2016, there are 145 cities (35 highly urbanized,
5 independent component, 105 component) and 1,489 municipalities encompassing the entire
nation. A city or municipality, in turn, is further subdivided into “barangay” or villages, the
smallest unit in the political system. There are presently over 42,000 villages. Below is a chart of
the country’s political subdivisions:
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Figure 1. Philippine Local Government
Source: Department of Interior and Local Government (2018)
For planning and de-concentration purposes, the Philippines is divided into administrative
regions. In Philippine context, “regions” are not sub-national governments. They are merely
administrative designations to enable the national government to effectively manage an
archipelagic and ethnically diverse nation. There are currently 17 administrative regions in the
country. The seat of national government is in Metro Manila or National Capital Region (NCR).
Due to a long-running Muslim secessionist rebellion, the only region that was granted autonomy
and additional political power is the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the
south. (Department of Interior and Local Government, 2018). Below is a map depicting the
Philippine administrative regions:
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Figure 2. Philippine Administrative Regions
Source: Department of Interior and Local Government (2018)
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B.3. Federalism: The Proposed Philippine Model
Weaknesses of the Current Unitary System. Advocates of federalism in the Philippines
blame the inherent weaknesses of the current unitary government for serious problems that
have plagued the country for decades. According to Araral (2017), government resources are
over-concentrated in the central government. In 2015, the national government accounted for
82 percent of total government expenditures (net of debt service) while the share of local
government units (LGUs) was a mere 18 per cent.
Another source of discontent is the highly unequal economic development across
administrative regions. In the same year, 3 out of 17 administrative regions accounted for 62 per
cent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Further, there is a correlation between GDP
and poverty incidence, with 3 regions exhibiting the lowest poverty incidence rates (ranging from
3.0 to 6.8 per cent), in stark contrast with the remaining 14 regions (ranging from 54 to 72 per
cent). The national average poverty incidence rate for the same period was 22 per cent.
The highly centralized government in the Philippines had failed to solve the long-running
Muslim secessionist rebellion in the south. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Duterte
pledged to correct the historical injustices done to Filipino-Muslims in Mindanao. It is undisputed
in Philippine history that decades of uprising in Mindanao can be traced to the unitary
government’s failure to address the Filipino-Muslims’ deeply rooted economic and political
grievances, notably land-grabbing and discrimination based on religion. The Philippines is
predominantly a Catholic country, with 85 per cent of the population belonging to the Roman
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Catholic Church. Filipino Muslims are a minority, accounting for only 5 per cent of the population
(Chen, 2015).
Due to the foregoing reasons, the federalism movement in the Philippines has gained traction
particularly upon the assumption to power by Duterte, the first President of the Philippines to
hail from Muslim-dominated Mindanao Island.
Proposed Philippine Federal Model. Fulfilling his electoral promise, Duterte formed a 25-
member constitutional commission (Con-Com) in September 2017 with a mandate to draft a
federal charter for the Philippines. In July 2018, the Con-Com unanimously approved the draft
charter proposing a federal system patterned after the United States model (presidential
federal). Within the same month, the draft charter was transmitted to Duterte who in turn,
endorsed it to Congress for study. The plan is for members of Congress, sitting as a constituent
assembly, to call for a plebiscite in mid-2019 (coinciding with the mid-term elections) where
Filipinos can vote for or against the proposed federal charter (Ilas and Santos, 2018).
In a press conference organized by the Con-Com, the features of the proposed federal
government were disclosed to the public. Ranada (2018) reported that the Con-Com draft charter
provides for the executive power to be vested in the President. There shall be a bicameral
legislature with senators elected by region, not nationwide. The judiciary shall be composed of
four high courts, including the Federal Supreme Court. Sixteen new federated regions (i.e.
subnational governments) shall be created while the two existing asymmetrical regions,
Bangsamoro and Cordillera, shall be retained.
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The federated regions shall be led by a regional governor and deputy regional governor
elected as a team. They are to be elected by majority of the regional assembly from among its
members. The deputy governor will serve as the assembly's presiding officer. Each region will
have a regional supreme court and lower courts.
The federal government shall have exclusive powers for the following functions: defense,
security of land, sea, and air territory; foreign affairs; international trade, customs and tariffs;
citizenship, immigration, and naturalization; monetary policy and federal fiscal policy, banks,
currency; inter-regional infrastructure and public utilities including telecommunications and
broadband networks; postal service, basic education, social security benefits and elections,
among others.
On the other hand, the federated regions shall have the following exclusive powers viz.
their respective regions: creation of sources of revenue, financial administration and
management, tourism, investment, and trade development, infrastructure/ public utilities and
public works, economic zones, land use and housing, local government units, business permits
and licenses, municipal waters, parks and recreation and other similar functions.
Government functions not mentioned as “exclusive” to either the federal or the
subnational governments will then be “shared” by the two levels of government. Shared powers
include higher education and TVET.
With regards the allocation of fiscal powers and financial administration, the federated
regions shall collect the following taxes and fees: real property tax, estate tax, donor's tax,
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professional tax, franchise tax, games and amusement tax, environmental /pollution tax, road
users' tax, vehicle registration fees and other local taxes.
For its part, the federal government shall collect the following taxes: income taxes,
(personal and corporate), value added taxes (VAT), customs duties, excise taxes and natural
resource taxes. Further, there shall be an equalization fund which shall shall be distributed based
on the needs of each region to be determined by a federal intergovernmental commission.
VI. FEDERAL SYSTEM
A. Characteristics of a Federal Government
There are 25 known federal countries in the world today representing approximately 40
per cent of the world's population. They include some of the largest democracies such as India,
the US, Canada, Germany and Australia. Their system of government, while it can be complex,
has contributed to these countries’ progress and high standards of living (Gerring, Thacker and
Moreno, 2012).
The federal system is characterized by the following features: (a) at least two orders of
government (i.e. national and subnational) acting directly on their citizens, (b) allocation of
revenue resources between the two levels of government that ensures some areas of autonomy
for each order, (c) provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within
the federal policy-making institutions, (d) a supreme constitution that can not be unilaterally
amended, (e) an umpire, usually in the form of courts or provision for referendums to rule on
disputes over constitutional powers of governments, and (f) processes and institutions to
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facilitate intergovernmental collaboration in those areas where governmental powers are shared
(Watts, 1996).
In designing federal systems, policy makers are guided by a body of knowledge known as
“fiscal federalism,” a sub-field of public economics that examines how competencies
(expenditure side) and fiscal instruments (revenue side) are allocated across different (vertical)
levels of government. Another important aspect of fiscal federalism is the system of
intergovernmental transfers by which the federal government shares its revenues with lower
levels of government. This arrangement allows the federal government to exercise its
redistributive role and can be done through individual tax sharing, general revenue sharing, and
grants (Miral, 2017).
B. Expenditure Assignment
B.1. Principles
Citing the works of Oates (1972) and Watts (1996) in fiscal federalism, Manasan (2017)
states that the functions of government should be assigned to the jurisdiction with control over
the minimum geographic area that would internalize the benefits and costs of such provision of
public goods. Following this basic principle, functions and competencies whose benefits are
national in scope should be assigned to the federal government. For example, such functions as
national defense, foreign affairs, functions related to economic stabilization and macroeconomic
management (e.g. monetary policy) and the preservation of internal common market (e.g.
regulation of interstate trade) should be assigned to the federal government.
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In contrast, public services with little or no benefit spill-over (i.e. local benefits) are best
assigned to subnational governments. These include public works, land use and housing, local
government units, business permits and licenses, municipal waters, parks and recreation, among
others. However, in line with “equity” goals, the federal government may be involved to enforce
some degree of uniformity in the delivery of quasi-public goods and merit-goods (e.g. basic
education, health and social insurance). Moreover, Shah (1994) proposes other important
principles when assigning expenditure functions between federal and subnational governments,
namely:
Fiscal Efficiency - Decentralized decision-making in a federation results in differential net
fiscal benefits (imputed benefits from public services minus tax burden) being realized by
citizens depending on the fiscal capacities of their place of residence. Thus, resource
allocation would be inefficient, because people in their relocation decisions would compare
gross income (private income plus net fiscal benefits minus cost of moving) at new locations,
whereas economic efficiency considerations warrant comparing private income minus
moving cost. In this case, the national government should have a role in correcting such a
fiscal inefficiency;
Regional (Horizontal) Equity - Differential net fiscal benefits across various jurisdictions also
lead to unequal treatment of citizens with identical private incomes depending on their place
of residence. This is because their after−tax income inclusive of NFB would be different
depending on their residence. Likewise, this calls for the national government to play a role
in dealing with these fiscal inequities;
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Redistributive Role - The national government has a redistributive role, exercised through a
tax and transfer system or through the joint provision of such public services as education
and health; it may also provide compensatory grants to cover the spillovers of benefits from
provincial−level services;
Provision of Quasi−Private Goods - Public provision of quasi- private services (e.g. health and
education) is justified on grounds of equity; since benefits accrue mainly to residents of
separate jurisdictions, such services would be better provided by subnational governments –
while national government's involvement is limited to ensuring horizontal equity and
minimum standards of service in all jurisdictions; and
Spending Power - In a federation, there is always some degree of conflict among priorities
established by various levels of government; one way to induce lower level governments to
follow priorities set by the higher level government is for the higher level government to use
its spending power or what is known as “powers of the purse.”
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Based on the abovementioned fiscal federalism principles, Shah (1994) constructed a conceptual
basis in the assignment of expenditures for major public services, as follow:
Table 1. Conceptual Basis of Expenditure Assignment
B.2. Implications of Expenditure Assignment for TVET in a Federal Philippines.
Assignment of TVET Expenditure to National Government. Historically in the Philippines,
the function of education (which is categorized into basic, higher and technical/vocational or
“TVET”) falls under the jurisdiction of the national government. In the case of TVET, the national
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agency mandated to oversee its governance is the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA).
A study by Orbeta (2016) indicates that 33 per cent of TVET financing came from the
general appropriation allocation (GAA) by the national government, 29 per cent from trainees’
fees, 23 per cent from private firms and non-government organizations (NGOs) and 14 per cent
from the local government units (LGUs). In 2010, the share of the national government in TVET
financing increased to 51 per cent (Syjuco, 2010).
It must be recalled that the Local Government Code of 1991 has devolved to the local
government units 4 government functions, namely: agriculture, health, environment and social
services. In spite of this development, the national government has continued to dominate
government spending in the Philippines.
Prior to the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991, the national
government accounted for 87 per cent of general government expenditures net of debt service,
while the LGUs’ share was 13 per cent. In 2015, the national government’s share in the general
government expenditures net of debt service was 83 per cent, while the LGUs’ share accounted
for 17 per cent. Thus, more than two decades later since the passage of the Code, nothing much
has changed in the government’s spending pattern (Manasan, 2017).
The Challenge of Shifting TVET Expenditure to Local Government Units. Given the
historical spending ratio between the national and local government units, it would be
challenging for the national government to decentralize TVET as an expenditure function, if and
when the Philippine shifts to a federal system.
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In the next section, data will be presented to support the claim that despite the passage of
the Local Government Code of 1991, the local government units (LGUs) have not really stepped
up to maximize taxation powers granted them by the Code. In other words, the LGUs’ weak
revenue generation capacity has stifled their self-reliance to deliver public goods and services in
their jurisdictions. The LGUs have remained over-dependent on the national government for
resources.
C. Revenue (Tax) Assignment
C.1. Principles
Reviewing the works of other authors, Manasan (2017) summed up the key principles in
assigning revenue powers to different levels of government under a federal system, namely: a)
economic efficiency, b) equity, c) administrative feasibility and d) revenue autonomy.
The economic efficiency criterion states that subnational taxes should be related to the
benefits that local taxpayers receive from local services. For example, taxes on immobile factors
(e.g., taxes on real property, local business) are appropriately assigned to subnational
governments while taxes on international and inter-jurisdictional trade are best assigned to the
federal government.
On the other hand, equity considerations indicate that progressive taxes (e.g., taxes on
personal income and wealth) are best assigned to the federal government. Meanwhile, the
administrative feasibility criterion prescribes that taxes are best assigned to the jurisdiction that
is able to collect said taxes more efficiently, in terms of both collection and compliance costs.
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Lastly, the revenue autonomy criterion provides that each level of government must be
assigned sources of “own” revenues whose level they have the power to control at the margin.
This implies that voters can hold their elected officials more accountable if local public services
are financed to a significant extent from locally imposed taxes, as opposed to where financing is
primarily done through national government transfers.
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Based on the abovementioned fiscal federalism principles, Shah (1994) formulated the following
conceptual matrix for tax assignment:
Table 2. Conceptual basis for tax assignment
C.2. Implications of Revenue (Tax) Assignment for a Decentralized TVET in Federal
Philippines
Weak revenue generation at the local level. Despite the passage of the Local Government
Code of 1991, revenue autonomy at the local government level has remained weak as evidenced
by a low “local tax- to-GDP ratio” and own-source revenue or “OSR-to-GDP ratio” of all local
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government units or LGUs – i.e. comprising all provinces, cities/municipalities, and villages in
the aggregate.
According to a study done by Manasan (2017), the improvement in the OSR effort of LGUs
under the Local Government Code of 1991 is fairly modest, with own-source revenues (OSR) for
all LGUs in the aggregate increasing only by a slim margin, from 0.7 per cent of GDP for the period
1985 to 1991, as compared to 1.2 per cent of GDP for the period 1992 to 2016. Undoubtedly, the
LGUs have continued to rely heavily on fiscal transfers from the national government, particularly
the internal revenue allotment (IRA) which was provided for in the Local Government Code of
1991.
According to Manasan (2017, pages 13-14), the foregoing problem is attributed to the
“limited local taxing authority particularly with respect to rate setting, limited revenue
productivity of assigned local tax bases, and less than optimal utilization of local taxing powers
by LGU officials.” For example, although the Local Government Code of 1991 has raised the
ceiling rate for real property taxation at the provincial level from 0.5% to 1%, the Code removed
the power of municipalities to impose such tax, thus maintaining the effective real property tax
rate in municipalities at the pre - 1991 level. Moreover, out of 11 taxes collected by LGUs as
mandated by the Code, only two have significant impact in revenue generation, namely, real
property tax (RPT) and local business tax.
Poor implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991. Further, earlier studies
indicate that LGUs have not fully maximized the utilization of local taxing powers assigned to
them under the Local Government Code of 1991. For example, a high percentage of cities have
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not revised their local tax codes since 1992 despite the fact that rates of some taxes are not
indexed to inflation. This problem is due to the resistance of some local executives/ politicians to
increase tax rates in their jurisdictions for fear of backlash from voters during election. In
addition, many LGUs have weak institutional capacity as evidenced by inadequate staffing and
non-computerization of tax data base (Manasan, 2017).
Local government units (LGUs) in the Philippines derive their revenues from local and
external sources. Local sources include tax revenues from real property tax and business tax,
while non-tax revenues come from fees and charges, receipts from government business
operations and proceeds from sale of assets. External sources, on the other hand, include the
internal revenue allotment (IRA) which are cash transfers from the national government as
mandated by the Local Government Code of 1991, and other shares from special laws, grants and
borrowings.
Data from the national Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) indicate that locally sourced
income of 70 per cent of LGUs in the aggregate accounted for less than 15 per cent of their regular
income in 2015. Thus, it can be concluded that more than two decades of decentralization under
the Local Government Code of 1991 has failed to develop the LGUs’ fiscal capacity to raise locally-
sourced income. Consequently, LGUs have remained over-dependent on transfer payments (i.e.
internal revenue allotments or IRA) from the national government (National Tax Research
Center, 2016).
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VII. TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING (TVET)
A. Importance of TVET
Definition of TVET. The term “Technical and Vocational Education and Training” (TVET) is
defined by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2006,
p.15) as “aspects of the educational process involving, in addition to general education, the study
of technologies and related sciences, and the acquisition of practical skills, attitudes,
understanding and knowledge relating to occupants in various sectors of economic and social
life.” TVET is delivered through formal or informal instruction in public and private learning
institutions.
Different terminologies have been used to describe essential elements of TVET, such as:
Apprenticeship Training, Vocational Education, Technical Education, Technical-Vocational
Education (TVE), Occupational Education (OE), Vocational Education and Training (VET), Career
and Technical Education (CTE), Workforce Education (WE) and Workplace Education (WE).
However, participants at the world congress held in Seoul in 1999 decided that the most
comprehensive term to use is “Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) (UNESCO,
2006).
Role of TVET in Economic Development and Poverty Alleviation. According to the Asian
Development Bank (2009a), TVET contributes to “productivity, poverty alleviation and
development of human capital in the region.” TVET promotes economic growth by enhancing
productivity at the individual, enterprise, and national level. Higher individual and enterprise
productivity lead to increased competitiveness and employment, or in a shift of employment
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from low to higher productivity sectors. As economies move from agricultural production to
manufacturing and service industries, workers and enterprises must be able to adapt and acquire
new skills (i.e. technical, entrepreneurial, and social). Inability to learn new skills for the
workforce slows the transfer of all factors of production from lower to higher value-added
economic activities.
B. Current TVET System in the Philippines.
Locating TVET in the Philippines’ Education Sector. Education in the Philippines is provided by
public and private schools, colleges, universities, and technical and vocational institutions.
Funding for public education comes from the national government. At the basic education level,
the Department of Education sets the overall educational standards and oversees the
implementation of the “K to 12” basic education system. By law, education is compulsory for
thirteen years (kindergarten and grades 1–12) which are categorized into three levels:
elementary school (kindergarten to grade 6), junior high school (grades 7 to 10), and senior high
school (grades 11 to 12).
At the higher education level, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) supervises and
regulates colleges and universities while TESDA oversees TVET governance in the country.
(Department of Education, 2017).
TVET Legal Mandate. The Philippine Constitution of 1987 provides for the right of every
Filipino to education. Republic Act No. 7796 (also known as the Technical Education and Skills
Development Act 1994) provides the legal basis for the creation of the TESDA. Every five years,
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TESDA is required to prepare the “National Technical Education and Skills Development Plan”
(NTESDP) which sets out a course of action for all relevant TVET stakeholders (TESDA, 2018a).
Classification of TVET Programs. There are three delivery modes for the implementation
of TVET in the Philippines: centre-based, community- based and enterprise-based. Centre- based
programs are delivered by TESDA through its network of 120+ schools and training institutions
nationwide. Community-based training is conducted in coordination with local government units
(LGUs) and non-government organizations (NGOs). The third category is the enterprise-based
training which includes apprenticeship and the Dual Training System (DTS) that range from three
to six months. Apprenticeships can only be offered by TESDA-accredited private firms.
In 2014, center-based training accounted for 51 per cent of TVET enrollment. A close
second (46 per cent) was community-based training, while enterprise-based programs accounted
for only a very small proportion of total training programs implemented (3 per cent) (Orbeta,
2016).
TVET Governance. The highest policy making body is the 22-member TESDA Board chaired
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and with representations from the government,
private firms and workers’ organizations. The Director-General is the chief executive officer of
the agency. At the central office, there are seven bureaus which comprise the national
secretariat. Moreover, TESDA maintains regional offices whose directors report directly to the
Director-General. Under the jurisdiction of the regional offices are provincial and district offices.
TESDA operates its own network of schools nationwide. As of 2015, TESDA administers
122 training institutes (TTIs) consisting of 16 regional training centers (RTCs), 45 provincial
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training centers (PTCs), 18 agricultural schools, 7 fishery schools, 31 trade schools and 5
specialized institutions. Below is TESDA’s organizational structure (TESDA, 2018b).
Table 3. TESDA Table of Organization (2018)
Source: TESDA (2018)
TVET Financing. A study by Orbeta (2016) found that in 2008, 33 per cent of TVET
financing came from the general appropriation allocation (GAA) by the national government, 29
per cent from trainees’ fees, 23 per cent from private firms and non-government organizations
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(NGOs) and 14 per cent from the local government units (LGUs). In 2010, the share of the
national government in TVET financing increased to 51 per cent (Syjuco, 2010).
Philippine TVET Qualification and Certification System (PTQCS). This system ensures that
TVET graduates and skilled workers have the necessary competency to perform the tasks
consistent with the required standards in the workplace. It involves the process of gathering
evidence to prove possession of competencies according to industry standards. The two types of
competency assessment are the National Certificate (NC) and Certificate of Competency (CO).
Quality Assurance. TESDA enforces a “Unified TVET Program Registration and
Accreditation System” (UTPRAS), a regulatory mechanism by which TVET programs are quality-
assured. All TVET providers are required to comply with a set of standards in curriculum design,
qualification of trainers, facilities and tools and equipment. Training regulations are being
developed in consultation with industry leaders and promulgated by the TESDA Board.
TESDA Accomplishments. In 2017, the TVET sector recorded a total of 2.3 million
enrollees where community-based training accounts for the largest share (51 per cent) with 1.2
million enrollees (51%), followed by Institution-based training with 1.1 million enrollees (46%)
and enterprise-based- training with 73,300 enrollees (3%) (TESDA, 2018b).
C. Existing TVET System in Federal Countries
Models of Decentralized TVET in Federal Countries. Given the context of this paper which is
the proposed shift by the Philippine Government from the current unitary to a federal system, it
is important to examine the policy implications of such a shift on the governance of TVET in the
country. Specifically, this paper will examine how federal countries decentralize their TVET
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system by asking this question: Which TVET sub-functions are assigned to what level of
government?
This paper will examine TVET institutional arrangements in 8 federal countries using an
analytical framework called “Comparative Institutional Analysis” (CIA), a detailed description of
which is presented in the section on Methodology. Such analysis can provide evidence for
effective public policies in the decentralization of TVET in the Philippines.
Moreover, this paper is informed by a similar study done by the British Council (2017) which
analyzed the assignment of TVET sub-functions between national and subnational governments
in the United Kingdom. The British Council report identified 4 TVET sub-functions, namely: 1)
planning and policy-setting, 2) regulatory/ enforcement of quality standards, 3) funding and
contracting, and 4) provision or delivery of TVET training services to clients. This paper adopts
the same categories of TVET sub-functions as basis for analyzing TVET systems in the 8 sample
federal countries.
UNESCO TVET World Database. The source of data for TVET analysis are the country
profiles found in the “World Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Database” -
an online repository developed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). The 8 country TVET profiles chosen for this study are Pakistan, India and
Australia (Asia-Pacific region); Nigeria and South Africa (Africa); Canada (North America); and
Brazil and Mexico (South America).
Based on the foregoing TVET data by country, we were able to determine the assignment
of specific TVET sub-functions by level of government. To the extent possible, concerned
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government agencies by level of government were identified. Then, this information was
formatted in table forms to reflect where a particular TVET sub-function is assigned: national,
subnational or shared between the two levels of government. Below are tables representing our
analysis of TVET system by country (UNESCO, 2017).
Table 4. Pakistan TVET System
TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government
Policy-Setting & Planning National Vocational & Technical Commission (NAVTTC)
Provinces may or may not adopt national policies and set their own
Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards
NAVTTC provides national guidelines
Devolved authority at subnational, through Technical Education and Vocational Authorities (TEVTAS) & Provincial Exam and Certification Bodies
Funding & Contracting Support to provinces through transfer of payments
Provinces are primary sources of funding within own jurisdiction
Delivery of TVET Services Through (TEVTAS)
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Table 5. India TVET System
TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government
Policy-Setting & Planning Ministry of Human Resource Development; Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE)
Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards
National Skill Development Agency under MSDE; All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE)
Funding & Contracting MSDE; National Skill Development Fund
Delivery of TVET Services Industrial Training Institutes under the State Governments or Union Territory Administrations.
Table 6. Australia TVET System
TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government
Policy-Setting & Planning Department of Education & Training ; Council of Australian Governments; Australia Industry and Skills Council
State & Territory Governments plan for their respective jurisdictions
Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards
Department of Education & Training ; Australian Skills Quality Authority; Australian Industry and Skills Committee
Devolved to subnational governments in the case of Victoria and Western Australia
Funding & Contracting Department of Education and Training (increasing trend since 2012)
State Government Education Departments (decreasing trend since 2012)
Delivery of TVET Services TAFE Colleges & Institutes managed by State education authority
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Table 7. Nigeria TVET System
TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government
Policy-Setting & Planning Ministry of Education (MOE) & National Board for Technical Education (NBTE)
Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards
National Board for Technical Education
Funding/ Contracting Federal funding
State-level funding
Delivery of TVET Services Network of federally owned universities, polytechnics, technical colleges
State level through Innovation Enterprise Institutions (IEIs) and Vocational Enterprise Institutions (VEIs)
Table 8. South Africa TVET System
TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government
Policy-Setting & Planning Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET)
Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards
DHET & Quality Council for Trades and Occupations (QCTO)
Funding & Contracting National Skills Fund only for priority TVET skills
Provincial education departments fund and administer TVET colleges.
Delivery of TVET Services Provincial TVET colleges & institutes
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Table 9. Brazil TVET System
TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government
Policy-Setting & Planning Ministry of Education (MEC) in cooperation with the National Council for Education (NCE)
Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards
National Institute for Educational Studies ( Anisio Teixeira - Inep)
Funding/ Contracting National funding for network of TVET schools/ universities
State governments allocate funds but need support from federal government
Delivery of TVET Services MEC supports a network of federal universities, technical and agro-technical schools and technological education centers/
Department of Technical and Vocational Education in each State (26 states or subnational governments)
Table 10. Mexico TVET System
TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government
Policy-Setting & Planning Federal Ministry of Public Education or Secretaria de Educacion Publica (SEP)
State Ministry of Education
Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards
National Council for Normalization and Certification (CONOCER) under SEP
Funding & Contracting SEP & Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare
State governments allocate funds for TVET
Delivery of TVET Services Colegio Nacional de Educacion Profesional Tecnica (CONALEP) operates 300+ campuses nationwide
State Centers for Scientific and Technological Studies (CECyTE) and Institutes of Training for Work (ICAT)
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Table 11. Canada TVET System
TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government
Policy-Setting & Planning Provincial & territorial ministries of education
Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards
Provincial & territorial ministries of education
Funding/ Contracting Federal Government provides support to provinces/ territories thru cash transfers (equalization fund)
Provincial & territorial governments are primary sources of funding
Delivery of TVET Services For First Nations (on-reserve) only
Provincial & territorial ministries of education thru technical and vocational colleges/ institutes
VIII. METHODOLOGY
The conceptual framework devised by Shah (2014) on the assignment of expenditure and
revenue (tax) functions between the national and subnational governments serves as a
theoretical guide for this study. This paper is also informed by a study done by the British Council
(2017) which identified 4 TVET sub-functions in the UK and determined their assignment between
the federal and subnational governments. The secondary data used in this paper come from the
TVET country profiles published online by UNESCO (2017).
Further, this study employs an analytical framework called the Comparative Institutional
Analysis (CIA) model. According to Mintrom (2012, page 210), the CIA framework is “predicated
on the view that effective policy responses to current problems are most likely to be struck on
when policy design is closely informed by knowledge of actual working policy settings found
elsewhere.” He cited a classic research done by Chubb and Moe in the U.S. in 1990 to find out
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whether private schools produced better student outcomes, measured by test scores, than
traditional public schools. Based on their findings that private schools performed better at lower
cost, the researchers proposed a radical plan for the overhaul of the American public school
system.
Applying the CIA analytical tool for this study, this writer examines existing TVET
decentralization models in 8 federal countries in Asia-Pacific, North America, South America and
Africa. The analysis provides qualitative data that can inform the design of a decentralized TVET
in the Philippines under a federal system. It must be noted however, that this study provides a
cursory review of TVET systems in selected federal countries and is by no means, exhaustive. For
example, it does not determine political, social and economic factors that shape the development
of TVET system in these federal countries. In the same manner, a determination of key success
factors that could guide TVET decentralization in countries like the Philippines were not tackled
in this paper.
Further, TVET is such a complex sector that it is important to examine the relationships
and dynamics among public and private stakeholders to distill important lessons for an effective
policy formulation on TVET decentralization.
IX. FINDINGS / CONCLUSION
A. Patterns of TVET Decentralization in Selected Federal Countries
Data gathered from the analysis of TVET systems in 8 federal countries are summarized below:
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Table 12. Assignment of TVET Policy-Setting/Planning By Level of Government
Country National Government Subnational Government
Pakistan X X
India X
Australia X X
Nigeria X
South Africa X
Brazil X
Mexico X X
Canada X
Analysis: The majority of TVET systems included in this study (4 out of 8, or 50 per cent) assign
TVET policy-setting and planning solely to the national government; only 1 out of 8 (13 per cent)
assigns it solely to the sub-national governments (i.e. Canada); while 3 out of 8 (37 per cent)
assign it as a “shared sub-function” between the national and sub-national governments.
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Table 13. Assignment of TVET Regulatory/ Standard-Setting By Level of Government
Country National Government Subnational Government
Pakistan X X
India X
Australia X X
Nigeria X
South Africa X
Brazil X
Mexico X
Canada X
Analysis: The majority of TVET systems surveyed in this study (5 out of 8, or 63 per cent) assign
the regulatory and standard-setting sub-functions solely to the national government; only 1 out
of 8 (13 per cent) assigns them solely to the sub-national governments (i.e. Canada); while 2 out
of 8 (25 per cent) assign them as “shared sub-function” between the national and subnational
governments.
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Table 14. Assignment of TVET Funding/ Contracting By Level of Government
Country National Government Subnational Government
Pakistan X X
India X
Australia X X
Nigeria X X
South Africa X X
Brazil X X
Mexico X X
Canada X
Analysis: Only 1 out of 8 (13 per cent) of TVET systems surveyed assigns the sub-function of
funding and contracting TVET solely to the national government; likewise, only 1 out of 8 (13 per
cent) assigns it solely to the sub-national governments (i.e. Canada). The majority, or 6 out of 8
(75 per cent) assign it as a “shared sub-function” between the national and subnational
governments.
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Table 15. Assignment of Delivery/Provision of TVET Services By Level of Government
Country National Government Subnational Government
Pakistan X
India X
Australia X
Nigeria X X
South Africa X
Brazil X X
Mexico X X
Canada X
Analysis: None of the 8 TVET systems surveyed (0 per cent) assigns the provision or delivery of
TVET training services solely to the national government. The majority or 5 out of 8 (62 per cent)
assign this sub-function solely to the sub-national governments, while 3 out of 8 (38 per cent)
assign it as a “shared sub-function” between the national and subnational governments.
B. Summary of Findings
There is no single model in designing a decentralized TVET system in federal countries. An
analysis of TVET systems surveyed in this study shows that there are different ways of
decentralizing TVET in a federal setting. For example, subnational governments have assumed
greater responsibilities in managing TVET in countries like Pakistan and Australia. But in Brazil
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and India, the national government is assigned more powers in governing TVET, although some
sub-functions are shared with subnational governments. Then, Canada has the most
decentralized TVET system where provinces are solely responsible for TVET implementation in
their jurisdictions.
Policy-setting, planning and enforcement of a regulatory system are TVET sub-functions
commonly assigned to the national government. This observation is true for all the TVET systems
surveyed in this study, except for Canada. The importance of having a centralized TVET plan and
uniform set of policies across all jurisdictions can be attributed to the role of TVET in developing
countries, i.e. TVET being an essential component of national strategies for economic growth and
poverty alleviation (ADB, 2009b).
TVET funding/ contracting is generally a shared sub-function between the national and
subnational governments. While this is true in the 8 TVET systems surveyed, there are variations
on how the “sharing” of TVET financing is done across countries. For example, Pakistan’s
subnational governments are assigned greater responsibilities in funding TVET while the contrary
is true in Australia. Of the 8 countries surveyed, only Canada assigns TVET financing/contracting
solely to the subnational governments (with the exception of First Nations’ reserves). Education
in general is highly decentralized in Canada.
The delivery or provision of TVET services to clients is commonly assigned to the
subnational governments, but in some cases, may be shared with the national government. This
finding is consistent with Shah’s conceptual framework in assigning the provision or delivery of
educational services to subnational governments. Shah (1994) also suggests that education in
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general (with TVET being a sub-sector of education) is considered a quasi-private good which the
national government may provide on grounds of equity. Since benefits accrue mainly to residents
of separate jurisdictions, such services would be better provided by subnational governments.
IX. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, CONSULTATION, COMMUNICATION & IMPLEMENTATION
Status quo or Decentralization for TESDA? The Introduction section of this paper
established the context of this study, which is the Philippines’ impending shift to a federal system
and the subsequent need for policy study in determining government functions to be retained
by the national government, shared with or devolved to the subnational governments. In the
case of TVET, TESDA is the national agency mandated by law to oversee and manage TVET in the
Philippines.
In the course of our research, we were shown a position paper which TESDA Central Office
is considering to submit to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The paper proposes for
the elevation of TESDA from its current status as a “government- owned and controlled –
corporation” (GOCC) to a full-fledged Department with a Cabinet portfolio under the proposed
federal government, thereby expanding the organizational scope of TESDA.
Moreover, the position paper calls for TESDA to retain its current centralized structure,
with additional bureaus to upgrade the central office’s capacity to do secretariat functions and
retaining administrative supervision over the agency’s network of TVET schools and training
institutions nationwide. The paper states that TESDA should contribute to the country’s
economic development and poverty alleviation goals which it can only perform if TVET is retained
as a function solely of the national government.
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We disagree with the above-mentioned position of TESDA because it runs counter to the
very nature of federalism which in principle, favors granting of greater autonomy to subnational
governments. Instead of proposing that TESDA be elevated to a full-fledged Department under
the national government, the Agency should be asking the question -- How should it be
restructured following the principles of fiscal federalism and informed by examples of
decentralized TVET systems in federal countries? In other words, TESDA as a national agency
should be prepared to decentralize its power and resources in favor of subnational governments
that will be created under a federal system.
At the beginning of this paper, we posed 3 questions that hopefully can guide policy-
makers in designing a decentralized TVET system for the Philippines, namely:
a) What sub-functions of TESDA should be retained at the national level, and why?
b) What sub- functions should be assigned to subnational governments, and why?
c) What sub-functions should be concurrent or shared by both national and subnational
governments, and why?
A. Policy Recommendations
1) Retain the sub-functions of policy setting, planning and regulation of TVET at the national
level. By doing so, the Philippines would be adopting a model that is commonly practiced in
federal countries covered in this study. The underlying reason here is the need for a national
TVET framework plan and regulatory mechanism that will harmonize the provision of TVET
services across all jurisdictions. This approach reinforces the national government’s equity
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concerns as TVET is considered a crucial strategy to achieve economic development and poverty
alleviation in developing countries like the Philippines.
This is not to say however, that subnational governments should not be involved in the
planning of TVET in their respective jurisdictions. On the contrary, we believe that the current
practice of TESDA regional offices being asked by central office to formulate their respective
regional TVET plans for consolidation at the national level should continue. But the primary
responsibility of harmonizing TVET plans and policies for the country should remain with the
national government.
On the matter of TVET regulation, it is recommended that the national government retain
this TVET sub-function which is the common practice by the majority of the countries included in
this study. Having a uniform set of TVET regulatory guidelines and quality standards across all
jurisdictions would help the national government ensure the attainment of its economic
development and social equity goals.
2) Funding/ contracting for TVET can be a “shared function” by the national and
subnational governments. The majority of TVET systems included in this study assign the
financing/contracting sub-function to both the national and subnational governments. In the
Philippines, the local government units (LGUs) have not maximized their capacity to raise local
revenue despite the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991. Therefore, it might not be
feasible to expect the subnational governments to assume the responsibility of financing TVET
training services in the initial stage of federalism in the Philippines.
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In addition to the general appropriation allocation (GAA) which is the dominant source of
public sector funding for TVET, the national and subnational governments could explore new and
innovative financing schemes, such as:
- Piggyback TVET expenditure on the existing Special Education Fund (SEF). Local
government units (LGUs) in the Philippines have access to the Special Education Fund
(SEF), a sustainable mechanism intended by law to augment financing for the basic
education sub-sector. The SEF comes from an additional 1 per cent tax on real
property that LGUs are mandated to impose and collect under the Local Government
Code of 1991. The SEF is intended primarily for the “construction, repair, and
maintenance of school buildings and other facilities of public elementary and
secondary schools” (Orbeta, 2016).
A study in 2008 found that there was a relatively large surplus in the SEF. In 2006,
the surplus was 30 percent of SEF collections nationwide. (Manasan et al, 2011). This
unexpended SEF represents resources that could have been put to better use in the
education sector. Thus, decision makers could determine if it would be feasible to
divert these surpluses to finance TVET. There might be a need however, to amend
the Local Government Code to make a portion of SEF accessible for TVET financing.
- Establish a TVET Training Fund similar to other federal countries. Other countries have
set up a TVET Training Fund outside the normal budgetary channel. Some training
funds are financed by levies (taxes) on enterprises. For example, South Africa has
established a National Skills Fund (NSF) financed by a levy mandated by the Skills
Development Act. All employers who have an annual payroll of more than 250,000
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rand are required to pay 1 per cent of their total payroll to the NSF. Subsequently, 80
per cent of these funds are distributed back to skills education and training authorities
and the remaining 20 per cent are paid into the fund (UNESCO, 2014). Policy-makers
should study if this financing option is applicable to TVET in the Philippines.
3) Provision or delivery of TVET training services can initially be a “shared function”
between the two levels of government; however, as the subnational governments improve their
administrative and fiscal capacity under a federal system, this sub-function can be solely assigned
to them. The majority of TVET systems surveyed in this study assign this sub-function solely to
the subnational governments, although there are a few cases when this sub-function is “shared”
between the two levels of government.
This paper recommends that in the early stage of federalism in the Philippines, this
particular sub-function should be shared between the national and subnational governments.
This is because TESDA continues to fund and administer a network of over a hundred training
centers/ institutions nationwide, and it will take time for these training facilities to be devolved
or assigned to the subnational governments. Another concern is the prevailing weak capacity at
the local government level to generate revenue and administer public institutions. Thus, it might
not be feasible for the national government to abandon at once its current responsibility in the
provision of TVET training services.
However, the long-term goal should be to upgrade the financing and administrative
capacity of the subnational governments to provide TVET services in their jurisdictions. This
recommendation is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity which prescribes that public
43 | P a g e
services with no or little benefit / spill-over should be assigned to the subnational level of
government.
B. Consultation Strategy The policy recommendations of this study shall be presented to representatives of various
TVET stakeholders such as TESDA (central and regional offices), partner government agencies,
industry boards, accredited TESDA private training providers and clients. There are presently
ongoing government–sponsored consultation workshops on federalism and these assemblies can
be appropriate platforms as well for TESDA to use for consultations purposes. The purpose of
consultation is to engage these stakeholders so they can validate the findings of this study and
through a consensual process, arrive at some kind of agreement on which policy
recommendations to move forward.
C. Communication Strategy
The key messages to be communicated among TVET stakeholders during he consultation
process shall include: the importance of undertaking an evidence-based policy process in
designing a decentralized TVET system for a federal Philippines; key principles of fiscal federalism;
current models of TVET system in selected federal countries to inform the policy process; an
assessment of the current TVET sector in the Philippines, and the key policy recommendations
set forth in this study.
Targeted audience includes: TESDA officials and stakeholders, lawmakers, Office of the
President of the Philippines, firms/ industry boards involved in TVET and the general public.
TESDA can use various platforms in communicating its policy recommendations such as: personal
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briefings to government officials, town halls, social media (mainly facebook and twitter) and
traditional media composed of print, radio and TV.
D) Implementation Strategy
TESDA may draft an executive order (E.O) embodying the key policy recommendations of
this study to be submitted to the Office of the President of the Philippines, or any designated
agency tasked to re-organize the executive branch under a federal system. It is also crucial that
members of the House of Representatives and Senate be provided a copy of the draft E.O. as
they will be involved in passing a law on the re-organization of the bureaucracy, if and when the
country shifts to a federal system.
Further, TESDA stakeholders in the private sector (e.g. industry boards, private training
institutions and NGOs) may engage in some form of policy advocacy to push for the
implementation of this paper’s policy recommendations.
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